JIABS 2-1

'fH;EJOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A. K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

EDITORS

Heinz B echert Leon Hurvitz

Universitat Gottingen FRG University of British Columbia

Vancouver, Canada

Lewis Lancaster A. W. MacDonald

University of California, Berkeley, USA Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France

. B. J. Stavisky

WCNILKR, Moscow, USSR

Alex Wayman

Columbia University, New York, USA

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Stephen Beyer

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

Volume 2 1979 Number 1

the watermarkTHE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc., and is governed by the o~jectives of the Association and accepts scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS is published twice yearly in the Spring and Fall.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related publications.

Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,JIABS, Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A. The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the Journal and reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication and is not obliged to give reasons therefor.

Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andr; Bareau (France) JosephM. Kitagawa (USA)

John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland)

M.N. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura Uapan)

R. Card (USA) John RosenJield (USA)

B.C. Cokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA)

P.S.Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)

J. W. de Jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

Volume 1, Number 2 <;:>ftheJIABS was incorrectly marked with the year date of 1979. It is in fact a 1978 volume.

Copyright oThe International Association of Buddhist Studies 1979 ISSN: 0193-600X

Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the Anonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. The Mongol Khans and Chinese Buddhism and Taoism, by Sechin J agchid

2. From Madhyamika to Yogacara, an Analysis of MMK, XXIV. 18 and MV, 1.1-2, by Ga(?jin m. Nagao

3. Dynamic Liberation in Yogacara Buddhism, by Alan Sponberg

4. Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians, by Alex Wayman

II. SHORT PAPERS

1. Sambodhi in Asoka's 8th Rock Edict, by A. L. Basham 2. Can Meditational Practice be Measured? A Report on a

Quantitative Survey, by Jacques Maquet 3. Nirvana and Metaphysical Experience, by Ismael Quiles

III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Reviews:

1. World Conqueror and World Renouncer, by S. j. Tambiah

2. Comparative Ethics in Hindu and Buddhist Traditions, by Roderick Hindery.

3. Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, by Minoru Kiyota, assisted by Elvin W. Jones

4. Chand] Borobudur: A Monument of Mankind, by Dr. Soekmono

Obituary:

l. Paul Demieville,.iJy Alexander W. Macdonald

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29

44 65

81

84 91

99

103

106

108

110

THE MONGOL K.RANS AND CHINESE BUDDHISM AND TAOISl\f

by Sechin Jagchid

Before the Mongols made any contact with peoples of other cultures, their religion was Shamanism, a faith common among the nomads of North Asia. Mongke Tenggeri, or "Everlasting Heaven," was the most exalted amidst many other heavenly spirits and deities. People able to communicate with Tenggeri and other spirits were known to Mongols as bOes,and idilgens. Special shamans who could communicate with Mongke Tenggeri were honored with the title of Teb Tenggeri,l (Chs. Kao-t'ien-jen = "Heaven's reporter.") Their duty was to interpret the "Will of Heaven" to the people and to pray for the khan.

With the expansion of their empire, the Mongols made con­tact with many foreign religions; however, from the Mongolian point of view these alien religions were only branc:hes of the Mongolian pantheistic teachings, their deities additional to the native gods. If foreign priests, monks, or khojas communicated with Heaven and prayed for the khan, they also would be ho­nored as boes, for the more prayers for the life of the khan and the tranquility of the people the better. Because of their tra­ditional pantheistic beliefs, the Mongols felt no necessity to sus­tain one religion and oppress another.

On the other hand it was clear to foreign religious leaders that unless they could win the support of the Mongolian rulers, they could not fully develop their religion. As a result, most religious leaders prayed for the khan and supported the state. This may explain why the Chinese Taoist leader Ch'iu Ch'u­chi, though very old, traveled thousands of miles to Afghani­stan to pay homage to Chinggis Khan, and why the Tibetan lama Sa-skya Pandita, the fourth great master of the Sa-skya sect, also came personally to the camp of K6tan,2 commanding

7

prince of the Mongolian armies in western China and Tibet. The Mongols, who rose from being a small, unknown no­

madic tribe to conquerors of the world, could not avoid contact with foreign cultures and different ways of life. Their adoption of those new things also applied to foreign religions. As their sophistication increased, the Mongolian rulers began to feel that their own simple primitive religion could not match these foreign religions, with their profound philosophical teachings and magnificent rituals, and they felt a need for new religions adequate to their new status as world conquerors. This is quite certainly why various members of the Mongolian ruling class at one time or another adopted Buddhism, Christianity, or Is­lam.

But why, among so many religions, did the Mongolian khans of the Yuan dynasty in China choose Tibetan Buddhism as the imperial religion and honor Sa-skya-pa lamas as imperial in­structors (ti-shih) ? Besides the excuses given by monks and cler­gymen, that it was "by karma"(irugel in Mongolian, yuan in Chinese), "the will of God," or "Heaven's destiny," there were historical and cultural reasons. However, the purpose of this paper is not to discuss the religious faith of the Mongols them­selves but to concentrate on the relationship of the Mongols to Chinese Buddhism and Taoism in the thirteenth century.

A difficult question to answer accurately is whether it was the Chinese Buddhists or the Taoists who contacted the Mon­gols first. According to available sources it seems that the Bud­dhists made the earliest contact. When the Mongols invaded North China during the Jurchen-Chin dynasty, the famous monk Yin-ch'ien, (also known as Master Hai-yun, 1207-1257), had already made personal contact with the Kuowang ("king of a state") Mukhali,3 Commander-in-chief of the Mongolian forces and the top Mongolian administrator in North China. Through this powerful leader's recommendation, Yin-ch'ien received the honorable religious title Kao-t'ien-jen from Ching­gis Khan. In his youth he was a disciple of Master Chung-kuan, and was later received in audience by Chinggis Khan. The Fo­tsu li-tai t'ung-tsai records:

8

When the master was thirteen years old4 [1219] Emperor Chinggis was campaigning in the realm under Heaven. Just then the Master was in Ning-yuan when the city fell. [The

Master], among all the people, personally approached the presence of the Saintly [Emperor]. [The Emperor] advised him [to allow his hair to grow and] to wear a coil. The Master answered, "If [I] follow the style of the Nation [Mongols], I can not keep the style of a monk." Whereupon [The Em­peror] made a decree allowing [him] to continue his original practice.

The T'ung-tsai continues:

When the Master was eighteen [1219], the Heavenly troops approached again. Tai-shih kuo-want [Mukhali] directed the troops to attack Lan-ch'eng.6 All the people escaped and dis­persed [but] the Master remained to serve Chung-kuan as usual ... The next day, the city surrendered ... The Kuo-wang put Chung-kuan and the Master under the direct rule ofthe Emperor Chinggis ... Emperor Chinggis issued an Imperial Decree to Kuo-wang Mukliali saying: "The old elder and the young elder, whom you reported to me through an envoy, are truly Kao-t'ien-jen. NourIsh them nicely with clothing and food, make them the head-men, and take good care of them . . . Upon receiving this Decree, the Kuo-wang bestowed upon them great mercy ... All their needs were supplied by the office. Thus the name of the Young Elder began to be known. At the age of nineteen [1220], Chung-kuari ... passed away ... [Later] the Master entered Yen [Peking] and stayed at [the monastery of] Great Ch'ing-shou-ssu.7

By the time Hai-yun was thirteen, in 1214, Chinggis had been campaigning in North China for three years, and the Mongolian forces were besieging Yen (Peking). Consequently, Chung-kuan and Hai-yun had an opportunity to meet Ching­gis Khan. The Khan's tolerance towards the young acolyte and his master was probably due to the traditional Mongolian Sha­manistic practices. On the other hand, Hai-yun's bold refusal to obey the Khan's order might actually have pleased the khan because of his disposition to honor a straight-forward person. However, the short visit had no further significance for Chinese Buddhism.

The Mongols occupied Yen (Peking), in 1215. In 1216, Chinggis, conferring the rank of Tai-shih kuo-wang on Mukhali, allowed him to manage the lord-chancellor's affairs. Mukhali's recommendation was important both for obtaining Heaven's blessings for the Khan and to indicate the Mongols' concern

9

for the religious activItIes of their Chinese subjects. From Chinggis Khan's decree one may infer that both master and disciple had already been recognized by the Khan as chief sha­mans, or Teb-Tenggeri, also appointed headmen over Chinese Buddhist affairs. Thus it appears that Chinese Buddhist lead­ers had earlier contact with the Mongolian authorities than the Taoists.

Chinese Taoism by this period had developed into two main streams, mainly because of the political confrontation betweeri the Jurchen-Chin and the Chinese Sung. To the north, in the realm of Chin, was the Chuan-chen Sect headed by Ch'iu Ch'u­chi (also entitled, Ch'ang-ch'un chen-jen, "the perfect man of everlasting spring"); to the south of the Yangtze River was the Cheng-i Sect led by Chang T'ien-shih, "the heavenly instructor," and his household.s In the early thirteenth century, there was still no need for the Cheng-i Sect and its leaders to establish contact with the Mongols; however, due to the military threat of the Mongols, the Chuan-chen Sect was pressed to sue for the favor of the invaders. Ch'ui Ch'u-chi, head of the sect, was brought to the attention of Chinggis Khan by a Chinese cour­tier, Liu Chung-lu. In 1219, the Khan dispatched Liu to Shang­tung to invite this famous Taoist to his court. The meeting took place during Chinggis' western expedition against Khorezm. It is unclear whether this historic invitation ,was motivated by the Khan's interest in meeting the "Perfect Man" or whether it was due to a consistent Mongolian policy of summoning the various religious leaders they could reach. But, it is under­standable that the "world conqueror" would anxiously desire a long life.

According to a late Yuan work, T'ao Tsung-i's Ch'o-ching-lu, Chinggis Khan's decree to the Taoist Ch'iu Ch'u-chi was as fol­lows:

10

As soon as [We] humbly discovered [you ] hsien-sheng9

[teacher], in [your] retreat in the old terntory of Shantung, We limitlessly admired and were sincerely concerned about [you]. ... However, with many mountains and rivers be­tween [us], it is impossible for Us to fulfill the ceremony of welcoming you in person. But We will devoutly cleanse Our body with baths and eat vegetarian food. ... [We] invite [you], the teacher, to condescend in your immortal steps and to come to Us, notwithstanding the deserts and the remote-

ness. [You] may faithfully instruct Us for the sake of the peo­ple and the state, and sympathetically provide the nourishing method for Our body. We will serve you in person beside [your] immortal seat. We earnestly hope that even one phrase from the remnant of your spit may sustain [US].10

Here, for the Chinese courtier Liu Ch'ung-Iu the so-called "nourishing way for body" was perhaps the only method to get promotion for himself. To accomplish the dual purposes of the Khan and himself, Liu went as a special emissary in 1219 to summon the immortal Taoist from Shantung. The elegant Chinese decree that Liu delivered to the Taoist Master was very different from one of purely Mongolian tone. It was very dif­ferent from the style of others found in the Secret History of the Mongols and from the Yuan colloquial decrees to both Buddhist and Taoist temples collected in the Ta-Yilan sheng-cheng kuo­ch'ao tien-chang. 11 Chinggis Khan did not have an appreciation of Chinese culture, as did his grandson, Khubilai. Moreover, the expression "devotedly cleansing Our body with baths and eat vegetarian food" is entirely out of character for a warrior hero of the nomadic world. The same is true of the notion that "even one phrase from the remnant of your spit may sustain Us."

Chinggis Khan's historic conversation with Ch'iu Ch'u-chi took place in the snowy mountains of Afghanistan. It was a novel chat between the world conqueror, who had spent his life at war on horseback, and a religious leader, from the quiet life of retreat and meditation. Though the talk did not really satisfy the Khan, it did result in mutual understanding and respect and greatly influenced later historical events. Taoist records as­sess the meeting as very successful. However, in an account written by the Yuan monk Hsiang-mai, the story is somewhat different: "All the answers of Master Ch'iu to [the Throne] were quite common."12

Master Ch'iu's disciple, Li Chih-ch'ang, recorded the main talk as follows:

11

After settling in the hostel, [the Master] immediately went for an audience. The Emperor, comforting [him], said, "[You] did not respond to the invitations of other countries, but traveled tens of thousands of miles to arrive [here]. We are greatly pleased." [The Master] replied, "The reason that

[IJ, a person of the countryside, accepted the decree to come was [the willJ of Heaven." The Emperor was pleased and allowed [the Master] to be seated. After a meal [the Em­peror] asked, "As a chen-jen ["the perfect p~rson"] from afar, what kind of medicine of perpetual life do you have to help Us?" The Master replied, "Th.ere is a way to prolong life but no medicine for perpetual life as such." The Emperor ap­preciated his honesty and [ordered] two tents to tie erected east of the Imperial Pavilion to accommodate [the Master]. [Later] the interpreter asked: "You are addressed as Tenggeri mongke kumun. Is that what you call yourself or do other peo­ple so address you?" The Master saId, "It is not [I], a person of the countryside, who calls myself that. I am called that by others." The mterpreter again asked, "What were you called in the old days?" [The Master] replied [to the Emperor], "The people of the world call [me] hsien-sheng [teacher]." The Emperor asked Chimkhai, "What should the perfect person be called?,,13 Chimkhai replied, "Some persons call [him] respectfully the teacher, the perfect person, or the im­mortal." The Emeeror said, "From now on let [him] be called the immortal."14

It is not difficult to see that the sincere desire of Chinggis Khan was for the medicine of perpetual life. His quest failed, but he was not distressed. He calmly approved of Ch'iu's hon­esty. On one hand the Khan exerted strict self-control. On the other hand, because this famous Taoist had "not responded to the invitation of other countries but had traveled tens of thou­sands of miles" to meet Chinggis Khan, the Khan said that he was greatly pleased. It appears that he wanted to impress the Chinese, with whom he was actually waging a psychological war. In order to emphasize the fact, the Khan had his inter­preter ask the Taoist whether the high title, Tenggeri mongke kumun, "the Heavenly everlasting person" was self-assumed or whether it was legitimately conferred by others. This suggests that the Khan tried to find out whether the Taoist was an im­poster.

In confirming a title for the Chinese visitor, the Mongolian monarch also made a very careful choice among the three al­ternatives of "teacher," "perfect person" and "immortal" (shen­hsien). He selected the last one, and did not entitle Ch'iu the teacher (hsien-sheng). From this, one may infer that the conver­sation did not convert the Khan to the teachings of this Taoist, although he remained a supporter. This contrasted with the

12

later conversion of his grandsons: Prince Kotan accepted the Sa-skaya Pandita as his teacher and Khubilai Khan made the Phags-pa Lama the Imperial Instructor of his realm.

Most of the Chinese writers would like to emphasize the im­portant achievements on both sides as follows. Ch'iu Ch'u-chi's leadership in the religious world was firmly guaranteed by the Khan. The Taoist priests and temples of North China were protected and exempted from tax and corvee duties. Through these special privileges Ch'iu was able to provide safe refuge for many intellectuals and others in Taoist temples during the troubled periods of the Mongolian conquest. On the other hand, Chinggis Khan achieved fruitful results for Mongolian strategy from this meeting. The Jurchen-Chin Emperor and officials of the Chinese Sung dynasty had invited the Taoist several times but were all politely turned down. This was the notion that of those who invited him only Chinggis Khan was the true Son of Heaven with a Mandate to unify the universe, and the only sovereign to whom Ch'iu should pay his respects. In this manner Chinggis had achieved a success in his psycho­logical political propaganda.

The noted contemporary Confucian scholar, Yuan Hao­wen,15 estimates that by the end of the Chin dynasty and the beginning of the Yuan, twenty percent of the population of North China was under the influence of the Chuan-chenSect. 16 Thus, for Chinggis Khan, a good connection with the leader of· this powerful sect meant a great victory in his campaign against Chin.

Chinggis Khan's contact with Ch'iu Ch'u-chi might have been the Khan's first encounter with the cultivated, philosophi­cal and religious leader, and he obviously was greatly im­pressed. Earlier, the Khan had had a brief contact with the Buddhist monk Hai-yun, but the Khan was not more favorably inclined to Chinese Buddhism as a result; Chingghis Khan could not have known of the long struggle between Taoism and Buddhism in Chinese history. Eventually in this struggle the Khan too granted special privileges to this Taoist leader, which enabled him to provide refuge for Chinese intellectuals in his temples. This action disappointed both Buddhist monks and Confucian scholars. The expansion of Taoist influence stim­ulated the Buddhists to launch a counterattack later, during

13

the reign of Mongke Khan (r. 1251-1259). Chinggis Khan passed away in 1227 and his son Ogod~i as­

cended the throne in 1229. This same year, the great Buddhist supporter Yeh-hi Ch'u-ts'ai was promoted to the position of premier. All these events were unfavorable for the Taoist Ch'uan-chen Sect. However, Ogodei Khan did not alter the tra­ditional Mongolian policy of religious tolerance, so the Bud­dhist counterattack against the Taoists was postponed for two decades. During this significant change in the political situa­tion, the great Taoist Master Ch'ui Ch'u-chi also died. From that time, the Taoist movement was not as active as the Bud­dhists under the leadership of the outstanding monk Hai-yun.

Regarding the Buddhist movement among the Mongols, the Yuan shih records, "When the Yuan arose in the north they al­ready honored Buddhism."l7 The record must have some his­torical basis, but the record is unclear as to the time, the per­sons involved and other details.

The Yuan monk Nien-ch'ang recorded Hai-yun's activities in the Mongolian Court:

In the first month of the ting-yu [1237] the Second Empress of Emperor T'ai-tsu offered to the Master the title of Kuang­t'ien chen-kuo ta-shih [The great master of glorifying heaven and pacifying the kingdom]. In the winter of the year chi-hai [1239], the Master was a~ain appointed Abbot of the Great Ch'ing-shou Monastery.l

The most meaningful thing Hai-yun did, and most impor­tant for later history, was his teaching of Buddhism to Khubilai at the latter's princely residence, in the year 1242. The monk not only won Khubilai's sympathy and support for Chinese Buddhism but also succeeded in planting the basic truths of Buddhism in the heart of the future khan, which finally made him receptive to Buddhist teachings and led him to favor Bud­dhism over other religions. In T'ung-tsai the Yuan monk Nien­ch'ang wrote:

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In the jen-yin year [1242] the Great Prince Khubilai invited the master to his pavilion and asked him about the general ideas of the Law of the Buddha. At first the Master ex­plained the teaching of men and heaven, and the relation­ship between cause and effect. Next he explained several key words of the Law to open the Prince's heart. Then faith grew

in tJ:!e heart of the Prince; and he asked for the disciplined heart of a bodhisattva. At that time secretary Liu Ping-chung19 was in the service [of the Prince]. [Khubilai] again queried, "Does the Law of the Buddha provide the way for the realm under heaven to enjoy tranquility?" The Master said, "In the realm of the Law, it provides life to the four kinds of living beings. These facts are all included in the realm of the Law of the Buddha. However, as for the tranquility or unrest of a state, every­thing depends upon the joy or suffering of the people, The joy or suffering, peace or danger, depends upon politics. Of course, it also depends upon the Will of Heaven. In the teaching of the Law of our Buddha, the function of the court has already been pointed out clearly~ It is neither easy nor difficult, but it might be impossible for Your Highness, the Prince, to practice. It would be better to invite wise men and learned scholars from all parts of the realm to guery them about the history of tranquility and the decline of states, now and then. Your Highness may learn something by listening to them." The Prince asked again, "Among the three reli­gions [Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism] which one is the most honorable, which has the best law, and which is the outermost?" The Master answered, "Among all sages, only Buddhist monks are not tricky. Therefore from ancient times, Buddhism has always been held above the others. The Prince honored him as his instructor. The Prince asked him to stay, but the Master insisted on leaving. Before his departure, the Prince asked, "After you leave, how shall I keep the Law of Buddha?" The Master said, "It is difficult for faith to grow. Faith is not easy to develop. Since it has emerged, it IS important to hold it fast with all your heart. Please do not forget the disciplined mind of a bodhisattva. Do not find fault with the Three Jewels, and always be mind­ful of the sufferings of the people. Always do beneficial works for others. These are the Laws of the Buddha."20

In the Ta-Yuan Chih-yua1i-pien-wei-lu, a work of the Yiian monk Hsiang-mai, there are also some records of the early Buddhist activities in the pre-Yiian Mongolian Court. Among them, however, the most remarkable achievements were those of the Kashmir lama, Na-mo. In "The Biography of Tege" in the Yuan shih it says:

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Tege ... was a man from Kashmir .... Both his father O-t'o­Ch'I [Otochi] and his uncle Ma-mo [Namu] were disciples of the Buddha. One day O-t'o-ch'i and his brother said to each other: "The world is full of unrest, and our country is de-

dining, but in the northeast there is the sign of the Son of Heaven. Why should we not go and follow him?" S.9 they came together and were received by T'ai-tsung [Ogodei Khan]. Ting-tsung [Guyug Khan] made ,Na-mo his instruc­tor .... Hsien-tsung [Mongke Khan] honored Na-mo with the title of kuo-shih ["state Instructor"], bestowed upon him a jade seal, and appointed him to administer BuddhIst affairs in the realm under heaven. 21 .

Undoubtedly, the influence of the great Phags-pa Lama on Khubilai Khan was a decisive factor. Nevertheless, the Chinese Buddhist scholar Liu Ping-chung, another important figure, influenced the Mongolian rulers in their appreciation of Chinese Buddhism. Liu, who later became one of the important foun­ders of the Yuan state, originally was a monk attached to the princely residence of Khubilai. In attending the young prince, he had ample opportunity to influence him with the teachings of the Buddha. In addition, Hai-yun and Liu Ping-chung had an intimate personal relationship as master and disciple. Con­sequently, in the struggle of Taoists against the Buddhists, Liu was naturally on the side of the latter. Liu, half monk, half Confucian scholar, later became one of the main planners for the forthcoming Yuan Dynasty, and he recommended many important Chinese scholars to Khubilai. The stand of the Mon­golian Court in the case of the Buddhist-Taoist struggle was obviously influenced through such contacts.

Hai-yun was continually ordered to administer Buddhist af­fairs during the reigns of Guyug Khan (1246-1248) and Mongke Khan (1251-1259). This was not only a petsonal suc­cess for Hai-yun, but also influenced Mongolian policy towards religious affairs in China. "The Annals of Hsien-tsung [Mongke Khan]" in the Yuan shih records, "the monk Hai-yun was in charge of Buddhist affairs and the Taoist Li Chen­ch'ang22 was in charge of Taoist affairs."23

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The Ta-Yuan sheng-ch'eng kuo-Ch'ao tien-chang records: On the sixteenth day of the fifth month of the thirty-first

year of Chih-yuan [1294] the Premier's Office received a Saintly decree which said: "In tpe Saintly decrees of the For­mer Emperors, Chinggis and Ogodei, it has been said, 'Re­lease the [Buddhist] monks, the Christian priests and the Taoist priests from all their corvee duties and taxes. Have them report to Heaven and pray for [Our] long life. Now

according to this precedent of the Former [Emperors'] Saintly decrees, exempt [them] from their corvee duties and taxes and have them report to Heaven and pray for [Our] long life. This by His Majesty.' ,,24

Thus, both Chinggis and Ogodei Khan exempted from corvee duties and taxes the Buddhist, Taoist and Christian priesthoods, according to the traditional Mongolian broad­minded attitude towards all religions.

The aforementioned "Biography ofTege" mentions the ar­rival of the Kashmir lama Na-mo in the Mongolian Court and says, "Hsien-tsung [Mongke Khan] honored Na-mo with the title of kuo-shih [State Instructor], bestowed upon him a jade seal, and appointed him to administer Buddhist affairs in all the realm under heaven."25 However, it is difficult to decide whether this event happened before or after Hai-yun's ap­pointment. Nevertheless, this set the precedent for appointing a non-Chinese monk to administer Buddhist affairs in all the empire, including China. In other words, this was a forerunner of the institutionalized function of Ti-shih, the Imperial In­structor, a post always occupied by the great lamas of the Ti­betan Sa-skya sect.

Through the meeting of the famous Taoist master Ch'iu Ch'u-chi with Chinggis Khan, the Ch'uan-chen sect obtained especially favorable support from the Mongols and conse­quently, "flourished like the sun in the middle of the sky."26 This Taoist sect was then able to save many people, but also inev­itably attracted the hostility of Buddhism. The evil deeds of the Taoists listed by Hsiang-mai in the Ta-Yuan Chih-yuan pien-wei­lu are likely exaggerated and prejudiced; nevertheless, they are not all false accusations.

In general, after the death of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi the Taoists were not as active as Buddhists. This was probably due to the rise to power of Ogodei Khan and his appointment of Yeh-lu Ch'u­ts'ai, a devoted Buddhist, as his premier for Chinese affairs. Even so, the Taoists were not neglected by the Mongolian court, and Taoist leaders "received documents with the Im­perial Seal to administer the affairs of their religion." When Mongke Khan ascended the throne (1251) he appointed Li Chen-ch'ang to oversee Taoist affairs. 27 (This "Li Chen-ch'ang" is a mispronunciation of the name Li Chih-ch'ang, the author

17

of Hsi-yu-chi and Ch'iu Ch'u-chi's counselor in the Ch'lian-chen Sect.)

The long historical conflict between Taoism and Buddhism was not mere cultural struggle between two djfferent religions, one of Chinese origin and the other Indian background, but was also a political and economic conflict. This complicated ear­lier historical background was not known to the Mongolian rul­ers during their early occupation of China. However, when the Buddhist monks discovered that their opponents had gained support from Chinggis Khan, they immediately recalled these painful historical experiences suffered in the past, and tried to find some way to influence the Mongolian court so as to prevent a reoccurrence of the disaster suffered by the Proper Law.

The efforts of Na-rno and Hai-yun influenced the Mongolian rulers to renew their policy towards Chinese religions. More­over, the conversion of Prince Kotan to Tibetan Buddhism and the personal relationship between Prince Khubilai and Phags­pa Lama greatly aided the Chinese Buddhists in expanding their influence in the Mongolian court. First of all, they discred­ited Ch'iu Ch'u-chi, accusing him of dishonesty in dealing with Chinggis Khan. In order to gain the support of the new Khan Mongke in retaliating aginst the Taoists, they foresaw a sym­pathetic attitude on the part of the Mongolian rulers, and made assertions to the Khan that they were the victims of evil Taoist activities. The Yuan Han-lin scholar Chan Po-ch'un,28 in his preface to the Ta-Yuan Chih-yuan pein-wei-lu, the work of the monk Hsiang-mai, said:

The Taoist Ch'iu Chou-chi, Li Chih-ch'ang and others de­stroyed the Tien-cheng Confucian Temple of Hsi-ching and turned it into [.the TaOIst temple] ,Wen-ch'efoIg Kuan.JT~ey] destroyed the Image of Buddha Sakyamum, the whIte Jade [image] of Kuan-yin [AvalokiteSvara], and the sacred pagoda of Buddhist relics. [They] plotted against and occupied four­hundred eighty-two Buddhist monasteries, and spread the false words of Wang Fu,29 the Lao Tsu pa-shih-i hua-t'u [The eighty-one conversion figures of Lao Tsu] to mislead the people. Then the Elder [Fu-]yu of the Shao-lin [Monastery] led the honorable instructors to the Court and memorialized [ the case] to the former Emperor Mongke. 30

Upon receiving this Buddhist petition, Mongke Khan de­creed a debate in the year 1258 between the monks and the

18

Taoists. Hsiang-mai continued:

Then His Majesty, the Emperor [Khubilai] was ordered by [the Former Emperor] Mongke, to assemble the elite of the nineschools31 again to discuss and to distinguish between the truth and falseness of the two ways of the monks and the Taoists. Accepting the Saintly Decree of the Former Em­peror, His Majesty, the Emperor, decided to summon the two sides of Buddhism and Taoism with the Elder of the Shao-lin [Monastery] as the head of the monks and Chang Chen-jen as the head of the Taoist priests to come to the pal~ ace at Shangtu to discuss face to face in the presence of [His Majesty] under the Grand Hall. Also present were the State Instructor Na-mo, the State Instructor Phags_pa,32 His Ex­cellency the Senior Guardian of the Heir-Apparent Ts'ung [Liu Pmg-chung]; other monks totalling more than three hundred; Confucian scholars Tou Han-ch'ing,33 Yao Kung­ma034 and others; Premier Meng-su-su,35 Vice-Premier Lien,36 Premier Molkhachi, 'Chang Chung-ch'ien37 and two hundred others [officials and scholars] to witness; and the Taoist priests Chang chen-jen, Wang hsien-sheng from Mantzu [South China] and more than two hundred others to debate with the [Buddhist] monks. 38

The presence of so many dignitaries and luminaries illus­trates how great and significant the meeting was. It also shows the deep concern of both Mongke Khan and Prince Khubilai. Besides the Buddhist and Taoist opponents, many Confucian scholars attended, including Yao Shu, Tao Mo, Chang Wen­ch'ien and Lien Hsi-hsien. The crux of this great debate was recorded in "The inscription for the destruction of the false scriptures of the Taoist collections in all districts as commanded by the Saintly Decree" (Shen-chih fen-hui chu-lu wei-Tao-tsang­ching chih pei). The inscription was composed by the Han-lin Scholars Tang Fang and Wang P'an39 in the year 1284:

19

In the time of the reign of Emperor Hsien-tsung [Mongke], the Taoists produced a book called Lao-chun hua-hu ch'eng-fo ching ["The scripture of Lao Tsu's transformation to Buddha through the conversion of barbarians"] and Pa-shih-i-hua tu ["The eighty-one conversion figures"]' The words are vile, shallow and extravagant. [Their] purpose is to despise Bud­dhism and to elevate their own teachmgs. Then Hls Majesty was staying at [his] princely residence. [Former] Emperor Hsien-tsung ordered the two parties of Buddhists. and

20

Taoists to proceed to His Majesty's palace to debate. Both of the parties agreed that: if the TaOIsts won then the monks would wear hats to become Taoist; if the monks won then the Taoists would shave [their] hair to become monks. The monks asked the Taoists, "Your book is named the Scripture of Transformation to Buddha through the Conversion of the Barbarians. What does the [word] Buddha mean?" The Taoist answered, "The Buddha is the [great] awakening. It means the awakening of heaven and earth, the awakening of yin and yang, the awakening of and benevolence and up­rightness." The monk said, "It is not so. The awakening means self-awakening, to awaken others, the fulfillment of the deed of awakenmg and the clear completion of the [above] three awakenings. Therefore, this is said to be the Buddha. It is not limited only to the awakening of heaven and earth, yin and yang, and benevolence and uprightness." His Majesty said, "I also understand by heart that bene-vo­lence and uprightness are the words of Confucius. [They] said that Buddha is the awakening of benevolence and up­rightness. Their theory is wrong." The Taoist again pro­ceeded and presented the Shih-chz and other books and tried to talk more and to win by chance. The Imperial Instructor Pandita Phags-pa said, "What book is it?" [The Taoist] said, "It is the book about the emperors and kings of earlier dy­nasties." His Majesty said, "Now it is purposed to discuss re­ligion. Why should all hang on these emperors and kings of earlier dynasties?" The Imperial Instructor said, "In our In­dia, there is also a Shih-chi [record of history]. Have you heard of it?" [The Taoists] answered, "Not yet." The Im­perial Instructor said, "Let me explain it to you. In India the King Bimbasara praised the ment of the Buddha and said, 'Above heaven and under heaven there is nothing equivalent to Buddha.' When he was speaking these words, where was Lao Tzu?" The Taoist could not answer. The Imperial In­structor again asked, "Is the theory of the converSIOn of the barbarians [recorded] in your Shih-chi?" [The Taoist] said, "No." The Imperial Instructor said, "Since it is not in the Shih-chi, and again it is not recorded in the T'ao-te ching, it is clear that thIS is a falsehood!" The words of the Taoists were submitted. Minister Yao Shu said: "The Taoists are de­feated." His Majesty commanded that the punishment be performed as it had been agreed upon and dispatched the envoy Toghon to proceed to the Lung-kuang Monastery to shave the hair of the Taoist Fan Ch1h-yin and seventeen other persons to make them monks, and burn forty-five books of the false scriptures. In the realm under heaven two­hundred thirty-seven Buddhist Monasteries that had been

occupied by the Taoists were all ordered to be returned [to the BuddhlstsVO

From these records it is clear that this great debate was a Taoist struggle against an alliance of Buddhists and Confucian scholars. The background for this debate was not only religious contradictions but also political and cultural conflicts. The most decisive argument that put down the Taoists was from the mouth of Phags-pa. This not only increased his personal pres­tige and brought him reverence from Khubilai, but also greatly influenced Chinese society and its traditional culture and thought. Of course, the influence of Na-mo should not be ne­glected.

This great debate has also been recorded in the Tibetan H or Chos-'byung (a history of Mongolian Buddhism) by Jigmen­namkha:

Then in China there were many people of wrong views. They were the followers of the ancient Tai-shang Lao-chiin and were called shing-shing. Considering this matter as a harmful thing to both themselves and others, the Khan com­manded [Phags-pa] to extinguish these evil persons and to cause them to follow the Proper Law [of Buddha]. There­upon through the principle of proper reason he subdued tliis heresy, swiftly extinguished the leading figures of the shing-shing, turned their wrong views into proper views and ordered them to become monks to develop the Law of Bud­dha Shakyamuni.41

This Tibetan record indicates that the event was a significant victory in Buddhist history and was highly praised by Tibetan Buddhists. In fact, however, this victory did not overcome the Taoist activities effectively, and therefore, after Khubilai be­came the Khan (r. 1260-1294) the Buddhists again petitioned the court to destroy the Taoist scriptures. This was again au­thorized by Khubilai Khan and in the wintet of 1281 he or­dered the Buddhists and Taoists to debate their doctrines. The decree says:

21

Formerly, according to the Decree of Emperor M6ngke, in the year of wu-wu [1258], the monks and the Taoists carried out a debate on the Law of Buddha. The Taoists lost. Upon this, the Huan-hu-ching and other scriptures, which were falsely made from the lies of the Taoists, together with their

wooden blocks, were ordered to be burnt and destroyed. At present, because it was memorialized that the Taoists did not destroy those scriptures and wooden blocks, whi,!l should be destroyed, but hid them, [the Court] sent the Vice-Pre­mier Chang, the Deputy-Premier Chang, Minister Chiao, to­gether [with the monks], the General-Director [of Buddhist Affairs] Chiian and the Taoists Chang t'ien-shih,42 and others to go to the inner part of Ch'ang-ch'un Kung to collect them. Now Vice-Premier Chang and the others returned and me­morialized: "The Scriptures of the [Tao]-tsang [the canon of Taoism], except Tao-te-ehing which is the real scripture of Lao Tzu, are all creations of later persons. Most of them cal­umniate the teaching of Buddha [and] steal the words from Buddhism. Moreover, some of them were copied from the books of the yin-yang [school], medical and other words of many scholars, but with their names changed. The annota­tions are distorted and erroneous, and have lost their orig­inal truth. [The Taoists] have falsely made charms and amulets, and absurdly told people that those who wear them would not be drowned in water, burnt in fire or wounded by swords and knives. When Chang t'ien-shih [and others] were ordered to test them in fire, they all implored for mercy and said, 'these are all false. [We] dare not try.' Again the report of Chi ehen-jen, [and others] say: 'The [collection] of the scriptures of Tao-tsang, with the exception of the Tao-te­ching of Lao Tzu, are groundless words fabricated by later people. [We] are willing to have all of them burnt. It will also make us feel cleaner.' " This was authorized by the Throne [by saying], "From now on the Taoists should follow the TaQ­te-ehing of Lao Tzu for their practices. If there are those who prefer the scriptures of Buddha they may become monks. If they are not willing to become monks they should marry and go back to their lay life. Except for the Tao-te-ehing these groundless scriptures in the Tao-tsang that were created from falsehood, together with their wooden blocks, should all be burnt and destroyed."43

According to the Taoist record Hua-hu ching, Lao-Tzu went west to convert the barbarians. Even T'ien-chu (India), the holy land of Buddhism, it was claimed, came under the influence of the teachings of Lao Tzu. According to this Taoist Dotion the Buddha was not only transformed into Tai-shan Lao-chiin (Lao Tzu) but was even made Lao Tzu's disciple. This greatly offended the Buddhists, and consequently, all debates were concentrated on this crucial topic. .

The victorious Buddhists did not cease to undermine the

22

, Taoist influence ~nd again extended the Buddhist movement e'from North Chin_a to the south. The Buddhist~Taoist conflict

probably already existed before the Mongolian occupation. After the collapse of the Southern Sung, Yang-lien-chen-chia came to the Chiang-che area (present Kiangsu and Chekiang) as the General Director of Buddhism south of the Yangtze River. It appears that he was utilized by the Buddhists there as the hiading figure in their retaliati'On against the Taoists. This movement resulted in the excavation of the Sung tombs and was one of the great mistakes of Mongolian rule in China. In his Ch'o-eh'ing lu (Vol. XII) Tao Tsung-hsi wrote: "In the Chih-yuan period [1264-1294], the Buddhist monks became overbearing. [They] turned Taoist temples into Buddhist mon­asteries and shaved the Taoist priests. Also many great tombs were excavated.'.~44 However, in Chang Po-ch'un's preface for the Ta-yilan Chih::Yilan pein-wei-lu it records quite differently:

At that time, the General Director of Buddhist Affairs on . the south of the Yangtze River, Master [Yang-] lien-jenchai, greatly cultivated saintliness and in three years, from the spring of the twenty-second year of Chih-yuan [1285] to the spring of the twenty-fourth year [1288], rehabilitated more than thirty Buddhist monasteries. Those who abandoned Taoism, and became monks were some seven or eight hundred presons. 45

As for the background of the key person, Yang-lien-chen­chia, there is no information regarding where he came from or what sect he belonged to. If the speculation is correct this questionable monk must be a person from the Chinese Yang family who adopted the Tibetan Buddhist name Rin-chen dgah-ba. However, in the Chinese tradition a monk rarely put his family name with his religious name. This problem still needs further study.

The political mistake of the Mongols discussed above was due to religious conflict but also to a lack of understanding of Chinese history on the part of Mongolian rulers. As a result, from the beginning to the end of the Mongolian occupation of China, a well-balanced policy toward both Chinese Buddhism and Taoism was never forthcoming.

In the Buddhist-Taoist struggle, al( sects of Buddhism, even those of Kashmir and Tibet, joined in an alliance against the

23

Taoists. Consequently, the Taoist Chiian-chen sect, once so greatly supported by the Mongolian court, collapsed after the two great debates. With the establishment of the Yuan Dynasty in China, the Cheng-i sect headed by the t'ien-shih ("heavenly instructor"), Chang Tsung-yen assumed the leadership of Taoism instead of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi's Chuan-chen sect. Other sects, such as the Chen-ta and Tai-i sects, gained influence at court, but they were not as influential as the Cheng-i sect. The way Khubilai Khan treated the t'ien-shih Chang Tsung-yen, en­titling him shen-hsien ("immortality"), was quite similar to his grandfather, Chinggis Khan's handling of Ch'iu Ch'u-chi. The "shih-lao chuan" in the Yuan shih says:

After the pacification south of the [Yangtze] River [Em­peror] Shih-tsu dispatched an envoy to summon [the t'ien­shih]. At the audience, [the Emperor] said to him, "Formerly in the year chi-wei [1259], We carne to O-tu [present west of Wu-chang] and sent Wang I-ch'ing to visit your father, [the former t'ien-shih]. Your father reported to Us, saying, 'Twenty/ears from now, the realm should be unified.' The words 0 the immortal have already come to pass." Conse­quently, [the Emperor] allowed [him] to be seated and dine.46

This was the same way Chinggis Khan fought his psycho­logical warfare through the propaganda of the Immortal Ch'iu Ch'u-chi. Whether or not the honored treatment of the Taoist Cheng-i sect by the Mongolian court removed the hatred in the heart of the Chinese people created by the misguided Mon­golian religious policy should be carefully studied in the future. In general the Yuan Emperors tried to adopt a comparatively evenhanded policy toward all religions under their control. Of course, this approach was based on the traditional polytheistic beliefs, Shamanism. The Mongols probably thought that the term t'ien-shih, "the instructor of heaven," had a similar mean­ing to Teb-Tenggeri in Mongolian. This might have been one of the factors that interested the Mongolian court in the Cheng­i sect.

According to available materials, such as the decrees col-lected in the Ta-Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang, both Bud­dhist monks and the Taoist priests were treated equally. At least officially there is no unequal treatment to be seen from an examination of the laws. The "Monograph of Officials" in

24

the Yuan-shih, records that ~'The Ministry of Rituals administers the affairs of worship, confers titles on godly persons and ad­ministers matters pertaining. to the literati, monks and Taoists."47 It continues: "The Hsuan-cheng Yuan has jurisdiction over Buddhist monks and [their] disciples, and rules the land of Tibet."48 This office was "headed by the State Instructor."49 Thus the handling of Buddhist affairs was separated from the ordinary civil administration and the monks were put under the protection of a special powerful office headed by a Tibetan religious leader. Locally, especially south of the Yangtze River, the Kuang chiao tsung-kuanfu (the general director's office for propagating religion) was established as a Buddhist adminis­tration. Later this office came under the Branch Office of the Hsuan-chen Yuan in Hangchou. In addition to these organiza­tions, a special office, Kung-te-shih ssu (the office of the emissary for meritorious affairs) was abolished and reestablished from time to time. All these administrations indicate that the Mon­golian-Yuan court's concern for Buddhism was much more deep than that for Taoism.

Carrying out religious services and building religious centers were major activities for the believers of both Buddhism and Taoism. The activities were seen not only as blessings for the welfare of their deceased ancestors but also as beneficial to themselves and to society. The Mongolian authorities often re­quired the religious organizations to pray for the long life of the Khan and for blessings for the state,· in order to express their loyalty. On the other hand, at court the monks, Taoists and other religious groups were active in order to win the con­fidence and support of the Khan, and to gain such privileges as exemption from taxes and duties. In this situation both Bud­dhism and Taoism carried out the constructions of Buddhist monasteries and Taoist temples unceasingly. This eventually created a great financial deficit for the Yuan administration.

The Khans of the Yuan dynasty accepted Tantrayana Ti­betan Buddhism as their religious belief and honored the mas­ters of the Sa-skya-pa sect as their Imperial Instructions, and thus it prpmoted the development of Tantric Buddhism in China. Tibetan Buddhism was accepted by the Mongolian no­bility because of the cultural similarity between the Mongols and the Tibetans. But it was rejected by the Chinese, especially by the intellectuals, because of the basic cultural difference be-

25

tween the Chinese and the Tibetans. Consequently, most Chinese materials on this subject are one-sided and based upon their prejudices against an alien culture. In fact, most Imperial Instructors mainly remained silent on state affairs, and were ordered not to be involved in politics. The case of Tibet was an exception. As a result of the excessive belief in Buddhism and the exorbitant honor given to monks, many illegal activities took place among the clergy. Although this was not entirely neglected by the Yuan court, Chinese historians still commonly claimed that "half of the Yuan realm was destroyed by the monks." Of course this is an exaggerated, subjective interpre­tation of the Mongolian rule.

In short, the Mongolian Khans' selection of their own reli­gious faith was based upon their own traditional nomadic cul­ture. Nevertheless, their attitude and policy towards both Bud­dhism and Taoism in China gave rise to many deviations in their administration. This might be a result of basic differences and misunderstandings between nomadic culture and that of the agricultural world of China.

NOTES

1. See F. W Cleaves, "Teb Tenggeri," Ural-Altaishe jahrbucheT, 39 (1967), pp. 248-260.

2. Prince Kotan, son of Ogodei Khan, see Yuan-shih 107, 7a. T'u Chi in his Meng-wu-eTh shih-chi 37, wrote a brief biography of Kotan. See also John Andrew Boyle, The Successors ofCenghis Khan-Rashid al-Din Tabib, New York, 1971, pp. 20-21.

3. "Biography of Mu-hua-li," Yuan-shih 119. 4. According to Western reckoning, Hai-yun was only twelve. 5. According to the "Biography of Mu-hua-Ii," the title (ai-shih kuo-wang

was conferred on him by Chinggis Khan in the year ting-ch'ou (1217). 6. Lanch'eng, present-day Lanhsien, Shansi Province. 7. See Nien-ch'ang, Fo-tsu li-tai tung-tsai, 21, 9a-lla, 12 a-b. 8. In North China the Taoist religion was divided into three sects, Chi.ian­

chen, Tai-i, and Chen-ta; on the south of the Yangtze River there were two sects, Cheng-i and Mao-shan. Later there developed from the Cheng-i sect a branch known as Hsuan-chiao. See also note 42.

9. Hsien-sheng is a general term for a learned person, such as sir, teacher, or mister, but it was also applied to the Taoists. This word was often mIs­pronounced shing-shing in many Mongolian and Tibetan materials.

26

10. Wang Kuo-wei, Meng-ku shih-liao ssu-chung, Taipei, 1961, pp. 231-233, and Tao Tsung-i, Ch'o-ching-lu, Taipei, 1962, Vol. 10, pp. 150-15I.

II. See the decrees of the Yuan emperors to the Buddhists and the Taoists that were collected in the Ta-Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang, reprinted by the Palace Museum, Taipei, 1976.

12. Wang Kuo-wei, p. 356. . 13. The "Biography of Chen-hai" in the Yiian-shih makes no mention of

this matter. 14. Wang Kuo-wei, p. 340. 15. See the attached "Biography of the Son Hao-wen" to the "Biography

of Yuan Te-ming" in Chin-shih, 126. 16. Yao Tsung-wu, "Chih Yiian Ch'uan-chen-ch'iao ti min-tsu ssu-hiang yii

chiu-shih ssu-hsiang: (The Nationalistic Thought and World Salvation Thought of the Ch'iian-chen sect at the Period of Chin and Yiian). Tung-pei­shih lun-ts'ung, Taipei, 1959, Vol. 2, p. 262.

17. "Shih-lao-chuang," Yiian-shih, 202, 4b. IS. Nien-ch'ang, 21, 14b-15a. 19. See "Biography of Liu Ping-chung," Yuan-shih 157. 20. Nien-ch'ang, 31, 15b-16b. 21. "Biography of Tieh-ko (Tege)," Yiian-shih 125, 13b. 22. Li Chen-ch'ang is an erroneous reference to Li Chih-ch'ang. 23. "Annals of Hsien-tsung," Yiian-shih 3, 3a. 24. See the entry shih-lao (Monks and Taoists) of Vol. 6 of Li-pu, Ta-Yiian

sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang 33, the Palace Museum edition, Taipei 1976. 25. See note 21. 26. Yao Tsung-wu, "Ch'iu Ch'u-chi nien-pu,' in Tung-pei-shih lun-ts'ung,

p.245. 27. See note 23. 2S. "Biography of Chang Po-ch'ung," Yuan-shih 17S. 29. Wang Fu was a Taoist leader of Eastern Chin period (316-419) who

had failed in his debate against the Buddhists. 30. Nien-ch'ang, 21, 39a-b. 31. The "nine schools" were the Confucian, Taoist, Naturalist (yin-yang),

Legalist, Dialectician (ming) , Mohist (the followers of Mo Tzu), the tsung-heng (a school of political alliances and strategies), Agriculturalist, and others.

32. Phags-pa was granted the title Ti-shih, or Imperial Instructor, in the sixteenth year of Chih-yuan (1279), after the nirvana of this great lama.

33. It was Tou Mo. See "Biography of Tou Mo," Yiian-shih 15S. 34. It was Yao Shu. See "Biography of Yao Shu," Yuan-shih 15S. 35. It was the Uighur minister Meng-su-ssu. See "Biography of Meng-sll­

SSll," Yuan-shih 124. He had been the jarghuchi and therefore he was called by the Chinese ch'eng-hsiang, Premier.

36. It was another Uighur Confucian scholarly minister, Lien Hsi-hsien, who was well-known as "Mencius" Lien (Lien Meng Tzu).

37. It was Chang Wen-ch'ien. See "Biography of Chang Wen-ch'ien," Yiian-shih 157.

3S. Hsiang-mai, Chih-yuan pien-wei-lu, Yangchou tS'ang-ching-yiian, 1907 edition, 4, 20b-21a.

27

39. "Biography of Wang Pang," Yuan-shih 160. 40. Hsiang-mai,6, 1a-2b. 41. Hjigs-med nam-mkhah, Chen-po hor-gyi-yul-du dam-paihi-chos ji-ltar­

byuri-bahi-tshul-bsad-pa rgyal-bahi-bstan-pa-rin-po-che gsal-bar-byed pahi-sgron-me, 1819. The] apanese edition was translated by Koho Hashimoto and was pub­lished in Tokyo, 1940, under the title of Moko ramakyo shi (the history of Mongolian Lamaism)." ,

42. ,This Chang T'ien-shih, the Heavenly Instructor Chang, was Chang Tsung-yen, the Thirty-sixth tien-shih after Chang Tao-ling, the founder of Cheng-i t'ien-shih sect of Taoism.

43. Nien-ch'ang, 21, 30a-31b. In this entry there is another record of an imperial decree on the twelfth day of the twelfth month of the same year.

44. Tao Tsung-i, p. 202. See note 10. 45. Nien-ch'ang, 3, 40a-b. 46. "Shih-lao Chiian," Yuan-shih 202, 11a. 47. The entry Li-pu (Ministry of Ritual), in the "Monograph of Officials,"

I, Yilan-shih 85, 21a-b. 48. The entry of Hsiian Cheng-yiian, in the "Monograph of Officials,"

III, Yuan-shih 87, 8a. 49. Ibid.

FROM MADHYAMIKA TO YOCACARA An Analysis of MMK, XXIV.IS and MV, 1.1-2

by Gadjin M. Nagao

In the Sino-Japanese Buddhist tradition, the Madhyamika and Yogacara-Vijiianavada tenets have been understood to be both parallel and opposite to each other. The San-Iun-tsun, the Chinese version of the Madhyamika, was regarded as nihilistic or an Emptiness School, and the Fa-hsiang-tsun, the Vijiianavada, was regarded as realistic or an Existence School. While the former was characterized as Mahayana due to its doctrine of emptiness, the latter was considered to be semi­Mahayana for three basic reasons: the Vijiianavada remained realistic like the Abhidharma School; it elucidated the three yanas side by side without being confined to the Bodhisatt­vayana; and it did not emphasize the doctrine of Buddha-na­ture. These traditional but erroneous views have now been re­vised by most modern scholars. Presently, the Madhyamika philosophy, which began with Nagarjuna, is believed to be wholly inherited by Maitreya-natha, Asanga, and other Yogacaras. The Prajiiiipiiramitii sutras are equally revered as au­thentic byboth schools, and further, the doctrine of emptiness occupies an important position even in the Yogacara school.

While; in the history of Western philosophy, it was deemed necessary for a newcomer to negate and transcend previous philosophies through criticism, the situation in Buddhism, es­pecially Yogacara Buddhism, was such that it developed its doc­trines in a fairly different pattern from that of Western phi­losophy. The Yogacaras developed their doctrines by inheriting the entire body of thought of their former masters. Of course, even though a faithful transmission of a teaching without any changes was intended, in so far as there was a development,

29

this development necessarily involved a degree of change. Therefore, although both schools advocated the doctrine of sunyata, the manner in which they interpreted the meaning of this term has been different. In accordance,with the divergent views held by the schools as they grew in India and in China, there has been a difference in how they worded the doctrine and in how they logically developed it.

The verse XXIV IS of N agarjuna' s M ula-madhyamaka-kiirika (hereafter, MMK)! has been famous in the Sino-Japanese tra­dition since the Tien-t'ai school elaborated the doctrine called "Threefold Truth" and took this verse as one of its bases. The verse concludes with the term madhyama pratipat (Middle Path), and hence the treatise was named Madhyamaka-kiirika. On the other "hand, there is a treatise of the Yogacaras named Mad­hyantavibhaga(hereafter, MV). The root verses of this text have been ascribed to Maitreya-natha or Asanga and the prose com­mentary (bha~ya) has been attributed to Vasubandhu. The fea­tures of the first two verses, MV 1.1-2,2 closely resemble those in verse XXIVIS of MMK. In this paper, I would like to ex­amine all three verses in the hope that I can trace an aspect of the development of Buddhist philosophy from Madhyamika to Yogacara.

It seems that T.R.V Murti was also aware of this similarity.3 After pointing out that the Abhidharmic systems interpreted pratZtya-samutpada (originating co-dependently) incorrectly and arguing that the Madhyamika system was are-interpretation of it as sunyata, he refers to MMK, XXIV IS. He then explains the Vijnanavada position by saying, "In the Vijiianavada, sunyata is accepted, but with a modification," and quotes MV, 1.1 as the Vijiianavada formula. He should, however, have in­cluded MV, 1.2 in the formula, because the two verses together not only represent the basic tenet contained in the first chapter of MV, but also the fundamental point of view which the trea­tise is attempting to express.

At the outset, let us examine in detail MMK, XXIV IS. The verse in Sanskrit is as follows:

ya~ pratftyasamutPada~ sunyatar[l, taJ?l praca~mahe I sa prajiiaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama II

This can be rendered in English as follows:

30

What is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness. It is a designation basea upon (some material). Only this

is the Middle Path.4

. In this verse we see four key-terms: pratitya-samutpada (origi­nating co-dependently), sunyata (emptiness), upadaya-prajiiapti (designation based upon some material), and madhyama pratipat (Middle Path). Generally, these four are associated . with each other and in some way considered equal. According to Can­draklrti's explanation, sunyata, upadaya-prajiiapti and madhyama­pratipad are considered to be "different names" (vise~a-sa'Y{1-jiia,

synonyms)5 of pratitya-samutpada. Of these four terms, however, the last three (omitting the first, pratitya-samutpada), were taken by the T'ien-t'ai school to constitute the so-called "Threefold Truth": the truth of the empty (k'ung), the provisional (chia) , and the middle (chung).6

As the context of the verse and Candraklrti's "viSe~a-sa'Y{1-jiia" suggest, these three or four terms are regarded as reciprocally identical and simultaneous, but not in chronological sequence. Especially in the T'ien-t'ai doctrine, the ultimate and perfect identity of the three is emphasized. It is true that there is no chronological sequence of the four terms, but neither is it per­mitted to re-arrange them and state them in reverse order; there must be something that led the author to select the four terms and mention them in this particular sequence. I believe this something can be called the author's "logic," and conse­quently the four terms are in logical order, being linked to each other through a process of reasoning.

N ow, to begin with, all interpretations are in agreement with the fact that what is originating co-dependently is empty, or non-existent. In other words, co-dependent origination is char­acterized by emptiness. This is,· as Murti puts it, a re-inter­pretation of pratitya-samutpada in contradistinction to the Abhidharmic interpretation, which underStands it from a re­alistic viewpoint, taking it to be existent. This re-interpretation is revolutionary, because pratitya-samutpada, which had been conceived of in terms of something real, existent and affirm­ative is now declared to be empty, non-existent and negative. In order to give a logical rationale for this process, Candraklrti (as well as Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka) introduced the phrase: "Because it is devoid of self-being (nil],svabhiiva) , it is

31

empty.,,7 Here, existence and non-existence or affirmation and negation are combined into one. This indicates the dynamism or paradox spoken about in Mahayana texts. It differs from the static idea of the Abhidharmic systems and corresponds to what the Prajniipiiramita-sutras expound in the formula: "rupam eva funyatii" (this very matter is the essence of emptiness).

Next, the verse states that funyatii in this context is upiidiiya­prajnapti, or "a designation based upon (some material)." Al­though the compound upiidiiya-prajnapti is problematic, and scholars have interpreted it differently,S it is safe to assume that it can be interpreted as: upiidiinam upiidiiyaprajnaptilJ,.9 In this case, upiidiina means: "material as cause"; upiidiiya (an absolu­tive) literally means: "having taken to one-self," "appropriat­ing," and therefore, I have translated it "based upon," which is an interpretation also substantiated by the Tibetan transla­tion brten nas (depending on). Prajnapti (Tib. gdags pa) or "des­ignation" is of a worldly or conventional character, being op­posite to paramiirtha, which is supra-mundane and beyond any conceptualizations. Thus, the phrase as a whole means: "a des­ignation based upon (some mater,ial)."

Jacques May translates the compound upiidiiya-prajnapti as "designation metaphorique" (he seems to prefer this transla­tion to L. de La Vallee Poussin's "designation en raison de"), and, after equating "funyatii = upiidiiya-prajnapti," he gives the following explanation: "La funyatii est designation metaphorique de la realite absolue." And also equating "funyatii = madhyamii­pratipad" in regard to the 4th pada, he gives a similar inter­pretation: "Madhyamii pratipad est aussi une designation metaphorique de la realite absolue."lo

His interpretations would indicate that absolute reality man­ifests itself on the level of conventional truth, metaphorically taking the names funyatii or madhyamii-pratipad. If this be the case, these explanations seem not to coincide with the two equa­tions mentioned by him, and also seem to disregard the positive role played by upiidiiya-prajnapti as the third key-term. As he explains, any concepts, names or designations, are conven­tional; they are not on the level of ultimate truth and cannot represent the ultimate reality, which remains silent (tu.flJl'T(l­bhiiva) , beyond all grasping (anupalabdhi, anabhiliipya). This is the truth revealed by Nagarjuna in terms of the Twofold Truth (sat ya-dvaya) , the conventional and the ultimate. But, I believe,

32

the present verse is not intended to discuss the Twofold Truth; rather, it expresses a logical process starting from the Buddha's pratTtya-samutpada and concluding with the Buddha's Middle Path. In this process, upadaya-prajiiapti occupies an important

. stage. Venkata . Ramanan translates upada)la-prajiiapti as "derived

name," although he does not clarify how and from what the name is "derived." He states, however, "the [meaning of] rel­ativity, conditionedness (pratZtya-samutpada) ... is also conveyed by upadaya-prajiiapti, derived name."11

It is my contention that upadaya-prajiiapti is another name for pratitya-samutpada. In a passage, Candraklrti states: "[Those foolish people] do not see the truth of pratitya-samutpada which has the most profound meaning, being free from [the wrong views of] eternalism and nihilism, and being given the name upadaya-prajiiapti."12 This indicates that upadaya-prajiiapti and pratitya-samutpada are synonymous.

According to Avalokitavrata's explanation of the phrase upadanam upadaya prajiiaptiiJ,13 the word upadana (material cause) means hetu-pratyaya (cause and condition): a sprout is so named based upon a seed, its upadana; Tathagata is so desig­nated based upon the virtues such as the ten powers, the four convictions, etc., as His upadana. Being thus designated as based upon causes and conditions, not only the sprout but also Tathagata is empty, devoid of self-being. It is clear that Ava­lokitravrata interprets upadaya-prajiiapti with the. meaning of pratZtya-samutpada.

However, the compound upadaya-prajiiapti, although similar to pratitya-samutpada of the first pada, should still be different from it for the reason that, in the second pada, pratitya-sa­mutpada has been negated and dec.lared as sunyata. In the 3rd pada, in contrast to this, upadaya-prajiiapti is pratitya-samutpada revived from within sunyata after having been once negated. In other words, the world of pratitya-samutpada, in so far as it has been negated or has a negative aspect (Ist and 2nd padas), is sunyata. But, in spite of this negation, in so far as the ultimate reality does not cease to manifest itself as upadaya-prajiiapti (3rd pada), pratitya-samutpada is operative and functioning in the sarpsaric world, and therefore, still alive. Without this aliveness or the revival from sunyata, even madhyama pratipat could not be established. The Middle Path is a dynamic path and not a

33

mere cessation or extinction as expressed by the "Hlnayanic" nirva:r},a (of course, I do not intend "Hlnayanic" to refer to Theravada). One of the meanings of "Mahayanic" nirvii:'Ja is the Bodhisattva's aprat4thita-nirva:rJa (not dwelling in nirvaI).a).

Such a revived pratftya-sam'Cltpada is a "designation" (prajiiapti), for it appropriates, depends upon, or bases itself upon (upildilya) something else, or some kind of material (upildilna). In this sense, it is synonymous with sa1{lketa (conventional sym­bol) and loka-vyavahilra (common practice), terminologies used to designate conventional truth. Thus, upildilya-prajiiapti means "a designation based upon some material." Because it comes after the negation of sunyatil, it is a knowledge gained by a sort of bodhi or enlightenment. It can also involve the Buddha's lau­kika-pr:~thalabdha-jiiilna (conventional knowledge functioning after non-discriminative knowledge is obtained), to use 'the later Yogacara terminology.

To recapitulate, pratftya-samutpilda is twofold:

(1) the first order pratftya-samutpilda as expounded in the first pada: of the verse, and

(2) the second order pratftya-samutpilda (= upildilya-prajiiapti) as expounded in the 3rd pada.

The first order pratftya-samutpilda is said to be "direct," be­cause it has not yet been denied and represents the ordinary worldly life which is not yet negated as sunyatil. In other words, people are living it without any awareness of its true nature as sunyaiil. This pratftya-samutpilda dies in the second pada. In spite of its death, or its negation, worldly life necessarily continues, but now it is accompanied by a kind of sunya consciousness. The 3rd pada represents this stage, in which the second order pratftya-samutpilda is revived.

This second order or revived pratftya-samutpilda is said to be "indirect," because it has come through sunyatil and conse­quently was not directly derived from the first order. In con­trast to the first order, which must be negated, and which cor­responds to the word rilpa of "rupam eva sunyatil," the second order is are-affirmed pratftya-samutpilda which corresponds to the word rupa of "sunyataiva rupam" (this very essence of emp­tiness is matter). Although the first order pratftya~samutpilda must be negated, there still is a need for a life in which people can strive to live a moral life or can make every effort to exert

34

themselves in religious practices .. Finally, the fourth pada states: "Only this is the Middle Path."

The Middle is always revealed by being freed from two ex­tremes, such as existence and non-existence, or affirmation and negation. The dynamic movement from the first order prat'itya­samutpada of the first pada, to its negation (sunyata) in the sec­ond pada, and further to its revival as the second order prat'itya­samutpada (= upadaya-prajiiapti) in the third pada is the Middle Path (madhyama-pratipad). It is dialectical, moving from affir­mation to negation and again to affirmation. The Middle is not a point between two extremes and cannot be found at a certain point, because the path is total process, dynamic and dialectical. (The Middle can be found even in the extremes in so far as affirmation is negation and negation is affirmation.)

To conclude this section, the four terms explained above can be equated in a straight line:

prat'itya-samutpada = sunyata = upadaya-prajiiapti = madhyama-pratipad.

But from the above discussion and from the dialectical char­acter of the whole process, I would rather equate them in the following way:

prat'itya-samutpada = (affirmative)

sunyata (negative)

"'------v,-----~ 1/

[Sunyata =] upadaya-prajiiapti (affirmative)

madhyama-pratipad

The equation of prat'itya-samutpada = sunyata is the most basic: all others are derived from it. Anyone of these terms can be equated with madhyama-pratipad, but only through the whole process of negation and affirmation as discussed above.

Having examined MMK, XXIV. IS, we are now in a position to analyse the two verses of MV which elucidate the notions of abhuta-parikalpa, sunyata, and madhyamii-pratipad. In Sanskrit, verses 1.1-2 read as follows:

35

abhutaparikalpo 'sti, dvaya'0 tatra na vidyate I sunyata vidyate tv atra, tasyam api sa vidyate 111.1 na sunya'Y[l niipi ciiSunya'Y[l tasmiit saroa'Y[l vidhlyate / sattvad asattvat sattvac ca, madhyama pratipac ca sa II 1.2

This can be rendered in English as follows:

There exists unreal imagination; duality does not exist therein.

Emptiness, however, exists in it, and also the former exists in the latter. (1.1)

Therefore it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor non-empty,

Because of existence, because of non-existence, and again because of existence. And this is the Middle Path. (1.2)14

The word "imagination" (parikalpa) generally refers to cog­nitive functions or consciousness (vijiiiina) , which in turn is characterized by the Yogacaras as "dependent-on-other" (par­atantra), i.e., pratftya-samutpada. Basically speaking, the cognitive functions or thought of ordinary people is always stained by ignorance, hence the word "unreal" (abhuta). The phrase "there exists unreal imagination" (the 1st pada), however, does not mean that existence (of the imagination) is proclaimed or insisted in a metaphysical or ontological sense. It simply de­scribes the fact that all the common features of daily life are constituted by cognitive functions. Thus the fact that "unreal imagination exists" is the beginning point of the Yogacara's Weltanschauung. "Duality" (dvaya) means the duality of subject and object. Although, on the one hand, cognition necessarily implies a dichotomy, on the other hand, from the viewpoint of ultimate truth, neither the object grasped nor the grasping sub­ject has substantial existence. Therefore, "duality does not exist therein" (the 2nd pada), i.e., duality does not exist as substan­tial reality to be found in unreal imagination. This negation of duality, or absence of cognition with regard to duality, is re­stated in the third pada, employing the term sunyatii: "Empti­ness, however, exists in it (i.e., in unreal imagination)." Because sunyata is found in unreal imagination, unreal imagination is negated and, therefore, equal to sunyatii itself. Thus far, the verse conveys a meaning similar to the equation pratttya-sa­mutpiida = sunyata in the MMK. In the 4th pada, however, the opposite is also true: "the former [unreal imagination] exists

36

in the latter [in emptiness]." The phrase is important in that it means the revival of unreal imagination (or pratftya-sa­mutpada) and corresponds to upadaya-prajnapti of the MMK.

N ext, in accordance with the above statement, verse 1.2 reads: "Therefore ... all entities are neither empty nor non­empty." The reason for this is explained by three phrases be­ginning with "because of." According to the Vasubandhu's Bha~ya, the first phrase, "because of existence" means "because unreal imagination exists," and refers to the statement, "nei­ther empty." The second phrase, "because of non-existence," meaning "because duality does not exist," refers to the state­ment, "nor non-empty." The third phrase, "again because of existence," meaning "because emptiness exists in unreal imag­ination and unreal imagination exists in emptiness," refers to the statement, "neither empty." .

The verse concludes with the statement, "This is the Middle Path." In this sense, the two verses clearly indicate that the MV, whose title was originally "Madhya-vibhaga" (instead of "Mad­hyanta-vibhaga) , 15 was originally written to elucidate the Middle Path and to exemplify that very fact by discussing the emptiness of unreal imagination.

When one compares verse XXIV. IS of the MMK with these two verses of MV, the similarity between them should now be­come obvious. The reason why Murti should have given both verses as the Yogacara formula should also be clear. As stated previously, these two verses of MV are key-verses of this text and convey the fundamental ideas of the Yogacara school. And one can see that the Yogacaras, indeed, inherited the idea of emptiness and the Middle Path from Nagarjuna. It is almost as if Maitreya-natha or Asariga imitated, elaborated and ex­panded Nagarjuna's verse. An analysis of these two verses will not only help us to understand Buddhist thought, but will also demonstrate how these ideas progressed in the development of Buddhist thought from Madhyamika to Yogacara.

N ow that we have discussed the MMK verse and the two verses of MV individually, I would like to devote the remainder of this paper to a comparative study of the similarities and dif­ferences between the MMK verse and the two verses of MV. The corresponding padas of these verses and the relationship of them can be diagrammed as follows (the four padas are in­dicated by the letters: a, b, c, and d, respectively):

37

MMK, XXIVIS

l: pratftya-samutpada --­( co-dependent

origination)

MV,1.I

a: abhuta-parikalpa unreal imagina­

tion exists)

-- c: sattvat (because of

existence)

MV,1.2

I b: dvayaf!l na vidyate -- c: asattvat /_ _ (duality does (because of

): sunyata. ) ___ not exist) non-existence) (emptmess

c: sunyata vidyate

a: na sunyam (neither empty»

a: na casilnyam (nor non­

empty)

:: upadaya-prajnapti --­( designation based upon)

d: madhyama pratipat (middle path)

c: sattvat (e~~~!~~s>

d: tasyam api sa (be~ause of vidyate eXlstence)

(unreal imagina- ~

tion exists)

d: madhyama pratipat (middle path)

b: sarvam (all

entities)

As the diagram suggests, the point of departure for the two schools differs. MMK, XXIV.18a begins its discussion with pratitya-samutpada, whereas MY, 1.1a begins its discussion with abhutaparikalpa. The different topics with which the two texts

. begin refl«7ct the fact that, while the discussions found in the MMK are always metaphysical and abstract, dealing with such notions as pratitya-samutpada, utpatti (arising), gamana (going), and so on, the author of MV replaced these notions with oneS such as citta (mind), vijiiana (consciousness), and abhutaparikalpa (unreal imagination), which are more concrete, practical, and related to everyday life situations. But, abhutaparikalpa, which is essentially vijiiana, is not contextually different from pratitya­samutpada, because it also has the nature of paratantra (depend­ent-on-other), as stated before. Therefore, even though abhutaparikalpa is a term deeply associated with a monk's yogic practices, in so far as it is of paratantra nature and is taken as the starting point or the primary object of investigation, abhutaparikalpa does not differ from pratitya-samutpada, where the Madhyamikas begin their investigation.

Whereas MMK, XXIV.lSb simply and directly informs us that pratitya-samutpada is sunyata, without elaborating its logical process, MV, 1.1 gives a fuller explanation and develops its view around a more complicated logical process. Here silnyata is dis­cussed from two points of view: non-existence (of duality) and existence (of sunyata). The discussion extends its logical argu­ment into MY, 1.2 as the diagram indicates. At first, the sunyata established by negating the "duality" of subject and object may seem far removed from the "emptiness" of the MMK. When one considers, however, that the author of the MV wanted to demonstrate the sunyata of abhutaparikalpa, which is character­ized as pratitya-samutpada and is the most logical and natural place to begin one's reflection in yogic practice, it is not unusual to find that the author of MV chose to negate the "duality" of subject and object. Moreover, it should be noticed that not only object but also subject is negated. The later Vijnanavada is sometimes referred to as a school in which the outer world (object) is negated (bahyarthabhava) and only the existence of. inner consciousness (subject) is maintained (vijiianamatra) , 16

But this is not the case here. By the negation of both subject and object the sunyata of the whole world is intended. This is parallel to the statement often found in the Mahayana siltras,

39

"all entities are empty," and to the Madhyamika equation of the whole world (pratftya-samutpiida) with sunyata.

This sunyatii is not a mere negation; it transcends both ex­istence and non-existence. Consequently, MMK (XXI1.l1) states: "one should not proclaim something as empty, nor non­empty." MV, 1.2, however, gives us a more elaborate explana­tion. It first states that "all entities are neither empty nor non­empty" and then continues to explain this statement on the basis of three reasons: existence, non-existence, and existence. On the foundation of such a paradoxical statement, the MV

. finally develops its thought into the Middle Path. Undoubtedly, the three reasons beginning with "because of

existence" are reasons expounding different levels. The first two, "because of existence" and "because of non-existence," are obviously paradoxical and on the same level represent affir­mation and negation respectively. The third reason, "again be­cause of existence," must be understood to transcend the for­mer two and, therefore, to be different from the first, in spite of the fact that the first and the third reasons are worded in the same way. The meaning of "existence" in the third reason is twofold: it includes the existence of sunyatii and the existence of unreal imagination.

Sunyatii was originally characterized by negation and non­being. Therefore the "existence of sunyatii" is itself a contra­diction and this has been the focus of attack by Bhavaviveka, the Madhyamika polemicist. The Yogacara teachers, however, aware of this contradiction, dared to define sunyatii as "non­existence of the duality and existence of [that] non-existence" (MV, 1.13). Sunyatii is thus simultaneously non-existent as well as existent.

As for the "existence of unreal imagination," it corresponds to the second order pratrtya-samutpiida. As I have shown in my previous discussion, pratftya-samutpiida is once negated as sunya.tii, but revived again in the term upiidiiya-prajiiapti (MMK, XXIV 18c). But MV does not stop with the statement that emp­tiness exists in unreal imagination; it goes on further to say that unreal imagination exists in emptiness: "also "the former exists in the latter" (tasyiim api sa vidyate). That is to say, abhutaparikalpa (as paratantra = pratrtya-samutpiida) is revived in the midst of emptiness, as the second order abhutaparikalpa, so to speak, after its duality is negated. It is in a sense a redeemed and jus-

40

tified abhutaparikalpa. This revived abhutaparikalpa is to be understood as contextually the same as "designation based upon (some material)" (upadaya-prajnapti).

In conclusion then, it is now clear that the zigzagging logic found in the MMK, XXIY.IS, which develops its thought through the steps of affirmation (pratftya-samutpada) to nega­tion (sunyata) and further to affirmation again· (upadaya­prajnapti) is followed exactly by the author of the MV, with the exception that the latter, using a little different wording, adds the logical basis for this dynamic process with statements such as "because of existence," and so on. By zigzagging logic I mean a paradoxical and dialectical logical process which evidences a dynamism continually moving from being to non-being and again to being, in which the former two are transcended. Both texts agree with each other in so far as they arrive ultimately at the same Middle Path through that vital and dialectical pro­cess.

Although I have attempted to show that these texts are sim-ilar in their schemes of developing the Middle Path, very subtle problems remain. It may be true that the Yogacaras inherited in general the Madhyamika thought concerning sunyata. But, is it proper to speak of the logical process involved in estab­lishing sunyata as the same in both schools? Isn't it that, al­though the name sunyata is shared by both, what is intended by this name is entirely different in the two schools? For one thing, their points of departure differ: the Madhyamika starts from pratftya-samutpada, while the Yogacara starts from abhutaparikalpa. Another remarkable difference is that the Yogacaras speak of the "existence of non-existence" when de­fining sunyata. We must also pay attention to the fact that, al­though both the Madhyamikas and the Yogacaras are thought to base their idea of sunyata on the Prajnaparamita-sutras, the. Yogacaras also place importance on the Culasunnata-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaya. (For details about this point, readers are re­ferred to my discussion in another paper.)l7 Due to these dif­ferences, one can assume that there is, or could be, a consid­erable difference between the two schools concerning their idea of sunyata.

Even if there is such a difference, however, is it due to nat­ural development during the course of time, or to the different tenets particular to the schools, or to the differences·in the texts

41

upon which they established themselves? Or, rather, are we to say that in spite of these questions, the difference, if any, is negligible when contrasted to the vast universality and ultimacy of ideas such as sunyatii, the Middle Path, 'and co-dependent origination?

(I would like to express my hearty gratitude to Professor Leslie S. Kawamura and Ms. Michele Martin for their cor­rection of the English text.)

NOTES

1. Louis de La Vallee Poussin, Mulamadhyamakakariki'is (madhyamikasutras) de Nagarjuna, avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candrakirti, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV (St.-petersbourg, .1913), p. 503.

2. Gadjin M. Nagao (ed.), Madhyantavibhaga-bh~ya, A Buddhist Philosoph­ical Treatise Edited for the First Time from a Sanskrit Manuscript (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964), pp. 17-18.

3. T.R.V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955), pp. 7-8.

4. Other translations by modern scholars are available in: Jacques May, Candrakirti, Prasannapada Madhyamakavrtti (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959), p. 237; Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning (Nashville & New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 213; Kenneth K. Inada, Nagarjuna. A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika with an Introductory Essay (Tokyo: Hokuseido-shoten, 1970), etc.

5. La Vallee Poussin, MMK, p. 504.14. 6. Cf. J. Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: Office

Appliance Co., Third Ed.), p. 129: "Therefore, objectively, we have the triple truth, and subjectively, we have the triple knowledge. Of the triple truth, the Void is at the same time the temporary, the temporary is at the same time the middle, which is at the same time the Void."

7. La Vallee Poussin, p. 500.15. 8. F. Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary (New Haven: Yale Uni­

versity Press, 1953), p. 145 (s.v. upadaya); May, Candrakfrti, p. 161, n. 494; p. 237, n. 840.

9. Bhavaviveka interprets upadaya-prajnapti as "ne bar len pa dag la brten nas gdags pa" in his Prajnapradrpa-mulamadhyamakavrtti, The Tibetan Tripiraka (Peking Edition), ed. D. T. Suzuki, 95, p. 247-1-2.

10. May, p. 238, n. 840. 11. K. Venkata Ramanan, Nagarjuna's Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banar­

asidass, 1975), p. 339a. 12. La Vallee Poussin, p. 214-215.

42

13 .. Avalokitavrata, Prajfta-pradzpa-rika, Tibetan Tripitaka Peking, 97, p. 277-3. The following is an abridged translation.

14. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, Madhyanta-vibhanga, Bibliotheca Buddhica XXX (Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR Press, 1936), pp. 16,24.

15. The title, Madhyantavibhaga, "Elucidation of the Middle and Ex­tremes," is generally used, but the author himself states that the treatise was originally called Madhya-vibhaga, "Elucidation of the Middle." Therefore, it can be interpreted to be more a "Madhyamaka-sastra" than that of Nagarjuna. Actually, its discussion on the Middle appears initially in verses 1.1-2 and then in verses V.23-24. See my article: "On the Title Madhyantavibhaga" (in Japanese), in Chilkan to Yuishiki (Madhyamika and Vijftanavada: A Collection of papers on the Mahayana Philosophy) (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978), pp. 443-454.

16. In the earlier Yogacara, too, we can find the affirmation of the non­being of outer things and being of cognition-only. But at the same time it is stated that perceiving the truth of cognition-only, the non-being of outer things is perceived, and when an outer object is not perceived, the perceiving subject likewise is not perceived (MV, 1.6). After the realization of such funyata, the cognition-only is re-attained which is different from the first one and equal to tathata (suchness), or parin4panna-svabhava (consummated na­ture) and in which impressions of both subject and object (graha-dvayavasana) are extinguished.

17. G. M. Nagao, " 'What Remains' in Sunyata: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness" in Mahayana Buddhist Meditation, ed. Minoru Kiyota (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 66-82.

43

DYNAMIC LIBERATION IN YOGACARA BUDDHISM

by Alan Sponberg

I. Introduction

Why did Sakyamuni Buddha, having realized liberation from the world, choose to give up the seclusion of his enlight­enment and go forth again into that same world? Why did he take on the task of preaching the content of his realization to all the beings still" ensnared in the net of death and re-birth? The early Buddhists seem to have had some difficulty account­ing for the apparent paradox in this decision. In the Ariyapa­riyesana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaya, one of the earliest accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment, we find the following reflec­tions attributed to Sakyamuni:

Then I thought, now I have gained the doctrine, profound, hard to perceive, hard to know, tranquil, transcendent, be­y<?nd the sphere of reasoning, subtle, to be known by the WIse ....

But if I were to teach the Doctrine, and others did not understand it, it would be a weariness to me, a vexation. Then also there naturally occurred to me these verses un­heard before:

Through painful striving have I gained it, Away with now proclaiming it; By those beset with lust and hate Not easily is this Doctrine learnt. This Doctrine, fine, against the stream, Subtle, profound, and hard to see, They wIll not see it, lust-inflamed, Beneath the mass of darkness veiled.

Thus, monks, as I reflected, my mind turned to inaction, not to teaching the Doctrine. Then Brahma Sahampati

44

knowing the deliberation of my mind thought, "verily the world is being destroyed, verily the world is going to destruc­tion, in that tbe mind of the Tathagata, the arahat, the fully enlightened, turns to inaction and not to teaching the Doc­trine." Then Brahma Sahampati, just as a strong man might stretch olit his bent arm, or bend his stretched-out arm, so did he disappear from the Brahma-world and appear before me. And arranging his upper robe on one shoulCler he bent down his clasped hands to me and said, "may the ·reverend Lord teach the Doctrine, may the Sugata teach the Doc­trine .... ,n

What was it then that finally overcame Sakyamuni's initial hesitation? In this and other versions of the incident we are told that the fateful decision was made only at the behest of the god Brahma, who, in the interest of the beings, descended from his Brahma Heaven to intercede in a deus ex machina man­ner.

This explanation was apparently not adequate for some however. With the Mahayana innovation that made explicit the integral link between compassion and wisdom, an additional means of resolving this puzzling question was provided. The enlightenment realized by Sakyamuni was seen to comprise both Great Wisdom (mahaprajiiii) and Great Compassion (mahakarurJii); whereupon his preaching career became per­fectly consistent with the very nature of his enlightenment. It would thus have been inconceivable-with or without the in­tercession of Brahma-for Sakyamuni not to have sought the liberation of other beings as well. This solution was one part of a broader universalistic tendency in Mahayana Buddhism, a development which raised additional problems that were to become the focus of further soteriological innovations in the later Madhyamika and Yogacara schools. Once the ideal of uni­versal salvation through the agency of enlightened Buddhas and bodhisattvas was asserted, the problem remained of ac­counting-both theoretically and practically-for the relation­ship between the supramundane and the mundane, between the Absolute and the individual. How can the transcendental interact with the worldly? How is the bodhisattva to function at the same time in two mutually exclusive realms? In what way does the bodhisattva after realizing the trans personal Absolute still retain some individual personality active in the relative world for the salvation of other beings?

45

The two principle schools of Mahayana Buddhism each sought to work out answers to these basic questions, answers that are probably best seen as complementary rather than con­tradictory. Both schools shared a good deal of common ground and certainly a common basic problematic. It is in this context that the doctrinal differences between the two schools must be examined. The thesis upon which the present article hopes to shed some light can be stated simply as the view that Madhyamika and Yogacara represent two different, yet paral­lel, approaches to the same set of problems: Madhyamika fo­cusing its attention primarily on the logical and philosophical issues involved and Yogacara concerning itself more with the practical and psychological issues.

The significance of this common problematic and of the sub­sequent differences between the two schools can most clearly be seen in the contrast in the formulations of the nirval)a doc­trine in the two schools. Unfortunately, this has not as yet been fully appreciated. While a great deal has been written in the West on the Madhyamika conception of nirval)a, very little has been said about the corresponding Yogacara doctrines of un­fixed nirval)a (aprati~thita-nirvary,a) and non-discriminating cog­nition (nirvikalpaka-jnana), a rather striking reflection of the cur­rent state of Yogacara studies. 2 We are still a long way from a comprehensive account of the place of Yogacara in Buddhist thought; certainly one necessary step is a preliminary exami­nation of these two key doctrines.

II. Soteriological Innovation in Yogacara Buddhism

It is these two doctrines that represent the m~or soterio­logical innovation of Classical Yogacara Buddhism::!-I; a dynamic conception of liberation formulated to bridge, in practice, the apparent gap between the individual and the Absolute. The Yogacarins felt the need for a formulation of nirval)a that would shed light on the practical aspects of the psychological transition in the individual to the Absolute. The doctrine of unfixed nirval)a (aprati~thita-nirvary,a) expressed the Yogacara understanding of liberation as a state of enlightenment in which the practitioner is not permanently established in either the Absolute or the mundane human realm, and the concom­itant doctrine of intuitive or non-discriminating cognition (nir-

46

vikalpaka-jiiiina) elucidates the. special cogmtIve process 111-

volved in that dynamic state of liberation.

The Mahiiyiina-sarrtgraha as a Source

The best primary source for a preliminary study of these two doctrines is the Mahiiyiina-sarrtgraha of Asanga,4 best because it provides an introduction to the most important features of the twO that is both detailed and systematic. Reference to the two te_rms can be found, at least implicitly, in a number of other Yogacara works: in some-e.g., the Abhisamayiilankiira, the Rat­nagotravibhiiga, the Sandhinirmocana-sutra and the Lankiivatiira­siura-that most likely predate the Mahiiyiina-sarrtgraha, and also in others-e.g., the Mahiiyiina-sutriilankiira, the Madhyiinta­vibhiiga, the TrirrtSikii and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-Iun-that are more closely contemporaneous with, or of later composition than, the Mahiiyiina-sarrtgraha.5 For the most part however, these other references are either very cursory or already presuppose a basic familiarity with the doctrines. Thus, as is generally the case with Yogacara studies, one is well advised to begin with the Mahiiyiina-sarrtgraha.

Before considering the two doctrines individually it will be useful to review the organization of the Yogacara system pre­sented in the Mahiiyana-sarrtgraha. This will give us some idea of the place and the significance of these two doctrines in the broader context of Yogacara soteriology. The arrangement of the ten chapters of this work provides us with a concise outline of classic Yogacara thought. Extrapolating from the list of top­ics in the introduction and from the content of each chapter we can devise the following summary:

47

I. The Base of the Knowable'; (jiieyiiSraya) , i.e., the store-cognition (iilaya-vijii.iina), eighth of the eight modes of mental activIty and die basis for that which can be known.

II. The Characteristics of the Knowable (j11eyala~a'Yfa), i.e., the three natures-the Imaginary, the De­pendent, and the Absolute-that characterize that which can be known.

III. The Entrance to the Characteristics of the Know­able (jiie_'Vala~a~w-pravesa), i.e., conceptualization­only-ness (-vijiiaptz-miitratii), the philosophic prin­ciple asserting that the world, as we experience it, is nothing but conceptualization.

IV. The Cause and the Fruit of the Entrance (tat­pravesahetuphala), i.e., the six virtues or perfec­tions (paramita) of the bodhisattva.

V. The Various Degrees of Cultivation of the Cause and Fruit of that Entrance (taddhetuphala­bhavanaprabheda), i.e., the ten lands or stages (dasabhumi) of the bodhisattva.

VI. The Training of Superior Morality (adhisilaT[l sikJa), i.e., the bodhisattva discipline (samadhi) in­volved in the above cultivation.

VII. The Training of Superior Thought (adhicittaT[l sikJa) , i.e., the various meditative trances or con­centrations (samadhi) involved in the cultivation.

VIII. 'The ~raining. of ?~perior Wis~o~ (adhiprajnaT[l szkJa), l.e., the mtUltlve or non-dlscnmmatmg cog­nition (nirvikalpaka-jnana) involved in the culti­vation.

IX. The Severing which constitutes the Fruit (phala­prahar;,a), i.e., the unfixed (aprati!ithita) nirval)a of the bodhisattva characterized by a basic revolu­tion (asrayaparavrtti) in which he rejects all defile­ments (saT[lklefa) and yet does not abandon the mundane realm subject to death and re-birth (saT[lSara).

X. Cognition of the Fruit (phalajnana), i.e., the triple body (trikaya) of the Buddha.

Thus, Chapters I and II discuss what is to be known and how we are to know it; Chapters III, IV and V treat the en­trance to and the progression of the practice; Chapters VI, VII, VIII discuss the types of training involved in the practice; while Chapter IX treats the decisive turning-point that is the fruit of the above activity, and Chapter X discusses the various modes in which the fruit is experienced or known. The important

chapters for the present study are the IXth, which is completely devoted to the Yogacara notion of liberation, i.e., unfixed nirval)a, and the VIIIth, which presents the special form of cognition that leads to and constitutes that liberation.

The pivotal position of these two doctrines in the system is apparent from the place of their respective chapters in the above outline. It is also important to note the concomitant re­lationship between the two. Asvabhava indicates this in his Upanibandhana; commenting on the transition in the Mahayana­saT[lgraha from Chapter VIII, on non-discriminating cognition, to Chapter IX, on the severing brought about in unfixed

48

nirval).a, he says, "The non-discriminating cognition [topic of Chapter VIII] is able to counter everything that is to be count­ered [i.e., it is the antidote (pratipak0a) for every instance of opposition (vipak0a)]. It necessarily implies the severing [that constitutes nirvaI).a] , and so the author [Asanga] immediately continues [in Chapter IX] to discuss the distinctions of this sev­erance.,,7

Asanga's presentation in the Mahayana-sarrzgraha is thus se­quential. The present analysis will employ a more heuristic ap­proach, beginning with a discussion of the features of unfixed nirvaI).a and then proceeding to consider the particular, if not to say peculiar, type of cognition that leads up to and consti­tutes it. It will remain necessary to bear in mind, throughout, the connection between the two, the state of liberation and the type of cognition that makes it possible.

APrati~thita-nirvar;,a

What then is meant by aprati~thita-nirvar;,a,8 the unfixed lib­eration of the Yogacarins, and what is the dynamic element of this doctrine? APrati~thita is bes.t understood as referring to a nirvaI).a that is not permanently established in, or bound to, anyone realm or sphere of activity.9 The implicit contrast is to the nirvaI).a of the sravakas and pratyeka-buddhas who are crit­icized in several early Mahayana works lO for remaining per­manently established or fixed (Prati0thita) in the transcendent state of nirvaI).a-without-remainder (nirupadhise0a-nirvar;,a) , a notion of liberation that was the ideal of the earlier Abhidharmikas, who saw in it the final extinction of both men­tal and physical afflictions. The dynamic notion of aprati~thita­nirvar;,a gradually developed as the later Yogacarin Abhidharmikas came to reject the earlier view as inconsistent with the Mahayana ideal of the salvation of all beings. 11

While this doctrine of unfixed nirvaI).a is mentioned in the Mahayanasutralankara, its soteriological implications are devel­oped much more fully in the Mahayana-sarrzgraha. In Chapter IX of the latter work, Asanga introduces the doctrine in the context of his discussion of the severing of all obstacles (avarar;,a)12 that comes as the fruit of the three types of training discussed in Chapters VI, VII and VIII. He then goes on to 49

present the following concise definition:

This severing is the unfixed nirvaI).a of the bodhisattva. It has as its characteristic (la10arJa) the revolution of the dual base in which one relinquishes all defilements, but does not abandon the world of death and rebirth (sa1!lsara).13

Thus the essential features of this Yogacara notion of liberation are that it is a radical reorientation of the base of all cognition, and that it allows the bodhisattva to enjoy emancipation from all defilements (sar(lklesa) without losing any salvific efficacy in' the realm of beings who have not yet achieved liberation. This is the dynamic aspect, the aspect that resolves, at least at the level of practice, the apparent duality of Absolute and individ­ual, of nirvaI).a and sarp.sara.

Asanga continues in the Mahayana-sar(lgraha to gloss each of the key terms in the above definition:

The world of death and re-birth (sar(lSiira) is the defiled com­ponent of the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhiiva­sar(lkle.sabhiiga) , [i.e., the Imaginarl].

NirvaI).a is the pure component 0 the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhiivavyavadiinabhiiga) , [i.e., the AbsoluteV4

The dual base (iiSraya) is the dependent nature with both components combined.

The revolution (pariivrtti) takes place when, on the arising of the dependent nature's antidote (pratipa10a) one rejects fJf! the defiled component and redeems ,,~ the pure component. 15

In his commentary to this passage, Asvabhava develops two im­portant connections. First, he points out that the antidote (pra­tipa10a) that initiates the revolution is the non-discriminating cognition (nirvikalpaka-jiiiina).16 He then goes on to illustrate the role of the two key Mahayana virtues, wisdom (prajiiii) and compassion (karur;,ii) , in this process:

50

The bodhisattva dwells in this revolution of the base as if in an immaterial realm (iirtlpyadhiitu). On the one hand-with respect to h!s own pe.rson~l interests (sva~iirtham)~he is fully endowed wIth superIor wIsdom (adhzpraJiiii) and IS thus not subject to the afflictions (klesa); while on the other hand-with respect to the interests of other beings (pariirtham)-he is fulfy endowed with great compassion (mahakarurJii) and thus never ceases to dwell in the world of death and re-birth (sar(lsiira).17

This dynamic interaction of prajna and karul).a is an impor­tant correlative feature of the unfixed nirval).a. It is clarified further in a helpful passage from the Ch 'eng-wei-shih-lun dis­cussing four types of nirval).a, the last of which is the aprat4thita-nirvii1Ja:

The fourth is unfixed nirval).a: It is Thus-ness (tathatii) free from the obstruction blocking what is to be known (jiieyiivara1Ja); it is always assisted by great compassion (mahiikaru1Jii) and great wisdom (mahiiprajiiii). Because of this the bodhisattva does not remain fixed in either samsara or nirval).a; in working for the weal of all beings, though he actively employs [his compassion and wisdom] until the end of time, he nonetheless remains forever quiescent. Hence it is called nirval).a. 18

The fact that this nirval).a is free from the jiieyiivara1Ja indicates that it is the prerogative of fully enlightened bodhisattvas and not of the arhats, who succeed in severing only the obstacle of the defilements, or passions (klesiivara1Ja).

Having thus resolved the problems of formulating a nirval).a doctrine that bridged the gap between Absolute enlightenment and continued individual activity, and that allowed full play of both the Mahayana ideals of wisdom and compassion, the Yogacarins felt it necessary to say something more about the special kind of cognition in which one realizes this dynamic state of liberation. Along with the Madhyamikas, they recog­nized that the cause of our defilement and affliction is the dis­criminating and conceptualizing cognition by which we consti­tute our world and participate in it. Concerned primarily with the practical psychology of liberation, they then asked what manner of awareness or cognition would allow the bodhisattva to free himself of this world-constructing involvement and yet to continue to work actively for the weal of the beings still en­snared in that world. The doctrine of nirvikalpaka-jiiiina is the Yogacarin's attempt to answer this question.

Nirvikalpaka-jiiiina

Vikalpa, for the Buddhists, is the discrimination or concep­tualization by which we perceive and function in tl;le world and, correspondingly, by which we are inextricably bound to this 51

world, with its inevitable frustration and woe. It is a negative activity, always with the implicit connotation of false discrimi­nation or vain imagining, because it is what prevents us from realizing the true Thus-ness of all things, the Absolute.

Nirvakalpaka-jiiana is, for the Yogacarins, the antidote to this world-constructing -activity. When rendered literally as 'non­discriminating cognition or awareness,' 19 the negative aspect of its meaning is readily apparent: it is a kind of cognition or awareness that is free of the discrimination that binds us to the world of death and re-birth. A good deal more than a simple lack-of-something is implied by the term, however. In this cog­nition there is not only the lack of discrimination; there is also a more positive aspect: the direct and intuitive cognition of the Absolute. This is an essential feature and suggests some freer translation such a:; 'intuitive wisdom. ,20

While correct in the broadest sense, this rendering does not have the disadvantage of obscuring the somewhat paradoxical aspect that becomes apparent in the Sanskrit term when we reach the fully developed form of nirvikalpaka-jiiana, the mode which allows participation in both nirvana and sarpsara, in the supramundane Absolute and in the mundane realm of discrim­ination. In this mode of nirvikalpaka-jiiana we shall find a non­discriminating cognition that, subsequent to enlightenment, is still able to function in the world of discrimination, the char­acteristic that allows the crucial dynamic aspect of unfixed nirvaI)..a. This interpenetration of the apparent duality of nirvaI).a and sarpsara must also be an essential feature of the non-discriminating cognition.

Thus, for the Yogacarins, nirvikalpaka-jiiana has at once a negative, a positive, and a dynamic connotation: negative, in that it is non-discriminating cognition; positive, in that it is in­tuitive wisdom; and dynamic, in that it gives access to the Ab­solute without yielding efficacy in the relative.

A survey of the Mahiiyana-sarrtgraha chapter that is devoted to the nirvikalpaka-jiiana21 will make these three features more clear. There we find that there are three varieties or degrees of non-discriminating cognition:

1. preliminary non-discriminating cognition (jmiyogika-nir­vikalpaka-jiiana) .

2. fundamental non-discriminating cognition (mula-"), and

52

3 .. subsequently-acquired non-discriminating cognition (pr:~tha­labdha-O).22

The order of the three degrees or modes is progressive, and the text djscusses first the preliminary or preparatory stage of non~discriminating cognition, the stage which according to Va­subandhu's commentary is also kn.own as conjectural wisdom ~,'i!.t~ vitarkalparitarka?-prajna) or investigative wisdom (par­ye~a7Ja-O).23 Vasubandhu says also that this first stage arises by virtue of faith (sraddha) and resolute conviction (adhimukti) , which is to say that initially a bodhisattva in training hears from others about the principle of being free from false discrimi­nation (nirvikalpa-naya); though he is as yet unable to realize it for himself, hearing of it does produce a resolute conviction on the basis of which he proceeds to investigate the principle.24 By virtue of that investigation, non-discriminating cognition does eventually arise, and thus the first stage is said to be the cause (hetu) of the second.25

It is with the second stage that we are dealing with nirvikal­paka-jnana proper, and hence it is known as the root or fun­damental stage of non-discriminating cognition. Vasubandhu adds that it is also known as introspective wisdom (pratyatmavedya­prajna) or the wisdom of realization (sa~atkara-T 26 It is with this cognition that one realizes the Absolute, and we are in fact told that it is identical (sama) with Thus-ness (tathata).27 With the fundamental cognition, one is thus liberated from all obstacles (avara7Ja); one becomes fully accomplished and perfected.28

This being the case, why did the Yogadirins add yet a third stage? In the second, fundamental stage we can see both the negative, non-discriminating aspect and the positive, intuitive­identification-with-Thus-ness aspect; the third essential fea­ture, however, is still undeveloped.

It is in the third or subsequently-acquired (Pntha-labdha) stage of non-discriminating cognition that we again see the characteristic Yogacara innovation of an explicitly dynamic no­tion of liberation. This third stage is 'subsequently-acquired' in that it is the result or fruit of the fundamental cognition. It is also known as the active or practical wisdom iE9fflW: kriya?­prajna) or as the sustaining wisdom (sa1{/,dhara7Ja-").29 In his com­mentary on the Mahayana-sa1{/,graha passage discussing the ad­vantage of the three degrees, Vasubandhu tells us:

53

By virtue of the power of this [subsequently acquired] cog­nition of the bodhisattvas, out of consIderation for the weal of all sentient beings, decide to be reborn in the world. When they are reborn, however, they are no longer subject to de-

, filement by worldly contingencies, viz., the eight lokadhar­mas: gain (labha) , loss (alabha) , praise (pra.sa'Y[lSa) , censure (ninda), honor (ya.sas), dishonor (aya.sas) , frustration (dulJkha) and happiness (sukha). Because this [subsequently-acquired] cognition is born of the [fundamental] non-discriminating cognition, it is also called non-discriminating.30

That last statement raises a provocative question. If the sub­sequently-acquired cognition allows the bodhisattva to be active in the world, is it still non-discriminating (nirvikalpaka)? Just how does non-discriminating awareness function effectively in the world of discrimination? This is a variation of the central soteriological issue for the Yogacarins. As Vasubandhu himself puts it, "If non-discriminating cognition thus succeeds in re­alizing Buddha-hood, having become free of effort (abhoga) and mental discrimination. (manasikaravikalpa) , how then does it accomplish the matter of bringing benefit and pleasure to the beings?"31 The Yogacara masters had no doubt that this can in

. practice be done, that non-discriminating cognition can func­tion actively in the world of discrimination without being dis­criminating; they recognized, however, that it does seem para­doxical-at least to the discriminating mind. To side-step the apparent paradox inherent in the terminology, they employed a metaphorical explanation which Asanga expresses III one conCIse verse:

Just as the precious gem32 and the divine musical instrument33

Perform their respective roles without any conscious thought,34

So are all the various activities of the Buddha performed,

Also thus, auite free of any conscious thought.3

In explanation Vasubandhu says:

54

The metaphors of the precious gem and the divine musical instrument in this verse demonstrate that just as the wish­fulfilling gem, though devoid of discrimination, is still ca­pable of fulfilling whatever it is that beings desire, and more-

over that just as the divine musical instrument, without any­one to play it, produces all varieties of sound in accord with the aspirations of the beings in its proximity, just so you should know that the ncin-discriminating cogmtion of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, while free of discrimination, is nonetheless able to carry out all sorts of activity.:16

To this Asvabhava adds:

The wish-fulfilling gem and the divine musical instrument do not have the thought, "I shall now radiate brilliancy!" or "I shall now give forth sound!" because they are both without any conscious thought; nevertheless, by the power of the meritorious actions and aspirations of the beings in their proximity and without waitmg to be played [etc.], they emit all sorts of radiance and give forth all varieties of sound. You should know the non-discriminating cognition of the bud­dhas and bodhisattvas to be just like this: though completely free of discrimination and without making any effort, they are nonetheless capable of producing all varieties of benefit and service in accord with the merit and aspirations of the beings converted by them.:li

This is a crucial passage, for it was this analogy that conveyed for the Yogacarins the inner workings of the special type of cognitive activity that made their notion of dynamic or unfixed nirval)-a viable. It is their explanation of how non-discriminat­ing cognition can, at the highest level, be active within discrim­ination.

These then are the three degrees of non-discriminating cog­nition as presented in the Mahayana-sarrtgraha. 38 To illustrate the differences between them, and the sequence within, Asanga summarizes the three in a series of brief verses:

55

1. Like a mute seeking to comprehend some object, Like a mute who has succeeded in comprehending the

object, Like a non-mute who has comprehended the object, The three cognitions are analogous to these.

2. Like a fool, seeking to comprehend some object, Like a fool who has succeeded in comprehending the ob­

ject, Like a non-fool who has comprehended the object, The three39 cognitions are analogous to these.

3. Like the five modes of sensory perception, seeking to ap­prehend an object,

Like the five when they have succeeded in apprehending the object, '

Like manas40 when it has comprehended the object, The three cognitions are analogous to these.

4. Like one who has not yet understood a treatise But seeks to understand it, eventually comprehending

[now .the letter of] the doctrine and [ finally] the meanmg,

This sequence IS a metaphor for the three cognitions: Thus should you know the preliminary, etc.4l

According to Asvabhava's commentary, the preliminary stage of non-discriminating cognition is like a mute or a fool seeking to comprehend some object, because they can neither comprehend it nor talk about it-the mute lacking the verbal ability and the fool lacking the conceptual ability. Fundamental cognition is like the case of a mute or fool who has managed to comprehend the object but is still unable to communicate his comprehension. Finally, the subsequently-acquired cognition is like one with full verbal and conceptual powers who has com­prehended the object and can also communicate his under­standing. 42

Regarding the third verse, he explains that even when one has apprehended an object by means of the five modes of sen­sory perception one nonetheless lacks the conceptualization or discrimination (vikalpa) which is added by the sixth or coordi­nating mode of perception called mano-v~·iiiina.-±:i

In Vasubandhu's explanation of the fourth verse he com­ments that first one seeks to understand the treatise, then one comes to understand the words; and finally one understands the words and the meaning. In the same way one progresses through the three cognitions.-±4

The analogies employed in these four verses reiterate and summarize the most basic theme involved in the doctrine of the three degrees of non-discriminating cognition: that under­standing must be coupled with activity, that wisdom must in­clude compassion. The subsequently acquired cognition is not to be seen as a relapse from the fundamental cognition-or even as a voluntary retreat. Rather, it is the fruition, the ful­fillment, of that realization. The verses make clear that both of 56

the latter two degrees are necessary. According to this doctrine, the enlightenment of the buddhas and bodhisattvas is in full flower only when the subsequently-acquired cognition has de­veloped in addition to the fundamental cognition.45

III. Some Broader Implications

The preceding analysis of the doctrines of unfixed nirval).a and non-discriminating cognition in the Mahayana-sar(lgraha suggests several observations on the place of these Yogacara innovations in the broader context of Buddhist soteriology and also, more particularly, on the relationship between Yogacara and Madhyamaka. In order to bring these into focus it is nec­essary first to review the common ground shared by the two schools.

Two main themes characterize the revitalization movement initiated in the early Mahayana scriptures:

1) a marked tendency towards philosophic absolutism; and

2) a concern for the salvation of all sentient beings in con­trast to the earlier focus on individual liberation.

These two developments are, of course, not unrelated. Both may be seen as instances of a broader theme of universaliza­tion. Just as the Buddha was universalized from an historical individual to an abstract principle, so also was the concept of liberation universalized, in both content and extension.

The basic difference that the Mahayana converts saw be­tween their notion of liberation and that of their Hlnayana antagonists is eloquently expressed in the Prajnaparamita Scrip­tures and in the Lotus Sutra. 46 The nirval).a sought by the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas was criticized as the attainment of a transcendent (lokottara or aparyapanna) state, irrevocably separated from the mundane sphere of human existence. Nirval).a and sarp.sara were thus seen as totally distinct, an as­sertion antithetical to the emerging notion of Mahayana ab­solutism. A primary objective of the early Mahayana scriptures was to counter that view with a universalized notion of libera­tion that recognized no ultimate distinction between sarp.sara and nirval).a, and that encompassed the salvation of all beings as its ultimate goal. This was the common ground shared by adherents to the Mahayana. 57

The task of working out the implications of these new ideas, both in theory arid in practice, was subsequently taken up by the later Mahayana masters. What was initially a division of la­bor and inclination among these Mahayanists eventually re­sulted in the division into the two main Mahayana schools. Fol­lowing the epistemoiogical criticism implicit in the Prajiiaparamita Scriptures, the Madhyamikas focused their interest -on the ab­stract and logical issues of the basic Mahayana themes; one may say their approach was primarily philosophical. The Yogacarins had no quarrel with the critical philosophy of the Madhyamikas; indeed, they assumed it, while going on to take a rather dif­ferent approach. Following the systematic soteriology of the early Abhidharmikas, the Yogacarins focused their interest on the practical and technical issues of the common Mahayana themes; thus, their approach may be seen as basically psycho­logical. The two schools shared a common problematic; their difference was one of method and point of view.

This difference in approach between the two schools re­sulted in two parallel formulations of nirval)a.47 Concerned with the logical refutation of duality, the Madhyamika discus­sions of nirval)a are characteristically negative in expression. In one of the best known summaries of the Madhyamika con­ception of nirval)a, Nagarjuna states:

What is not abandoned and not attained, Not cut off and not eternal, What is not suppressed and not produced, That is called nirval)a.

To which Candraklrti comments:

That which cannot be abandoned like greed and the other [afflictions] and also cannot be attained hke the fruits of re­nunciation, that which cannot be cut off like the aggregates, etc. and also is not permanent like non-empty [prmciples], that which by its nature is not suppressed and not produced, that which has as its characteristIC the cessation of all vain discourse, that is what is called nirval)a.48

The intention of the Madhyamika notion of nirval)a is to break down, by means of the via negativa, the duality implicit in all conceptual formulation. The Absolute is inexpressible; ultimately, one must realize that there can be no duality, that

58

there can be neither samsara nor nirvaIJa.

The above analysis of the doctrines of unfixed nirvaIJa and non-discriminating cognition has shown the Yogacara concep-

. tion of liberation to be characteristically more positive in expression. The delusion of duality is still to be resolved, but in their framework the emphasis is different: the Absolute must be shown to encompass or interpenetrate both nirvaIJa and saITlsara at one and the same time.49

The Madhyamikas were primarily concerned with critically examining the philosophic nature of bondage. By examining the logical inadequacies of language and. discursive thought, they sought to explain why we are trapped by the duality of saITlsara and nirvaIJa. The Yogacarins, accepting that critique, turned away from the purely philosophic issues to address the more immediate question of how one is to realize that non­duality in practice. By analyzing the psychological structures by which beings become trapped in the dualities of discursive thought, they sought to chart the path by which one may, in practice, escape bondage.

Both schools recognized that we are bound to the world of our experience and that this inevitably leads to frustration and suffering. Madhyamaka sought to explain logically how this experience was ultimately a delusion; it generated thereby a critical and soteriologic philosophy of language. On the basis of that critical analysis of delusion combined with their own interest in meditative practice, the Yogacarins sought to ex­amine the mental process by which we perpetuate the world­constructing delusion, and to explain in practical terms how one is to escape from that process. They, in turn, generated a speculative and soteriologic psychology.

In this sense, we may see Yogacara as the old Abhidharmic enterprise carried on in the new light of Madhyamika critical epistemology, an enterprise that required-now in its Yogacara guise-an innovative and dynamic reformulation of the notion of liberation, one that would go beyond the static duality of the Hlnayana nirupadhise~a-nirvar.w and one that would also com­plement the practical austerity of the rigorously negative Madhyamika nirvaIJa. And, indeed, this is precisely what we see in the doctrines of nirvikalpaka-jiiana and aprati~thita­

nirvarJa.

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NOTES

A summary of this article was presented under the title "Soteriological Innovations in Yogacara Buddhism" at the Asian Studies Pacinc Area Con­ference (ASPAC) held at Evergreen State University, Olympia, Washington, June 1979.

All translations are those of the author unless otherwise noted. In the case of passages from the MahaYlna-sw?zgraha and its commentaries. (see n. 4 be­low), translations are hom the Chinese version of HSllan-tsang (T: 1594, XXXI. 132c-152a) unless otherwise noted. References to the Ch 'eng-wei-shih­lun are cited from the edition of SAEKI Join f:j:fBJtJi ShindrJ Ju-yuishiki-nm m~RX:llfH~~ (Nara: Sh()sogaku Seiten, 1940). This allows easy reference to the French translation of Louis de la Vallee-Poussin, Fijiwptimlitratclsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928-1948).

I. This is the translation of E. J. Thomas, The LiFe ur the Buddha (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1927), p. 81. In his reference to the Majjhima-nikdya source of the passage, Thomas indicates that it is from the fl;lalu7saccaka-sutla; in fact, it is from the Ariyapariyesana, corresponding to pp. Ui7-l(j8 of V. Trenckner's edition of the Pali original, Majjhillw-nikdya, I (London: Pali Text Society, 1888).

Very similar versions of this story are also found in the DZl!;lulIlikcl.'V1I (Pali Text Society ed. Vol. II, p. 36) and in the Finaya (H. Oldenberg's ed. Vol. I, p. 4). There are other accounts (also in the MajjhiIlUl-nikdJ'a) that tell of Mara tempting the newly enlightened Buddha with the thought that he should not bother going forth to teach his message, another early tradition that also warrants consideration in any broader study of the development of the nirvaIJa concept.

2. There is no mention of the apmti.~·!hita-nirvm.U/ doctrine in the most commonly used surveys of Buddhism, e.g., E. Thomas' Histm), or Buddhist Thuught, E. Conze's Buddhism: Its Essl'llce and Development and Buddhist Thought in India, A. K. Warder's Indian BZlIldhislIl, David Kalupahana's Buddhist Phi­lusuphy, etc. More surprising is the omission of the doctrine in A. K. Chat­terjee's The YUg(lCClnl Idealism and also the very summary and inadequate treatment in Th. Stcherbatsky's Conception of Buddhist Nir[l(II.Ul (pp. 185n & 204n) where it is mentioned only parentheticallv as an instance of Yogacara having "deviated from strict Mahayanism."

Some discussion of aprati.~·!hita-nin'iil.za in western-language sources is found in the annotation to the appropriate sections (see below) of L. de la Vallee-Poussin's translation of the Ch'mg-wei-shih-{un (Fijl1aptim(/(ratii-sirldhi) and E. Lamotte's translation of the Ma!uly7na-stll!zgmlw, also in D. T. Suzuki's Olltlines of Alalu7yc7na Buddhism (London: Luzac and Co., 19(7), pp. 345-346; A. B. Keith's Buddhist Philusophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 257-259; J. Masuda's Del' individwilistisch IdealislI/lls (Heidelberg, 1926), pp. 49ft'., .J. Kitayama's Metaphysik des B uddhislllus (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhal11l11er, 19:\4), pp. ]!i4-]65; H. von Glasenapp's Unsterblichkeit lind ErWslIIIg ill den indischen Relir:;ionm (Halle, 1938), p. G2; N. Dutt's Malu7yc7l1a Buddhism, new ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsiclass, 1977), p. 250, n. 3. These latter secondary works for the most part simply paraphrase the one short passage from the Ch 'eng~wei-shih­{UII translated below in this article.

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3. The historical development of Yogacara doctrine is still a very contro­versiarsubject. Provisionally, I would suggest a division of the Yogacara lit­erature into (at least) three main historical periods: Early Yogacara (pre­Asanga), Classical Yogacara (Asanga and Vasubandhu, esp. the Mahiiyana­sCt1!1graha), and Late or Scholastic Yogacara (post-Vasubandhu); more refine­ment must await further textual studies-the Yogii.cambhftmi and the Abhid­ha17nasa-muccaya, for example, should go in the first period in spite of their association with Asanga. Contrast Jacques May's proposal for a Vijilanavada periodization in "La philosophie bouddhique idealiste," Asiati;~('he Stlldien (Eludes asiatique), 25 (1971): 265-323; and see also Lambert Schmithausen, "Zur Literaturgeschichte del' aiteren Yogacara-schule," ZeitschriJl deT De1lISchen Morgenliindischen GesellschaJl, Supplementum I, Vol. 2 (1968), pp. 811-823. I agree with Schmithausen (p. 811n) that, as a generic term, Yogacara is preferable to V~jiianavada.

4; The Mahayana-sarpgraha does not survive in Sanskrit, but we do have four translations into Chinese and two into Tibetan. Etienne Lamotte's La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga (Louvain: Bureaux du Museon, 1938; rpt Louvain: Universite de Louvain, Institute Orientaliste, 1973) includes an edition of the Tibetan text and an excellent French translation from the Tibetan with annotations from the two principle commentaries. Vasuban­dim's MahiiyanasaT(tgraha-bha~ya and Asvabhava(?)'s MahaY{lS{l/!lgmha-llpani­bandhana. For details of the different versions of the original work and its commentaries, see Lamotte, Vol. 1, pp. v-viii. In this article references will be given to the Taishii edition of the Chinese translations; this allows easy reference to Lamotte's translation ofthe Tibetan which gives the correspond­ing TaishO page numbers after each section.

5. For details on these references and others see Lamotte, La Somme, pp. *45-46 and *47-48.

6. In Sanskrit j7ieya, the passive future or optative participle of Vjiiii: "to know," means both "that which is knowable" as well as "that which is to be known." Hstian-tsang expresses both aspects in his rendering of Vasuban­dllU's gloss PJf~IlJ~i!&~PJf~ (T:XXXI.322b29-cl).

7. T:XXXI.434cl6-17. 8. The germ at least of this idea is to be found already in the A~'!(wlh(ls7'ik(l­

pllJ'alllila; c(. aPl'ali.~!hil(lIll(inaso hi lalh(igalo 'J'hal! salllyak­

sll1!lbliddha~l/ sa Ilaiva SCI/!Is/!!,I!' d/uilallslhito l/(iPJ' aSCl1!lskrll' d/ultall slhilo na ca tato I~)llItihila~l/ (eel. of R. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888, p. 37). The earliest occurrence in a Yogacara context seems to be in the Siill'cilailktira where it is mentioned several times (see Lamotte, La SOlllllle, p. *48 for the references).

9. The term has been variously rendered into Western languages: "the nirval}a that has no abode" (Suzuki), "nirVal)a without basis or stay" (Keith), "das absolut freie Nirval}a" (Kitayama), "altruistic nirval}a" (Stcherbatsky), "l'illllllortel et actif Nirval)a" (La Vallee-Poussin), and "Ie Nirval~a instable" (Lamotte). Nil'7.1(I'.la, of course, means literally "extinction" and represents in the broadest sense the Buddhist conception of liberation, deliverance, sal­"ation, etc.

10. See for example Afa/ulyll1a.l'iil}'(l/aizlu/ra XVII.42:

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aviganaql lq-paya na tighati mana~1 same krpaliinaql kuta eva lokasaukhye sv~jIvite va bhavet snehahl).

sarvasya hi lokasya laukike saukhye svajIvite ca snehal)./ tatrapi ca nil).snehanal!l sravakapratyekabuddhanalp. sarvadttl).khopasame nirval)e pratiHhital!l manah/ bodhisattvanalp tu karuna-vi~tatvan nirVal,le 'pi mano na prati~rhitalp//

Which S. Levi (iViaiulydnasfitrrdaiJJldra. Vol. II. p. 217) translates:

Les Compatissants, tout penetres de Compassion, n'arretent pas leur esprit dans la Suppression. Comment done se prendraient-ils d'affection pour Ie bonheur mondain ou pour leur vie?

Le monde entier, il est vrai, aime Ie bonheur mondain et tient a sa vie. Les Auditeurs et les Bouddhas-pour-soi, qui ne tiennent ni a l'un ni a l'autre, arretent du moins leur esprit dans Ie NirvaI,la, qui est Ie sous­Apaisement de toute douleur. Mais les Bodhisattvas, penetres qu'ils sont de Compassion, n'arretent pas leur esprit meme dans Ie Nirval,l<l.

II. Lambert Schmithausen has presented a very important document in the development of the Yogacara conception of liberation in Del" NinJll1}a­

abschnitt in deT ViniscayaSCl~!zgnt!u!1.~z del" Yug{[cdmbhCmlizz (Wien: Hermann Boh­laus, 1969, pub. as Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Sitzungs­

(michte, 264.2). While the term aprati~!hita-nil"V(II.la is apparently not to be found in the Yugticclmbhl1mi, the doctrine is foreshadowed in this section which reflects a distinction between the static nirval)a of the arhats and the dynamic nirval)a of the tathagata (see esp. 1. 9-11, pp. 53-59; and also note 159, p. 159-160). The distinction is explained with reference to nil"lljJadhi§e:[a-

1!il"vcl~w: after entering the transcendental nirval)a-without-remainder the tathagata, in contrast to the arhat, chooses to return. As Schmithausen sug­gests (p. 7) this very likely represents an earlier and transitional stage in the development of the aprati~!hit(l-/lil"7HII.la doctrine that is found in later works like the MahcI)'ttnaStltl"dlaiziull"{l and the jl,laiul),clnasw!lgmha.

12. Vasubandhu (T:XXX1.322c20-21) identifies these as the obstacle of the afHictions or passions (kle§ilval"w.lIl) and the obstacle blocking what is to be known (jlie)'clVara~!(l). For a summary account of the important Yogacara doc­trine of the two obstacles see Ch 'eng-wei-shih-lzm ix.5b-8b along with La Vallee­Poussin's annotations. Note especially the different meaning ofjJie)'clvaJ"{/l.la

in a Yogacara as opposed to a Madhyamika context. 13. T:XXXI.148c14-15. 14. In Chap. II (T:XXXI.140c7-11) Asanga has already explained that

the defiled component is the Imaginary (parikalpita) and the pure component is the Absolute (parir.z-ispanna), while the Dependent (paratantra) comprises both.

15. T:XXXI.148c15-18. 16. T:XXXI.435a6-7.

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17. T:XXXI.434c21-23. IS. S:x.9b; T:XXXI.55bI6-19. 19. The Sanskrit verbal-noun jiiiina (cf. vijiiiina) should require as an

equivalent an English word expressing an act rather than a state; hence 'cog­nition.' In Buddhist Chinese, however,jiiiina is consistently rendered with '& which is generally translated into English as 'knowledge' or 'wisdom.' Also, the equation 'of ° jiiana and ° -prajiia in this context as indicated below should be borne in mind.

20. Cf. Lamotte's "Ie savoir intuitif." 21. The eighth chapter on the "Training of Superior Wisdom"

(T:XXXI.14 7b19-14Scll): Erich Frauwallner's Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1969) includes a translation of some brief selec­tions from this chapter (pp. 345-347) and also a discussion in which he draws attention to the key position of nirvikalpakajiiana and p,,:!!thalabdha-jiiana in Asanga's thought.

22. The text discusses the difference between the three modes at some length before the specific terms are actually introduced at T:XXXI.14Sa23-2S. Later scholastic works in Chinese refer to the three also as the initial :f}], the middle ,*, and the subsequent 1~ .

23. T:XXXI.363cl5-20. 24. T:XXXI.365b23-26. 25. T:XXXI.363c21. 26. T:XXXI.363cl5-20. 27. T:XXXI.364b24-25. 2S. Mahayiina-sarIJgraha T:XXXL14Sal-2 and Vasubandhu's Bha!!ya

T:XXXI.365c2-5. 29. Hsuan-tsang translates Wl:Rf (T:XXXI.363cl9); Lamotte reconstructs

iidhara-o, but that seems less likely since sarIJdhara1Ja ("holding together") is used specifically in the sense of "supporting life," etc. Also Wl:Rf for sarIJdharana is attested in Hsuan-tsang's translation of the Kosa, T:XXIX.llclO.

30. T:XXXI.365clO-14. 31. T:XXXI.366a2S-29. 32. This is the cintiima1Ji, the wish-fulfilling gem or philosopher's stone

that fulfills its possessor's every wish. 33. This is a musical instrument (turya) that produces without being

played just what the possessor wishes to hear. Hsuan-tsang's 7(~ is probably elliptic for 7(~~ (or ~) Paramartha's 7(~.

34. In Hsuan-tsang's Chinese $.\f;~, normally renders ocetanam, "uncon­sciously," "without conscious intent," etc. Paramartha (T:XXXI.12Sc3) says "without discriminating" in the second half of the verse; Buddhasanta (T:XXXI.I09a6-7) speaks of "non-discrimination" in the case of the gem and musical instrument and of the Buddha's "unfixed [nirvaI,la]" in the second half. Dharmagupta (T:XXXI.30Sa7-S) has "free from discrimination" in both cases.

35. T:XXXI.14Sa17-1S. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 245, points out that this verse is very close to Mahayanasutriilankiira IX.1S-19.

36. T:XXXI.366b4-7. 37. T:XXXI.431c23-2S.

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38. Each of these is further analyzed in the text (T:XXXI.148a23-28) into various sub-species---,.three, three, and five respectively. These further dis­tinctions are explained in Vasubandhu's and Asvabhava's commentaries (see Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 248-2S0).

39. Following the variant given in the notes T:XXXI.148. 40. Vasubandhu (T:XXXI.366aS) and Asvabhava (T:XXXI.431b27-28)

both specify the "manaS transcribed in the text to be mano-vijftana, the sixth mode of mental activity (vijftana).

41. T:XXXI.l48aS-12. 42. T:XXXI.431blS-23. 43. T:XXXI.431b23-29. 44. T:XXXI.366a7-12. The commentary explains the third line of the

verse, saying that "the doctrine (~ : dharma) " means "the words ( )C~ )," i.e., what it says as opposed to what It means.

4S. There is an unfortunate error in La Vallee-Poussin's discussion-of the three cognitions that obscures this important point (La Siddhi, p. 634). In a paraphrase of the first of these same four verses from the Mahayana-saT[!graha he says that the preliminary cognition corresponds to "Ie muet qui ne sait pas"; the fundamental cognition, to "Ie muet qui sait"; and the subsequently­acquired cognition, to "Ie non-muet qui ne sait pas" (emphasis added). The whole point of the analogy, however, is that the subsequently-acquired cog­nition is a step beyond the fundamental: it corresponds to someone who both knows and can act, in this case, talk about or preach his realization to others.

46. Perhaps the best study contrasting the differences between the various notions of nirvaIfa in the Hinayana as opposed to the Mahayana schools is found in Nalinaksha Dutt, Mahayana Buddhism (see above, n. 2), pp. 178-254.

47. It is surely no coincidence that, of the principal adversaries in the modern debate over the meaning of Buddhist nirvaIfa, Stcherbatsky, who advocated a more negative .conception, worked especially with Madhyamika works in Tibetan, while La ValU:e-Poussin, who advocated a more positive understanding of the term, worked especially with Yogacara works in Chinese. Consider also in this light Stcherbatsky's evaluation of aprat4thita­nirvaTfa as a Yogacara deviation from "strict Mahayanism" (see n. 2 above).

48. This is verse XXV.3 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika along with Can­drakirti's Prasannapada commentary.

aprahrTfam asaT[!praptam anucchinnam aSilSvataml aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvaTfam ucyatell

Vrtti: yad dhi naiva prahryate ragadivat napi prapyate sramaTfyaphalavat napyucchidyate skandhadivat yac capi nanityam aSunyavat tat svabhavato 'niruddham anutpannaT[! ca sarvaprapaftcopaSama-la~aTfaT[! nirvaTfam uktaml

The Sanskrit text is found in the revised and enlarged edition of Stcher­batsky's The Conception of Buddhist NirvaTfa (ed. by Jaideva Singh, Varanasi: Bhara:tiya Vidya Prakasham), p. 40 of the appendix. For Stcherbatsky's some­what different translation of the same passage, see pp. 288-289 of the Singh ed. or pp. 186-187 of the original ed.

49. The significance and prominence of this 'positive' element in Yogacara thought is too quickly disregarded by those who would represent Indian Buddhism as negative and world-denying in contrast to Chinese Bud­dhism which is positive and world-affirming. 64

YOGAcARA AND THE BUDDHIST LOGICIANS

by Alex Wayman

Introduction

The school of Buddhism known as Yogacara or alternately as Cittamatra.is a standard topic in surveys of Indian philoso­phy. It is also one of the two main sides of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, the other side being called Madhyamika. Many scholars have gone deeply into the intricacies of the Indian sys­tems of philosophy, and the Yogacara school has not escaped their keen considerations. However, the present writer found in the course of his studies over the years that the philosophical position of these texts that emerged while he read the texts of Asariga and his followers did not bear out the standard survey explanation of the Yogacara position. At the same time, it be­came apparent why some scholars-undoubtedly intelligent and capable-would come to a conclusion not verified by my own delvings into this literature. I allude to the unqualified denial of an external object, attributed to this school. Of course, if indeed the Yogacara school denies the reality of an external object, it would hardly be possible to find its position attractive to the Buddhist logicians who were to follow, since Dignaga and his successors, especially Dharmaklrti, do not deny an external object; rather they call it a svalakwr;,a (the 'particular') and even sometimes describe it as paramartha-sat (,absolute existence'), to underscore the reality of this object of direct perception (pra­tyak!ja). But it has been claimed by Stcherbatsky and 0thers that there is a pronounced-influence of Yoga car a philosophy on Bud­dhist logic of the Dignaga-Dharmaklrti lineage. If we grant this, and indeed we should, there remains the problem of what

65

is the nature of the influence and what kind of Yogacara is most affiliated to the Buddhist logician's position.

But, then, there appear to be different kinds of Yogacara. At the sutra stage, there is the Sa'r(l-dhinirmocana-sutra and its continuation into Asanga's school, and there is the Lankiivatiira­sutra. As a kind of revealed sastra, there is the Madhyiintavibhiiga, attributed to Maitreya, with Vasubandhu's commentary. Finally, there is Vasubandhu's Vi'r(l-satikii and Tri'r(l-sikii. Of course there are Mahayana sutras or sutra portions besides the above that were authoritative for both the Madhyamika and Yogacara schools, and also further exegetical commentaries on the main works, as well as more independent treatises to be included in the general category of Yogaclra; the present paper can barely touch upon this extensive literature. After considering certain texts of the abov~-named literature, I shall treat the term iilayavijfiiina, and, finally, some views about the Yogacara.

A. Vijfiaptimiitratiisiddhi and the Sa'r(l-dhinirmocanasutra

The Sa'r(l-dhinirmocanasutra is the main Yogacara scripture. Va­subandhu's two brief treatises are the form of Yogacara the most known and treated by '!"Nestern scholars as to attributed Yogacara philosophical position. The introduction to Tripathi's The Problems of Knowledge in Yogacara Buddhism says:! "Dr. Stcherbatsky has also corroborated the view that Diimaga's Alambanaparik:jii simply summarizes the arguments of Vasuban­dhu's Vijfiaptimiitratiisiddhi. A comparative study of the Vi'r(l-satikii and the Alambanapari10ii certainly lends support to the view of Dr. Stcherbatsky." In further support, one may observe that VinItadeva, who wrote several well-known commentaries on Dharmakirti's logical works, composed the commentaries, Prakara1J,a-vi'r(l-saka-tika and Tri'r(l-sikii-tikii, on the two Vasuban­dhu treatises, perhaps as a preparation for his logic commen­taries, including his commentary, Alambanapari10ii-tikii, on the small Dignaga work.

It is necessary to treat certain terms. There is the term iilambana, employed in the title of Dignaga's work, and I render it 'consciousness-support.' Then there is the correlative subjec­tive term, vijfiiina, which I usually translate 'perception.' In the summary of the master Yogacara commentator Sthiramati, from his commentary on Vasubandhu's Paficaskandhaprakara1J,a: 2

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Now, what is vijiiiina? It is defined as representation (vijiiapti) of a consciousness-support (iilambana). A consciousness-sup­port is a sense object of a thought (citta) and a mental (caitta); furthermore, it IS of six kinds, from form (rupa) up to na­tures (dharma). Besides, representation is defined as appre­hension ~riiha), ascertainment (*pratipatti), and understand­ing (*adhzgama). It is the six evolving perceptions (Pravrtti­vijiiiina) from eye-based perception up to mind-based per­ception (manovijiiiina).

Notice that there is no denial of an iilambana in the meaning of a sense object. Passing to Vasubandhu's two treatises, we can notice references to the ordinary situation of mankind and to the transcendental experience. In the first case, his 'represen­tation-only' (vijiiapti-miitra) as applied to the normal conscious­ness in sentient beings is somewhat subtler than a simple denial of external things. This is clear from Verse 3 of the Sanskrit Vi1[tSatikii, containing the words, "furthermore, like the hungry ghosts (preta), so with all, there is no certainty in the stream of consciousness, upon seeing the stream of pus, and so on.,,3 This alludes to the Buddhist mythological theory of five or six des­tinies (gati), including the hungry ghosts as those disembodied spirits that are perpetually hungry and thirsty because their own consciousness pollutes what is inherently pure, making it so repulsivea,s to be uneatable and undrinkable. J nanagarbha's commentary on the Maitreya chapter of the Sar[ldhinirmocanasutra illustrates the mis-reported nature of the external object with the standard example of the stream of water which animals, hungry ghosts, men, and gods all see differently, the hungry ghosts seeing it full of pus, the gods seeing it as lapis lazuli, and so on.4 The stream itself is not denied. What those remarks mean is that the consciousness shared by a particular destiny (gati) , say men, or hungry ghosts, agrees on a particular fab­rication attributed to an external, and that the external is not the way it was represented. Hence, the point is not to deny an external object, but rather to affirm the representation of it as a group fabrication; and so the common denial of an external object means in these terms that there is no object of which the representation is a faithful copy. In short, Vasubandhu could well argue that his representation-only is the correct way to speak of the nature of consciousness in the light of the Bud-

. dhist teaching of five or six destinies (gati) , with the position

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that the object is the same for all the sentient beings: they only see it differently on account of the destiny.

Once we take this as Vasubandhu's position, it becomes more reasonable to assume a possible consistency with Dignaga's Alambanaparl~ii, since this work indeed admits an iilambana.

It is aho well to notice that Vasubandhu treats the transcen­dental experience, since Dignaga also admits a yogiPratya~a. Thus toward the end of the Trirrzsikii (verse 28):5

When perception (vijiiiina) does not perceptively reach the meditative object (alambana), it abides in the state of percep­tion-only (vijiiiina-miitra) , which lacks an apprehendible oy reason of not apprehending that meditative object.

Here again Vasubandhu clarifies that he does not deny the iilambana. The state of vijiiiina-miitra is reached when vijiiiina does not apprehend the iilambana. Subject and object have be­come one in samiidhi; and Vasubandhu's verse is consistent with Asanga's citation of the Sarrzdhinirmocrznasiitra (Maitreya chap­ter) in his Mahiiyiinasarrtgraha:

Lord, is that image which is the samiidhi-domain different from that mind (which perceives) or is it the same? The Lord answered: Maitreya, it is not different. And why? Because that image amounts to representation-only (vijiiaptimiitra). Maitreya, I have explained that the meditative object (iilambana) of perception (vijiiiina) is distinguished (vibhakta) by representation -only (vijiiaptimiitra). 6

This passage again clarifies that there is no denial of the iilambana even in the successful samiidhi situation. Indeed, rep­resentation-only distinguishes the consciousness-support when it is no longer perceived. This corresponds to the usual situa­tion when, seeing something quite striking and wondering if it is really there, we would turn away from it and not see it, showing that our perception itself was not responsible for the object (here the iilambana) , and that the object was distin­guished (set apart) by our no longer perceiving it. By the same token, the state of samiidhi is distinguished by the yogin's re­turning to ordinary consciousness.

Now, is the preceding consistent with Dignaga's Alambanaparl~ii? Since it is a brief work, I shall translate the eight verses with the help of Dignaga's own commentary.7

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L Although atoms are the cause of the sensory represen­tation, they do not appear therein, so its sense object (vi!jaya) is not the atoms, like a sense organ (has objects).

2. Whatever appears (i.e. in the representation) that way, does not (do so) from them, because it (the representation) is non-substantial, like a double moon. Accordingly, neither of the two externals (atoms and their aggregation) is feasible as the object of cognition.

3. Some persons claim that the aspects (akara) of aggrega­tion accomplish (the cognition), and that the aspect of atoms is not the object of representation, like solidity, etc.

4. If it were that way, the cognitions of pot, cup, etc. would be the same. If the differentiation (of cognition) is by virtue of differentiation of aspects, it would exist as atomic substance-

5. because if it were not (so), there would be no differentia­tion of measure (e.g., roundness). Therefore, it exists (i.e., con­ventionally) without material. Because if one excludes the at­oms, the cognition of an appearance in that place would disappear.

6. The form of the inner knowable, which appears as though it were external, is the object-because it is the form of perception (vijiiana) and because it is the conditional state (pratyayata) of that (= alambana).

7. And it is the condition (pratyaya) because a single part (a1[lSa) is not delusive. Because it establishes capacity (Sakti), it is in sequence. Whatever is the form of sense capacity that is an associated cause (sahakarin), is the sense organ (itself).

8. Besides, that does not contradict the representation. Ac­cordingly, these (three) pass (as valid): 1) the form of the sensory object (vi!jaya); 2) the capacity of mutual cause (i.e., capacity of eye, and based. on inner form the perception, vijiiana, to wit, the alambana ap- . pearing as objective thing); 3) immemorial time.

Later, we shall see by a passage of Dharmottara's that Dignaga has a kind of nominalism here. He distinguishes be­tween the atoms and the form of atoms. What causes sensory representation is atoms, not an aggregation of 'form' of atoms. In his summary (verse 8, 2), he shows that this cause is further treated by an associated cause, to wit, the sense-organ capacity.

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These are taken together as one item. Left over 1) is. the 'form' (the so-called 'aggregation of atoms') attributed to the object; this is added by the mind, and is another item (which he calls "the form of the sensory object"). A third item is 'time,' since this is necessary for sequence, as in the discussions on various causes.

So far I detect no divergence from that part of Vasubandhu's two treatises, Asanga's citation in the Mahayana-sarrtgraha, and Sthiramati'spassage, as presented above. In this kind of nom­inalism8 (though called 'idealism' in Indian Philosophy sur­veys), what is real is the atomic object, called in other logic texts the svalak!iar;,a, and the real is causal and has the sense organ as a cooperating capacity. On top of this the mind adds the 'form,' more comprehensible by the word 'shape,' meaning that the aggregation of atoms was not what caused the perception: this aggregation is a representation-only (vijitapti-matra) of a consciousness-support (alambana) and makes up a picture in the mind, which the mind attributes to the external world. It is impossible that this picture or aggregation could exist in the external world, since it is representation-only. The vulgar in­terpretation-that this denies external objects-is nonsense. It fails to get Vasubandhu's point, or Dignaga's either.

When Vasubandhu says, "like the hungry ghosts (preta)," he intends that when they see the river as full of pus and other unclean matter, this is their representation-only; he does not deny the external object. He here appears consistent with the Maitreya chapter of the Sarrtdhinirmocanasutra. However, Va­subandhu and Dignaga show a different emphasis. Dignaga attempts to give equal weight to the real object and the unreal object. Not particularly in this treatise, Alambanaparik!ia, but, rather, in his Pramar;,asamuccaya, he sets forth the object of pra­tyak!ia (sensory perception) as the svalak!iar;,a; and the object of an appropriate cognition called 'inference' (anumana) as the samanyalak!iar;,a. .

B. Madhyantavibhaga and two 'reals'

This treatise obtained a reverence tantamount to that of scrip­ture by the legend that Asanga received it from Maitreya, understood as the Bodhisattva; and Vasubandhu's commentary

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has .a derived lustre thereby. I have cited Dharmottara's pramar;,aparik!;a for a passage on color and shape to show a con­sistency with the Madhyantavibhaga's first chapter, in. an old re­view article of mine in Philosophy East and West. Here the phil­osophical position is evidently a kind of nominalism, and as was previously indicated, is apparently consistent with Dignaga's Alambanaparzk!;a. Dharmottara is a well-known commentator on Dharmaklrti. This is Dharmottara's passage: 9

Of those, the efficient entity is the subtle atom, and color (varr;,a) is the nature of the subtle atom, but shape (sa'Y[lSthana) is not. ~hu~, shape exists conventionally (sa'Y{tvrtitas) while color eXIsts m the absolute sense (paramarthatas). The latter serves for an effect while shape does not. Consequently, while one ordinarily sees something efficient as a multiple, when one understands the nature of this and that, it is not distinct, for example, a moment. [It is objected:] "Shape is that way. Its existence in a distinct manner pervades as an adjunct to an entity in the sense of a distinct configuration. Just as in the absence of a thesis there is no reason, it would contradict this were the adjunct to an object (vi~aya) (to be) without distinctness." Now we have explained that shape is not an adjunct. Therefore, the shape, or the 'state of a given thing' (diws po fiid, S. vastutva), or a moment, are dependent on something, whatever the something else.

Here, Dharmottara takes the 'color' out there, 'shape' in the mind; the realist takes the shape and color out there. In my review article on Chatterjee's The Yogacara Idealism,IO I pointed out that the Madhyantavibhaga has two reals, the void Dhar­madhatu and the Imagination of Unreality. Here, the void Dharmadhatu is on the side of the efficient entity, the color, where the Buddhist logician puts the svalak!;ar;,a; and the Imag­ination of Unreality is on the side of constructive imagination, discursive thought, which adds the dimension, the shape, where the logician puts his samanyalak!;ar;,a.For example, the clay is the atomic portion in the void Dharmadhatu, and the shape impressed upon it-consequently the 'pot'-came from the potter's mind, a vestige of the Imagination of Unreality.

C. The Lankiivatarasiitra and Cittamatra

This sutra is frequently taken to be in the Yogacara tradition,

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since it uses freely the term alayavijiiana (though in conjunction with the Tathagatagarbha), a characteristic term of the Asanga­Vasubandhu Yogacara (which, however, does not appear to ac­cept the Tathagatagarbha theory), and frequently employs the term cittamatra. Suzuki, in his Studies in the Lankavatara-sutra, l! states that this sutra never employs the term vijiianamatra (em­ployed by Vasubandhu in an above citation), although it uses cittamatra and vijiiaptimatra interchangeably. In terms of the previously-mentioned two situations from Vasubandhu's two treatises, namely, the ordinary situation of mankind, and the yogin's samadhi situation, it appears that the Lankavatara uses the term cittamatra in terms of the ordinary situation. At least, this is the conclusion of passages cited in Tson-kha-pa's com­mentary on Candraklrti's Madhyamakavatara (a work in the Madhyamika tradition). Thus, the Lanka, Chap. III, verse 33Y

There is nothing manifested outside, for the mind manifests the multiplicity. Body, sense experience, dwelling place-I call mind-only.

Tson-kha-pa explains: 13 'body' means the material (riipin) sense bases (ayatana) of eye, etc.; 'sense experience' (bhoga) means the five sense objects, form, sound, etc.; 'dwelling place' means the receptacle world (bhajana-loka). While they are all manifested by the mind, they appear as though external. Tson-kha-pa calls this a sutra of 'provisional meaning' in the Madhyamika mean­ing of the terms neyartha (provisional meaning) and nftiirtha (final meaning). He claims that such sutra passages as this one were taught by the Lord to divert sinful beings from their at­tachment to sense objects; and so they are provisional. He bears this out by citing another verse from the Lanka, Chap. II, 123: 14

In the way that a physician offers a medicine to one patient and a medicine to another patient, in that way the Buddhas teach mind-only for the sentient beings.

Thus the teaching of mind-only is subservient to the particular sentient beings that are taught. This application of the Mahayana 'skillful-means' (upiiya-kausalya) approach, in con­trast to what is actually the case, would hardly be inviting to the Buddhist logicians.

On the other hand, it is possible to take the term cittamatra

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in a meditative context. Perhaps consistent with those Lankiivatara verses is what Sthiramati says in his subcommen­tary on the Mahiiyana-Sutralar[!,kara, Bodhipak~a chapter, verse 66: "The halting of thought on such a single area of thought

. as 'Mind-only is the three worlds; they are nothing but the mind,' constitutes calming (of the mind) (Samatha)."15 That is, he here counts the passage "Mind-only is the three worlds" as a meditative object in the form of an aphoristic sentence, rather than as a philosophical tenet of ordinary discursive thought. This meditative sense of the term cittamatra is also in the Sutralar[!,kiira itself, Chap. XIV, verses 24-25, during an expla­nation of the four degrees of yoga-warmth, summits, for­bearances, and supreme mundane natures: l6

So as to expand the light of dharma, he begins striving in earnest. And having expanded the light of dharma, he stands fast in mind-only (cittamatra). Then he discerns the appear­ance of all objects in the citta. At that time there are cast off his shifting objects of perception.

In these meditative passages, it could be argued, the sense of matra in cittamatra, i.e. 'only,' as excluding external objects, is not to do away with external objects, but to disregard them, since this situation of samadhi is purely an interior movement.

D. The alayavijnana

In the Siddhanta book of the Tibetan author Dkon-mchog­Jigs-med-dban-po, the Yogacarins (sems tsam pa) are divided into two: those who follow scripture (agama-anusarin) , and those who follow reason (yukti-anusarin). The former are those who follow the five divisions of Asanga's Yogacarabhumi. The latter are those who follow the seven treatises of logic (by Dhar­maklrti). Worthy of note is the difference attributed to the two regarding their theory of the 'subjective' (vi0ayin, T. yul can): "The followers of scripture accept the alayav&·nana as the per­sonality (pudgala) because they believe in the eight kinds of vijnana. The followers of reason believe in the mano-vijnana as the basic characteristic of the personality."l7 I have pointed out in another study that the Buddhist logicians apparently re­placed the alayavijnana with the kind of pratya~a called 'in-

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trospection' (svasa1'{£vedana).18 However, Dharmakirti, in his Pramanavarttika, Pratyak~a

chapter, verse 522, refers to the alaya, which Prajiiakaragupta in his commentary explains as the alayavij'iiarw. The commen­tarial passage is quite difficult, and here I shall just give the gist of it. First, there ate verses 521 and 522 by Dharmakirti: 19

521. When capacity ends for the previous cognition, there is no cognition in the absence of the prior cognition, because one does not understand the arising of a cog­nition in the event the cognition loses the capacity for another object.

522. Although the two, unaffiliated, have arisen simulta­neously by means of a single perspicacious thought (= evolving perception), since loss of capacity has set in, there is no arising of another from the alaya.

Dharmakirti here refers to the situation where a cognition of an object is dissipated and there is a problem of accounting for the next cognition. But do we have to bring in the help of a 'store-consciousness' (alayavijiiana) to get the next cognition? It seems that Dharmakirti denies any need of the alayavijiiana. However, Prajiiakaragupta concludes: "Let this thought (cinta) of alayavijiiana stay! Besides, since it is imagined as the basis of 'habit-energy' (vasana) , there is no fault."20

This reference to vasana recalls the discussion earlier in this paper about Vasubandhu's 'representation-only' in terms of the destiny distortion, e.g. the hungry ghosts. Standard Buddhist tenets relate this to the karma theory. Thus, Tson-kha-pa, in his Tibetan commentary on Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, which refutes the alayavijiiana, mentions four theories to .ac­count for effectiveness of karma. In brief, the four are: 1. that of certain 'mind-only' (cittamatra) followers, who resort to the alayavijiiana to account for it; 2. that of a Vaibha~ika school outside of Kashmir, as is explained by Avalokitavrata (a volu­minous commentator on Bhavaviveka's Prajiiapradzpa), credit­ing the sa1'{£Skaras (motivations) with an indelible record of the debt to be paid; 3. that of the standard Vaibha~ika school, whi<;h claims that the dharma called 'reach' (prapti) has the ca­pacity to reach the fruit; 4. that of a number of persons, both Vaibha~ika and Sautrantika, who held that the stream of 74

vijiiiina is .suffused (~rom Chinese texts one would sa~ .'per­fumed') wIth the habIt-energy (vasana) of karma (the volItIOnal act).21 In short, some Cittamatra followers appealed to the alayavijfiana alone for effectiveness of karma. Some others took sa1[lSkiiras alone. Some decided on a special force called 'reach'. Finally, some combined vijfiana and sa1[lSkCiras, without an alayavijfiana, for the karma role. Prajnakaragupta apparently means that the Buddhist logicians treat the problem of per­ception and inference without bringing in the notion of alayavijfiana; and for all that, not necessarily rejecting it in terms of the karma theory.

E. Do the Yogacarins deny an external object?

Japanese scholars have in recent years published a number of books dealing with the Yogacara, usually by the name Vijnaptimatra, as a topic in itself, or in comparison with the Madhyamika. When I was in Kyoto in 1970, I spoke with one of these authors, Professor Masaaki Hattori, who had recently published such a book, in collaboration with a philosopher, Professor Shunpei Ueyama. I mentioned that I had failed to find any denial of an external object when I read the mirror simile passage22 in the Maitreya chapter of the Sar(l,dhinirmocanasiltra and as it was taken over by Asanga in his Mahayanasar(l,graha along with Vasubandhu's comment; or when I read the extensive material on that simile passage in Yiian-ts'tYs great commentary on the Sar(l,dhinirmocana that was translated into Tibetan; or when I read J nanagarbha's com­mentary on the Maitreya chapter. It seemed to me that these authors took the external entity for granted, but were silent about it because the siltra itself was concerned with the samadhi image, which is not derived from the reflex in consciousness of an external object. Dr. Hattori agreed with me that the Sar(l,dhinirmocana there was silent about an external rather than in denial of it. But he added: the later Yogacara school stems from the Vijnaptimatrata after Vasubandhu, and in this de­veloped school there is definitely a denial of the external object. I am pleased to mention this -agreement on the thesis I have been advancing in this paper, since my own considerations of the Yogacara in comparison with the Buddhist logicians go up

75

to Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati; and so far anyway, there is no denial of the external object, but rather ~ stress on its mis-reported nature. Professor Hattori's book is called Ninshiki to ChOetsu (yuishiki) (Tokyo, 1'970). In response to a later inquiry, he wrote me, among other things, that the terms 'Ninshiki' (cognition) and 'Choetsu' (Transcendence/The Act of Transcending) in the title of his book "stand respectively for the theoretical and the practical aspects of the Yogacara­vijnanavada." After writing the foregoing, I found a corrobor­ation from a work of Tson-kha-pa, founder of the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. He said, referring to the Sa7[ldhinirmocanasfltra, "In that sl1tra it is clearly stated that the .denial of an external is in the phase of calming (the mind)."23 However, even granted that the Sa7[ldhinirmocanasfltra, the basic scripture of Yogacara, did not deny an external object except for in the samadhi situation, it should be acknowledged that various scholars have understood Vasubandhu's Vi7[lfatika Vijnaptimatratasiddhi to have denied an external object without reference to the samadhi situation. But the opening gloss, which seems to indicate such a denial, can be understood differently. Explaining the term "representation-only" (vijnaptimatra) , it defines the "only" this way: matram ity arthaprat4edhiirtharrt ("only" means negation of an object). Here the word artha is properly taken as "external object." The word prat4edha is known in Indian logic, including Buddhist logic, to have two kinds, "simple negation" (prasajya-prati~edha) and "qualified ne­gation" (paryudasa). The interpretation that this treatise of Va­subandhu's has denied an external object without qualifications opts for the "simple negation." In the light of passages previ­ously cited from his two treatises, it is reasonable to opt for the "qualified negation." It is qualified because for the ordinary situation of life Vasubandhu indicates that the representation differs for the various destinies of men, hungry ghosts, etc.; and because for the special case of the yogin, "representation­only" concerns the samadhi situation.

Conclusion

As I long ago pointed out in the review article on the Chat­terjee book, the belief of some that the Yogacara system admits

76

a sole reality, called Mind-only, does not prevent Chatterjee or any number of other authors of East and West from writing good books on the topic, with refined philosophical sentences . . But problem-solving is of a different nature. It should have been intrigl,ling, to say the least, that the Buddhist logicians should be classified as 'Yogacarins' if these Yogacarins deny an external object and those logicians affirm it, insisting on the reality of the momentary object of direct perception (pratya~a).

Because Ratnakarasanti comes near the end of the Buddhist period in India and follows the Yogacara position in certain independent treatises, while having also written a little text of Buddhist logic, I should like to close with a passage from a com­mentary of his on the Guhyasamajatantra: "Because the mental burnt-offering (homa) is 'mind-only,' one should understand it as not dependent on an external thing."24

NOTES

1. The introduction by Sangam Lal Pande to C. L. Tripathi, The Problems of Knowledge in Yogiiciira Buddhism (Varanasi, 1972), p. xiv.

2. Photographic edition of Peking Tibetan canon (PTT), Vol. 114, The Paiicaskandha-prakararJa-vaibhii~ya, p. 20-1,2.

3. . .. pretavat punaJ:l I satptananiyamaJ:l sarvaiJ:l puyanadyadidadane II 4. Aryasaf{!dhinirmocanasiltre Aryamaitreya-kevala-parivarta-bhii~ya, PTT, Vol.

109, p. 198-4 . . 5. yadalambanatp vijnanatp naivopalabhate tada I sthitam vijnanamatratve

grahyabhave tadagrahat II 6. Etienne Lamotte, Saf{!dhinirmocana Siltra (Louvain, Paris, 1935), pp. 90-

91,211; also Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga (Mahiiyanasaf{!graha) (Louvain, 1938, 1939), Chap. II.

7. Translated from the Tibetan texts (in transcription) contained in N. Aiyaswami Sastri, Alambanapari~ii and Vrtti by Dinniiga with the Commentary of Dharmapiila (The Adyar Library, 1942). However, Sastri's reconstructed San­skrit and other materials were not employed for my translation.

8. Cf. Ernst Steinkellner, "Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem in Buddhis­mus," in TranszendenzerJahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils, ed. by G. Oberham­mer (Wien, 1978), p. 131, for the observation that the entire school of Bud­dhist logic has a nominalist position in the theory of concepts.

9. PTT, Vol. 138, p. 63-2-1. As translated with Tibetan cited in A. Way­man, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," forthcoming lndologica Taurinensia.

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10. Philosophy East and West, XV:1, Jan. 1965. 11. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sidra (London,

1930), p. 18I. 12. The Lankiivatara Siltra, ed. by Bunyiu Nanjio (Kyoto, 1956), p. 154:

drsyarp. na vidyate bahyarp. cittarp. citrarp. hi drsyate 1 dehabhogaprati~!hanam cittamatrarp. vadamy aham /I .

13. Tson-kha-pa, the Dbu ma la Jug pa'i rgya cher bsad pa 'Dgons pa rab gsal' ies bya ba, PTT, Vol. 154, p. 74-1-7,8. .

14. The Lankiivatara Siltra, p. 49: ature ature yadvad bhi~ag dravyam pray_ acchati 1 buddha hi tadvat sattvanarp. cittamatrarp. vadanti vai /I

15. PTT, Vol. 109, p. 61-1-3: 1 khams gsum thams cad ni sems tsam du zad pa ste 1 sems las gian med do ies sems rtse gcig tu jog pa ni ii gnas zes bya ste I. This passage was called to my attention by a former student, Shinjo Kawa:saki, now a professor at the Tsukuba University, Tokyo.

16. Sylvain Levi, ed., Mahayana-Sutrala1[Lkiira, p. 93: dharmalokasya vrddhyartharp. vlryam arabhate dr<;lharp. 1 dharmalokavivrddhya ca citta­matre 'vati~!hate /I sarvarthapratibhasatvarp. tatas citte prapasyati 1 prahlno grahyanik~epas tad a tasya bhavaty asau /I

17. Dkon-mchog-Jigs-med-dban-po, Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par biag pa rin po che'i phren ba (edition of Dha-sa-ses-rig press of India, 1967), p. 49.

18. The article "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," n. 8, above. 19. Rahula Sankrityayana, ed., PramaTJavartikabhashyam of Vartika­

lankaralj, of Prajnakaragupta (K. P.Jayaswal Institute, Patna, 1953), p. 457: 521. saktik~aye purvadhiya!). nahi dill!). pragdhiya vina 1

anyarthasaktiviguI.1e jiiane jiianodayagate!). /I 522. sakrdvijatiyajatav apy ekena patiyasa 1

cittenahitavaiguI.1yad alayan nanyasambhava!). /I 20. Sankrityayana, ed., Prajiiakaragupta, p. 457: astam iyam

alayavijiianacinta 1 vasanadharataya va parikalpitan tad iti na do~a!). I. 21. Tson-kha-pa (cf. n. 12, above), PTT, Vol. 154, p. 52-5 to p. 53-2. 22. This mirror simile goes with the passage cited above, per n. 6. 23. Tson-kha-pa's Dran nes legs Mad siiin po (Sarnath ed., 1973, p. 73):

mdo de las zi gnas kyi skabs su ni phyi rol dgag pa gsal bar gsuns so I. 24. Srfguhyasamaja-maTJq,alavidhi-tfkii, PTT, Vol. 65, p. 155-2: yid kyi sbyin

sreg ni sems tsam yin pas phyi rolla bltos pa med par ses par bya'o.

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Sam.bodhi In Asoka's 8th Rock Edict.

by A. L. Basham

Asoka's 8th Rock Edict (Girnar version) reads ... raja dasa­vasabhisitto sar[lto ayaya sar[lbodhir[l. All other versions substitute a verb derived from the Sanskrit root kram with the prefix ni0 for this and other occurrences of derivatives of the root ya in the edict. Thus we must assume that the original document on which the inscriptions were based contained ni0kram. Why the Girnar scribe substituted ya is not clear.

Earlier scholars (Senart, Buhler, Smith) believed that this meant that Asoka had taken a solemn Buddhist vow, or had even entered the Order. Nowadays it is almost universally ac­cepted that Asoka is telling his subjects that he made a pilgrim­age to the Bodhi Tree at Gaya. This interpretation seems to have been first made by D. R. Bhandarkar (p. 294).

Eggermont (pp. 79-81) strongly supports this now conven­tional explanation. The objection that the famous tree is not generally referred to as Sar[lbodhi he overrules by adducing one reference from a Jataka (iv.26), already noted by others, and six from the Dfpavar[lsa. The latter text also contains 22 pas­sages where the tree is referred to as Mahiibodhi or Bodhi. He fits this interpretation into the brilliant chronological scheme which he has devised for Asoka's reign.

In our view there are strong arguments against the now con­ventional interpretation:

i) Admitting that, in texts produced in Sri Lanka several cen­turies later, the Bodhi Tree was occasionally referred to as Sar[lbodhi, would it have meant this to the average educated In­dian of c.250 B.C., who had no special knowledge of Bud­dhism? Probably not. He would have interpreted it as meaning that Asoka was in search of enlightenment.

ii) Geographical factors suggest that Asoka, as a recent and

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very devoted convert, would have made several trips to the Bodhi Tree in .the two years between his conversion and the hypothetical visit mentioned in the 8th Rock Edict. Gaya is about 100 kilometres from Pataliputra and Asoka could have visited it on horse- or elephant-back, or in a chariot, with only one or two nights-away from his palace. If the phrase refers to a pilgrimage or ceremonial visit it is surprising that he waited so long before making it, and thought fit to record it thus. This, incidentally, is the only specific reference to Buddhism in the Major Rock Edicts, if we accept Asoka's Dhamma as Righteous_ ness generally, and not the Buddhist Dhamma.

iii) Because the Girnar version is among the best preserved versions of the Major Rock Edicts its readings tend to be fa­voured by historians. The occurrence of kram in all the other versions, however, makes it virtually certain that this and not yo, is the correct reading. The same verb is used earlier in the edict with reference to the pleasure trips which kings formerly made. Between the two verbs there are definite shades of meaning. N4kram puts the emphasis on departure, rather than arrival. yo, on the other hand, indicates arrival at a specific goal, unless the failure to arrive is explicitly stated. Asoka intended to tell his subjects that he had set out for Sa1(tbodhi but had not yet arrived there.

iv) Bloch objects (p.112,n6), that to take Sar[l-bodhi in a psy­chological or spiritual sense would imply that at the time of Asoka a doctrine which only appears in Mahayana texts was already current. This objection is hardly serious. We cannot tell how long it took for Mahayana Buddhist doctrines to become formally codified in literature; nor can we tell how much ed­iting the earlier oral sacred texts of Buddhism underwent be­fore they were committed to writing. We must remember that, even according to the Theravada tradition, there were no writ­ten Buddhist texts at the time of Asoka.

While we cannot reject the interpretation of Sa1(tbodhi as the sacred tree at Gaya out of hand, we believe that the weight of the evidence is strongly in favour of the older interpretation being correct. In the evolving Buddhism of the times the cus­tom already existed of devotees making a solemn vow to aim directly for enlightenment. NirvaI,la, on the other hand, is men­tioned nowhere in Asoka's edicts, and we may conclude that

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the vow was made with largely altruistic motives, like the Great Resolve of the Bodhisattva in Mahayana.

Some confirmation of this interpretation may be gathered from Asoka's Minor Rock Edict (Bloch, pp.145-51), where . he declares that he had been an upasaka for more than two and a half years, but had not made much progress, until, over a year before, he had 'drawn near to the Sa1(lgha,' after which he had made much progress. This drawing near to the Sa1(lgha may be linked in some way with his 'setting out for Sa1(lbodhi.' Perhaps, in the course of his spiritual journey, he submitted himself more closely than before to the discipline and pa1itoral

• care of monks among whom Mahayana ideas were already de­o veloping.

Bibliography

Bloch, Jules: Les Inscriptions d'Asoka. Paris, 'Les belles Lettres,' 1950. Bhandarkar, D. R: Afoka. University of Calcutta, 1925. Eggermont, P. H. L.: The Chronology of the Reign of Asoka Moriya. Leiden,

Brill, 1956.

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Can Meditational Practice be Measured? A Report on a Quantitative Survey

by Jacques M aquet

In October and November 1977, I administered a question­naire on meditational practice and spiritual development to 157 Buddhists in the Colombo region of Sri Lanka. During the four preceding years, I had approached the same matters by other methods: the usual anthropological participant obser­vation of behavioral and verbal sequences during field trips in Sri Lanka (1973, 1974), India (1974), Thailand and Burma (1976); the study of the traditional texts, many of which are relevant to meditation, as this practice is considered essential in the quest for liberation; and my own meditational experi­ence, gained during 82 days of intensive training in three vi­passana centers in Asia (Kanduboda in Sri Lanka, the Chonburi Vivek Asom in Thailand, and Thathana Yeiktha in Burma). [See Maquet 1975 a & b.]

The 1977 survey by questionnaire was an attempt to ascer­tain if it would be possible to study the relationship between the practice of meditation and spiritual development, which are phenomena of consciousness, by quantitative procedures. This is a report of that attempt.

1

Before describing this limited survey, its theoretical rele­vance should be briefly discussed. What is called "the social con­struction of reality" has become the focal point of interest in a recent and growing trend of anthropological theory. Its fun­damental assumption is that a society creates the reality in

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which its members live. That reality, which is perceived by them as objectively given and independent from the knowledge they have of it, is in fact a collective construction validated by con­

. sensus rather than by conformity to an external world. The processes through which "realities" are constructed cannot be easily observed. Now the Theravada tradition seems to offer a privileged case of reality in the making. Those entering the path discard the "wrong views," i.e. the conventional common reality (e.g. there is an identical self from birth to death), and begin "to see things as they are" (e.g. there is no such self). The passage from one reality to the other is obtained through med­itation. My hypothesis is that meditators differ from non-med­itators in their experience and behavior. They are in the pro­cess of moving from the mainstream reality, validated by the implicit consensus of common men (puthujjana) and by the everyday life experience, to the "true reality," validated by the consensus of the noble ones (ariyapuggala) who have realized one of the stages of liberation and by the momentary insights experienced during meditation. This transition from one real­ity to another should be reflected by a spiritual progress, such as becoming less attached to one's pleasure and prestige, less involved in the pursuit of wealth and power, and more com­passionate to others.

In the preceding periods of my research, the influence of the independent variable (meditational practice) on the dependent one (spiritual development) had been established by qualitative methods such as empathic familiarity with a few meditators, impressionistic assessments of the achievements of some rec­ognized advanced monks (as they are freely made by nearly everyone in traditionally Buddhist countries), case histories re­ported in literature, and comments in doctrinal texts. I wanted to test the applicability of a quantitative approach to the same question.

2

In order to do so, I devised a questionnaire. The first section was meant to assess the intensity and the length of the respon­dent's practice of meditation by asking: does he/she meditate

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· regularly (everyday, once a week, once.a month); for how long each time (less than one hour, one hour, two hours, or more than two hours); for how many months or years has he/she meditated with that frequency. Some other pertinent infor­mation was asked such as: sex, age, level of education, and so­cial role (monk or ·lay person).

Section II was composed of 40 pairs of statements. In each pair the respondent was asked to mark with an "X" the state­ment which expressed his/her behavior, feelings, or experience better than the other statement.

The questionnaire was administered to four groups. Group A included 21 young men, average age 21 years, who were stu­dents in a Buddhist high school (pirivena). Eleven of these stu­dents were monks. Group B included 19 monks, average age 27.8 years, who were students in a teachers college. Group C included 17 young monks, average age 21 years, who were res­idents in a monastic training institution. Group D included 100 lay persons, 28 males and 72 females, whose average age was 43.6 years; they were teachers attending a six-week program designed to enable them to teach Buddhism courses in primary and secondary schools.

TABLE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS POPULATION

Group A Group B Group C Group D

Number: 21 pers. 19 pers. 17 pers. 100 pers. Youngest: 18 yr. 23 yr. 18 yr. 32 yr. Oldest: 28 yr. 35 yr. 25 yr. 50 yr. Average: 21 yr. 27.8 yr. 2Lyr. 43.6 yr. Monk: 11 19 17 0 Lay: 10 0 0 100 Male: 21 19 17 28 Female: 0 0 0 72

A ten-minute introductory presentation" was given to each group in both English and Sinhala. The purpose of the inquiry was explained: "To study, on a statistical basis, the relationship between meditation practice and spiritual development in a Buddhist perspective." It was also pointed out that the ques-

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tionnaire was not meant to find out what the respondents thought they should do, but what they really did feel or ex­perience. The questionnaires were completed voluntarily and anonymously.

The answers to the questions were intended to be indicators of spiritual development, which was defined according to the Theravada tradition shared by the respondents.

Following Bhikku NyaI).amoli's division of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification) into three main parts, virtue (sfla), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (Panna), fif­teen questions were asked concerning virtue, twelve concern­ing concentration, and thirteen concerning wisdom. Here are a few examples:

On virtue: #4. If somebody achieves something as outstanding as I have

achieved - my satisfaction diminishes - my satisfaction remains the same

#6. When a friend of mine becomes the friend of another person, - I resent it - I do not resent it

On concentration: #26. When I endure some physical pain, usually

- I try to see it "at a distance" - I worry about it

#29. When a thought comes to mind - sometimes, I notice its arising - rarely, if ever, I notice its arising

On wisdom:

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#36. When reflecting upon my past deeds - I regret very much some of them - I try to forget, rather than regret, some of them

#40. I make offerings and attend ceremonies at the temple, - very often - very rarely I perform such rituals

For each of the 40 questions, one answer indicated a more advanced spiritual achievement than the other. The overall score (on 40) of each respondent was supposed to be a rough estimate of his/her spiritual development compared to that of the other respondents. The hypothesis mentioned above led me to expect that meditators would have higher scores than non":meditators.

3

In the analysis of the results, the first problem was to deter­mine where to draw the dividing line between meditators and non-meditators. A priori it seemed reasonable to assume that a regular practice of at least a one-hour sitting per day for one year was necessary to expect significant effects of the practice. So the criterion of one-hoUl;- daily sitting for one year was used to identify meditators. Only 12 of the 157 respondents met this requirement (2 from Group C, and 10 from Group D, 2 of which were men and 8 of which were women).

TABLE 2 MEDITATORS / NON-MEDITATORS

(meditator: one-hour daily sitting for one year; non-meditator: less or no sitting)

Group D/ Group D/ Group A Group B Group C Males Females Total

Meditators: 0 0 2 2 8 12 Non-medita-tors: 21 19 15 26 64 145 Total: 21 19 17 28 72 157

This number of 12 represented only 7.6 per cent of a total population which varied in age, sex, and social role; it was not likely to provide me with a significant term of comparison.lf I considered only the female teachers, the minority of 8 med­itators constituted 11.1 per cent of the entire group of 72 women, then the proportion of meditators was higher, and the total population was homogeneous with respect to sex, age, education, and occupation.

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Now, the crucial question: were there significant differences between meditators and non-meditators in their answers to the 40 questions? I compared meditators and non-meditators among the female respondents of Group D. For the 8 medi­tators, the average score was 32.4; for the 64 non-meditators, the average score was 3l.5. This makes a difference of 2.3 per cent which is not significant.

TABLE 3 MEDITATORS / NON-MEDITATORS AMONG FEMALES OF GROUP D

(Overall Scores)

Meditators: Non-meditators:

No. Average Score on 40 on 100

8 64

4

32.4 31.5

81 78.7

In conclusion, my attempt at measuring meditational prac­tice and spiritual development has produced two results. First, at least a one-hour daily meditation was practiced for one year prior to the inquiry by 7.6 per cent of our population of pre­sumably serious Buddhists. This relatively low percentage was in agreement with the qualitative observations made in Sri Lanka in 1973. Though meditation is well known and deemed to be necessary for attaining liberation, it is practiced on a reg­ular basis by very few Sinhalese Buddhists [Maquet 1975b: 184-185]. Quantitative survey and qualitative observation con­verged and confirmed one another.

The second result: meditators do not have an average overall score of spiritual development significantly higher (by 2.3 per cent only) than the non-meditators of the same population. My hypothesis-the association of meditation with spiritual devel­opment-was thus not supported by the survey findings. In addition they were contradicted by the evidence provided by qualitative methods (phenomenological description based on the close observation of a few cases, analysis of traditional texts,

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my experiential approach). The qualitative evidence was so overwhelming that the reasons for the disappointing results of the quantitative survey were to be found in shortcomings of application, such as the lack of a sufficient humber of advanced meditators and the misunderstandings of some respondents who answered what they knew rather than what they did.

Can meditational practice be measured? For the study of phe­nomena of consciousness, a quantitative approach has poten­tialities as a complement to qualitative methods. But it should be used only under certain conditions: The investigator should know each respondent personally to be sure that he/she un­derstands the full significance of the questions, and so be able to assess the meaning of the answer.

These are the practical conclusions that can be drawn from this episode of my ongoing research on contemporary Ther­avada meditation.

References Cited

Na.gamoli, Bhikkhu, tr. 1975: The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga) by Bhadantacariya Buddhaghosa (third edition). Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Pub­lication Society.

Maquet, Jacques 1975 a: Expressive space and Theravada values: A med­itation monastery in Sri Lanka. Ethos (Berkeley, CA) 3, no. 1: 1-2l.

Maquet, Jacques 1975 b: Meditation in Contemporary Sri Lanka: Idea and Practice. The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (Palo Alto) 7, no. 2: 182-196.

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Nirvana and Metaphysical Experience

by Ismael Quiles, SJ.

In my study Buddhist Philosophy I arrived at the conclusion that the complex phenomenon of Nirvana, as described by Bud­dhist interpreters, is fundamentally a metaphysical experience. Of course, it is something more than a metaphysical phenom­enon, but no doubt, this is the basic, and the most common basis of all descriptions and analyses of Nirvana amongst Bud­dhist mystics and philosophers.

In this paper, I am trying further to develop my analysis of Nirvana as metaphysical experience, pointing out some of the fundamental aspects of such an interpretation.

I What is metaphysical experience?

First of all, let me explain briefly what I mean by "metaphys­ical experience." This is a relatively new denomination in west­ern philosophical terminology. Although the reality is easy to find in many cases in the history of western philosophy, the terminology has been used only recently as a common expres­sion accepted by many philosophers. The main difficulty was the idea of traditional scholastic philosophers, as well as those who worked within the frame of rationalism in modern times, who rather considered the level of metaphysics as the result of a process of abstraction, and therefore could not think in the terms of metaphysical experience.

Nevertheless, in our century, many European philosophers

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tried to surpass the rational method and to approach the ul­timate reality of things by means of experience; therefore they attempted the method of analysis of our human experiences as the best way for our first meeting with reality itself. In this sense, we can quote many contemporary philosophers, from Bergson up to the existentialists of the last decades, and, among scholastic philosophers, Maritain, Cornelio Fabro, E. Gilson and others. Now, the terminology "metaphysical expe­rience" is commonly accepted.

According to the meaning of the expression generally rec­ognized, we notice the following elements.

. 1) Metaphysical. This means the expression is related to the ultimate reality of things, which is beyond our phenomenal or sensory knowledge. When we say "metaphysical" we are talking about the last reality, the true profound reality of things. Therefore, we are looking also to the "ultimate Truth," the ultimate and most profound "Being" of this phenomenal world. So it is called simply "Being" or "pure Being."

2) Experience. a) First, by experience we mean always some kind of knowl­

edge, which makes us aware of something . . b) Second, this knowledge by experience is different from

that by abstraction or reasoning. The former requires the ob­ject to be present to the knower. No experience can be possible without the presence of its object. Experience means an im­mediate or direct knowledge of its object.

c)· Third, this knowledge by experience needs to be felt. It is not conceptual, theoretical or rational, but simply felt by the knower.· The being of the knower is immediately and, so to say, existentially affected by the object, both becoming a kind of unity, as the former is in its being itself pervaded by. the object.

For a better understanding of what the expression "Meta­physical Experience" means in current discourse to western philosophers, it will be useful to add some quotations.

In the Xth International Congress of Philosophy (Bruxelles 20-26, August 1953) one of the central themes was Experience and Metaphysics. Twenty-four papers were presented on this subject. Let us see how some of them understand the fact of

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a metaphysical experience as the highest level of human ex­·perience.

A. de Conink, in his paper "Experience and Metaphysics" says: "Ainsi donc notre experience comporte un aspect auquel nOUS ne nous interessons ni dans notre connaissance journa­liere ni dans nos travaux scientifiques, et qui pourtant l'englobe totalement et sans lequel elle est impossible, savoir l'aspect«etre». Or, c'est 13. l'objet pro pre de la metaphysique" (Proceedings Vol. IV, Louvain 1953, p.14).

More explicitly, D. G. Londhey points out the connection of human experience and Metaphysics: "Man is a Metaphysical animal. Metaphysics is concerned with the search after first and ultimate principles. Man cannot reach the ultimate principle by the way of the world, as it is the business of science to discover the principle of the world. To reach the ultimate Reality man must analyze his own experience and discover the ultimate ground and principle underlying his experience." (Anatomy of experience, Ibid., p. 90.)

Wilhelm Weischedel makes an illuminating analysis in his paper "Wesen und Aufgabe der Metaphysischen Erfahrung" (Essence and Function of Metaphysical Experience). He care­fully distinguishes three levels of experience: 1) Common Ex-perience, through which we know the Beings (Erfahrung von Seiendem) of the external world, other men, and also our­selves; 2) Religious Experience, which is the encounter with God; 3) Metaphysical Experience, which is a higher experience of Being or things, because it is the encounter with the last reality which is the foundation of all beings (Ibid., p. 121-122).

It seems that Western Philosophers are approaching in this way the conception of Buddhist Nirvana.

II Nirvana Experience

If we now consider Nirvana, we will find the very same ele­ments we described when analyzing metaphysical experience. We do not say that with these elements we take account of the whole reality of Nirvana, but certainly we find that this is a kind of metaphysical experience.

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First, evidently Nirvana deals with the Ultimate Reality of things, that is the true Being of things. The Buddhist goal is to reach the Ultimate Truth, the Ultimate Reality, which is the real Being which underlies all changing ,phenomena, all dif­ferences and all multiplicity of things which we see in this ma­terial world. This is indeed a metaphysical target, as we have seen before. All Buddhist teachers, starting from. the Buddha talk about the Ultimate Truth, the Ultimate Reality of ali things, as the goal of Nirvana. What this Reality consists of is a further question, but certainly to reach the Ultimate Reality of hu­man existence was clearly preached as Nirvana, meaning lib­eration from the burden of human suffering.

We may observe this in the earlier Buddhist teachings, in the classic masters and in contemporary scholars. That Nirvana is a "special knowledge," which can be also called intuition, wis­dom, prajiia or jiiana, belongs to the first teachings of Buddha in his First Sermon: "It is insight, which leads to wisdom, which conduces to calm, to knowledge, to the sambodh, to Nirvana."!

Doubtless, the monk Gautama is teaching his personal experience, and therefore asks his first disciples to call him "Buddha."

This personal experience of Gautama was the most sacred tradition in early Buddhism. Although Asvagho~a's Buddha-car­ita is a poem with much poetical imagination, it reveals the es­sence of the experience of Buddha under the Bodhi-tree.

Gautama longs for the truth of this human life. First he learns the stages of "contemplation" from the Sage Ara<;la2 • He sees that they do not give him the true knowledge of Reality.

Then "seeking to know the true distinction," which means the higher knowledge, "he went to the hermitage of Udraka, but he gained no clear understanding from his treatment of the soul."3 He always looks for transcendent knowledge, "clear un­derstanding," which reaches the essence of reality. This is a metaphysical knowledge.

After failing in his goal, Gautama is joined by five mendi­cants in his asceticism, and decides to find by his own effort the truth by means of a profound meditation (that is to say, "in­trospection," "intuition," prajiia, jiiana, all of which are a kind of knowledge, which European philosophers would call meta­physical).

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Asyagho~a goes on in chapters XII and Xln using expres­sions which all mean metaphysical experience: "higher wis­dom,,;4 "in his longing to become a Buddha" or illuminated;5 "higher wisdom";6 "perfect knowledge";7 "he was on the point of attending perfect knowledge";8 Kala, the Naga king, says to Gautama, ''Thou shalt certainly today become a Buddha";9 Gautama is called "a lamp of knowledge"; 10 the tree is called "the tree of Knowledge" (Bodhi-tree)ll etc.

The Book XIV '2 contains the description of Nirvana. It is a clear account of a special act of knowledge, which is attained by "the great master of meditation ... longing to know the su­preme end."'3 It is an intuition of the totality of reality: "Then by that divine perfectly pure sight, he beheld the whole world as in a spotless mirror."14 And when finally "the all-knowing Bodhisattva"'5 discovered the four sacred truths, "he knew all as it really was."16 The poet completes the process with these words: "Thus he, the holy one, seated there on his seat of grass at the root of the tree, pondering by his own efforts, attained at last perfect knowledge."'7 The same Bodhisattva declares solemnly: "I have here attained perfect wisdom."18

Let us consider some of the classical doctrines, for instance, the conception of alaya-v~'nana of Asanga. Ultimate reality is pure mind or pure consciousness (viSuddhavijnana) and to re­alize it is the Buddhist goal. ''The own nature (svabhava) of the knowledge-receptacle (alaya-v~'nana) is a knowledge which is the sum of all seeds (sarrabijaka). All existences in the triple world and all destinies (gati) are the result of this knowledge."'9 In this manner the intuition of this ultimate Reality (visuddhavijnana) gives the perfect knowledge or Nirvana and the description of attaining it reveals that it is the kind we have called "metaphysical experience."

Now can we resort to a modern western scholar, whose study on Nirvana is based on a profound knowledge of classic texts and history of Buddhism. Th. Scherbatsky, in The conception of Buddhist Nirvana gave us the following description:

"The Buddhist Saint is supposed, in a moment of mystic il­lumination, suddenly to perceive the whole construction, with its gross and mystic worlds, as vividly as if it were a direct sense perception. As a psychological process it is equally taught in Hinayana and in Mahayana, but its content, the picture which

95

reveals itself at this moment, is quite different in both systems. It corresponds to their theoretical parts, to the system of plu­ralism which is taught in Hinayana, and to the monist view which is the central conception of Mahay.ana, as will be seen later on.,,20

It is easy to find in this analysis of Nirvana all elements be­longing to what we described as "metaphysical .experience," "mystic intuition," "mystic illumination," "to perceive the whole construction ... as vividly as if it were a direct sense percep­tion." We can apply to metaphysical experience what Scher­batsky says of Nirvana as "the path of illumination" (dnti­marga), which for Scherbatsky is "sudden and momentary."

Daizets T. Suzuki has been one of the most outstanding Bud­dhist scholars in the last decades. He has studied Buddhist Zen Satori from different points of view: historical, religious, psy­chological, psycholanytical, philosophical. Of course, his ap­proach to Nirvana is many-sided and sometimes paradoxical. But certainly he emphasizes much more the onto-psychological reality of Nirvana and in my opinion his description or inter­pretation is very near or practically the same as that which I describe as metaphysical experience, that is to say, is a special knowledge (illumination), immediate (non-conceptual), of Being (Ultimate Reality or Truth). According to him, Nirvana is no more than a state of consciousness (knowledge), by which in fact we transcend relativity; that is, the world of birth and death (Being).21 And to emphasize the philosophical and me­taphysical aspect of Nirvana, Suzuki furnishes this description, which completely fits what I call "metaphysical experience": "Satori is no doubt incommunicable, but it is not any sort of transport. If it is, it will be a mere psychological phenomenon and cannot have any deeper import. But it really is what stands at the basis of every philosophical system. It thus has a meta­physical connotation."22 These last statements synthesize the essence of Satori as a metaphysical experience.

La Vallee Poussin, in his Nirvana, clearly reduces it to a "cor­rect act of attention," that is "enlightenment," which will cut out the roots of desire. 23 It seems to fit Suzuki's description.

But let us quote another expressive passage from Suzuki, which shows once more that Nirvana is a special profound act of "living knowledge": "Satori is generally translated as 'en-

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lightenment,' but 'awakening' may be a better term .... But as long as Satori explores and reveals the deepest and darkest re­cesses of consciousness which have hitherto escaped our ordi­nary inspections or introspections, it is enlightenment."24

And finally let us give the interpretation of Satori which Su­zuki attributes to the Sixth Patriarch: "This state of mind is echoed by Eno, the Sixth Patriarch, when he tells us to realize 'no-mind,' 'no-form,' 'no-abiding,' and further advises us 'to keep Tao' (i.e. prajiiii) ever flowing with no obstructions."25

We understand prajiiii as Suzuki here uses it to mean not the simple act of knowledge v'iiiina) but a "special act of know­ledge" much more profound, rich and steady, which attains the bottom of Reality itself. A kind of vital-intuition-introspection of our profound reality and in it the pure Being; that is what I call, with other Western philosophers, a metaphysical expe­rience.

Notes

1. Mahavagga, S.B.E. XIII, I, 6 17-18 Y Dhamma-cakkappavattana S.B.E. XI, n. 4.

2. Asvagho~a, Buddha-carita XII, 1-81. Translated by E. B. Cowell, S.B.E., Buddhist Mahayana Texts, vol. 49.

3. Ibid., XII, 82. 4. Ibid., XII, 59. 5. Ibid., XII, 97. 6. Ibid., XII, 102. 7. Ibid., XII, 102. 8. Ibid., XII, 113. 9. Ibid., XII, 115. 10. Ibid., XIII, 63. 11. Ibid., XIII, 65. 12. As is well known, the last four chapters of the Sanscrit text were writ­

ten by a Nepalese author, Amyitananda in 1830. He seems to have had an imperfect copy of this part of the original Sanscrit, and also Tibetan and Chinese translations, but in some parts is very independent (E. B. Cowell, Introduction p. XI). But Amyitananda's terminology regarding Nirvana is faithful to Books XII and XIII.

97

13. Ibid., XIV, 1. 14. Ibid., XIV, 8. 15. Ibid., XIV, 64. 16. Ibid., XIV, 65. 17. Ibid., XIV, 66.

18. Ibid., XIV, 79. 19. Asanga-Mahiiyana-samgraha (La Somme du Grand Vehicule) Edition

of Tibetan and Chinese text, with French translation by E. Lamotte. Louvain Bibliotheque du Museon, T II chap. I, 21, p. 38. '

20. The conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Leningrad 1927, p. 16. 21. Zen and Japanese Buddhism, Tokyo, 1956, p. 17. 22. Ibid., p. 48-49. And follows: "It is a new view of life and of the uni-

verse that must be felt." 23. Nirvana, p. 86, cf. pp. 75-76. 24. O.c., p. 47-48. 25. Ibid., p. 27.

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III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

s. J. Tambiah, World Conqueror and World Renouncer, A Study of Buddhism and Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background. Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology, Vol. 15 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1976).

Some decades ago, Hocart and Paul Mus drew attention to the role of royal power in Theravada Buddhism. The latter's Barabwf,ur, concerned with much else besides Theravada Buddhism, was a veritable monument, inspir­ing awe because of the dazzling talents of its author, but apparently little visited and certainly never ransacked by contemporary researchers. More recently, Heinz Bechert's masterly three-volume survey, Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Uindern des Theravada-Buddhismus (Wiesbaden: Otto Har­rassowitz, 1967-1973), combined extraordinarily wide reading with great clarity of exposition. However, the influence exercised by Mus and Bechert has been limited by the absence of English translations of their massive con­tributions. Since the last war, in the Burmese corner of the Theravada field, the labours of Gordon Luce, the thoughtful work of E. Sarkisyanz, the con­scientious volumes of M. E. Spiro and the lively analyses of E. M. Mendelson have opened up new perspectives. Meanwhile, the thrust given by Louis Du~ mont, notably in his Homo hierarchicus, towards the integration of Indology in Social Anthropology has had a seminal effect both on field research and on theoretical writings. But there is, to my mind, nothing quite like Tambiah's latest volume.

Tambiah has had long and varied experience as a field anthropologist both in Sri Lanka and in Thailand. He is already well known for his work on Buddhism and the Spirit Cults in North-East Thailand, published by the Cam­bridge University Press in 1970. His latest work is aimed at a wider al.idience. It is concerned not only with twentieth-century Thailand and the results of the author's own field-work; it also seeks to contribute to theoretical studies on the relations between Church and State throughout Indian and South East Asian history. In a word, it is concerned with the practical and theoretical functioning of Buddhism and Hinduism, and it is written in English. It is a

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very ambitious book; and it is, unfortunately, a very badly written one. Its turgid prose is thick with pretentious jargon; there is much repetition; and the author has a passion for par~nthesis which ~his reader found irritating. Once one has understood what IS, so to speak, In brackets, the: effort is not always rewarding. Let me say at once that I found 'the second part of the book (pp. 200-530), devoted to ethnographic descriptions and much less the­oretical than the firstpart,much the more interesting. There Tambiahtells us much about what he discovered in the field: the information is often new or difficult of access, and the knowledge that is transmitted is situated against the 19th- and 20th-century historical background. In these pages the author is concerned with "the provisions of the Sangha Acts of 1941 and 1963; the study of present-day monas tical institutions; the plotting of the careers of monks, the routes they took and the patronage system they relied on; the appreciation of the doctrinal interpretations and activism currently in vogue among the educated monks; the probing of the links between the ecclesias­tical and political hierarchies, between prominent monks and ruling politi­cians; the discerning of the present role of kingship vis-a.-vis Buddhism on the one side and ruling elites on the other" (p. 4). He shows us that "the existing ecclesiastical hierarchy, the recent Sangha Acts, and the educational aspirations of the present-day monks" must "be referred back to develop­ments in King Chulalongkorn's reign, especially culminating with the Sangha Act of 1902; similarly, today's issues, idiom and language of reformism and scripturalism take their major precedents from the era of Mongkut, first when he was monk and later king (1851-1868), not to mention the sectarian split and the policy towards educated monks who disrobed to take up valued lay positions. Moreover these developments were inflected by the nineteenth century political history of Thailand-when it collided with the West and launched upon modernisation" (ibid.). All this is put across relatively clearly and this reader sympathises with the author's view that to practice good ·an­thropology in a literate society one must have a solid knowledge of history. Buddhism is treated throughout as a serious social force, and its historical and contemporary impact are examined in terms that are more pertinent than the ill-informed, if clearly expressed, theses of Max Weber. Tradition, mythology and popular cults are not dismissed as minor and relatively un­important facets of a great philosophical enquiry; and the artificial barriers set up between rival disciplines in Western academic circles are consistently ignored.

All this is well and good; but the first part of Tambiah's book is much less satisfying. One gets the impression that an appendix to the ethnographic text swelled to ungovernable proportions in the course of the author's rumina­tions, and that he decided that the only thing to do with it was not to keep it in a drawer but to publish it as an introduction to the results of his field­work. The first hundred pages or so deal with the passage of the idea of rajadharma to that of dharmaraja. The brahmanical theory of society and king­ship is contrasted with the early Buddhist conception of "World Process," Dharma and Kingship; and Asoka's reign is envisaged by Tambiah as "a model both generating and legitimating political action" (p. 54). This model,

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he argues, served to shape society not so much in India-where the Mauryan empire soon broke apart-as in South East ASIan countries, where trans­planted Indian ideas shaped kingship and polity. In ThailaI)d and in other Eastern Theravada lands, the moral progress schematised in the original Asokan model slipped into the formulation of a paradoxical identity: the world conqueror, the cak.kavatti, became equated with the world renouncer, the bodhisattva (p. 96). Around this new equation converged the original po­larised themes from both Hinduism and Buddhism. There is 'nothing par­ticularly new about these ideas; and they have been expressed more clearly and discussed more succinctly elsewhere. My quarrel with this aspect of Tam­biah's work lies in his off-hand and unscholarly use of secondary sources. For instance, despite the space accorded to Asoka, no mention is made of Przy­luski's basic work on the Asokllvadllna (incidentally, it is perhaps pertinent to remember that Asoka was an upllsaka but never a monk); several pages are devoted to the Buddhist Councils but there is no mention of the work of Andre Bareau; Heine-Geldern is referred to for his 1942 American article but there is no mention of his fundamental "Weltbild und Bauform in Siidostasien"; the TraibhUmikathil (p. 96) is a text and not a man (it has been translated by Coedes and Charles Archaimbault in the Publications of the Ecole franc;:aise d'Extreme-Orient); and so on. While it is true that Tambiah's latest book draws attention indirectly to the absence of any attempt at a com­parable analysis in the vast field of Mahayanist studies, one may question whether it was advisable to separate, in such a wide-ranging study, the Ther­avada material from other Buddhist documents. To recall the conflicts be­tween Church and State in China might have been more apposite than the author's excursus into Medieval Europe (pp. 360-364). It would have been justifiable, to illuminate the discussion, to remind readers of Paul DemievilIe's admirable pages on Buddhism and War (Choix d'etudes bouddhiques [Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973], pp. 261-299). Again, note might have been made, at least en passant-so much else that is not directly relevant is mentioned--of the theory and practice of the lugs giiislqoyar yosun among Tibetans and Mongols (see, most recently, K. Sagaster, "Das System der Beiden Ordnungen," Die Weisse Geschichte [Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1976], pp. 9-49).

I understand that a French translation of Tambiah's work is in prepara­tion. Let us hope that the occasion will be seized to reduce the English to a more palatable form, to correct the numerous misprints, to tighten up the analysis, and to bring the bibliography up to date and into closer relationship to the text. If the Barabw!ur of Paul Mus figures in th.e Bibliography of the English edition, there is no indication anywhere in the text that Tambiah has read it. I have seldom been so exasperated by a book that interested me so much.

Alexander W. Macdonald

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Reply to Professor Macdonald

I am grateful to the Editor, Professor Narain, for inviting me to reply to Professor Macdonald's review of my book. ,

Professor Macdonald has pounced on an error in my book. He points Out that on page 96 Traibhumikathii is incorrectly referred to as the name of a man. He then takes the opportunity to air his scholarship by reporting the well-known fact that there is a French translation of the cosmological text. However, in his eagerness to expose my ignorance he tendentiously fails to mention that at least at four other places in the book (pages 88, 183, 186, and 212) I clearly state that the Traibhilmikathii is a cosmological work, and that, wherever relevant, I have also identified its author as Lu Tai. What has happened on p. 96 is that by a mistake in editing or printing three words have been deleted; the text should read: "Thus the author of Traibhumikatha

" Professor Macdonald shows a penchant for piling up strong denuncia_

tions. He declares that my book is "very badly written," that "its prose is thick with pretentious jargon," that he finds my "passion for parenthesis ... irri­tating," etc.

However, a few lines later, he pronounces that the greater part of the book (some three-fifths or more) is "put across relatively clearly." I cannot avoid the reflection that there is evidence of compositional intemperateness and judgmental imbalance in this review. Judgments of style are notoriously sub­jective. For example, the reviewer of my book in the American Anthropologist (Mar. 1978) is lavish in his praise of my style. I am quite prepared to accept that my book contains some stylistic infelicities, printing errors and mistakes of fact. In turn, Professor Macdonald should be open to the suggestion that his own orientalist parochialism may profit by greater familiarity with the conceptual schemes and theoretical objectives of disciplines such as anthro­pology and sociology. I seem to have communicated my ideas with clarity and distinction to the reviewer of my book in the British J oumal of Sociology (Sept. 1978). Scholars of different disciplines can learn from one another, and ad­vance the cause of Buddhist studies-which I take is the main objective of the LA.B.S.-not by an attitude of pedantic petulance but by an openness to interdisciplinary exchange. I am thankful to Professor Macdonald for cit­ing certain sources such as Demieville, Przyluski and Sagaster, which I had not previously read, and I intend in the future, with encouragement from sympathetic experts, to extend my readings in the field of Mahayanist studies and about schools other than Theravada Buddhism. It is for this reason.that I gladly accept Professor Narain's invitation to me to join the LA.B.S.

Professor Macdonald makes the categorical assertion that my represen­tation of the relation between the Brahmanical and Buddhist schemes of so­ciety and kingship as a passage from rajadharma to dharmaraja, and my un­derscoring of the importance of the Buddhist scheme for understanding the Asokan and the subsequent Southeast Asian Buddhist polities, are non'con­troversial and, in fact, better said by other writers. Since at least one anthro­pologist-Spiro-and one orientalist-Gombrich (1 am of course not refer­ring here to the distinguished father)-have declared this thesis to be

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preposterous, I hope Professor Macdonald will continue to proclaim the truism as loudly and as often as he can. The task may be boring but there is the reward of making conversions.

By the way, a French translation of my book is underway. And the pub­lisher has not given me the gratuitous advice that Professor Macdonald allows himself to give.

S: J. Tambiah

Comparative Ethics in Hindu and Buddhist Traditions by Roderick Hindery, Delhi-Varanasi-Patna: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975. Pp. xvi-30S.

The author of this volume must be commended for both his exploration of Hindu ethical systems and his sensitive treatment of the intricate philo­sophical, historical and linguistic problems encountered when examining' these traditions. Professor Hindery provides an extensive synopsis of ethics in the Rgveda, Upan4ads, Laws of Manu, Riimiiya7fa, and Bhagavad-Gztii, as well as in popular Indian classics like the Paiicatantra and Kalidasa's Abhijiiiina­Siikuntala.The purview of this trans-cultural inquiry culminates in an excel­lent discussion of the ethical systems engendered by ancient and contem­porary philosophers and reformers, including Sal11kara, M. K.Gandhi, and Rabindranath Tagore. Especially valuable are the two Appendices-the first elaborating on critical oral and textual matters (dating, authorship, etc.) in the Riimiiya7fa and Mahiibhiirata, the second providing a table of parallel topics in the texts surveyed. The Selected Bibliography contains a variety of English translations, together with sources encompassing many specialized fields, in­cluding ethics, religion, philosophy, literature, and international law. Despite the inclusion of "Buddhist" traditions in the title, the reader will discover only a single chapter dedicated to the exposition of ethical thought in Mahayana Buddhist texts. The author intended this chapter as an introduc­tory essay, pending the future publication of three additional volumes on comparative ethics in other religious and philosophical traditions, the sub­sequent volume to begin with a more comprehensive treatment of Buddhist ethics.

Professor Hindery's concern is not with how Hindu ethical systems or models of conduct may have served as normalizing influences on people. In­stead, he applies a descriptive approach in his analysis of what moral pre­scriptions people have alleged through their literature and social institutions. For purposes of this study, the author equates "morality," meaning a person's reflections upon and practice of normative social values, to "ethics," which re­fers to the justifications of and meanings associated with social conduct. The focus of this inquiry is twofoid: what warrants and emotive factors are pres­ent for people to decide on normative ethical ideals; and, more importantly, what beyond inner convictions do they claim motivates them to perform ac-

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tions intended to promote the general welfare? Five guidelines, addressing moral assertions in textual and oral traditions, are specified: (1) Confronted with cultural mores, Hindery asks what reasons are given for being moral_ that is, whether or not the grounds for other-regarding decisions are based on self-compensation. In addition, he asks whether morality is claimed to be realized through either knowledge (vidya) or a "minimum of free volition" independent of social Influences such as laws and customs (p. 3). (2) The au­thor suggests that ethical behavior may be motivated (but not necessarily normalized) by one or more models of moral conduct. Three such models are discussed in this volume-a model of "social cooperation" similar to that which Max Weber attributed to the Vedic period; an "altruistic" model based on intuitional judgments and self-sacrifices; and a "mystical/religious" model based on mystical insight, divine revelation, or the belief therein. (3) Whether or not ethical behavior is validated by worldviews (Weltanschauungs) or models of conduct, Hindery points out that it may also be justified by common-sense reasoning based on the consequences of actions, by trust in collective expe­riences which are partially encapsulated in legal statutes and surviving cus­toms (sadacara), or by various aesthetic and emotive human capacities, e.g. creating and loving. The author discusses the RamayaI).ic heroine, SUa, and the Buddhist bodhisattva as altruistic models with which people have iden­tified themselves and their actions. The mystical/religious model is exempli­fied by the Upani~adic appeal to a personal experience of the "oneness" and "inseparability" of the individual self (atman) and the ultimate self (Brahman or Atman). (4) The author examines his sources with an eye for the ethos or ethoses-values and virtues which assume motivational priority in decisions and actions. (5) Finally, this inquiry explores what attitudes develop from relationships between individuals and institutions (agents which enforce the adherence to social conventions). Hindery is especially conce.rned with the "populist" and "elitist" movements within the evolution of Hindu religious and philosophical traditions. He' considers the masses and elite groups as mutually responsive--competing with and complementing each other throughout Indian history, with this interaction gradually contributing to a rich Hindu ethical pluralism (pp. 202-203). The author is conscientious about delivering the pros and cons at each stage of his analysis.

Discussion of these issues is exemplified in the chapter on the Rgveda. The author compares his view, that the Vedas display moral ethoses representative of the people during that period, with the views of such eminent scholars as Max Weber, who regard the Vedas as expounding sets of amorally-grounded elitist sanctions. The Weberian position points to the Vedic absence of lib­eration from this-worldly suffering (mokra) and moral notions like karmic retribution. This position is supported by the predominance of pragmatic civil codes, social conventions, and the affirmation of this-worldly concerns as found in the Rgveda's "Hymn to Dawn" (RV.I.113.1-20) and in the Athar­vaveda's lists of civil crimes, including theft, indebtedness, and incest. Further support lies in the observation that "misfortune," "human incapacity," or "social evil" have often been misconstrued by scholars as "sin" (agas; enas; papa). Hindery, however, regards the Vedic use of dana (giving/sharing) as an aesthetic ideal and not merely related to self-compensation. He cites several

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songs in the Rgveda (Rv.I.I25, 126.1-5; V.61) which express love as the res­'ervoir of giving. The author also points out that the Rgveda mentions guilt (enas) as the product of not giving to those in need (Rv.VII:89.5; X.1l7). Here, he follows the P. V. Kane and A. A. Macdonnell translatIOns of enas as "guilt." Dana is also related to satya, or "truth" (Rv.X.lO.4), and to fr:ta (Rv.I.75.5) where the latter term is personified as one of the gods. The au­thor contends that Weber's observations serve as evidence for a life-affirming ethos in the form of the tri-varga: wealth (artha), pleasure (kama),. and order (rta). Here, we are to read rta etymologically as "natural" and "ritual" order, as well as the order of proper' human conduct. On the basis of this discussion, Hindery suggests that the Vedas display "at least a partly moral outlook" for the people of that period (p. 52).

Acknowledging, with the author, the problem of historical layering in Vedic texts, the reviewer is inclined to agree with his position, but finds sup­portive historical evidence regrettably sparse in this chapter and elsewhere. A broader discussion of social milieux would have benefitted the reader, with­out the necessity of drawing from outside the bibliography of this volume. For example, the use of dana in the Rgveda (Rv.X.117.2) appears to be more strongly related to common sense and self-compensation: "The man with food in store who, when the needy comes in miserable case begging for bread to eat, hardens his heart against him--even when of old he did him service­finds not one to comfort him" (p. 45). With due respect to Professor Hin­dery's valuable insights and discussions, the reader would have profited by stronger evidence demonstrating either the degree to which the featured ethical systems (Vedic, Upani~adic, etc.) were socially normative or what cul­tural groups were represented by the texts discussed in this volume. The author's exposition of early Indian philosophical contributions to relatively contemporary ethical concepts and systems is more successfully corrobo­rated.

The introductory essay on Buddhist ethics deserves comment here. There is a brief description of Theravada ethics (about 7 pages) focusing on the Five Precepts (paiica-szla) and the Four Illimitables (brahmaviharas). The re­mainder (33 pages) of this chapter is devoted to Mahayana ethics. The Bo­dhisattva ideal serves as the central topic around which the discussion is or­ganized. The author has selected his sources with a definite predisposition toward Japanese forms of Buddhism, including the Diamond S'lltra, Lotus Satra, Shinran's Letters, and Japanese No plays in his analysis. Indian, Tibetan, and Chinese sources, however, are almost completely absent from this anal­ysis-the author considers them to be less pervasive arid less viable repre­sentations of Mahayana traditions present today (p. 238).

In summary, the author's opening discussion of ethical terms and concepts leaves too many questions unresolved, which is regrettable, since any expo­sition of ethical systems hinges on a clear understanding of such terms as "ethics" and "morality." His categorization of the Bodhisattva ideal solely as a model of ethical altruism is unconvincing-the bodhisattva is first and foremost a soteriological symbol and could just as easily satisfy the require­ments of the other two models. Professor Hindery covers a wide range of material on ethics in Indian traditions, incorporating a variety of opinions

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held by scholars from different disciplines. He avoids drawing parallels too quickly between Indian and non-Indian ethical concepts. Also, he has pre­sented a valuable discussion on the incorporation of early Indian thought into contemporary ethical systems. This edition is a ,useful study if used in concert with other texts. Though it is too difficult for the novice, Comparative Ethics should prove a valuable reference for those interested in the social and political sciences.

Michael B. Bement

Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice, edited by Minoru Kiyota, assisted by Elvin W. Jones. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1978. Pp.313.

This volume is dedicated to the memory of Richard H. Robinson (1926-70), who was instrumental in establishing a Buddhist Studies program at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he taught Indian philosophy, Indian civilization and Buddhism. It was his life-long conviction that the truths of Buddhism "were not premises for a deductive system but enunciations of gnosis ('saving knowledge') to be meditated upon until the hearer 'catches on' and breaks through to another plane of being." (The Buddhist Religion: A Historical Introduction, 1970, p. 29.) It is most appropriate, therefore, that this commemorative volume deals with Mahayana Buddhist meditation.

In his introduction the editor defends the volume's emphasis on the "the­ories" of Mahayana on the ground that in Buddhist tradition the actual na­ture of the object to be meditated upon is first noetic, regarding a correct analysis of the phenomenal thing. Then this noetic object is brought within the limits of direct perception through the power of repeated meditative practice. Basically, "the core of Buddhist teaching is simply the demonstra­tion of anatma, and of the paths and final results which arise from meditating upon that view" (p. xv). Following this premise, nine scholars contributed articles dealing with philosophical and doctrinal theories that underlie med­itational practices in various schools of Mayayana Buddhism. Inasmuch as space does not permit any elaborate review, let me present the main motifs of each article.

In the first article, "Buddhist Theories of Existents: The Systems of Two Truths," Edwin W. Jones discusses different theories of the phenomenolog­ical and ultimate truths by examining how' two Hlnayana (the Vaibha~ika and Sautrantika) and two Mahayana (the Yogacara and Madhyamika) schools developed their respective philosophical structures in explicating the mean­ing of the anatma doctrine. In the second article, Geshe Sopa deals more directly with meditation as such by analyzing the two principles involved, namely samatha (mental stabilization) and vipaSyana (higher vision), and ex­plicates how the perfect union of these two principles

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(samathavip~syanii~uga~addha) i: s~en as the .im~edi~;e aim of all Bu~dh~,st traditions, t.e., Hmayana, Mahayana and VaJrayana ( the adamant vehtcle ). I hope Professor Sopa will expand his reference to the Vajrayana method of meditation (p. 64) more fully in the near future.

In the third article, Gadjin M. Nagao pursues the meaning of sunyatii, or emptiness, not· merely as an ontological or metaphysical concept but as the most important object of me"ditation for Mahayana Buddhism, under the in­triguing title, "'What Remains' in Sunyata: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness." Professor Nagao deals with this difficult subject with admirable clarity. The fourth article, by Stefan Anacker, is primarily the translation of Vasubandhu's Madhyiintavibhiigabhf4ya ("Commentary on the S~paration of the Middle from Extremes"), Chapters 2, 4, and part of 5, with Dr. Anacker's

." own brief but very helpful introduction and commentary. In the fifth article, "Later Madhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation," Yuichi Kajiyama deals with the syncretistic system of later Indian Madhyamika, the Yogacara­madhyamikaschool, which advocated gradual enlightenment. Professor Ka­jiyama deftly delineates the main f~atures of this school, as exemplified by the writings of two of its leaders, Santarak~ita and KamalaSIla, within the context of the development of Buddhism in India. In the sixth article, Char­lene McDermott examines Dharmaklrti's proposition that yogic direct aware­ness (yogipratya~a) is a means of valid cognition, which was commented upon by the Tibetan Buddhist philosopher Rgyal-tshab. In dealing with this elusive theory, Professor McDermott astutely recognizes the necessity of both a tho­roughgoing logical investigation on the one hand, and a consideration of its practical (viz., ascetico-contemplative cum moral-spiritual) implication for the individual's spiritual progress, on the other.

The last three articles are addressed to Mahayana Buddhism in East Asia. In the seventh article, Francis H. Cook contributes .his translation of A Brief Commentary on the Prajiiiipiiramitii-hrdaya-sutra (Heart Sutra) by Fa-tsang (643-712 A.D.), the systematizer of architechtonic Hua-yen philosophy, together with his own assessment of Fa-tsang's understanding of the Indian Buddhist doctrine of emptiness and the implication of the Heart Sutra for meditation. The eighth article, "Fa-sheng's Obs~vations on the Four Stations of Mind­fulness," by Leon Hurvitz, is a case study of the impact of the historic Bud­dhist notion of salvation on Chinese Buddhism. Professor Hurvitz's masterful treatment of the subject, as exemplified in the work of the little-known Fa­sheng, is an important contribution to this fascinating subject. In the last chapter, Minoru Kiyota presents a careful study of the Sukhiivat'ivyuhOpadeSa, or Upadesa, with its central theme of universal salvation. This scripture pro­vided the doctrinal basis for Tan-luan's Lun-chu in China and Shinran's Kyo­gyo-shin-shO in Japan, and as such left a lasting impact on Pure Land devo­tional meditation iIi East Asia.

This volume is definitely not for general readers but will be welcomed by serious students of Buddhism, comparative philosophy and history of reli­gions. Throughout the book, footnotes are as important as the text. This reviewer's minor complaint is the lack of an index, which would have en­hanced greatly the value and usefulness of this volume. Be that as it may, we are all grateful to those who planned and executed the publication of this

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volume, a worthy tribute to the memory of Richard H. Robinson, whose un­timely death deprived us of his further contribution to the advancement of Buddhist studies.

Joseph M. Kitagawa University of Chicago

Chandi Borobudur: A Monument of Mankind by Dr. Soekmono. Assen-Amster_ dam-Paris: The UNESCO Press, 1976. Pp. Preface + 53.

This short monograph could have been a major contribution to the study of Buddhism and Buddhist archeology, as the author is an eminent Indo­nesian archeologist who has dedicated a large part of his life to the study and reclamation of Chandi Borobudur. Unfortunately, the book fails to meet its potential. The initial problem is one of scope. The work discusses too specific a topic for the general public, yet it lacks the substance needed by the scholar, either Buddhologist or archeologist. One gets the feeling that this is a prog­ress report, published to placate a bureaucracy by proving that money ex­pended on the restoration project was well spent.

Dr. Soekmono's book fails in three major areas: technical quality, style, and content. While paper quality, type style, and binding are all very good, typographical errors are frequent enough to be a minor irritant. The black and white plates are too small and are underexposed. Illustrations lack clarity because the subject field was too broad. Other photographs are superfluous, i.e., draftsmen at work, chemists in the lab, etc. They add little to our un­derstanding of the process of restoration. The color plates are better, but again there is often a lack of definition. Those plates which show the state of deterioration, both current and by comparison with 1910, are extremely valuable, however, and more should have been included. Line drawings of the ground plan and cross section of the monument also are excellent. How­ever, the inclusion of an additional map situating Chandi Borobudur onJava with the map showing the monument and its environs would have been use­ful.

The author's prose flows well, but his failure to footnote government doc­uments and to cite full names frustrates the serious researcher. For a schol­arly work these are serious omissions. In addition, a work of so few pages should not suffer from redundancy, yet the reader constantly experiences deja vu because the book lacks thematic organization. The reliefs carved on the base of the monument are described in detail on page 18, and again a few pages later. In Chapter II, the author twice mentions J. G. De Casparis' theory that the name Borobudur is a simplification of "Bhumisambharabhudhara," denoting a sanctuary for ancestor worship, and that while many scholars disagree with this interpretation, it is the most plau­sible theory yet to be advanced. Finally, the paragraphs entitled "Rediscovery and Rescue," and "Past Efforts" impart the same information.

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In so~e instances the English is confusing or clumsy. For example, on page 21, describing the birth of the Buddha in the Lalitavistara series of

:panels, he writes, "He then descended on earth, and in the shape of a white •. elephant with six tusks he penetrated Queen Maya's right womb." The au­

thor, of course, means right side. These are but a few examples, and are minor points o( style, but collectively they detract from the work.

If this monograph were seminal or highly innovative, technical difficulties and stylistic problems could be ignored. Content, however, is also a. problem. The author devotes four pages to the sub-section titled "Buddhism," and in these four pages he attempts to summarize Buddhist doctrine. The resulting condensation and simplification causes him to make generalizations which are misleading. For example, he defines nirvana as "absolute non-existence" (p. 7). He further states that in Buddhism avidya, or ignorance, is the pri­mary cause of all suffering, "Hence, Buddhism sets no value on rituals, nor on penance" (p. 7). These are but a few examples of the author's failure to differentiate between Buddhism as a philosophy and as a popular religion, between the various traditions and theoretical schools, and between lay and

. monastic Buddhism. The result is an unsatisfactory syncretism. ·Dr. Soekmono's work is not without worth, however. He is at his best when

he describes the various theories about the name and function of the mon­ument. The tracing of the rediscovery of the monument, past and present efforts at restoration, and the monument's place in ancient and modernJa­vanese history is a concise introduction to this important subject.

Douglas J. Rasmussen

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Obituary

. Paul Demieville

With the disappearance of Paul Demieville not only France but the world has lost a truly great scholar. His influence in the field of Oriental Studies was immense and he was universally respected and admired. His erudition was prodigious. As a Sin­ologist, a Buddhologist and a "Tun-huang-ologist"-his Own expression-his contribution was both massive and humani­sing; and his mastery was as much appreciated in Tokyo as in Paris. As a teacher of Chinese, as an interpreter of Chinese poetry to the West, as a grand maItre whose lectures on Ch'an Buddhism at the College de France opened up new vistas of research, his activity was many-sided and seminal. As Redacteur-en-chef of the Hobogirin and as Director and Co­Director of the T'aung Paa, he occupied for several decades a commanding professional position; yet he also wrote admirable articles for the general reader.

At this moment, to praise his work or to enumerate the hon­ours and distinctions conferred on him seems frivolous. What must be emphasized is the big-ness of the man, his lack of pe­titesse. One does not only think, in this perspective, of the time and energy he devoted to revising and publishing the post­humous works of Chavannes, Pelliot, Maspero, Jean Escarra and Etienne Balazs; of his revision and publication of the work of his friend Lin-Ii Kouang on the Saddharmasmrtyupasthiina­sidra and of the publication, with the help of Andre Bareau and J. W. de Jong, of the three volumes of the Dharma-samuc­caya. What must be stressed is the sympathy and encourage­ment he extended to younger and more ignorant fellow-work­ers, his genuine and generous interest in the work of others. He was not just a great figure at whose feet several generations

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.. of students learned to take their.first, hesitant steps in fields he . knew so well. Even if he had never written a line, Paul De­c rnieviIIe would still have been an exceptional, an exemplary human being. Chuang Tzu, Lao Tzu and Lin-chi ... DemieviIIe was a man of their trempe.

Paul DemieviIIe: a brief sketch of his career

Born in Lausanne, Switzerland, on September 13, 1894; a French national by decree dated October 5, 1931.

Licence es Lettres (Universite de Paris) 1914. Diplome de l'Eco!e des Langues Orientales, Paris, 1919. Member of the Ecole fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient, at Hanoi,

1919-1924. Charge de missions d'etudes in Indochina and in China, 1920-

1922. Professor at the University of Amoy, China, 1924-1926. Pensionnaire then Director of the Maison Franco-Japonaise at

Tokyo, 1926-1930. Professor at the Ecole des Langues Orientales, 1931-1945. Charge de conferences at the Institut des Hautes Etudes chi-

noises, 1934. Charge d'un cours at the Sorbonne, 1937-1938. Professeur au College de France, 1946-1964.

Redacteur en chef HobOgirin, Dictionnaire encyclopedique du bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et japonaises, since 1929.

Co-Director with J. J. L. Duyvendak of T'oung Pao, Archives concernant l'histoire, les langues, la. geographie, l'ethnographie et les arts de l'Asie orientale, 1945-1954; Director, 1954-1955; Co-Director with A. F. P. Hulsewe, 1956-1975.

Died on March 23, 1979. An excellent bibliography, prepared by GiseIe de J ong and

. checked by P. DemieviIIe himself, was published in Choix d'i:tudes bouddhiques and in Choix d'Etudes sinologiques, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1973, p. IX-XXXII, and covered the years 1920-

.Ill

1971. A complementary bibliography, prepared by Yves Her­vouet, will appear shortly in the T'oung Pao. Below are listed a few of Paul Demieville's more important books and articles on Buddhist subjects.

1: Les versions chinoises du Milindapafiha, BEFEO, XXIV, Hanoi, 1924, p. 1-258.

2: Sur la memoire des existences anterieures, BEFEO XXVII, Hanoi, 1927, p. 283-298. '

3: Sur l'authenticite duTa tch'eng k'i sin louen, BMFJ, II, 2, Tokyo, 1929, p. 1-78.

4: L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres Paramartha, Melanges chir;ois et bouddhiques, publies par l'Institut BeIge des Hautes Etudes chinoises, I, Bruxelles, 1931-32, p. 15-64.

5: The Twin Pagodas of Zayton. A Study of Later Bud­dhist Sculpture in China. Photographs and Introduction by G. Ecke (p. 1-26). Iconography and History by P. De­mieville (p. 27-95). Harvard-Yenching Institute Monograph Series, vol. II. Cambridge, Mass., 1935.

6: Le miroir spirituel, Sinologica, I, 2, Basel, 1947, p. 112-137.

7: A propos du Concile de Vaisali, TP, XL, Leiden, 1951, p.230-296.

8: Le Concile de Lhasa, Vne controverse sur Ie quietisme entre bouddhistes de l'inde et de la Chine au VIIIeme siecle de l'ere chretienne, Bibliotheque de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes chinoises, VII, Paris, 1952, viii + 399 + 32 pages.

9: L'Inde classique, par Louis Renou et Jean Filliozat, II, avec Ie concours de Paul Demieville, Olivier Lacombe et

Pierre Meile h. XI, 4, Les sources chinoises, Paris-Hanoi, 1953, p.

398-463. 10: Appendice: Notes additionnelles sur les editions im­

primees du Canon bouddhique, p. 121-138, a l'ouvrage posthume de Paul Pelliot, Les debuts de l'imprimerie en Chine, Paris, 1953.

11: La Yogacarabhumi de Sangharak~a, BEFEO, XLIV, 2, Paris, 1954, p. 339-436.

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12: La penetration du bouddhisme dans la tradition philo­sophique chinoise, Cahiers d'Histoire mondiale, III, I, UNESCO, Neuchatel, 1956, p. 19-38.

13: Le bouddhisme et la guerre. Post-scriptum a l' "Histoire des moines guerriers du Japon" de G. Renondeau. Melanges publies par l'Institut des Hautes Etudes chi­noises, tome I, Paris, 1957, p. 347-385.

14: Le chapitre de la Bodhisattvabhumi sur la Perfection du Dhyana, Rocznik Orientalistyczny, XXI, Warszawa, 1957, p. 109-128.

15: Un fragment sanskrit de l'Abhidharma des Sarvastivadin, JA, CCXLIX, Paris, 1961, p. 461-475.

16: Deux documents de Touen-houang sur Ie Dhyana chi­nois, Essays on the History of Buddhism presented to Professor Zenryu Tsukamoto, Kyoto, 1961, p. 1-27.

17: Vimalaklrti en Chine, Appendice dans L'Enseignement de Vimalakirti, traduit et annote par Etienne Lamotte, Lou­vain, p. 438-455.

18: Momies d'Extreme-Orient, Journal des Savants, Troisieme Centenaire, Paris, 1965, p. 144-170.

19: Le bouddhisme chinois, Encyclopedie de la Pleiade, Histoire des Religions, t. I, Paris, 1970, p. 1249-1319.

20: Airs de Touen-houang (Touen-houang k'iu). Textes a chantes des VlIIe-Xe ses

BEFEO = Bulletin de l'Ecole Fran<;:aise d'Extreme-Orient BMFJ = Bulletin de la Maison Franco-Japonaise J A = Journal Asiatique TP = Toung Pao

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