TORTS Principles & Defenses Involving Torts_ Full Text
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EN BANCG.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952HIDALGO ENTERPRISES,
INC.,petitioner,vs.GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT
OF APPEALS,respondents.Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Salazar
for petitioner.Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.BENGZON,J.:This
is an appeal bycertiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals
requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo Balandan and
his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son
Mario.It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was
the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna,
in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet
deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory
compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not
provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the
tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground.
Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor
vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and
any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There
was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948,
plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while
playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the
factory premises through the gate, to take a bath in one of said
tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the
tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been
died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."The Court of Appeals, and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the
petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and
neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to
persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of
attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this
Jurisdiction inTaylor vs. Manila Electric16 Phil., 8.The doctrine
may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his
premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is
injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in
the premises. (See65 C.J.S., p. 455.)The principle reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although
its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring
to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on
or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children (65 C.J.S., p. 458).Now, is a swimming pool or water tank
an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little
children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive
nuisance?The great majority of American decisions say no.The
attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies
of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some
unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water
and its location.There are numerous cases in which the attractive
nuisance doctrine has not been held not to be applicable to ponds
or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches,
culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, . . . (65 C.J.S., p.
476 et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)In
fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above
volume of Corpus Juris Secundum was published in 1950, whereas its
decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.The reason why a
swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an
attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana Appellate
Court as follows:Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which
attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of
drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that
they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner
of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property,
merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new
danger, . . . (he) is not liable because of having created an
"attractive nuisance." Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co., N. E.,
2nd, 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.Therefore, as petitioner's tanks
are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the
petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And
the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy
were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because
they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under
the care of no responsible individual needs no further
discussion.The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo
Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.Feria,
Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Bautista Angelo, JJ.,concur.
FIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992SOFIA FERNANDO, in her
behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely:
ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS
LIAGOSO, ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian
of her minor children, namely: EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND
JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA FAJARDO in her behalf
and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN,
JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO,
in her behalf and as guardianad litem, of her minor grandchildren,
namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE and GERRY, all surnamed
LIAGOSO,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF
DAVAO,respondents.MEDIALDEA,J.:This is a petition for review
oncertioraripraying that the amended decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 11, 1990 in CA-G.R. No. C.V. 04846, entitled
"Sofia Fernando, etc., et al. v. The City of Davao," be reversed
and that its original decision dated January 31, 1986 be reinstated
subject to the modification sought by the ``````petitioners in
their motion for partial reconsideration dated March 6, 1986.The
antecedent facts are briefly narrated by the trial court, as
follows:From the evidence presented we see the following facts: On
November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of
the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank
in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano,
Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr.
Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he
signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically
onNovember 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions
namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose
Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies
were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was
taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional
Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office
investigated the case and learned that the five victims entered the
septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and
consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to
be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who
did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office
autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of
all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen
supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of
the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was
due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide
gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. (p. 177,
Records)On August 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
this case is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.SO
ORDERED. (Records, p. 181)From the said decision, the petitioners
appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals). On January 3, 1986, the appellate court issued a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, in view
of the facts fully established and in the liberal interpretation of
what the Constitution and the law intended to protect the plight of
the poor and the needy, the ignorant and theindigent more entitled
to social justice for having, in the unforgettable words of
Magsaysay, "less in life," We hereby reverse and set aside the
appealed judgment and render another one:1. Ordering the defendant
to pay to the plaintiffs Dionisio Fernando, Sofia Fernando and her
minor children the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages
for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.002. Ordering the
defendant to pay to the plaintiffs David Garcia and Anita Garcia
the following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death
P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.003. Ordering the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff Rosalia Bertulano (sic) and her minor children
the following sums of moneya) Compensatory damages for his death
P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.004. Ordering the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff Primitiva Fajardo and her minor children the
following sums of money:a) Compensatory damages for his death
P30,000.00b) Moral damages P20,000.005. Ordering the defendant to
pay to the plaintiffs Norma Liagoso, Nicolas Liagoso and Emeteria
Liagoso and her minor grandchildren the following sums of money:a)
Compensatory damages for his death P30,000.00b) Moral damages
P20,000.00The death compensation is fixed at P30,000.00 in
accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court starting
withPeople vs.De la Fuente,Nos. L-63251-52, December 29, 1983, 126
SCRA 518 reiterated in the recent case ofPeople vs.Nepomuceno, No.
L-41412, May 27, 1985. Attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00
for the handling of the case for the 5 victims is also awarded.No
pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 33-34)Both
parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. On
January 11, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered an Amended
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, finding
merit in the motion for reconsideration of the defendant-appellee
Davao City, the same is hereby GRANTED. The decision of this Court
dated January 31, 1986 is reversed and set aside and another one is
hereby rendered dismissing the case. No pronouncement as to
costs.SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)Hence, this petition raising the
following issues for resolution:1. Is the respondent Davao City
guilty of negligence in the case at bar?2. If so, is such
negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the
victims hereof? (p. 72,Rollo)Negligence has been defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another
person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, L-21291, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 674, 680). Under the law, a person who by his
omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
As to what would constitute a negligent act in a given situation,
the case ofPicart v.Smith(37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the
answer, to wit:The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used
in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreetpater familiasof the Roman
law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation
before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before
them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case
under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm.Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to
exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining
the existence of negligence in a given case is this:Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or
guarding against its consequences. (emphasis supplied)To be
entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the
omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the
New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan,
et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181, 186). Proof of such relation of
cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did not in
any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However,
where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of
both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall
be considered the proximate cause of the accident. InTaylor
v.Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this
Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the
situation:Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts
of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the
accident.The test is simple.Distinction must be made between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own
proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review
was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace
it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages that is,
the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this
event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car
did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage which
came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or
partly through his act or omission of duty, that would have been
one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which
he would have been responsible. Where he contributes to the
principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not
recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the
defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
(emphasis Ours)Applying all these established doctrines in the case
at bar and after a careful scrutiny of the records, We find no
compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.Petitioners
fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of
hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that
such failure was compounded by the fact that there was no warning
sign of the existing danger and no efforts exerted by the public
respondent to neutralize or render harmless the effects of the
toxic gas. They submit that the public respondent's gross
negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident.We do not
subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the public
respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank
annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning
from the report of the market master about the need to clean the
septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public
respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for
such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder,
Mr. Feliciano Bascon (TSN, May 24, 1983, pp. 22-25). The public
respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures
to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that
despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank
since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet
for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The
testimonies of Messrs. Danilo Garcia and David Secoja
(plaintiffs'-petitioners' witnesses) on this point are relevant, to
wit:Atty. Mojica, counsel for defendant Davao City:xxx xxx xxxThe
place where you live is right along the Agdao creek, is that
correct?DANILO GARCIA:A Yes, sir.Q And to be able to go to the
market place, where you claim you have a stall,, you have to pass
on the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q Day in and day out, you pass on top
of the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q Is it not a fact that everybody
living along the creek passes on top of this septic tank as they go
out from the place and return to their place of residence, is that
correct?Andthis septic tank, rather the whole of the septic tank,
is covered by lead. . .?A Yes, sir.there is cover.Q And there were
three (3) of these lead covering the septic tank?A Yes, sir.Q And
this has always been closed?A Yes, sir. (TSN, November 26, 1979,
pp. 21-23, emphasis supplied)ATTY. JOVER, counsel for the
plaintiffs:Q You said you are residing at Davao City, is it
not?DAVID SEJOYA:A Yes, sir.Q How long have you been a resident of
Agdao?A Since 1953.Q Where specifically in Agdao are you residing?A
At the Public Market.Q Which part of the Agdao Public Market is
your house located?A Inside the market in front of the fish
section.Q Do you know where the Agdao septic tank is located?A Yes,
sir.Q How far is that septic tank located from your house?A Around
thirty (30) meters.Q Have you ever had a chance to use that septic
tank (public toilet)?A Yes, sir.Q How many times, if you could
remember?A Many times, maybe more than 1,000 times.Q Prior to
November 22, 1975, have you ever used that septic tank (public
toilet)?A Yes, sir.Q How many times have you gone to that septic
tank (public toilet) prior to that date, November 22, 1975?A Almost
1,000 times. (TSN, February 9, 1983, pp. 1-2)The absence of any
accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the
sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and
the septic tank (TSN, November 4, 1983, p. 51). Hence, the toxic
gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the
septic tank was air-tight (TSN,ibid, p. 49). The only indication
that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed
emptying was when water came out from it (TSN, September 13, 1983,
p. 41). Yet, even when the septic tank was full, there was no
report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite the presence of
people living near it or passing on top of it or using the public
toilet for their personal necessities.Petitioners made a lot of
fuss over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to
emphasize the negligence of the city government and presented
witnesses to attest on this lack. However, this strategy backfired
on their faces. Their witnesses were not expert witnesses. On the
other hand, Engineer Demetrio Alindada of the city government
testified and demonstrated by drawings how the safety requirements
like emission of gases in the construction of both toilet and
septic tank have been complied with. He stated that the ventilation
pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could also
be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in residential
buildings (TSN, November 4, 1983, pp. 50-51). The petitioners
submitted no competent evidence to corroborate their oral
testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr. Alindada.We also
do not agree with the petitioner's submission that warning signs of
noxious gas should have been put up in the toilet in addition to
the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already in place in that area.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisancesper seas defined in
Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning
signs for the protection of the public. While the construction of
these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and
sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one
of those requirements. The testimony of Engr. Alindada on this
matter is elucidative:ATTY. ALBAY:Q Mr. Witness, you mentioned the
several aspects of the approval of the building permit which
include the plans of an architect, senitary engineer and electrical
plans. All of these still pass your approval as building official,
is that correct?DEMETRIO ALINDADA:A Yes.Q So there is the sanitary
plan submitted to and will not be approved by you unless the same
is in conformance with the provisions of the building code or
sanitary requirements?A Yes, for private building constructions.Q
How about public buildings?A For public buildings, they are
exempted for payment of building permits but still they have to
have a building permit.Q But just the same, including the sanitary
plans, it require your approval?A Yes, it requires also.Q
Therefore, under the National Building Code, you are empowered not
to approve sanitary plans if they are not in conformity with the
sanitary requirements?A Yes.Q Now, in private or public buildings,
do you see any warning signs in the vicinity of septic tanks?A
There is no warning sign.Q In residential buildings do you see any
warning sign?A There is none.ATTY. AMPIG:We submit that the matter
is irrelevant and immaterial, Your Honor.ATTY. ALBAY:But that is in
consonance with their cross-examination, your Honor.COURT:Anyway it
is already answered.ATTY. ALBAY:Q These warning signs, are these
required under the preparation of the plans?A It is not required.Q
I will just reiterate, Mr. Witness. In residences, for example like
the residence of Atty. Ampig or the residence of the honorable
Judge, would you say that the same principle of the septic tank,
from the water closet to the vault, is being followed?A Yes.ATTY.
ALBAY:That will be all, Your Honor. (TSN, December 6, 1983, pp.
62-63)In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely
to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case
at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without
authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank.
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily
prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take
precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident. InCulion Ice, Fish and Elect.Co., v.Phil.Motors
Corporation(55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds
himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional
skill,he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work
which he attempts to do(emphasis Ours). The fatal accident in this
case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. Thus,
the appellate court was correct to observe that:. . . Could the
victims have died if they did not open the septic tank which they
were not in the first place authorized to open? Who between the
passive object (septic tank) and the active subject (the victims
herein) who, having no authority therefore, arrogated unto
themselves, the task of opening the septic tank which caused their
own deaths should be responsible for such deaths. How could the
septic tank which has been in existence since the 1950's be the
proximate cause of an accident that occurred only on November 22,
1975? The stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to occurrence of
the accident in 1975 no injury nor death was caused by the septic
tank. The only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the
above is that the victims' death was caused by their own negligence
in opening the septic tank. . . . (Rollo, p. 23)Petitioners further
contend that the failure of the market master to supervise the area
where the septic tank is located is a reflection of the negligence
of the public respondent.We do not think so. The market master knew
that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be
remembered that the bidding had just been conducted. Although the
winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be
made by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident
which befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the
winning bidder happened before the award could be given.
Considering that the case was yet no award to commence work on the
septic tank, the duty of the market master or his security guards
to supervise the work could not have started (TSN, September 13,
1983, p. 40). Also, the victims could not have been seen working in
the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage
which is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room
itself (TSN,ibid, pp. 38-39). The surreptitious way in which the
victims did their job without clearance from the market master or
any of the security guards goes against their good faith. Even
their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank.Finally, petitioners' insistence on the
applicability of Article 24 of the New Civil Code cannot be
sustained. Said law states:Art. 24. In all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant
for his protection.We approve of the appellate court's ruling that
"(w)hile one of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he
did not win the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of
contractual relations between the victims and the City Government
of Davao City that could give rise to any contractual obligation,
much less, any liability on the part of Davao City." (Rollo, p. 24)
The accident was indeed tragic and We empathize with the
petitioners. However, the herein circumstances lead Us to no other
conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death
of the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the
petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.ACCORDINGLY, the amended decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 11, 1990 is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO
ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., C
THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992GEORGE MCKEE and
ARACELI KOH MCKEE,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
JAIME TAYAG and ROSALINDA MANALO,respondents.G.R. No. L-68103 July
16, 1992CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO,
ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH
TURLA,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
ROSALINDA MANALO,respondents.DAVIDE,JR., J.:Petitioners urge this
Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April 1984, which
set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing
the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners'
complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga
entitled "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero,
Araceli Koh McKee and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and
Rosalinda Manalo," and "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs.
Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," respectively, and granted the
private respondents' counterclaim for moral damages, attorney's
fees and litigation expenses.The said civil cases for damages based
onquasi-delictwere filed as a result of a vehicular accident which
led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc and
caused physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee
and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102,
parents of the minors George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and
the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and her co-petitioners in
G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children, respectively, of the
late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4477. Upon the
other hand, private respondents are the owners of the cargo truck
which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the driver
of the truck at the time of the accident.The antecedent facts are
not disputed.Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8
January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway,
between Angeles City and San Fernando, Pampanga, a
head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76 owned by private
respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort car
bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh. The
collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and
Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee,
Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the
Ford Escort.Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh
McKee, the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee.
Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a
half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was seated on
the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of
the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's
back seat.Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which
was loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about
10,000 kilos, was traveling southward from Angeles City to San
Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on
the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando.
When the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the
southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from
the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys
were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way
to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so,
his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the lane
of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.The
incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles
City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith
dispatched to conduct an on the spot investigation. In the
sketch1prepared by the investigating officers, the bridge is
described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" long and fourteen (14)
"footsteps" wide seven (7) "footsteps" from the center line to the
inner edge of the side walk on both sides.2Pulong Pulo Bridge,
which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders
and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high.The
sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear
portion of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of
the right sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the
center line of the bridge, with the smashed front side of the car
resting on its front bumper. The truck was about sixteen (16)
"footsteps" away from the northern end of the bridge while the car
was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the opposite end. Skid
marks produced by the right front tire of the truck measured nine
(9) "footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front tire
measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck,
however, produced no skid marks.In his statement to the
investigating police officers immediately after the accident,
Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48
kilometers) per hour.As a consequence of the collision, two (2)
cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January
1977 before the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga and were
raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the said court, respectively.
In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 prayed for the
award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose Koh,
P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses,
P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus
attorney's fees.3In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102
prayed for the following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim
McKee, the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for
funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the
tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli
Koh McKee, in connection with the serious physical injuries
suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of earnings, P5,000.00 for
the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the filing of the
complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in connection
with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P50,000.00
as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the following
medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, P3,500.00
payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to the
Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting
to 25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with
costs.4On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with
the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple
Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed
with the trial court. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and
was raffled to Branch V of the court, the same Branch where Civil
Case No. 4478 was assigned.5In their Answer with Counterclaim in
Civil Case No. 4477, private respondents asserted that it was the
Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped (sic) the lane of the
truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the
award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, P20,000.00 as actual and
liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
business losses.6In Civil Case No. 4478, private respondents first
filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action
(Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an indispensable
party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to
consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before Branch
III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs.7Both
motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge
Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer
with Counter-claim8wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the
person "at fault having approached the lane of the truck driven by
Ruben Galang, . . . which was on the right lane going towards
Manila and at a moderate speed observing all traffic rules and
regulations applicable under the circumstances then prevailing;" in
their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as may be
determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of
litigation.Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in
both cases.To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the
testimonies of witnesses taken during the hearing of Criminal Case
No. 3751, which private respondents opposed and which the court
denied.9Petitioners subsequently moved to reconsider the order
denying the motion for consolidation,10which Judge Capulong granted
in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that Civil Case
No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III of
the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr.Left then
with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.In the
civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh
McKee, Fernando Nuag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel,
Eugenio Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh,11and offered several
documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents
presented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag
and Roman Dayrit.12In the criminal case, the prosecution presented
as witnesses Mrs. Araceli McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuag,
Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr.
Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo
Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and
offered several documentary exhibits.13Upon the other hand, the
defense presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan,
Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered documentary
exhibits.14On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision
against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the information and after applying the provisions of
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and indeterminate sentence
law, this Court, imposes upon said accused Ruben Galang the penalty
of six (6) months ofarresto mayoras minimum to two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccionalas maximum; the
accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of
Loida Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for her death;
to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the amount of P2,000.00
representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc
the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of income; to
indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased Jose Koh the value of
the car in the amount of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs.15The
aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on
the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the
court where the two (2) civil cases were pending a manifestation to
that effect and attached thereto a copy of the decision.16Upon the
other hand, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2) civil
cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.17The dispositive
portion of the said decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, finding
the preponderance of evidence to be in favor of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED
with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants had proven their
counter-claim, thru evidences (sic) presented and unrebutted.
Hence, they are hereby awarded moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and
litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual damages claimed
for (sic) by the defendants is (sic) hereby dismissing for lack of
proof to that effect (sic).18A copy of the decision was sent by
registered mail to the petitioners on 28 November 1980 and was
received on 2 December 1980.19Accused Ruben Galang appealed the
judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and was assigned to the court's
Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478
likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980 decision to the
appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 69041-R
and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned to the
Fourth Civil Cases Division.On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court
promulgated its decision20in C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the
conviction of Galang.21The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ay
Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang
pinagbabayad ng gugol ng paghahabol.A motion for reconsideration of
the decision was denied by the respondent Court in
itsKapasiyahanpromulgated on 25 November 1982.22A petition for its
review23was filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently
denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality
in the Resolution of 20 April 1983.24On 29 November 1983,
respondent Court, by then known as the Intermediate Appellate
Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in A.C.-G.R. CV Nos.
69040 and 69041,25the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from it hereby reversed and set aside and
another one is rendered, ordering defendants-appellees to pay
plaintiffs-appellants as follows:For the death of Jose Koh:P
50,000.00 as moral damagesP 12,000.00 as death indemnityP 16,000.00
for the lot and tomb (Exhs. U and U-1)P 4,000.00 expenses for
holding a wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979)P 950.00 for the casket
(Exh. M)P 375.00 for the vault services (Exhs. V and V-1)For the
death of Kim Koh McKee:P 50,000.00 as moral damagesP 12,000.00 as
death indemnityP 1,000.00 for the purchase of the burial lot (Exh.
M)P 950.00 for funeral services (Exh. M-1)P 375.00 for vault
services (Exhs. V and V-1)For the physical injuries suffered by
George Koh McKee:P 25,000.00 as moral damagesP 672.00 for Clark
Field Hospital (Exh. E)P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles Medical Clinic
(Exhs. D, D-1 andD-2)P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Medical Center
(Exhs. B and B-1)For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh
McKee:P 25,000.00 as moral damagesP 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis
Medical Center (Exhs. G andG-1)P 75.00 paid to St. Francis Medical
Center (Exhs. G-2 and G-3)P 428.00 to Carmelite General Hospital
(Exh. F)P 114.20 to Muoz Clinic (Exh. MM)For the physical injuries
suffered by Christopher Koh McKee:P 10,000.00 as moral damagesP
1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Center (Exhs. L and L-1)P 321.95 to
F.C.E.A. Hospital (Exhs. G and D-1)In addition, We award P10,000.00
as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another
P10,000.00; as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478.No
pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.26The decision is anchored
principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben
Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which caused the
accident. The appellate court further said that the law presumes
negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the
latter; it was further asserted that these defendants did not
allege in their Answers the defense of having exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and supervising
the said employee.27This conclusion of reckless imprudence is based
on the followingfindings of fact:In the face of these diametrically
opposed judicial positions, the determinative issue in this appeal
is posited in the fourth assigned error as follows:IVTHE TRIAL
COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE (sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS
TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE
TO THE RIGHT.Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness
Araceli Koh McKee testified thus:Q What happened after that, as you
approached the bridge?A When we were approaching the bridge, two
(2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver
of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2)
boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn
the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come
back to our right lane.Q Did the truck slow down?A No, sir, it did
not, just (sic) continued on its way.Q What happened after that?A
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the
right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on
the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic),
sir. (tsn, pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil
Cases).xxx xxx xxxQ Mrs. how did you know that the truck driven by
the herein accused, Ruben Galang did not reduce its speed before
the actual impact of collision (sic) as you narrated in this
Exhibit "1," how did you know (sic)?A It just kept on coming, sir.
If only he reduced his speed, we could have got (sic) back to our
right lane on side (sic) of the highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July
22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
Appellants' Brief).Plaintiffs' version was successfully
corroborated to Our satisfaction by the following facts and
circumstances:1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio
Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when it had already
collided with the car:xxx xxx xxxTanhueco repeated the same
testimony during the hearing in the criminal case:xxx xxx
xxxTanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
because he was one of the first to arrive at the scene of the
accident. As a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured
passengers to the hospital.We are not prepared to accord faith and
credit to defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of
the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived across the
street.Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary
course of events people usually take the side of the person with
whom they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a
general rule, they do not wish to be identified with the person who
was at fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among
the several persons within the same group (People vs. Vivencio,
CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR, Jan. 31, 1962).With respect to Dayrit, We can
not help suspecting (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He
did not go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he wanted
to call the police authorities about the mishap, but his phone had
no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may, the trial court in the
criminal case acted correctly in refusing to believe Dayrit.2.
Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claim that
Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car, according
to plaintiffs (p. 25, Appellants' Brief). This contention of
appellants was completely passedsub-silencioor was not refuted by
appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits not
included in the record. According to the Table of Contents
submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by
defendants-appellees. In this light, it is not far-fetched to
surmise that Galang's claim that he stopped was an eleventh-hour
desperate attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and
damages.3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the car
about 10 meters away:ATTY. SOTTO:Q Do I understand from your
testimony that inspite of the fact that you admitted that the road
is straight and you may be able to (sic) see 500-1000 meters away
from you any vehicle, you first saw that car only about ten (10)
meters away from you for the first time?xxx xxx xxxA I noticed it,
sir, that it was about ten (10) meters away.ATTY. SOTTO:Q So, for
clarification, you clarify and state under your oath that you have
(sic) not noticed it before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn. 3 to 5,
Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16, Appellants' Brief)Galang's testimony
substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's statement that Galang stopped only
because of the impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck
running at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's affidavit
(Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh impossible to
avoid a collision on a bridge.5. Galang's truck stopped because of
the collision, and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to
his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L. Nuag,
stated that he found skid marks under the truck but there were not
(sic) skid marks behind the truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3,
1978). The presence of skid marks show (sic) that the truck was
speeding. Since the skid marks were found under the truck and none
were found at the rear of the truck, the reasonable conclusion is
that the skid marks under the truck were caused by the truck's
front wheels when the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before
the mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as aforesaid,
Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters away, a very short distance
to avoid a collision, and in his futile endeavor to avoid the
collision he abruptly stepped on his brakes but the smashup
happened just the same.For the inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence of Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of
the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the
supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such defense of
having exercised the duties of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees in their answers. They
did not even adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of
selection and programs of supervision. The inattentiveness or
negligence of Galang was the proximate cause of the mishap. If
Galang's attention was on the highway, he would have sighted the
car earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. He
proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop when a collision
was already inevitable, because at the time that he entered the
bridge his attention was not riveted to the road in front of him.On
the question of damages, the claims of appellants were amply
proven, but the items must be reduced.28A motion for
reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was
subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the
respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984,29reconsidered
and set aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmedin totothe
trial court's judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider
this Resolution was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July
1984.30Hence, this petition.Petitioners allege that respondent
Court:I. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT
TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE
"PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT ALSO DISREGARDED
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE,
RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS (ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND
WITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE.II. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAID
DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT CANNOT
CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE
WHERE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT WAS
INDICTED.III. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
MADE A MISLEADING PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS
INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLY
MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.IV. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic)
ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE
WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES.V. . . COMMITTED A
PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY THEY (sic)
ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.VI. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION,
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT
ALLOWED BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT.VII. . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS
DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.31In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We
required private respondents to Comment on the petition.32After the
said Comment33was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply34thereto;
this Court then gave due course to the instant petitions and
required petitioners to file their Brief,35which they accordingly
complied with.There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the
main task of dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some
observations on the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in
order.Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery
of civil liability arising from aquasi-delictunder Article 2176 in
relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of
Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil Case No. 4478 was eventually
consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for joint trial in Branch III
of the trial court. The records do not indicate any attempt on the
part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably concluded
that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751 with the
civil cases, orvice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and
understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or
ruling of this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that
an independent civil action, authorized under Article 33 in
relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code, such as the civil cases
in this case, cannot be consolidated with the criminal case.
Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from their
minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may,
there was then no legal impediment against such consolidation.
Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to avoid a
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression and abuse, prevent
delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of the trial
court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the
parties litigants,36would have easily sustained a consolidation,
thereby preventing the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two
(2) judges appreciating, according to their respective orientation,
perception and perhaps even prejudice, the same
factsdifferently,and thereafter renderingconflictingdecisions. Such
was what happened in this case. It should not, hopefully, happen
anymore. In the recent case ofCojuangco vs. Court or Appeals,37this
Court held that the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent civil action
for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32,
33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject,
however, to the condition that no final judgment has been rendered
in that criminal case.Let it be stressed, however, that the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751 finding Galang guilty of
reckless imprudence, although already final by virtue of the denial
by no less than this Court of his last attempt to set aside the
respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
relevance or importance to this case.As We held inDionisio vs.
Alvendia,38the responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
aquasi-delictis entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as
more concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, "in the case of independent civil actions under the new
Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or
conviction, would be entirely irrelevant to the civil
action."39InSalta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs. Purisima,40this Court
stated:. . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the
civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner
to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed
similarlyregardless of the result of the criminal case.Indeed, when
the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case, to be
filed separately and to proceed independently even during the
pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on
the separate civil case. This must be so because the offenses
specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses
not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate
civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . .What remains
to be the most important consideration as to why the decision in
the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the
fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would
have been entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action
was for damages arising from adelict,in which case private
respondents' liability could only be subsidiary pursuant to Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any collusion, the
judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Galang would
have been conclusive in the civil cases for the subsidiary
liability of the private respondents.41And now to the merits of the
petition.It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the
principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondent Court's findings in its challenged resolution are
supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations,
conjectures and presumptions.The principle is well-established that
this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal
bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is
the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this
Court.42The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions.
Findings of facts of the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may
be set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence
or when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which
would have led to a conclusion different from what was stated in
its judgment.43The same is true where the appellate court's
conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures, speculations and
surmises44or where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on
a misapprehension of facts.45It is at once obvious to this Court
that the instant case qualifies as one of the aforementioned
exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial court and
the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not supported
by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and the
inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent
Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of
fact.In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the
fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that
the collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption
that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis
of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately
concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate
and proximate cause of the collision. This is an unwarranted
deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached
the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road
from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to
by petitioner Araceli Koh McKee:Q What happened after that, as you
approached the bridge?A When we were approaching the bridge, two
(2) boys tried to cross the right lane on the right side of the
highway going to San Fernando. My father, who is (sic) the driver
of the car tried to avoid the two (2) boys who were crossing, he
blew his horn and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the two (2)
boys. We noticed the truck, he switched on the headlights to warn
the truck driver, to slow down to give us the right of way to come
back to our right lane.Q Did the truck slow down?A No sir, it did
not, just (sic) continued on its way.Q What happened after that?A
After avoiding the two (2) boys, the car tried to go back to the
right lane since the truck is (sic) coming, my father stepped on
the brakes and all what (sic) I heard is the sound of impact (sic),
sir.46Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during
cross examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was
necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a
greater peril death or injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can
hardly be classified as negligent.Negligence was defined and
described by this Court inLayugan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court,47thus:. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black's
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley defines it,
"(T)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)In
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more than seventy
years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e held:The test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent
act use that(reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation?)If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreetpaterfamiliasof the Romanlaw. . . .InCorliss vs. Manila
Railroad Company,48We held:. . . Negligence is want of the care
required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of
the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a
want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern v.
Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).On the basis of the
foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts
obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be
imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would
have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural
course to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane
would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to
the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car. Moreover,
under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly finds
himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a
better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
brought about by his own negligence."49Considering the sudden
intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We find
that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given
situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test,
therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of negligence.In any
case, assuming,arguendothat Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be
said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause has been defined as:. . . that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.50Applying the above definition, although it may be said
that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act
in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a
sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the
car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the
former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into
its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far
right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under
the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more
apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide
while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in
width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by
side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare.51Furthermore, the
bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated
the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given
situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it
head-on.The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records.
He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48
kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum speed
allowed by law on a bridge52is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating
any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private
respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by
the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in
Pampango as to whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour
or miles per hour. The law presumes that official duty has been
regularly performed;53unless there is proof to the contrary, this
presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim
is based on mere conjecture.The truck driver's negligence was
likewise duly established through the earlier quoted testimony of
petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the
testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the
mishap.Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus:xxx xxx xxxQ Mrs.
how did you know that the truck driven by the herein accused, Ruben
Galang did not reduce its speed before the actual impact of
collision as you narrated in this Exhibit "1," how did you know?A
It just kept on coming, sir. If only he reduced his speed, we could
have got (sic) back to our right lane on side (sic) of the highway,
sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July 22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these
Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, Appellants' Brief)54while Eugenio Tanhueco
testified thus:Q When you saw the truck, how was it moving?A It was
moving 50 to 60 kilometers per hour, sir.Q Immediately after you
saw this truck, do you know what happened?A I saw the truck and a
car collided (sic), sir, and I went to the place to help the
victims. (tsn. 28, April 19, 1979)xxx xxx xxxQ From the time you
saw the truck to the time of the impact, will you tell us if the
said truck ever stopped?A I saw it stopped (sic) when it has (sic)
already collided with the car and it was already motionless. (tsn.
31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants'
Brief).55Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's
subsequentnegligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.Even if Jose Koh was
indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of
torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that
the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the
injured party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear
chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible
for the consequences thereof.56InBustamante vs. Court of
Appeals,57We held:The respondent court adopted the doctrine of
"last clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear
chance means that even though a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured
person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually
stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. (Sangco, Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).The
practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is
held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who
has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he,
aware of the plaintiff's peril, or according to some authorities,
should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due
care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff
to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).InPantranco
North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa,58We ruled:The doctrine of last
clear chance was defined by this Court in the case of Ong v.
Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise:The
doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence
of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising
reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.The
doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty
of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so,
is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v.
Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's Lumber and Hardware, et
al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de
Calibo, et al., G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent
negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause
of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the more
remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith,supra].Generally, the last
clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
to defeat claim (sic) for damages.Applying the foregoing doctrine,
it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it was the truck
driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision.
As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable
for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent
flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,
however, is onlyjuris tantum,notjuris et de jure.59Theironly
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. Article 2180 reads as
follows:The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.xxx xxx xxxEmployers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxx xxx xxxThe
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.The diligence of a
good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.60The answers of the private respondents
in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense.
Neither did they attempt to prove it.The respondent Court was then
correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in reversing the
decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477
and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no
sufficient legal and factual moorings.In the light of recent
decisions of this Court,61the indemnity for death must, however, be
increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the respondent
Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29
November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject
to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from
P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
McKee.Costs against private respondents.SO ORDERED.THIRD
DIVISIONG.R. No. L-44264 September 19, 1988HEDY GAN y
YU,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.Pacis, Baluyot, Reyes & De Leon for
petitioner.The Solicitor General for
respondents.FERNAN,C.J.:Petitioner Hedy Gan was convicted of the
crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence in Criminal Case No.
10201 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXII
presided by Judge Federico C. Alikpala. She was sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day ofarresto
mayoras minimum and two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
ofprision correccionalas maximum and was made to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of P12,000.00 without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal,
the trial court's decision was modified and petitioner was
convicted only of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence. Still
unsatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals,1petitioner
has come to this Court for a complete reversal of the judgment
below.The facts of the case as found by the appellate court are as
follows:In the morning of July 4, 1972 at about 8:00 o'clock, the
accused Hedy Gan was driving a Toyota car along North Bay
Boulevard, Tondo, Manila. While in front of house no. 694 of North
Bay Boulevard, there were two vehicles, a truck and a jeepney
parked on one side of the road, one following the other about two
to three meters from each other. As the car driven by the accused
approached the place where the two vehicles were parked, there was
a vehicle coming from the opposite direction, followed by another
which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front of it and
thereby encroached the lane of the car driven by the accused. To
avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, the defendant
swerved to the right and as a consequence, the front bumper of the
Toyota Crown Sedan hit an old man who was about to cross the
boulevard from south to north, pinning him against the rear of the
parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney
to move forward hitting the rear of the parts truck ahead of it.
The pedestrian was injured, the Toyota Sedan was damaged on its
front, the jeep suffered damages on its rear and front paints, and
the truck sustained scratches at the wooden portion of its rear.
The body of the old man who was later Identified as Isidoro Casino
was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but was
(pronounced) dead on arrival.2An information for Homicide thru
Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner in view of the
above incident. She entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment
and the case was set for trial.Meanwhile, petitioner sought and was
granted a re-investigation by the City Fiscal, as a result of which
the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against
petitioner during the resumption of hearing on September 7, 1972.
The grounds cited therefor were lack of interest on the part of the
complaining witness to prosecute the case as evidenced by an
affidavit of desistance submitted to the trial court and lack of
eyewitness to sustain the charge.The motion to dismiss filed by the
fiscal was never resolved. The Court instead ordered the
prosecution to present its evidence. After the prosecution rested
its case, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence.On December 22, 1972, the trial
court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the of- offense charged.Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14472-CR. On May 3, 1976, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:Wherefore, as modified, the accused Hedy Gan is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide thru simple
imprudence and, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code, she is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of
three (3) months and eleven (11) days ofarresto mayorand to
indemnify the heirs of Isidoro Casino in the sum of Twelve Thousand
Pesos (Pl2,000.00) without, however, any subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.3Petitioner now appeals to
this Court on the following assignments of errors:IThe Court of
Appeals erred in holding that when the petitioner saw a car
travelling directly towards her, she should have stepped on the
brakes immediately or in swerving her vehicle to the right should
have also stepped on the brakes or lessened her speed, to avoid the
death of a pedestrian.IIThe Court of Appeals erred in convicting
the petitioner of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence.IIIThe Court of Appeals erred in adjudging the
petitioner liable to indemnify the deceased in the sum of
P12,000.00.4We reverse.The test for determining whether or not a
person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law
imposes the duty oil the doer to take precaution against its
mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence.5A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the
emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in
a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless
the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence."6Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find
the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence
resulting in Homicide.The appellate court in finding the petitioner
guilty said:The accused should have stepped on the brakes when she
saw the car going in the opposite direction followed by another
which overtook the first by passing towards its left. She should
not only have swerved the car she was driving to the right but
should have also tried to stop or lessen her speed so that she
would not bump into the pedestrian who was crossing at the time but
also the jeepney which was then parked along the street.7The course
of action suggested by the appellate court would seem reasonable
were it not for the fact that such suggestion did not take into
account the amount of time afforded petitioner to react to the
situation she was in. For it is undeniable that the suggested
course of action presupposes sufficient time for appellant to
analyze the situation confronting her and to ponder on which of the
different courses of action would result in the least possible harm
to herself and to others.Due to the lack of eyewitnesses, no
evidence was presented by the prosecution with respect to the
relative distances of petitioner to the parked jeepney and the
oncoming overtaking vehicle that would tend to prove that
petitioner did have sufficient time to reflect on the consequences
of her instant decision to swerve her car to the light without
stepping on her brakes. In fact, the evidence presented by the
prosecution on this point is the petitioner's statement to the
police8stating::And masasabi ko lang ho umiwas ho ako sa isang
sasakyan nabiglangnagovertake sa sasakyan na aking kasalubong kung
kaya ay aking kinabig sa kanan ang akin kotse subalit siya
namanbiglangpagtawid ng tao o victim athindi ko na ho naiwasan at
ako ay wala ng magawa. Iyan ho ang buong pangyayari nang nasabing
aksidente.9(Emphasis supplied)The prosecution having presented this
exhibit as its own evidence, we cannot but deem its veracity to
have been admitted by it. Thus, under the circumstances narrated by
petitioner, we find that the appellate court is asking too much
from a mere mortal like the petitioner who in the blink of an eye
had to exercise her best judgment to extricate herself from a
difficult and dangerous situation caused by the driver of the
overtaking vehicle. Petitioner certainly could not be expected to
act with all the coolness of a person under normal conditions.10The
danger confronting petitioner was real and imminent, threatening
her very existence. She had no opportunity for rational thinking
but only enough time to heed the very powerfull instinct of
self-preservation.Also, the respondent court itself pronounced that
the petitioner was driving her car within the legal limits. We
therefore rule that the "emergency rule" enunciated above applies
with full force to the case at bar and consequently absolve
petitioner from any criminal negligence in connection with the
incident under consideration.We further set aside the award of
damages to the heirs of the victim, who by executing a release of
the claim due them, had effectively and clearly waived their right
thereto.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting
petitioner HEDY GAN y YU of the crime of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence. She is no longer liable for the P12,000.00 civil
indemnity awarded by the appellate court to the heirs of the
victim.SO ORDERED.Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.IRST DIVISONG.R. No. 115024
February 7, 1996MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA,petitioner,vs.COURT OF
APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL,
INC.,respondents.x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-xG.R.
No. 117944 February 7, 1996RICHARD LI,petitioner,vs.COURT OF
APPEALS and LOURDES VALENZUELA,respondents.D E C I S I O
NKAPUNAN,J.:These two petitions for review oncertiorariunder Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court stem from an action to recover
damages by petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for injuries sustained by her in a vehicular
accident in the early morning of June 24, 1990. The facts found by
the trial court are succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals
below:This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict,
for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident.Plaintiff's version of the accident is as follows: At
around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU
542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza
Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with
a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of
Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong
with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were
people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help
if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that
car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet
away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of
the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help
her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi
Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact
plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the
defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She
was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was
severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and
sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the
UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a
"traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)".
She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was
eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the
hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial
leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance.In
her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of
P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and
other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.Defendant Richard
Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling
at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected
and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was
driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd.
towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when he was suddenly
confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car
coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with
"full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved
to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and
bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning
device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense
that the left rear portion of plaintiff's car was protruding as it
was then "at a standstill diagonally" on the outer portion of the
right lane towards Araneta Avenue (par. 18, Answer). He confirmed
the testimony of plaintiff's witness that after being bumped the
car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another car
parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a
licensed driver.The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who
prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three
cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car
was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not remember whether the
hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and d