Maritime Security and the Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China SeaCarlyle A. Thayer Paper to The Maritime Institute of Malaysia Conference on the South China Sea: Recent Developments and Implications for Peaceful Dispute Resolution Royal Chulan Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia December 12-13, 2011
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8/3/2019 Thayer Maritime Security and Role of Naval Diplomacy in the South China Sea
This paper considers three broad issues: the strategic outlook for Southeast Asia, current naval
activities, and opportunities for further cooperation among the region’s navies.
Part 1 considers eight major trends that currently shape the regional security environment: the
global economic and financial crisis, China’s military modernisation, United States re‐
engagement, increased regional arms procurements, the heightened importance of themaritime domain, the increasing salience of transnational security issues, the persistence of
‘everyday security challenges’, and the evolution of the regional security architecture.
In part 2, current naval activities are discussed under five headings: Chinese naval activities;
U.S. naval activities; regional naval activities; anti‐piracy operations; and confidence building
measures related to the South China Sea.
In part 3 paper looks at the future prospects for further naval cooperation with a focus on the
roles of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
The paper concludes with a proposal for a Code of Conduct for Southeast Asian’s Maritime
Domain.
Strategic Outlook for Southeast Asia
Eight major trends are currently shaping the security environment in Southeast Asia.2 These are
discussed in turn.
1. Global financial and economic crisis. The global financial crisis is the single most important
driver of inter‐state dynamics in Asia‐Pacific region. The global financial crisis has accelerated
the power shift from North America and Europe to East Asia. The most dramatic manifestation
of this power shift has been to reinforce China’s rise as a major power in all dimensions of
national power. China now has an enhanced global and regional leadership role through the
Group of Twenty and ASEAN Plus Three (APT). China has used its new position to press for strengthened supervisory and regulatory
1Emeritus Professor, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. E‐
3 arrangements over international financial institutions and greater influence for newly emerging
economies in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. China’s leadership on these
issues has found widespread support in the region. China’s challenge to the regional order
established under United States leadership after the Second World War will continue to
generate tensions that will be transmitted to Southeast Asia. The dynamics of Sino–American
relations will have a continuing major impact on the security environment in Southeast Asia.
The global financial crisis has driven home to Southeast Asia its interdependence and
vulnerability to global forces. It also triggered a regional power shift that contributed to the rise
of Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam as major regional players. Both countries emerged
from the global financial crisis in a strengthened position due to their domestic recovery
programs and maintenance of internal stability. Indonesia and Vietnam can be expected to play
an increasingly important role in shaping Southeast Asia’s security environment.
2. China’s military modernization. There is a direct link between China’s phenomenal economic
growth and rising defence budgets to support the modernisation and transformation of its
military forces. This has both strategic and regional implications. China’s People’s Liberation
Army Navy (PLAN) is developing roles and missions that will permit it to project power beyond
its territorial sphere of interest into the Western Pacific and South China Sea. Admiral Mike
Mullen, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated that the strategic intent behind
China’s development of new capabilities seemed to be ‘very focused on the United States Navy
and our bases that are in that part of the world’.
In sum, China’s military modernisation and transformation, especially naval modernisation, has
created a security dilemma for regional states. China’s efforts to safeguard its security by
developing what it considers a reasonable force structure to deter the United States has
created insecurity in several neighbouring states due to China’s lack of transparency.
3. United States stepped‐up engagement . There can be no doubt that the global financial crisishas dented the authority of the United States and undermined the attraction of its free market
capitalist economy as a model of development. In February 2009, Dennis Blair, then Director of
U.S. National Intelligence, observed in testimony to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that the global financial crisis ‘has worsened questioning of US stewardship of the
global economy and international financial structure’ and damaged America’s reputation for
world leadership.
In broad strategic terms the global financial crisis has forced a reduction of U.S. defence
spending in acquisition accounts, procurement, and research and development that are vital if
the United States is to maintain its commanding technological superiority. Despite the
declaration by U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta that the defence budget for the Asia‐Pacific will not be affected, in the long‐term the United States will have fewer resources to
shape strategic developments in the Asia–Pacific, including Southeast Asia. In the coming
decades, the United States will rely even more heavily on its allies and strategic partners to
cooperate to ensure regional security.
The change in power relativities between China and the United States has prompted some
strategic analysts to write about the possible erosion of US power and loss of US strategic
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5 for the East Asian economies that depend on sea lanes of communication (SLOC) that pass
through Southeast Asia for trade and for the import of vital energy resources.
The heightened importance of the maritime domain raises the possibility of increased
multilateral cooperation to guarantee maritime security. On the other hand, vital SLOCs pass
through the South China Sea, where China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and
Brunei have conflicting sovereignty claims. It is noticeable that the current military
modernisation and transformation programs contain elements of a naval arms race embedded
in competitive rather than cooperative maritime strategies.
6. Increasing salience of transnational issues. All ASEAN states stress the salience of non‐
traditional security issues as a major factor shaping the regional security environment. Because
non‐traditional security issues are transnational in nature and beyond the ability of any state to
resolve, they are more amenable to multilateral cooperative security approaches. It is
unsurprising, then, that Southeast Asian states have given priority to security cooperation to
address non‐traditional threats.
It is debatable whether each and every non‐traditional issue should be ‘securitised’ and treatedas a threat to national security. Submissions to the ARF’s Annual Security Outlook 2009, for
example, identified twelve non‐traditional security threats: terrorism, piracy, transnational
crime, small arms and light weapons smuggling, money laundering, drug trafficking, people
smuggling, illegal migration, illegal logging, illegal fishing, avian influenza and swine flu, and
climate change.
The extent to which the armed forces, as distinct from law enforcement, customs, immigration
and public health officials, should be involved in addressing non‑traditional issues is a matter of
debate within individual countries. But it is clear from evolving trends that armed forces will be
increasingly involved in addressing these security challenges, especially in responding to large‐
scale natural disasters, terrorism, and piracy and armed robbery at sea.7. Persistence of ‘everyday domestic security challenges’ . At least seven of Southeast Asia’s
eleven states are affected by domestic security challenges of varying orders of magnitude in
which violence has been used to advance the interests of a particular group or non‐state actor.
In recent years, Malaysia, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam have all experienced sporadic outbreaks
of sectarian or ethnic violence. At the other end of the scale, Thailand, Myanmar and the
Philippines continue to experience political instability and ethno‐nationalist insurgency, ethnic
conflict, and communist insurgency and armed separatism, respectively. Cambodia and
Thailand were embroiled in an unseemly low‐level conflict over disputed land surrounding a
temple complex on their border.
These ‘everyday domestic security challenges’ will persist over the next decade. The ongoingconflicts in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines, and the unstable domestic political
situation in Myanmar, if unaddressed, all have the potential to spill over and affect the security
of neighbouring states. Human rights abuses and violations of religious freedom in states
experiencing domestic strife raise the question of whether humanitarian intervention might be
invoked if a state fails to meet its obligation to protect its citizens.
8. Evolution of the Region’s Security Architecture. From the very inception of the ARF, ASEAN
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7 all nuclear submarines were under the command of China’s Northern Fleet; this marks the first
permanent deployment to China’s Southern Fleet.
An analysis of construction activities indicate Yulin Naval Base will be capable of housing
nuclear submarines capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. When these
facilities are completed they will provide China with the potential capability to station a
substantial proportion of its submarine‐based nuclear deterrent capabilities there.
China’s most modern strategic nuclear submarine is not yet fully operational but when it is the
submarine is expected to carry twelve Sea Launched Ballistic Missiles. This class of submarine
will be even more potent if China succeeds in equipping the missiles with multiple warheads.
Chinese nuclear subs will be able to patrol and fire from concealed positions in deep waters off
Hainan island if China can develop the necessary operational skills. According to the U.S.
Defense Department five more Chinese ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN)5 are
expected to become operational in coming years. It is this geo‐strategic aspect in particular that
explains the interest by the U.S. Navy in conducting military surveys in waters off Hainan. 6
China‐U.S. Relations. Relations between China and the United States in the Asia‐Pacific havebeen shaped by China’s responses to the Obama Administration’s continuation of arms sales to
Taiwan, U.S. naval exercises in East Asia and U.S. military activities in China’s Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), including the waters off Hainan Island. In March 2010, for example, U.S.
and South Korea conducted naval exercises following the sinking of the Republic of Korea Navy
frigate Cheonan. Four months later thousands of military personnel, hundreds of aircraft, F‐22
stealth fighter‐bombers, the USS George Washington and three US Navy destroyers
participated in military exercises with South Korea in the Sea of Japan.
In January 2010, in response to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, China suspended high‐level military‐
to‐military relations with the United States, including the bilateral Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement, for ten months. China also conducted four high profile naval exercisesto showcase the growing prowess of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).
Chinese Naval Exercises. Between April and July 2010, the PLAN conducted three large‐scale
maritime exercises and in November the PLAN held a fourth. The first exercise was held in early
April. This exercise involved the long‐range deployment of sixteen warships from the PLAN
drawn from the North Sea, East Sea and South Sea Fleets. As the combined fleet sailed down
the China coast it conducted live firing and anti‐submarine warfare exercises and defended
itself against simulated attacks launched from the mainland. The PLAN warships sailed past
Okinawa through the Bashi Channel, conducted live firing exercises north of the Philippines
before steaming toward the Malacca Straits. Up until this exercise China’s South Sea Fleet was
the only fleet to operate in the South China Sea.The South Sea Fleet is currently being modernised with the deployment for the first time of a
Jin‐class nuclear submarine and amphibious landing craft to Yulin Naval Base on Hainan island.
5SSBN is the designation used by the U.S. Navy for a nuclear‐powered ballistic nuclear missile‐carrying submarine.
The SS refers to a submersible ship, the B stands for ballistic missile, and the N denotes nuclear powered.
6Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences,” China Security , 5(2), Spring 2009, 24.
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9 These five PLAN exercises were viewed as a demonstration by China that it was now capable of
deploying beyond the first island chain to the second. 11 The implications are clear: China is
developing the capacity to sustain larger naval deployments in the Spratly archipelago and
further south for longer periods.
Chinese Naval Diplomacy .12 In October 2003, China acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. China and ASEAN issued a joint declaration establishing a strategic partnership.
The joint declaration was the first formal agreement of this type between China and a regional
organization, as well as a first for ASEAN itself. The joint declaration was wide‐ranging and
included a provision for the initiation of a new security dialogue as well as general cooperation
in political matters.13
In July 2004, at China’s suggestion, ASEAN and China raised their relationship to one of
‘enhanced strategic relations’. This took the form of a five‐year Plan of Action (2005–2010) that
set out the following objectives:
• Promote mutual confidence and trust in defense and military fields with a view to maintaining peace and
stability in the region;
• Conduct dialogues, consultations and seminars on security and defense issues;
• Strengthen cooperation on military personnel training;
• Consider observing each other’s military exercises and explore the possibility of conducting bilateral or
multilateral joint military exercises; and
• Explore and enhance cooperation in the field of peacekeeping.14
Between February 1999 and December 2000, China negotiated long‐term cooperative
framework arrangements with all ten ASEAN members. Seven of China’s agreements included a
clause on security cooperation (Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines,
and Laos). Between 2001‐2009, China and nine ASEAN states conducted 21 naval goodwill (Laos
is landlocked). Chinese warships visited Vietnam (on three occasions), Singapore and Thailand(twice each) and Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In turn, China
11The first island chain refers to the line of islands that runs north–south from the Kuriles, Japan, the Ryukyu
Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The second island chain extends further east of China’s coast and
includes a line running north‐south from the Kuriles through Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines, and
Indonesia. The first second island chain embraces an area 1,800 nautical miles from China’s coast and includes
most of the East China Sea and East Asian SLOCs.
12This section is based on Carlyle A. Thayer, “China and Southeast Asia: A Shifting Zone of Interaction,” in James
Clad, Sean M. McDonald and Bruce Vaughn, eds., The Borderlands of Southeast Asia: Geopolitics, Terrorism, and Globalization. Center for Strategic Research, Institute of National Strategic Studies. Washington, D.C.: National
Defense University Press, 2011. 235‐261.
13“Joint Declaration of the Heads of State/Government of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the
People’s Republic of China on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity,” October 8, 2003,
http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm.
14“Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration of ASEAN‐China Strategic Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity,” October 8, 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/16805.htm.
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10 hosted port visits from Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (twice each), and Indonesia, the
Philippines and Vietnam.
As early as 2002, China invited the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise. This suggestion
was reiterated in May 2005 at the first China‐Philippines defense and security dialogue. China
proposed that the Philippines conduct joint maritime security exercises with the PLAN focusing
on search and rescue. As of May 2010 Manila has not taken up the offer.
In June 2005, China proposed extending PLAN port visits to include bilateral exercises. Thailand
responded by suggesting it would prefer to participate in a multilateral exercise that included
other ASEAN states. Nevertheless, in December that year the Royal Thai Navy conducted its
first combined exercise with the PLAN involving search and rescue and escort. In late 2006,
China approached individual ASEAN states with a suggestion first made to Thailand for
combined multilateral naval exercise. In April 2007, defense circles reported that this proposal
was under ‘active consideration’.
In April 2006, China and Vietnam commenced biannual joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin.
This was a first for the Chinese navy. By June 2010, a total of eleven joint naval patrols had beenconducted in the Gulf of Tonkin.15 After a gap of seventeen years, PLAN vessels resumed
goodwill port visits to Vietnam in November 2008, December 2009 and October 2010. Vietnam
made its first port call to China in June 2009 and its second in June 2011.16
China and the South China Sea. During the first half of 2011, China began to aggressively assert
its jurisdiction over the South China Sea. According to the Philippines Department of Foreign
Affairs, China increased its presence and activities in the Spratly Islands in the fourth quarter of
2010.17 This increased presence led to six incursions into waters claimed by the Philippines in
the first five months of 2011.18 In one incursion, on February 25, a Chinese PLAN frigate fired
warning shots in the direction of Filipino fishing boats. On March 2, Chinese civilian vessels
threatened to ram a Filipino oil exploration boat forcing it to cease commercial operations andflee the area. With respect to Vietnam, Chinese state‐owned vessels twice cut the cables of oil
exploration boats conducing seismic surveys in Vietnam’s EEZ. These incidents occurred on
May 26 and June 9.
In light of these two incidents, and immediately following China’s announcement that it would
be conducting routine naval exercises in the Western Pacific,19
Vietnam responded by
15Margie Mason, “Vietnam and China hold joint naval patrol amid spat,” Associated Press, June 21, 2011 and
Agence France Presse, “China, Vietnam hold joint sea patrols near disputed Spratlys,” June 23, 2011.
16“Vietnamese naval ships on friendly visit to China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 22, 2011; “China, Vietnam
engage in Joint naval patrols,” People’s Daily Online, June 22, 2011 and “Vietnamese naval ships wrap up visit to
China,” Quan Doi Nhan Dan Online, June 27, 2011.
17Max De Leon and Estrella Torres, “Business steps in to end Spratlys row,” ABS‐CBN News, June 3, 2011.
18Jerry E. Esplanada and Tara Quismundo, “Abide by UN pact, China told,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 3, 2011.
The Philippines has not officially released its list. Government officials initially referred to six or seven incidents and
currently they claim nine incidents.
19Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, “China says to hold ‘routine’ navy drills in western Pacific,” Reuters, June 9,
2011.
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11 conducting live firing exercises on June 13 in the waters near Hon Ong Island located
approximately forty kilometres off Quang Nam province in central Vietnam.
In October 2011 Vietnam’s party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong made an official visit to
China to meet with General Secretary Hu Jintao to discuss the South China Sea issue among
other bilateral issues. At the end of Trong’s visit the two leaders issued a Joint Statement that
included stepped up defence cooperation. The statement read:
Fourthly, to promote in‐depth cooperation between the two armies, increase contact between high‐ranking
army leaders of the two countries; continue to organise good strategic dialogues at deputy ministerial level;
accelerate the establishment of a direct telephone line between the two defence ministries; increase
cooperation in personnel training and exchanges between junior officers; conduct trial joint patrols along the
land border at a convenient time; continue to hold joint naval patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; increase
cooperation in such fields as mutual visits by the two countries’ naval ships.20
Hu and Trong also witnessed the signing of the Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the
Settlement of Sea Issues Between Vietnam and China. The Agreement committed both parties
‘to seek mutually acceptable fundamental and lasting solutions to sea‐related disputes’. In the
interim, the two sides ‘shall actively discuss provisional and temporary measures withoutaffecting each side’s positions and policies, including the active consideration and discussion on
cooperation for mutual development [hop tac cung phat trien]…’. Specifically, the two parties
would speed up negotiations to demarcate the waters forming the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin
‘and actively discuss cooperation for mutual development in these waters’ (emphasis added).
The Agreement also specified ‘if the disputes involve other countries, the consultations shall
include all other parties concerned.’
U.S. Naval Activities
The United States responded to China’s naval build‐up and development of anti‐access/area
denial capabilities by strengthening its posture on Guam, stepping up weapons and equipment
sales to the Philippines, basing Combat Littoral Ships in Singapore,21
and negotiating new
arrangements with Australia giving the U.S. greater access to defence facilities near Darwin,.
Currently, Obama Administration officials are outlining a new U.S. strategy to pivot military
forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to East Asia in coming years. The new Defense Secretary, Leon
Panetta, has indicated that the Asia‐Pacific will be largely quarantined from defence budget
cuts.
In response to China’s development of a large submarine force, the US has deployed thirty‐one
of its fifty‐three fast attack submarines to the Pacific and stepped up its anti‐submarine warfare
program. Eighteen of the U.S. subs are home‐ported in Pearl Harbor; the others are based in
Guam.22 The United States has also deployed three Ohio‐class nuclear submarines to the Asia–
Pacific Indian Ocean region. Each has been modified to carry 154 conventional Tomahawk
cruise missiles. In late June‐early July 2010, in a calculated demonstration of naval power, the
20“Tuyen bo chung hai nuoc Viet Nam va Trung Quoc,” Vietnam News Agency, October 15, 2011, point 4(iv).
21Craig Whitlock, “Navy’s next stop in Asia will set China on edge,” Checkpoint Washington, November 18, 2011
22Oyaol Ngirainki, “Guam Gets New Sub Buildings,” NavyTimes, July 21, 2010.
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12 USS Florida, USS Michigan, and USS Ohio submarines, simultaneously appeared in Diego Garcia
(Indian Ocean), Busan (South Korea) and Subic Bay (the Philippines), respectively.23 The United
States has stationed the fifth‐generation Raptor aircraft in Hawaii. Finally, the United States is
developing an air‐sea battle concept to counter China’s development of area‐denial/anti‐access
capabilities. The air‐sea battle concept is being drawn up to enable the United States to prevail
in conflicts where area‐denial/anti‐access capabilities are well developed.
United States‐China Relations. In June 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates aroused
Chinese ire with his remarks to the 9th
Shangri‐La Dialogue in Singapore. After announcing his
acceptance of an invitation to attend the inaugural meeting of the ADMM Plus in Hanoi,24
Gates
then called for ‘open, transparent, and equal access to the global common’, including the
maritime commons, ‘for security, for trade and commerce, and free passage’. He then
pointedly directed his remarks to the South China Sea:
In this respect, the South China Sea is an area of growing concern. This sea is not only vital to those directly
bordering it, but to all nations with economic and security interests in Asia. Our policy is clear: it is essential
that stability, freedom of navigation, and free and unhindered economic development be maintained. We do
not take sides on any competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinderfreedom of navigation. We object to any effort to intimidate US corporations or those of any nation engaged
in legitimate economic activity. All parties must work together to resolve differences through peaceful,
multilateral efforts consistent with customary international law. The 2002 Declaration of Conduct [sic] was an
important step in this direction and we hope that concrete implementation of this agreement will continue.25
Secretary Gates and China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie held a bilateral meeting on the
eve of the inaugural ADMM Plus meeting in Hanoi on October 11th. Minister Liang invited
Secretary Gates to visit Beijing early in 2011 thus ending the freeze on high‐level defence
contacts imposed in January 2010 in reaction to the sale of U.S. arms to Taiwan. China’s
position was signaled earlier when, on September 30, 2010, Major General Qian Lihua told
visiting U.S. Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer that regular dialogue and
exchanges on military safety at sea and other issues would be resumed.26
China and the US the held talks on maritime security in Hawaii from October 14‐15. These
discussions were aimed at improving security on the high seas when naval forces operated in
close proximity to each other.27 The results of this discussion were reported to the bilateral
Defense Consultative Talks held from December 9‐10 in Washington. This resumption of
23“U.S. Posts Pictures of Nuclear Sub in ‘Show of Force’,” The Chosun Ilbo, July 8, 2010 and Mark Thompson, “U.S.
Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message,” Time Magazine, July 8, 2010.
24Apparently the United States was the first of eight invited dialogue partners to accept.
25
Dr. Robert M. Gates. Secretary of Defence, United States, “Strengthening Security Partnerships in the Asia‐Pacific,” presentation to the First Plenary Session, The 9
thIISS Asian Security Summit, The Shangri‐La Dialogue,
Singapore, June 5, 2010. IISS is an acronym for International Institute of Strategic Studies.
26Audrey McAvoy, “US, China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii,” The Jakarta Post , October 16, 2010.
27Audrey McAvoy, “US, China hold maritime security talks in Hawaii,” The Jakarta Post , October 16, 2010. China
was represented by Rear Admiral Liao Shining and the U.S. was represented by Major General Randolph Alles,
USMC.
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13 bilateral military relations paralleled an upswing in political relations when President, Hu Jintao,
would visit the United States in the early 2011.
The upswing in U.S.‐China relations was reflected at the 2011 Shangri‐la Dialogue. Secretary
Gates did not specifically mention the South China Sea. However, he stated the well‐known
position that the U.S. had a ‘national interest in freedom of navigation…’. He also stressed the
importance of customary international law as a guide for ‘the appropriate use of the maritime
domain, and rights of access to it’.28
China’s Defence Minister put on record his country’s
commitment ‘to maintaining peace and stability in South China Sea’. He noted that, ‘at present,
the general situation in the South China Sea remains stable.29
In September 2011, the Obama Administration announced arms sales to Taiwan totaling $5.85
billion. This decision was a carefully calibrated one. The U.S. chose to provide funding to
upgrade Taiwan’s F‐16 fighter jets but not provide more modern aircraft. Unlike the previous
year, these arms sales did not precipitate a suspension in military relations. On December 7, the
U.S. and China held defence talks in Beijing at deputy minister level. China’s representative,
General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of Staff, declared that the talks demonstrated ‘both
countries are being sincere about maintaining military exchanges. Hopefully both sides will
make the best of this opportunity to expand common ground, keep risks under control and
avoid misjudgment’.30
United States Naval Diplomacy . The United States conducts two major theatre engagement
programs in Southeast Asia: Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and
Multinational Planning Assistance Team (MPAT).
The CARAT program involves U.S.‐led annual bilateral training exercises conducted serially in
Southeast Asia. CARAT was inaugurated in 1994. Seven ASEAN members participate: Brunei,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The purpose of CARAT
is ‘to strengthen relationships and enhance the operational readiness of the participatingforces’. For example, the US–Indonesian leg of CARAT involves, inter alia, symposiums on
aviation operations; legal, law enforcement and surface operations; and afloat exercises.
In 2000, as a result of instability in East Timor and influenced by conflict in the Balkans, U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM) initiated discussions with selected states in the Asia–Pacific to
establish MPAT to create the capacity to deploy quickly a multinational force headquarters to
support the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) in times of
emergencies. MPAT successfully developed a set of standard operating procedures that have
been accepted by its thirty participants, including international and non‐government
organisations. PACOM regularly conducts multinational command post exercises. The value of
the MPAT program was demonstrated in December 2004, when an earthquake off the coast of 28
Robert M. Gates, “Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia‐Pacific,” The 10th
IISS Asian Security Summit the
Shangri‐La Dialogue, June 4, 2011.
29Liang Guanglie, “China’s International Security Cooperation,” The 10
thIISS Asian Security Summit the Shangri‐La
Dialogue, June5, 2011.
30Agence France Presse, “U.S., China Hold Military Talks,” December 7, 2011.
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14 Sumatra triggered a devastating tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The United States, India, Japan
and Australia quickly assumed the lead role in relief efforts along with other contributing
countries.
The United States also had conducted two ‘naval activities’ with Vietnam, the first in 2010 and
the second the following year. Both were conducted in the port of Da Nang. The second naval
exchange activity included a community relations project (medical and dental services), and
training in search and rescue, damage control, and dive and salvage.31
No formal naval
exercises (i.e. combat training) were conducted.
Regional Naval Activities
China’s rapid military modernization, coupled with its assertive behaviour in the South China
Sea, led several Southeast Asian states to undertake force modernization programs of their
own aimed at developing anti‐access/area‐denial capabilities directed against China. This
section will review developments in the Philippines, Vietnam and elsewhere in the region.
The Philippines. In 1995 the Philippines passed into law The Armed Forces Modernization Actwith the aim of modernizing the AFP in fifteen years with a total fund of Pesos 331 billion. The
Philippines Congress failed to follow through and the AFP was starved of funds.
In 2011, in response to Chinese assertiveness in its EEZ and Kalayaan Island Group, the
Philippines drew up a new defence strategy focused on both internal security operations and
external territorial defence. The Aquino Administration allocated P11 billion to support force
modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Of this figure P8 billion will come
from the proceeds of the Malampaya Natural Gas and Power Project and the remaining P3
billion will come from the AFP’s current modernisation funds.32 Starting in 2012, the
government will implement a five‐year modernization program totalling P40 billion (or P8
billion annually).
In March 2011, AFP Chief of Staff General Eduardo Oban announced plans to upgrade Rancudo
Air Field on Pag‐Asa island.33 Two months later a Philippine navy study recommended the
acquisition of submarines as a ‘deterrent against future potential conflicts’.34 In September
2011, immediately after President Benigno Aquino’s state visit to Beijing, he announced that
4.95 billion pesos (US $118 million) would be allocated to top up the defence budget.35
These
funds were earmarked for the purchase a naval patrol vessel, six helicopters and other military
31U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City, Public Affairs Section, Press Advisory, July 1, 2011 and Agence France
Presse, “US Navy says no S. China link to Vietnam visit,” June 24, 2011.
32Alexis Romero, “Submarine for Navy? Noy bares AFP shop list,” The Philippine Star , August 24, 2011.
33Jaime Laude, “AFP to maintain presence in Spratlys,” The Philippine Star , March 29, 2011.
34Katherine Evangelista, “Philippines eye submarines to boost navy,” Philippine Daily Inquirer , May 17, 2001. The
prospect of the Philippines acquiring submarines is very unlikely.
35Agence France‐Presse, “Philippines Ups Spending To Guard South China Sea,” September 7, 2011.
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16 prepared to sell Vietnam its BrahMos supersonic cruise missile.42 That same month, while on a
tour of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung expressed interest in purchasing four
Sigma‐class corvettes.43 Vietnam will take delivery of six conventional Kilo‐class submarines in
2014 and currently has on order sixteen more Su‐30MK2 jet fighters.44
In October 2011, the Defence Ministers of Japan and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on the enhancement of defence cooperation. The MOU includes provisions for
regular defence talks at deputy minister level, mutual ministerial visits, and exchanges between
the Japan Self‐Defense Force and the Vietnam People’s Army. According to Japanese officials,
the two ministers discussed maritime incidents involving China’s obstruction of maritime
activities. The MOU was designed in part ‘to keep in check China’s growing assertiveness in he
South China Sea and East China Sea’.45
In November 2011, Vietnam announced a $3.3 billion defence budget for 2012, a reported rise
of 35% over 2010.46 According to IHS Jane’s Vietnam’s annual naval procurement budget has
increased by 150% since 2008 to US $276 million in 2011. The budget is projected to rise to
$400 million by 2015.47
Regional . According to one noted regional security analyst, naval acquisitions in Asia ‘have
become especially disturbing, with undeniable signs of action‐reaction dynamics’, and
Northeast Asia in particular is witnessing an ‘emerging naval arms race’.48
In Southeast Asia the
conventional submarine has been the new hallmark of naval acquisitions. Defence analysts
estimate that 86 submarines will be added to the fleets in the Asia‐Pacific by 2020 of which 30
will be Chinese.49 This prospect has led Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the
United States to step up investment in their anti‐submarine warfare capabilities. Security
analysts warn that the proliferation of submarine fleets may be destabilizing in times of
tensions and crises due to the complexities of command and control.
Vietnam’s purchase of Kilo‐class submarines is part of a regional trend in naval modernisation.China has the largest submarine fleet (more than sixty) and most extensive plans to expand its
42“India to sell BrahMos missile to Vietnam,” The Asian Age, September 20, 2011 and Robert Johnson, “India is
Preparing To Sell BahMos Supersonic Cruise Missiles to Vietnam,” Business Insider , September 20, 2011.
43BBC, “VN dam phan mua 4 tau chien cua Ha Lan,” October 18, 2011.
44“Russia to supply Vietnam six submarines in 2014,” Thanh Nien News, July 3, 2011.
45Kyodo, “Japan, Vietam sign memo on defense cooperation enhancement,” Mainichi , October 25, 2011.
46Trefor Moss, “Chinese Aftershock,” The Diplomat , November 26, 2011.
47Agence France Presse, “China tensions stoke Vietnam naval ambitions,” The Economic Times, November 14,
2011.
48Desmond Ball, “Asia’s Naval Arms Race,” Paper presented to the 25
thAsia‐Pacific Roundtable, ISIS Malaysia,
Kuala Lumpur, May 29‐June 1, 2011.
49IHS Jane’s quoted by Sabine Pirone, “China’s Pacific Push Spurs U.S. Spending on Anti‐Sub Warfare,” Business
Week , November 25, 2011.
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17 numbers including the Type 095 nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and Type 094 (JIN‐class)
nuclear‐powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). China is expected to base both attack and
ballistic missile submarines at Yulin Naval Base on Hainan Island.
Indonesia, the first country in Southeast Asia to acquire submarines, is now considering
replacing them with newer South Korean models. Indonesia reportedly will boost defence
spending by 35% in 2012.50
Singapore has upgraded its submarine fleet to include two Archer‐class submarines. The first of
which, the RSS Archer , was commissioned in December 2011.51 Singapore reportedly is also in
the market for four or five P‐3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft.52
Malaysia has acquired two Scorpene‐class submarines. Both the Singaporean and Malaysian
submarines are equipped with Air Independent Propulsion systems.
Thailand is currently considering acquiring its own conventional submarines.
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper set out plans to construct twelve new conventional
submarines. Recently, it was reported that ‘visiting U.S. Navy officials have repeatedly raisedthe issue of the lack of availability of Australia’s troubled Collins‐class submarines, as well as the
lack of progress on Australia’s planned new class of submarines’. This pressure has prompted
the Gillard Government to place the matter before Cabinet.53
Regional force modernization has and will continue to result in the introduction of increased
numbers of warships equipped with new technologies and weapons systems. A recent review
of regional force modernization over the last decade highlights the introduction of new
capabilities such as ‘stand‐off precision‐strike, long‐range airborne and undersea attack,
stealth, mobility and expeditionary warfare and, above all, new capacities when it comes to
greatly improved command, control communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks’.
54
This review concludes that ‘new types of armamentspromise to significantly upgrade and modernize the manner of war fighting in the region… [and]
fundamentally change the concept and conduct of warfare’.55
Finally, new developments in military technology will see the introduction of more
sophisticated aerial and undersea drones and unmanned systems for intelligence gathering,
reconnaissance, surveillance and strike. Mark Valencia has drawn particular attention to Large
50Step Vaessen, “Indonesia to increase military spending,” Al Jazeera.net, November 7, 2011.
51Jermyn Chow, “RSS Archer submarine now operational,” The Straits Times, December 3, 2011.
52 Craig Hoyle, “Singapore interested in ex‐US Navy P‐3s,” Flight Global , December 15, 2011.
53John Kerin, “Gillard bows to US on submarines,” The Australian Financial Review , November 24, 2011.
54Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 63‐64.
55Richard A. Bitzinger, “A New Arms Race? Explaining Recent Southeast Asian Military Acquisitions,” Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 31(1), April 2010, 64.
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18 Diameter Unmanned Underwater Vehicles, Persistent Littoral Undersea Surveillance Systems
and Modular Floating Bases that can be deployed in the EEZs of target states. According to
Valencia:
The situation is presently beyond international control. Thus continued intrusive probes are likely to generate
frustration and resentment that may translate into the forcible halting of such ‘intrusions’ when and if
detected. The scale and scope of maritime and airborne intelligence collection activities are likely to continueto expand rapidly in many countries, involving levels and sorts of activities quite unprecedented in peacetime.
They will not only become more intensive; they will generally be more intrusive. Indeed stepped up drone
missions may even be considered a prelude to impending warfare. They will generate tensions and more
frequent crises; they will produce defensive reactions and escalatory dynamics; and they will lead to less
stability in the most affected regions, especially in Asia.56
According to Vice Admiral Scott Swift, Commander U.S. Seventh Fleet, his prime concern is not
the outbreak of a major conflict but ‘any tactical trigger with strategic implications… I do have
concerns about a specific brushup that could result in a tactical miscalculation…’.57 In sum,
regional sea lanes are set to become more ‘crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed
strife’.58
Anti‐Piracy Operations
There are no observable threats by state actors to the safety of the large number of commercial
vessels that ply Southeast Asian waters. The main threat to the safety of navigation comes from
piracy.59 Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the littoral states along the maritime passageway
through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, have conducted coordinated anti‐piracy patrols
since July 2005. In September 2005, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore joined once again to
launch coordinated air patrols over the Malacca Strait, known as Eyes in the Sky.60
An
agreement on standard operating procedures and a cooperative air surveillance and
intelligence exchange group was agreed in 2006. Two years later, Thailand joined the scheme.
In 2004, Japan successfully initiated the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy
56Mark J. Valencia, “The South China Sea, Military Activities and the Law of the Sea,” Paper presented to the
International Conference on Major Law and Policy Issues in the South China Sea: European and American
Perspectives, co‐sponsored by the Institute of European and American Studies and the Center for Asia‐Pacific
Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, October 7‐8, 2011 and Mark Valencia, “The Impeccable Incident: Truth
and Consequences,” China Security , 5(2), Spring 2009, 26.
57Quoted by Stephen Coates, “US Pacific commander warns of tactical errors,” The China Post, November 10,
2011. Admiral Smith also noted that he expected diplomacy to prevail in the event of a brushup and ‘compromise
to prevail’.
58
Rory Medcalf and Raoul Heinrichs, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo‐Pacific Asia (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, June 2011), 3 and Sam Bateman, “Solving the ‘Wicked
Problems’ of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(1), 2011,
15‐17.
59Sam Bateman, Joshua Ho and Jane Chan, Good Order at Sea in Southeast Asia, RSIS Policy Paper (Singapore: S.
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, April 2009), 17‐20.
60Joshua H. Ho, “The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey , 46(4), July/August 2006, 571‐572.
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22 Opportunities for Cooperation Among the Region’s Navies
Since 2002, when ASEAN issued its first declaration of concern on the South China Sea,
confidence building measures have been conspicuous by their absence. There has been much
discussion of CBMs but little practical implementation in the South China Sea. However
heightened interest by regional states in maritime security in general, and interest in
implementing the DOC and possibly a more binding COC in particular, have put CBMs back on
centre stage. Currently there are a variety of groups working under the auspices of ASEAN and
the ASEAN Regional Forum charged with maritime security and South China Sea issues.
ASEAN. In May 2006, ASEAN Defence Ministers met for the first time and began the process of
institutionalizing defence cooperation on a regional basis. The ASEAN Defence Ministers are
members of the ASEAN Political Security Council established under ASEAN’s Charter.
ASEAN established the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) in 2010 under the terms of the ASEAN
Political Security Community (APCS) Blueprint.64 The second meeting of the AMF was held in
Thailand in August 2011 and proposed expanding its membership to include dialogue partners
in a separate meeting. The AMF is focused on a comprehensive approach to maritime issuesand has so far not dealt with South China Sea issues in detail.
65
The ADMM brought under its umbrella separate meetings of the ASEAN service chiefs (army,
navy and air and military intelligence) that had been meeting informally outside the official
ASEAN framework. At the 4th ADMM in May 2010, it was agreed that ASEAN navies would
cooperate to patrol their maritime boundaries. The prospects of practical cooperation among
ASEAN navies do not appear good. At the most recent ASEAN Navy Chiefs Meeting (ANCM‐5) in
Vietnam in 2011 there was disagreement over a number of issues including the formal name of
the meeting, how often it should meet, conducting joint patrols, and a proposal for an ASEAN
communications protocol when navy ships passed each other at sea. 66
In November 2011, ASEAN Senior Officials began discussions on what activities and projects to
include in a code of conduct. Once agreement is reached, the draft COC will be presented to
China ‘to determine what, when, where and how the project would be carried out’, according
to an Indonesian official.67
The terms of reference for the ADMM Plus Expert Working Group on Maritime Security were
only approved in October 2011. This group will report its deliberations to the ADMM Plus
Senior Officials Meeting. But the second meeting of the ADMM Plus will not take place until
2013.
64 “Hanoi Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN Regional Forum Vision Statement,” May 20, 2010, Point 3.
65“Chair’s Statement of the 19
thASEAN Summit, Bali, 17 November 2011,” Points 14‐17 (Maritime Cooperation).
66For general reports see: Joyce Pangco, “Vietnam asks Asean navies to unite amid China forays,” Manila Standard
Today , November 24, 2011 and Viet Nam News Service, “ASEAN navy chiefs advance co‐operation,” Maritime
Security.Asia, July 28, 2011.
67Antara, “ASEAN ready to discuss continuation of doc with China,” November 14, 2011.
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24 Coverage of the entire Southeast Asian maritime domain would make all of ASEAN’s members
stakeholders in the code of conduct, including Cambodia and Myanmar.70 This would overcome
the present division of ASEAN states into the four claimant states and the six non‐claimant
states with respect to just the South China Sea.
All signatories to the code of conduct should renounce the threat of and use of force to:
• settle their disputes over sovereignty and sovereign rights,
• disrupt good order at sea including safety of navigation and over flight.
All ASEAN states should bring their maritime claims into line with international law, with
particular attention to eliminating excessive baselines and clearly distinguishing islands from
rocks. The expertise of an independent panel of technical and legal experts could be called
assist in determining base lines and the classification of islands and rocks.
All signatories should commit themselves to a resolution of maritime disputes within a mutually
agreed time frame through negotiations or other mutually agreed methods. If, at the expiration
of the agreed time frame, no resolution of maritime disputes is reached, the states involvedshould agree to a settlement based on arbitration by an appropriate international court or
tribunal (International Tribunal on Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice) or other
agreed procedure.
All parties to the Southeast Asia Maritime Code of Conduct should commit themselves to
demilitarising the features (islands and rocks) that they physically occupy, including the
prohibition of deploying specified types of weapon systems such as land based anti‐ship
missiles.
For purposes of security, including protection against piracy and armed criminals, police or
coast guard personnel may be stationed on occupied features.
A maritime code of conduct should also contain provisions for all parties to cooperate in: