Thayer US Air Sea Battle Concept and China's Asymmetric Challenges to Maritime Security in the South China Sea

7/28/2019 Thayer US Air Sea Battle Concept and China's Asymmetric Challenges to Maritime Security in the South China Sea

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PANEL 321sT CENTURY SEA POWER AND GLOBALMARITIME LEADERSHIP

CARLYLE A.THAYERCarlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra .Professor Thayer was educated at Brown (A.B., political science), Yale (M.A.Southeast Asian Studies) and ANU (PhD, international relations). He beganhis career at the UNSW and taught first at The Royal Military CollegeDuntroon (1979-85) before t ransferring to ADFA (1986-2010). His careerincludes senior appointments to The Australian National University (199295); the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii (1999-2002);Centre fo r Defence and Strategic Studies, Austral ian Defence College (200204); and the Austral ian Command and Staff College (2006-07 and 2010). Hewas appointed the c.v. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School ofAdvanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University in 2005 and theInaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor

at Ohio University (2008). Professor Thayer is the author of over 450 publications including, "China'sNew Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea," The International Journal of ChinaStudies, 2(3), 2011; "The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia'sAutonomy?," in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough, eds., Strategic Asia 2011-12: AsiaResponds to its Rising Powers-China and India (2011) and Southeast Asia: Patterns of SecurityCooperation (2010).


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American Grand Strategy: Power and Purpose in the 21st

Century

64th

Current Strategy Forum

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

June 18-19, 2013

Panel 3: 21st

Century Sea Power and Global Maritime Leadership

The U.S. AirSea Battle Concept and

Chinas Asymmetric Challenges to Maritime Security in the South China Sea

Carlyle A. Thayer1

Introduction

This presentation is in two parts. Part 1 critically reviews the U.S. AirSea Battle Concept,

while Part 2 analyses Chinas asymmetric challenges to maritime security in the South

China Sea and the implications for Southeast Asia and U.S. alliance relations. The paper

concludes with a discussion of the U.S. and maritime leadership.

Part 1. AirSea Battle Concept

This section presents the findings of a Strategy Reportby the Australian Strategic Policy

Institute (ASPI), a Department of Defence-funded think tank, entitled, Planning the

Unthinkable War: Air-Sea Battle and Its Implications for Australia.2

This report was

published in April 2013 before the release of Australias 2013 Defence White Paper (May

3) and the Air-Sea Battle Offices Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-

Access & Area Denial Challenges (May 12). The views of the ASPI report do not

represent the official views of the Australian Government or its Department of Defence.

1Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy,

Canberra and Director, Thayer Consultancy.2Benjamin Schreer, Planning the Unthinkable War: Air-Sea Battle and Its Implications for Australia,

Strategy Report(Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013).

http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=356&pubtype=5.
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=356&pubtype=5http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=356&pubtype=5http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=356&pubtype=5


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The Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access & Area Denial

Challenges notes that the AirSea Battle (ASB) is a limited objective concept; it is not an

operational plan or a strategy for a specific region or adversary. It deals with global Anti-

Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies. It aims at reducing risk, preserving the U.S.

ability to project power and maintain freedom of action in the global commons. ASB

provides a range of options to counter aggression. At the low end of the conflict

spectrum, the ASB Concept enables decision-makers to maintain freedom of action,

conduct a show of force, or conduct limited strikesand engage with partners to assure

access. At the high end of the conflict spectrum the ASB concept preserves the ability to

defeat aggression and maintain escalation advantage despite the challenges posed by

advanced weapons systems.

U.S. investment in the capabilities identified in the ASB Concept seeks to assure allies

and partners, and demonstrate the U.S. will not retreat from, or submit to, potential

aggressors who would otherwise try and deny the international community the right to

international waters and airspace. ASB Concept is combined with security assistance

programs and other whole-of-government efforts.

ASPI Report

The ASPI Report notes that the Air-Sea Battle is an operational concept that aims to

deter and if necessary defeat the Chinese military. The ASPI Report also asserts that

Chinas military modernization has already changed the military balance of power in its

near seas, especially in the Taiwan Strait. The ASB aims to defeat Chinas A2/AD

strategies by withstanding an initial attack, and then conduct a blinding campaign

against Chinas command and control networks; a missile suppression campaign against

land-based systems; and a distant blockade against Chinese merchant ships. The ASB is

based on the assumption that escalation can be kept below the nuclear threshold.

Finally, the ASPI Report states that Japan and Australia will be active allies throughout

the ASB campaign.


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The ASPI Report argues that the ASB should be welcomed because it strengthens U.S.

conventional deterrence against China by developing a concept for operations in

maritime zones contested by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). ASB could make a

contribution to regional stability by promoting deterrence in U.S.-China strategic

relations.

The ASPI Report then offers this criticism: leaving aside funding questions, the biggest

concerns about ASB are strategic. ASB is widely viewed as a U.S. effort to contain China

in spite of repeated U.S. denials. For example, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations Admiral

Jonathan Greenert stated that ASB is a centerpiece of the Navys pivot to Asia. The ASPI

Report notes that it is unclear how ASB fits within a broader U.S. grand strategic

framework to address Chinas military rise. According to the ASPI Report in fighting

China there are no good options. Conflict will lead to stalemate. The ASB fails to spell

out the relationship between ASB and U.S. political objectives.

Yesterday one of the speakers at the Current Strategy Forum raised the the dichotomy

ofwrestling or dancing with China. In my view, regional states do not want to have to

make a choice, either the U.S. or China. They want a U.S. grand strategy that enables

them to develop relations with both.

The ASPI Report notes that the ASB is optimized for high-intensity conventional war

between Chia and the U.S. and its allies. It applies only in three extreme cases: a Chinese

attack on Taiwan; missile attacks on Japan or US military bases in East Asia; or sinking of

a U.S. air craft carrier. ASB, therefore, faces the challenge of potential nuclear

escalation. U.S. deep penetrating attacks on the Chinese mainland to disrupt PLA

command and control nodes could provoke a disproportionate Chinese response. China

might perceive such attacks as undermining its nuclear deterrent and miscalculate by

taking pre-emptive action including nuclear escalation.

The ASB Concept implementation includes: conducting engagement activities to build

conceptual alignment and partner capacity and to strengthen relationships to assure

access to multiple domains in the event conflict occurs. But the ASB does not address


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more likely scenarios such as Chinese coercive actions in territorial disputes in the South

China Sea (discussed below).

The ASPI Report offers these snapshots of the role of frontline U.S. allies.

Japan. Japan is a key enabler of ASB. Japan is not particularly concerned about

entrapment in its alliance with the United States. .Japan can augment U.S. forces in

selected mission areas, particularly submarine and air-based anti-submarine warfare

(ASW); maritime ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance); maritime strike,

defensive escort, and ballistic missile defence (BMD). Japan is in the initial phase of

shifting towards complementarity in ASB and they have a direct interest in ASBs

success.

South Korea. To the Republic of Korea (ROK) the ASB presents an unwanted risk of being

drawn into conflict with China. South Korean territory could be targeted by China

against U.S. forces. Nonetheless, the ROK is concerned over potential Chinese

dominance in Northeast Asia and is developing a blue water navy. The ROK is concerned

at being drawn into cooperation with Japan. The ASPI Report concludes that it is unlikely

the ROK will offer its support for ASB unless relations with China deteriorate.

Taiwan. A China-U.S. war over Taiwan is at the heart of ASB. Taiwan is the centerpiece

of Chinas counter-intervention or A2/AD strategy. Therefore Taiwan can be expected to

play a key role in ASB. Taiwan is moving to a more asymmetric defence posture to deny

the PLA approaches to the island.

Australia. Australia is not a front line state but is viewed as a preferred U.S. partner, and

reliable political ally. It is located in a favourable geostrategic position, and the

Australian Defence Force (ADF) is of high standard. Australia also provides: strategic

depth. U.S. Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and U.S. long-range strike aircraft

located at Australian facilities could be integral part of operations in Southeast Asia.

Australia could contribute to rear guard actions and provide niche capabilities for

forward deployed U.S. troops such as: tanker aircraft, Airborne Early Warning and

Control, airborne Electronic Warfare, long-range strike capability, offensive strike


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operations in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, and contributions to peripheral

campaigns including maritime interdiction of Chinese merchant and energy shipping.

But, the ASPI Report argues, fully embracing the logic behind AirSea Battle or

developing specific military capabilities to underpin the concepts implementation are

so far not in Australias interests. Why? Because it sends a strong message to China

that ADF is actively planning and equipping for a potential war with the PLA. Australia

prefers a U.S. Grand Strategy aimed at integrating China into a cooperative Asian

security order.

The ASPI Report also raises questions regarding the costs to Australia of developing

interoperability for the ASB. Australias2013 Defence White Paper, issued after the ASPI

Report, called for the procurement of twelve Australian designed and built follow-on

Collins class conventional submarines with strike capacity; twelve Boeing EA-18 Growler

fighters; seventy-two Lockheed Martin stealth Joint Strike Fighters; two new Australian-

built supply ships; and 24 new Australian-built patrol boats. But neither the Government

nor the Opposition have indicated where funding will come from.

The ASPI Report makes the following recommendations: Australia should call on the US

to develop an Asia-Pacific strategy to provide an overarching grand strategic context for

AirSea Battle The US should provide a clear message on how it intends to deal with

Chinas growing military power and what role AirSea battle will play.

The ASPI Report argues, There is no need for the government or Defence to publicly

endorse AirSea Battle.. At this point we dont have an interest in signaling to China that

the ADF is preparing for a future military conflict with the PLA. In the [unlikely] event of

a war with China, Australia could not only provide the US with greater strategic depth

but also contribute ADF military niche capabilities without having officially signed up for

AirSea Battle. Australia also should seek clarification of the role MAGTF and U.S. Air

Force elements rotating through bases in Australia would plan in a future AirSea Battle

context. How would they be used in event of conflict between China and the United


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States? Nonetheless, Australia should study the implications of integration of the ADF

into a Southeast Asia AirSea Battle framework operating with US forces.

Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia becomes more prominent in ASB as part of a distant

blockade to cut Chinas sea lines of communication (SLOC) by controlling chokepoints

and anti-submarine barrier from the Ruyuku islands to Luzon Strait, the Philippines

islands to southern exits of South China Sea.

According to the ASPI Report, regional states look to U.S. for support as part of hedging

strategies against a more assertive China but do not want to be roped into over battle

planning against China. It is also unclear how ASB would apply to territorial disputes

with China.

The ASPI Report offers these snapshots of prospective ASB partners:

The Philippines. The Philippines can offer facilities and access to bases to be used by

U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marines to stage operations in the South China Sea. The

Philippines is building up A2/AD capabilities from a very low base and in present

circumstances there is not much else that the could contribute to ASB.

Singapore. The Singapore Government would think twice before committing to ASB and

giving operational consent that could involve Singapore in major war with China. If the

strategic environment deteriorated Singapore would become more an important U.S.

partner. It presently hosts Littoral Combat Ships and its navy and air force could play a

supporting role.

Vietnam. Vietnam is building up its own A2/AD capabilities through force

modernization. Vietnam would be reluctant to move too close to the U.S. overtly and is

therefore unlikely to offer access to facilities or bases.

Indonesia. Indonesias geostrategic location ideally places it to play a role in ASB as part

of a distant blockade.

The ASPI Report summarizes the position of the non-frontline states in Southeast Asia as

providing less potential support for ASB than the frontline states in Northeast Asia.


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Southeast Asian states, the Report argues, are most reluctant to support a concept that

could lead to rapid escalation. In their view, territorial disputes in the South China Sea

do not warrant a major war with China.

Chinas Asymmetric Challenges in the South China Sea

This section reviews Chinas A2/AD strategy in the South China Sea. Chinese capabilities

in the South China Sea would certainly be targeted in an ASB campaign.

The South Sea Fleet headquarters at Zhanjing, Guangdong province. forms the central

hub of a major complex of strategic space and tactical long-range radars and

communications to support operations in the South China Sea. These electronic systems

link Woody Island, Fiery Cross Reef and other Chinese-occupied features with local and

fleet commanders. Also, they are augmented by the combat and other electronic

systems of PLA Navy (PLAN) warships, aircraft and paramilitary vessels.

One of China very first high-powered very low frequency (VLF) stations was built at

Yalong Naval Base near Sanya on Hainan Island to communicate with submarine and

surface ships. Hainan Island houses several electronic intelligence (ELINT) installations.

The PLAN stations several major surface combatants, amphibious landing craft, and

conventional and nuclear submarines at Yalong. Continued construction indicates that

Yalong will be able to accommodate larger advanced surface combatants such as assault

ships, attack and ballistic missile submarines, and eventually one or more aircraft

carriers.

Continued construction at Yalong suggest that it will be a major military base that will

provide China with the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea

and beyond. The Yalong Naval Base will also provide China with a forward presence to

protect its SLOCs through the Malacca and Singapore Straits or alternatively, disrupt

adversary transit via these SLOCs.

Satellite imagery has confirmed the presence of a single Chinese Type 094 Jin-class

nuclear submarine at Yalong since late 2007. The Type-094 is a second-generation

nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and represents Chinas most lethal


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naval strike weapon. This marks the first permanent deployment on an SSBN to Chinas

South Sea Fleet. Five more Chinese Jin-class SSBNs are expected to become operational

in coming years and Yalong is expected to become their home base.

China regularly conducts major naval exercises to showcase the growing prowess of the

PLAN. Chinese naval exercises in the East China Sea in October 2012 involved PLAN

warships exercising with the paramilitary vessels from the China Marine Surveillance

(CMS) and the Fishery Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). A total of eleven ships and

eight aircraft took part.3

A statement issued by the PLAN East Sea Fleet noted, This

exercise will simulate a situation where foreign law enforcement vessels obstruct and

interfere with our maritime surveillance and fisheries administration vessels on a

mission to safeguard maritime rights and enforce the law. In this exercise the East Sea

Fleet responded by dispatching a frigate, hospital ship, tugboat and advanced fighters

and helicopters for support, cover and emergency rescue.4

In late June 2012, Chinas

Ministry of Defence, revealed that China had commenced combat-ready patrols in

disputed waters in the South China Sea.

PLAN exercises can be viewed as a demonstration by China that it is now capable of

deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. The implications are clear: China

is developing the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly archipelago

and further south for longer periods. This is a significant development because up to

now the PLAN has played a relatively low-key behind-the-scenes role in South China Sea

incidents. Chinas surveillance patrols have been mainly conducted by ships belonging to

the CMS force or the FLEC.

Developments on Hainan have been paralleled by Chinas construction activities in the

Paracel islands. The airstrip on Woody Island can accommodate fighter aircraft such as

the Su-27 and Su-30MKKs, H-6 bombers and large supply transport aircraft. Other

3East China Sea tension: China conducts naval exercises, BBC News Asia, October 19, 2012.

4 Ariel Zirulnick, Chinas naval exercises in East China Sea send warning to regional rivals, The Christian

Science Monitor, October 19, 2012.


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military infrastructure on Woody Island includes naval docks capable of accommodating

frigates and destroyers and a fuel depot. Open sources report that China may have

stationed the HY-2 anti-ship cruise missile on Woody Island.5

China established its military presence in the South China Sea by force of arms. In

January 1974 it seized the western Paracels from the Republic of Vietnam after a naval

engagement. In March 1988, Chinese naval forces attacked communist Vietnamese

naval forces and marines and occupied Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands. China

seized Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995 by landing there and building

structures. The facilities on Mischief Reef have since been upgraded with the

construction of two new piers, a helicopter pad, a marine navigation radar, several anti-

aircraft guns and an anti-ship cruise missile system (either the HY-2 or C-801).

In sum, China has developed an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims

over the South China Sea and protect its vital SLOCs through the Malacca and Singapore

Straits as well as the capacity to surge expeditionary forces into the South China Sea

from these bases with a considerably shortened logistics tail. By extension, China will

also have the capacity to interdict the same SLOCs on which Japan, Taiwan and South

Korea are dependent. These developments portend a greater Chinese capacity to assert

regional influence and to challenge U.S. naval supremacy.

Chinas Paramilitary Fleets. Chinas maritime surveillance fleet is estimated at more than

300 vessels only two of which, the Haixun 11 and Haixun 31, weigh more than 3,000

tons. In October 2010, China announced it would build thirty-six new China Marine

Surveillance (CMS) vessels for maritime law enforcement over the next five years. In

May 2011, the CMS announced it would recruit 1,000 more law enforcement officials,

bringing its total to over 10,000 personnel. And in June 2011, China announced plans to

expand its maritime surveillance force to sixteen aircraft and a total of 350 vessels by

2015. In late July 2012 China launched the Haixun 01, weighing 5,418 tons. This is

Chinas largest and most capable ship in its maritime surveillance fleet.

5Bill Geertz, Woody Island Missiles, The Washington Times, June 15, 2001.


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In recent years China has mounted an asymmetric threat to the sovereignty of the

Philippines (and also Vietnam) by engaging in legal warfare promulgating laws and

regulations that justify so-called normal sovereignty enforcement missions by its

paramilitary fleets. These now operate hand in hand with civilian fishing fleets.

In April 2012, when the Philippines attempted to arrest Chinese poachers caught in

Scarborough Reef, China prevented their arrest by interposing CMS and Fishery Law

Enforcement Command (FLEC) vessels. A standoff quickly developed. The U.S. played a

behind-the-scenes diplomatic role in getting both sides to agree to withdraw. The

Philippines withdrew but China remained erecting a cable barrier to the mouth of the

shoal. China also has declared a no go zone for Filipino fishermen effectively annexing

Scarborough Shoal.

Another confrontation is developing at the present moment at Ayguin Shoal (Second

Thomas Shoal). In 1999 the Philippines beached an LST and have maintained a small

detachment of marines to demonstrate sovereignty. Chinese military and civilian ships

have now appeared at Ayguin and demanded that the Philippines withdraw from

Chinese territory. The Philippines are fearful China will interfere with resupply efforts

and leave the stranded marines with no choice but to withdraw.

In summary, Chinas use of legal warfare combined with civilian paramilitary ships and

commercial fishing vessels in the South China Sea have enhanced its capacity to enforce

its sovereignty claims and to intimidate other claimant states. They bear the onus of

escalating the situation or backing off. Chinas strategy of legal warfare poses an

asymmetric challenge to the United States and its ally, the Philippines. Current U.S.

engagement policies and future AirSea Battle operations at the lower end of the conflict

spectrum do not address this current challenge to maritime security. The U.S. must

devise an effective counter-strategy to deter China from its present course and to

prevent any weakening of its Mutual Defence Treaty with the Philippines.


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Future Global Maritime Leadership

It is clear that the majority of regional states support a clear role for U.S. leadership in

regional maritime security issues. These states do not want to make a choice between

China and the United States. Regional states support U.S. deterrence against the rise ofChinese military power. The ASPI Report argues that the U.S. should develop an

alternate concept to the ASB, one that stresses denial to Chinese naval forces within the

first island chain in conflicts short of war. A strategy of denial diminishes the risks of

escalation.

Regional states prefer to see the U.S. adopt a Grand Strategy that deters Chinese

assertiveness while at the same time engages China and draws it into playing a

constructive role in providing support for the regional commons by adhering to

established norms and rules of the road.

Regional states would like the United States and China to become enmeshed in the

multilateral security architecture such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus

(ADMM Plus) and the East Asia Summit (EAS). The U.S. and its partners should promote

norms and legal regimes (such as codes of conduct) and practical activities in the ASEAN

Regional Forum, ADMM Plus (Expert Working Groups) and EAS. The U.S. could play a

role in obtaining regional consensus on streamlining the regional security architecture

so it addresses maritime security issues practically.

U.S. leadership is needed to counter Chinas resort to legal warfare and its asymmetric

challenge to state sovereignty through the use of civilian fishing fleets and paramilitary

enforcement vessels. The U.S. is implementing long-range plans to enhance maritime

domain awareness and capacity to enforce sovereignty. But China is currently

undermining the Philippines sovereignty and the credibility of US security guaranteeson a daily basis.

The ultimate aim of a U.S. Grand Strategy is to get China to moderate it assertiveness,

cease intimidation and coercion in handling its territorial disputes, and join with other

maritime powers in securing the global and regional commons.

Thayer US Air Sea Battle Concept and China's Asymmetric Challenges to Maritime Security in the South China Sea

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