JIABS 30.1-2

JIABSJournal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 30 Number 1–2 2007 (2009)

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EDITORIAL BOARD

KELLNER BirgitKRASSER HelmutJoint Editors

BUSWELL RobertCHEN JinhuaCOLLINS StevenCOX ColletGÓMEZ Luis O.HARRISON PaulVON HINÜBER OskarJACKSON RogerJAINI Padmanabh S.KATSURA ShōryūKUO Li-yingLOPEZ, Jr. Donald S.MACDONALD AlexanderSCHERRER-SCHAUB CristinaSEYFORT RUEGG DavidSHARF RobertSTEINKELLNER ErnstTILLEMANS Tom

JIABSJournal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 30 Number 1–2 2007 (2009)

Obituaries

Georges-Jean PINAULT

In memoriam, Colette Caillat (15 Jan. 1921 – 15 Jan. 2007) . . . . . . 3

Hubert DURT

In memoriam, Nino Forte (6 Aug. 1940 – 22 July 2006) . . . . . . . . . . 13

Erika FORTE

Antonino Forte – List of publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Articles

Tao JIN

The formulation of introductory topics and the writing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Ryan Bongseok JOO

The ritual of arhat invitation during the Song Dynasty: Why did Mahāyānists venerate the arhat? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Chen-Kuo LIN

Object of cognition in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti: On the controversial passages in Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s translations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Eviatar SHULMAN

Creative ignorance: Nāgārjuna on the ontological signifi -cance of consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Sam VAN SCHAIK and Lewis DONEY

The prayer, the priest and the Tsenpo: An early Buddhist narrative from Dunhuang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

CONTENTS2

Joseph WALSER

The origin of the term ‘Mahāyāna’ (The Great Vehicle) and its relationship to the Āgamas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

Buddhist Studies in North AmericaContributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 23–28 June 2008

Guest editor: Charles S. Prebish

Charles S. PREBISH

North American Buddhist Studies: A current survey of the fi eld . . 253

José Ignacio CABEZÓN

The changing fi eld of Buddhist Studies in North America . . . . . . . . 283

Oliver FREIBERGER

The disciplines of Buddhist Studies – Notes on religious commitment as boundary-marker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299

Luis O. GÓMEZ

Studying Buddhism as if it were not one more among the religions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319

•Notes on contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

In memoriam

COLETTE CAILLAT

(15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007)

GEORGES-JEAN PINAULT

International Indology has suffered a great loss by the demise of Prof. Dr. Colette Caillat, precisely on her eighty-sixth birthday, 15 January 2007. She had contacts and friendly relationships with scholars of Indian studies allover the world, especially in her field of expertise: Jaina and Buddhist studies and Middle Indo-Aryan linguistics, not excluding other topics, as classical Sanskrit litera­ture and Indian culture in general. 1 may refer to obituaries· that have been already published for full information about her career and publications.! I would like to stress shortly some important facts. On one hand, the education of Colette Caillat is deeply root­ed in the French humanist tradition, which is based on the study of classical languages (Latin and Greek), and masterworks of French and world literature: her interest for Sanskrit was initially con­nected with comparative Indo-European linguistics, but the French lndology of the 1930s and 1940s had developed a keen interest for the study of Indian languages and literature in the larger context of India and South Asia, that is in their native milieu. Her teach­ers, whose merits she was never reluctant to recognize, were Louis

1 See Indo-Iranian Journal 50, 2007, pp. 1-4 (by Minoru Rara); Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 22-23, 2004-2005 [published in June 2007], pp. 23-70 (by Nalini Balbir, with full bibliography, including the reviews); The Jour­nal of Jaina Studies (Japan), Vol. 13, September 2007, pp. 77-90 (by Nalini Balbir, with list of papers related specifically to Jaina studies); Indologica Taurinensia, VoL XXXIII, 2007, pp. 167-182 (by Nalini Balbir, with list of books and articles published between 1988 and 2007); Journal Asiatique 295.1,2007, pp. 1-7 (by Nalini Balbir).

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 3-11

4 GEORGES-JEAN PINAULT

Renou (1896-1966), who had the deepest knowledge of the Vedas, of Pat;lini and of the literary genres of classical Sanskrit, and Jules Bloch (1880-1953), who drew the attention of his audience to the whole history of Indo-Aryan, with Pali and Prakrits as intermedi­ates, and to all aspects of Indian material and non-material cul­ture. This latter influence explains why Colette Caillat learned, iii. addition to Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan languages, Hindi at the School of Oriental Languages ("Langues Orientales") in Paris. On the other hand, Colette Caillat has been from the beginnings of her research on Jaina literature at the level of international re­search in Indology, through the decisive collaboration with Walther Schubring (1881-1969) in Hamburg, to Whom she was addressed by Louis Renou, because nobody in France was proficient in the texts of the Jaina tradition. Later, again under the recommendation of Schubring, she became a collaborator of the Critical PaIi Dic­tionary, an international venture based on the highest philological c

standards, the publication of which started in 1924. One should add that she visited India for the first time in 1963, and that she worked regularly there over the years, especially in Mysore and Ahmeda­bad, being in friendly contacts with Jaina scholars. Therefore, Colette Caillat has been able to combine her European scholarly education with open-mindedness for the Indian culture, including its contemporary aspects, but she never forgot the rational and his­torical approach, that is based ultimately on the influential doctrine o:(~toine Meillet (1866-1936), linking linguistics with social and cultural history.

All works of Colette Caillat are characterized by great accuracy in philological matters, lucidity of exposition, and high sensibility to the texts. One should add Common sense, which is not the qual­ity that is most frequently met among great Indologists. Accord­ingly, her researches on the vocabulary and on minute details of grammar were conceived as tools for understanding with the best exactness the way of thinking of Indian authors of the past. This method is certainly welcome for the understanding of literatures that play consciously with the potentialities of the language itself.

COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007) 5

Colette Caillat has made a great contribution to a wider knowledge of the Jaina religion and literature. As a matter of fact, she has also emphasized the links between Jaina and Buddhist traditions, despite their independence, on the linguistic as well as on the doc­trinal side. Her doctoral thesis about the Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks (1965)2 remains a masterpiece, since she was able in a luminous style to disentangle a complicated doctrine from the texts themselves and to explain it in a wider context, that makes the difficult matter understandable for every humanist.

The bibliography of Colette Caillat is quite impressive: nine personal books, mostly on Jaina texts, direction of eight books,3 around 90 articles and 190 reviews in various journals. I can testify that Colette Caillat, since the beginning of her career, has read in depth and annotated many works of Indologists of present and past time. Therefore, every statement from her pen is based on long­time thinking, pondering and immense learning. I remember that she has followed with passion all advances about the interpretation of the edicts of Asoka that remain a turning point of Indian lin­guistic and cultural history. She said also that she never hesitated to immerse herself in the monumental edition of the Gandhari Dhar­mapada by John Brough (1962). It is no surprise that she has been much interested in the past years in the publication of manuscripts from several collections that emerged from the Gandhara region. In some sense, her teaching and original contributions helped to fully appreciate under the best angle the relevance of these doc­uments for the history of Buddhism, which, in addition to their intrinsic linguistic import, committed to oblivion some rash ear-

2 Date of the original publication in French; English translation published in Ahmedabad, 1975.

3 Some of them are proceedings of conferences; others are editions of the works of her teachers: Jules Bloch, Application de la cartographie a l' histoire de l'indo-aryen, in collaboration with Pierre Meile, specialist of Dravidian (Paris, 1963); Recueil d' articles de Jules Bloch 1906-1955 (Paris, 1985); Louis Renou, Etudes vediques et palJineennes, t. XVII (Paris, 1969).

6 GEORGES-JEAN PINAUL T

lier generalizations based on less material. As an appendix to this present memorial, I give a list of her articles devoted to Buddhist studies and Middle Indo-Aryan linguistics, but I would insist on the importance of her reviews, from which one can glean many im­portant insights. To this list should be added the booklet Pour une nouvelle grammaire du PaZi, Turin, 1970, based on a lecture given at the Istituto di Indologia dell'Universita di Torino. This modest publication (around 30 pages) actually paved the way to the ~inguis­tic interpretation of facts in a larger spectrum, including morphol­ogy, syntax, derivation, thus replacing the innovations and stylistic choices ofthe PaIi language into history.4 One of her last works was the direction of a collective dossier about ancient Buddhism: "Le bouddhisme ancien sur Ie chemin de l'Eveil. Les vies du Bouddha, Nobles Verites et Octuple sentier. Philosophie ou religion?" for the journal Religions & Histoire, Nr. 8, May-June 2006, pp. 12-75. It testifies to her pedagogical talent in introducing the fundamentals of the Buddhist way of thinking.

Colette Caillat was quite engaged in the teaching of Indology at the University: having started her career in Lyon (1960-1965), she succeeded Louis Renou at the Sorbonne in 1966, and she taught there until her retirement in 1989. She was convinced that Indian studies are as demanding as studies of classical languages: they are worth of a complete course at the university. Her direct pupils have much benefited from her teaching that was quite stimulating because of her wide knowledge of all aspects of Indian culture and of Indology. She was able to share with the audience her curios­ity and even her love for everything Indian. As a former student, I will always remember her unique way of pronouncing Pali and ArdhamagadhI, which helped to communicate the feeling of living and real languages. She has encouraged young researchers that had different interests in the large field of Indology. One may say that

4 It has been openly taken into account in the handbook of Middle Indian published by Prof. Dr. Oskar von Hiniiber, Das altere Mittelindisch im Uber­blick, Vienna, 1st edition 1986, 2nd revised edition 2001.

COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007) 7

several (French and non-French) Indologists, while having their own intellectual aims, owe their degree to her benevolence and her capacity to form a decent committee for a thesis; she had the abil­ity to highlight the strong points of a student, while indicating the weak points if needed. Her influence spread to scholars of other countries, especially from Japan, where she had many friends, some of them being former pupils, starting with Prof. Katsumi Mi­maki (Kyoto). One may recall that the latter colleague gave the name Kaya ("perfume" in Japanese) to his daughter, born 1977, as a reminder of his Parisian teacher. While having strong convic­tions, and being quite sympathetic towards modern trends, Colette Caillat was both fair and friendly, and she never compromised firm ethical principles. These personal features explain her wide influ­ence and her role in several academic institutions, learned journals and international committees; she served as treasurer of the In­ternational Association for Sanskrit Studies (1977-2000), and she was elected to the Presidency of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (1999-2002). She conceived indological research on an international basis, and was opposed to every form of nation­alism, which turns often to chauvinism or sectarianism. She was open to all sound advances in Indology; one could also say that she could express a typical French irony against fuss and overstate­ment, which belong to the usual pathology of scholarship. She was very demanding of herself, and she was devoted to the transmis­sion of the knowledge that she had received from her teachers and friends, because it remains the basis of every future progress in the understanding of the contribution of India to the universal culture.

8 GEORGES-JEAN PINAULT

Articles by Colette Caillat on Middle Indo-Aryan and Buddhist stud­iess

« Deux etudes de moyen-indien (1. A propos de pali philsuvihilra, ardhama­gadhi phasuya-esalJ-ijja ; 2. Sur l' origine de gOlJ-a) », Journal Asiatique 248, 1960, pp. 41-64.

« Nouvelles remarques sur les adjectifs moyen-indiens philsu, philsuya »,

Journal Asiatique 249, 1961, pp. 497-502.

« Les derives moyen-indiens du type kilrima », Journal Asiatique 253, 1965, pp. 289-308.

« La sequence SHYTY dans les inscriptions indo-arameennes d' Asoka », Jour­nal Asiatique 255, 1966, pp. 466-470. Following Emile Benveniste & Andre Dupont-Sommer, « Dne inscription indo-arameenne d'Asoka provenant de Kandahar (Afghanistan) », ibid., pp. 437-465.

« La finale -ima dans les adjectifs moyen- et neo-indiens de sens spatial »,

in : Melanges d'indianisme a la memoire de Louis Renou, Paris, De Boc­card, 1968 (Publications de 1'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, n° 28), pp. 187-204.

«Isipatana migadaya », Journal Asiatique 256, 1968, pp. 177-183.

« Pali ibbha, Vedic {bhya- », in : Lance Cousins et al. (eds.), Buddhist Studies in honour of I.B. Horner, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1974, pp. 41-49.

« A propos de sanskrit candrimil- 'clair de lune' », in : Melanges linguisti~ ques offerts a Emile Benveniste, Paris (Collection Iinguistique pubIiee par la Societe de Linguistique de Paris, t. 70), 1975, pp. 65-74.

« Forms of the Future in the Gilndhilrf Dharmapada », in : Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1977-1978 (Diamond Jubi­lee Volume), pp. 101-106.

« Pronoms et adjectifs de similarite en moyen indo-aryen », in: Indianisme et Bouddhisme. Melanges offerts a Mgr. Etienne Lamotte, Louvain-Ia-Neuve, 1980 (Publications de 1'Institut orientaliste de Louvain, n° 23), pp. 33-40.

« La langue primitive du bouddhisme », in : Heinz Bechert (ed.), The Lan­guage of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition, Gottingen (Abhandlungen der Aka­demie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen. Phil.-hist. Kl., 3. FoIge, Nr. 117), 1980, pp. 43-60.

5 A volume of selected papers on this topic is currently in preparation for publication by the Pali Text Society.

COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921-15 Jan. 2007) 9

« Etat des recherches sur les inscriptions d' Asoka », Bulletin d' Etudes In­diennes 1, 1983, pp. 51-57.

« Pali (langue; litterature) », in : Encyclopaedia Universalis, Paris, 1985, Corpus, t. 13, pp. 986-988.

« Prohibited speech and subhasita in the Buddhist Theravada tradition », In­dologica Taurinensia 12, 1984, pp. 61-73 (Proceedings of the Scandinavian Conference-Seminar ofIndological Studies, Stockholm, June 1''-5t\ 1982).

«Notes bibliographiques : quelques publications recentes consacrees aux tra­ditions manus crites du bouddhisme indien et aux conclusions generales qui decoulent de leur etude », Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 2, 1984, pp. 61-69.

«The Condemnation of False - Wrong Speech (musavada) in the Pali Scrip­tures », in : Tatsuro Yamamoto (ed.), Proceedings of the 31st International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North-Africa, Tokyo-Kyoto (31st

August-7th September 1983), Tokyo, 1984, Vol. 1, pp. 201-202 (resume).

« Grammatical Incorrections, Stylistic Choices, Linguistic trends (with ref­erence to Middle Indo-Aryan) », in: Wolfgang Morgenroth (ed.), Sanskrit and World Culture. Proceedings of the 4th World Sanskrit Conference (Wei­mar, 1979), Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1986 (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des Alten Orients, Nr. 18), pp. 367-373.

« Sur l'authenticite linguistique des edits d' Asoka », in: Colette Caillat (ed.), Dialectes et formes dialectales dans les litteratures indo-aryennes. Actes du colloque international, Paris, De Boccard, 1986 (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, nO 55), pp. 413-432.

« The constructions mama krtam and mayii krtam in Asoka's edicts », in: Albrecht Wezler & Ernst Hammerschmidt (eds.), Proceedings of the XXXII International Congress of Asian and North African Studies (Hamburg, 25th

-30th August 1986), Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, (ZDMG, Supplement IX), 1992, p. 489.

« Some idiosyncrasies oflanguage and style in Asoka's Rock Edicts at Gir­nar », in: Harry Falk (ed.), Hinduismus und Buddhismus. Festschriftfur Ul­rich Schneider, Freiburg, 1987, pp. 87-100.

« Vedic ghraf!!sa- 'heat' of the sun, ArdhamagadhI ghif!!sU 'burning heat', Jaina Mahara~trI ghif!!_o 'hot season'», in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Ori­ental Research Institute 68 [Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar 150th Birth­Anniversary Volume], 1987, pp. 551-557.

« Aspects de 1'epigraphie dans l' Asie du Sud et du Sud-Est », Comptes ren­dus de I'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 1988, 4e fascicule, pp.

10 GEORGES-JEAN PINAUL T

1-12 (communication prononcee dans la seance publique annuelle du 18 no­vembre 1988).

« Notes grammaticales sur les documents kharo~!hI de Niya », in : Akira Haneda (ed.), Documents et archives provenant de I'Asie centrale. Actes du colloque franco-japonais (Kyoto, 4-8 octobre 1988), Kyoto, Societe Franco­Japonaise des Etudes Orientales, 1990, pp. 9-24.

« Asoka et les gens de la brousse (XIII M-N) "qu'ils se repentent et cessent de tuer"», Bulletin d'Etudes Indiennes 9, 1991, pp. 9-13.

« The 'double optative suffix' in Prakrit Asoka XIII (N) na hartmesu/na haiiiieyasu », in: Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute [Amrtamahotsava Volume] 72-73 (1991-1992), 1993, pp. 637-645.

« Connections between Asokan (Shahbazgarhi) and Niya Prakrit? », Indo­Iranian Journal 35, 1992, p. 109-119.

« Deux notes de moyen indo-aryen. I. Les quatre themes de present de HAN­en pali. II. 'Double optatif' en mahara~!rI jaina ? », Bulletin d' Etudes Indien­nes 10, 1992, pp. 97-111.

« Doublets desinentiels en moyen indo-aryen », in : Reinhard Sternemann (ed.), Bopp-Symposium 1992 der Humboldt-Universitiit zu Berlin (Akten der Konferenz vom 24.3.-26.3.1992), Heidelberg, Universitatsverlag Carl Win­ter, 1994, pp. 35-52.

« Vedic and Early Middle Indo-Aryan », in : Michael Witzel (ed.), Inside the texts, beyond the texts. New approaches to the study of the Vedas. Proceed­ings of the International Vedic Workshop (Harvard University, June 1989), Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Oriental Series (Opera Minora, Vol. 2), 1997, pp.15-32.

« L'appel de la Loi ou l'age transcende », in : Christine Chojnacki (ed.), Les ages de la vie dans Ie monde indien. Actes des journees d'etude de Lyon (22-23 juin 2000), Lyon, 2001 (Collection du Centre d'Etudes et de Recher­ches sur l'Occident Romain. Nouvelle serie, nO 24), pp. 325-332.

« Gleanings from a Comparative Reading of Early Canonical Buddhist and Jaina Texts », Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 26/1,2003, pp. 25-50.

« Manuscrits bouddhiques du Gandhara », Comptes rendus de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, janvier-mars 2003, pp. 453-460.

« L'epoque du Bouddha et la diffusion du bouddhisme », « La doctrine des Anciens (Thera-vada) », in : Religions & Histoire, n08, mai-juin 2006, pp. 14-17,36-42.

COLETTE CAILLAT (15 Jan. 1921 - 15 Jan. 2007) 11

Articles in the Critical Piili Dictionary (CPD), Copenhagen, in Volume II, from fascicle 7 (1971) to fascicle 15 (1990) : is-issayitatta, uddha-unnltaka, upatapeti-upananda-sakyaputta, ekato-ekavasa, etadI-etava(ta), ettaka-ettavata, edI-edisaka.

Reviews of fascicles of the CPD : Indogermanische Forschungen 71, 1966, pp. 306-309 ; 74, 1969, pp. 223-225 ; 75, 1970, pp. 299-303 ; 78, 1973, pp. 247-249 ; 79, 1974, pp. 250-255 ; 81, 1976, pp. 327-329 ; 88, 1983, pp. 312-318 ; Bulletin de la Societe de Linguistique de Paris 66/2, 1971, pp. 66-67 ; Comptes rendus de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 1992, pp. 689-691.

In memoriam

NINO FORTE (6 Aug. 1940 - 22 July 2006)

HUBERT DURT

Antonino Forte, who passed away in his beloved Kyoto during the rainy season of 2006, was a pioneer in a new approach to Buddhist studies. This approach cannot be separated from the Sicilian background of this Sinologist and Historian born in Cefalu. Sicilian writers, and especially the novelist Leonardo Sciascia who in his essays tried to define the spirit of the island, were obsessed with the weight of the power of institutions, or pseudo-institutions, hanging over the shoulders of a population com­posed much more of country people than of seafarers. In the rather indo­lent world of studies on Chinese Buddhism the title of the first book of A. Forte, and in its revised version his last, Political Propaganda and Ideol­ogy in China at the End of the Seventh Century, sounded like a gun shot. "Propaganda" is a despised term, and so also, in a somewhat reduced measure, is the term "ideology."

Opening the book, the reader is faced with a survey made with intense scrupulousness, but also with much clarity, which unravels a double mach­ination whose effects have persisted for almost thirteen centuries. The first machination consisted in offering, by a group of eminent representa­tives of the Buddhist clergy at the end of the first Tang age, of a pseudo commentary on the well-known Great-Cloud Sutra (Mahiimeghasutra, Dayunjing). This Indian Mahayanic sutra contains several prophetic ele­ments, and the pseudo-commentary, found in the early twentieth century among Dunhuang manuscripts, was intended to support the founding of the Zhou dynasty (690-705) by Empress Wu. The commentary then dis­appeared with the collapse of the ephemeral Zhou era.

Forte's outstanding annotated translation of the commentary forms the second part of the book. But there was a second machination. After the Zhou dynasty was abolished, the official (and sometimes Buddhist) historiography of the second Tang age and following periods darkened the memory of Empress Wu. This resulted in numerous misunderstand­ings which were renewed when modern historians, mostly Chinese and

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2·2007 (2009) pp. 13-15

14 HUBERTDURT

Japanese, attempted a new evaluation of the troubled, but for many rea­sons brilliant, reign of Empress Wu.

Much of the scholarly production of Forte was devoted to that short but extremely important period of Chinese history, where we see a reign­ing woman topple several taboos and initiate what could be considered a Chinese enlightened policy. Forte's choice to concentrate on Chinese Buddhist "ecclesiastical" documents, and especially on epigraphy, has made his work extremely original and creative.

Following his seminal Political Propaganda, first published ip Naples in 1976 and completely revised in the new edition of the Kyoto Italian School of East Asian Studies, another major contribution on the Empress Wu period was Forte's Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of the Astronomical Clock. The Tower, Statue and Armillary Sphere Con­structed by Empress Wu, jointly published by the EFEO of Paris and by the IsMEO of Rome in 1988. In connection with these works, several of Forte's articles deal with religious figures contemporary to Empress Wu: Buddhist (including a monograph on Fazang's letter to Uisang) or non­Buddhist as the Persian Aluohan (616-710).

Another book, which was also co-produced, this time by the Italian School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto and the College de France in Paris, was the edition of an unfinished study of Paul Pelliot, L'inscription ne­storie nne de Si-ngan-fou in 1996. With the help of his indefatigable wife Lilla, Forte not only edited and completed Pelliot's work, but he also contributed no less than five appendices (pp. 349-495), which mark his foray into the post-Wu period of the Tang dynasty. Furthermore, he un­dertook some investigations on the Persian and Manichean relations of the Tang empire, some of which have deep roots in the past, as shown by his. everlasting interest in the archaic translator An Shigao (fl. ca. A.D. 148-170).

The magisterial and very homogenous scholarly written heritage left by Antonino Forte is far from representative of the totality of his ac­tivities. His various undertakings at his Alma Mater, the Istituto Uni­versitario Orientale of Naples, currently called Universita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale," and at the Institut du H6b6girin of Kyoto, where he was sent by the leader and inspirer of the H6b6girin Dictionary, Paul Demieville, were the platform from which he later launched his major projects, when he started the Italian School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto, as its first and long-time director. His activities took, amongst oth­ers, three special directions: the study of Chinese religious epigraphy, the Italo-Chinese collaboration for the study of Longmen, and the Italo-

NINO FORTE (6 Aug. 1940 - 22 July 2006) 15

Japanese collaboration for the study of the Buddhist Canon kept at the Nanatsuderain Nagoya.

Having known Nino Forte since 1964 (in Bordeaux), I keep the fond memory of a friend with a warm smile, whose passion for research im­mediately attracted to him the support of a plead of eminent Masters: the already mentioned Paul Demieville, Giuseppe Tucci, Tsukamoto Zenryu, and Makita Tairyo. Later (1976-1984), we became colleagues at the Ecole Fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient in Kyoto. I benefited from his his­toricallucidity and also from his expertise in computers when this new technology was introduced into our studies. In the years that followed, I saw for myself the inspiration he gave to his own students in Naples and in Kyoto, where he spent close to twenty years, I witnessed his generosity to students of every nationality engaged in East Asian studies. It would be difficult not to find warm acknowledgment expressed to Nino Forte in any work prepared in the stimulating atmosphere of the Italian School of East Asian Studies during his directorship.

After having studiously spent every summer in Kyoto since his return to Italy after his first directorship, Nino Forte had just begun a second period as director in the Spring of 2006, when he sadly was defeated by cancer. It is Silvio Vita, his able predecessor, who will once again take up the direction of the School.

Although ultra-specialized in his field, Antonino Forte was not a man secluded from his time: he was deeply active in the struggle for the pro­tection of Old Kyoto from financial conspiracies, megalomaniac tenden­cies, and the lack of consciousness accompanied by irreverence for the past. He was, moreover, engaged in activities to prevent war in Iraq. In him, in his wife Lilla, and in their daughter Erika, an archaeologist in the field of Chinese and Central Asian Studies, I could always see the sacred fire of devotion to Asia and to world peace.

Books

ANTONINO FORTE - LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

(Compiled by the late Prof. Antonino Forte

and amended by Erika Forte.)

1. Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Cen­tury. Inquiry into the Nature, Authors and Functions of the Tunhuang Docu­ment S. 6502, Followed by an Annotated Translation. Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli 1976.

2. Index des caracteres chinois dans les Fascicules I-V du Hobogirin. Mai­sonneuve, Paris, Maison Franco-Japonaise, Tokyo 1984.

3. Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of the Astronomical Clock. The Tower, Statue andArmillary Sphere Constructed by Empress Wu. Istituto per il Medio edEstremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, vol. LIX), Ecole Fran9aise d'Extreme-Orient (vol. CXLV), Rome and Paris 1988.

4. The Hostage An Shigao and his Offspring. An Iranian Family in China. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 6), Kyoto 1995.

5. A Jewel in Indra's Net. The Letter Sent by Fazang in China to Uisang in Korea. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 8), Kyoto 2000.

6. Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century. Inquiry into the Nature, Authors and Functions of the Tunhuang Document S. 6502, Followed by an Annotated Translation (Second Edition). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Monographs 1), Kyoto 2005.

Edited books

1. Gururajamaiijarika. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci, 2 vols. Istituto Uni­versitario Orientale, Napoli 1974. (Co-editor with Maurizio Taddei and Luigi Polese Remaggi.)

2. Tang China and Beyond. Studies on East Asia from the Seventh to the Tenth Century. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Essays 1), Kyoto 1988.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 17-31

18 ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)

3. Maurizio Riotto, The Bronze Age in Korea. A Historical Archaeological Outline. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 1), Kyoto 1989.

4. Giuliano Bertuccioli, Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two Lectures on East Asia. With an Appendix: Francesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppres­sion, by Antonino Forte. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 2), Kyoto 1990.

5. Tonami Mamoru, The Shaolin Monastery Stele on Mount Song. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 1), Kyoto 1990. .

6. Hubert Durt, Problems of Chronology and Eschatology. Four Lectures on the Essay on Buddhism by Tominaga Nakamoto (1715-1746). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 4), Kyoto 1994.

7. Claudio Zanier, Where the Roads met. East and West in the Silk Production Processes (l7th to 19th Centuries). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Oc­casional Papers 5), Kyoto 1994.

8. Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-fou. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996.

9. Giorgio Amitrano, The New Japanese Novel. Popular Culture and Literary Tradition in the Work of Murakami Haruki and Yoshimoto Banana. Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 7), Kyoto 1996.

10. A Life Journey to the East. Sinological Studies in Memory of Giuliano Bertuccioli (1923-2001). Italian School of East Asian Studies (Essays 2), Kyoto 2002. (Co-edited with Federico Masini.)

Articles and reviews

1968

1. "An Shih-kao: biografia e note critiche." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 28 (1968), pp. 151-194.

1970

2. "La prima opera buddhista delle fonti giapponesi." Il Giappone, X (1970), pp.43-52.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 19

3. Review: Fujishima Tateki ~~3tW, "Gench6 K6hi no bukky6 shink6" :7G !MJP~20){~~{~fm. IBK 16, 2. pp. 309-313. Revue Bihliographique de Si­nologie, 14-1~5 (1968-1970), p. 311.

1971

4. "11 P'u-sa cheng-chai ching e l'origine dei tre mesi di digiuno prolungato." T'oung Pao, LVII (1971), pp. 103-134.

5. "The Ching-tu san-mei ching and the Tun-huang Manuscripts" by Tairy6 Makita. East and West, 21.3-4 (September-December 1971), pp. 351-361. (Annotated translation from Japanese).

1973

6. "11 'Monastero dei grandi Chou' a Lo-yang." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 33 (1973), pp. 417-429.

7. "Deux etudes sur Ie manicMisme chinois: 1. Une poesie attribue a Po Chil­i; II. Le manicMisme dans la region de Wen-chou en 1120." T'oung Pao, LIX.l-5 (1973), pp. 220-253.

1974

8. "Divakara (613-688), un monaco indiano nella Cina dei T'ang." Annali della Facolta di lingue e letterature straniere di Ca' Foscari, Ser. Or. 5, XIII (1974), pp. 135-164.

9. "Un pensatore Vijfianavadin del VII secolo: Hsiian-fan." In Gururiijamaii­jarikii. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Tucci, edited by Maurizio Taddei, Antoni­no Forte and Luigi Polese Remaggi, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Napoli 1974, vol. II, pp. 559-570.

1979

10. "Ch6sai *'J1!f" (Prolonged Fast). In Hobogirin ?:ft.~#. Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et Japonaises, V (1979), pp. 135-164 (with collaboration of Jacques May).

11. "Le moine Khotanais Devendraprajfia." Bulletin de l'Ecole Franraise d'Extreme-Orient, LXVI (1979), pp. 289-298.

20 ANTONlNO FORTE (1940-2006)

1980

12. "Additions and Corrections to my Political Propaganda and Ideology in China at the End of the Seventh Century." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 40 (1980), pp. 163-175.

1983

13. "Daiji *~ (Chine)" (Great Monasteries in China). In HabiJgirin rt;)t ~*. Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chi­noises et Japonaises, VI (1983), pp. 682-704.

1984

14. "The Activities in China of the Tantric Master Manicintana (Pao-ssu-wei ?-721) from Kashmir and of his Northern Indian Collaborators." East and West, 34.1-3 (September 1984), pp. 301-345.

15. "II persiano A1uohan (616-710) nella capita1e cinese Luoyang, sede del Cakravartin." In Incontro di religioni in Asia tra il III e il X secolo d. c., edited by Lionello Lanciotti. Olschki, Firenze 1984, pp. 169-198.

16. "Daiungyasho 0 megutte" *~~i9IC~~,-:>-C (About the Commentary on the Great-cloud Satra). In Tonka to Chiigoku bukkya ~;I;li!,!: q:tOOfJ,.Wc (Dunhuang and Chinese Buddhism), edited by Makita Tairyo !\:5(JElWri'i~ and Fukui Fumimasa mfrX~, Vol. no. 7 of the series Koza Tonko ~J*~;I;li!, DaitO shuppansha **I±\Jlj~, Tokyo 1984, pp. 173-206.

1985'

17. "Hui-chih (fl. 676-703 A.D.), a Brahmin Born in China." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 45 (1985), pp. 105-134.

18. "Brevi note suI testo kashmiro del Dhiirar;f-satra di AvalokiteSvara dall'infallibile laccio introdotto in Cina da Manicintana." In Orientalia Iose­phi Tucci memoriae dicata, edited by Gherardo Gno1i and Lionello Lanciotti, Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, vol. LVI, 1), Roma 1985, pp. 371-393.

19. "La Secte des Trois stades et l'heresie de Devadatta. Yabuki Keiki corrige par Tang Yongtong." Bulletin de ecole Franraise d'Extreme-Orient, LXXIV (1985), pp. 469-476.

20. "Itaria Tohogaku kenkyujo no sosetsu" ..{ ~ y 7*h~1iJfJ'EmO)~IjIDt (The foundation of the School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto). Tah6gaku * h~ (Eastern Studies), 69 (January 1985), pp. 163-167.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 21

21. "The School of East Asian Studies (Tohogaku Kenkyujo) in Kyoto." An­naZi dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 45 (1985), pp. 357-365.

1986

22. "Scienza e tecnica." In Cina a Venezia. Dalla dinastia Han a Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 36-49.

23. "Science and Techniques." In China in Venice. From the Han Dynasty to Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 36-49. (English translation of no. 22.)

24. "II buddhismo e Ie altre religioni straniere." In Cina a Venezia. Dalla dinastia Han a Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 58-7l.

25. "Buddhism and the Other Foreign Religions." In China in Venice. From the Han Dynasty to Marco Polo. Electa, Milano 1986, pp. 58-71. (English translation of no. 24.)

26. Review: Recherches sur les chnfftiens d'Asie Centrale et d'Extreme­Orient. II, I: La stele de Si-ngandou. Oeuvres Posthumes de Paul Pelliot. Editions de la Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris 1984. East and West, 36.1-3 (September 1986), pp. 313-315.

27. "The School of East Asian Studies (Tohogaku Kenkyujo) in Kyoto." Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali, XXXIII, 5 (maggio 1986), p. 516.

1987

28. Review: Horward J. Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk. Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T'ang Dynasty. Yale University Press, New Haven and London 1985. T'oung Pao, LXXIII.4-5 (1987), pp. 327-340.

1988

29. "Un gioiello della rete di Indra. La lettera che dalla Cina Fazang invio a Uisang in Corea." In Tang China and Beyond. Studies on East Asia from the Seventh to the Tenth Century, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Essays 1), Kyoto 1988, pp. 35-83.

1989

30. "Yutian seng Tiyunpanruo" TIil{~tll':~~5t*· (The Khotanese Monk De­vendraprajiia). In Xu Zhangzhen ~.~ (translator), Xiyu yu fojiao wenshi lunji I'§J~~{~tffi:xse~ffij~ (A Collection of Literary and Historical Essays

22 ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)

Concerning the Western Regions and Buddhism), Xuesheng shuju Jj!1:..fili, Taipei 1989, pp. 233-246. (Chinese version of no. 11; revised in 1988.)

31. Review: Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism under the T'ang. Cambridge Uni­versity Press, Cambridge 1987. T'oung Pao, LXXVA-5 (1989), pp. 317-324.

32. Comment (in Japanese) to Nakanishi Susumu~g§"J1!j, "Higashi Ajia ni okeru Nihon Bunka. Hohoron 0 motomeru tame no joshQ" Jlf7~7~~:tolt.Q S*xf[:; - jJ~~=a::-ttlil).Qk.Iil)c7)ff:~ (Japanese Culture in East Asia. In­troductory Chapter in Search of a Methodology). In Sekai no naka no Nihon l. Nihon kenkyu no paradaimu: Nihongaku to Nihon kenkyu. i:!tJi!.c7)~c7) s* I. S*-1iJf~c7)/'~7?t~ A - S*~t S*1iJf~ (Japan in the World l. The Para­digm of Japanese Studies: Japanology and Japanese Studies), Kokusai Ni­hon Bunka Kenkyii senta OO~S*xf[:;1iJf~-e:/?T~ (International Research Center for Japanese Studies), Kyoto 1989, pp. 197-198.

1990

32. Foreword and editorial note to Tonami Mamoru, The Shaolin Monastery Stele on Mount Song, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 1), Kyoto 1990.

33. "The Relativity of the Concept of Orthodoxy in Chinese Buddhism: Chih-sheng's Indictment of Shih-Ii and the Proscription of the Dharma Mir­ror Sutra." In Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha, edited by Robert E. Buswell, Jr., University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 1990, pp. 239-249.

34. "Francesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppression." In Giuliano Bertuccioli, Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two Lectures on East Asia, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 2), Kyoto 1990, pp. 59-80.

~5. "On Carletti's Book with Particular Reference to his Chapter Conc€!rning Japan." In Giuliano Bertuccioli, Travels to Real and Imaginary Lands. Two Lectures on East Asia, edited by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 2), Kyoto 1990, pp. 81-85.

36. "ltaria no futatsu no tOyo kenkyii kikan" '{?TY7c7)-:,?c7)~~-1iJf~~M (Two Italian Research Institutions for Oriental Studies) . .{?T Y 7~T (Itali­ana), 1990.1, pp. 29-36.

37. "Studying at the Jinbun-ken." Kyoto daigaku tsiishin .... 'F-t1tk~~f~ (Kyo­to University Newsletter), 11 (November 1990).

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 23

1991

38. Foreword· and Presentation to Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of Nanatsu-dera. A Recently Discovered Treasure-House in Downtown Nagoya, edited by Silvio Vita, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Pa­pers 3), Kyoto 1991, pp. vii-ix, 1-3.

39. "My First Visit to Nanatsu-dera. Impromptu Notes and Impressions." In Ochiai Toshinori, The Manuscripts of Nanatsu-dera. A Recently Discovered Treasure-House in Downtown Nagoya, edited by Silvio Vita, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Occasional Papers 3), Kyoto 1991, pp. 55-77.

1992

40. "Chinese State Monasteries in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries." In Echo 6 Go-Tenjikkoku den kenkYLl 7Il~tt1L~k:'!-OO1$1i3fJ'E (Huichao's Wang Wu-Tianzhuguo zhuan Record of Travels in Five Indic Regions), edited by Kuwayama ShOshin ,*=WJjE:i:f!, Kyoto daigaku Iinbun kagaku kenkyujo H:tIl ::k'¥:A::x:f4,¥:1i3fJ'Em (Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto Universi­ty), Kyoto 1992, pp. 213-258. (For a partial version in Japanese, see no. 54.)

41. "An Shigao 'tCi!t~ and his Descendants." Bukkyo shigaku kenkYLl {?lJWl5t'. ~1i3fJ'E (The Journal of the History of Buddhism), XXXV.l (July 1992), pp. 1-35.

42. "On the Subject of the Mingtang." Monumenta Serica, 40 (1992), pp. 387-396. (Reflections on 1. Gernet's review of Mingtang and Buddhist Utopias in the History of the Astronomical Clock, published in Toung Pao LXXVL4-5, 1990, pp. 337-340.)

43. "About Carletti's Attitude towards Slavery." East and West, 42.2-4 (De­cember 1992), pp. 511-513.

44. Review: Nahal Tajadod, Mani Ie Bouddha de Lumiere. Catechisme mani­chien chinois. Les editions du cerf, Paris 1990. Asian Folklore Studies, LI,2 (1992), pp. 367-369.

45. "Itaria TohOgaku kenkyujo" -{ l7 Y 7Jlt:1j'¥:1i3fJ'Em (The Italian School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto). TSLlshin :;m{~ (Circulaire de la Societe franco­japonaise des etudes orientales), 14,15 (1992), pp. 26-27.

1993

46. "Again on the Subject of the Mingtang of the Empress Wu." Studies in Central and East Asian Religions, 5/6 (1992-93), pp. 144-154.

24 ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)

47. Entries "An Shigao (fl. 148-170 circa)," "Bodhidharma (?-532?)," "Bud­dha (566-486)," "Buddhismo," "Buddhismo cinese," "Buddhismo giap­ponese," "Fazang (643-712)," "Nalanda," "Xuanzang (602?-664)," "Zen." In Dizionario di storia e storiograjia, Edizioni .scolastiche Bruno Mondadori, Milano 1993.

48. "A New Study on Manichaeism in Central Asia." Orientalistische Litera­tur Zeitung 88.2 (Miirz/April1993), Nr. 1089, col. 117-124.

Review article of Moriyasu Takao ~R~X, Uiguru manikyo-shi no kenkya ':7-1 ~')v=y::=.~st:O)1iJf'tE (A Study on the History of Uighur Manichaeism: Research on Some Manichaean Materials and their Historical Background), Osaka daigaku Bungaku-bu kiyo *~1Z**:)(*lf~*2.~ (Memoirs of the Fa­culty of Letters Osaka University), Vols. XXXI and XXXII, August, 1991. iii + 2 + 248 pages, 34 plates (of which the first 22 in colour), 23 figures, two maps.

49. The Journal of Asian Studies, 52,1 (February 1993), pp. 107-'-108 (a com­munication to the editor concerning the book Mingtang and Buddhist Uto­pias in the History of the Astronomical Clock. The Tower, Statue and Armil­lary Sphere Constructed by Empress Wu).

1994

50. "An Ancient Chinese Monastery Excavated in Kirgiziya." Central Asi­atic Journal, 38.1 (1994), pp. 41-57.

51. "Daishi*~ffi" (The Title of Grand Master in China and Japan). In Hobogirin ¥~~~*. Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et Japonaises, VII (1994), 1019-1034.

52. "Marginalia on the First International Symposium on Longmen Studies." !$tudies in Central and East Asian Religions, 7 (1994), pp. 71-82.

53. "A Symposium on Longmen Studies, Luoyang, 1993." East and West, 44.2-4 (December 1994), pp. 507-516.

1995

54. "Shichi hachi seiki ni okeru Chugoku no kanji" 7· 8i1!:{f,2.\;:;jOft0"POOO) 'g~ ("Chinese State Monasteries in the Seventh and Eighth Centuries"), Ko­dai bunka tl1-1(;:)(11::: (Cultura Antiqua), 47.7 (July 1995), pp. 380-390 (Eng­lish summary, pp. 423-424). (A partial version in Japanese of no. 40.)

55. "Nanatsu-dera z6 Daijo Bishamon kudoku kyo 'ZenshO-bon' dai ni (hon­koku)" -t;~~*~"H'Ef:J>r~:J}Jl~*&~:i".J'p~= (wtU) (,The Sujata Chapter,' Second juan of the Satra of the Merits of Vai§rava~a of the Great Vehicle

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 25

in the Nanatsu-dera [reproduced]). Setsuwa bungaku kenkya lm~Jt¥:1iJf~ (Studies on Legendary Literature), 30 (1995), pp. 121-131. In collaboration with Toshinori. Ochiai and Silvio Vita.

56. Foreword to Inventaire sommaire des manuscrits et imp rimes ehinois de la Bibliotheque Vatieane. A posthumous work by Paul Peliiot, edited by Taka­ta Tokio, Italian School of East Asian Studies, Kyoto 1995, pp. VII-IX.

1996

57. Foreword to Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-j'ou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. vii-xii.

58. Avant-propos to Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. xiii-xix.

59. "The Edict of 638 Allowing the Diffusion of Christianity in China." In Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supple­ments by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 349-373.

60. "On the So-called Abraham from Persia. A Case of Mistaken Identity." In Paul Pelliot, L'inseription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supple­ments by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College deFrance, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 375-428.

61. "The Chongfu-si *tgj~ in Chang'an. A Neglected Buddhist Monastery and Nestorianism." In Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supplemerits by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 429-472.

62. "A Literary Model for Adam. The Dhfita Monastery Inscription." In Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si-ngan-jou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 473-487.

63. "Additional Remarks" to Paul Pelliot, L'inscription nestorienne de Si­ngan-j'ou, edited with supplements by Antonino Forte, Italian School of East Asian Studies (Epigraphical Series 2) and College de France, Kyoto and Paris 1996, pp. 489-495.

26 ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)

64. "Kuwabara's misleading thesis on Bukhara and the family name An "ii." Journal of the American Oriental Society, 116.4 (1996), pp: 645-652.

65. "On the Identity of Aluohan (616-710), a Persian Aristocrat at the Chi­nese Court." In La Persia e l'Asia Centrale. Da Alessandro al X secolo, Ac­cademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1996, pp. 187-197.

66. "The Origins and Role of the Great Fengxian Monastery **)'[;~ at Longmen." Annali dell'Istituto Orientale di Napoli, 56.3 (1996), pp. 365-387.

1997

67. "Longmen Da Fengxian si de qiyuan ji diwei" ll~~~**)'[;~~~!8lrl*bU!h ill ("On the Beginning and Status of Big Fengxian Temple at the Longmen Grotto"), Zhongyuan wenwu rpJJl'i:JtIfto (Cultural Relics of Central China), 1997.2, pp. 83-92. (A Chinese translation [unchecked by the author] of a preliminary version of no. 66. Published under the author's Chinese name Fu Andun tji"ii~.)

68. "Fazang's Letter to Uisang. Critical Edition and Annotated Translation." In Kegongaku ronshu ¥M1'¥~illi;l, (Collected Essays on Avatal1lsaka Stud­ies), edited by the Kamata Shigeo hakushi koki kinenkai ~B3Dt$w±tIfffi~c ~:ii;, Daizo shupp an *~tI:lJjR, Tokyo 1997, pp.109-129.

1998

67. "Some Considerations on the Historical Value of the Great Zhou Cata­logue." In Chiigoku Nihon kyoten shOsho mokuroku rpOO· S**,llJ!t:¥iE1rE~~ (Catalogues of Scriptures and their Commentaries in China and Japan), 6th volume of the Nanatsudera koitsu kyoten kenkyii sosho -t;~6J~M,llJ!t.JiJf~ • • (The Long Hidden Scriptures of Nanatsu-dera, Research Series), edited by Makita Tairyo t:Sz:B3~*7TI and Ochiai Toshinori 74=it{~J!t, Daito shuppansha *J![tI:lJjR1lf, Tokyo 1998, pp. 21-34 of the German and English part of the book.

68. "Da Shu kantei shukyo mokuroku juichi" *Jj!fJfIjJEjfl.tt,ll~~+- (The Eleven Fascicle of the Da Zhou kanding mulu). In Chugoku Nihon kyoten shOsho mokuroku rpOO· S**,llJ!t:¥iE1rE~~(Catalogues of Scriptures and their Commentaries in China and Japan), 6th volume of the Nanatsudera koitsu kyoten kenkyu sosho -t;~6ili,*,llJ!t.JiJf~ •• (The Long Hidden Scrip­tures of Nanatsu-dera, Research Series), edited by Makita Tairyo t:Sz:B3~7TI and Ochiai Toshinori 74=it{~J!t, Daito shuppansha **tI:lJjR1lf, Tokyo 1998, pp.3-58.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 27

69. "The Maitreyist Hl1aiyi (d. 695) and Taoism." Tang yanjiu J1If1iJf~ (Jour­nal o/Tang Studies), IV (1998), pp. 15-29.

70. "Wu Zhao de mingtang yu tianwenzhong"Jit~~"J~¥:~J(::Jc~ (The Mingtang of Wu Zhao and the Astronomical Clock). In Wu Zetian yanjiu lunwenji Jit5VJJ(1iJf~~illl::Jc~ (Collected Research Papers on Wu Zetian), ed­ited by Zhao Wenrun m::Jc¥~and Li Yuming *.:E~, Shanxi guji chubanshe l.lfii!f~r.fI±lJljt±, Taiyuan 1998, pp. 140-147. (A Chinese translation [un­checked by the author] of the concluding part (pp. 253-260) of Mintang and Buddhist Utopias in the History o/the Astronomical Clock (see Books, no. 3). Published under the author's Chinese name Fu Andun @;~t5c.)

71. Review: Silvio A. Bedini, The trail 0/ time. Time measurement with in­cense in East Asia. Shih-chien ti tsu-chi, Cambridge University Press, Cam­bridge, 1994. xvii + 342 pp. Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences, vol. 48 no. 140 (1998), pp. 225-226.

1999

72. "The Sabao iiiJf Question." The Silk Roads Nara International Sympo­sium '97. Vol. 4: The Silk Road of Sanzo-Hoshi· Xuanzhuang: The Climate and His Foot-Steps. Research Center for Silk Roadology, Nara, March 1999, pp.80-106.

73. "Sappo mondai" iiiJfF,,~~ (The Sabao Question). Shirukurodo Nara kokusai shinpojiumu kirokushu Vol. 4: Sanzo hoshi Genjo no Shirukurodo: Fudo to ashiato ~)v::7 p- F~ROO~~/*,:;.::LA~c~~Vol. 4: r=~¥t:;~ijJ Y:*O)~)v::7 p- F:J!\±~JEJYJl;J(The Silk Roads Nara International Sympo­sium Vol. 4: The Silk Road of Trepitaka Master of the Law Xuanzang: Natu­ral Features and [Xuanzang's] Footsteps). Shirukurodogaku kenkyu sentli ~ )v::7 p- F'¥1iJf~t/~- (Research Center for Silk Roadology), Nara 1999, pp. 102-124. (Japanese version of no. 72.)

74. "Francesco Carletti sulla schiavitu e l'oppressione." Strumenti critici XVI.2 (maggio 1999), pp. 1-21. (Italian revised version of the article "Fran­cesco Carletti on Slavery and Oppression" published in 1990).

75. "The Maitreyist Huaiyi (d. 695) and Taoism. Additions and Corrections." Tang yanjiu J1If1iJf~ (Journal o/Tang Studies), V (1999), pp. 35-38. (A Chi­nese summary of no. 69, as augmented and emended in no. 75, is on pp. 38-40 of the same journal: "Milejiao zhe Huaiyi [695 nian zu] yu daojiao [tiyao]" ~1IiJJ~*'t~~[695±F$]~J1t~[~~]).

76. "The Clock and the Perfect Society." Kyoto Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 28-31.

28 ANTONINO FORTE (1940--'2006)

2000

77. "Iranians in China. Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Bureaus of Com­merce." Cahiers d'Extreme~Asie, 11 (1999-2000), pp. 277-290. (English ver­sion of no. 78.)

78. "Iraniens en Chine. Bouddhisme, mazdeisme, bureaux de commerce." In La Serinde, terre d'echanges. Art, religion, commerce, du Ier au Xe siecle. Actes du colloque international Galeries nationales du Grand Palais 13-14-15 fevrier 1996, edited by Jean-Pierre Drege, La Documentation fran<;:aise, Paris 2000, pp. 181-190.

79. ''Additions and Corrections to A Jewel in Indra's Net." Cahiers d'Extreme­Asie, 11 (1999-2000), pp. 345-348.

2001

80. "The Five Kings of India and the King of Kucha who According to the Chinese Sources Went to Luoyang in 692." In Le parole e i marmi. Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70° compleanno, edited by Raffaele Torella, Serie Orientale Roma XCII, Istituo Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, Roma 2001, pp. 261-283.

81. "Fazang e Sakyamitra (fl. 664-670), un medico singalese del settirno secolo alIa corte cinese." In Filosofia, storiografia, letteratura. Studi in onore di Mario Agrimi, edited by Bernardo Razzotti, Editrice Itinerari, Lanciano, 2001, pp. 925-962. (Italian version of no. 82.)

2002

82. "Fazang and Sakyamitra, a Seventh-century Singhalese Alchemist at the Chinese Court." In Zhong shiji yiqian de diyu wenhua, zongjiao yu yishu FPijU2.bl.Mt¥-J:It!!~)t{t, *~~~* (Regional Culture, Religion, and Arts before the Seventh Century). Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Disanjie guoji hanxue huiyi lunwenji, lishi zul=j:l:9<!:1iJf~~Jtm-=-,ijjOO~~~itaiii1li)t~~5t:*.ll (Pa­pers from the Third International Conference on Sino logy, History Section), edited by I-tien Hsing (Xing Yitian) *~~Il3, Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo q:r:9<!:1iJf~~Jt~5t: ~ lffi-1iJf~m (Institute of History and Phi­lology, Academia Sinica), Taipei 2002, pp. 369-419.

83. "The South Indian Monk Bodhiruci (d. 727). Biographical Evidence." In A Life Journey to the East. Sinological Studies in Memory of Giuliano Ber­tuccioli (1923-2001), edited by Antonino Forte and Federico Masini, Scuola Itahana di Studi sull'Asia Orientale (Essays 2), Kyoto 2002, pp. 77-116.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 29

84. "The Chinese Title of the Manichaean Treatise from Dunhuang." An­nali dell'Universita degli studi di Napoli "L'Orientale", 62.1-4 (2002), pp. 229-243. (English modified version of no. 87.)

2003

85. "Daisojo ::k{)!fj]E" (Grand Rector of the Sa:rp.gha). Hobi5girin ;I:t;;.~*. Dictionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et Japonaises, VIII (2003), pp. 1043-1070.

86. "Daitoku ::k1ffJJ" (The Title of Great-Virtue). Hobi5girin ;I:t;;.~*. Dic­tionnaire encyclopedique du Bouddhisme d'apres les sources chinoises et Japonaises, VIII (2003), pp. 1071-1085.

87. "II titolo cinese del Traite manicheen." In Turcica et Islamica. Studi in memoria di Aldo Gallotta (Series Minor 64), edited by Ugo Marazzi, Univer­sita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale," Napoli, vol. I, pp. 215-243.

88. "Suowei Bosi 'Yabolahan.' Yili cuowu de biding." pJT~i!l'~m£![{sill.~ --{fu~li\t.~fr:JJt;JE ("On the So-called Abraham from Persia. A Case of Mis­taken Identity"). In Tangdai jingjiao zai yanjiu .Il!f{-t:Jll:W:¥i=1iJf~ (New Re­flections on Nestorianism of the Tang Dynasty), edited by Lin Wushu *'i'~ :7,*, Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe r:p OOt±~;f.4¥:tf:!Jt&t± (China Academy of Science Press), Beijing 2003, pp. 231-267. (An abridged Chinese transla­tion [unchecked by the author] by Huang Lanlan ~MM of no. 60, published under the author's Chinese name Fu Andun ~*tJc.)

89. "La Scuola di Studi sull'Asia Orientale di Kyoto. Note sparse." In Italia­Giappone 450 anni, edited by Adolfo Tamburello, Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, Roma, and Universita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale," Napoli 2003,pp.712-723.

90. "On the Origin of the Purple Ka~aya in China." In Buddhist Asia 1. Papers from the First Conference of Buddhist Studies Held in Naples in May 2001, edited by Giovanni Verardi and Silvio Vita, Italian School of East Asian Studies, Kyoto 2003, pp. 145-166.

91. "L'intervista a Buddhapalita nel 677 0 all'inizio del 678." In Studi in on­ore di Umberto Scerrato per il suo settantacinquesimo compleanno, edited by Maria Vittoria Fontana and Bruno Genito, Universita degli studi di Napoli "L'Orientale" and Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, Napoli 2003, pp. 369-384.

92. Review: Maurizio Scarpari, Ancient China: Chinese Civilization from ist Origins to the Tang Dynasty. Barnes and Noble Books, 2000. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 123.4 (2003), pp. 851-860.

30 ANTONINO FORTE (1940-2006)

2004

93. "Remarks on Chinese Sources on Diva:kara (613-688)." In Chugoku shukyo bunken kenkyu kokusai shinpojiumu hokokusho cpOO*~xi¥iK!iJt~OO ~*y/'t;Y'./ .6.¥~~~ (Report of the International Symposium: Researches on Religions in Chinese Script), Kyoto daigaku Jinbun kagaku kerikyiijo * '?l'G*'!f':Axf4'!f':~Jt~PJT (Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto Univer­sity), Kyoto, December 2004, pp. 75-82.

2005

94. "Cenni storici e re1azioni estere, religioni straniere, scienze." In Tang. Arte e cultura in Cina prima dell'anno Mille, edited by Lucia Caterina and Giovanni Verardi, Electa, Napoli 2005, pp. 25-37.

95. "II monaco indiano Bodhiruci (m. in Cina nel 727). Note biografiche." In Studi in onore di Luigi Po lese Remaggi, edited by Giorgio Amitrano, Lucia Caterina, Giuseppe De Marco, Universita degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale" (Series Minor LXIX), Napoli 2005, pp. 199-242.

2006

96. "Buddhismus und Politik - Die Kaiserin Wu Zetian und der Famen-Tem­pel." In Xi'an. Kaiserliche Macht im Jenseits. Grabfunde und Tempelschiitze aus Chinas alter Hauptstadt (Catalogue of the exhibition held at the Kunst­und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Bonn, April 21 - July 23, 2006), Philipp von Zabern, Mainz 2006,pp. 109-119.

97. "Brief Notes on the Kashmiri Text of the Dhiirm;! Sutra of AvalokiteSvara of the Unfailing Rope Introduced to China by Manicintana (d. 721)." In Tang­dai fojiao yu fojiao yishu ~{-t{~~c~·{~W:fi1*J (Tang Buddhism and Bud­dhist Art) edited by Kathy Cheng-mei Ku (Gu Zhengmei) tlJE~t Chuefeng fojiao yishu jijinhui jl{~W:fi1*J£3%:i" (Chuefeng Buddhist Art and Culture Foundation), Taiwan 2006, pp. 13-28. (A revised version of no. 18.)

2007

98. "Jibakara ni kan suru kango shiryo" ±1H~§iiJ~llH;::'7pJvTQ¥~ffi5t:f-+ (Re­marks on Chinese Sources on Diva:kara). In Chugoku shukyo bunken kenkyu cpOO*W:Jti¥ik1iJf~ (Researches on Religions in Chinese Script), edited by Kyoto daigaku Jinbun kagaku kenkyiijo Jii:~*¥AJtf-l-¥1iJf3'Effl (Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University), Rinsen shoten I:lii;) 11:J:J;5, Kyoto 2007, pp. 109-117.

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 31

Listed as "forthcoming articles" in 2006

i. Entries "Daiunky5 :k~*,Jf," "Daiunji :k~~," and "An Seik5 ~t!t~," in Chilgoku bunkashi daijiten r:pOOJt1t:.se:kI'i"fA (provisional title), to be pub­lished by Taishukan, Tokyo.

2. "The So-called Buddhapalita Chinese Version of the Buddho~lJi~a vi­jaya dhiiralJfsiltra and its preface." In Kuo Liying (ed.), volume in honour of Makita Tairy5.

3. "Scrittura e ideologia in Cina. Note sui caratteri particolari del periodo 689-705." A paper presented at the .conference "II testo, il supporto e la fun­zione." Cortona and Viterbo, 13-15 Novembre 2003.

4. "On the Origins of the Great Fuxian Monastery :k*i)t~ in Luoyang."

Rome, July 24, 2009

THE FORMULATION OF INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND

THE WRITING OF EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM1

TAOJIN

As a guide to the interpretation of sutras, introductions in Chinese Buddhist commentaries almost always present a wide range of top­ics that allow commentators to survey the texts they comment upon from various different perspectives. The formulation of these intro­ductory topics varies with commentators and, in many cases, also with commentaries of the same commentator. While, for example, Zhiyi (538-597) adheres steadfastly to his famous model of "five aspects of profound meaning" (wuchong xuanyi), regarding the "title" (ming) of the work, the "essence" (ti), "central tenet" (zong) and "function" (yang) of the religious truth taught in it, and the "characteristics" (xiang) that set one sutra apart from another on the basis of these four aspects,2 his slightly younger contemporary

1 This paper is adapted from a chapter of my 2008 dissertation, "Through the Lens of Interpreters: the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana in Its Classi­cal Re-presentations;" an earlier version of this chapter was presented in the 2005 Annual Meeting of American Academy of Religion. I want to thank the anonymous reviewer of the JIABS for his or her careful and insightful com­ments and suggestions.

2 For a discussion of the structural relationship of these "five aspects," see below, section three: Elaboration of teaching: from essence to its manifesta­tions. The topic of "characteristics" is designed to differentiate a particular sutra from others, or to determine its position in a tradition by comparing its "characteristics" with those of others. A commentary of the Sutra of the benevolent kings (Renwanghuguoboruojing shu) thus spells out this sense of "differentiation" as follows: '''Teaching' (jiao) refers to the words with which sages edify the people, and 'characteristics' differentiate similarities from differences (in various such teachings)" (T33n1705p255b9). It is perhaps for this sense of "differentiation" that the topic of "characteristics" is often used

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30· Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 33-79

34 TAOJIN

Jizang (549-623) appears to be much less focused and organized in his exegetical attention - indeed, he has never really settled on any set of introductory topics, sometimes even allowing the list of his inquiries to be rampantly open,3 and occasionally also find­ing it convenient to borrow Zhiyi's "five aspects.'>! Such examples abound in Chinese Buddhist commentaries and, together, they am­ply demonstrate the variation in the formulation of introductory topics in the writing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism.

This variation draws our attention to the breadth and depth of commentators' introductory surveys, for it asks us to think about what questions different commentators raise in their introductions, and how they in their respective ways understand, organize and present these questions - with the former reflecting the breadth of a survey and the latter, the depth. Put in other words, such a variation directs our attention, not to what is said in commentaries, but to how it is said, or, using the words of this article, not to the content of exegesis, but to the writing of exegesis.

This attention to the writing of exegesis is, apparently, not something new. In his magnum opus on the history of Chinese Buddhism, Tang Yongtong touches upon the issues of origination and methods of the Chinese Buddhist exegesis;5 Mou Runsun ex­plores the relationship between siitra lectures and commentaries in his 1959 comparative study of the Confucian and Buddhist exege­,~is from, particularly, the perspective of rituals performed during

to discuss the practice of doctrinal classification (panjiao).

3 For example, he has ten topics in Milejing youyi (T38n1771), and these ten still do not seem to have exhausted all that he wants to ask about that sutra, because his tenth topic "clarification of miscellaneous issues" (zaliaojian) is made, apparently, to include more or "miscellaneous issues."

4 See, for example, the introduction of his Renwangboruojing shu, T33n1707.

5 Tang, Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi, pp. 114-20 & 546-52.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 35

those lectures;6 OchO Enichi's 1979. "Shakuky6shik6" presents a comprehensive inquiry into the evolution of the Chinese Buddhist exegesis;7 the conference on and the subsequent publication of Bud­dhist Hermenutics in 1988 look at the "principles for the retrieval of meaning," an indispensable element in the interpretation of sutras;8 and, in his 1999 study of Chinese prajiiii interpretation, Alexander Mayer assigns three levels of significance to Buddhist interpreta­tion, namely, exposition, exegesis, and hermeneutics.9 This list has been continuously growing in recent decades.lO

While scholars have approached the writing of exegesis from all these various perspectives, the formulation of introductory topics has remained largely an unexplored subject. This subject entails such questions as: What questions are generally asked to introduce a sutra? How are these questions related to each other or, in other words, how do commentators categorize their inquiries in different ways? And, more importantly, how do the asking and re-asking of these questions expand and deepen the exegetical inquiry into sutras and, in that sense, contribute to the development in the writ­ing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism? This article thus aims to ad­dress these previously unanswered questions by focusing its atten­tion on the formulation of introductory topics in Chinese Buddhist commentaries.

6 Mou, "Lun rushi liangjia zhijiangjing yu yishu," pp. 353-415.

7 OchO, "Shakukyoshiko," pp. 165-206.

8 Lopez, ed., Buddhist Hermeneutics, p. 1.

9 Mayer, "The Vajracchedika-sutra and the Chinese Prajfiil Interpreta­tion."

10 Continuously broadened and deepened in recent years, the scholarly at­tention to the writing of exegesis has been mostly focused on a number of ma­jor topics, such as the practice of "matching of meaning" (geyi) in the initial stage of Buddhism's introduction into China, satra lectures, sutra transla­tion, relationship among Confucian, Daoist and Buddhist exegesis, and re­lationship between Buddhist exegesis and popular literature, and between Buddhist exegesis and literary theory.

36 TAOJIN

While it is difficult to give a conclusive list of all introductory topics actually used in Chinese Buddhist· commentaries, several themes in the introductory inquiries appear to be more recurrent than others. Even it is difficult to reproduce the exact course in which these themes evolved, such a course can be seen roughly as characterized by a movement of commentators' attention from brief thematic discussions, which rely heavily on the explanation of title, to elaborations of the introductory survey from v~rious per­spectives. Hence the following list of seven themes, on the basis of which the formulation of introductory topics is to be treated below in seven sections:ll

1. title 2. introductory summary 3. elaboration of teaching 4. arising of teaching 5. central tenet 6. medium of truth 7. classification of teachings

The first two revolve around title and its role in the writing of an introduction, and the remaining five elaborate upon the process of introductory survey, with the third as a general discussion and the last four as discussions of a few specific themes frequently exam­ined in that elaboration. As a general pattern of discussion, each of the seven sections is engaged primarily with two tasks, i.e., a

,:general overview of a particular theme and a look at the introduc-

II Well-known as they may be, these seven themes have apparently not exhausted all questions commentators have asked of their siitras. They also look, for example, at the audience of teaching, among many others, and this theme gives rise to such introductory topics as Jizang's "number of people at­tending (Buddha'S) assembly (of Dharma)" (huiren duoshao, T38nl771) and "believers and followers" (tuzhong, T35n1731 and T38n1780), Won'chuk's "sentient beings (for whom) the teaching is intended" (suowei youqing, T33n1708), Wonhyo's "categorization of people" (juren fenbie, T37n1747), Kuiji's "clarification of the time (in which) and the faculties (for which) the teaching (is given)" (bianjiao shiji, T43n1830), and many of Fazang's "facul­ties (for which) the teaching is intended" (jiaosuo beiji).

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 37

tory topics formulated on that basis, though not necessarily always distinctly in such an order.

1. Explanation of work title

To most Chinese Buddhist exegetes, explanation of title is perhaps the most natural and most logical first step in the writing of intro­duction. Located in the beginning of a text, title is naturally the first thing that catches a commentator's attention, and, perceived as embodying the central tenet of a sutra,12 it is treated, logically, as the most ideal platform for a thematic survey of that sutra. It is probably for this reason that the Chinese Buddhist exegetes always start their exegesis with an effort to kai-ti, or to "layout the subject matter (through the explanation of title),"13 and it is for this same reason that almost all commentaries contain a section on title and, in many cases, such a section begins a commentary. In fact, the

12 For example, in his Wuliangshoujing yishu, Huiyuan lists ten types of title, five of which, i.e., 1", 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th, are represented as embody­ing central tenet, either completely or partially (T37n1745p91b16~b23). Even when it does not fall into one of these five categories, commentators still tend to use title to discuss central tenet in their introductions. For an example see Wonhyo's "main ideas" (dayi) (T38nl773p299bl~b29) in his Mileshangshengjing zongyao, where the "main ideas" of teaching are sum­marized through a discussion of the future Buddha Maitreya (i.e., "Mile" in Chinese), after whom the satra is named.

13 The word ti in kai-ti refers to "subject matter" instead of its more obvi­ous meaning of "title," although the word itself can be understood in both ways. Thus, to kai (i.e., open) ti is to "layout the subject matter." However, if we take a look at the content of kai-ti-xu, (i.e., introduction laying out the subject matter), such as those in Jizang (ex., T34nl722p633b12) and Kuiji (ex., T33n1695p26a19), it is quite clear that the laying out of ti as subject mat­ter relies heavily on the explanation of ti as title. In that sense, it would be not unreasonable to suggest that, in the context of Chinese Buddhist exegesis, when a commentator sets out to kai-ti, he thinks not only of the "subject mat­ter," but also of the "title" that embodies such a "subject matter."

38 TAOJIN

introductory sections in many early commentarie~ are devoted al­most entirely to the explanation of title.14

The interest in title is expressed in two different perceptions about its role in the writing of commentaries. On the one hand, believed to embody central tenet, title is sometimes treated as a means of exegesis, i.e., title is sometimes used to summarize and bring out the central tenet of a sutra as a way to begin a com­mentary.lS On the other hand, however, the increasing attention to title itself also allows it to be treated as an end of exegesis, i.e., an introductory topic in its own right, which can be examined for its various aspects, such as those philological, textual, biographical,16 typological and etc. A typological analysis of title by Huiyuan is given below as an illustration:

The title of a sutra (is formed) differently, and (its formation) contains many varieties. Some (are formed to) reflect the Dharma (ofthe sutra); some (are formed) from the perspective of the person (who teaches the Dharma); some, in accordance with the event (in which the Dharma is taught); some, to follow the metaphor (of the Dharma); some, to dwell upon the person and the Dharma; some, on (both) the Dharma and the metaphor; some, on (both) the event and the Dharma. Such examples are simply innumerableP

14 See, for example, the introductions in Dao'an's Renbenyushengjing zhu (T33n1693), Sengzhao's Zhu weimojiejing (T38nl775), and the ten commen­taries compiled in the Dapanniepanjing jijie (The Collected explanations of the NirvalJasatra, T37n1763; hereafter referred to as the "Collected explana­tions" for the sake of convenience).

15 This role will be discussed further in section two: Summary of teaching as pre-introduction.

16 Because the discussion of title sometimes includes a discussion of au­thor; see also the discussion of the close association between "intention," "author" and "title" (as well as the notes thereof) in section four: Accounting for the arising of teaching: intention, conditions and transmission.

17 T37n1764p613b15-b17.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 39

The interest in title finds its most sophisticated expression in Zhiyi's commentaries, where the two perceptions of its role fuse and the examination Of title becomes extremely complex. On the one hand, Zhiyi sometimes devotes an entire commentary to the expJ.anation of title, making title ostensibly the only task and therefore the end of his exegesis; but on the other hand, he subsumes various issues surrounding a sutra under the framework of the explanation of title, clearly treating title as a means to his exegesis. Take, for example, his multi-level discussion of the title Vimalakfrtinirddasutra:18

At the first level, he divides the title into Vimalakfrtinirdda and sutra:19

This explanation of title can be divided into two sections: Section one explains the specific name (i.e., Vimalakfrtinirdesa), and section two explains the general name (Le., satra).

By thus making the first section "specific," and the latter "general," the commentator presents and contrasts these two aspects of sig­nificance and, in doing so, links this specific work to a larger con­text of similar sutras. At the second level, the commentator further divides the "specific" name of Vimalakfrtinirdda into Vimalaklrti and nirdda:

This explanation of specific name can be divided into two sections: Section one explains Vimalaklrti, and section two explains nirde§a.20

In doing so, the commentator separates issues related to the person who speaks the Dharma and issues about the Dharma spoken by that person. At the third level, he specifies the issues related to the person, listing them as translation, practice, classification of teach­ings, and a basis-ramification (ben-ji) relationship, i.e.,

First, the explanation of Vimalaklrti is divided into four sections: 1. Translation of the name and explanation of its meanings; 2. Explana­tion (of the name from the perspective of) three contemplations; 3.

18 See his Weimojing xuanshu, T38nl777p524b05-554b18.

19 T38n1777p524b6.

20 T38n1777p524b18-b19.

40 TAOJIN

(Explanation of the name from the perspective of) the four-teaching classification; 4. (Explanation of the name from the perspective of) the basis and the ramifications of Vimalakirti. 21

Each of these four perspectives receives still further divisions, and such a bifurcation continues for several more levels, exploring is­sues related to the title in further and greater details, an act that reinforces the impression of the complexity and therefore maturity in the treatment of title.

The importance oftitle, however, diminishes in the eyes of com­mentators over the time, a situation characterized not only by the disappearance of the kind of exegesis devoted exclusively to the discussion of title after Zhiyi and his disciple Guanding, but also by a steady movement of the title section away from the beginning or the most prominent position in introduction and, consequently, its relegation to the status of a regular introductory topic. In works by Dao'an (312-385) and Sengzhao (384-414), and in the Collect­ed explanations (before or early 6th century),22 explanation of title alone constitutes introduction; in Zhiyi (538-597), title is always the first of his "five aspects of profound meaning;" in Jizang (549-623), title is not always in the first place; in Zhiyan (602-668), title is the fourth in the list; in Wonhyo (617-?), title is either third or fourth; in Fazang (643-712), title is generally always in the seventh place. These examples are by no means comprehensive and such a trait of change must not necessarily be representative, but the diminishing of exegetical attention to title is simply unmistakable, a situation that indicates a general tendency to look beyond title for more specified inquiries into siitras.

The introductory topics derived from the theme of title are gen­erally formulated on the basis of two words, namely, ti (title) and

21 T38n1777p524b24-b26.

22 While serious doubts have been raised about the attribution of the Col­lected explanations to Baoliang, the time placement of the work has not been questioned. See, for example, Och6, pp. 182-186, for a discussion of its au­thorship.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CIllNESE BUDDIDSM 41

ming (name), with the latter genera,1ly referring only to the key words of a title, rather than its entirety.23 Chief among all title­related introductory topics are shi-ti, shi-ti-mu, shi-ming, shi-ming­ti, shi-ti-ming and their derivatives, and all can be tran~lated as "explanation of title."

2. Summary of teaching as pre-introduction

With the development in the writing of exegesis, introductions to commentaries gradually attain a relative independence from the in­terlinear textual expositions (suiwen jieshi), and this independence culminates in the appearance of such exegetical works as Zhiyi's "profound meaning" (xuanyi) and "profound commentary" (xuan­shu), Jizang's "wandering thoughts" (youyi) and "profound trea­tise" (xuanlun), Wonhyo's "doctrinal essentials" (zongyao),24 etc.

23 See the "Explanation of title" (shiming) section in the Collected expla­nations in T37nI763p380b2-b29, where the compiler put together only the explanations of nirvli1J,a, the key word in the title Mahaparinirva1}-asatra.

24 This type of exegetical works, though generally treated as an indepen­dent commentary (see OcM's discussion of the gendan jidai, pp, 193-200), is by nature and origin only a very special type of introduction in commen­tary.

In the sense that the size of such a work is disproportionately bigger than is commonly expected of a regular introduction and that it usually appears as an independent work, it is treated as a commentary in its own right, as is evidenced by its inclusion in Ui'chon's Sinp'yon chejong kyojang ch'ongnok (T55n2184), a catalogue of Buddhist commentaries,

However, such a work is first and foremost an introduction by nature, for, like other introductions, it approaches a sutra by presenting a set of general and mostly thematic questions without getting into detailed interlinear textual ex­position. In explaining the function of his "profound meaning," Zhiyi is very clear about such a feature: "The teaching in this sutra is deep and far-reach­ing, and the purport of its words is unfathomably abstruse. If (we) explain (the sutra), relying only on its writing (i.e., its words and sentences, and therefore its interlinear textual exposition), (what is clarified) is only its individual is­sues, while its Ultimate tenet can never be brought out clearly. (What we are obliged to do, however) is also to briefly reflect upon (its) abstruse and subtle

42 TAOJIN

(meanings) in order to uncover its central tenet of the 'inconceivable' (truth). (For this reason, we) present, here, the five aspects of profound meaning before the text (i.e., the interlinear textual exposition)" (T38n1777p519a6-a9). That is, a "profound meaning" is an introduction to the interlinear tex­tual exposition, which he sees as the main text of a commentary. In fact, when Zhiyi (or Guanding, as the editor of Zhiyi's lectures) introduces his completely interlinear textual exposition of the Sqddharmapur:uf.arfkasutra, namely, the Words and sentences of the Saddharmapu1Jq.arfkasutra (Miao­falianhuajing wenju, T34nl718), he indicates that a Profound meaning afthe Saddharmapu1Jq.arfkasutra (Miaofalianhuajing xuanyi, T33nl716) precedes and thus prepares for this Words and sentences, saying: "A careful and com­prehensive explanation of the subject matter of the sutra has been made in a prior (work)" (T34nl718plb23). This "prior (work)" is his Profound meaning. Put in other words, the thematic survey of the Profound meaning is by nature and origin the introduction to the interlinear textual exposition of the Words and sentences.

Jizang's "wandering thoughts" and "profound treatise" and Wonhyo's "doc­trinal essentials" are apparently alternate forms of Zhiyi's Profound mean­ing. The concluding sentence in Wonhyo's "doctrinal essentials" on the Mahiiprajfitiptiramittisutra (Dahuidujing zongyao) is more telling about the nature of such a work: "The fifth subject, the classification of teachings, hav­ing been thus discussed, the sixth subject, the interlinear exposition of text is to explain the sutra in an extensive manner. Here ends the Doctrinal es­sentials on the Mahiiprajfitiptiramittisutra" (T33n1697p74a2-a4). The first five subjects introduce and prepare for the sixth subject, i.e., the interlinear textual exposition, which Wonhyo chooses not to include in the Doctrinal

,:,essentials. The very fact, however, that he attaches the name of the sixth sub­ject to the Doctrinal essentials suggests that Wonhyo sees a regular and full commentary as composed of both a "doctrinal essentials" and an interlinear textual exposition and, in that sense, he sees the Doctrinal essentials as the introduction to the latter.

Such a perception underlies the "wandering thoughts" and "profound trea­tise," too, although no specific remarks to that effect have been found. In fact, the standard ten-section format in Fazang's commentaries, which includes nine introductory sections and a section for interlinear textual exposition as the tenth, incorporates both a general introductory overview and an interlin­ear textual exposition in one work, a practice apparently derived from this same perception - it is only that Fazang's introductory section is so much reduced in size, in comparison with those of Zhiyi, Jizang and Wonhyo and

1NTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 43

For that reason, it is quite natural that an introduction should de­'Velop its own introduction, which, for the lack of better words and also for the purpose of distinction, is provisionally called in this paper a "pre-introduction." Like an introduction, a pre-introduction also gives a thematic survey of sutra, although only on the scale of a miniature,25 and, in that sense, it is at once a summary of teaching and an introduction.

While there are different ways in the writing of a pre-introduc­tion, it generally settles on a two-part format. The first part sum­marizes the central tenet, sometimes represented by the key words of title, such as nirviilJ-a, "inconceivable" (busiyi, or bukesiyi), and prajfiii in the titles NirviilJ-asutra, Vimalaklrtinirdeiasutra26 and the titles of prajfiii sutras, respectively; the second part takes a brief excursion into the entire title, both as a conclusion to that summary and as an introduction to the main body of the introductory sec­tion. An example of such a format is given below in an abridged pre-introduction:

1. The Dao (of the sutra) is abstruse, subtle, deep, far-reaching and unfathomable ... For this reason, the laying out of the satra's central tenet in the beginning abides in the Dharma of non-abiding, and the elucidation of its purport in the end is attained through (the notion of) non-attainment ...

2. (The title) Mahaprajiitiptiramittisutra .. , the term mahti means ... ; the term prajiiti means ... ; the term ptiramitti means ... ; the term sutra means ... 27

with his own interlinear textual exposition, that the two can be placed side by side in a perfect proportional relationship in the same commentary.

25 The full thematic survey of sutra in introduction is discussed in section five: Explanation of central tenet: zong, zong-qu, and other zong-related top­ics.

26 Another of its Chinese name is Bukesiyi-jietuo jing (The Sutra of incon­ceivable liberation), hence the key phrase bukesiyi or, simply, busiyi (incon­ceivable).

27 Jizang, Dapinjing youyi, T33n1696p63a27-b9.

44 TAOJIN

It opens with a brief thematic survey through the explanation of prajfia, the key words in the title Mahaprajfiaparamitasutra. The term prajfia itself is not mentioned, but is identified as the "Dao" and assigned the attributes of "non-abiding" and "non-attainment." The pre-introduction then concludes with a brief explanation of the title in its separate components, i.e., maha, prajfia, paramita and sutra.

The earliest instance of such a format can be found in Sengzhao's introduction to his commentary on the Vimalakfrtinirdeiasutra.28

After Sengzhao, especially after Zhiyi and Jizang, such a format seem to have become and remained a general, although not neces­sarily universal, standard for the writing of pre-introduction.

Most pre-introductions are untitled. Occasionally, however, a rubric is assigned surrounding the word xu (introduction), such as the aforementioned kai-ti-xu (introduction laying out subject mat­ter) in Jizang,29 and xu-wang (literally, "introduction king," i.e., in­troduction that captures the essence of teaching) in Jizang30 and Guanding (561-632).31 As discussed earlier, to kai-ti is to layout subject matter (ti) through the explanation of title (ti). A xuwang performs the same task. As Guanding explains:

A xuwang expounds the abstruse intentionion, which explains the heart of a text, which does not lie beyond the ramifications (ji) and

28 See his Zhu Weimojiejing in T38nl775p327a14-p328a9, where he dis­cusses "inconceivable" (busiyi) in the first part and the entire title in the second part. This introduction is not as concise as later introductions of the same format and contains, between the two parts, a discussion of issues re­lated to the translation of the slUra, but the two-part format itself is quite clear.

29 See his Fahua youyi at T34nl722p633b09.

30 See his Guanwuliangshoujing yishu at T37n1752p233c13.

31 See his introduction to his transcription of Zhiyi's lecture on the Sad­dharmapUlJlJarfkasatra at T33nl716p681a25 and T33n1716p681b25.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 45

the basis (ben). A look at this purport (represented by the xuwang thus allows) all meanings to fall orderly into place.32

A pre-introduction occasionally also appears under the name of dayi (main idea).33 Fayun (467-529) assigns such a rubric, ret­rospectively, to the pre-introduction in his commentary to the Saddharmapwujarfkasutra,34 but Wonhyo uses the term most reg­ularly - all his commentaries collected in the Taish6, except for the revised version of his Qixinlun commentary, begin with a dayi.

3. Elaboration of teaching: from its essence to its manifesta­tions

Generally speaking, the development in the writing of introduc­tion is accompanied by the elaboration of teaching from a general interest in central tenet to increasingly more specific discussions of various issues that are either based on, derived from, or related to central tenet Analogically, the process of such an exegetical elabo­ration, from the general to the specific, can be described with the terms of a philosophical one that "elaborates" the absolute into the phenomenal, or "essence" (ti) into its "manifestations" (de).35

32 T33nl716p681b19-b20.

33 Dayi was also used for other, but related, purposes, such as the discussion of subject matter (see Jizang, Niepanjing youyi between T38n1768p230blO­p232b6) or the search for the intention of teaching (see Jizang, Fahua xuan­[un between T34nl720p365a25-p371c9).

34 See Fahuajing yiji at T33n1715p573a16.

35 See, for example, a formulation of the philosophical "elaboration" of "es­sence" into its "manifestations" in the Collected explanations, with nirvQ1}a as the "essence" and "dharma body, true wisdom and ultimate liberation" as its "manifestations": "Therefore, (the author) places it (i.e., nirvQ1}a) in the beginning of the sutra as (its) title, for it is (at once) the name of the es­sence (ti) and its manifestations (de). The name names the essence, and the essence naturally entails manifestations. The 'essence' is the root of sublime perfection and wondrous existence, and 'manifestations' refers to wisdom (prajfiii), liberation (nirvii1}a), etc. The 'manifestation' is multifarious, but

46 TAOJIN

Commentators usually do not agree on their choice of "manifesta­tions," or on the selection of perspectives for the elaboration of "es­sence." In his commentary to the Mahaprajfiiipiiramitasutra,36 for example, Jizang summarizes, before giving his own, two schemes of elaboration in the explanation of maha, a summary ilhistrating the diversity in the perception of "manifestations":

In the elucidation of this maha there are two schools. Recounting (the master of Zhuangyan Monastery),37 the Nirva1!asutra master of the Zhaoti Monastery says: Maha has ten meanings; (it means the "great­ness," i.e., maha, of) first, object; second, person; third, essence; fourth, function; fifth, cause; sixth, effect; seventh, guidance; eighth, benefit; ninth, cessation; and tenth, the removal of sins ... Drawing on (the master of) the Kaishan Monastery,38 Longguang observes: Maha has six meanings; (it means the "greatness" of) person, object, es­sence, function, cause and effect. Thefour remaining ones, i.e., "guid­ance," "removal of sins," etc, are included in the greatness of"func­tion" ... The application, here, (of these two schemes) includes (the meaning of) "greatness" in only essence and function. Why? Because (none of these) meanings lie beyond the frameworks of the middle and the provisional, and the ten meanings and six meanings explained by the two previous schools all belong to (the category of) "function."39

The second school narrows down the first school's ten aspects to its six by incorporating the latter's last four into its "function" (yong) aspect, and Jizang makes a much more drastic move to reduce all these aspects to only two, namely, the aspect of "function" when their distinctions are allowed "provisional" Uia) significance, and the aspect of the philosophical "essence" when these distinctions

the 'essence' is (marked by) oneness. (Put in other words,) names (ming, i.e., manifestations) may be various, but substance (shi, i.e., essence) remains in­variable." (T37n1763p379a17-a19)

36 Dapinjing youyi, T33n1696.

37 I.e., Sengmin.

38 I.e., Zhizang.

39 T33n1696p63b17-c13; italicization mine.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 47

are viewed as ultimately non-existent from the perspective of the "middle" (zhong). Put in other words, mahii is the "essence," and the ten, six and finally the two specific topics are its "manifesta­tions" - this example shows that the effort to elaborate teaching has been under constant negotiation among various commentators, who expand or narrow down the scope of topics in accordance with their respective understandings about the "essence" and, in doing so, create the diversity in the perception of "manifestations."

Despite this apparent diversity, commentators share a number of common focuses in their elaboration of teaching, such as the philosophical "essence," "characteristics," "function," "wisdom," "practice," and "teaching," and this elaboration of "essence" into its "manifestations" provides the basis for the formulation of in­troductory topics, for, when the "focuses" on these specific "mani­festations" grow with the development in the writing of exegesis, these "manifestations" tend to take on definitive forms and thus be­come independent topics themselves. In other words, the erstwhile "focuses" become separate topics in the elaborated introductory surveys, a tendency to be illustrated below with two examples.

The first example is the eight-topic introduction of the Collected explanations, where the elaboration of "essence" allows its various "manifestations" to take on the forms of such independent topics as the philosophical "essence," "root and being" (ben-you) and "cessa­tion of names." The full titles ofthe eight topics are as follows:

1. explanation of title (shiming)

2. elucidation of essence (bianti)

3. discourse on root and being (xubenyou)

4. discussion of cessation of names (tanjueming)

5. explanation of the word mahii (shidazi)

6. explanation of the word sutra (jiejingzi)

7. clarification of the intention of teaching (hejiaoyi)

8. structural classification of text (pankeduan)

48 TAOJIN

Except for the last two topics, the first six were devoted to the ex­planation of the title, Mahiiparinirvii1}asutra, with the first four to the key words (pari)nirvii1}a, and the fifth and sixth to mahii and sutra, respectively.40 The discussion of (pari)nirvii1}a in the first four sections can be further divided into a general explanation of the "essence" in the first section, and specific analysis of the "manifestations" in the second, third, and fourth, a relationship il­lustrated in the table below:

I. "essence"

1. explanation of title

II. "manifestations"

2. elucidation of essence

3. discourse on root and being

4. discussion of cessation of names

The central tenet (i.e., the "essence") is treated generally in the ex­planation of the title (pari)nirvii1}a, and is also treated specifically in the three following topics (i.e., in its three "manifestations"). In these three specific treatments of the central tenet, section two looks at nirvii1}a from, self-evidently, the perspective of the philo­sophical "essence;''41 section three deals with the dynamic relation-

40 To Och6, the discussion of the title takes place in 1st , 5th, and 6th sections ~ apparently, he has not noticed that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th are also part of the discussion of title, although they are not as explicitly so identified. Cf. OcM, p.185.

41 The content of this section, built upon citations from several authors of the Collected explanations, which deal with not only dharmakiiya (i.e., es­sence), but also prajfiii (i.e., wisdom) and nirviiIJa (i.e., practice), gives the ap­pearance that the compiler of the Collected explanations is not only treating the issue of "essence" in this section, but also the other two aspects. However, given the fact that he unmistakably identifies this section with the rubric of "essence," that he deals with the other two in the two following sections, and that his task of compiling passages from others restrains him from fully fo­cusing on "essence," it would not be unreasonable to suggest that this section is intended primarily to discuss the issue of "essence."

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 49

ship between "root" (ben) and "being" (yoU)42 and, in that sense, looks at nirviilJa from the perspective of its "function;" section four touches upon the provisional nature of words in the expression of truth and; in that sense, looks at nirviilJa from the perspective of "teaching." Thus, in the sense that the 2nd , 3rd and 4th sections each reveals one specific aspect of the central tenet, which is represented by (pari)nirviilJa, or that the three manifestations each reveal one aspect of the central tenet, this table presents a first-hand example of how the elaboration of teaching results in the formulation of independent introductory topics.

Zhiyi's scheme of "five aspects of profound meaning" presents a more developed example of the formulation of introductory topics based on the elaboration of teaching. Of his "five aspects,"

title, essence, central tenet, function, characteristics

the rubrics bring out the nature of their respective topics more ac­curately than do those in the Collected explanations, for the top­ics of "root and being" and "cessation of names" in the Collected explanations have not spoken directly and explicitly about what precisely these two topics are meant to discuss; also, Zhiyi more consciously draws upon the "essence vs. manifestations" relation­ship when he explicitly applies such a relationship to "title" and "essence (philosophical), central tenet, and function" in his analy­sis ofthe five aspects. A section in the introduction to his Profound commentary to the Vimalaklrtinirddasutra (Weimojing xuanshu) provides just such an example:

42 That is, between the absolute and the phenomenal. Such a ben-you re­lationship describes, apparently, the relationship between Daosheng's "root" (ben) and its "activation" (shiqi), Sengliang's "unconditioned" (wuyin) and "conditioned" (yin), Baoliang's "true" Czhen) and the "conventional" (su), Fa­zhi's "originally existent" (benyou) and "newly created" (shizao), and Fayao's nirvalJa and sal!lSara. In the sense that this ben-you relationship looks at two different aspects, Fazhi's benyou corresponds only to its ben or the absolute aspect. See T37n1763p381a7-a24.

50 TAOJ1N

Section four, "the clarification of the general and the specific," (re) organizes the previous fives aspects into three. The first, highlighting only the person and Dharma, constitutes the general discussion;43 the second, elaborating (teaching) into essence, central tenet and func­tion, constitutes the specific discussion; the third, clarifying the char­acteristics of teachings, encompasses in its content both the general and specific discussions.44

The reason for such (a reorganization) is:

Since the first dwells upon the name of the person (i.e., Vimalakfrti), which encompasses the three aspects (i.e., essence, central tenet, and function), it is thus called "general (discussion)."

Since now (the second) is to differentiate between the aspects of teaching, it should differentiate between the essence, central tenet, and function, and is therefore called "specific (discussion)."

(The discussion from the perspective of) person is the general (discus­sion) of the specific (issues), and (the discussion from the perspectives of) the three aspects is the specific (discussions) of the general issue - thus, the general generalizes the specific, and the specific specifies the general.

The reason (why the second is a specific discussion) is: Since the name of the person is Iing-wugou-cheng (i.e., Vimalaklrti),jing (vimala, i.e., clean) describes the true nature, which, being pure and clean, stands for the essence; wugou (vimala, i.e., immaculate) describes the true wisdom, and (the practice as a) cause guided by and (the salvation as an) effect ascertained through (this) true wisdom constitute the cen­tral tenet of the sutra; cheng (kfrti, i.e., name), being the expedient or

43 This section presents a general discussion of teaching through the dis­cussion of the key words of the title, i.e., Vimalaklrti, from the perspective of person, and nirde.sa, from the perspective of Dharma.

44 This section compares the Vimalakfrtinirde.sasiitra and other teachings, i.e., it presents a classification of teachings, with the Vimalakfrtinirde.sasiitra as the central object of this comparison or classification, on the basis of their respective "characteristics." Being a comparison with other teachings, it repeats the general and separate discussions undertaken previously for the Vimalakfrtinirdesasiitra.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 51

skillful (means of naming the unnamable), stands for the function of truth. (In short, this second) extends and elaborates (the first) and, for this reason, is called a "specific (discussion)."

Since (the third, i.e.,) "the characteristics of teachings," compares the similarity and difference between various slUras, it, in its content, en­compasses both the general and specific (discussions).45

In short, the section on "title" summarizes the teaching of the text and is thus general in nature; the sections on "essence, central te­net, and function" each provide a specific perspective in the elabo­ration of this central tenet, and are thus specific in nature; and the section on "characteristics" encompasses at once the general and the specific. This relationship is better illustrated in the following rearrangement of the five aspects in this passage:

1. characteristics

2. (title, essence, central tenet, function)

a. ("essence"): title

b. ("manifestations"): essence, central tenet, function

As the table shows, the first level of the hierarchy, numbered with Arabic numerals, contrasts "characteristics" with the remaining four of the five aspects, and, in doing so, shows that the ultimate objective of Zhiyi's five-aspect scheme is not set on the interpreta­tion of one particular siitra, but on all siitras. Put in other words, this level shows that Zhiyi intends to establish a universal model for the writing of exegesis, an ambition explicitly stated in his reply to an imaginary query:

(One) asks: Is this five-aspect (scheme) designed for (the interpreta­tion of) this satra alone, or (is it applicable) also to other satras? (I) answer: (Since) in the establishing of meaning various schools have placed their intention at various places (I) am creating here the five-as­pect (scheme) as a general paradigm of interpretation for all satras.46

45 T38nl777p519b13-cl.

46 Le., although expressions may vary, this universal model can be used to adequately decipher the teachings in all satras; T38nl777p519cOl-03.

52 TAOJIN

It is for this reason that he divides the five aspects into "character­istics" and the remaining four - to discuss one particular text with these four subjects should ultimately lead to a comparison with all other sutras, which can all be approached from these four perspec­tives! The second level of the hierarchy, alphabetically ordered, dwells upon one particular text, the Vimalaklrtinirdeiasutra in this case, by looking at its teaching from both a general perspective, i.e., the perspective of "title," and specific perspectives, i.e., the per­spectives of the philosophical "essence," "central tenet" and "func­tion" - clearly, the general perspective is that of the "essence," and the specific perspectives are those of the "manifestations."

As we can see from this analysis, the core of Zhiyi's interpreta­tion lies in the specific discussions of the philosophical "essence," "central tenet" and "function." It substantiates the general discus­sion of title and, together with it, prepares for a comparison with other sutras from these same perspectives, thus creating what Zhiyi would believe to be the universal model of exegesis. For our present purpose, such a model (particularly the general topic of "title" and the specific topics of "essence, central tenet and function") clearly brings out the "essence vs. manifestations" relationship, and, in do­ing so, illustrates how central tenet is elaborated into specific issues and, on that basis, how introductory topics are formulated.

Having thus examined the elaboration of teaching and its role in the formulation of introductory topics, the rest of this paper will dwell upon a small selection of the "manifestations," which have appeared more frequently than others in the Chinese Buddhist ex­egesis and are thus, in that sense, the more representative. These include the introductory topics derived from the themes about the arising of teaching, central tenet, medium of truth, and classifica­tion of teachings.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 53

4. Accounting for the arising of teaching: intention, conditions and transmission

In their effort to account for the arising of teaching, commentators look primarily at the intention in the giving of teaching, the condi­tions through which a teaching arises, and the history of a teach­ing's transmission.

The exegetical attention to "intention" is generally expressed in the introductory topics surrounding the word "intention" (yi) itself, most notably the "intention of sutra" (jing-yi),47 "intention of teach­ing" (jiao-yi),48 "intention of the coming (of the teaching)"(lai-yi),49

"intention in the writing of the treatise" (zaolun-yi)50 and etc. In some cases, the discussion of intention is closely associated with the discussion of author,S! for, after all, the "intention" must be the au-

47 See, for example, Jizang: xushuo jingyi in T33n1699; Won'chuk: shuojingzhiyi in T33n1708; Kuiji:jingqizhiyi in T34nl723.

48 See, for example, xu jiaoxing yi, Daoxun, T40n1804.

49 See, for example, laiyimen, Jizang, T34nl722.

50 See, for example, zaolunyi in Jizang, T42n1825 and T42n1827.

51 This close association between the issues of "intention" and "author" reminds us of the close association between the issues of "title" and "author" (sometimes also translator) in commentators' categorization of introductory topics. Huiyuan must have implied such a perception when he places his discussion of A§vagho~a immediately after the discussion of the title of the satra, and this implication is explicated in Fazang's commentary to the same siitra, when the commentator includes the discussion of author as an integral part of the discussion of title. In fact, Fazang appears to have always con­sciously grouped the issues of "title," "writing" and "translation" together. As Zixuan has noted, Zongmi divides Fazang's nine introductory topics into two categories of the first six and the last three, with the latter including title, time of writing, and year of translation (See Zixuan, Qixinlun bixiaoji in T44n1848p0303a9-a28). Such a differentiation is probably not arbitrary, for the 6-3 division appears to be the standard format in most of Fazang's commentaries, though not without some slight differences in selection and organization of these topics.

54 TAOJIN

thor's intention, and a look at the person responsible for the spread­ing of teaching is a good place to discuss the intention of doing so. Thus, for example, as soon as the name of the purported author Asvagho~a is mentioned in the Qixinlun commentary attributed to Huiyuan, the attention is immediately directed to Asvagho~a's pur­pose or "intention" in writing the treatise,

To say "written by Bodhisattva Asvagho~a" is to present the name of the author of the treatise ... The reasons why the Bodhisattva wrote this treatise are ... 52

and the section on author concludes with a reiteration of his inten­tion:

Such is the intention for the writing (of this treatise).53

The exegetical attention to "conditions" is generally expressed in the introductory topics surrounding the words "cause" (yin) and "by way of" (yoU),54 and gives rise to such topics as "that which to rely on" (suo-yin),55 "direct cause and indirect cause" (yin-yuan),56 "causes for arising" (yin-qi),57 and "by the means of which" (suo­yoU).58 Such an attention to conditions sometimes finds itself ex­pressed as the indispensable qualities required of someone who gives the teaching. Zhiyan's (602-668) topic of "admirations for the sage's response to the individual circumstances and (for) the basis of (his) meritorious deeds (i.e., the giving of teaching)" (tan-

52 T44n1843p175c12-c13.

53 T44n1843p176all.

54 Meaning "by way of," you thus refers by extension to "means" or "ba­sis."

55 See, for example, Kuiji: T38n1782, T43n1829 and T44n1840.

56 Here it means only "cause," without the distinction between direct and indirect causes. See, for example, yinyuan in Wonhyo's T38n1769 and T33n1697, where yinyuan is also called yuanqi.

57 See, for example, yi zhang yinqi in see Kuiji, T33n1700p125a18.

58 See, for example, Kuiji: zaolun suoyou in T43n1834p979b18-c12.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 55

shenglinji, deliang youzhi),59 for example, singles out the under­standing of "non-abiding" (wuzhu) and the aspiration for bodhi as the necessary spiritual preparation for Buddha's giving of teach­ing.

The exegetical attention to the "history of transmission" is some­times expressed as the topic of "origination" (yuanqi), which, pri­marily translating "dependent origination" (pratftyasamutpiida), is here simply referring to "historical development." Jizang relates as a yuanqi, for example, Zhu Shixing's adventure in Khotan to bring the Mahiiprajfiiipiiramitiisutra back to China.60

While commentators account for the arising of teaching from the three perspectives of "intention," "conditions," and "transmis­sion," the first two are apparently more closely related to each other than to the third. The yin in Pazang's accounting for the arising of teaching refers not only to "intention," but also to "conditions," as can be illustrated in the "ten yins" section in his Qixinlun com­mentary. It contains two major parts. Part 1, including yins 1 to 6, explains the following six conditions: 1st, insight of the teacher; 2nd ,

specific forms of the teaching; 3rd , pedagogical means; 4th, peda­gogical tools; 5th , doctrinal basis; and 6th , powers to invoke for the giving of teaching. Part 2, including yins 7 to 10, explains the in­tention as the following four reasons: 7th , obligation to Buddha; 8th

and 9th , compassion of the author; 10th , benefits anticipated in the giving of teaching.61

The distinction between the intention, conditions and transmis­sion is not always very clear. Thus, yuanqi is about the "transmis­sion" of sutra in one place,62 but explains "reasons" in another,63

59 T35n1732p13c8.

60 See Jizang, T33n1696p68a24-b4.

61 T44n1846p241a18-b24

62 See Jizang, T33n1696p68a24-b4.

63 See Jizang, Shengman baoku in T37n1744p4b26-5b12.

56 TAOJIN

and is interchangeable with yinyuan in a third.64 Similarly, Zhiyan dwells on you to discuss the attributes of teacher 'in one commen­tary, but with the same word explains "reasons" in a second.65

5. Explanation of central tenet: zong, zong-qu, and other zong­related topics

The explanation of central tenet is undoubtedly the most important step in the elaboration of introductory survey. While the' aforemen­tioned pre-introduction certainly touches upon central tenet with its reliance on the explanation of title, it offers only a summary of that central tenet and serves, as is obvious in its name, primarily as an introduction. It is only zong and its related topics that are designed primarily for the explanation of central tenet; indeed, it is probably for this reason that all Chinese Buddhist schools call themselves a certain zong - the identity of a certain school depends largely on its adherence to a particular type of teaching.66

Zong often appears in the forms of zong-zhi, zong-yao, zong-ti, zong-qu, etc. Since zhi stands for "purport," yao for "essentials," and ti for "essence," the suffixation of the first three words to zong simply produces varied forms for the topic of zong; another word represented by zhi means "to arrive at" or, in Wonhyo's words, "the intended destination of central tenet" (yi-zhi),67 and in that

., 64 See Wonhyo, Dahuidujing zongyao in T33n1697p68b23 and T33n­

. 1697p72a19-p73a20.

65 See jiaoxing suoyou (that through which the teaching arises) in Jingang­boruoboluomijing lueshu, T33n1704p239a11.

66 According to Yan Shangwen, the meaning or use of zong in the Bud­dhist context develops from "to revere," to "central tenet" (i.e., that which is revered), and finally to "school" that "reveres" a particular tenet. See his Suitang jojiao zongpai yanjiu, pp. 1-16.

67 This translation is meant to bring out its main idea. Translated liter­ally, it means "the (destination which the teaching) is intended to arrive at." See his discussion of zongzhi in, for example, his Liangjuan wuliangshou jing zongyao: "Section two, i.e., the clarification of zongzhi, (argues that)

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 57

sense this different zong-zhi represents a similar though more em­phatic expression of zong, pointing to, in a sense, the culmination of central tenet. Zong-qu is a similar reformulation of zong, for the word qu, meaning "to approach," is essentially not different from the second zhi in highlighting the "destination" of central te­net.68 In some cases, commentators simply use zong-qu and zong interchangeably, apparently seeing no difference at all between the twO.69

Zong-qu, however, was transformed into the most unique of all zong-related topics at the hands of Huayan scholars, i.e., it was re­conceptualized in such a way that the separate attention to and the combined use of these two words zong and qu produces a complex set of perspectives for the examination of central tenet.

The re-conceptualization of zong-qu can be observed in two related aspects. The first aspect is the conscious differentiation of zong and quo While, in Huiyuan and Kuiji's treatment, the two words have their respective emphasis, (i.e., zong for central tenet and qu for its destination,) the difference between the two is meant, as mentioned earlier, only to give an emphatic expression for the in­terest in central tenet and, in that sense, the differentiation between

this sutra takes the cause and effect of the Pure Land as its central tenet, and the rebirth of sentient beings (in Pure Land) as its intended destination" (T37n1747p125c28-c29).

68 Kimura's suggestion that zong and qu point, respectively, to the philo­sophical and aspirational aspect ofa sutra probably better explains the zong­qu and also the zong-zhi relationship. See his "Kegonkyo shiishuron no reki­shi to yimi," p. 255.

69 See, for example, Huiyuan, "section four, i.e., the discussion of zong­qu, (argues that) the zong of this sutra is the meritorious deeds of giving that bring about good fortune" (T39n1793p512c15); for another example, see Kuiji: "Section six asks: How many versions are there for this sutra and what zong-qu does each of these versions clarify? (The commentator answers:) An exhaustive search for the versions of this sutra comes up with four. (In the sense that) all explain the Pure Land, (this sutra in its four versions) takes Pure Land as its zong" (T37n1757p313a15-a16).

58 TAOnN

the two is not significant. This difference is, however, highlighted and capitalized upon in Zhiyan's use, for the entire section of his zong-qu relies on the elaboration of both the zong and the qu of central tenet. The second aspect is the abstractification ofzong, ex­pressed in the replacement of its meaning "central tenet" with the meaning "to revere" or, more precisely, "that which is revered."70 The former is derived from the latter, for "central tenet" must be something "revered" in a siitra, and this replacement str~ps zong of its specific reference to "central tenet" and thus turns it into a more widely applicable term.

This new perception of zong-qu allows Zhiyan to present a more complex and subtle examination of central tenet or the religious truth of a sutra.

To Zhiyan, religious truth can be approached from the perspec-tives of principle, practice, and teaching:

Section one explains the zong-qu from a general (perspective). This siitra adopts (i.e., teaches as its zong-qu) three types of prajiiii: first, the prajiiii of reality (i.e., principle); second, the prajiiii of contem­plation (i.e., practice); and third, the prajiiii of words (i.e., teaching). This is known because the sutra below elucidates all three aspects of principle, practice, and teaching.71

By making no distinction whatsoever between zong and qu from this "general perspective," Zhiyan presents truth as comprising at

. once principle, practice, and teaching which, in Zhiyan's primary . choice of expressions, are reality, contemplation and words, or, as in a unity of these three aspects - principle results from practice

70 Fazang thus explains the nature of zong: "That which is revered in a text is called zong" (T44n1846p245b04). Zhiyan has not made a statement as ex­plicit as this, but the way he treats zong and qu, as analyzed shortly, indicates that he also sees zong as generally "that which is revered" rather than the specific "central tenet," i.e., he also abstractifies the use of zong. For a discus­sion of zong's various meanings, see Yan, Sui tang fojiao zongpai yanjiu, pp. 1-16.

7] T33n1704p239b17-b19.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDlllSM 59

and is conveyed in teaching, practice is guided by principle that is conveyed in teaching, and teaching conveys principle that results from practice.

This unity, however, is brought out more vividly when Zhiyan applies his new scheme of zong-qu, in which, with the separation of zong and qu and the abstractification of zong, he allows each of the three aspects to be both the zong, i.e., the "revered" or simply the "means," and the qu, i.e., the "destination" or the "end." In other words, such a scheme allows the examination of truth to start any­where from these three perspectives (or, by an extended application of this scheme, from perspectives not listed by Zhiyan) and still ar­rive at its destination. A rearrangement of principle, practice, and teaching in different zong-qu relationships produces five pairs of correspondence, and thus five perspectives for an elaborate exami­nation of truth in its unity of the three aspects. Below is such an example in Zhiyan's separate discussion of zong-qu:

Section two explains long and qu separately from five perspectives:

The first (perspective) is the correspondence between teaching and (its) purport, i.e., (one) takes teaching as long and (its) purport as qu;

the second is the correspondence between the cause (of practice) and the effect (of realization), i.e., one takes cause as long and (its) effect as qu ... ;

the third is the correspondence between person and Dharma, i.e., (one) takes Dharma as long and person (i.e., Buddha-hood) as qu ... ;72

the fourth is the correspondence between principle and phenomena, i.e., (one) takes principle as long and phenomena as qu;

the fifth is the correspondence between the object of perception (i.e., teaching)?3 and practice, i.e., (one) takes the object of perception as

72 "Because (one) relies on Dharma to become the Buddha" (T33n1704 p239b24).

73 "Because teaching, comprising objects of perception, is established to facilitate the practice" (T33n1704p239b26).

60 TAOJIN

zong and practice as qu ... 74

The first pair of the zong-qu correspondence, i.e., of teaching and its purport, indicates that "teaching," as zong, conveys "principle" in its "purport" as qu; the second pair, of cause and effect, indicates that "practice" of cause, as zong, leads to the "effect" of realizing truth as qu, for the "effect" marks the realization of "principle;" the third pair, of "person" and "Dharma," indicates that "principle" (i.e., Dharma), as zong, results in "practice" as qu, for the attain­ment of Buddhahood is the culmination of practice; the fourth pair, of principle and phenomena, indicates that the teaching of "princi­ple," as lOng, gives rise to "practice" as qu, for the shift of attention from the absolute principle to phenomena is designed ultimately for the purpose of realizing principle, i.e., practicing it, in the phenom­enal world; the fifth pair, of the object of perception and practice, indicates that "teaching," as zong, provides guidance to "practice" as qu, the "object of perception" being the teaching itself.

Put in other words, the five pairs of zong-qu rearrange the three aspects of principle, practice, and teaching and present their uni­ty from five different perspectives. Thus, the first pair states that teaching leads to principle; the second pair, practice to principle; the third and fourth pairs, principle to practice, although one fo­cuses on "Dharma" and "person" and the other on "principle" and "phenomena;" and the fifth pair, teaching to practice. Despite this apparent diversity of perspectives, the ultimate purpose is to unfold the originally unified truth into its various aspects with what Zhi­yan would believe to be the greater precision and subtlety.

Zhiyan's re-conceptualization of zong-qu is further developed in Fazang's explanation of central tenet. This development lies in two aspects. For one, he theorizes a perception which underlies Zhi­yan's treatment of zong-qu, but which has never been brought out explicitly; for the other, he further develops the separate perspec­tives, from which Zhiyan approaches the central tenet, by organiz-

74 T33n1704p239b20-b26.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN ClllNESE BUDDHISM 61

ing them into a unified and systematic relationship of a successively related and increasingly deepened progression of inquiries.

As discussed earlier, Zhiyan re-conceptualizes zong-qu by first separating zong and qu and then stripping them of their specific ref­erence. In doing so, Zhiyan makes zong represent that which is to be relied on, i.e., a means, and qu as its objective, i.e., an end. Such a re-conceptualization allows one to approach the central tenet of a sutra from a number of different perspectives. However, although this new perception of zong-qu underlies Zhiyan's discussion of central tenet, he has never spelled out this understanding explicitly, i.e., he has never moved his attention from the content of zong-qu to the nature of zong-qu. It is Fazang who consciously takes up the task of theorizing this previously unspoken perception:

That which the sutra reveres is called zong, and the destination to which this zong leads is called qU.75

By not limiting the significance of zong to "central tenet," although "central tenet" is "that which the sutra reveres," the new percep­tion makes it possible to read different meanings into zong and, by extension, also qu, in the examination of central tenet.76

75 T44n1846p245b04.

76 In most of his other commentaries, Fazang has a slightly different the­orization of zong-qu, i.e., "what the words express is called zong, and the destination to which this zong leads is called qu" (See, for example, T35n-1733p120a7). "What the words express" is apparently a mere different formu­lation of "that which the satra reveres." A similar statement Fazang makes in his other commentaries reinforces the same perception by rejecting any sense of distinction between zong and qu: "In the general discussion, zong is in itself qu." (See, for example, T35n1734p495b6). Such theoretical assertions about zong-qu are manifested in his treatment of the subject, particularly in his formulaic expression in the separate discussions of zong-qu: "(The satra) takes ... as zong and ... as qu; or, the reverse (is also true)" (See, for example, T35n1734p495b4-b13). By emphasizing that zong and qu are interchange­able, Fazang gives the two a general applicability, i.e., he preserves only the sense of correspondence between the means and its end, but not their specific references.

62 TAOJIN

While Zhiyan's zong-qu opens up the central tenet and presents a number of different perspectives for its understanding, he seems to have never paid attention to the relationship between these dif­ferent perspectives. Fazang, however, takes it as his task to build a coherent relationship between them. He thus discusses the zong-qu of QixinZun:

Section two shows long and qu separately from, briefly speaking, five (perspectives). The first (perspective) is the correspondence between teaching and (its) purport, i.e., (one) takes teaching as long and (its) purport as qu ... ; the second is the correspondence between principle and phenomena, i.e., (one) takes the sampling of phenomena as long, and the revelation of principle (therein) as qu ... ; the third is the corre­spondence between the objects (of perception) and practice, i.e., (one) takes objects (of perception, both) ultimate and conventional, as long, and the practice of mind contemplation as qu; the fourth is the cor­respondence between realization and faith, i.e., (one) takes non-retro­gression of faith upon its formation as long, and the ascendance onto bhamis and the entry into realization as qu; the fifth is the correspon­dence between the cause (of practice) and the effect (of realization), i.e., (one) takes cause as long and the accomplishment of effect as quo Of these five (perspectives), subsequent ones arise from preceding ones in a successive and causal (progression), (a situation) understood when the explanation (i.e., the commentary) is referred to.77

Such a "successive and causal" relationship is more clearly outlined jn Zixuan's explanation, where he supplies certain connections not apparent in Fazang's own discussion:

By "successive and causal (progression)," (Fazang means:) First, from teaching, its purport is obtained; second, from phenomena (presented as examples) of the purport, principle is revealed; third, by taking phe­nomena and principle as the object (of perception), one accomplishes the practice of calming and contemplation (samatha and vipasyana); fourth, with (the practice of) calming and contemplation, (one) enters

77 T44n1846p245b5-b12. The translation of the last sentence is taken from Dirck Vorenkamp's translation of this commentary. See his English transla­tion, p. 53.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 63

into the stages of realization (bhiimis); fifth, with such an entry, (one) attains the fruit (or effect of realization). Thus, taking turns to supply a basis for one another and delving from surface (levels) to deeper (levels), (the five steps) transmit the central tenet of the treatise.78

This relationship can be further elucidated in the following sim­plified rearrangement of the five perspectives, constructed on the basis of both Fazang and Zixuan's explanations. Extra words are added in brackets to bring out the connections between concepts at different levels, and the indentations in subsequent levels are de­signed to highlight Fazang's perception that "subsequent ones arise from preceding ones in a successive and causal (progression)":

l't: teaching vs. purport

2nd : phenomena (i.e., which manifests the purport) vs. principle (i.e., which is the purport revealed through phenomena)

3rd : object of perception (which is at once phenomena and Prin­ciple, or the provisional and the ultimate, and which, in the unity of the two, is also the purport) vs. practice (which con­tains calming and contemplation)

4th: faith (i.e., the initial stage of practice) vs. realization (i.e., the culmination of practice)

5th : cause (which includes practices from faith to realization) vs. effect (which is realization)

From the first and the most general perspective, one relies on Bud­dha's words (i.e., teaching as zong) to obtain the intended purport (i.e., purport as qu). The purport of this teaching is, however, mani­fested only in things to which sentient beings have access through their sense faculties (i.e., phenomena), and it is in these things (i.e., phenomena as zong) that one retrieves the principle intended by Buddha in his teaching (i.e., principle as qu), hence the second per­spective. The teaching (i.e., the object of perception, which is also purport) that unites both phenomena and principle (also identified as the "the provisional" and "the ultimate" by Fazang himself),

78 Qixinlunshu bixiaoji, T44n1848p312c26-c29.

64 TAOnN

however, is not sufficient in accomplishing the realization; thus, from a third perspective, one has to resort to practice (i.e., practice as qu) after retrieving the teaching (i.e., purport or object of per­ception as zong). Zixuan identifies the two major forms of practice as "calming and contemplation" (samatha and vipasyanii), but as Fazang has it, the two ends of the spectrum in the practice are faith at the beginning and realization at its conclusion, thus the fourth perspective, with "faith" as zong and "realization" as quo :rhe fifth perspective summarizes various forms of practice (from faith to realization) as the cause and its ultimate destination as the effect, hence "cause" as zong and "effect" as quo In short, "teaching" leads to "purport," which in turn leads to "principle," which in another turn calls for "practice," which in still another turn necessitates a progression of practices from lower stages to higher stages, which, as an inseparable whole, eventually leads to the ultimate realiza­tion. Such a system of five perspectives thus organizes them, as said earlier, into a unified and systematic relationship of a successively related and increasingly deepened progression of inquiries.

6. The medium of truth: neng vs. suo

Another subject in the elaboration of teaching is the means for the transmission of teaching or, in other words, the medium of truth. Tci Buddhists, the medium of truth is not only that which teaches truth, such as words and writings, but ultimately also that which is taught, i.e., truth itself. Put in Chinese Buddhist terminology, the medium of truth includes not only the neng aspect (that which teaches), but ultimately also the suo aspect (that which is taught).

Such a perception is often reflected in the debates among Bud­dhist scholars in their effort to determine what comprise(s) the me­dium of truth. Jizang records such a debate in his commentary on the Mahiiprajiiiipiiramitiisutra:

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 65

In the explanation of medium (ti),79 there are a total of four schools of views:

the first school argues that principle is the sutra itself ... For, as Long­guang asserts, principle is that which imprints, and the writings are its imprints ... ;

the second, i.e., the Dharma master Shi of the Lingmei Monastery, argues that ... the writings and principle, mutually expressing (each other), constitute the sutra in their unity - neither of the two alone is the sutra ... ;

the third, i.e., the Dharma master Sheng of the Lingyao Monastery, . argues that writings constitute the satra (from the perspective of) writings, and principle constitutes the sutra (from the perspective of) principle - writings and principle is each in itself a sutra ... ;

the fourth, i.e., the Dharma master Zong of the Taichuang Monas­tery and the Dharma master Yaofa of the Baima monastery, consider teaching (i.e., writings) as the sutra. SO

The four schools have four different views about what comprise(s) the medium of truth. The first school sees truth itself (suo) as the medium; the second, a combination of both truth (suo) and writ­ings (neng); the third, either truth (suo) or writings (neng); and the fourth, writings (neng) alone. While the four schools cannot agree exactly what the medium is, at least three of them accept that suo

itself could be the medium, either in part or in full; also, the very fact that a choice has to be made between neng and suo suggests that both were perceived as potential but legitimate candidates for the medium of truth.

79 Often referring to "essence" or "base," ti in this case refers by an exten­sion of meaning to "vehicle" or "means" through which Buddhist teachings are transmitted, hence the translation of "medium." In this particular pas­sage, the commentator uses "medium" interchangeably with sutra for the apparent reason that a sutra is one form of such media. For a discussion of another meaning of the same ti or "essence," see section three: Elaboration of teaching: from essence to its manifestations.

so T33n1696p65b15-b26.

66 TAOJIN

The inclusion of suo as the medium reflects the Buddhist per­ception of truth in its active aspect. While truth remains inacces­sible to intellectmi1ization in its quiescent and thus absolute state, it also actively manifests itself in the myriad of phenomena, i.e., phe­nomena constitute the media of truth. As Jizang concludes in his summary of these four schools, "each of the ten thousand dharmas is without exception a sutra (i.e., medium of truth)."81 In that sense, truth teaches itself, or truth is its own medium. This is e~act1y the argument made by the first school, which draws on Longguang to support its claim that truth or suo is the medium:

The principle is that which imprints, and the writings are its imprints.

What we have in the fonn of writings or neng is simply given to us by principle or suo itself. Using the metaphor in this remark, that which teaches (neng) is the "imprints" imprinted by that which is taught (suo), and writing is one fonn of such "imprints."

A tension, however, exists between neng and suo in commenta­tors' minds, for they constantly attempt to accommodate these two perspectives in their discussion regarding the medium of truth, and this effort in turn suggests a tendency to separ<;tte suo from neng and, ultimately, to deny suo the role as medium of truth.

An obvious problem that arises regarding this issue is: If both neng and suo can serve as the medium of truth, why then is there this difference between the neng and suo? Or, simply, how shall the

;;'(tifference be accounted for? Some commentators attempted to rec­oncile this difference by interpreting neng and suo with the help of the two truths theory, arguing that the two are different from each other from the perspective of provisional truth, but are ultimately the same from the perspective of ultimate truth. In the discussion of the medium of truth in his Vimalakfrtinirde.fasutra commentary, Kuiji makes just such an attempt by drawing on Bhavaviveka and Dharmapala. Below is an outline of this section:82

81 T33n1696p65c3.

82 T38n1782plOOOb22-plOOlc19

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 67

The medium of teaching has two aspects: The first is the writings that explain (truth), and the second is the purport that is explained (in the writings) ..

1. Bhavaviveka

a. From the perspective of provisional truth

1) From the perspective of suo: All dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned, empty or existent, constitute the medium of truth;

2) From the perspective of neng: The medium includes name,83 sentence, paragraph, and treatise.

b. From the perspective of ultimate truth: Both the neng and the suo are empty of self-nature ... (In the sense that the nature of) all dharmas is empty of self-nature, what (is there to be called) the teaching (i.e., neng) or principle (i.e., suo)?

2. Dharmapala

a. From the perspective of provisional truth

1) From the perspective of suo: All dharmas, conditioned or unconditioned, empty or existent, constitute the medium of truth;

2) From the perspective of neng: The medium includes voice, name, sentence and treatise.

b. From the perspective of ultimate truth

1) The medium that incorporates the characteristics into the tathata

2) The medium that incorporates all others into the mind

3) The medium that incorporates the provisional into the subc

stantial

4) The medium that separates the provisional from the substantial

According to Kuiji, Bhavaviveka and Dharmapala each see the rela­tive roles of neng and suo in conveying the truth from the provision­al perspective and the ultimate perspective. From the provisional

83 "(It or ju) is the same as the 'name' in Dharmapala's discussion" (T38n1782plOOOb29).

68 TAOJlN

perspective, neng and suo are different from each ot~er, with name, sentence, paragraph and treatise in Bhavaviveka, or voice, name, sentence and treatise in· Dharmapala as neng, and all dharmas as suo. From the ultimate perspective, however, this distinction, simply disappears. As Bhavaviveka explains, that which teaches and that which is taught are both void of self-nature and, in that sense, neng is not different from suo, or, "what (is there to be called) the teach­ing (i.e., neng) or principle (i.e., suo)?" Dharmapala explains the same idea with different words: That is, from the ultimate perspec­tive, the medium can be identified with either xing (tathatii) which encompasses all "characteristics," or "mind" (shi) that gives rise to and thus also encompasses phenomena, or "substance" (shi) that constitutes the basis for the "provisional." While the discussion of the fourth type of medium appears to separate the provisional from the ultimate, Dharmapala sees the provisional as eventually derived from the ultimate, thus also integrating the neng and the SUO. 84

The significance in accommodating the neng-suo relationship in this provisional-ultimate framework lies in the fact that it rep­resents a conscious effort to understand the relative roles of neng and suo, and that it suggests an increasingly stronger intentionion to distinguish the two as different topics. This can be illustrated in the following examples:

Jizang: Section two, explanation of the central tenet and the medium (zong-ti):

Sub-section one, explanation of medium; Sub-section two, explanation of central tenet.85

Zhiyan: Section three, the central tenet being taught, and the medium that teaches.86

84 I.e., "of all provisional dharmas, none has a separate essence, i.e., (each arises) on the basis of its respective source, and takes the substantial dharma as its nature" (T38n1782plOOla28-a29).

85 T33n1696p65b13.

86 T35n1732p13c07.

INIRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 69

Won'chuk: Section two, elucidation of the central tenet being taught, and the medium that teaches.87

Wonhyo: Next, explanation of central tenet; Section three, explanation of the medium of teaching.88

Kuiji: Section five, discussion of the medium; Section six, discussion of versions of the sutra and (their respec­tive) central tenets.89

Fazang: Section five, the medium that teaches; section six, the central tenet that is taught.90

What these examples show first is a clear and increasing tendency to distinguish between neng and suo. Neng, i.e., medium of teach­ing, and suo, i.e., truth being taught, are expressed in different top­ics, and, in most cases, the words neng and suo are assigned to de­fine the two different topics. What's more, the two topics are orga­nized such that the connection between them becomes increasingly weakened. As we can see in these examples: Jizang includes neng and suo as two different parts of the same topic of "central tenet and medium;" Zhiyan andWon'chuk still see them as belonging to the same category, but equate and, in that sense, differentiate the two by making both rubrics parts of the title; Wonhyo, Kuiji, and Fazang simply treat them as two separate and independent topics. What these examples also show, however, is a clear perception of the mutual dependence of the two, for, in all these cases, the topics of neng and suo are always placed side by side. This suggests that, even when these commentators do not agree with the claim that

87 T33n1708p359a24.

88 T38n1769p239b19.

89 T37n1757p31Oc29

90 T44n1846p241a15-16

70 TAOJIN

suo is in itself the neng, this view has apparently i1;s hold on their understanding of the relationship between neng and suo.

7. Classification of teachings: textual and doctrinal orientations, and the bu-, zang- and jiao-classification

Still another subject in the elaboration of teaching is the categori­zation or classification of various specific teachings. Th€? primary purpose for the classification of teachings is to determine the posi­tion of a particular teaching in a certain part or the entire body of Buddhist teachings. As we can see in all examples of such a prac­tice, commentators always begin with a classification of various teachings, and always conclude with the identification or location of a particular sutra in that classificatory scheme.

Generally speaking, classification of teachings is oriented ei­ther textually, or doctrinally, or both. A textual classification deter­mines the position of a particular teaching from the perspectives of version and content, i.e., it asks to which of its many versions a par­ticular text belongs, or into which of the three canonical categories, sutra, vinaya, abhidharma, a text falls. A doctrinal classification determines the position of a particular teaching with the identifica­tion of the level of its doctrinal value, or in comparison with those of all other teachings.

>~; These two types of classification appear, generally, in the forms of three types of topics, namely, bu (version), zang (pitaka or collection) andjiao (teaching). While all three of them constitute a response to the increasing diversity of Buddhist teachings and subsequently the need to sort them out for the purpose of determining the position of a particular teaching, each has its specific way of classification.

The bu-classification is textually oriented, for it is a response to the diversity of texts, particularly the different versions, or some­times different translations, of a sutra in its transmission in China. As we can see in the relevant sections in Zhiyi's commentary on V ajracchedikaprajfiiipiiramitiisutra and Jizang's commentary on the

ThlRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CIDNESE BUDDHISM 71

Mahiiprajiiiipiiramitiisutra, the purpose of both commentators is to locate their respective texts in the series, or various versions, of the Prajiiiipiiramitiisutra. Zhiyi lists eight versions, and identifies his text as the eighth;91 Jizang outlines four classificatory schemes, each proposing a list of its various versions, and locates his text in each of these schemes.92 The bu-classification in Jizang's commentary on the SaddharmapulJ¢arfkasutra simply identifies his text as one of the translations of the sutra.93 This classification usually appears in the forms of bu-lei (versions and categories), bu-dang (or bu­tang, i.e., versions and kinds), and bu-zhou (versions and scrolls).94

The zang-classification is oriented both textually and doctrin­ally. Oriented textually, the zang-classification differentiates sutras from the perspectives of subject matter and authorship, an act that results in the classification of sutra, vinaya, abhidharma collections (i.e., the Tripitaka); oriented doctrinally, the zang-classification looks at the level of doctrinal sophistication and gives rise to the classification into Bodhisattva collection (pusazang) and Sriivaka collection (shengwenzang) (i.e., the Dvipitaka) .. This two-fold clas­sification generally appears as the topic of zang-she (i.e., inclusion in a certain collection), but occasionally also takes the forms of ji­aojenqi (differentiation of teachings)95 and jiaodaxiao (i.e., whether

91 See lingang bonta jing shu, T33n1698p76a2- a7.

92 See Dapin jing youyi, T33n1696p67c20-p68a23.

93 See Jizang, Fahua youyi, in T34nl722p649cU-p650a03.

94 See, for example, bulei in Jizang (T34nl721), Zhiyan (T33n1704) and Kuiji (T37n1757), budang in Jizang (T33n1696, T33n1699, T34nl722), and buzhou in Zhiyi (T33n1698), etc.

95 See T37n1745, T37n1764 and T38nl776. These formulations of the sub­ject are given only at the end of the section and the beginning of the next. In T37n1745, Huiyuan only uses fen (differentiation), apparently an abbreviated form of jiao zhi fenqi of the other two.

72 TAOJIN

the teaching in question belongs to the Great Vehi~le or the Small Vehicle).96

The most prevalent form of classification, jiao-classification, is doctrinally oriented. With the development of the Chinese under­standing of Buddhism, the textual classification, in its differentia­tion of versions and of the collections of sutra, vinaya and abhid­harma, becomes increasingly inadequate in determining the posi­tion of a particular teaching in tradition; so it is the case with the doctrinal classification in the Bodhisattva and Sravaka collections, for the mere distinction between the two is simply incapable of explaining the complex relationship between, and thus the relative positions of, a vast array of teachings. The jiao-classification goes beyond, not only the textual classification, but also the relatively formulaic classification of the two collections, and allows commen­tators greater freedom in the classification of teachings, thus push­ing the practice to a new level of sophistication. Its topics mostly carry the term "teaching" (jiao), hence "characteristics of teach­ings" (jiaoxiang),97 "classification of teachings" (panjiao), "differ­entiation of teachings" (jiaofenqi), "differences in teachings" (jiao butong), and "distinctinctions between teachings" (jiaoyi chabie).98

The origination of the jiao-classification, however, deserves some more attention. It probably begins as an effort to explain the intention of teaching. Almost all the authors of the Collected expla­

; 'nations make comparisons between earlier teachings and the teach-

96 See, for example, Huiyuan, T37n1749 and T39n1793; Shandao, T37n1753.

97 See the discussion of the "characteristics" as one of Zhiyi's "five aspects of profound meaning" in section three: Elaboration of teaching: from essence to its manifestations.

98 Given Zhiyi's introductory topic of panjing jiaoxiang (differentiation of the characteristics of a sutra, i.e., from those of other sutras), panjiao is probably just a different formulation of jiaoxiang. The rest of them, with their unanimous emphasis on differentiation, are apparently other reformulations of the same topic.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDIDSM 73

ing to be commented upon in their commentaries, and all identify the earlier teachings as provisional and theirs as ultimate.99 In that sense, the differentiation of teachings was aimed to explain the in­tention of teaching with a view to reaffirm the importance of their exegetical projects - this text, the Mahtiparinirvii1:zasutra, gives the highest teaching and thus requires further explication. It is prob­~bly for this reason that the compiler sets aside a separate section for these differentiations of teachings, and defines it as an effort to "clarify the intention of teaching." While the "intention of teach­ing" only implies a comparison or differentiation of teachings, this secondary objective gradually comes to the fore and occupies the center stage. That is, commentators gradually move away from the interest in justifying their exegetical projects, and begin instead to set their attention squarely on a comparison regarding the degrees of doctrinal sophistication, thus producing various forms of jiao­classification.

Conclusion

The foregoing seven sections have examined the seven most recur­rent themes that commentators in Chinese Buddhist history used in surveying sutras in the introductions of their commentaries - most introductory topics in Chinese Buddhist exegesis were derived from or formulated on the basis of these themes. In these seven sections, this article has demonstrated the variation in the breadth and depth of introductory inquiry in commentaries. While the vari­ation in breadth is reflected in the diversity of the themes and their derivative introductory topics, the variation in depth is expressed in the extended examination of and sometimes fluid perception of a subject - in the latter the variation unfolds a subject into its sev-

99 See the formulaic expressions of "formerly ... , but now ... ," as illustrat­ed in the example of the compiler's statement: "Therefore (the Buddha) first (i.e., formerly) presents the teaching of expedience, which is to lay the basis for the perfect and permanent teaching here (in the Mahiiparinirviil}aSLltra)" (T37n1763p381c15).

74 TAOJIN

eral aspects, as shown in the elaboration of essence ~to its various manifestations; it expands the use of a certain topic, as illustrated in the re-conceptualization of zong-qu at the hands of the Huayan scholars; and, last but not the least, it extends and shifts the central focus of a certain subject, as seen in the transition from the "inten­tion of teaching" to the "classification of teachings." Such a varia­tion both in breadth and depth, allows us to observe the ways in which commentators select, organize and present import~nt ques­tions in an introduction, and, in that sense, illustrates the extent of sophistication and complexity of the development in the writing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhist history.

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Citations from the TaishO shinshU daizokyo *IEifM~*it~~ are identified in conformity with the conventions employed in its elec­tronic version, i.e., the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Associa­tion (CBETA). Thus, the first line of Fazang's commentary on Qixin­[un, for example, is identified as T44n1846p240c19 (slightly modified from the original T44n1846p0240c19[00]), i.e., TaishO volume num­ber 44, serial number 1846, page 240, line 19 of the lower (i.e., c) sec­tion (as opposed to the upper [a] and middle [b] sections of that page).

Primary sources

Amituojing shu IloJ)jW8~ifJ1E, by Kuiji mt1i. T37n1757.

Bailun shu B~~Jit, by Jizang 5~. T42n1827.

Chengweishilun shuji gJ<:Ol~~lli§c, by Kuiji mt1i. T43n1830.

Daboruoboluomiduojing boruoliqufen shuzan *~§t:*)El*i~?H,![~§t:*:E!t!z :51llim, by Kuiji mt1i. T33n1695.

Dafangguangfohuayanjing souxuanfenqi tongzhifanggui *:1JJJ'1~*Jii~:f1!l "k":51~im9§':1J:m, by Zhiyan 9§'ii. T35n1732.

Dahuidujing zongyao*~~£~*~, by Wonhyo 7C8~. T33n1697.

Dapanniepanjing jijie *~§t:)i.~~,![~m, attributed to Baoliang W:;!':.. T37n1763.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDillSM 75

Dapanniepanjing yiji *m~5.!E~~~§c, by.Huiyuan ~~. T37n1764.

Dapinjing youyi *&M~Jaifi!, by Jizang ti~. T33n1696.

Dashengqixinlun yiji **re{§§'Ajf~§c, by Fazang ~~. T44n1846.

Dashengqixinlun yishu **re{§*ffli~ifJit, by Huiyuan ~~. T44n1843.

Fahuajing yiji )**~~~§c, by Fayun )*~. T33n1715.

Fahua xuanlun 5**~§'Ajf, by Jizang ti~. T34nl720.

Fahua yishu ~*~ifJit, by Jizang ti~. T34nl721.

Fahua youyi 5**Jaifi!, by Jizang ~~. T34nl722.

Guanwuliangshoufojing shu Wl.~;.~{~~ifJit, by Shandao ~~. T37n1753.

Guanwuliangshoujing yishu Wl.~;.=~~~ifJit, by Huiyuan ~~. T37n1749.

Guanwuliangshoujing yishu Wl.~;.~~~~ifJit, by Jizang ~~. T37n1752.

Huayanjing tanxuanji *iM'~~~~§c, by Fazang 5*~. T35n1733.

Huayanjing wenyigangmu :rbiM'~~:x:~~,jOOJ§, by Fazang )*~. T35n1734.

Huayan youyi *iM'Jaifi!, by Jizang ti~. T35n1731.

lingangboruoboluomijing lueshu ~~Um~;fi5gz~~~~~iIJit, by Zhiyan ~jji. T33n1704.

lingangboruojing shu ~~Umli;fi~~ifJit, attributed to Zhiyi ~ii~. T33n1698.

lingangboruojing zanshu ~~Um~;fi~~~}z!j;, by Kuiji m~. T33n1700.

lingangboruo shu ~~Um~;fiifJit, by Jizang ~~. T33n1699.

lingming xuanlun )~;g~§'Ajf, by Jizang ~~. T38n1780.

Liangjuanwuliangshoujing zongyao m;ffi~;'~~~*¥, by Wonhyo n~. T37n1747.

Miaofalianhuajing wenju frry>*}i*~~:x:"'J, attributed to Zhiyi ~iil T34 nl718.

Miaofalianhuajing xuanyi frrJ>5*}i*~~~~, attributed to Zhiyi ~ii~. T33 nl716.

Miaofalianhuajing xuanzan frrJ>5*}i*~~~~, by Kuiji m~. T34nl723.

Milejing youyi 5I.1jjJJ~}Qffi!, by Jizang ~~. T38nl771.

Mileshangshengjing zongyao ~i!WJl:±~*¥, by Wonhyo n~. T38nl773.

Niepanjing youyi ).!E~~Jaifi!, by Jizang ~~. T38n1768.

Niepan zongyao ).!E~*¥, by Wonhyo nUJil. T38n1769.

76 . TAOJIN

Qixinlunshu bixiaoji m0IDfliifJit*JljU~G, by Zixuan rff. T44n)848.

Renbenyushengjing zhu A*tlX~fJ~tt, by Dao'an m~. T33n1693.

Renwangboruojing shu e.:E.j§~;s:~ifJit, by Jizang e~. T33n1707.

Renwanghuguoboruojing shu {=.:E.ii:i~JN;s:~ifJit, attributed to Zhiyi ~~. T33n1705.

Renwangjing shu e.:E.~ifJit, by Won'chuk ~5J{U. T33n1708.

Shengman baoku )ljjJ(lf@, by Jizang ~~. T37n1744

Shiermenlun shu +-r~IDfliifJit, by Jizang e~. T42n1825.

Shuowugouchengjing shu ~JMI\~#§f~~ifJit, by Kuiji ~~. T38n1782.

Sifenlushanfanbuque xingshichao [Q:fr~ffil!J~M~1T$t), by Daoxuan mW. T40n1804.

Sinp'yon chejong kyojang ch'ongnok *'f~mf'fH&~~J~~1, by Ui'chon ~*. T55n2184.

Weimojing xuanshu ~t.~"t"ifJit, by Zhiyi ~~. T38n1777.

Weimo yiji ~t.~~G, by Huiyuan ~~. T38n1776.

Weishiershilun shuji 1I!E~-+rufU~~c., by Kuiji ~~. T43n1834.

Wenshijing yiji 5.ml.~~!~~c., by Huiyuan ~~. T39n1793.

Wuliangshoujing yishu~;I:.~~ifJit, by Huiyuan ~~. T37n1745.

Yinmingruzhenglilun shu [ZSJ13I3.A1Hll[rufUifJit, by Kuiji ~~. T44n1840.

Yuqieshidilun luezuan :Etu{j]uWj:ftIDfliIll!~, by Kuiji ~~. T43n1829.

Zhu Weimojiejing 5'±~.~~, by Sengzhao {IW •• T38nl775.

Secondary sources

Kimura, Kiyotaka *f1m;1:: "Kegonky5 shiishuron no rekishi to yimi" ¥. ~*JmXrufUO)J1f5:t~lliK (The History and Meaning of the Zongqu Theory about the Avatarrzsakasutra). IBK fPIt~{~~~li.Jt~ 37 (19-1) 1970, pp. 255-61.

. Lopez, Donald S., Jr., ed. Buddhist Hermeneutics. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1988.

Mayer, Alexander. Das Vajracchedika-sutra und die chinesische Auslegung der prajiiii. Ein Beitrag zur Expositorik. Exegese und Hermeneutik im sino-buddhistischen Kommentar (The Vajracchedika-siitra and the Chi­nese Prajiiii Interpretation: A Contribution to the Exposition. Exegesis.

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 77

and Hermeneutics of the Sino-Buddhist Commentary). Habilitation, Heidelberg University 1999. .

Mou, Runsun $5f.lEf*. "Lun rushi liangjia zhi jiangjing yu yishu" §'Alil®flm *L~~~W~iFfrt (On Scripture Lecture and Commentary in Both Con­fucianism and Buddhism). Xinya xuebao *Jr2~¥&, vA n.2 (Feb. 1959), pp.353-415.

OchO, Enichi tJ\ttHI,JB"Shakuky6shiko" f~~se~ (A Study in the History of the Interpretation of Scriptures), Chugoku bukkyo no kenkya t:p~{~~0) tiJf~, vol. 3. Kyoto: Hozokan 1979.

Tang, Yongtong 5®fflfjg. Hanwei liangjin nanbeichao fojiaoshi 5J;ftm~l¥jjt ~)j{~~se, (A History of Buddhism in the Han, Wei, Two Jin, and Southern and Northern Dynasties) Xiandai foxue daxi 27 fJH~{~~*-* 27. Taibei: Mile chubanshe 1982.

Vorenkamp, Dirck. An English Translation of Fa-tsang's Commentary on the Awakening of Faith. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press 2004.

Yan, Shangwen ~f6j)(. Sui tangfojiao zongpai yanjiu ~m{~~*5JIHJf~ (A Study of Buddhist Schools during the Sui and Tang). Taibei: Xinwenfeng chubangongsi 1980.

Glossary

Asvagho~a,\!fr~~

Avataf!lsakasutra *fi~ Baoliang JtJL. ben 2js: benyou 2js:~ bhami :f:tt Bhlivaviveka, or Bhavya 5'j!f~JiF bianjiao shiji ~JiF~8ff~ bianti ~JiF~ bie XlV bodhi:gill!: bu'liB budang 'liB:i: Bukesiyijietuo jing ::fPJ}j~"~lWg>t~ bulei 'liB;!iffi[ busiyi ::f}~~

butang 'liB,. buzhou 'liB,m da* Dao'anm~

dayi*1t. dharmakaya )~::!tr Dharmapiila §j5~ dvipitaka =~ Fa'an )~~ Fayao )M~ Fayun)~~

Fazang )~~ Fazhi )~~ gendan ~~ geyi t~~ Guanding 51m

78 TAOJIN

hejiaoyi !H£~ huiren duoshao Wr A37Y Huiyuan~m

jiao~ jiaobutong ~~ICIT jiaodaxiao ~*/J\ jiaofenqi ~:5t'lZf jiaoqi ~iffi jiaoshe ~~ jiaosuo beiji ~PJT*~ jiaoxiang ~t§ jiaoxing ~JI! jiaoxing suoyou ~~PJTEf3 jiaoyi~~ jiaoyi chabie ~~j£3U jiao zhi fenqi ~L:5t'lZf jiejingzi m*~* jietuo fg!¥~)t jingqizhiyi ~iffiL~ jingyi~~

Jizang ~lJi ju {J] jueming ~B;g jurenfenbie $A:5t3U kaiti Ifflm! kaitixu Ifflm!ff Kuijim~

laiyi *~ laiyimen *~F~ Li Tongxuan '*WE: Mahiiparinirvtir:tas~ttra *Bji531~~~ Mahiiprajiitiptiramittisatra:

~~iiJBji£5~~~37~, *~N~~ mahiiytina ** ming;g mingquan ~;f~ Mou Runsun iF-51'~1* neng ~5 nirvtiIJa 531~ OeM Eniehi t.liffi.~B panjiao !#U~

panjing jiaoxiang !#U~~t§ pankeduan !#Uf4tli ' parinirvtiIJa (Bji)531~ pitaka lJi prajiiti B£t£ pratftya-samutptida ~~iffi pusazang ifililJi Qixinlun iffi1§~ quan t~ SaddharmapuIJ¢arfkasatra fr'Y5tJi

fi~J[ samatha l1: sa1J1stira1=.YE stistra ~ Sengliang {~:lW Sengmin{~~

Sengzhao 1~~ Sengzong 1~* Shandao ~Uf shengsi1=.YE shengwenzang §liQlJi shidazi f~** shiming f~;g shimingti f~;gm! shiqi frEriffi shiti f~m! shitiming f~m!;g shitimu f~m!§ shixiang Jft§ shizao frE1~ shizhi Jf~ shuojingzhiyi m~J[L~ su 1:fr suiwen jieshi ~.i:x:mf~ suopJT suowei youqing PJT1.i9~;~ S[ttra ~ Taishi5 shinsha daizokyo kiE~Jf1I~

*lJi~~ Takakusu Junjir6rSJfi¥j!ll~=.xe~ Tang Yongtong ~m*

INTRODUCTORY TOPICS AND EXEGESIS IN CHINESE BUDDHISM 79

Tanji ~);1f tanjueming ~~g;g Tanyan ~JJ!; . Tanzhun ~~'l tathatii ~3m ti 1m tiR

o Tripitaka=-ii. tuzhong 1iE~ Uich'on~:7i:: Vajracchedikaprajiiiipiiramitiisutra 3'i'iI!!JUn~~5~~~~

Vimalakfrtinirddasutra mJ$~PfT

~~~ vinayaf=it vipasyanii W wenju )(1:i] Won'chuk ~J5Jm Wonhyo If;~ wuchong xuanyi 1im~~ wuyin~Jz:;j

wuzhu~{± xiang;f§ xiao IJ\

xuff xuan~ xuanlun ~~ xuanshu~jfJit

xuanyi~~ Xuanzang~~ xubenyou*JI::2fs:ff xu jiaoxing yi ff~Jt~ xushuo jingyi ff~mg xuwang ffx.

yan1§ Yan Shangwen~fcj)( yao~ yig yin Jz:;j yinqi Jz:;jJre yinyuan Jz:;j~ yi zhang yinqi -~Jz:;jJre yizhi giR yong.F§ you E8 youyi~g

yuanqi ~!Jre zaliaojian ~1Pf.fIij zang ii. zangshe ii.m zaolun suoyou ~~pfTE8 zaolunyi ~~g zhen~ zhi 13 zhiW Zhili 9altl ZhixiuW3§' ZhiyanWfli ZhiyiW~ Zhizang Wii. Zixuan rl?f zong* Zongmi*~ zong-qu*~ zongti*R zongyao*~ zongzhi *13 zongzhi *iX

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION

DURING THE SONG DYNASTY:

WHY DID MAHAYANISTS VENERATE THE ARHAT?'

RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

Introduction

At first glance, it seems odd that Chinese Buddhists have vener­ated arhats. Given that the Mahayana doctrine vehemently rejects the arhat ideal in favor of the bodhisattva path, it appears contra­dictory that Chinese who follow the teachings of Mahayana Bud­dhism have worshipped arhats.2 The painting3 [Fig. 1] shows an

I An early version of this essay was presented at the Five College Bud­dhist Studies Faculty Seminar in Smith College, Apri13rd , 2008. I would like to thank Peter Gregory, Jamie Hubbard, Jay Garfield, Marilyn Rhie, Young Rhie, Susanne Mrozikand Maria Heim for their helpful comments.

2 For instance, the Lotus Satra, one of the best-known Mahayana Bud-. dhist scriptures in China, claims that the arhat is no longer an arhat un­less he heeds to the teaching that the arhat is on his way to becoming the bodhisattva. Chapter two of the Lotus Satra states, "Sariputra, if any of my disciples should claim to be an arhat or a pratyekabuddha and yet does not heed or understand that the Buddhas, the Thus Come Ones, simply teach and convert the bodhisattvas, then he is no disciple of mine, he is no arhat or pratyekabuddha. Again, Sariputra, if there should be monks or nuns who claim that they have already attained the status of arhat, that this is their last incarnation, that they have reached the final nirvi'ilJa, and that therefore they have no further intention of seeking anuttarasamyaksambodhi, then you should understand that such these are all persons of overbearing arrogance." See Burton Watson, The Lotus Satra (New York: Columbia University Press 1993), p. 33.

3 I would like to express my gratitude to Gregory P.A. Levine and Uni­versity of Washington Press for granting me permission to use this image.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 81-116

82 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

example for such arhat worship, portraying what appears to be a scene of what I will refer to as, in a generic term, "the ritual of arhat invitation.''4

The painting depicts a Buddhist monk standing in front of an altar with a portable incense burner in his hands and gazing at the descent of arhats in clouds. Two literati, probably brothers and the sponsors of the ritual, are bowing down behind the monk while their wives are folding their hands respectfully, joining the rite of veneration.5 Meanwhile, four servants in the back are busy setting up food offerings in front of arhat portraits hung on the wall. This scene of arhat invitation appears to be a private family function carried out inside the pavilion of a donor's home adjacent to his garden. The painting is part of the Five Hundred Arhat paintings from Daitokuji *1J!(~ in Kyoto, which were originally produced in China during the Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279).6

Readers familiar with eady Indian Buddhist doctrine may be perplexed at seeing that people have ritually invited arhats for worship, who, by definition, have attained nirvalJa and, therefore, would not return to the world of sa1!lsara. However, this practice has a canonical basis, offering a rather reasonable explanation for engaging in such a seemingly counter-intuitive practice. Accord­ing to A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the Great Arhat Nandimitra, the Buddha, upon entering parinirval}a, yntrusted his Dharma to the Sixteen Great Arhat disciples and their

See Gregory P.A. Levine, Daitokuji: the Visual Cultures of a Zen Monastery (Seattle: University of Washington 2005), p. 294.

4 The ritual was known by several Chinese names, including Luohan qing *-i5l~~ (Invitation of Arhats), Luohan zhai *-i5lJ,llf (Feast of Arhats) and Luo­han gong *-i5l{;!:!: (Offering to Arhats). For my purposes, I will refer to all these forms with the generic term, "ritual of arhat invitation."

5 The lady on the right is looking at her baby held by her baby-sitter.

6 For the study of the Daitokuji set from an art historian's perspective, see Wen Fang, Five Hundred Lohans at the Daitokuji (Princeton University, Ph.D. diss. 1956).

[Fig. 1] Zhou Jichang, Li Tinggui. One scroll from the Five Hundred Arhats, Southern Song Dynasty, ca. 1178. Hanging scroll. Ink and color

on silk. Daitokuji.

84 RY ~ BONGSEOK JOO

retinues and ordered them to prolong their lifespan and stay in the world of sa1J1siira through their supramundane powe~.7 As a result, the Sixteen Arhats and their retinues became deputies during the Buddha's absence, undertaking the duties of protecting the Dharma and becoming the field of merit for a donor. 8

This legend of the living Sixteen Arhats and their retinues was transmitted to China in the seventh century when the famous pil­grim Xuanzang ±r~ (600-664) translated this scripture in. the cap­ital, Chang'an -f.f:'tt.9 However, the actual cultic movement based on the Sixteen Arhats started mu~h later, in the tenth century, when

7 See A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the Great Arhat Nandimitra (Skt. Nandimitravadana; Ch. Da aluohan Nantimiduoluo suoshuo fazhu ji, *IlaJ*I~ iIH~~~*I?JT~5~f±§c.), trans. Xuanzang~~ (600-664), T. no. 2030, 49: 12c-14c.

8 For the study of A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, see Jen Lang Shih, The Perpetuity of the Dharma (University of California, Berke­ley, Ph.D. diss. 2002); Sylvain Levi, and Edouard Chavannes. "Les seize ar­hat protecteurs de la Loi," Journal Asiatique 8 (1916) 206-224; John Strong "The Legend of the Lion-Roarer: A Study of the Buddhist Arhat PiI:H;iola Bharadvaja," Numen 26 (1979), pp. 51-55; Bong Seok Ioo, The Arhat Cult in China from the Seventh through Thirteenth Centuries: Narrative, Art, Space and Ritual (Princeton University, Princeton, Ph.D. diss. 2007), pp. 49-63.

9 Some doubts have arisen as to whether A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma was actually translated by Xuanzang since there is no extant Sanskrit original text. However, Xuanzang is consistently listed as the author of A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma in early Chinese catalogs of the Buddhist canon such as Da Tang neidian lu *~p'g!tlJ,~1( and Kaiyuan shijiao lu 1mj[;~~~~1(. Given that Da Tang neidian lu was compiled in 664 by Xu­anzang's contemporary Daoxuan, and the alleged year of translation of the text was only ten years earlier than the compliment of Da Tang neidian lu, I think this is strong evidence that it was most likely translated by Xuanzang. In addition, there are also Tibetan and Khotanese versions of the A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, which suggest that the text was probably authored outside China. See Da Tang neidian lu *~p'g!tlJ,~1(, Daoxuan m'§' (596-667), T. no. 2149, 55: 325c; Kaiyuan shijiao lu 1mj[;~~~~1(, Zhisheng ~ ¥f. (fl. 730), T. no. 2154, 55: 557b. John Strong also discusses this issue in his article. See Strong, "The Legend of the Lion-Roarer" (cf. n. 8), p. 53.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 85

the arhat motif image and arhat hall were established and widely accepted as independent genres in Chinese Buddhist art and temple architecture.lO'As for the ritual of arhat invitation, it was only in the Song Dynasty (960-1279) that the ritual became known throughout China and gained popularity among lay followersY

In this essay, I am interested in exploring the following questions regarding the ritual of arhat invitation and veneration practices in China. First, how were the Song Dynasty Chinese able to over­come, reconcile or ignore the negative portrayal of the arhat de­picted in Mahayana polemical texts while venerating the arhat in the ritual? In other words, who was the arhat for Chinese Buddhists vis-a-vis the canonical definitions of the arhat? Second, how was the ritual of arhat invitation carried out? Who participated in the ritual, and how long did it last? What kind of images, material of­ferings and ritual instruments were involved? What was the atmo­sphere like? Third, which individuals and groups sponsored the ritual, and why? Did Chinese Buddhist ever imagine that the arhat

10 See Bong Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 67-110, 231-290.

11 There is one exception to this claim. Although it was limited mostly to the monastic community in China, the cult of PiI).<.iola as an independent tradition was already developed as early as the fourth century. According to the hagiography of Dao'an llio/ (312-385), the ritual of inviting the holy monks to bathe was taught to Dao'an by a strange-looking monastic guest who visited Dao'an's monastery in the year 385. After finding that this monk had the supramundane ability to pass in and out of the hall through a small hole in a window, Dao'an asked why he came to see him. The monk's answer was that he came to accompany Dao'an to Tu~ita Heaven where Maitreya Bo­dhisattva resides. However, in order to be reborn in Tu~ita Heaven, the monk mentioned one condition: Dao'an must invite the holy monks to bathe. Fol­lowing the guest monk's instruction, Dao'an performed this ritual of inviting the holy monks and saw the appearance of an unusual child (jeichang xiao'er ~F1It!J\~r.) and his company entering into the bath. In the same hagiography, there is also an episode about the appearance of PiI).<.iola in Dao'an's dream. Dao'an saw PiI).<.iola in his dream, who asked Dao'an to offer foods for him. In exchange, PiI).<.iola promised to help Dao'an spread the Dharma. See Gaoseng zhuan ~{~{t, Huijiao ~8~ (497-554), T. no. 2059, 50: 353b17-c9.

86 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

is specialized in solving certain kinds of human nredicament or suffering? Fourth, in light of recent scholarship on Buddhist ritual by Robert Sharf - particularly his idea of ritual as "adult play" and "Buddhist darsan" - what does the ritual of arhat invitation teU us about Mahayana Buddhist ritual in general?12

Apart from the visual material, there are largely three types of literary sources available for the study of the arhat invitation ritual in China: an indigenous liturgical text by a scholar-officer, Huang Shang ~~ (1044-1130), an eye-witnessed account of the ritual performance recorded in the diary of Japanese monastic pilgrim Jojin ffl(~ (1011-1081), and several short Song Dynasty literati writings on the ritual of arhat invitation including a letter of a fa­mous scholar-officer and writer, Su Shi i*~ (1037-1101). I will examine these sources one by one while providing a translation of these texts.

The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats

The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats (Qing Luohan zanwen ~m~liIx:) is a rare extra-canonical liturgical text composed specifically for the ritual of arhat invitation in China. The text is valuable since it is the earliest extant liturgical text of its kind.13 The author of The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats was Huang Shang ~~ (1044-1130), a high-ranking official from the present-day city of Nanping 1¥.i.lJZ in 'Pujian :ri~ province.14 After passing the highest imperial exami-

12 See Robert Sharf, "Ritual" in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, ed. Donald S. Lopez Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005), pp. 245-270.

13 There is a fifth century canonical text called The Method of Inviting Pil:u!ola (Ch. Qing Bintoulu fa, IDBlMmt5t), translated by Huijian ~M (fl. 457). However, this text concerns only PiI},c,lola and not the entire Sixteen Ar­hats and their retinues. In addition, the language in the text is narrative, not liturgical. For the translation of The Method of Inviting Pir.u!ola, see Bong Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 294-300.

14 In the biography of Huang Shang, his place of origin is listed as Yanping J:!£~, which is the old name of the city of Nanping. It also says that Huang

THE RlTUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 87

nation (jinshi ~±) in the year 1082, Huang Shang served for much of his career in the Department of Rites (Libu Wrl15~). His work at the court was later recognized by the emperor, who granted Huang Shang the honorable title of Shaofu yff upon his death.15 He also left many poems and essays, which were compiled together in sixty volumes titled The Collection ofYanshan (Ch. Yanshanji 5ji[LlJ~).16 The subject of our study, The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats, is also in­cluded in this book.

Given that the eulogy is too lengthy to include the entire text here, I will limit my translation to the parts that are most relevant to the discussion that follows. The text states:

Kings, ministers, elders and lay Buddhists should set up a joyful rit­ual offering and arouse their utmost sincere heart. Then, the honor­able ones along with their retinues will take part in the seats of the five offerings (wushi EDtE)P This [holy] crowd will surreptitiously exercise the virtue of the six supramundane powers (liutong 7\W) simultaneously,18 receive offerings from all fields and reveal their

Shang liked Daoist (Ch. Daojia m*) and mysterious (Ch. Xuanmi t:fJ}) books. See Bide Chang ~1El1~ et al., ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin 5R.A {-'*['.jiil2t~i§ I (Taibei: Dingwen shuju 1974-6), vol. 4, pp. 2866-2867.

15 The title Shaofu ytt is one of the Sangu =W titles, which include Shaoshi ygijJ and Shaobao Y{:if;. The Sangu titles were considered one step below the Sangong =.0 titles consisting of Taishi ;t:gijJ, Taifu ;t:{~ and Tai­bao;t:{:if;.

16 See Huang Shang :;:~ (1044-1130), Yanshanji >~llJ~:3j:,j. 1-60, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Dax­ue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998). For the collection of Huang Shang's writings in modern editions, see Chen Huifen ~*!l3}, ed., Huang Shang sanwen xuanji :;:~j\J~x:~~ (Tianjin: Baihua wenyi chubanshe 1997); Jiang Deming ~1J! f!)j, ed., Huang Shang shu hua :;:~-1'Jil5 (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe 1996).

17 The five offerings consist of unguent, chaplet, incense, food, and lamp.

18 The six supramundane powers (liutong t\:w) refer to the powers of di­vine vision, divine hearing, knowing people's mind, remembering people's previous lives, unimpeded bodily action and the extinction of all defilements. See Mochizuki Shink6, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten, (Tokyo: Sekai Seiten

88 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

form again and again. How could such results not be obtained [if there is] utmost sincerity? .

Therefore, the magnificent offerings [for arhats] were prepared in the JambUdvipa, the great Song (*), the great China (mohezhinaguo r,JgOj :stJj~~)19 in such and such (mou ;Jt)20 province (zhou j'f'/) of such and such (mou ;Jt) village (fang :Ij]) [by] such and such (mou ;Jt) disciple. Arhats enter into sal!lsiira and work inside the burning. house. It is never the case that their power of liberation Uietuoli iWij)tfJ) is insuf­ficient in aiding sentient beings in the ocean of suffering. Nor is it the case that arhats are deficient in benevolence to guide sentient beings away from the path of confusion. [Therefore,] I now set up the seat of the bountiful Dharma assembly and respectfully uphold the order of the Buddha. For the last forty-nine years, the samiidhi was difficult to pursue. [However,] the Sixteen Arhats have constantly existed. Great sincerity will surely bring a response (zhicheng kegan ~@X:PJ~), just like the sound of an echo within a deep valley. The response of the virtuous one is like having the image of the moon on a clear river. [We] wish that [the arhats] have pity on us and hope to have their hon­orable visitation. [Now,] the great assembly chants in one voice and respectfully carries out the rite of invitation.

With one heart (yixin -{,\), [we] reverently invite (fengqing ¥g~) the first great arhat, Pil).c;iolabharadvaja, from the Aparagodanlya continent in the west, and his one thousand arhat retinues. [We] wholeheartedly wish to receive their boundless [holy] assembly. Have pity on sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall. In the Aparagodanlya continent in the west, the self-awakened ones already set themselves free from all outflows (wulou ~~ffiffl). In the Central Land (zhongtu cp±),21 even more karmic affinity (with the arhats) has been established as we wel­come them. Who gets to be the foremost in spiritual cultivation and

Kank5 Ky5kai 1955-63), p. 5060.

19 Zhina 3tjj~ was the ancient name of China used by people in India and Central Asia.

20 On the meaning of the character ;lj!;, see below p. 93.

21 The Central Land (zhongtu r:p±) refers to China.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 89

benefit this world? Among the sixteen of honorary rank, [PiI.1qola]

should be the first.

... With one heart, [we] reverently invite the fourth great arhat, Subinda, from the Uttarkuru continent in the north, and his one thousand arhat retinues. [We] wholeheartedly wish to receive their boundless [holy] assembly. Have pity on sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall. In a trance-like state, [Subinda] suddenly hears the sound of calling from the Central Land. Being leisurely and carefree, [Subinda] peace­fully stays in the cloud of the northern continent. Flowers and flags are waving inside the spacious Dharma hall. [One] should believe that

in the midst of ordinary people, there are holy ones.

The honorable ones rest their bodies in the tenth bhumi (shidi +:ttt)22 and their virtue appears in three luminous lights. Some [of them] hide their light when encountering sentient beings. Some reveal their form in empty space. Some breathe wind and cloud in and out [while] some ride on dragons and tigers. [As they] respond with the eight methods

of liberation (bajie !\~~),23 ten thousand spirits (wanting ;lit.) look

at them with awe.

22 The tenth bhumi (shiti +:ttt) refers to the last stage in the development of a bodhisattva into a Buddha. There are several ways to define the ten stag­es including the ten stages of Mahayana bodhisattva development (Dash eng pusa shidi **~~+:ttt), the ten sriivaka stages (Shengwensheng shidi ~M *+:ttt) and the ten stages of the pratyekabuddha (Yuanjuesheng shidi ~$:1f* +:ttt). The most well-known ten stages development in China was that of the Mahayana bodhisattva, originating from the Flower Garland Sutra (Huayan jing ~Ji'~~, Skt. Avatar!ISakasatra). The tenth bhami in the development of a bodhisattva into a Buddha is named "the stage of Dharma Cloud" (Skt. Dharmamegha, Ch.fayun di ;~~:ttt). The person in this last stage is equipped with countless merits and wisdom and can "rain" the Buddha's Dharma to all sentient beings. For more information on the tenth bhami, see Mochizuki Shink5, Mochizuki bukkyi5 daijiten (cf. n. 18), pp. 2297-2303.

23 The eight methods of liberation (bajie )\~~) consist of (1) liberation through the realization of filthiness in objects as desire arises within, (2) lib­eration through meditating on filthiness in objects when no desire arises, (3) liberation through the realization of a permanent state of freedom from all desire, (4) liberation through the realization of the infinity of space, (5) lib­eration through the realization of infinite knowledge, (6) liberation through

90 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

... With one heart, [we] reverently invite the seventh great arhat, Kalika, from the Sarrghatadvlpa continent, and his one thousand arhat reti­nues. [We] wholeheartedly wish to receive their boundless [holy] as­sembly. Have pity on sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall. Would the arhat respond only to affairs leading up to the achievement of Buddhahood? [He] still composes poetry together with [Daoist] immortals and has patience not to pass into nirvtiIJa. [Kalika] rushes

into the ocean of suffering only because of sentient beings.

Honorable ones! Some [of you] have serene and exotic appearances while some have extraordinary and wonderful characters. Some [of you] enjoy drifting and floating in the air while some [of you] are wholly engrossed in [the act of] contemplation. Your mind (xin )~\)

has both fullness and emptiness, and your nature (xing t1.) does not have inner and outer differentiation. [You] ride on clouds and cranes and leave the otherworldly home of tranquility. [You] cross over moon and cloud to receive the magnificent offerings from this world. Hon­orable ones, please let [your] vessel of Dharma (faqi )l;~)24 accept these offerings and let the light of [your] mind enlighten us. If there is sincerity, there must be resonance. If there was no seeking, neither would there be any response. Please withdraw from [your] samtidhi temporarily and grant [us] swiftly the dignified vision [of yourself]! Please come to [this place of] twinkling lights soon and become the merit field of sentient beings. It is all because the arhats are compas­sionate and sympathetic. Indeed, it is because they are compassionate

and sympathetic .

. .. [Our] admiration to the honorable Sixteen Ones, their retinues and others! Those [of you] who reside in different continents (zhou y'I'!) have the view of water and moon. Those [of you] who are entrusted with mountains (shan llD have the comfort of spring water and rock.

the realization of nothingness or nowhereness, (7) liberation through having neither thought nor absence of thought, (8) liberation through attaining the state of nirviiIJa. See Mochizuki Shinko, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 18), pp. 4206-7; Charles Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, (http:// www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/ accessed April 28, 2006).

24 In this context, I think the vessel of Dharma (faqi 5l;~) is a metaphoric way of denoting the arhat's body.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 91

Those living in the country (guo ~) become fellow friends with hu­man beings [while] those living in heaven (tian *) become partners with the immortals (xian 1l1J). Although their names are different, they are equal in regards to [having] the [same] virtue (de qf!(). Although their abodes are varying, they are united with the [same] heart. There­fore, they abide by the Tathagata's entrustment and disseminate [his Dharma] throughout the world. Their cultivation of the Way is all for the purpose of clarifying the view of the unborn (wusheng ~~), rid­ing on the wheel of the non-returner (butui /f'~), being awakened suddenly to the three levels of emptiness (sankong .=:@),25 quickly moving beyond the tenth bhami (shidi +:f:ili), opening the latch of the door to emptiness and freeing the block on the road to awakening. Their acceptance of our offerings is all for the purpose of unlocking the door of expedient means (fangbian jJ{f), establishing the hall of compassion, providing the essence of one hundred Dharma (baifa s5*), guiding their sentient beings and creating the karmic affinity [lasting] three periods (sanshi =f!:t).26 [We] beseech you to descend to this world. Today is even more special, [given that we have] pre­pared a dignified assembly and conveyed our reverent sincerity. The [ritual] implements and material [donations] compete in color while incense and flowers vie for their scent. We beseech the honorable ones along with all Buddhas, bodhisattva-mahasattvas, and others in the universe to visit us. [Please] come neither too quickly nor too slowly. Regardless of distance or nearness, once the six bands of the staff have made their sound, [the arhats] leave the pavilions in the mountains and oceans. With one breath, [the arhats make] clouds and depart the grotto palaces (dongfu 515liff) under cliffs. [We] dutifully welcome you

25 The three levels of emptiness (sankong -=~) imply emptiness of oneself (wogong flt~), emptiness of dharma (fakong 5*~) and emptiness of empti­ness (kongkong ~~). The last, emptiness of emptiness, is sometimes re­placed by emptiness of all phenomena (jukong 1J!~). See Mochizuki Shinko, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 18), p. 1486.

26 The three periods (sanshi =f!:t; Skt. traiyadhvika) refer to past, present and future. See Mochizuki Shinko, Mochizuki bukkyo daijiten (cf. n. 18), pp. 1592-4.

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all without making distinction. [Please] have pity on sentient beings, come to this Dharma hall and receive these offerings.27

The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats reveals that the author, Huang Shang, was an erudite scholar-officer who had great interest in the Bud­dhist tradition. He had obviously read A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, having matched all Sixteen Arhats' names in Chinese characters and sharing a similar narrative about how the Sixteen Arhats became the field of merit during the Buddha's absence.28 In addition, the text shows that Huang Shang understood much tech­nical Buddhist terminology such as the tenth bhiimi (shidi +:l:tt), the eight methods of liberation (bajie AM), the six supramundane powers (liutong :t\W) and the five offerings (wushi .litif[). On the other hand, although it was not unusual for Buddhist clergy to ask prominent literati to write commemorative writings for Buddhist architecture during the Song Dynasty, it is noteworthy that the task of writing a liturgical text was also taken up by a literatus instead of a Buddhist priest. 29 I suspect that this might have had more to do with the fact that Huang Shang worked for the Department of Rites (Libu ffrl=&B). Although the text does not mention why Huang Shang composed this eulogy, it nevertheless reveals that this text was not composed just for the ritual performance of his family. Instead, it was intended for much wider usage. For example, in the introduc-

> 27 See Huang Shang fi~ (1044-1130), Yanshan jijuan )j[LlJ~3J:, j. 36, pp. 1a-8b, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

28 The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats also mentions the Chinese title of A Re­cord of the Perpetuity of the Dharma with a slight variation, as The Satra of the Perpetuity of the Dharma (fazhu jing >t{U!rD. A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma is the only Buddhist scripture in Chinese recording the names of the Sixteen Arhats and their residences.

29 For an examination ofthe Song Dynasty literati's commemorative writ­ings on Buddhist architectures, see Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: Lite­rati Perspectives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279 (Cambridge: Har­vard University Press 2006).

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 93

tory part, the character mou * meaning "such and such" appears three times .

.. . the magnificent offerings (for arhats) were set up in the Jambudvipa, the great Song (*), the great China (mohezhinaguo ~gEiJ3tJj~~) in such and such (mou ~) province (zhou )'1'[) of such and such (moLt ~)

village (fang:9]) [by] such and such (moLt ~) disciple.

The character mou * is supposed to be replaced by the names of the province, village and person specific to each ritual perfor­mance. This suggests that the author intended that this text be used by many different people carrying out the ritual of arhat invitation. Unfortunately, since there is no independent Song Dynasty record of this text, it is almost impossible to know how widely The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats was circulated and used for actual ritual service.

The language in this text is descriptive and beseeching, all at the same time. The descriptive part reveals that the identity and behavior patterns of the arhat are quite similar to those of the bo­dhisattva and the Daoist immortal (xian {W). According to Huang Shang, the Sixteen Arhats and their retinues are "compassionate and sympathetic" beings who can unlock "the door of expedient means" to aid "sentient beings in the ocean of suffering." Like the bodhisattvas, they respond to many people's requests simultane­ously while remaining in "the tenth bhiimi." These descriptions suggest that Huang Shang saw virtually no difference between the arhat and the bodhisattva.

Similarly, arhats are also depicted not only as friends of Daoist immortals but also as sharing some of their characteristics. For instance, some arhats and their retinues are described as "partners with immortals" while engaging in leisurely activity of "composing poetry" together. Like Daoist immortals, arhats can ride on clouds and cranes and know how to control dragons. Some arhats live in "a grotto heaven," which is also one of the places of residence for immortals.3D Notably, many of these descriptions of the arhat are

30 For a study of Daoist grotto heavens, see Franciscus Verellen,"The Be-

94 RYAN BONGSEOK 100

consistent with Song Dynasty arhat images.31 Thi~ suggests that Huang Shang's vision of the arhats was not unique but shared by many of his contemporary Chinese.

Another characteristic of the language is its beseeching tone. Sometimes, the text is addressed directly to the arhats, proving for certain that the text was written for the ritual performance. For ex­ample, the following paragraph was quoted sixteen times whenever a new arhat was introduced and called upon.

With one heart (yixin -)~,), [we] reverently invite (jengqing ¥~) the first great arhat, Pir:u;iolabharadvaja from the Aparagodanlya conti­nent in west, and his one thousand arhat retinues. [We] wholeheart­edly wish to receive their boundless [holy] assembly. Have pity on

sentient beings and come to this Dharma hall.

What is interesting about this way of addressing the arhat is that behind the highly reverential language, the author is also asking the arhat to behave in a certain way. Another example is:

Honorable ones! Some [of you] have serene and exotic appearances while some have extraordinary and wonderful characters. Some [of you] enjoy drifting and floating in the air while some [of you] are wholly engrossed in observation; ... Please refrain from [your] samadhi temporarily and grant [us] swiftly the dignified appearance [of yourself]! Please come to [this place of] twinkling lights soon and

become the merit field of sentient beings.

Here, the author first praises the appearance and ability of the arhat. Then, the tone of its voice shifts and the author asks the arhats directly but politely to leave their meditation temporarily to act as the field of merit, as they have promised to the Buddha.

In his study of early Japanese death ritual poetry, Gary L. Ebersole also notices the power of ritual language and quotes a section from

yond Within: Grotto-heavens (dongtian ;1EJ7::) in Taoist Ritual and Cosmol­ogy," Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie 8 (1995), pp. 265-290.

31 The arhat images were represented to resemble Chan masters, immortals, literati and recluses. See Bong Seok Joo, The Arhat Cult (cf. n. 8), pp. 136-158.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 95

the Japanese preface to the Kokinshu: "it is poetry which, without effort, moves heaven and earth, stirs the feelings of the invisible gods and spirits, smoothes the relations of men and women, and calms the hearts of fierce warriors."32 Ebersole then adds that the ritual poem frequently acts as "a linguistic means of manipulating religio­political power in the human sphere as well as of manipulating the spiritual powers including the kami and the spirits of the dead."33 In my analysis, the polite and reverential language in The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats ultimately serves similar functions. The language was meant to "stir the feelings of the invisible" arhats and to manipulate their "spiritual powers." For example, by repeatedly calling them "compassionate" and "sympathetic," Huang Shang, or anyone who recites this text aloud in a ritual setting, is, in a way, compelling arhats to show their compassion and sympathy_ In other words, the ritual language in The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats is not merely describing who the arhats are. Rather, it is a tool used by the author to orchestrate the entire ritual process.

The text gives only a general description of the ritual performance. In its closing words, it briefly mentions the presence of ritual implements, incense and flowers inside the hall where the ritual is carried out. However, it repeatedly emphasizes one prerequisite for the ritual performance: in order to succeed in inviting the Sixteen Arhats, participants must be very sincere. Huang Shang wrote, "Great sincerity will surely bring a response (zhicheng kegan .¥ ~PJ~), just like the sound of an echo within a deep valley." This belief about great sincerity bringing a response or resonance is a fundamental belief underlying The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. If the result of the ritual were successful, the author would say that it was because the arhats responded to people's sincerity.

Interestingly, this particular language of sincerity and resonance originated from an indigenous tradition dating back to the time of

32 See Gary Ebersole, Ritual Poetry and the Politics of Death in Early Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), p. 19.

33 Ibid., p. 19.

96 RYAN BONGSEOKJOO

the Han ~ Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE).34 According to The Book of Documents (Shu jing .~~), "great sincerity [ca~] move gods" (zhicheng ganshen ~~~t$).35 In the "Great Treatise" chapter of The Book of Changes (Yi jing ~~), it also says, "when stimulated (gan ~) it penetrates (tong W)."36 However, this does not mean that Buddhist tradition did not value sincerity when evoking deity's presence. In fact, according to A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, before setting up offerings for the monks of fo~r direc­tions, one's "sincere and pure mind" has to be present first.37 An­other scripturual text called, Tlie Method of Inviting Pi1:uj.ola also mentions that if one wants to obtain the presence of PiI).Q.ola, one should prepare various offerings and "believe with great sincerity" that PiI).Q.ola will come to the offering.38 What this exemplifies is a case of pre-Buddhist Chinese ideology conforming well to Indian inheritance, or vice versa.

34 Another similar expression in Chinese is ganyin ~/JI;, translated as "sympathetic resonance." For a more extensive discussion of· ganyin, see Robert Sharf, Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism (Honolulu: Univer­sity of Hawaii Press 2002), pp. 82-88.

35 See Shujing.~ in Shisanjing zhusu +==~)±ifJit (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju 1979), vol. 4, p. 25b.

';" 36 For the complete translation and study of the Great Treatise chapter (Da zhuan or Xi cizhuan) see Gerald Swanson, "The Great Treatise: Commentary Tradition of the Book of Change" (University of Washington, Ph.D. diss. 1974). Also see John Kieschnick, The Eminent Monk, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 1997) p. 101; ehlin-Fang Yli, Kuan-yin: the Chinese transforma­tion of AvalokiteSvara, (New York: Columbia University Press 2001) p. 157.

37 See A Record of the Perpetuity of the Dharma, Narrated by the Great Arhat Nandimitra (Skt. Nandimitrtivadiina; Ch. Da aluohan Nantimiduoluo suoshuo fazhu ji, *lloJm~.m~~mfJT~)*{H['), trans. Xuanzang ~~ (600-664), T. no. 2030, 49:13b. Also see Jen Lang Shih's translation The Perpetuity of the Dharma (cf. n. 8), p. 213.

38 Qing bintoulu fa, IDW~lmJa)* trans. Huijian ~tm (fl.457), T. no. 1689, 32: 784c.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 97

The ritual of arhat invitation in the diary of Jojin

After visiting. the Tiantai Mountains (Tiantaishan :7(EnlJ) , the Japanese monastic pilgrim Jojin fflG~ (1011-1081) headed out to Kaifeng Iffl!t. the capital ofthe Northern Song Dynasty, in the year 1072. According to his diary, Jojin had an opportunity to witness the ritual of arhat invitation offering in one of the major temples in Kaifeng, Dapingxingguo monastery (Dapingxingguosi *.:ifJ!! ~~). It is noteworthy that the ritual was performed in the capi­tal city, evidence of the growing popularity of this ritual beyond Zhejiang and nearby provinces where the cult of arhats had been most popular in the previous century. The ritual service was per­formed at the beginning of winter, the thirtieth day of the tenth lunar month. Jojin's diary record states:

On the thirtieth day, the weather was clear; ... Around noon (Jp. uma­doki, Ch. wushi q::B~), [the ritual of] arhat offering (Jp. Rakan kyo, Ch. Luohan gong m)~f~) [began]. The lecture hall was decorated, with spread canopy and hanging needle-sewn images (Jp. nuimono, Ch. fengwu f.ili~) of the Sixteen Arhats and one image of Sizhou )[9 jl[I[ master.39 Each one was about two chi R wide and four chi tall.4o

In front of the seats [of the images], there were offerings made of gold and silver, flowers, etc. In front of those [offerings], the sweet body of golden dancing (Jp. Gigaku, Ch. lile ffi:~) bodhisattvas stood.41 Their height was about two chi. In front of those [bodhisattvas], there was the food offering of one hundred different flavors followed by the offering of burning incense. Cymbals (Jp. batsu, Ch. bo ~) were struck four

39 Sizhou 5[9)+[ master refers to the eminent Buddhist monk named Sengjia {~{f.m (fl. 1016) who was known as one of the Five Hundred Arhats. Sizhou refers to the area in Anhui !ft':m& province where Sengjia master used to stay.

40 One chi R. is about 33 centimeters. Thus, two chi is about 66 centime­ters long while four chi is about 132 centimeters long.

41 It is not clear what the sweet body of golden dancing (Jp. Gigaku Ch. lile 12~) bodhisattvas is. Given that it is only 66 centimeters tall, it cannot be real people dressed like bodhisattvas. My educated guess would be that it is the image of a dancer or musician made of either gold-colored paper or sweet material such as sugar.

98 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

times, a small drum (Jp. ko, Ch. gu ~R) once and a hand bell (Jp. nyo, Ch. nao £~) once and a wooden percussion (Jp. Mfa'n, Ch. fadan 5* ~) once. The sound of praise filled the entire room. Next, incense was lighted in all halls [within the monastery] and [people] chanted praise. Next, [the assembly of the ritual participants] moved toward the living quarters while holding the Buddha image (Jp. jibutzu, Ch. chifo :fif1~). [The assembly] first went to the associate abbot's room (Jp. Shokei bo, Ch. Shaoqing fang jrgff~m). [He] donated one roll of silk to the Bud­dha. Next, from the [master] Tripitaka's (Jp. sanzo, Ch. sanzang -=-~) room, one string of coins was donated. Next, [the assembly] paid their respect to the Earth Guardian Protector of the Dharma (Jp. iishugoho, Ch. Tizhuhufa :tfu'±'~I5*).42 Next, [they] moved toward master Chong­fan's ,*JI: room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master Guangzhi's!J['W room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master Zhaoda's ~* room. [He] donated one roll of silk. The next quarter was locked. [The assembly] pressed down the lock, shouted a number of times, and [then] moved on [to the next]. The next was J6jin's room. [I] donated two rolls of silk. The associate abbot, Tripitaka [master], and others returned one roll [to me]. Next was master Wenhui's )(~ room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next was master Ciji's 1i1f.m room. [He] donated one roll of silk. Next, [the assembly] returned to the original hall [where the ritual was performed]. Around two o'clock (Jp. hitsujidoki, Ch. weishi *B~), Tripitaka master sent three items: a head scarf (Jp. zukin, Ch. toujin \mrtJ), four liang ~43 of Longnao ~~ij~ incense, and Rukou ~LD silk. Then Wenhui master came and brought one jin fT44 of tea. He wrote [his words] and said, "[this tea] is the finest tea of Lu Mountain JlILlJ. [Please] take this to Japan and offer it to eminent monks. The interpreter bhik/ju Zhipu 'Wllff sealed [the tea bag], which won the honor of being bound together with [the statue of]

42 Earth Guardian, Protector of the Dharma (Jp. jishugoho Ch. Tizhu hufa tfu.:tiil5*) was probably the local earth god who became incorporated into the Buddhist pantheon. Another possibility is that this refers to a wealthy layman who supports the temple.

43 One liang m is about 37 grams. Thus, the four liang are about 148 grams.

44 One jin IT is a little more than 500 grams.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 99

MafijusrI bodhisattva. Around eight o'clock [at night] (Jp. inudoki, Ch . . xushi fX8~), from the quarters of Tripi!aka master, eight kinds of pre­

cious fruit and one bottle of wine were sent. This morning, all monks [in the monastery] received eight kinds of soups and precious foods. Tonight, it was to be repeated just as before. This [announcement] was repeated. In a couple of hours, the associate abbot and Tripitaka master invited [me] to come to the arhat offering and have tea, snacks and more. All day and night, the instrumental music and the songs of praise [were performed], and [the participants] ate porridge and fruits. Although there were frequent requests to come out and join [the ritual], I could not find free time and [thus could] not go. [It was] very regrettable. Around two o'clock [at night] (Jp. ushidoki, ch. choushi ff:B~), [the monk,] Kedao PJlli [who is] the facilitator of the hall (Jp. tenjo, Ch. dianzuo :J:I!l,~) came and brought nine hundred coins [that he] put aside. Two hundred coins were given to the old monk45 and one hundred each were given to seven monks. [These were] the leftover offerings after the chanting (Jp. nenbutsu, Ch. nianfo Z:{~). The old monk recited the blessing and accepted it. The Dharma activity was [finally] over at that time.46

The ritual of arhat invitation that Jojin witnessed was a grand ser­vice involving virtually everyone and every hall in the monastery. The decorations and offerings prepared for the ritual were elab­orate. Canopies were hung and the Sixteen Arhat images, which were not painted but sewn on fabric, were installed. In addition to

45 I think the old monk refers to Jojin himself.

46 For the annotated reprint of Jojin's San Tendai Godaisan ki fi.7'ef:iE Ei'uJiic, see Hirabayashi Fumio :iJZ#::x:tt, San Tendai Godaisanki Kohon narabini Kenkya ~7'eEi'EEi'LiJ*ctx;zjs::slft(;:liJf~ (Tokyo: Kazamashobo MrB~ ~m 1978) pp. 140-1. There are extensive scholarly works on Jojin's text available. See Fujiyosi Masumi iii:g~5§:, San Tendai Godaisanki no Kenkya ~7'eEi'1i~LiJ*cCVliJf~ (Osaka: Kansai Daigaku Tozai Gakujutsu Kenkyiijo 2006); 0 Reihei .:EB3~, Sodai no Chanichi Koryashi Kenkya *{-1(;CVCPB Y::5fris!:liJf~ (Tokyo: Benseisha 2002); Nakajima Ryoichi CP§':;u-, "San Tendai Godaisanki no Mondaiten r~7'eEi'1iEi'LiJ*CJ CVFo~~l'LB," Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkya 27 (December, 1978): 250-253. For more works on Jojin's text, see Hirabayashi Fumio's book, pp. 441-3.

100 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

the Sixteen Arhats, the image of the eminent Chinese monk Sizhou 5e.rJj'f'[, who was regarded as a reincarnated arhat, was added. Several rows of offerings were placed in front of the arhats, beginning with flowers and followed by images of dancing (Jp. Gigaku, Ch. Jiyue 15t~) bodhisattvas. Most importantly, many different kinds of food offerings were prepared before the images.

The actual ritual procedure seems to have been relatively un­complicated, but very long. Starting by burning incense .and play­ing different instruments, the assembly inside the hall then chanted the hymn (zan iiJ) of the Sixteen Arhats. Jojin did not describe what exactly they were chanting. It is possible that they used a ritual text similar to The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. 47 Next, the as­sembly dispersed and went to different halls within the monastery. They burnt incense and chanted in all halls of the monastery at the same time. Since other deities were enshrined in other parts of the temple, this act probably signifies the invitation of all other Bud­dhist deities besides arhats. Then, the assembly joined again and held a procession to the living quarters of the monks, while holding the Buddha's image. When the assembly arrived, each monk had to donate either a roll of silk or a string of coins. Jojin was also vis­ited by the assembly. He donated two rolls of silk, but one roll was returned to him. It is not clear why this part was incorporated into the ritual of arhat invitation. It might have served as an occasion for monks to make merit or pay their respect to their arhat ances­tors and other Buddhist deities. Afterward, the assembly returned to the ritual hall, and different offerings and foods were sent out to all monks in the living quarters.

Surprisingly, the ritual continued all night long. The assembly kept on chanting praise and playing instruments periodically. There was enough tea, snacks and food to go around for everyone. This suggests that the mood of the ritual was festive. It was time to share

47 Since Huang Shang passed his imperial examination in the year 1082, it is most likely that The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats was written after J6jin's visit to the capital city.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 101

foods, gifts and money among all monks. Jojin was no exception to this rule. Although he was just a visiting monk from Japan and did not actively participate in the ritual, he and his entourage were given fruit, wine, food, tea, silk, headscarves and even money. Un­fortunately, Jojin did not record who sponsored this ritual and why s/he did it. Given the size of the ritual, the donor must have been quite wealthy. To find out the possibly diverse motivations behind sponsoring the rituals, we need to examine the Song Dynasty lite­rati records on the ritual of arhat invitation.

Literati writings on the ritual of arhat invitation

Compared to Jojin's diary, many Song Dynasty records concerning the ritual of arhat invitation are less descriptive and more poetic, as they were written mostly by literati. They are usually brief and eu­logistic, and the number of extant records is limited. Nonetheless, they survive in sufficient numbers to help us examine the reasons for sponsoring the arhat ritual. From these writings, we see not only why the medieval Chinese performed the ritual but also what sort of abilities they imagined the arhat to possess.

In gratitude for passing the examinations

The first record is written by a literatus named Shi Tianzhi 9:7(1)t. We know almost nothing about the author other than that he was a Song Dynasty literatus.48 However, from the record we can imagine what kind of life he led. The title reveals quite a bit about the con­tent that follows; it is "The Memorial of Gratitude for Passing [the Imperial Examinations] and Setting Up of the Arhat Ritual (Xie­dengdi sheluohanzhai shu ~f~$§.§t*l~~'j!fiIfft)." The text states:

48 Shi Tianzhi's name is not listed in the Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin. However, the Siku quanshu (Wenyuange edition) contains eight essays by Shi Tianzhi. They are all within the book series titled Wubaijia bofang daquan­wencui. See Wei Qixian ~'JifW ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui llEHR ¥.i7¥7c~>Cf4,j. 14,15,17,37,79,81, Sikuquanshu, WenyuangeSikuquan­shu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

102 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

Although the Way of Heaven (tiandao 5ICm) is distan!, it listens [even] to the lowly beings. Gods (shen ~$) reside in all directions, and [thus] if there is a request, surely there will be a response. I often prepare offerings of fruits and· vegetables and respectfully convey my sincere heart. [I] lay down and thought [to myself] that I was unfortunate, living alone even in these late years. Since I had to pass the imperial examinations at the county, regional and provincial levels, even more worries were added to [my] anxious mind. I was afraid of not having [my] name on the list [of those who had passed the examination]. Even in dreams, I saw the absence of my name. Suddenly, looking at the face of-my [present] life, [I realize that] I made the poverty of earlier days disappear and attained the governmental position in the south which I had wanted earlier. As I have pursued prosperity and happi­ness, they [seem to] have come from the help of the unseen world. On the morning of Insect Awakening Day Uingzhe .~)49 of the second spring month (zhongchun f9='~), it is also befitting for the day of the true governors (zhenzai ~*)50 descending. I eagerly spread out the pure offerings and welcome the wind of immortals (xian flLr). I humbly beseech the great gentlemen (dashi *±) to examine [this place] and the true [governors] to bestow protection. [Please] remove the signs of a lifetime's bad luck and open up the road of ten thousand li ahead [of me]. [Please] make my vocational path smooth and let my life span

be long.51

Shi Tianzhi's motivation for sponsoring the ritual of arhat invita­tion was very personal, originating in a specific situation in his life.

"~As the title indicates, the author set up the ritual in gratitude for having passed the imperial examinations and obtaining the official position that he had previously wanted. Before taking the examina­tions, he often made offerings and prayed to the arhats and gods.

49 Insect Awakening Day Uingzhe .~) is one of the 24 seasonal divisions based on the length of the day and the sun's shadow at noon. It is usually around March 5th or 6th on the solar calendar.

50 The "true governor" here implies the arhat.

51 See Wei Qixian ~'jl;fJf ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui (cf. n. 48), j. 81, pp. 18a-18b.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 103

He believed that the gods would listen and respond to his prayer even if he was just a "lowly being" without a wife or career. Af­ter successfully passing the examinations, he still remembered the help from the "unseen world" that he might have received. Thus, he sponsored the ritual in the early spring, on the morning of Insect Awakening Day Uingzhe ~m). Formally inviting the arhats, he requested that they descend to the ritual space where he prepared "pure offerings." This portion of the memorial sounds somewhat similar to Huang Shang's The Eulogy of Inviting Arhats. This sug­gests that Shi Tianzhi's memorial could have been recited at that time of ritual service.

Shi Tianzhi designated arhats with different names. Arhats were referred to with the titles of "the true governor" (zhenzai ~*), "the immortal" (xian111J) and "the great gentleman" (dashi *±), as if they were local gods, immortals and bodhisattvas.52 The last part of the memorial specifies the kind of help the author would like to receive from the arhats in the future. More than anything else, Shi Tianzhi desired the aid of the arhats in his burgeoning career. He believed that the arhats could help him clear away any unforeseen obstacles to the advancement of his career in office. In addition, he asked thearhats to help him live a long life.

For my deceased mother

In contrast to Shi Tianzhi, Li Qubing *"*Wg sponsored the ritual of arhat invitation not for himself but for his deceased mother. 53

The text is short, providing only limited information about the au­thor's (and his mother's) specific situation. However, the title is long and informative: "The Memorial on Setting Up the Arhat Ritual on

52 Guanyin bodhisattva was often called "dashi." See Chiin-Fang Yii, Kuan-yin (cf. n. 36), p. 345, 357, 373 and 417.

53 There is not much information on Li Qubing. Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin only mentions his style name, Zhonghuo {rpm and his place of origin, Mincheng ~~tm. See Bide Chang ~1EZ:1~ et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 2, p. 964.

104 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

Behalf of [Deceased] Mother (Jianmu sheluohanzhai shu ~-ag5Hi ;~Jlfi&'R)."54 Let us read the text and find out why he sponsored the ritual. It states:

[Since the arhats] have not forgotten the entrustment [of the Buddha], [the sentient beings can] have this wonderful karmic affinity [with them]. (As the arhats] possess the six supramundane powers (liu­tongzhishen 7'\WZ1$), (they] know everything and see everything. (Please] withdraw from the samadhi, come this way and arrive here! [Please] become my mother's spiritual guide (daoshi ~giiJ), take the place of all Buddhas and send down [your blessing] to my family. That will correspond exactly to our sincere wishes. 55

The overall structure of this text is similar to the previous one by Shi Tianzhi. The text has three parts. The first part gives a general background about arhats, such as the Buddha's entrusting of the Dharma to the arhats and a mention of their supramundane powers. The second part describes calling the arhats and inviting them to the ritual space. After extending the invitation, the author moves on to the third part, expressing his wishes to the arhats. From this last part, we can know more about Li Qubing's reasons for sponsor­ing the ritual. He first asks the arhats to become his mother's spiri­tual guide (daoshi ~giP). Given that his mother has already passed away, the author is probably requesting that the arhats guide his mother to a better rebirth, perhaps in the Pure Land. The second wish concerns his living family. Li Qubing beseeches the arhats to

54 The first character in the title, jian li, implies that the author's mother was deceased at the time this text was written. In classical Chinese,jian usu­ally means, "to make an offering"(jinxian }t~ or xiangji ¥~) in a ritual setting. In Buddhist context, jian is used together with the character zhui lli in zhuijian lilli. It means, "To make offerings on behalf of a deceased person and his or her well being." See Chen Fuhua ~*~i/2 et al. ed., Gudai Hanyu cidian tI{-I;;~~g~iiJ~ (Nanjing: Shangwu yinshuguan 1998), p. 752; Charles Muller, ed., Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, (cf. n. 23, accessed July 1,2006).

55 See Wei Qixian ~'illfN ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui (cf. n. 48), j. 82, p. 9b.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 105

take the place of the Buddha, who is not present in this universe, and bless his family. All of his wishes are family-centered and, in contrast to the first text, not at all related to the author's career or long life.

For the health and prosperity of my family

A third account also concerns family, although, unlike the second one, here the ritual is not dedicated to a specific member of the au­thor's family. The author is Han Iu ~~t~ (?-1135), a Song Dynasty literatus from Xianjing 1w# in Sichuan IZ:QJ r 1.56 He was the student of Su Zhe ~*m: (1039-1112), a younger brother of Su Shi and a well-known poet and scholar-officialY The title, "Setting Up the Arhat Offering and Praying for Well-Being (Sheluahangang qi'an g5[m5J;1tH1T~),' reveals that Han Iu prays to the arhats for the gen­eral well-being of his family. The text states:

The bodhisattva responds to the calls of his karmic affinity and [there­by] has become the king of longevity. The srtivaka (shengwen !fi:p,j;j)58 benefits the world greatly and [thus has become] no different than the arhat. The assembly of Chan (Chanzhong 1~~), which respectfully relies on [the arhats], venerates [them] and cultivates the truth. [I hum­bly] bow down and wish that my family be healthy and untroubled while my posterity (zisun -=t-I*) prosper. [May my family remain]

56 Xianjing is modern day Iingyan #liff city in Sichuan. For the biography of Han Iu, see Bide Chang ~iE'ti~ et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 4151-2.

57 The styled name (zi ~) of Han Iu ~t,~ was Han Zicang ~t-=t-i.', and sometimes his poems are under his styled name. His poems became well known because they resembled the poems of famous Tang Dynasty writer, Chu Guangxi fi.Ji1G« (fl. 706-763). His writings were compiled under the title Lingyang ji ~~~~~, in four volumes. See Han Iu ~t,~, Lingyang ji ~~~~ ~, j. 1-4, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

58 The srtivakas (shengwen JiM) are personal disciples of the Buddha. They are also known as the "voice-hearers." The term often designates the early arhat disciples.

106 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

pure and have few worries. [May we] always live in the village where there is fortune and virtue. [May I] live long in peace and joy. May I again see the world that gradually [becomes] more peaceful!59

The first half of the text eulogizes arhats while contrasting them with bodhisattvas and the assembly of Chan (Chanzhong t~~J The second half contains the author's prayer to the arhat. This in­cludes petitions for the health and prosperity of Han Ju's family, as well as for peace and happiness in his life and in the village where he lived. The author also includes prayers for a worry-free life. The characteristics of these wishes are decisively worldly and yet very general. This suggests that the author might not have had any spe­cific occasion in his life to perform the ritual, such as the death of his mother, or passing the imperial examination. Nevertheless, Han Ju may have still wanted to perform the ritual because it helped to reaffirm the peace and happiness of his family.

Village people praying for rain

I have so far discussed sources that indicate personal reasons for performing the arhat ritual. However, there were also rituals in­volving arhats carried out by the public. This arhat ritual was per­formed by a group of villagers who hoped for rainfall. the text is written as a poem by Fan Chengda YBRX.* (1126-1193). The author was a Southern Song Dynasty scholar-officer and poet from Wux­ian ~~, Jiangsu aiJ province. After passing the highest imperial examination in the year 1154, Fan Chengda served initially at the Department of Rites (Libu ffiJHl$) and then as the Great Scholar at Zizheng hall jli1&~. 60 Like the poems discussed above, this poem also bears a long and descriptive title: "In the Year of Draught, Vil­lagers Prayed to the Fifth Arhat and Received Rain. [This Poem is]

59 See Wei Qixian ~'I1fjf ed., Wubaijia bofang daquan wencui (cf. n. 48), j. 81, p. 17a.

60 For the biography of Fan Chengda, see Bide Chang ~igH~ et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 2, pp. 1655-8.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 107

in Response to the Poem of Mr. Le (Suihan yiren dao diwu luohan deyu Le xiansheng youshi ciyun ~1fl.5}J;$1iH5:l1~ffi~)t± 1fW:"*Ef~)." Fan Chengda wrote the poem to commemorate the successful outcome of the arhat offering and prayer. After receiv­ing Mr. Le's poetry, Fan Chengda composed the following poem:

In the pool of ocean and mountain is the palace of a dragon. At the bottom of a splashing waterfall, a jade-striking sound reso­nates. The great gentleman of azure colored eyes!61 Whom do you reign over? [Because you] love the silky waterfall, [you] fly up from the misty bottom. You sit in meditation for a hundred thousand kalpas (jie MJ) by chance. You are equipped with boundless supramundane power and compas­sionate vows. Until now, blazing clouds have been holding the sun under their arm. Sands are frying and the sun rots a thousand mountains after anoth­er. Mingling with heat, the wind from Luhun ~)Ij[62 blows high. The lush grass of lingchuan ):!lfJ 1[63 waits for the work of rain. The mouths of ten thousand [people] are crying out for the gentleman (shi ±)! Even before the incense burner spits out, [our] sincerity has reached [him] first. The dust of the sunset swirls around the land, making the sound of a whirlwind. The morning glow hangs over the sky, reddening the [shape] of a fish­tail cloud. The shangyang [§I;f:. bird64 rubs the sky and a hawk flies up and dances.

61 "The great gentleman of azure colored eyes" refers to the arhat who has the face (and thus the eyes) of a non-Chinese foreigner.

62 Luhun ~)!!! is the name of a town in Henan )ilJl¥j province.

63 lingchuan ):!lfJ r [ is in Gansu i:tffi province.

64 The shangyang p.;:j;f:. bird refers to a legendary bird that flies right before

108 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

Suddenly, timely rain falls and [people] sing [the song of] this year's

good harvest.65

Fan Chengda's poem is rhythmic, picturesque and dramatic. His language invokes various moving images and sounds of rapidity. Unlike the previous texts, his poem does not directly address or make a request to the arhats. Instead, it describes the miraculous event from a third person perspective, starting from the time of drought to the moment of falling rain. This suggests that the au­thor might not have personally attended the ritual. Nevertheless, the poem still describes a type of arhat-centered ritual practice at a local level, and shows how Fan Chengda perceives the arhat. He first presents the arhat as a king who reigns over the dragon and its palace underneath the waterfall. In medieval Chinese society, the dragon represents the divine animal responsible for rainmak­ing. Thus, reigning over the dragon implies having control over the weather. As the poem continues, the author further reveals his perception of the arhat's . preternatural ability and character; the arhat can remain in meditation for a long time, and has boundless supramundane power and compassion. Next, the poem shifts to a scene of scorching weather before the rainfall, followed by the ritu­al scene in which people burn incense and pray for rain. The poem ends with the arhat's miraculous response to the people's sincerity (cheng ~), showering timely rainfall.

For the accumulation of merit

The next record to examine is a letter penned by the famous scholar­officer Su Shi in~ (1037-1101). While Su Shi was exiled in Hainan

the rain falls. See Chen Fuhua ~*~$ et al. ed., Gudai Hanyu cidian (cf. n. 54), p. 1368.

65 See Fan Chengda 5BfflGje (1126-1193), Shihu shiji :O)~W'~,j. 4, p. 1b-2a, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhong­wen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 109

;ijJ¥j, he was able to acquire a set ofthe Eighteen Arhat paintings.66 The following letter was enclosed together with the arhat paintings and sent to his younger brother, Ziyou rrn.67 The letter states:

After the Buddha's nirviilJa, the sentient beings in lambudvfpr;t became rigid, hateful and self-centered. Faith did not easily enter [into their mind]. Therefore, all holy beings hide and do not manifest themselves. Only their images and transmitted words can lead the unenlightened. However, the magical transformations of light are still appearing in Emei ilJft)§ [mountains], Wutai Ii=- [mountains], Lu • [mountains]68 and Tiantai 7C1S' [mountains]. [These phenomena] allow people to de­tect their presence and see them. My house had Sixteen Arhat images. Whenever a tea offering was made [to the arhats], a transformation oc­curred, which turned the tea into milky floats. Sometimes, [it] became congealed in [the shape of] white flower, peach, plum or herbaceous peony and so on. Some say that the compassion of arhats is profoundly deep, and they quickly help sentient beings. Therefore, many magi­cal transformations were manifested. Is this not the case? Today, I obtained the Eighteen Arhat images in Hainan ~i¥i, and I am send­ing [them] to Ziyou rEB, my younger brother. [People] should pay respect to [the arhat images] at the right time. If it happens to be the birthday of one of the members of the couple, then set up [food] offer­ings (shegong ~)[f~) and pray for the accumulation of merit (jifu ~1i) for that year. I am sending these images along with the poems that [I] have previously composed. Ziyou's birthday is the twentieth day of the second [lunar] month and his wife, the lady of the Deyangjun t~~~~,

66 For Su Shi's biography, see Bide Chang l!§:iEl.1~ et al. ed., Songren zhuanji ziliao suoyin (cf. n. 14), vol. 5, pp. 4312-4324. For the study of Su Shi's life and writings, see Ronald C. Egan, Word, image, and deed in the life of Su Shi (Cambridge: Harvard University 1994). For Su Shi and Buddhism, see Beata Gran, Mount Lu Revisited: Buddhism in the Life and Writings of Su Shih (Honolulu, University of Hawaii 1994); Ronald C. Egan, ibid.

67. Ziyou is a style name. He is better known as Su Zhe iflJ: (1039-1112).

68 Mount Lu ELl! is the place where later Buddhists believed that the fa­mous monk Huiyuan ~ffi (334-416) expounded the teachings of Pure Land Buddhism.

110 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

Ms. Shi's (Shishi ~~), is the seventeenth day of the eleventh [lunar] month. On the day of Zhongyuan ,*51:,69 [I have written] this.?o

Su Shi's letter is elegant and easy to follow. He begins by explain­ing why the arhat was no longer seen in the world. It was because people had become hateful and self-centered after the Buddha's nirvii;(La. However, the arhat still manifests himself through the magical appearance of various lights in Chinese holy mountains. Su Shi then records the arhat's magical manifestation th~t he often witnessed while growing up. After making a tea offering to the Six­teen Arhat images at his home, he saw the appearance of milk-like liquid floats, which turned into different flower and fruit shapes. Su Shi interpreted these as the compassionate work of arhats, . letting their worshippers know of their presence through signs.

Next, Su Shi mentions the Eighteen Arhat paintings that he ac­quired in Hainan and gives instructions on how to venerate the images at home. He first asks his brother's family to venerate them according to a time schedule. This probably meant that they should burn incense in front of the arhat images and pray on a regular basis. On a birthday, however, he instructed them to make special offerings to the Arhat images "for the accumulation of merit (jifu ~t;) for that year." In other words, Su Shi's reason for setting up the arhat ritual was to accrue enough merit for the year to come, in order to prevent troubles and bring good luck.

Praying for having sons

The last record describes the miraculous tale of Huang Kuo ;;:J3. Unlike the previous five records, the story of Huang Kuo was writ­ten not by the subject himself but by Hong Mai )~}I (1123 - 1203) in The Record of the Listener (Yijianzhi ~~i5). Compared to the

69 Zhongyuan is the fifteenth day of the seventh month.

70 See Su Shi jf~ (1037-1101), Dongpu chuanji *fbt~~,j. 98, p. 15a-15b, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhon­gwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 111

previous five records, it is less poetic and more descriptive. The title is also informative: "Mr. Huang, the Story Teller, Prays for a Son (Huang'Jiangshu daozi ;t~~taT)." The text states:

Huang Kuo ;':m, the story teller (jiangshuzhe ~~:g-) was originally from Xinghua J!1c?! His horne was in Xinzhou {~1'W2 and he did not have any sons. Once he took his wife, Ms. Shi JjiE, and his concubine to a Buddhist temple in order to pray inside the arhat hall. That night, the wife and concubine both dreamed of several honorable arhats. The arhats looked at each other and laughed. [Then,] all of sudden, they looked at [the wife and concubine] and started to say "before and after three years each (qianhou gesannian iWtrt-&=:q::.)." When [they] awoke, they could remember the dream clearly. The wife and concubine had had the dream at the same time. However, no one knew what the phrase meant. [Later] they both got pregnant three years apart from each other. Afterward, they both had sons in the same year. After the death of Mr. Huang, Ms. Shi diligently taught [her son] how to read. The concubine's son was named Tao ~ and Ms. Shi's son was named Jie ~. In the Jiachen EtfItZ year of Chunxi ~l!f~ reign era (1184), Jie passed [the imperial examination] and three years later (1187), Tao [also] passed it succeeding Jie. Now, [everyone] knows the meaning of "before and after three years each." [Huang] Kuo also had

four other sons and Tao was the oldest.73

Huang Kuo's reason for going to the arhat hall with his wife and concubine was to pray for a son. At that time, Huang Kuo was without a son, and he thought that the arhat could help him. The

record does not give any detailed information about what Huang Kuo did inside the arhat hall. It is likely that before praying to the. arhat, he made some offerings to the arhats perhaps with the help of

a Buddhist priest. The text explains how his wishes came true after praying inside the arhat hall. At night, a number of arhats appeared

71 Xinghua ~1c is located in Jiangsu )I~ province.

72 Xinzhou {~j'f'[ is located in Jiangxi 5Iffi province.

73 See Hong Mai 5~~ (1123-1203), Yijianzhi ~~;:t;, j. 10, pp. 4b-5a, Siku quanshu, Wenyuange Sikuquanshu dianziban (Hong Kong: Zhongwen Daxue Chubanshe Dizhi 1998).

112 .RY AN BONGSEOK JOO

magically in the dreams of Huang Kuo's wife and concubine. The arhats uttered the mysterious phrase, "before and after three years each," which became comprehensible only after the wife and con­cubine gave birth to two sons three years apart. Later the two boys passed the imperial examinations, again three years apart.

Conclusion

In this part, let us revisit the four questions raised in the beginning. First, for the Song Dynasty Chinese, the arhat was essentially not different from the bodhisattva. The liturgical text written by Huang Shang states that, just like the bodhisattva, the Sixteen Arhats and their retinues willfully remain in the tenth bhami and extend their help to sentient beings out of their compassion. They often hide themselves in the midst of ordinary people and surreptitiously use their supramundane powers to grant people's wishes and protect the Dharma. Their powers include a variety of different preternatu­ral abilities: granting a male child, bringing down rain, protecting the health and prosperity of a family, guiding a deceased parent to a better rebirth, and aiding in career advancement and long life. This shows that there was no set pattern to the arhat miracle tales -that the arhat was regarded as granting all and any kinds of wishes. This positive portrayal is obviously different from the image of "overbearing" or selfish arhats whose only concerns lay in the at-tainment of their own nirvQl}a in Mahayana polemical texts. This shows that for most Song Dynasty Chinese Buddhists - whether they were monastics or lay followers - the canonical definitions of the arhat were irrelevant. They neither stopped a highly educated scholar-officer like Huang Shang from creatively redefining the ar­hat's identity nor prevented village people from making offerings to the arhat and praying for rain. In other words, Chinese people venerated the arhat not because the arhat is on his way to becoming the bodhisattva on the path to Buddhahood, but because in their minds, arhats are disguised bodhisattvas.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 113

Second, thanks to Jojin's diary, we are able to reconstruct a scene of arhat invitation during the Northern Song Dynasty. The ritual was performed in Dapingxingguo monastery located in the capital city of Kaifeng. It was a long, elaborate and community-wide event, involving many priests in the monastery. The Sixteen Arhat images were made of needle-sewn fabrics while the offerings of "one hun­dred different flavors" of food, flowers and incense were presented in front of those images. When the assembly chanted the praise of arhats, cymbals, drums, bells and wooden percussion instruments were played repeatedly. Curiously, a part of the ritual procedure included solicitation of donations from monks. They used a roll of silk as their donation to the assembly. Other material objects were exchanged between Jojin and other resident monks of the monas­tery including a head scarf, incense, tea and coins, as well as many different kinds of food and wine. The ritual lasted all day and night, and the atmosphere was highly festive.

Third, the Song Dynasty literary and visual sources attest that the Song literati played a significant role in the development and sustainment of the arhat cult. Huang Shang, a high ranking schol­ar-officer, composed a liturgical text for the ritual of arhat invita­tion for wide public usage. Other high-profile literati such as Su Shi, Han Ju and Fan Chengda participated in the arhat veneration practices by commissioning arhat paintings, sponsoring the ritual for family, and composing a commemorative poem about the mi­raculous rainfall after a performance of the ritual at the village. Lesser known literati Shi Tianzhi and Li Qubing also left a record of the ritual service, professing personal gratitude to the arhat and eulogizing the arhat's power and benevolence. Although the Song Dynasty literati engaged in the ritual for a variety of different rea­sons, the overall tone of their voices was uniform, displaying awe, reverence and devotion to the arhat. This devotion, however, is dif­ferent from what Mark Halperin called "worldly devotion," denot­ing highly nuanced, multi-faceted and socially engaged views of Buddhism by the Song Dynasty literati. Rather, it is closer to the

114 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

language of less "savvy" and more pious laymen of T~ng Dynasty?4 In addition, this also stands in sharp contrast to Jacques Gernet's claim about the literati and Buddhism. He states:

Those raised in the classical tradition could not be fervent Buddhists. Their rationalism restrained them from adopting common beliefs and superstitions. Noble women, by contrast, female members of the great families, self-made men, and commoners had no such protection against religious faith. There were more receptive to Buddh,ism. The literati, moreover, had an austerity of principle, an inclination to tem­

perance and thrift, that disapproved of extravagant expenditures?5

All of the evidence in this study proves that it was not just women, commoners and self-made men who engaged in the "superstitious" practices of arhat veneration. Contrary to Gernet's assertion, the literati group participated in the arhat cult just as much, if not more. The old and tired assumption that only the uneducated masses par­ticipated in "superstitious" cultic practices should finally be laid to rest.

Fourth, Robert Sharf recently published an excellent theoretical essay on ritual, proposing the idea of Buddhist ritual as "adult play" and "Buddhist darsan." In his analysis, the performative approach to ritual advocated by contemporary scholars ended up reinforcing to the very dichotomies - thought and action, the subjective and the objective, inner and outer, etc. - that they have tried to avoid. To overcome this problem of "moieties," he turns to the realm of "play" where children first learned to detach a signifier from the signified and place the signifier onto some other object. This "transfer of

74 Mark Halperin's recent work was very helpful for this article. I am not suggesting that Halperin's analysis is incorrect. My point is that if we were to look outside the genre of commemorative writings on Buddhist temple, we can also discover more uniform and devotional voices of the Song literati. See Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister (cf. n. 29), pp. 4, 27-61, 233-237.

75 See Jacques Gernet, Buddhism in Chinese Society: An Economic His­tory from the Fifth to the Tenth Century, trans., Franciscus Verellen (New York: Columbia University Press 1995), p. 299.

THE RITUAL OF ARHAT INVITATION 115

meanings" implies that "For a child, the word 'horse' applied to the stick means .'there is a horse,' because mentally he sees the object standing behind the word."76 Like a child who uses a stick as the pivot of detaching meaning/signifier and yet still sees a horse in the new object of the stick, an adult participates in ritual in a similar manner, taking, for instance, "the wafer as if it were the flesh of Christ" and worshipping "the stone icon as if it were the body of a god."77 In other words, a ritual recreates an "as-if world" like that of young children, where a conceptual displacement is encouraged, and a signifier and a signified are fused.

Sharf also points out how the practice of Buddhist ritual resem­bles, more so than Buddhists often admit, those of Hindu darsan and Vedic sacrifice. The practice of darsan involves consecrated images which are treated "not merely as a representation of the deity but as its animate corporeal embodiment (murti)."78 Suppli­cants in Vedic sacrifice invoke the deity's presence and make of­ferings along with ritualized gestures and utterances in exchange for a preternatural boon. However, according to Sharf, Mahayana Buddhist rituals differ from Hindu sacrifice in that the Buddhist deity invoked is none other than the Mahayanist truth of emptiness (sunyatii), and the ultimate purpose of any Mahayana Buddhist rit­ual is to "elicit precisely the understanding that all form is empty." He further elaborates that "recognition of this 'truth' - namely, that all truth is relative - is precisely the boon bestowed by the bud­dhas" while "Mahayana rituals both affirm and confute ... the real­ity of the deities that take center stage in the practice."79

Extending Sharf's theory to the ritual of arhat invitation pro­vides some new insights. Generally speaking, the ritual of arhat

76 These are the words of Vygotsky that Sharf is quoting in his essay. See Sharf, "Ritual" (cf. n. 12), p. 255.

77 Ibid., pp. 256-257.

78 Ibid., p. 257.

79 Ibid., p. 258.

116 RYAN BONGSEOK JOO

invitation fits quite well with the model of Buddhist darsan and sacrifice. According to Jojin's diary, the needle-sewn images of the arhat take the center stage and are treated as if they were "real things" by adding metalinguistic cues such as chanting, bowing, playing instruments, and making offerings to the images. As the literati's writings reveal, those offerings were made with the expec­tation of receiving various preternatural boons from the arhat.

On the other hand, there is near silence on the subject of in­terpreting a preternatural boon as doctrinally sound epistemologi­cal knowledge. For the most Song Dynasty Chinese Buddhists, the boon that they sought in return for offerings to the arhat was onto­logical transformation in their everyday lives - becoming pregnant with a male child, bringing down rain, living a healthy and pros­perous life, guiding a deceased parent to a better rebirth, etc. - and had little to do with knowledge. To borrow Sharf's own words in critiquing performative approach, this habit of reducing a "non­Western ontology to an epistemology" is one of the signature char- ' acteristics of "the modernist project" valorizing "the parochialisms and limitations of Western enlightenment."8o

Lastly, let us revisit the Song Dynasty arhat painting Wig. 1] that we viewed at the beginning of this essay. Interestingly, although there are arhat images hung in the back where food offerings are made, the main supplicants in this painting are not having eye­to-eye Buddhist darsan experience with the arhat images. Instead, they are facing the sky above the garden. This turning away from the image to face the "real things" descending from the sky sug­gests that adults do not always participate in children's "play." Rit­ual participants can and often do remain aware that a signifier is just a signifier, never a "real thing," in spite of what Catholic theo­logians or traditional Buddhist exegesis advocates. If Zhou Jichang and Li Tinggui, the artists of our painting [Fig. 1] were still alive today, they would proclaim that "map" is just "map" and "terri­tory" is in the sky.

80 Ibid., p. 252.

OBJECT OF COGNITION IN DIGNAGA'S ALAMBANAPARIK~AVlj.TTI: ON THE CONTROVERSIAL PASSAGES IN PARAMARTHA'S.

AND XUANZANG'S TRANSLATIONS*

CHEN-KUO LIN

1. Introduction

There are four Chinese translations ofDignaga'sAlambanaparlk~ii­vrtti. The earliest translation, Wuxiang sic hen lun, by Paramartha, is dated between 557 and 569 C.E. The second one, Guan suoyu­anyuan lun, by Xuanzang, was done in 657. The third one, com­pleted in 710, was included in Yijing's translation of Dharmapala's Commentary, Guan suoyuan lunshi. The last version, by Lti Cheng, was translated from the Tibetan in 1928.1 In Lti's work, all four versions are arranged in parallel form for convenience of compari­son. Lti concluded that, as far as the original text was concerned, Paramartha's version and the Tibetan version were very similar, while Xuanzang's version was rather close to Yijing's.2 A similar comparison by Vi Hakuju was conducted in 1958 partially on the basis of Lti's contribution.3

* Acknowledgements: This article is indebted to Professor Shoryu Kat­sura's invaluable instruction in several occasions of discussion. It is also ben­efited from Professor Chien-hsing Ho's comments and Carlo Harris' edito­rial assistance.

1 Lii & Yincang 1928.

2 Lii 1928: 34.

3 Di 1958: 13-14. Yamaguchi Susumu also acknowledged his indebted­ness to Lii's exegetical reading of Dharmapi'ila's text. See Yamaguchi & No­zawa 1965: 413-414.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29· Number 2·2006 (2008) pp. 117-138

118 CHEN-KUOLIN

Regarding the content, however, it is quite obviqus that Xuan­zang followed Dharmapala's Commentary, claiming that the object of cognition in Dignaga's critique of realism referred to the five kinds of sensory objects. By contrast, in Paramartha's translation the object of cognition is said to consist in the six kinds of objects, including the object of mental consciousness (manovijiiana).4 Al­though Dignaga's original Sanskrit text was no longer extant, we are quite sure that, as agreed in both the Tibetan and Yijing's trans­lations, Dignaga did not specify the scope of the cognitive objects in his critique of realism.

Here arises the question: Is the textual discrepancy between the two translations a minor issue? Or is it rather a critical sign of an interpretative difference in Paramartha's and Xuanzang's concep­tion of Dignaga's epistemology? I shall argue in this article that the discrepancy cannot be overlooked, for both Paramartha's and Xuanzang's translations are quite consistent in themselves with re­gard to whether five kinds or six kinds of the object of cognition should be subject to investigation. It is obvious that these differ­ences were deliberately maintained in both translations. Now, how do we explain this interpretative difference? The key to answer this question is to explain how the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness was conceived differently in Buddhist episte­mology during the fifth and sixth centuries, especially in the debate between the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schools. If the object of mental consciousness is regarded as externally real, it should be subject to the same criticism that Dignaga had launched against re­alists. On the other hand, if it is not externally real, there is no need to include it as the target of investigation. In other words, we should

4 In Paramartha's translation, the treatise is directed to "those who claim that the six kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness, etc., are caused by the external objects" (~1:fA¥MIll~7\~~M~:9~:ljUf,), while in Xu­anzang's translation the treatise is rather directed to "those who would re­gard external matter (riipa) as the known object (alambana) and the cause (pratyaya) of the five kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness, etc." (~1:f~~§Ill~1i~Jj,:9H31'FpJT~~*~~). See T.31.1619.882c; 888b.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 119

be more concerned with the epistemological arguments about the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness than with the differences between the various translations of Dignaga's text.

There are two approaches that may be employed to solve the foregoing problem. The first is to look into Dignaga's other works, especially Nyiiyamukha and PramiilJasamuccaya, with the hope that we may find an explanation in some doctrinal clues. The sec­ond approach is to contextualize the whole issue within the Indian Buddhist scholastic debate, mainly between Sarvastivada and Sau­trantika, about the ontological status of the cognitive object. Hypo­thetically, I believe that Dignaga, just like his Yogacara predeces­sors, conducted his epistemological analysis by engaging with both contemporary Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers. That this approach is a better choice can be confirmed through Dignaga's PramiilJasamuccaya, where he vigorously responded to the chal­lenges from Nyaya, Vaise~ika, Sailkhya, and MlmaIp.sa.5 In the Alambanaparfk~iivrtti, however, Dignaga took Buddhist realists as the main antagonists, arguing that the Buddhist realist atomic the­ory fails to explain the object of cognition. This way of reading is

. also confirmed in Chinese Yogadira literature, especially in Kuiji's Weishi ershilun shuji and Chengweishilun shujii, Taixian's Cheng­weishilun xueji (and Huizhao's Chengweishilun liaoyideng).6

The elaboration of these issues in the discussion that follows is divided into three parts: (1) Firstly, I provide a brief account of the main thesis in Dignaga's Alambanaparfk~iivrtti. (2) Then I use Dharmapala's Commentary to explain the rationale for Xu­anzang's exclusion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness in Dignaga's argument. (3) Thirdly, I explore the doctrinal debate about the ontological status of the cognitive object in Buddhist di­rect realism (Sarvastivada), indirect realism (Sautrantika) and epis­temological idealism (Yogacara). In the last section I look for some

5 For a comprehensive view of Dignaga's philosophical enterprise within the Indian philosophical and religious context, see Dan Arnold, 2005.

6 See Lii 1928: 39.

120 CHEN-KUO LIN

doctrinal clues to explain the raison d'etre for Para~artha's inclu­sion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness.

2. Main theses in Dignaga's AlambanapaTfk~iivrtti

What is the object of cognition (alambana)? This is the question addressed in Dignaga's Alambanaparfk~avrtti, a small treatise that contains 900 words in Xuanzang's translation. Before giving Dignaga's answer, let us check the Abhidharma literature first. Ac­cording to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa, the object of cognition (alambana) is differentiated from the object of senses (vi~aya). The latter refers to that which is acted upon (i.e., perceived) by the sens­es, whereas the former refers to the object of consciousness, i.e., the object of mind (citta) and mental associates (caittas). This defini­tion is clearly stated in Abhidharmakosabhti~yci I.19:

What is the distinction between the 'object-realm' (vioJaya) and the 'object of cognition' (alambana)? VioJaya refers to that which is acted upon by the senses, whereas iilambana refers to that which is grasped (grhyate) by the mind and its mental associates for their arising.7

As to the relationship between the object-realm and the object of cognition, however, Sarvastivada contended that they are not on­tologically differentiated. What is directly perceived by the six senses must be the same as what is known in cognition. According tp the Sarvastivada theory of simultaneous causation, an object is said to be cognized in the mind/consciousness when this object is directly perceived by a sense faculty. A cognized object must be an object perceived by a sense faculty too. As for the Sautrantika, who held the theory of successive causation, only if the object of sense has been perceived by the sense faculty first is it possible for the perception of the same object to arise at the next moment. In

7 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.1558.7a: ~J'l!., plT*t, 1£1'f{OjJ3U?;finNEl;i;;, Jf:t :J§Jj]ijg, §!P§5ti'El~Jf:t;i;;~J'l!. 0 {I" )L"plT;i;;ttli'ElffiJJre, 1El!T2-)LA~, ;g~pMt. For the Sanskrit text, see Ejima 1989: 30: kaJ:! punar vi.JayiiZambanayor viie.JaJ:! / yasmin yasya ktiritraf!! sa tasya vi.JayaJ:! / yac cittacaittair grhyate tad iilambanam /. Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004: 5-6.

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each successive moment of perception, the object of sense during the first moment first ceases to be, and then there arises the object of cognition of the following moment. The object one knows is no longer the object perceived by the six sense faculties. They occur at different moments in the same process of perception.8

As for the Sarvastivada, the object of mind must be the same real object of the sense faculties. It is not possible for one to perceive something not existent. On the contrary, the Sautrantika claimed that one is able to perceive both existence (bhiiva) and non-exis­tence (abhiiva), including objects in both the past and the future.9

Confronted with the distinction between the object of the sense faculties and the object of cognition, Dignaga did not agree with the ontology of either direct realism or indirect realism, both of which assumed the existence of the external object as the condition of cognition to begin with. However, Dignaga did not question the Buddhist causal theory of knowledge. That is, knowledge should be explained in terms of causality. Only when the sense and the object are given as the causal conditions, there arises perception, no matter simultaneously or successively. Conversely, if the object of sense is absent, at least for the Sarvastivadins, there arises no perception.lO Accordingly, since we all experience perception, we are thus able to infer that there must exist an object of sense. As for Dignaga, however, to prove that the object of sense exists is not the same as to prove that the object of sense exists externally.

Dignaga's argument starts from redefining the premises that the object of cognition needs to fulfill. The two conditions are (1) the object of cognition must be a substance (ti mI I shiti .m1, dravyal

8 For Buddhist causal theories of knowledge in the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika, see Dhammajoti 2004: 69, 81.

9 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.l558.05c: ~W~~1'f~F1'f~.

10 Vasubandhu, AKBh, T.29.l558.104b: J;)~M;.8it, !.I6'1'f~t& 0 ~~!.16'1'f~, ~ )]i'~±' 0 iIIUW::f"±..

122 CHEN-KUO LIN

svabhava)ll as the support for the arising of cognition and (2) cog­nition arises with the mental representation (akara) of the objectP The first premise excludes the realist metaphysical assumption of the existence of external world in the epistemological analysis. For Dignaga, whether or not the external world exists is precisely the subject matter an epistemologist needs to investigate. It can be de­termined only after the investigation has been soundly conducted. Like Descartes, we are justified only in starting from the. investi­gation of cognition.13 Due to the fact that cognition is not able to arise without any "support," no matter what kind of "support" that may be, internal or external, there must be "substance" to serve as the substratum which grounds the properties or attributes of the object. Here we see that although Dignaga avoids the metaphysi­cal assumption of external world, he inevitably employs another metaphysical distinction between substance and attribute in the definition of the object of cognition. Only after the first premise is granted are we able to explain why it was necessary for Dignaga to adopt the standpoint of sakaravijfianavada, claiming that all we know are nothing but the representations of object that appear in consciousness. This theoretic stance follows as a direct result of the substance/attribute distinction made in the first premise- along with

II The Sanskrit equivalent of ti S / shiti 'JfS could be dravya or svabhava, which is confirmed by Tibetan rendering rali gi lio boo See Tola & Dragonetti 1982: 108, 129, note 3. This reading is also confirmed in Yijing's translation of Dharmapala's Commentary: "As to 'self-nature' (svabhiiva), it refers to the 'particular' (svalak~W:La) and the 'universal' (siimiinyalak~al}a). As to 'mak­ing known' (vijfiiipyate), it means 'determination.' How is it characterized as 'making known'? It is because [cognition] arises in accord with that form." Cf. T.31.1625.889c: §EltE~, ~El~~§ 'T~, JElli, 3<D{OJJlt1~::g~TI1~?3<Di~ ~§±iR.

12 See Xuanzang's translation, T.31.1624.888b: pff*t*t~, ~jlJ~5~t~ffl~~§ ~, 1SFfoF'JfS~~5~~~H~lffi±.

13 In this respect, the first condition of the cognitive object reminds us of the Husserlian method of epoche employed to suspend our natural attitude towards the external world. See Zahavi 2003: 46.

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the use of the notion of akara to explain that what one perceives is only an attribute (since the substance itself cannot be known di­rectly). This is the second premise, which is also shared by indirect realism, i.e., Sautrantika.

The above exegetical analysis is based on our reading of Xuan­zang's text. When we come to Paramartha's translation, some slight differences should be noted. The same passage on the definition of alambana is translated by Paramartha as follows:

What are the characteristics of the object of cognition? The object of cognition is thus named insofar as its form of substance is made known in the consciousness, and the consciousness arises in accord with the form of substance.14

Unlike Xuanzang's interpretation, substance and form are not separately treated in Paramartha's definition. According to the lat­ter, the form of substance serves as the condition of the object of cognition. According to Xuanzang, however, there are clearly two aspects of cognition: form as the object of cognition and substance as the support (substratum) of cognition, each of which must be analyzed separately.

After the definition has been given, Dignaga proceeds to argue that the realist theories of external object are not justifiable, for they are not able to meet both conditions of cognition. The four realist theories are stated as follows: (1) Perception can only be caused by single atoms (paramalJu) because nothing else is real except for atoms. (2) The synthesis (*saiicitakara) of atoms can serve as the

14 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.882c: ~1!ffOJtEl, ;s~~5T5.lU~ tEl, ~DAH:f§~~, :J'lHtz:§)tlf;t:i;~. Here I follow Ui Hakuju's Japanese trans­lation , see Ui 1958: 30, 31, 36. In the beginning, I tried to render H:tEl as dvandva, meaning "substance and form". Thanks to the comments by Chien­hsing Ho and an anonymous reviewer, I agree that Ui's interpretation is more acceptable. However, this rendering does change the difference between Paramartha's and Xuangzang's interpretations. Cf. also Frauwallner 1930: 180: "Objekt (vi.yaya) sein hei~t, das eigene Wesen (svan7pa) wird durch die Erkenntnis (jfiana) erfa~t (avadharyate), indem sie in seiner Gestalt (akara) entsteht."

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object of perception too. (3) Some maintain that the conglomera­tion (*saficita) of atoms, such as solidness and wetness, is qualified as the object of perception because it is capable of creating its own image in consciousness.l5 (4) The various forms of object deter­mined by the conglomeration of atoms are objective real, because they are evident in perception.

Responding to the above realist theories, Dignaga argues that (1) even if a single atom could be recognized as a substance, it still does not have a perceivable form (visual, tactile, etc.). As a substance, an atom is said to be able to serve as the cause of cogni­tion. However, since it lacks form, it is not able to be represented in cognition. Hence, an atom cannot be the object of cognition be­cause it fails to meet the second condition. (2) As for the synthesis of atoms, although it has a form to be represented in cognition, it is not qualified to be the object of cognition because, just like the double-moon illusion caused by the disease of the eye, there is no substance which acts as the cause of the cognition. In other words, it does not meet the requirement of the first condition. (3) Regard­ing the theory of conglomeration, Dignaga argues that although the conglomeration of atoms is able to meet the first condition, it does not fulfill the second requirement, i.e., producing the representation in cognition. For example, solidity in the conglomeration of atoms cannot be perceived in the visual consciousness. (4) As to the last theory, Dignaga argues that the form of a thing, e.g., a jar, is not an ultimate existence (paramarthasat), but a conventional existence (saJ!lVrtisat). Why? Consider that there are two same-size jars with

15 In addition to reconstructing the Sanskrit origin of ;rD* by *saiicita (or *sanghata) and ;fOE;- by *saiicitttkttra (or *sanghtitttkttra), Kata Junsha also proposed to reconstruct these two terms by *saiicita and *saiicaya respec­tively. See Kata 1989: 176-180. According to Sanghabhadra, the conglom­eration (saiicita) of atoms can serve as the object of five sensations, because it is the collection of real atoms, whereas the synthetic form (*saiicitttkttra) cannot be taken as the object of sensations, because it is the object of concep­tual discrimination (T.29.1562.350c). For analysis in detail, see Dhammajoti 2004: 75-78.

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different shapes. The different shape of a jar cannot be explained by the same amount of atoms in two jars of the same size.

When all alternatives of realist theory have been refuted, Dignaga continues to argue for his own thesis, namely that the external object does not exist at all, whereas what truly exists as the object of cognition is nothing but the internal object appearing like an external object.16 For Dignaga, there is only one theoretic alternative left when the existence of external world has been re­futed. That is, what truly exists is the internal object that arises as a part of cognition itself. Within the domain of cognition, there arises simultaneously something as an "object" dualistically stand­ing opposite to cognition itself as "subject."

At this point, the ontological problem of the internal object needs to be pressed further. What is this internal object? How does it arise? Dignaga answers as follows:

The external objects do not exist at all. Due to the mental construction of the sentient being's deluded mind, the construction of the six [ex­ternal] objects arises in the consciousness. The mental construction [of external object] appears in such way that it looks external [to the consciousness]. Thus it is named aZambanapratyaya (Paramartha's translation)P

For Dignaga, the object of cognition is mental construction only, which serves as the cause of cognition. Between the object and

16 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.883a: :9~Jm~F~~Wo ;Em, fPJ5t1;Jm? ~pgJmi'§, 31D:9H!(,ffJt ~1;~Jm; Xuanzang's translation, T.31. 1624.888c: :9~~m~, jffi~pg-BfJ;l,:9~~fJ1., 1.i9PfT~~~. The thesis (1) that the object of cognition is merely an internal object does not necessarily imply another thesis (2) that external object does not exist. Although Dignaga ex­plicitly argues for thesis (2), his argument for such an ontological claim needs further explication. This ambiguity is also the reason why Dignaga has been identified as a Yogacara idealist by some and as a Sautrantika by others.

17 Cf. Paramartha's translation, T.31.1619.883a: :9~JmJt~PfT~ 0 1i'S'pg~if1 ~1:.jjLI~v5tJ}Ui5)(, ~7\Jm)j-J}U 0 lIt)j-J}U3ID:t£~:9~ 0 31DlIUlfifJ1., ~~~if11;~~~ ~~.

126 CHEN-KUOLIN

cognition, there is simultaneous mutual causation. As to the sub­jective aspect of cognition, Dignaga employs a Yogacara notion of "potential force" (§akti),18 the synonym of "seed" (blja), to re-inter­pret the meaning of "sense faculty." The so-called "sense faculty" is thus nothing but the potential force (to cause the arising of cog­nition) embedded in the consciousness. Even though he appealed to the Yogacara interpretation, it must be noted that Dignaga did not mention the iiZayavijfiiina as the matrix of consciousn~ss where "potential force" is supposed to reside. On the contrary, Xuanzang deliberately inserts the notion of iiZayavijfiiina (root-consciousness) into the text to make Dignaga's theory fall in line with Yogacara position, even if it might not be faithful to Dignaga's original in­tent.19

Dignaga concludes that it is the internal object which meets both conditions of the object of cognition. First, the internal object appears as the object of cognition. The appearance of the internal object meets the premise that cognition arises with the representa­tion of the object. Second, the mutual causation between the inter­nal object and its respective perception, for instance, visual object and visual perception, meets the premise that the object of cogni­tion must be a substance to act as the support/cause for cognition to arise. Although the internal object is the result of mental con­struction, it does not mean that mental construction does not have causal force. A well-known example is that of the "wet dream." For Yogacara, the object of cognition is defined in terms of causal ef­ficacy, but not by the exteriority or physicality of object.

18 For the Sanskrit restoration, cf. Yamaguchi 1938: 11 (Verse 7b). Cf. also Sastri 1942: 5l.

19 Cf. Xuanzang's translation, T.31.1624.889a: PJ~5-3~~t;tJ;01§f~, lft1§.:r;fj ~6, ~F:9~.PfT~t& 0 *~-.t.liB:r;fj~5, :gg~~f~, 3'J\::f~J:ll[. English translation: "The existence of sense faculty is inferentially justified by the potential force (Jj]~5 sakti) for producing perception. However, the potential force is not derived from outside. It is not unjustifiable to claim that five senses, includ­ing eye, etc., are named after the various kinds of potential force in the root­consciousness (*~) by which five sensory objects are perceived."

OBJECT OF COGNITION 127

3. Tracing Xuanzang's interpretation in Dharmapala's Commen­

tary

It is also worthy of note that, according to Paramartha, the inter­nal objects of the six cognitions are merely mental constructions. According to Xuanzang, however, only the five internal sensory objects are included in Dignaga's critique of realism, whereas the object of mental consciousness is left unexamined. The difference between the two translations is mainly marked by their different interpretations of the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness. In order to solve this problem, we will focus on Dharmapala's Commentary first and take it as our primary clue in exploring the rationale and assumptions underlying Xuanzang's translation.

Dharmapala's interpretation can be summarized as follows:

(1) The Buddhist realist holds that, according to the theory of existence, ultimate existence (paramiirthasat) consists of the ob­jects of five sensory perceptions, whereas conventional existence (sal!lvrtisat), such as the existence of a "cart," is the object of men­tal consciousness only. Ultimate existence is truly real (dravyataJ:z sat) in the sense of existing independently from conditions other than itself. It exists in itself (svo bhiivaf:z). On the contrary, con­ventional existence, which is also called "verbal-conceptual exis­tence" (prajfiaptisat), depends upon other conditions, which can be reduced to more fundamental factors. 2o Strategically speaking, as far as the realist theory is concerned, there is no need to refute conventional existence (which serves as the object of mental con­sciousness), because conventional existence is ontologically based on ultimate existence. And to the extent that ultimate existence is refuted, conventional existence likewise becomes untenable.

(2) Here arises another question: In addition to taking the conventional existence for its object, does the mental conscious-

20 For a brief Abhidharma distinction of paramarthasat and saY(lvrtisat, cf. Hirakawa 1990: 143-144.

128 . CHEN-KUO LIN

ness also take five sensorial objects for its dire~t object? The Sarvastivada's answer is that it doesn't. They argue that the mental consciousness and the five sensory perceptions are not directed at the same object at the same moment. Historically, this question has been subject to dispute among Abhidharma schools. Some held that mental consciousness is able to perceive both the sensory object and its concept. If the mental consciousness is capable of perceiv:­ing the sensory object, that is tantamount to saying that the mental consciousness has the function of perception (pratyak~a). If that is the case, Paramartha's translation is justifiable, because the mental consciousness is said to be capable of perceiving the external ob­ject. This is the problem of mental perception (miinasapratyak~a) which will be discussed below.

According to Buddhist realism, whenever there is sensory per­ception, there must be a sensory object. Sensory perception and its object are not separated from each other in the experience of cognition. This is the fundamental principle upon which the Sarvastivadins argue for the existence of external objects. How­ever, this principle does not fully apply to the mental consciousness which also perceives non-sensory objects, such as the objects in dream, the past or the future. Therefore, according to Dharmapala, even if mental perception is granted, it occurs only on the basis of the five sensory perceptions. Thus, this argument is sufficient for

. Dignaga's critique of realism insofar as the existence of the five > sensory objects have been refuted.

(3) For some Buddhist realists, who contend that the physical object perceived by the mental consciousness in the state of medi­tation is not the object of reasoning (tarka), but an object which has to be based on the real factors of existence,21 Dharmapala re­plies that in his treatise Dignaga does not deal with extraordinary experiences such as the state of concentration. The experience of cognition Dignaga attempts to analyze in that treatise belongs to

21 For Sarvastivada's view on the object of meditation, see *Abhidharma­nyayanusarasastra, T.29.1562.622a-623b.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 129

the ordinary spheres of learning and tbinking only, but not of med­itation. Even if in the state of deep concentration a practitioner is able to perceive the object as real through yogi-perception (yogi­pratyak~a), which is accepted as one of the four perceptions in the Pramal}asamuccaya, such direct perception is still different from ordinary sensory perception. Precisely for these reasons, there is no need for Dignaga to include the object of mental consciousness in examination.22

(4) Some argue that the mental consciousness is able to directly perceive the external object. Therefore, the object of mental con­sciousness should be included in Dignaga's anti-realist analysis. Dharmapala replies that if so, then deaf and blind people would not exist, for they are supposed to be capable of perceiving the external object through the mental consciousness only. And this contradicts our everyday experience.

The issue that whether or not the mental consciousness directly perceives the external object was widely contested among Abhi­dharma schools. The Sarvastivada contends that the mental con­sciousness does not arise with sensory perception simultaneously and that it perceives objects in the past and the future, but not the object in the present. The object of the present is perceived by sen­sory perception. For example, the green color of a table is perceived by visual perception first. At the next moment it is perceived as "square" or "round" by the mental consciousness, which needs to be based on the visual perception of the preceding moment. While sensory perception is primary in the process of cognition, the men-

. tal consciousness is derivative and secondary only.

(5) Some argue that the mental consciousness is capable of per­ceiving "unmanifested matter"(avijfiaptirupa), the physical aspect of "unmanifested karma" (avijfiaptikarman), which is character-

22 Dharmap1l1a, T.3l.1625.889a-b: J(.~~t~{I§:*f&pJTTES~~FDElj@PJT1=r ~Ml:, &3cDpJT~fffl~.lz:Ml: 0 4Jt{gfif:.lj}G\±'1~f&L~m 0 3cDwr~~pM~Z~~ PX~F*i, Jl:t~E!~~~5~Ml:.

130 CHEN-KUO LIN

ized by the Sarvastivada as a sort of physical existence.23 The fact that aVijfiaptirapa exists indicates that the mental consciousness is capable of perceiving the physical object (rapa). As to this objec­tion, Dharmapala replies that since avijfiaptikarma exists in itself as substance only without appearance, it cannot be taken as the ob­ject of the mental consciousness, for any object of cognition needs to have two aspects: substance and attribute.24

To sum up Dharmapala's commentary, the central argument of Dignaga's Alambanaparfk~avrtti is said to be a refutation of the realist thesis that all sensory objects of cognition are external ob­jects. The thesis is theoretically involved with Buddhist scholastic debates on other issues such as yogipratyak~a and avijfiaptirapa. Dharmapala concludes that, as the main target of Dignaga's cri­tique, the Sarvastivada's direct realism denies mental perception (manasapratyak~a), claiming that there is no way for the mental consciousness to perceive the external object directly. Hence there is no need to examine the problem of the object of mental con­sciousness in Dignaga's treatise.

4. Reconstructing the reasons for Paramlirtha's translation

What would be Paramartha's response to the same problem? By reference to his translation only, we cannot find any textual evi­dence to explain why he deliberately includes the object of mental consciousness as the target of Dignaga's criticism. A possible alter­native explanation is to contextualize the complexity of the issue within the Buddhist scholastic debate. For Paramartha, Dignaga clearly stands for Yogacara idealism in the Alambanaparfk~avrtti by claiming that "the external object does not exist" though whether or not this ontological claim can be necessarily deduced from the epistemological proposition, i.e., "cognition takes the internal ob-

23 Hirakawa 1990: 144-145.

24 Dharmapala, T.31.1625.889b: ~~~~~E1.M;&~fffi]J~iN, f!\€o&1g~::f 1'Ftt iN§~'T~f!\€, *~frDJJt.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 131

ject as its object," is subject to further investigation. If SO, according to Paramartha, what would be Dignaga's response to Sarvastivada and Sautrantika with regard to the object of mental consciousness? Did both Sarvastivada and Sautrantika contend that the mental consciousness is capable of cognizing the external object?

Let us take a look at Dignaga's answer in PS I.6ab first where he claims that in addition to sensory perception, there is mental per­ception (miinasapratyak~a) which non-conceptually apprehends the external object, such as nlpa, for its object.25 Most of pramii1}a scholars take this statement as evidence to label Dignaga as be­longing to the lineage of Sautrantika, for he claims that external objects can be perceived by the mental consciousness. However, as Nagatomi argues, such a way of reading would be incompat­ible with Dignaga's theory of self-cognition (svasafJlvedana) which posits that cognition occurs within a twofold structure: the appear­ance of the object (arthiibhiisa) and the appearance of cognition itself (sviibhiisa). Mental perception is no exception as it takes the appearance of the object as the object of cognition, which can only be interpreted as an internal object. 26 And in regards to the Alambanaparfk~iivrtti, the external object is clearly not accessible to mental perception. That is, Dignaga does not take the Sautrantika position in that treatise.

25 Hattori 1968: 27: "There is also mental [perception, which is of two kinds:] awareness of an [external] object and self-awareness of [such sub­ordinate mental activities as] desire and the like, [both of which are] free from conceptual construction. The mental [perception] which takes a thing of color, etc., for its object, occurs in the form of immediate experience (anu­bhava) is also free from conceptual construction. The self-awareness (sva­sal'[lvedana) of desire, anger, ignorance, pleasure, pain, etc., is [also recog­nized as] mental perception because it is not dependent on any sense-organ." For the reconstruction of the Sanskrit text, see Steinkellner 2005: miinasal'[l ciirthariigiidisvasal'[lvittir akalpikii / miinasam api rapiidivi~ayiilambanam avikalpakam anubhaviikiirapravrttal'[l riigiidi~u ca svasal'[lvedanam indri­yiinapek~atviin miinasal'[l pratyak~am.

26 Nagatomi 1979: 254-255.

132 CHEN-KUO LIN

According to the Sautrantika, cognition needs to be explained under two theoretic premises: (1) the theory of successive causation and (2) the theory of momentariness. As seen in the record of the debate between the Sautrantika (Sriiata) and the Sarvastivada (Sati­ghabhadra) in the *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, the Sautran­tika holds the doctrine that all six kinds of perception arise in the following successive process. (1) At the first moment, the external object and the sense faculty arise simultaneously. How~ver, what is perceived is not the external object itself, but the representation (iiMra) of it, which we name "object x." (2) At the second moment, the "object x" serves as the object of cognition for the sensory perception. (3) The same "object x" preserved and passed down through anudhiitu, the field of object-continuum, becomes "object x-2," which in turn becomes the object of cognition for mental perception at the third moment. (4) The "object x-3" of the third moment becomes the object of cognition for mental construction which occurs at the fourth momentY In this successive process of cognition, both objects of cognition for sensory perception and mental perception are not the external object itself which appeared only at the first moment.

The above theory held by the Sautrantika is inherited in the Alambanaparfk~iivrtti except that Dignaga does not assume the existence of external objects. For Dign~ga and Sautrantika, all

. objects of cognition for six kinds of perception are not external objects. They are the representation of objects appearing to be the objective pole of cognition. Since the Sautrantika holds that the object of cognition for the mental consciousness (mental percep­tion and mental construction) is not the external object, this theory could not be the reason why Paramartha argues that the object of cognition for the mental consciousness must be included in the list of Dignaga's refutations.

There is one final alternative explanation for Paramartha's translation which we find in Sarvastivada's ontology, which claims

27 Nagatomi 1979: 256; Dhammajoti 2004: 59, 92.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 133

that all existents in the three time-periods are real. According to this realist ontology, the five sensory perceptions take the external object of the present as the object of cognition, whereas the mental consciousness is capable of taking all objects of the three time­periods as its object of cognition. This theory is seen in the *Ahhi­dharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra:

The group of five [sensory] perceptions grasps the object of the pres­ent moment only. There are no perceptions of two moments sharing the same object of cognition. There is also no object of cognition for the preceding moment of perception, which has already vanished, to be grasped again by the perception of the second moment as the cause for its arising. Mental consciousness is capable of cognizing the object of the three time-periods. [That is,] even if the existents [in the past] have ceased, they are still taken as the object [of the mental, consciousness].28

According to Sarvastivadin ontology, mental consciousness is not merely capable of perceiving conventional existence, i.e., verbal­conceptual existence, it is also capable of perceiving the real exis­tent of all three time-periods, including those in the past and the fu­ture. The only difference between the existence of the present and the existence of the past and the future is that the former is capable of function, whereas the latter are not. 29 However, since the objects of all three time-periods exist in the form of substance (svabhiiva), they are considered real existents, including those in the past and the future which are the objects for the mental consciousness.

Another critical question also arises in this context: Is the men­tal consciousness capable of directly perceiving the external object, if, as the Sarvastivada claims, it is capable of cognizing all objects of the three time-periods? There is no problem for the five sen-

28 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.349a: 1i~~, 1llJ:&:EJ?~, ~ =~~, [OJ-PJT*~, ~-PJT*~, JjiJ~)~E, ~=~~m:!fSl1:i!&'~~~5~~=f!:!:~ 3'f-, )tBE~, j'~~PJTi''T. Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004: 63.

29 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.409b: J!:t~1'f1.&m:1'f=1l,

~~1'f1'Fm, lRlll1'fJm ' M~:EJ?1:E, 1&~**.

134 . CHEN-KUO LIN

sory perceptions to cognize the external object. Ho~ever, the same epistemic function cannot be ascribed to the mental consciousness as it is commonly assumed that mental perception was accepted in the systems of the Sautrantika, Dignaga, and DharmakIrti, but not the Sarvastivada.3~

Here I shall argue that this assumption might need to be modi­fied. As Dhammajoti points out, the Sarvastivada distinguishes three types of immediate perception (pratyak~a): (1) sensory perception (*indriyasritapratyak~a {;&f~J~]!), i.e., that which is dependent on the five sense faculties, (2) perception of [men­tal] experience (*anubhavapratyak~a ~~pgJ~£), i.e., the imme­diate experience of mental activities, such as feeling (*vedana) and conception (*safijfia) and (3) perception of understanding (*buddhipratyak~a 1l"'J~:I:), i.e., the sensory comprehension of the particular (*svalak~a1Ja) and the intellectual comprehension of the universal (*samanyalak~a1Ja).31 Although the terminologies are different, Dhammajoti considers the third type of perception to be the same as mental perception because "it is a clear, vivid perception directly induced by the immediately preceding sensory perception."32 In other words, the Sarvastivada holds the same view that the mental consciousness is also capable of perceiving two as­pects of the external object: its particular and. universal character. If this view is accepted, it seems reasonable for Paramartha to list

;:~all objects of the six consciousnesses as the target of Dignaga's criticism. \

Here I would like to add one more consideration for the possible acceptance of mental perception in the Sarvastivada. As generally

30 Cf. Nagatomi 1979, Yao 2004, Nagatomo 1993.

31 *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, T.29.1562.736a: ffl.:JU!*-i=:ft, {:& . m, ~Jl~, J:~JjUi& 0 f:&f~fJtl;:, ~{:&1if~fJiI&t5~1i:9~~:W 0 ~Jl&~fJi!l:, ~ 5't~~JL..\{,\PfT)t;;lEffl.:tEWJ 0 J:~ffl.!l:, ~Dtmi)*Ilt~pfTm~t13#f§. Cf. also Dhammajoti 2004: 71.

32 Dhammajoti 2004: 71.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 135

assumed, the five sensory perceptions are characterized as "non­discriminative" and mental consciousness is characterized as "dis­criminative" (vikalpaka). According to the Sarvastivada, the notion ofvikalpa is divided into three types: (1) svabhiivavikalpa, i.e., rea­soning (vitarka) and investigation (viciira) as the essence of discrim­ination. (2) anusmaralJ-avikalpa, discrimination through the men­tal contribution of recollection (smrti). (3) abhinirupalJ-avikalpa, i.e., discrimination through the mental contribution of intellection (prajfiii). It is due to the strong activity of recollection and intel­lection, which can be appeased in the meditative state, that mental consciousness possesses the function of conceptual discrimina­tion.33 However, mental consciousness is capable of retaining the pure function of mental perception as intellectual intuition when the discriminative function of recollection and intellection has been appeased, or even eliminated in the meditative state. This explains why mental consciousness is capable of cognizing the universal character of the object through intellectual intuition whereas the five sensory consciousnesses are capable of cognizing only the par­ticular character of the object through sensory intuition. In short, it seems likely that the Sarvastivada maintained the realist thesis that mental perception also takes the external object as its object of cognition.

5. Concluding remarks

Demonstrating true philosophical genius, Dignaga aptly refuted the Buddhist realists' theory of iilambana in one short philosophi­cal treatise. Although he gave his own interpretation in prose, there are still some puzzles left for further pondering. In this article I have simply chosen one of these puzzles, that of the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness to serve as an entry point into the ocean of Buddhist scholastic epistemology. Now it becomes clear that Buddhist philosophers in fifth and sixth century

33 Dhammajoti 2004: 61-63.

136 , CHEN-KUOLIN

India and China, including the Madhyamika and !he Yogacara in particular, could not construct their philosophies without reference to the whole net of concepts weaved in the Abhidharma literatures, which indeed forms the matrix of all Buddhist philosophical sys­tems. This applies to our proposal for solving the interpretative conflicts in Paramartha's and Xuanzang's translations of Dignaga's A.Zambanaparzk$iivrtti, which were based on differing interpre­tations that can be traced back to the scholastic debat~ engaged by various Buddhist schools, especially the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika.

As far as the A.lambanaparzk~iivrtti is concerned, there is no doubt that, for both Paramartha and Xuanzang, the main target of Dignaga's criticism is Sarvastivada's direct realism. Dignaga did not consider the Sautrantika as the main target because they shared the same assumptions regarding iilambana. Both belonged to siikiira­vijfiiinaviida. However, Paramartha and Xuanzang were not in con­sensus with regard to Sarvastivada's theory of the object of mental consciousness. Following Dharmapala's' Commentary, Xuanzang did not count the object of mental consciousness as that which re­quired refutation in Dignaga's critique because Xuanzang assumed that mental perception was not accepted in the Sarvastivada. On the contrary, Paramartha might have held a different opinion of Sarvastivada with regard to the same issue when the latter con-:­,tends that all existents of the three time-periods are real in the form of substance and also knowable to the mental consciousness. Moreover, as recorded in the *Abhidharmanyiiyiinusiirasiistra, the mental consciousness is said to be capable of perceiving both the individual and the universal, through "perception of understand­ing," which can be interpreted as the same function of mental per­ception. Accordingly, for Paramartha, all six objects of cognition, including the object of mental consciousness, need to be refuted in Dignaga's critique of realism.

OBJECT OF COGNITION 137

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CREATIVE IGNORANCE: NAGARJUNA ON THE ONTOLOGICAL

SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS!

EVIATAR SHULMAN

It is generally accepted that N1igiirjuna's dialectic is aimed at ex­posing, or proving, the lack of self-nature2 (svabhava) of all phe­nomena, all things whatsoever. The fact that this paper, for exam­p,le, is dependent on the material conditions for its production (my computer, electricity, paper, my fingers, etc.), on my intention to write it, on its audience and/or readers, and so forth, suggests it has no true nature of its own. What the refutation o'f svabhava actually means, both philosophically and experientially, is hotly debated; numerous views haven been suggested. Some believe the lack of svabhava implies Nihilism,3 others see it as pointing to the decep-

1 This paper is an elaborated version of the one I read at the XVth lABS conference, held in Atlanta, June 2008. I wish to thank Akira Saito and Ernst Steinkellner for their valuable comments following my presentation. I also wish to thank Jonathan Silk and Paul Harrison for their remarks on an earlier version of this paper.

2 I will hereby be translating svabhiiva, most literally "self-existence," "existence of /by/in/for/ as itself," or "own being," and commonly translated as "intrinsic nature" or "inherent existence," as "self-nature." Svabhliva most simply means "nature," and Nagarjuna at times will use the term in such a non-technical sense as well (e.g. y~ 55). Specifically, svabhliva refers to a quality of being attributed to something that has it own private nature that it possesses of itself. MMK 15.2cd is commonly viewed as a defini­tion of svabhiiva (see for example Saito [2007: 157]): akrtrimaJ.t svabhiivo hi nirapek~aJ.t paratra ca (Self-nature is unmade and does not depend on another).

3 Recent examples are Wood (1994), Tola & Dragonetti (1995) and Burton (1999: ch. 4).

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30· Number 1-2·2007 (2009) pp. 139-173

140 EVIATAR SHULMAN

tive nature of language, or even to a fundamental errpr which char­acterizes any form of knowledge.4 Still others view the refutation of svabhava as being conducted from the point of view of ultimate reality, and thus as directing the mind toward the realization of an absolute truth.5 There are still more who doubt that Nagarjuna had any positive philosophical message.6 Finally, there are those who believe the realization of the lack of self-nature to be an end in itself?

Although these positions can be elaborated, and many others could be listed, I believe the views just mentioned are the major readings Nagarjuna has received in modern scholarship. They are

4 This is possibly the most widely accepted view of Nagarjuna today, and it consists of a number of separate but nonetheless related positions. Sprung (1977) and Ganeri (2001) are among the scholars who define Nagiirjuna as a skeptic. Siderits (1988) believes him to be arguing against the c,?rrespondence theory of knowledge. The view of Nagarjuna and the Madhyamaka as dis­cussing the nature of language, often inspired by Wittgenstein, has achieved great popularity, and is advocated in such works as Thurman (1980), Hun­tington (1983, 1989, 2007) and Loizzo (2001).

5 A clear definition of the "absolutistic" reading of Nagarjuna is given by de Jong (1972: 5):

"There is no doubt that paramiirtha, being the 'supreme goal' of the be­liever, may be called 'the absolute.' But this absolute by its very nature

ji is inaccessible to philosophical thought. One might try to approach it by indirect means, but all one could say or think about it would of neces­sity be false. It cannot be thought of as being or as nothingness. For the Miidhyamikas it is 'the silence of the saints'."

More than vestiges of this position can be identified in many works on Nagar­juna and the Madhyamaka, such as Gomez (1976), Seyfort Ruegg (1977: 6, 12, 1981: 34-41), Harris (1994) and Lindtner (1997).

6 Schroeder (2000, 2001) is a prominent example, and he represents a common Zen-Buddhist approach to Emptiness.

7 The classic case in this regard is the understanding of the Madhyama~ ka developed in the Tibetan dGe-Iugs-pa sect, which has influenced a great number of modem discussions on the subject. For prominent examples see Napper (1989) and Williams (1989: ch. 3).

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all rooted in understandings of Nagarjuna's thought which were developed in the different Buddhist philosophical traditions.8 But although all of these various teachings of emptiness do relate to certain aspects of Nagarjuna's writings, I will argue that they also suffer from fundamental errors, in regard both to what the texts reliably attributed to Nagarjuna actually say, and to philosophical consistency. Not only do these readings misrepresent Nagarjuna's original message; they also fail to come to terms with the full im­plications of his thought. In fact, all these presentations of Madhya­maka ignore a central aspect of Nagarjuna's insight which concerns his understanding of the relation between consciousness and reality.

I. Genre sensitivity

In this paper I will attempt a faithful reconstruction of Nagarjuna's teaching, based on a careful reading of his Mulamadhyamakakiirikii ("The Core Verses of the Middle Path," MMK)9 in light of his Yukti~a~tikiikiirikii ("Sixty Verses of Reasoning," Y$)lO and Sun­yatiisaptati ("Seventy Verses of Emptiness," SS)P Naturally, my

8 Some of these views are characteristic of non-Buddhist Indian traditions' take of Nagarjuna as well. In the VV Nagarjuna argues against a rival who is understood to represent the Nyaya school and who accuses Nagarjuna of Nihilism. The "absolutistic" reading of Nagarjuna was developed in the Hin­du Advaita-Vedanta school, most explicitly by Gauc;lapada. On Gauc;lapada's adoption of Nagarjuna's rhetoric see Radhakrishnan (1956: 456), Whaling (1979), Darling (1987: I.G) and King (1989).

9 For the text of the MMK I am relying on the edition of de Jong (1977 [1958]), together with the emendations made by MacDonald (2007).

10 For the text of the Y$ I am relying on the excellent critical edition pre­pared by Scherrer-Schaub (1991).

11 The text of the 5S presents many philological and interpretive problems, the greatest of which are the significant divergences which exist between the version of the karikiis alone and the version accompanied by a svavrtti at­tributed to Nagarjuna. For the text of the 5S itself I prefer the version of the kiirikiis over the one embedded in the svavrtti. The verses quoted here are based on an edition of the text I have prepared, which I hope to publish in the

142 EVIATAR SHULMAN

methodological position determines much of the reading of Nagar­juna I will suggest. I argue that in order to achieve 'a clear picture of Nagarjuna's understanding of emptiness we must regard his four extant analytical treatises - the MMK, y~, SS, and his Vigraha­Vyiivartanf ("A Refutation of Objections," VV)l2 - as an integral unit of meaning. When Nagarjuna is read in light of the MMK and VV alone, as commonly happens, a limited picture of his thought emerges. The MMK's power lies in its unrelenting critical force, which precludes the possibility of offering a positive description of existence. The VV is a polemical, one could say a defensive treatise, in which, in a "user-friendly" fashion, Nagarjuna attempts to blur the severe consequences of his theory and method. Alter­natively, if the MMK and VV are read in light of texts belonging to distinct literary genres, such as the Ratntivalf ("The Precious Garland"), the picture becomes rather hazy,13 since Nagarjuna's four analytical texts do not discuss the more practical aspects of the Mahayana Buddhist path, such as compassion and the path of the Bodhisattva.14 If we wish to reach a reliable understanding of what sunyatii ("emptiness") meant to Nagarjuna, we must first de­fine the message expressed in the texts he devoted to 'this subject it-

near future. There I will also elaborate on my preference for the ktirikil ver­sion of the text. My edition is based on the one presented by Lindtner (1986), who relied on the Narthang and Peking canons, which I compared to the Verge edition. I have also compared these versions of the text to those found in the svavftti, as well as to those found in Parahita and Candraklrti's com­mentaries. For Candraklrti's commentary, Erb (1997) has prepared a critical edition of his discussion of verses 1-14. For a discussion of the different ver­sions of the SS see Komito (1987: section 3).

12 For the text of the VV I am using the edition found in Bhattacarya, Johnston and Kunst (1978).

13 Examples of such a presentation which views Nagarjuna as a traditional Mahayana teacher are Lindtner (1982, 1986), and Williams (1984).

14 A rare exception to this rule would be MMK 24.32 which speaks of "the practice of the Bodhisattva" (bodhisattvacaryil). See also the conclud­ing verses of the MMK and the Y~.

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self. We should better first achieve a clear definition of Nagarjuna's philosophical message, before we ask how emptiness relates to Bo­dhisattvas, their vehicles and the like.

It should be emphasized that the four texts I wish to examine are regarded as authentic to Nagarjuna by nearly all the knowledge­able authorities both among modern scholars and within the Bud­dhist tradition. IS Regarding all other texts attributed to Nagarjuna in the Chinese and the Tibetan traditions, serious doubts have been raised regarding their authorship. Moreover, the Tibetan tradition has grouped these four texts as a distinct genre within Nagarjuna's writings, that is his "analytical corpus" (rigs tshogS).16 Although

IS The most important discussions of Nagarjuna's ~orpus have appeared in the following sources: Seyfort Ruegg (1981), Lindtner (1982, 1986) and Wil­liams (1984) mainly discuss Tibetan views on the subject. Ramanan (2002 [1966]) and Robinson (1967) discuss Chinese positions. Further important studies of specific works by Nagarjuna are Dragonetti (1978, 1986), Vetter (1992), Huntington (1995), Tola & Dragonetti (1995, 1995a, 1998) and Ja­mieson (2000).

Tola & Dragonetti (1998) have argued against the authenticity of the VV, in a manner I find unconvincing. They raise the plausible suggestion that the first 20 verses of the text, which express the position of a purvapak.#n, were originally an independent text. Aside from this argument, the authors offer no claims that should seriously cause us to doubt the traditional attribution of the VV to Nagarjuna, as the majority of their arguments are answered by taking into consideration the different perspectives from which Nagarjuna may have written different statements.

In Tola & Dragonetti (1995: 54-57) the same authors have suggested that a number of verses from the SS may not be authentic, since the title of the text speaks of 70 verses while the text actually includes 73. Again, I do not believe such a technical argument to be persuasive, especially since such dis­crepancies are common to the genre (e.g. Vasubandhu's Virrtsatikli). In this respect, see the comments made by Prebish (1974: 176).

Regarding the SS, the Chinese tradition seems to be unfamiliar with the text, although the Dvadasamukhasiistra, a central text of the Chinese Madhya­maka, quotes SS 8 and 19.

16 The common Tibetan classifications of the rigs tshags normally include

144 EVIATAR SHULMAN

this category is clearly a retrospective classification" it is not with­out its merits. We can safely assume that Nagarjuna was aware of the differences which exist between writing a philosophical text and composing a devotional hymn or a "frienqly letter." In, short, based on these four texts we can hope to achieve a clear definition of emptiness, or this is at least where we should begin.

The Y.$ and the SS expand on the analysis conducted in the MMK, and allow a fuller understanding of Nagarjuna's philosophi­cal thought. They demonstrate that the MMK has a special place in the Nagarjunian corpus, but that Nagarjuna's philosophical insight is not exhausted by the text. An attentive reading of the Y~ and the SS will lead us not only to a better understanding of the way Nagarjuna viewed the world, but to a fuller comprehension of the MMK's thought as well. 17

n. The object of refutation

What is Nagarjuna actually refuting? A quick but bold look at the texts tells us that Nagarjuna was troubled not by "self-existence" - svabhava - but by existence in general - bhava, or astitvam. Nagarjuna attempted to pave the middle path between existence

5 or 6 texts. The additional texts included are the (1) Vyavahiirasiddhi, no longer extant (the first 6 verses are quoted in Lindtner [1982: 96-99, 1986: 120-123], identified by Lindtner in Santarak~ita's MadhymakiilaY[lkiiravrtti). (2) VaidalyaprakaralJa, a polemical text dedicated to a refutation of the 16 basic categories of Nyaya thought. Serious doubt regarding the text's authen­ticity have been raised by Tola & Dragonetti (1995a) and Pind (2001). (3) Ratniivalf, at times listed in the rigs tshags, but generally assigned to the gtam tshags ("The religious narrative corpus"), where it does in fact belong. The major bulk of this text is actually about Buddhist practice and belief, and discusses Buddhist concerns on a much wider scale. For a discussion of the Tibetan classification of Nagarjuna's works see Seyfort Ruegg (1981: 7-9) and Williams (1984).

17 The Y-5 and the SS offer rich insight in regard to Nagarjuna's soteriolog­ical views as well. This issue will not be discussed in the present context.

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and non-existence: he believed all notions of existence to be rooted in ignorance. As he states in MMK 15.10:

"Exists" is a grasping at eternalism. "Does not exist" is a view of annihilation. Therefore the wise should not base themselves on exis­tence or non-existence.

astfti stisvatagrtiho ntistfty ucchedadarsanam I tasmtid astitvantistitve ntisriyeta vichak:jafwJ:t I

This verse supplies an important definition of the middle path which avoids both existence and non-existence.I8 Nagarjuna is here extending the meaning of the traditional Buddhist definition of the middle as the path that avoids etemalism and annihilation (§iiSvata

and uccheda). These terms, which originally referred primarily to the nature of the self,19 now make an ontological statement about the nature of reality. A similar position is expressed in MMK 5.8:

The slow-witted who see existence and non-existence of things do not see the auspicious quieting of objects.

astitval!l ye tu pasyanti ntistitval!l calpabuddhayaJ:t I bhtivtintim te na pasyanti dra:jtavyopasamal!l sivam II

Again Nagarjuna makes it more than clear that he believes any view, any actual seeing of existence or non-existence, to be mistak­en. These verses alone should rule out the interpretations of Nagar-

]8 A similar statement is given in SS 21:

yod pa nyid na rtag nyid dang limed na nges par chad nyid yin II dngos po yod na de gnyis 'gyur II de phyir dngos po khas blang min II If there is existence there is eternalism, and if there is non-existence there is surely annihilation. When there are existent things, both occur, and therefore one should not accept existent things.

]9 See my discussion of this issue in Shulman (2008: section III). In this context, it is of primary importance to notice that the terms used by the Kacciinagottasutta (SN II. 16-17) for the extremes, attitha and natthita, do not relate to abstract notions of existence but to particular ways of under­standing the nature of the Self. In fact, for the Kacciinagottasutta, attitha and natthita represent sassata and uccheda (eternalism and annihilation). See also note 31 in the same article.

146 EVIATAR SHULMAN

juna's thought delineated at the outset of our discuss~on: Nagarjuna denies non-existence and therefore cannot be a nihilist.20 He must not be expounding a vision of an absolute truth, since such a truth must exist. 21 He is also making a definite philosophical statement regarding the nature of reality, which must not exist as it appears, and therefore his verses cannot be only of pragmatic ("upayic") value. Finally, the focus of the discussion must not be only lan­guage or knowledge, since that would imply an existent rea)ity mis­represented by thought. If words or concepts are invalidated, surely the objects they refer to are unreal as well.22 In order for these verses to mean anything, they must be a description of reality itself, which is characterized as neither existent nor non-existent, neither absolutely true nor wholly false.

Both of the verses quoted deny astitvam and nastitvam, exis­tence and non-existence, or better "is-ness" and "non-ness." In other places Nagarjuna prefers to target a more general notion of existence - bhava. A most important example is the opening verse of the MMK (Ll):

20 Burton (1999: 90) has argued that Nagarjuna's thought is nihilistic even though Nagarjuna did not believe so himself. See note 54 below for my re­sponse to such a position.

'21 The discussion of Nagarjuna's view of absolute truth, or "the absolute," cannot be fully developed in this paper. Clearly there are verses which sug­gest that Nagarjuna accepted an ultimate and unconditioned reality, such as MMK 18.9 and 25.9. But the maligalaslokas of the MMK, as well verses such as MMK 7.32, 18.10, 25.19, 20, y~ 5-6, and SS 30-32, strongly sug­gest that Nagarjuna did not believe in ultimate truth in any absolute sense. These verses imply that Nagarjuna used "absolutistic" terms such as tattva, dharmatii, and nirvii1}a, not as a description of an actual state, but rather as a poetic description of a truth that exists only in the realms of the imagina­tion.

22 See also MMK 12.10, which explicitly states that the impossibility of suffering arising from itself, from another, from both or without a cause, is true also in regard to external things (biihyiiniim bhiiviiniim).

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Not from themselves, not from another, not from both or without a cause, are arisen entities ever found, anywhere.

na svato niipi parato na dViibhyii1!l niipy ahetutaJ:z I utpannii jiitu vidyante bhiiviiJ:z kva cana ke cana II

Here Niigiirjuna argues against the truth of bhava/:t in the plural, and hence we must translate "entities" or "things." Such a trans­lation could lead us to believe that Niigarjuna is arguing against "thingness," against the differentiation of entities into distinct phe­nomena with clear-cut boundaries.23 Obviously, "thingness" is part of what Niigiirjuna is targeting here, but it cannot contain all of his purpose. If things do not have any true boundary, any well-defined state of existence, any bhava, they can not really be understood to exist. This point is expressed more clearly when Niigiirjuna refutes bhiiva in the singular, as in y~ 46:

When one accepts existence, there are the arising of passion and ha­tred, the holding of bad and violent views, and the strife which comes from them.

dngos por khas len yod na ni II 'dod chags zhe sdang 'byung ba yi II Ita ba mi bzad ma rungs 'dzin II de las byung ba'i rtsod par 'gyur II riigadve~odbhavas tfvradu~tadr~fiparigrahaJ:z I viviidiis tatsamutthiis ca bhiiviibhyupagame sati If4

The y~ continues to discuss the great misfortunes caused by be­lieving existence to be true. This verse tells us that the refutation of "things" in the plural, is related to the refutation of "existence" in the singular.25 In fact, the Sanskrit allows a meaning unavailable in

23 Such a reading of Niigiirjuna, based on the MMK and the VV, was ar­ticulated by Streng (1967).

24 In quoting from the y~ I will provide the Tibetan text, accompanied by the Sanskrit verse in the few cases in which it has been identified in later sources.

25 The compound bhiiviibhyupagame could obviously be read as referring to bhiiva in the plural (probably bhiiviiniim abhyupagame), and thus the verse would relate to "things" and not to "existence." MMK 21.14-15 tells us what Niigiirjuna probably means by this phrase, speaking of bhiival'{t abhyupapan-

148 EVIATAR SHULMAN

English - "existences," that is bhiivii/:l in the plural. We should note that Nagarjuna's argument against "things" is better'understood to be a refutation of "states of existence." Nagarjuna denies the real­ity normally attributed to all that is, saying it does not existin any true fashion.

Some readers may have noticed that the lack of self-nature has yet to appear in any of the verses I have quoted thus far.26 There is no need to amend the message of these verses so as to deliver a meaning not theirs - they are denying existence, not self-nature.27

nasya in the singular.

26 It is true that following MMK 15.10, MMK 15.11 explains the relation between astitva/niistitva and siiSvata/uccheda in terms of existence by way of svabhiiva. But 15.11 should not cause us to read 15.10 as denying exis­tence/non-existence only by way of svabhiiva. Rather, Nagarjuna is explain­ing that in order for something to exist, it would have to have svabhiiva, and thus it would be "eternal."

27 There are a number of additional considerations that should cause us to doubt whether svabhiiva is so central a concept for the thought of the MMK. First, it should be noted that svabhiiva is a rather rare concept in the MMK, especially if we do not over-emphasize the importance of chapters 17 and 24. In these two chapters, Nagarjuna uses the notion of svabhiiva in order to defend himself against his parvapak~ins. I suggest that these two chap­ters, much like the VV, should not be understood as a positive articulation of Nagarjuna's position, but rather as a defensive strategy in which Nagarjuna exposes the problems that arise once one accepts svabhiiva. Aside from chapters 17 and 24, and chapter 15 which is an analysis of svabhiiva, the term svabhiiva appears only in verses 1.3, 7.16, 13.3-4, 20.21, 21.17, 22.2-4, 9, 14, 16 and 23.2,6,24-25. This means that the term svabhiiva is absent from 17 of the MMK's 27 chapters (which amounts to no less than 63%)! Clearly, the notion of svabhiiva is central to the MMK's thought, but this observation alone should cast a doubt on the idea that the MMK as a whole is a refutation of svabhiiva. Furthermore, if the text's main objective was a refutation of svabhiiva, surely the term should appear in its concluding chapter. But MMK 27 makes no mention of svabhiiva. Also, the fact that Nagarjuna devotes a separate chapter to svabhiiva, just as he does to the skandhas and iiyatanas or the terms saT{lskrta and kiila, implies that svabhiiva is part of what the MMK is analyzing, rather than being the focus of the discussion.

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In fact, the y~ makes it clear that the refutation of svabhiiva is not an end in itself (contra dGe-lugs-pa exegesis), but rather the means by which existence is refuted. Once things are proven to lack a true nature of their own, there is nothing left to lack self-nature. What can be said to lack self-nature? When self-nature is refuted, noth­ing is left. As Nagarjuna states in y~ 19:

What appears dependent on this and that does not arise by way of self-nature. What does not arise by way of self-nature - how can it be called 'arisen'?

de dang de brten gang byung de II rang gi dngos por skyes ma yin II rang gi dngos por gang ma skyes II de ni skyes zhes ji itar bya II

tat tat priipya yad utpannarrt notpannarrt tat svabhiivataJ:t I svabhiivena yan notpannam utpannarrt niima tat katham II

The fact that things arise in dependence proves they do not arise "svabhiivically." But if they have not really arisen in any true way, how can they be said to have arisen? If there is no svabhiivic arising there is, in fact, no arising at alp8 And again, more bluntly:

What appears together with causes does not abide without conditions, and is destroyed as a result of their absence - how can it be understood that 'it exists'?

gang zhig rgyu dang bcas 'byung zhing II rkyen med par ni gnas pa med II rkyen med phyir yang 'jig 'gyur ba II de ni yod ces ji Itar rtogs II

hetutaJ:t sarrtbhavo yasya sthitir na pratyayair vinii I vigamaJ:t pratyayiibhaviit so 'strty avagataJ:t katham II y~ 39

Verse 39 re-states what verse 19 said about arising in terms of existence. What exists in dependence cannot existl In this verse

28 y~ 19 is followed by a verse that makes a similar statement regarding extinction, a verse that hints at the implausibility of understanding nirviil}a as "cessation."

rgyu zad nyid las zhi ba ni II zad ces bya bar rtogs pa ste II rang bzhin gyis ni gang ma zad II de la zad ces ji ltar brjod II y~ 20

The calm (which results) from an extinction of a cause is understood as 'extinction.' What (exists) by way of self-nature does not become extinct. How can it be understood to be extinct?

150 EVJATAR SHULMAN

Nagarjuna skips defining the dependent as lacking ~elf-nature and proceeds to state with confidence that dependence implies non­existence.

Another important example of the principle that there can be no existence without svabhiiva is MMK 13.3:29

There is no self-nature of things, since change is perceived. The emp­tiness of things (is understood) from the fact that there are no things devoid of self-nature.

bhiiviiniilJ1- niJ:tsvabhiivatvam anyathiibhiivadarsaniit J asvabhiivo bhiivo niisti bhiiviiniilTL siinyatii yataf:z Jfo

What changes has no svabhiiva. What has no svabhiiva is empty, it does not exist. There is no such a thing that lacks svabhiiva. This verse summarizes the stages we have seen so far by which Nagar­juna's dialectic proceeds: Because of (1) change (or dependence), thi~gs are understood to have (2) no self-nature. But nothing can exist without a true nature, and hence (3) things are empty, they do

29 Both Candraklrti and Bhaviveka understand MMK 13.3 (and 13.4ab) to be voiced by a parvapak~in (see Nietupski [1994]). It is obviously not easy to argue against such authorities. Candraklrti's and Bhaviveka's reading is adopted also by Streng (1967) and Inada (1993). For Buddhapalita as well, the verse articulates the position of a Buddhist who equates emptiness with impermanence (Derge, dBu rna, vol. 1, 3842, 217.2-218.2). It is obviously not easy to argue against such authorities. Nevertheless, in light of the many other places in which Nagarjuna makes arguments similar to the ones I am outlining here, such as the ones I have quoted and the ones I will quote below (most importantly MMK 13.7 which appears in the same chapter), I believe my reading is more than plausible. Even if this may not be "what Nagarjuna intended" by the verse, it is fully consistent with his overall system. In any case, the third piida of the verse - asvabhiivo bhiivo niisti ("There is no thing devoid of self-nature") - emphasizes the point I am making regarding the meaning of svabhiiva even if it is understood as a pfirvapak~in's claim: Once there is no self-nature, no existent thing remains.

30 Another translation that could be offered here (substituting the referent of yataJ:t) is "there is no thing lacking self-nature, because of the emptiness of things." This translation would not change the meaning of the lack of self­nature I am discussing here.

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not exist. We see in this verse that there is a qualitative difference between lacking self-nature and being empty. Because things lack self-nature, they are empty.31 This same point is made in the Vrtti to VV 1:

Since there is no self-nature anywhere (in any of its conditions), the sprout lacks self-nature. Because it lacks self~nature it is void.

yasmiid atra sarvatra svabhiivo niisti tasmiin ni/:tsvabhiivo 'ftkura/:t / yasmiin niF:zsvabhiivas tasmiic chilnya/:t /

If emptiness is equal to the lack of self-nature, the second sentence of this passage would be both tautological and meaningless. We see that emptiness results from the lack of self-nature, a statement quite distinct from the one which says that emptiness is emptiness of self-nature.32 This same point is made again in the commentary to VV 57, where Nagarjuna adds that if something is empty, in this case a name, it is unreal:33

And also, because of the non-existence of the self-nature of things, the name lacks self-nature. Therefore it is empty. Because of its emptiness it is unreal.

tad api hi bhiivasvabhiivasyiibhiiviin niima ni/:tsvabhiivaJ?'! tasmiic chilnyaJ?'! silnyatviid asadbhiltam /

31 See also Nagao (1991: p. 191). Nagao believes that the formulation "be­cause it is devoid of self-being it is empty" was produced by Nagiirjuna's In­dian commentators in order to explain why the dependently originated is said to be empty and non-existent. As we see here, this formulation had already been introduced by Nagiirjuna himself.

32 There are clearly many places where Nagiirjuna speaks of emptiness of self-nature, such as SS 67. This is also the general drift of MMK 24. None­theless, the existence of such passages does not mean that lack of svabhiiva is the sole meaning of emptiness. The refutation of svabhiiva is, in fact, the main avenue by which the fuller meaning of emptiness is reached, and thus it comes as no surprise that Nagarjuna speaks of the emptiness of self-nature as well.

33 The statement that what lacks svabhiiva is unreal (asadbhiUa) is made not only in the commentary but in the verse as well.

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Again - what can lack svabhiiva? Once there is no self-nature, there is nothing left to lack its own nature, an insight Nagarjuna expresses in what may .be the acme of the MMK:

If there were anything non-empty, there could be something empty too. And there is no non-empty thing - how will there be something empty?

yady asunyarrz bhavet kirrz cit syiic chanyam api kirrz cana I na kirrz cid asty asunyarrz ca kutaJ:z sunyarrz bhavi~yati II MMK 13.7

This verse is followed by the famous denial of the possibility of tak­ing emptiness itself as a true view of reality (13.8). MMK 13.7 tells us that once the thing is empty, there is nothing left that is empty. No existence remains after the Madhyamaka dialectic penetrates its object of scrutiny. Not only does the object lack self-nature, it is unreal and has no true existence.

This is probably the right moment to re-affirm that I do not believe that Nagarjuna was a nihilist, intentionally or by default. Nagarjuna denied the validity of notions of non-existence,34 and found non-existence to be morally dangerous.35 But before we ask ourselves how Nagarjuna escapes nihilism, and before I present a positive definition of Nagarjuna's vision of the middle, I would like to push my point a little further and discuss two common intuitions about Nagarjuna which I believe are rooted in error. I am refer­ring to the role the traditional Buddhist insights of impermanence

;and dependence, as well as the notion of the two truths, play in Nagarjuna's thought.

34 MMK 5.6: When there is no existence, whose non-existence will there be? (avidyamiine bhiive ca kasyiibhiivo bhavi~yati). See also MMK 15.5 and 25.7.

35 Y$ 2ab: First refute non-existence, the source of all faults. (re zhig nye kun 'byung ba'i gnas II med nyid rnam par bzlog zin gyis I)

CREATIVE IGNORANCE 153

III. Nagarjuna's innovations36

In modern interpretations of Nagarjuna, one often encounters the idea that Nagarjuna attempted to retrieve the Buddha's original message in response to dogmatic tendencies which prevailed in the Buddhism of his day, primarily in Abhidharma traditions. Such a position generally argues that for Nagarjuna, emptiness is a differ­ent way of saying impermanence and/or dependence.37

There are many problems with such an interpretation, among them the fact that the Buddha did not characterize all things as dependent,38 and that Nagarjuna has much in common with Abhi­dharma traditions.39 In the present context I wish to concentrate

36 It is clear that Nagarjuna is not responsible on his own for the ideational developments I will discuss in this section. Many Mahayanasiltras (e.g. the SiiralJ1gamasamlidhin7tra and the siitras of the Prajiiliparamitli genre) ex­press these same doctrinal shifts. Nonetheless, Nagarjuna is a clear exponent of these new Mahayana visions, and he offers a full logical exposition of them. In this sense he is an emblematic figure who represents the innovations produced by thinkers and meditators in the earlier stages of the Mahayana.

37 The classic proponent of such a thesis may be Kalupahana (1986), al­though this view of Nagarjuna is endorsed by many scholars, such as Gom­brich (1996: 32) and Ronkin (2005: 200). Understanding emptiness as a syn­onym of dependence and or impermanence is also deeply rooted in the Zen reading of Nagarjuna, and is central to dGe-Iug-pa presentations of Madhya­maka as well (e.g. Garfield [1994, 1995]).

38 See my discussion of this issue in Shulman (2008). See also in Cox (1993).

39 Nagarjuna shares with the Abhidharmikas the conviction that a thor­ough and detailed analytic inquiry into the nature of reality can bring one to a vivid vision of truth. Moreover, I suggest that Nagarjuna accepted tra­ditional Abhidharma insight and method, but wished to specify how this tradition's basic concepts should be understood. I believe this is a better op­tion than saying Nagarjuna rejected Abhidharma thought and viewed it as a corruption of the Buddha's message.

These remarks are clearly not intended as a final statement on the matter, and serve only as initial observations to be explored in the future. See also

154 EVIATAR SHULMAN

only on the fact that Nagarjuna directly refuted both itp.permanence and dependence, since both imply existence.4o When all existence is empty, there is nothing there to be impermanent, as he says in MMK 25.22-23:

All phenomena being empty - what is endless, what has an end? What has and doesn't have an end? What does not have nor not have an end?

What is the same? What different? What eternal? What ephemeral? What both eternal and ephemeral? What neither?

sanye~u sarvadharme~u kim anantaY(! kim antavat I kim anantam antavac ca niinanta'!z niintavac ca kiY(! II MMK 25.22

kiY(! tad eva kim anyat kiY(! sasvataY(! kiY(! asasvataYfl I asasvataY(! siisvatay(! ca kiY(! vii nobhayam apy ataJ:t II MMK 25.23

Or again, more cogently:

If everything is impermanent, and impermanence is also not perma­nent, how will there be permanent or impermanent things?

thams cad mi rtag yang na ni II mi rtag pa yang rtag pa med II dngos po rtag dang mi rtag nyid II 'gyur na de Ita ga la yod II SS 58

The same problem that Nagarjuna identifies in regard to the lack of svabhiiva, applies to impermanence as well: Just as there must be something existent to be characterized as devoid of self-nature, there must be something permanent to be characterized as impermanent, {)r something independent to be characterized as dependent. This point is made explicit in the y~ in regard to dependence:

Those who are attached to the self and the world (and see them as) non-dependent - Oh! They are confused by views of permanence and impermanence.

Saito's (2007: 158) reference to Nagarjuna as "the founder or originator of the Mahayana-Abhidharma movement," as well as the discussion in Wil­liams (1988: 8), Hayes (1994: 361) and Walser (2005: chapters 6 and 7).

40 For a fuller discussion of this issue see Shulman (2008a).

CREATIVE IGNORANCE 155

Those who accept that being dependent, things are established in re­ality - how will the faults of permanence and the like not appear for them as well?!

Those who accept that being dependent, things are like the moon on the water, neither true nor false, are not confused by views.

gang dag gis ni ma brten par II bdag gam 'jig rten mngon zhen pa II de dag kye ma rtag mi rtag II la sogs lta bas 'phrogs pa yin II Y~ 43

gang dag brten nas dngos po rnams II de nyid du ni grub 'dod pa II de dag la yang rtag sogs skyon II de dag ji ltar 'byung mi 'gyur II Y~ 44

gang dag brten nas dngos po rnams II chu yi zla ba lta bur ni II yang dag ma yin log min par II 'dod pa de dag ltas mi 'phrogs II Y~ 45

Verse 43 attacks the non-Buddhist position which denies that all exists in dependence. The key verse is the following one (44), which attacks Buddhists who believe dependent things really to ex­ist. Prior to these three verses, a similar claim was made regarding impermanence, where Nagarjuna again attacks Buddhists who do not realize that impermanence denies the possibility of existence.41

Later on he again says that:

What is born in dependence is unborn, said the best among knowers of reality.

brten nas skye ba ma skyes par II de nyid mkhyen pa mchog gis gsungs II pratftya jatarrz cajiltam aha tattvavidarrz varaJ:t II Y~ 48cd

Many more examples can be supplied in order to further substan­tiate the position that Nagarjuna believed that emptiness empties

41 gal te yod par smra ba rnams II dngos mchog zhen nas gnas pa ni II lam de nyid la gnas pa ste II de la ngO mtshar CUng zad med II Y.$ 40

sangs rgyas lam la brten nas ni II kun la mi rtag smra ba rnams II rtsodpasdngosrnamsmchogbzungbasllgnaspagangyindermaddolIY.$41

It is not at all surprising that those who speak of existence (astitvavadin) abide grasping at things as they abide on their path.

But it is quite amazing that those who rely on the path of the Buddha, who speak of impermanence with regard to everything, abide as they grasp at things through strife.

156 EVMTAR SHULMAN

impermanence and dependence, which both can only be viewed from the extreme of existence.42 '

The fact that there is 'nothing there to be impermanent or de­pendent should cause us to be very cautious with regard to the way we understand Nagarjuna's use of the theory of the two truths. Most often, this theory is used in order to re-affirm the validity of the phenomenal world, in an attempt to balance the intensity of Nagarjuna's dialectic of emptiness. It seems that such a read­ing of Nagarjuna may be no more than .a futile effort to avoid the deep and thorough refutation of existence he conducts. We may be convinced by now that according to Nagarjuna there really are no true phenomena that exist "conventionally" and are "ultimately empty." The concept of the two truths is valuable as a reminder that Nagarjuna is not affirming non-existence, but should not be seen as a positive description of reality. Rather, what MMK 24.8-10, the locus classicus for the discussion of the two truths, actually say is that the Buddha's teachings are useful in order to facilitate realiza­tion.43 This statement is corroborated by y~ 21-22 and 30-33, that explain that basic Buddhist concepts amount to useful fictions.44

42 Regarding impermanence, see, for example, the discussion in chap­ters 7, 11 and 21 of the MMK, where Nagarjuna makes it fully clear that he finds the ideas of origination and cessation, and thus of impermanence, to Qy unreasonable. The same idea is central to the y~ (See, for example, the maligalasloka and verse 18). I believe we should read these statements as they were phrased, rather than forcing them to say something else ("ultimately" or "conventionally"). I devote fuller attention to this issue in Shulman (2008a).

Regarding dependence, see MMK 10.8-11, where Nagarjuna clearly states that in order for the dependent to exist, it would have to be established prior to its dependence. Once two things depend on each other, neither of them is established.

43 A similar claim has been made by Wood (1994: ch. 5).

44 In y~ 21-22 Nagarjuna states that since there exist no arising or ceas­ing, the concept of impermanence was taught only for the practical purpose (kliryavaslit, dgospa'i don) of facilitating realization. y~ 33 states again that the concepts of "I and mine" and of the skandhas, dhlitus and liyatanas were

CREATIVE IGNORANCE 157

For brevity's sake, I will quote only two verses from the SS. First, the opening verse of the text:

Abiding, arising and ceasing, existence and non-existence, low, middle and superior - the Buddha spoke of these under the power of worldly convention, not under the power of truth.

gnas pa'am skye 'jig yod med dam II dman pa'am mnyam pa'am khyad par can II sangs rgyas 'jig rten snyad dbang gis II gsung gis yang dag dbang gis min II SS 1

The basic concepts we employ in describing existence should not be understood to reflect the truth, but only conventional agreement. Such conventions cannot be real, since we would need to specify an existent phenomenon that could be defined as empty.45 This would contradict the major thrust of Nagarjuna's argument and the ex­plicit statements of all the verses we have examined.

Near the end of the text, Nagarjuna summarizes his discussion and defines his position regarding the two truths:

The worldly principle "this arises in dependence on that" is not de­nied. (But) also - What is dependent has no self-nature, and hence -how could it exist? Understand this correctly!

'di la brten nas 'di 'byung zhes II 'jig rten tshul 'di mi 'gog cing II gang brten rang bzhin med pas de II ji ltar yod 'gyur de nyid nges II SS 71

There is truth in the way people see the world; thought is not to­tally mistaken in its analysis of experience. But once dependence is recognized, it should lead to the conclusion that nothing can exist. Again we encounter the three step procedure of Nagarjuna's dia­lectic: because of dependence, there is no svabhiiva, and therefore there is no existence.

also taughtfor such practical purposes.

45 . See in this regard SS 2ab:

bdag med bdag med min bdag dang II bdag med min pas brjod 'ga' 'ang med I

There is no self, no non-self, no self and non-self. Therefore there is noth­ing which can be expressed.

158 EVIATAR SHULMAN

We must now ask ourselves what this severe deconstruction of existence, that I awkwardly insist does not lead to non-existence, actually means.

IV. Creative ignorance46

We have now reached the heart of our discussion, the attempt to come to terms with Nagarjuna's deep and total denial of existence. There is, according to this vision, nothing truly out there in the world. Nonetheless, we are not in a non-existent void but can actu­ally discuss the meaning and value of our experience. How can a world that is not existent or non-existent (or both or neither) be de­scribed? In other words, how is it that a non-existent reality comes into being?

Surprisingly enough, the Y$ and SS supply a rather straightfor­ward answer to these questions, explaining that the world is created out of ignorance, as a result of processes of conceptualization. The clearest statement in this regard is Y$ 37:

Since the buddhas have said that the world47 has ignorance for its con­dition, does it not follow that this world is a mental construction?

46 Initial articulations ofthe reading of Nagarjuna presented in this section have previously appeared in de la Santina (1987: 174) and Tola & Dragonetti (1995: xxix), and more importantly in Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 252-259, n. 492). Regrettably, none of these sources developed these points much beyond the level of preliminary observations. Siderits (2004) has provided some of the logical basis for the reading of Nagarjuna suggested here, although he bases his discussion on MMK 1 alone. Burton (1999: ch. 4) defined certain elements of Nagarjuna's thought in a similar way to my treatment of them, although I believe he has misunderstood Nagarjuna's basic position (see note 54 below).

47 Candraklrti explains "the world" to be equal to "the five aggregates of clinging" ('jig rten ni nye bar len pa'i phung po'i nga rnams so, Scherrer­Schaub [1991:77]). The same definition is given also in chapter 12 of the A~ra (see Conze [2006 (1973: 173)]). Although this statement seems to suggest that only the world of subjective experience is conditioned by vikalpa, we must note that there is, for Nagarjuna, no "world" which exists beyond the five ag-

CREATrvEIGNORANCE 159

'jig rten ma rig rkyen can du II gang phyir sangs rgyas rnams gsungs pa II de yi phyir Tla 'jig rten 'di II rnam rtog yin zhes cis mi 'thad II y~ 37

The world is a mental construction, an act of creative imagination, a vikalpa propelled by ignorance. The following verse strongly sug­gests that everything depends on ignorance:

That which ceases when ignorance ceases, how can it not be clear that is an imagination constructed out of mis-knowledge?

ma rig 'gags par gyur pa na II gang zhig 'gog par 'gyur ba de II mi shes pa las kun brtags par II ji Ita bu na gsal mi 'gyur II y~ 38

When ignorance will cease to be, it seems that the world will not be there either. What appears to exist is constructed by our own imagination, out of ignorance. Nagarjuna, if I understand him cor­rectly, is asking why we believe, given that our perception of the world is colored by ignorance, that the world is true? How is it that our very knowledge of the world's existence is not created by igno- . rance? Moreover, when we realize that the world is conditioned by ignorance, why is it that we don't realize it to be an act of creative, ignorant imagination? What this means is not that our perception or ideation of things mistakenly constructs a mental image it re­places for a true object. Rather, the object itself is constructed by ignorance, since there is nothing objectively there independent of ignorant perception. Earlier in the Y$ Nagarjuna has stated twice that the true vision of reality means seeing that things are born of ignorance. The first instance is Y$ 10:

When true knowledge sees the appearance conditioned by ignorance, no arising or ceasing is perceived.

ma rig rkyen gyis byung ba la II yang dag ye shes kyis gzigs na II

gregates. More importantly, the riipa aggregate traditionally includes all that is material, and specifically the 6 perceptual objects. One would probably not want to argue that there is no relation between the "real" physical object and its representation in perception. Examples of the emphasis on the physi­cal aspect of the riipa aggregate can be found in Majjhima Nikaya i185-190, i88-90, i421-423. See also Gethin's (1986) treatment of the five aggregates in the nikayas and early Abhidhamma.

160 EVIATAR SillJLMAN

skye ba dang ni 'gags pa'ang rung II 'ga' yang dmigs par mi 'gyur ro II

Nagarjuna goes on to state that "this is nirvG1J.a and the seeing of reality in this very life, what is to be done has been done" (Y$ llab: de nyid mthong chos my a ngan las / 'das shing bya ba byas pa'ang yin) .

. Y$ 10 is based on a delicate play of meaning. In traditional Bud­dhist exegesis "appearance conditioned by ignorance" refers to the 12 links of conditioned arising, the descriptions of the process by which sarp.saric transmigration proceeds. The causational principle underlying this process is based on each link conditioning the aris­ing of the following one, or, when it is absent, conditioning its ceas­ing.48 But Nagarjuna envisions a very different picture: When one rightly observes the conditioning of ignorance - he sees no arising and ceasing! This is because he understands that what seems to be real is actually not much more than a fantasy, and therefore that it does not truly arise or cease. Nagarjuna is hereby articulating a fully new import for "appearance conditioned by ignorance." No­thing whatsoever undergoes arising and ceasing, because all such things are not really there, they are fictions produced by ignorance. Nagarjuna will make this point again in verse 26 where- he asserts that "the knowers of things" (dngos po la mkhas pa rnams gyis, verse 25) know them to "appear caused by ignorance" (ma rig rgyu las shin tu byung).

It is tempting to try to read these verses as describing the na­ture of experience, rather than characterizing existence in general. But in Y$ 34 Nagarjuna declares he believes the physical-material­objective reality to be dependent on consciousness:

Things spoken of, the great elements and so forth,49 are enclosed in consciousness. When this is understood, they dissolve. Indeed, they are a mistaken construction.

48 For an exceptionally strong statement of this principle see SN iil05.

49 For an explanation of mahtibhatadi Cbyung ba che la sogs pa), see Scherrer-Schaub (1991: n. 492, p. 256).

CREATIVE IGNORANCE 161

'byung ba ehe la sags bshad pa II mam par shes su yang dag 'du II . de shes pasni 'bral 'gyur na II log pas mam brtags ma yin nam II

mahabhatiidi vijfiane proktaf!l samavarudhyate I tajjfiane vigamaf!l yati nanu mithyii vikalpitaf!l II Y$ 34

The elements are "checked by" or "enclosed in consciousness" (vi­jnane samavarudhyate, mam par shes su yang dag 'dU).50 They can be dissolved when this is understood, and hence are not objectively

real but depend on consciousness for their being. They are further defined as a mistaken mental construction (mithya vikalpitam, log pas mam brtags).

When we realize that Nagarjuna understood things to rise out of ignorance, we can better understand his intention in describ­ing them as being similar to illusions, dreams, phantoms, cities of gandharvas, and the like. This is a central feature of Nagarjuna's thought, which he expresses in different verses and contexts.51 A

good example is SS 66:

Conditioned things52 are like a city of gandharvas, an illusion, a phan­tom, hairs (seen by a person suffering from a cataract), a bubble in the stream, a magical display, a dream and a whirling fire-brand .

. 50 The meaning of samavarudhyate is not fully clear. In this context the verb could imply either that the elements etc. are made of consciousness, or, more probably, that they depend on consciousness in order to be. Numer­ous translations for samavarudhyate have been presented, such as Lindtner (1986: 83): "made to cohere in consciousness," Ichigo (1989: 155) and Loizzo (2001: 506) "reduced to consciousness," Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 252) and Tola & Dragonetti (1995: 38): "contained in consciousness," and Iinpa: "ab­sorbed in consciousness." See further Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 254-255).

What is important to note about samavarudhyate in Y~ 34 is that it probably does not make the strong idealistic claim that reality consists only of mind.

51 See MMK 7.34, 17.31-33, 23.8; 5S 14, 36, 40-42, 66; VV 65-67; y~ 15-17, 27, 56.

52 This verse speaks of 'du byed (saf!lskara) in the sense of 'dus byas (saTfl­skrta), a use familiar from different Buddhist contexts (see, for instance, Boisvert [1995: 93-95]). One should note that the technical and generally subconscious meaning of saTflskara makes little sense in this verse. It should

162 EVrATAR SHULMAN

'du byed dri za'i grong khyerdang II sgyu ma smig rgyu skra shad dang II dbu ba chu bur sprul pa dang II rmi lam mgal me'i 'khar lo mtshungs II

A similar idea is expressed in y~ 17 as well:

When one understands that existence53 is like a mirage and an illu­sion, one is not polluted by views of the extremes of a beginning or an end.

srid pa smig rgyu sgyu 'dra bar II blo yis mthong bar gyur pa ni II sngon gyi mtha' 'am phyi ma'i mtha' II lta bas yongs su slad mi 'gyur II

Things are unreal, but nonetheless appear. This appearance does in fact occur, but has no substantial reality to it. Moreover, as we have learned, the appearance is conditioned by ignorance and caused by conceptualization. This is why it is similar to an illusion, a dream or a mirage, phenomena which are created mentally without hav­ing any true objective support. This is, in fact, Nagarjuna's vision of the middle way, in which appearance is neither truly existent nor fully denied.54

be clear as well that this verse is not intended as an affirmation of an uncon­ditioned (asaY[lskrta) truth, argued against earlier in verses 30-32 of the same text (SS 32): .

'dus byas dang ni 'dus ma byas II du ma ma yin gcig ma yin II yod min med min yod med min 1/ mtshams 'dir sna tshogs thams cad 'dus // Conditioned and unconditioned are neither one nor many. They do not exist, not-exist or (both) exist and not-exist. The whole variety (of things) is included in these boundaries.

53 In this verse, "existence" translates the more particular srid pa (bhava), rather than the more abstract bhiiva (yod pa or dngos po).

54 This formulation of the middle way also answers Burton's (1999: ch. 4) claim that the fact that Nagarjuna believes reality to be a mental construction leads his view to Nihilism. I would argue the opposite view to Burton's: the fact that Nagarjuna understands reality to be conditioned by subjectivity demands a great degree of moral responsibility of people, since man naturally condi­tions and creates his own reality. According to this view, morality is not only validated, but enforced. The argument could be made that only in an empty world is morality understood to be not only a necessary, but even a constitu­tional force. On an ontological level, there is obviously a difference between

CREATrvEIGNORANCE 163

Thus far I have been quoting mainly from the y~. The SS dis­cusses the creative capacity of the mind somewhat differently. First, it connects illusory existence to karma.55 Verses 33-43 are devoted to a discussion of karma, in which Nagarjuna shows thatkarma lacks svabhiiva. Of primary importance for our discussion are the conclusions the SS draws from showing karma to lack svabhiiva.

Just as the victorious Tathagata creates a magical manifestation by way of his magical power, and that same magical manifestation in turn creates another magical manifestation,

In such a case, the manifestation (created by) the Tathagata is empty, and what need we say about the manifestation (created) by the man­ifestation? Both exist only as names,56 and are wholly conception­only.

In just the same way the agent is like the manifestation, and his act like the manifestation created by the manifestation. What is empty of self-nature in every bit, is conception-only.

ji ltar bcom ldan de bzhin gshegs II rdzu 'phrul gyis ni sprul pa sprul II sprul pa de yis slar yang ni II sprul pa gzhan zhig sprul gyur pa II 5S 40

de la de bzhin gshegs sprul stong II sprul pas sprul pa smos ci dgos II gnyis po ming tsam yod pa yang II ci yang rung ste rtog pa tsam II 5S 41

de bzhin byed po sprul dang mtshungs II las ni sprul pas sprul dang mtshungs II

rang bzhin gyis stong gang cung zad II yod pa de dag rtog pa tsam II 5S 42

non-existence and the statement that what exists is constructed by the mind.

55 las ni rkyen skyes yod min zhing II rkyen min las skyes cung zad med II 'du byed rnams ni sgyu ma dang II dri za'i grong khyer smig rgyu

mtshungs II 5S 36 Karma does not arise from conditions, and it does not arise at all from non-conditions. Conditioned things are like illusions, a city of gandhar­vas, and mirages.

56 The characterization of things as "only names" (ming tsam) is absent from the svavrtti version of the text.

164 EVJATAR SHULMAN

Karma is similar to a magical manifestation. 57 Anything that ap­pears due to karmic conditioning is "conception-only," merely a name. The rationale of this insight is defined in verse 42: "What is empty of self-nature in every bit, is conception-only." This is, in fact, exactly what I have been arguing that the lack of self-nature means - when there is no true existence of itself, reality proves to be a conceptualization. The SS informs us that this conceptualiza­tion is caused not only by ignorance, but also by karma. .

The discussion of karma in the SS concludes with a statement regarding the enigmatic nature of existence (verse 44), following an elaborate discussion of the problems Nagarjuna identifies in de­fining the perceptual process (verses 45-57). The argument is too complex to be treated fairly in this context, since it rests on a very challenging and counter-intuitive assumption: Nagarjuna seems to believe that if we cannot supply a coherent definition for the way perception functions, every experience, every act of knowledge and every object are proven to be unrea1.58 I hope to give the intricate arguments of the SS fuller attention in another context. For now it will suffice if we note the intimate relation Nagarjuna intuits between definition and reality. Of even greater importance in the present context are the formulations he provides at the end of this discussion, in which he defines the creative power of conceptual­ization. First he states that the kleSas lack self-nature, since they are ;.Conditioned by pleasant and unpleasant sensation.59 Next he states:

57 The discussion of karma in chapter 17 of the MMK reaches the same conclusion. In 17.31-33, Nagarjuna uses the same image as in SS 40-42 in order to define karma as being similar to an illusion.

58 The most significant verse in this regard is SS 51:

mig blo mig la yod min te II gzugs la yod min par na med II gzugs dang mig la brten nas de II yongs su rtog pa log pa yin II Eye-consciousness is not in the eye, in the object or between the two. What depends on the form and the eye is a mistaken conception.

I 59 SS 59: sdug dang mi sdug phyin ci log II rkyen las chags sdang gti mug dngos II

CREATIVE'IGNORANCE 165

Because desire, anger and ignorance are directed toward one and the , same thing, they create it through conceptuality. That conception, too,

is unreal. 60

The conceived object does not exist, and without it - how will there be conception? Therefore the conceived and the conception, because they arise from conditions, are truly empty. 61

gang phyir de nyid la chags shing II de fa zhe sdang de la rmongs II de phyir rnam par rtog pas bskyed II rtog de'ang yang dag nyid du

medii SS 60

brtag bya gang de yod ma yin II brtag bya med rtog ga la yod II de phyir brtag bya rtog pa dag II rkyen las skyes phyir stong pa nyid II

SS 61

Nagarjuna understands the functioning of conceptuality in a sur­prising manner. Rather than conceptuality being an attempt to de­fine and understand reality, Nagarjuna sees conceptuality as re­sponsible for the creation of reality. Things are not objectively "out there," but are brought into being by ideation.

'byung phyir chags sdang gti mug dang II rang bzhin gyis ni yod ma yin II

The phenomena of desire, anger and ignorance arise conditioned by the mistaken perceptions of pleasant and unpleasant. Therefore desire, anger and ignorance do not exist by way of self-nature.

60 This verse could be read as a statement that conception creates the klefas rather than the kle§as creating the object. The reason I believe my translation - which stresses that the ktefas create the object - to be more convincing, is that the next verse begins with the statement "The conceived does not ex­ist ... " (brtag bya gang de yod ma yin), a fact which must have been refer~ed to in the previous verse. Also, in a Nagarjunian world, the fact that something is experienced through the distorting lenses of the klesas clearly implies that it is unreal. I wish to thank Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and Prof. Akira Saito for carefully reading this important verse, as well as the following verse, with me.

61 We could translate "emptiness itself" (stong pa nyid), but following the svavrtti I translate "are empty" (stong pa yin). The nyid which ends the verse appears to be a translation of eva. It is difficult to decide whether the original Sanskrit reads sanyatii-eva or sanya/e/ii-eva.

166 EYJATAR SHULMAN

. What leads Nagarjuna to conclude in these -yerses that ob­jects are created in the manner they are envisioned by the mind? Nagarjuna's analysis leads him to the conviction that there is no true existence; the object is not real. Observing that experience is manifold, as objects take different forms (in this case they are ex­perienced through the threefold division of the klesas), Nagarjuna realizes that it is ideation which creates the object. There exists no unitary reality which conditions experience, and hence tl,le objects of experience, which appear to be unitary, are created as part of the way they are envisioned by consciousness. They are not ac­tually perceived, but rather, are projected as part of the "percep­tual" process. For Nagarjuna, it is not the object which conditions experience, but experience which conditions the object. The logic Nagarjuna is employing in this case rests on the well-known "one or many" argument: The object cannot have a unitary or a manifold nature. Once it appears in different ways, the Madhyamika views it as a result of the way it has been conceived.62

Moreover, once things are proven to be brought into being by the power of ideation, that ideation itself is realized to be unreal as-well, since it perceives objects which are not really there. Emp­tiness is said to be the play of unreal conceptualization perceiving unreal objects.

The description of reality as "conception-only" in the 5S is ;.highly significant. It may remind us of Vasubandhu's statement at the opening of his Vif!tsatika: "In the Mahayana these three worlds are established as being mere figments of consciousness" (mahii­yane traidhiitukaf!t vijfiaptimatraf!t vyavasthapyate). 5S 61 is also remarkably similar to Madhyantavibhaga 1.3 and 1.6, and to Tri­svabhavanirde1a 36.63 Some readers will possibly be worried that Nagarjuna has turned into a Yogacarin.

62 The non-unitary nature of the object, which serves as a proof of its logical and ontological impossibility, is central to the logic employed by Nagarjuna in the SS. See verses 46 and 50 for examples of this principle.

63 I quote here only the last of these 3 verses, TrisvabhavanirdeSa 36:

CREATIYEIGNORANCE 167

I believe that to a great extent suchan understanding is true.64 In a future publication I wish to provide a complementary discussion, which will shOw that Vasubandhu was a sort of a Madhyamika. In my mind, in the earlier stages of their evolution the Madhyamaka and Yogacara shared a very similar intuition about reality, under­standing it to be an empty presentation determined by conscious and unconscious processes of conceptualization.65

cittamatropalambhena syac jfieyarthanupalambhata I jfieyarthanupalambhena syac cittanupaZambhata II From the perception of mind-only, there should be the non-perception of knowable things. From the non-perception of knowable things, there should be the non-perception of mind.

See also SS 57 for another remarkably similar statement by Nagarjuna.

64 For further discussion of the intimate relations between Madhyamaka and Ybgacara thought, albeit in a different context than the one developed here, see Nagao (1991: ch. 13) and King (1994). It is also interesting to note in this regard the way Saito (2007) refers to Nagarjuna as " ... the founder or originator of the Mahayana-Abhidarma movement, that was later devel­oped by the so-called Yogacaras and Madhyamikas" (p. 158). Saito refers also to the commentaries written by early Yogacara masters on the MMK. His words suggest the possibility that there was a viable Yogacara reading of Nagarjuna, now forgotten due to the immense influence thinkers such as Buddhapalita, Candraklrti and Tsong-kha-pa exert on our understanding of Madhyamaka. The possible, or even natural synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogacara is also attested by Santarak~ita's so-called Yogacara-Madhyamaka school. This school was particularly dominant during the early stages of Ti­betan Madhyamaka (see Seyfort Ruegg [2000: section one]).

65 It is most important to note that when Nagarjuna or Vasubandhu iden­tify the creative role of mental forces, this should not be meant to imply they believed people can control the processes of creation propelled by their own minds. Karma, ignorance and mistaken forms of imagination and conceptu­ality (vikalpa, vijfiapti, abhiUaparikalpa) are clearly not willful, and are to a large extent unconscious. This explains not only why we cannot create at will, but also why we make perceptual and ideational mistakes.

168 EVIATAR SHULMAN

V. Conclusion

The basic argument developed in this paper was that for Nagarjuna, the fact that phenomena lack svabhiiva implies that they are created by ignorance through processes of conceptualization. When noth­ing exists, as it has no true nature, it cannot be independent of the way it is known or perceived. The dialectic of Emptiness shows things to be a sort of a "real illusion." Phenomena are not really there in any objective or substantive sense. Nonetheless, they do appear, and hence are understood to be "like an illusion, like a dream, like a city of gandharvas."66

Abbreviations

JAOS

JIP

MMK

PEW

SS VV

WZKS

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Journal of Indian Philosophy

Millamadhyamakaklirikli - cf. n. 9

Philosophy East and West

Silnyatlisaptati - cf. n. 11

Vigrahavylivartanf"- s. Bhattacharya et. al1978

Wiener ZeitschriJt fur die Kunde Sudasiens und Archiv fur indische Philosophie

Yukti:ja:j!ikliklirikli - s. Scherrer-Schaub (1991)

Bhattacarya, K., Johnston, E. R., and Kunst, A. (1978). The Dialectical Meth­od of Nliglirjuna: Vigrahavylivartanf. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Boisvert, M. (1997). The Five Aggregates: Understanding Theravlida Psy­chology and Soteriology. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.

66 MMK 7.34ab: yathli mliyli yathli svapno gandharvanagararrz yathli.

CREATTVEIGNORANCE 169

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King, R. (1989). "Sunyatli and Ajliti: Absolutism and the Philosophies of ;§ Nagarjuna and Gaugapada." lIP 17: 385-405.

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Journal of the International Association of Buddhist StudiesVolume 30 • Number 1–2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 175–217

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO:

AN EARLY BUDDHIST NARRATIVE FROM DUNHUANG

SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

1. Introduction1

Historical writing in Tibet has been, by and large, a religious tra-dition. Tibetan histories have focused on the transmission of reli-gious practices ever since the anonymous ‘treasure’ histories began to circulate in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.2 These wove to-gether Buddhist cosmology, the history of Buddhism in India, and semi-legendary accounts of Tibet’s imperial past, creating a grand narrative that established Tibet at the centre of Buddhist history. The major works of Tibetan religious historians from the twelfth century onwards, while perhaps more recognisable as histories, were also religious accounts of the ‘arising of the dharma’ (chos ’byung).3 The authors of these works tended to begin their histories

1 The authors would like to thank Brandon Dotson, Kazushi Iwao, Birgit Kellner and Helmut Krasser for their comments on aspects of this article, and the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK).

2 These gter ma or treasure histories, the Bka’ chems ka khol ma and the Ma ṇi bka’ ’bum, claim to have been written and buried in the seventh century by the dharma-king Srong brtsan Sgam po; on these texts see Dan Martin’s major bibliography (1997), entries no. 4 and 16 respectively.

3 As Leonard van der Kuijp (1996: 46) points out, the fi rst chos ’byung still extant today was the Chos la ’jugs pa’i sgo, completed in 1167/8 by Bsod nams rtse mo. This narrative history, which charts the rise of dharma from the time of the Buddha to the twelfth century, lingers the longest over the re-ligion’s founder. Later that century, Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer wrote the very diff erent Chos ’byung me tog snying po sbrang rtsi’i bcud. It is much longer than the Chos la ’jugs pa’i sgo, and devotes more time to the Tibetan imperial

176 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

with what they knew of Buddhism in India, followed by the narra-tive of Tibet’s conversion to Buddhism during its imperial period of the seventh to ninth centuries. These narratives end with a brief account of the dark period, or ‘time of fragmentation’ (sil bu’i dus), which lasted from the mid ninth to late tenth century, and an ac-count of the Buddhist renaissance, the so-called ‘later diff usion’ (phyi dar), that followed.

In constructing their narratives, Tibet’s religious historians had to rely on a variety of sources, but they tended not to make these explicit. Thus the sources of Tibet’s religious narratives are not at all clear to us. On the one hand, we have the Dba’ bzhed, an ac-count of the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet during the reign of the eighth-century imperial king, or tsenpo (btsan po), Khri Srong lde brtsan. Quite how old this source may be is a matter of debate, but it certainly contains parts that go back to the ninth or tenth centuries, as a recent discovery of related Dunhuang fragments has shown.4 However, since the Dba’ bzhed focuses on the reign of Khri Srong lde brtsan, it can only have been one source among many.

period than any other. Nyang ral’s chos ’byung contains a short transmission history, apparently based on a chos ’byung by the eleventh-century Rnying ma pa Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (see Germano 2002). Rong zom’s history is no longer extant, but apparently only describes “the transmission of ‘old tantras’ into Tibet in imperial and early post-imperial times” (Martin 1997: 25). Other twelfth-century chos ’byung include She’u Lo tsa ba’s transmis-sion history for the Lam ’bras teachings of the Sa skya pas, as well as those written by the Bka’ gdams pa master Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his dis-ciple Gtsang nag pa Brtson ’grus seng ge (Martin 1997: 29). From then on chos ’byung proliferated in Tibet, continuing the diff erent trajectories begun by these twelfth-century exemplars.

4 The two Dunhuang fragments contain the story of the abbot Śāntarakṣita’s arrival at the court of Khri Srong lde brtsan, displaying a clear textual rela-tionship to the Dba’ bzhed version of the story (see van Schaik and Iwao 2008). The dating of the Dba’ bzhed and the other versions of the same nar-rative, such as the Sba bzhed, is discussed in Pasang and Diemberger 2000: xiv-xv, 11–14.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 177

On the other hand we have the many manuscripts drawn from the so-called ‘library cave’ in Dunhuang. These manuscripts date from the Tibetan occupation of Dunhuang (in the late eighth cen-tury) through to the closing of the cave at the beginning of the elev-enth century. Foremost among this group are the year-by-year royal records known as the Old Tibetan Annals and the poetic account of imperial Tibet known as the Old Tibetan Chronicle.5 While these texts, or others like them, were clearly important for the narrative of the imperial period in the later chos ’byung genre they are not primarily Buddhist works. We must assume, then, that a variety of sources used by the early Buddhist historians are no longer avail-able to us.

The manuscript presented in this article, PT 149, contains a brief historical narrative that illustrates the change from imperial to religious history in Tibet. As we shall see in the next section, the text probably dates from sometime between the late ninth and late tenth centuries, within Tibet’s ‘time of fragmentation.’ This period is often depicted in traditional and modern scholarship as a ‘dark age;’ indeed, owing to the paucity of historical literature from the period, it has been diffi cult to identify the sources for the early chos ’byung accounts. Thus the narrative in PT 149 might be helpful in this regard; though it cannot be identifi ed as a direct source for any of the extant Buddhist histories, it may be considered the kind of source that historians of the eleventh century onward would have utilized. PT 149 is actually the narrative setting for a single Bud-dhist text, a prayer known as the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna.6

5 On the Tibetan historical sources from Dunhuang, see Uray 1979. The Old Tibetan Annals are found in the following manuscripts: PT 1288, IOL Tib J 750 and Or.8212/187. The Old Tibetan Chronicle is found in PT 1287, with associated fragments in PT 1144 and IOL Tib J 1375, and a related ge-nealogy in PT 1286. Images of most of these manuscripts can be found on the IDP website (http://idp.bl.uk) and transcriptions are available from the OTDO website (http://otdo.aa.tufs.ac.jp).

6 This translates roughly as ‘the aspirational prayer of the practice of [Sa-manta]bhadra,’ to which is sometimes appended rāja, so as to read: ‘the king

178 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

This narrative, like the later Tibetan Buddhist histories, begins in India, and continues through to the imperial period in Tibet, spe-cifi cally the period of the reign of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan (r. c.754–797?). Also in line with most of the later histories, but unlike the Old Tibetan Annals or Old Tibetan Chronicle, PT 149’s narra-tive focuses on religious lineage rather than royal succession.

The manuscript contains the story of Sudhana’s7 quest for the Ārya bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna, which leads him to the bodhi sattvas Mañjuśrī and Samantabhadra. Obtaining the prayer from the lat-ter, he is able to reach the spiritual level (bhūmi) of ‘utter joy.’ The scene of the narrative then shifts to Tibet, where the prayer is trans-lated into Tibetan as part of the great translation project undertak-en during the reign of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan. The tsenpo’s priest, Dba’ Dpal byams, has a dream, which the Indian abbot Bo-dhisattva (known in other historical sources as Śāntarakṣita) inter-prets. The dream indicates that Dba’ Dpal byams must recite the Āryabhadracaryā pra ṇi dhāna for three days and nights. Dba’ Dpal byams fails to uphold this commitment, and so asks Khri Srong lde brtsan if he can go to a more spiritually conducive place. With the tsenpo’s blessing he travels towards the caves of ’Ching pu, where he meets two Tibetan monks who have experienced omens indi-cating that they should meet up with Dba’ Dpal byams. The three travel together and, reciting the prayer, ascend to the pure land of Sukhāvati.

of aspirational prayers, that of the practice of [Samanta]bhadra’ In PT 149 the prayer is fi rst referred to as “the king of aspirational prayers” (recto l. 1), but then three times as “the aspirational prayer” (recto ll. 1, 5 and 8). We have chosen the latter title for use here, since it is shorter and more often at-tested in our text. The text is found in the Derge and Peking editions of the Bka’ ’gyur (P 716, 1038 and D 1095). An English translation by Jesse Fenton (2002) based on the Tibetan is available.

7 Not to be confused with the hero of the romantic Sudhana (Manoharā) Jātaka (Jaini 1966), which also proved popular in Tibet (see Stein 1972: 276–278).

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 179

2. The Manuscript

PT 149 is a single folio in the pecha format, measuring 47 cm width by 8.6 cm height.8 The page has red margins, and no pagination, suggesting that is was originally a singular item as we have it, rath-er than part of a manuscript text collection. The scribe has written rather densely, fi tting eight lines on the recto side and six on the verso. This little manuscript is in good condition and gives a pleas-ing general impression, as Marcelle Lalou noted in her catalogue: “Beau papier et jolie écriture.”9

The scribe

The scribe who wrote PT 149 has characteristic handwriting that can be identifi ed in a number of other manuscripts. This identifi ca-tion is based on a method of forensic handwriting analysis adapted to the conventions of Tibetan manuscripts, which has been dis-cussed elsewhere.10 In brief, the method involves breaking down the handwritings into units of individual graphs (the written letters that appear on the page) and identifying suffi cient similarities at the graph level to produce a convincing identifi cation. The identifi ca-tion of such similarities is experience-based, in that the examiner must know which graphic forms are likely to be idiographic, and which allographic. While allographic forms are learnt variations in writing styles, idiographic forms are those that are specifi c to a given writer, and not under his or her conscious control. A series of

8 The pecha (dpe cha) format is orignally derived from the Indian palm leaf folio, which is much longer than high. This format, which was associ-ated with sacred Buddhist scriptures, was transferred to paper manuscripts in Central Asian states like Khotan, with little change except that larger pages could be made using paper instead of palm leaves. This Central Asian style was then adopted in Tibet during the imperial period. The form is often known by the Hindi word pothi, derived from Sanskrit pustaka.

9 Lalou 1939: 49.

10 See Dalton, Davis and van Schaik 2007.

180 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

benchmarks may then be established as a basis for comparing one example of handwriting with another.

The handwriting of PT 149’s scribe can be recognised by cer-tain general features, the letter-forms being (i) compact, (ii) round-ed, (iii) somewhat ‘clotted’ with ink at the points where the pen has come down or changed direction. More specifi c benchmarks include: (i) a very small, almost vestigal ra btags, (ii) a tha with a tiny, circular lower half, (iii) a cha which has lost not only the head but also the vertical line connecting the lower part to the head. Such features, while none of them unique, when found together are persuasive evidence of the same hand.

In addition, there are a number of other features that may not be specifi c to this scribe, but are found in most manuscripts with this handwriting and therefore are part of the ‘family resemblance’ within this manuscript group. These include (i) the use of double circles and shad to fi ll space left by incomplete lines of text at the end of a manuscript, (ii) an opening curl (mgo yig) followed by a shad, two dots and another shad, (iii) a recognisable mise en page comprising red margins, no obvious guidelines, and an unusually dense 7–8 lines per page.

With these criteria in mind, we can identify a group of manuscripts written in the same handwriting as PT 149, which includes:

• PT 89: two texts from the Ratnakūṭa, mainly dealing with Buddhist cosmology.

• PT 322: a prayer to the ‘magical net’ tantras in general, and the Guhyagarbhatantra in particular, that emphasises the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen).

• PT 808: a Chan treatise on the three jewels.

• PT 958: an extract attributed to the Abhidharma sūtra, again on Buddhist cosmology.

• IOL Tib J 597: a history of the Central Asian state of Khotan known as The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) (li yul gyi dgra bcom pas lung bstan pa). This text seems to have been

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 181

quite popular around Dunhuang. IOL Tib J 597 is actually a copy from another manuscript version of the same text (IOL Tib J 598), which may well date back to the mid ninth centu-ry.11

PT 322 and 808 belong to a wider group of manuscripts on Chan, tantric Buddhism, and a combination of the two, which have been discussed by Sam van Schaik and Jacob Dalton.12 The other three manuscripts are thematically more closely related to our PT 149. The emphasis in PT 89 and 958 on Mahāyānasūtras bears compari-son with the role of PT 149 as a narrative setting (gleng gzhi) for the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna from the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra.

The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) in IOL Tib J 547, though framed as the speech of the Buddha with its contemporary subject-matter presented as prophecy, touches on Tibetan history in its ac-count of how the monks of Khotan were given refuge by the Tibetan king. There is common ground here with the religio-historical nar-rative contained in PT 149, which extends from the journey of Sud-hana in India (the narrative framework of the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra) to the activities of the Tibetan tsenpo and his preceptor.

11 This text, one of fi ve related prophetic scriptures concerning Khotan, also exists in another manuscript version, IOL Tib J 601, which is closer to the versions preserved in four diff erent editions of the Tibetan Bka’ ’gyur (Personal communication from Tsuguhito Takeuchi). Furthermore, Pelliot chinois 2139 contains a Chinese translation of the text by the Dunhuang-based translator ’Go Chos grub; this may have been based on IOL Tib J 598. Géza Uray gives the dates of Chos grub as 770–c.858, and states that the text cannot date to later than 858 (Uray 1979: 289). There is a translation of this text in Thomas 1935: 3 –87 (where he confusingly refers to it as “The Proph-ecy of the Li Country,” which is actually the title of another of the Khotanese prophecies). See also Emmerick 1967.

12 See van Schaik and Dalton 2004.

182 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

Dating the manuscript

The handwriting in the manuscript does not correspond to any of the styles known to have been used in the period of the Tibetan occupation of Dunhuang, which ended in the middle of the ninth century. Instead, its general stylistic features correspond to cur-sive writing found in many of the tenth-century Dunhuang manu-scripts.13 So we can tentatively date the manuscript to the tenth century. This still leaves the question of the date of the text itself.

One of the other manuscripts in this handwriting group contains The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s). As we mentioned above, this is a copy of an earlier manuscript, which we also have in the Dunhuang collections. The earlier manuscript probably dates from the mid ninth century, and The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s)is therefore at least that old, and possibly older. Unfortunately the text found in PT 149 exists only in this single manuscript version. However, there are some indications that it may be a copy of an earlier text. These are archaic features in the text itself.

In terms of orthography, the ‘strong da’ (da drag) and ‘support-ing a’ (a rten) appear frequently. These features are traditionally held to have been removed from the offi cial script in the second revision of Tibetan orthography, which was probably enforced in 812.14 Though they are found in manuscripts and inscriptions after

13 Many Dunhuang manuscripts that can be proved to post-date the Tibet-an occupation are discussed in Takeuchi 1990 and 2004. For a preliminary study of the diff erences between imperial and post-imperial writing styles in Dunhuang, see van Schaik forthcoming.

14 See Li shi’i gur khang, pp. 2–3. Note that the author also considers the ya superscribed to ma to have been removed at this time, a feature that is nev-ertheless consistently present throughout the Dunhuang manuscripts. The standardization of 812 is traditionally said to be the second of three revisions of the Tibetan written language, and the one that resulted in a detailed royal edict, the Sgra byor bam po gnyis pa, which has been preserved intact. There is some disagreement between the traditional histories on whether this sec-ond standardization occurred in the reign of Khri Lde srong brtsan (r.799–

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 183

this date, they are less common, and are usually absent in tenth-century manuscripts that are not copies of earlier texts. In terms of language, the text contains a number of formulations that are characteristic of the documents originating in the Tibetan imperial period, such as btsan po’i snyan du gsol for a petition to the tsenpo. The phrase snyan du gsol is found in several Old Tibetan texts, and the specifi c phrase btsan po’i snyan du gsol appears in the Old Tibetan Chronicle.15

The orthography of the title tsenpo (btsan po) and the name Khri Srong lde brtsan in PT 149 follow the conventions of documents from the imperial period. These conventions, strictly adhered to at the time, necessitate that the name element is spelled brtsan, and the role btsan p(h)o. The spelling brtsan po is only seen in imperial-period sources in the specifi c phrase dbu rmog brtsan po or variants based thereon.16 The orthography btsan p(h) o, on the other hand, is seen repeated hundreds of times in these sources. Conversely, we fi nd the name element spelled brtsan in the vast

815) or Khri Gtsug lde brtsan (r.815–841). Most of the later sources place it in the latter’s reign; however, the earliest source to give a date, Bsod nam rtse mo’s Chos la ’jug pa’i sgo (p. 343-2-6), places it in the reign of the earlier tsenpo, and Mkhas pa’i dga’ ston of Dpa’ bo Gtsug lag ’phreng ba places it more specifi cally in a dragon year in the reign of Khri Lde srong brtsan (also known as Sad na legs), which can only be 812 (see Sørensen 1994: 412 n. 1431). This date accords nicely with the orthographic diff erences between the two inscriptions at the Zhwa’i lha khang, dated to 805/6 and 812. Recent scholarship dates the compilation of the full Sgra byor bam po gnyis pa to 814, a few years after this reform, though earlier versions are found in the Tabo manuscripts (see the excellent survey in Scherrer-Schaub 2002). On the orthographic features of early Tibetan manuscripts in general, see Scherrer-Schaub and Bonani 2002.

15 PT 1287: l. 323 and IOL Tib J 1375: r.2.

16 PT 1287: ll. 332, 387 (dbu rmog brtsan po); IOL Tib J 751: 38r.2–3 (dbu bang rmog brtsan po, dmag mang po’i mthu brtsan po); ’Phyong rgyas bridge inscription, ll. 3, 12 and 19 (dbu rmong brtsan po) and the east face of the Lhasa Treaty Pillar, ll. 16 and 49 (dbu rmog brtsan po, dmag brtsan po).

184 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

majority of cases in manuscripts and inscriptions from the imperial period.

Of course, in PT 149 these could all be conscious archaisms ad-opted to give the text an authentic fl avour, and we cannot use them to defi nitively place the text in the imperial period. Yet there is no doubt that it belongs to the earliest stratum of Tibetan religious his-tory, when the events of the imperial period, especially those from Khri Srong lde brtsan’s reign, were being reformulated as a specifi -cally Buddhist narrative.

The king of aspirational prayers

The title of the text is The Narrative Setting of the First Teaching of this Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhānarāja. The designation of the prayer as “this” suggests that the narrative setting was originally included as an introduction to the prayer. Importantly though, our manuscript seems to stand alone. It is a single folio with no pagina-tion, and though the text does not fi ll the verso folio, leaving some blank lines, the prayer does not follow it. Therefore it is possible that our scribe copied the narrative from a manuscript in which it preceded the prayer itself.

In later Tibetan Buddhism the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna is one of the most widely known and most frequently recited prayers, whether in monastic or lay contexts.17 It was already one of the more popular Buddhist texts in Tibetan by the ninth century, when several works related to it were included in the catalogue of the li-

17 Stephan Beyer stressed the importance of the prayer in Tibetan culture and wrote that a copy of the prayer “has adorned the house altar of every family in the Tibetan-speaking world.” (1973: 188). Matthew Kapstein is also of the opinion that it is “perhaps the most widely known prayer in Tibet.” (Kapstein 2000: 97). David Gellner and Mark Tatz have mentioned the use of the prayer in funerary contexts in Newar and Tibetan Buddhism (see Gellner 1992: 107 and Tatz 1977: 156). There is also a version of the Āryabhadra-caryā praṇidhāna in the Bon po canon named G.yung drung bzang por (sic) spyod pa’i smon lam gyi rgyal po (see Karmay and Nagano 2001: no. 285.7).

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 185

brary of Lhan kar monastery.18 Among the Dunhuang manuscripts there are over forty copies of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna in Tibetan: either on their own or in collections of several texts.19 It is likely that these collections were assembled for group recitation and ritual practice. These collections strongly suggest a ritual func-tion for the prayer, as they often contain ritual dhāraṇī texts like the Pūjā me gha dhāraṇī. There are also Tibetan translations of Indic commentaries on the prayer, including one by Bhadrapaṇa that was translated by Jñānagarbha and Dpal brtsegs.20 The latter translator is also mentioned in our manuscript.

An indication of the importance of the Āryabhadracaryā pra ṇi-dhā na for the cult of the tsenpos is found in PT 134, a prayer on the accession to the throne of U’i dum brtan (better known as Glang dar ma). This prayer is based on the seven-branch structure that derives

18 The prayer is listed as Bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam kyi rgyal po in the “various aspirational prayers” section of the Lhan kar ma, where it is no. 470. The commentaries listed in this catalogue are a Bzang po spyod pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa, attributed to the ācārya Śakya gshes gnyen (no. 559), a Bzang po spyod pa’i ’grel pa, attributed to the ācārya Yon tan ’od (no. 560), a Bzang po spyod pa’i ’grel pa, attributed to the ācārya Phyogs kyi glang po (no. 561), a Bzang po spyod pa’i ’grel pa, attributed to the ācārya Rgyan bzang po (no. 562), and a mnemonic (brjed byang) on the Bzang po spyod pa’i ’grel pa drawn from four diff erent commentaries by Ye shes sde (no. 563). See Lalou 1953 for a brief record, and Herrmann-Pfandt 2008 for full details and references to the canonical versions. For a discussion of the name of the monastery, see Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: xvi, n. 28. Here we have opted for the version of the name found in PT 1085: Lhan kar.

19 There are also several copies in Chinese. The fi rst complete Chinese translations of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna were made by Amoghavajra (Bu kong jin gang 不空金剛) and Prajñā (Ban ruo 般若) in the eighth century. See Dessein 2003 for a survery of the literary history of the Āryabhadracaryā-pra ṇidhāna in China. Given the importance of Chinese culture in Dunhuang, we should not ignore the possibility of a Chinese infl uence on the popularity of the Tibetan version.

20 IOL Tib J 146. This commentary is also found in the Bstan ’gyur (P 5515), where the text is attributed to the same author and translators.

186 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

from the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna, which is also mentioned here by name.21 Another early example of the use of the prayer is the bell at Yer pa, just outside Lhasa, dating to the fi rst half of the ninth century.22 In addition, certain early histories, including the Bka’ chems ka khol ma, mention an inscription of part of the prayer that was made at Ldan ma brag, along with an image of Maitreya, when the Chinese princess was being escorted to Lhasa to marry Srong brtsan Sgam po (618–649).23 However, Per Sørensen is of the opinion that the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna would not have been known to the Tibetans during the reign of Srong brtsan Sgam po. Another early history, the Me tog snying po of Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer, states that the prayer was translated a century later, to increase the lifespan of Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan (742–c.800).24 This latter testimony resonates with the use of the prayer in PT 134 as part of the cult of the tsenpos.

21 PT 134: l. 19. See the study of this manuscript in Scherrer-Schaub 2000. The prayer is also discussed in Yamaguchi 1996.

22 Richardson 1985: 144–145.

23 Bka’ chems ka khol ma: 185.18–186.1: khams su ldan ma’i brag sngon rtsi dkar can la rgyas pa’i dbu dum dang / bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam ’bur du btod pa brkos nas bris /

The same account appears in other early histories; see Sørensen 1994: 240–241 for a discussion. A rock carving and inscription at Ldan ma brag were discovered in 1983, and are discussed in Heller 1985. As Heller and Sørensen point out, these are not to be identifi ed with the ones mentioned in the histo-ries, as the carved deity is Vairocana, not Maitreya, and the inscription is not the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna. Moreover the rediscovered carving and inscription probably date to the reign of Khri Srong lde brtsan.

24 Chos ’byung me tog snying po: 336.17. Later the Chos ’byung me tog snying po identifi es a version of the prayer, written in gold, held in the Dge (rgyas) bye ma gling temple built in the reign of Khri Srong lde brtsan (417.14).

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 187

3. The story

Though PT 149 is not to be regarded as a credible source for the life or times of Khri Srong lde brtsan, it is an invaluable example of how his image began to be used in post-imperial times. It is also the sole known extant version of a unique historical contextualisation of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna.25 Unlike PT 134, this narrative does not emphasise the power of the prayer to give long life to its royal patron. Instead it stresses the thematic unity between the Indian and Tibetan stages of the prayer’s transmission. Both parts of the transmission reference the social hierarchy of spiritual friends, in India and Tibet respectively. This was perhaps in order to raise the status of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna in a post-imperial Tibet, where Buddhism had survived the fall of its dynastic patrons.

The Indian narrative

The fi rst third of the text is a condensed version of the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra narrative, describing how 102 spiritual friends (dge ba’i bshes gnyen) aid Sudhana (nor bzangs) on his search for the Ārya bha dra-caryāpraṇidhāna. None of the available Sanskrit, Chinese or Ti-betan versions describe this many spiritual friends, the traditional number being 53.26 The Sba bzhed mentions a wall frieze of the Sudhana story, including 102 spiritual friends, in the great court-yard (’khor sa chen mo) at the Bsam yas monastery built by Khri

25 We have so far only found gleng gzhi in a minority of later commentar-ies on the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna: for example the eighteenth-century rnam shes of Ye shes bstan pa’i sgron me (Chandra 1963) or the twentieth-century bzang spyod ’bru ’grel of A ’dzom rgyal sras rig ’dzin gyur med rdo rje. These gleng gzhi only give the Indian narrative, and their descriptions diff er from our narrative in following the traditional list of 53, not 102, spir-itual friends (dge ba’i bshes gnyen).

26 See Osto 2004: 29–33 for reference to the Chinese, Tibetan and Indian versions, and his Appendices for lists of the 53 spiritual friends in Sanskrit and Tibetan. Fontein (1967: 1 and passim) also lists 53 spiritual friends in iconographical representations around Buddhist Asia.

188 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

Srong lde brtsan.27 We have, as yet, been unable to verify whether such a frieze existed or still exists in some form; but it seems that what we have in PT 149 is a version of that variant of the popular Sudhana story.

Other variants exist, including an early Tibetan versifi ed retell-ing from Dunhuang called The History of the Cycle of Birth and Death (Skye shi ’khor lo’i lo rgyus). The Cycle of Birth and Death describes 27 spiritual friends, who diff er in name and order from Indian tradition. The Cycle of Birth and Death is apparently based on older textual sources, which suggests that this narrative was al-ready widely known in post-imperial Tibet.28 The popularity of the Sudhana narrative was not confi ned to the Dunhuang area either; the narrative is well-represented in both textual and visual culture from the imperial and post-imperial periods. As we saw, there may at one time have been frescos at Bsam yas depicting Sudhana’s visits to 102 spiritual friends. Still surviving today are a series of wooden panels at the Jo khang temple, carved in the Nepalese Lic-chavi style and possibly dating to as early as the seventh century. These panels, though incomplete, appear to depict Sudhana’s audi-

27 Sba bzhed 45–46: de nas ’khor sa chen mo bskor te rnam par snang mdzad ngan song sbyong ba’i dkyil ’khor du bzhengs so / [46] mda’ yab kyi ngos gsum na rnam par snang mdzad la sogs pa rigs lnga’i lder tsho zhal phyir lta ba / nang du mdo sdong po brgyan pa’i rgyud ris dang / tshong dpon gyi bu bzang pos dge ba’i bshes gnyen brgya rtsa gnyis bsten pa bris so /

28 The nine Dunhuang fragments, discovered and pieced together by Yo-shiro Imaeda, are: PT 218; 219; 220; 366; 367; IOL Tib J 99; 345; and vol. 69 fol. 17 (=IOL Tib J 1302) (Imaeda 2007: 114). Steinkellner concludes, fol-lowing de Jong’s discovery of sources for some of the quotes found in these fragments, that a “merely oral knowledge of the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra can be ruled out because [the Cycle of Birth and Death] copies words and phrases of a clearly textual kind” (Steinkellner 1995: 18–19). The list of spiritual friends (Steinkellner 1995: 128) includes neither Mañjuśrī nor Samantabhadra, but does include a fi nal scene set in Magadha, and the lauding of a text (the Uṣṇīṣavijayādhāraṇī) that is missing from the end of the narrative (Imaeda 2007: 132–33) – two features also present in PT 149.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 189

ences with several teachers, among other subjects.29 From the post-imperial period, the Tibetan Tabo inscriptions present a version of the story which seems to have the traditional 53 spiritual friends, despite a gap in the extant panels from the 34th to the 39th spiritual friend (inclusive).30 It is likely that PT 149 represents a similar Ti-betan reformulation of the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra narrative. We must also consider that it may have been infl uenced by popular Chinese narratives of Sudhana (Ch. Shancai 善財) or other Central Asian sources.31 Bearing in mind that the scribe of our manuscript also copied The Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s) we should also con-sider the possibility of infl uence from a lost Khotanese version of the story.

Where it does go into detail, the PT 149 narrative displays a mix of elements from the traditional story and the Cycle of Birth and Death reworking, with its own unique take on the spiritual friends’ speeches. Traditionally, Sudhana is searching for Samantabhadra’s code of conduct (samantabhadracarī). He visits many teachers, each of whom bestows a valuable teaching. His search ends after he is taken home to Dhanyākara by Mañjuśrī, questions Samantabhadra and gains enlightenment. In the Cycle of Birth and Death, the protagonist, here named Rin chen, tries to gain peace and happiness (bde zhing skyid pa) for his dead father. All of the teachers he visits are unable to help him, until the last, Rgya mtsho rgyal mtshan, instructs him to travel to Magadha, where Śākyamuni praises the Uṣṇīṣavijayādhāraṇī as the path to enlightenment.

29 See Heller 2004.

30 The Tabo inscriptions, studied by Ernst Steinkellner, may well be “the earliest example extant of a ‘local’ Kanjur text” (Steinkellner 1995: 7), dif-fering from extant Bka’ ’gyur versions. Steinkellner believes the inscriptions are nevertheless based on an older text, retaining Old Tibetan orthographic features (Steinkellner 1995: 14–17 and Appendix 1, 108–111).

31 On the history of the translation and circulation of the prayer in China, see Dessein 2003.

190 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

PT 149 follows the traditional Gaṇḍavyūha narrative in naming its protagonist Sudhana (nor bzangs), but his quest is specifi cally the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna, rather than the more abstract concept of the conduct of Samantabhadra. Unlike the Gaṇḍavyūha, but similarly to the Cycle of Birth and Death, none of the teachers he visits is able to help him, except for the very last. Our text is also similar to the Cycle of Birth and Death in that the last scene is in Magadha, and ends with an exhortation to the recitation of a text (the praṇidhāna) that is then (surprisingly) not included after the narrative.

Lastly, PT 149 contains certain elements not, to our knowledge, seen anywhere else. For example, we have not found the phrase “I don’t know [the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna], and since I don’t, you cannot be destined to be my student” used in any other versions of the spiritual friends’ speeches. The mixture of elements in this part of PT 149 suggests that this narrative is either a précis of a no longer extant early Tibetan version of the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, or is infl uenced by popular versions of the Sudhana narrative circulation in the ninth to tenth century – not only in the Tibetan language, but also in Chinese and perhaps Khotanese as well.

Dba’ Dpal byams

The remaining two thirds of PT 149 tell the story of how Dba’ Dpal byams, the commitment holder (thugs dam pa) to Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan, received and passed on the transmission of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna in Tibet. This is evidently the same fi gure as the Dba’ Dpal dbyangs to whom the Dba’ bzhed accords an eminent role in the establishment of monastic Buddhism in Ti-bet. There, Dba’ Dpal dbyangs is the fi rst Tibetan to be ordained as a monk (his previous, non-Buddhist name is given as Dba’ Lha btsan), is given high offi ce (ring lugs) by the tsenpo, and plays a

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 191

central role as an exponent of the gradual path in the Bsam yas debate.32

The offi cial title of Dba’ Dpal byams in our manuscript, ‘com-mitment holder’ (thugs dam pa), is not found in other sources. It may be related to the particular focus in our manuscript on the religious commitment (thugs dam) to the recitation of the Ārya-bha dra caryāpraṇidhāna. It is this commitment that is passed on from Śāntarakṣita to Dba’ Dpal byams and from Dba’ Dpal byams to his two Tibetan disciples. The transmission of the dharma in early Tibet is described elsewhere in the Dunhuang manuscripts in terms of commitments; for example, in The Dharma that Fell from Heaven, the kings Srong brtsan Sgam po and Khri Srong lde brtsan are said to have “taken up the commitments” (thugs dam bzhes) and spread them among the people of Tibet (see the full quotation below). Further examples from the same period of the use of thugs dam to signify ‘religious commitment’ are found in a collection of letters of passage, which make a request to Buddhist priests of lo-cal monasteries to look after a Chinese pilgrim monk. The phrase “please consider your commitments” (thugs dam la dgongs par gsol) there appears in three separate letters.33

The name of Dba’ Dpal dbyangs is also found in the lineage of ‘spiritual friends’ (dge ba’i bshes gnyen) teaching at the Bsam yas and ’Phrul snang temples, as listed in the manuscript IOL Tib J 689/2.34 Interestingly, there is also an overlap between other fi gures in the lineage of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna in PT 149, and

32 See Pasang and Diemberger 2000. The relevant pages of the text are 14b, 18b, 20a and 22b respectively. There is another example of the cor-respondence of the name elements byams and dbyangs in IOL Tib J 470, a version of the Rdo rje sems dpa’i zhus lan, in which the author’s name, which is given as Gnyan Dpal dbyangs in other sources, appears in the colophon as Slobs dpon Dpal byams.

33 IOL Tib J 754, letters 1, 3 and 5.

34 IOL Tib J 689/2 fol. 16b. See Karmay 1988:78–80 for a translation and transliteration, and see Uebach 1990 for further discussion.

192 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

the list of spiritual friends in IOL Tib J 689/2, as illustrated in the following table:35

Abbatial succession in IOL Tib J 689/2

Lineage in PT 149

Mkhan po Bo de sva dva Mkhan po Bo de sva dva

Dba’ btsun pa Yes she (sic) dbang po

Dba’ Dpal dbyangs Dba’ Dpal byams

Ngan lam Rgyal ba mchog dbyangs35

Ngan lam Rgyal mchog skyong

As with the abbatial succession, the narrative subtext of PT 149 gives the Indian abbot the most authority, both in the interpre-tation of dreams and the recommendation to recite the Ārya-bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna. The narrative suggests the place of Dba’ Dpal byams in the middle of this succession, since his practice, at the abbot Bodhisattva’s behest, is of benefi t to Ngan lam Rgyal mchog, who seems to be unaware of the prayer beforehand. Unlike the Indian abbot (and the tsenpo), Dba’ Dpal byams is presented as a fallible fi gure in PT 149. He is unable to interpret the signifi cance of his own dream, and fails at fi rst to uphold the commitments that the dream entails. Yet Dba’ Dpal byams is also the central fi gure who holds the narrative together, and the way the text relates the dreams, spiritual welfare and journey of Dba’ Dpal byams may be seen as a forerunner of the conventions of later biographical litera-ture in Tibet.36

Structurally, the text makes Dba’ Dpal byams equivalent to Sud-hana himself. By placing the Indian and Tibetan narratives next

35 The fi nal syllable diff ers between the two manuscripts: dbyangs in IOL Tib J 689/2 and skyong in PT 149.

36 Though there is at this time no general study of the role of biography or hagiography in Tibetan culture, see Robinson 1996 and the essays in Penny 2002. On the conventions of autobiography in Tibet, see Gyatso 1998.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 193

to each other in chronological order, PT 149 becomes a history of the transmission of Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna from India to Tibet. However, the story does not establish an unbroken lineage between India and Tibet, which is one of the functions of many later lineage histories. It seems rather to legitimise the Tibetan lin-eage by a kind of mimesis with the more well-known Indian story of the prayer’s transmission to Sudhana. This is most explicit in the phrase “a half-day’s journey for a horseman, a whole day’s journey on foot,” which is applied to the journeys of Sudhana and Dba’ Dpal byams.37 As well as having a journey as the principle narra-tive structure, the two stories are also characterized by the appear-ance of prophecies (lung bstan), and signs (ltas) and the reception of the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna as a commitment (thugs dam). Finally, where the journey of Sudhana ends with his seeing the fi rst bhūmi, ‘utter joy’ (rab tu dga’ ba), Dba’ Dpal byams’ journey ends with his ascension to the realm of bliss (bde ba can).

Khri Srong lde brtsan

If we are to read PT 149 as a validation of the Ārya bha dra caryā-pra ṇidhāna, we should also consider how the text associates the prayer with imperial patronage. Dba’ Dpal byams is bound by his religious commitments (thugs dam) to Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan, seeks his interpretation of dreams and begs him for leave to go on retreat. After the fall of the Tibetan Empire in the mid ninth century, the period of Khri Srong lde brtsan’s reign became a seductive source of narrative for Tibetan histories. Already in the Dunhuang manuscripts we see Tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan becoming a semi-mythological Buddhist king.

The most important of the Dunhuang texts that reference Khri Srong lde brtsan are the Old Tibetan Annals and Old Tibet-an Chronicle. The former is a yearly account of the Yar (k)lung Dynasty; the latter a verse and prose narrative of the imperial pe-

37 r.2: rta pa’i gdugs lam rkang thang gi zhag lam tsam, repeated on v.2.

194 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

riod. In the fi rst of these, which may date to the imperial period, Prince Srong lde brtsan is said to have been born at Brag mar in the horse year, 742 C.E.,38 and given the title Khri, marking his enthronement, in the Ape year 756 C.E.39 The dates of his rule and death are still uncertain, since the extant Old Tibetan Annals do not continue past the fi rst few years of his reign, but it is possible that he ruled Tibet twice in his lifetime.40 Under his leadership Tibet reached the heights of its military strength, capturing the Chinese capital Chang’an briefl y in 763 and threatening the Caliph Harun Al-Rashid in the west.41 In the Old Tibetan Chronicle, the tsenpo is described as the just ruler of an expanding empire.42 The Chronicle fi rst mentions Buddhism (sangs rgyas kyi chos) while describing his reign. It focuses especially on the monasteries he built around Tibet, as well as the compassion and freedom from birth and death that the Dharma brought to all his people.43 It then goes on to list the tsenpo’s military victories.44

38 PT 252, § 93; transliterated and translated in Bacot et al. 1940: 26 and 51 respectively.

39 Or. 8212.187, l. 17.

40 The eleventh-century Dba’ bzhed puts his death at 802 C.E. (Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 92). However Brandon Dotson believes it to be mistaken here (Dotson 2006: 13 n. 48). Based on early ninth-century inscriptional evi-dence, Dotson argues that Khri Srong lde brtsan probably died in 800 C.E, at the age of 59, after taking up the reigns of offi ce a second time (Dotson 2006: 14–15).

41 See Stein 1972: 66–67; Beckwith 1987: 146–152.

42 PT 1287, ll. 366–397; translated into French by Bacot et. al (1940: 114–117).

43 PT 1287: ll. 374–376: sangs rgyas kyI chos bla na myed pa brnyeste mdzad nas // dbus mtha’ kun du gtsug lag khang brtsigs te / chos btsugs nas / thams shad (sic) kyang snying rje la bzhugs shIng dran bas skye shi las bsgral to /

44 PT 1287: ll. 376–397. Line 98 begins an interpolated section from the reign of Srong brtsan Sgam po, caused by a misplaced folio (see Uray 1968).

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 195

Other Dunhuang documents tend to portray Khri Srong lde brtsan primarily as a religious king, and emphasise his religious works over his military achievements. There are three other signifi -cant descriptions of this tsenpo in the Dunhuang manuscripts and we will look at each of them briefl y here:45

(i) IOL Tib J 466/3 is a prayer paying homage to Khri Srong lde brtsan along with teachers and deities of India and Tibet.46 It has not previously been studied and is an interesting addition to the evidence for the portrayal of this tsenpo as a Buddhist king soon after the imperial period. The invocation of the tsenpo occurs in the middle of a long prayer of off ering to all the deities, monks and patrons of the dharma. Some of the language here is archaic, and it may be that the prayer is the earliest of our three descriptions here, perhaps just post-dating the Tibetan empire itself.

I make off erings to the spiritual teachers of our own Tibet, the great dharma kings such as the great king Khri Srong lde brtsan. I respect-fully make the off ering of homage to all those teachers who have gone to nirvāṇa [after] propagating the teachings – the magically emanated lord Khri Srong lde brtsan, who has mastered the royal methods of fortune (phywa) and [rules] the kingdom with the sword of the sky-gods, and Dharma-Aśoka, Kaniṣkā, (Harṣa) Śīlāditya and so on.47

45 In addition to the examples below, we may add IOL Tib J 709/9 and IOL Tib J 667, which together make up a treatise on Chan said to have been au-thorised under the seal of Khri Srong lde brtsan. Although this is not a depic-tion of Khri Srong lde brtsan as such, it does allude to his activity as patron of the dharma – interestingly in this case, from China rather than India.

46 This prayer is among a series of texts written on a scroll. Unlike the two previous scrolls, this is not a re-used Chinese sūtra, but a scroll dedi-cated to these Tibetan texts alone. Another diff erence is that the Tibetan texts are written with the scroll in the horizontal, rather than vertical ori-entation, in two columns per panel. This is the same method found in the Aparimitāyurnāmasūtra scrolls, which are also written on the same paper as these texts. The other texts are a number of prayers and dhāraṇī, apparently gathered together here for the purpose of recitation.

47 IOL Tib J 466/3: 5r.9–12: bdag cag bod khams kyI dge ba’I bshes gnyen //

196 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

The prayer is written on the same paper, and in the same handwrit-ing style, as the many copies of the Aparamitāyurnāmasūtra that were written in the 840s, during or soon after the last years of the Tibetan occupation of Dunhuang. The awareness of a tradition relat-ing to the Indian kings who patronized Buddhism, Aśoka, Kaniṣka and Harṣa is unusual in a prayer like this. The prayer also contains several interesting elements in its description of the tsenpo. We have the diffi cult concept of phywa – in other early sources a class of gods or an ancient clan.48 We also fi nd the tsenpo described as holding the sword of the gods of the sky (gnam gyI lde), a reference to the legends of the tsenpos’ ancestral lineage of divine beings.

(ii) IOL Tib J 370/6 is an account of the fl ourishing of Buddhism in Tibet, attributed to the will of the tsenpos Srong brtsan Sgam po and Khri Srong lde brtsan.49 This text, titled The Dharma that Fell from Heaven, is a brief celebration of the early transmission of Buddhism to Tibet. Like the text above, it begins with an account of how the kings introduced the dharma to the Tibetan people:

The protectors of men, divine sons, supreme kings,The magically manifested king Srong brtsan

rgyal po chen po khri srong lde brtsan lastsogs pa // chos kyI rgyal po chen po rnams la mchod pa // phywa’i rgyal thabs mnga’ brnyes shing // chab srId gnam gyI lde mtshon can // ’phrul rje khrI srong lde brtsan dang // dar ma sho ka / ka ni skā / shI la a tI da ṇya lastsogs // ston pa mya ngan ’das phyIn // bstan pa rgyas mdzad thams cad la // phyag ’tshal bsnyen bkur mchod pa dbul //

48 See Stein 1961: 60–64 and Karmay 1998: 285–6.

49 See Richardson 1998: 75–76. Richardson counted this as the fi fth text on the scroll. However, in this numbering he ignored the fi rst, fragmentary text on the scroll. The number here corresponds with Dalton and van Schaik 2006. As with PT 840, this is a re-used Chinese sūtra scroll. In this case, it is a Vajracchedikasūtra. All of the Tibetan texts are written on the verso of this scroll; they include a short treatise, some brief sūtras and a prayer to Mañjuśrī. Several handwritings are represented, and the text in question here is in a hand not seen elsewhere on the scroll. This hand in particular contains characteristic features of late ninth- and tenth-century writing styles.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 197

And the tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsanLearned the teaching of Gautama Śākya Which brought benefi t to all beingsIn Jambudvīpa, the world of men, Tibet …In accord with it, they took up the commitmentsAnd spread them far and wide among beings.As a record to maintain this, on a stone pillarIt was written as an edict of the lord and his subjects.50

Here the main focus of the prayer is less on the special features of the tsenpos, and very much on their activities of spreading the dharma.

(iii) PT 840/3 celebrates Khri Srong lde brtsan’s invitation of Buddhist masters from India.51

There is a king called Tsa,Born into a divine family in the lineage of the bodhisattvas:The divine son Khri Srong lde brtsan.He [introduced] the sublime dharma and invited masters from India.Like a lamp held aloft in the midst of darknessHe allowed [the dharma] to be practised throughout the kingdom,Placing [the kingdom] on the path of supreme enlightenment.

50 IOL Tib J 370/6, ll. 1–7: / gnam babs kyi dar ma bam po gcig go // // myi mgon lha sras rgyal mchog ste // ’phrul gyi rgyal po srong brtsan dang / btsan po khri srong lde brtsan gnyis // ’dzam gling myi yul bod khams su // ’gro ba kun la phan mdzad pa’i // u dum ’ba’ ra ’i men tog ltar // shin tu bzang dkon sman gi mchog // dus bde gshegs yul gyur pa // shes rab pha rol phyin pa’i chos // de bzhin nyid la mnyam ba ste // yod dang myed pa’i phyogs ’jig pa’i // bla myed theg chen rab sgrags pa // ’ge’u tam shag kya’i bstan pa bslabs // dang du blangs nas thugs dam bzhes // ’gro ba kun +la+ rgyas par spel // brtan ba’i gzungs su rdo rings la // rje ’bangs rnams kyi gtsigs su bris //

51 See Karmay 1998: 76–93. The text is written on a re-used Chinese sūtra scroll, containing part of the Avataṃsakasūtra. A long Mahāyoga sādhana (PT 840/1) is written on the verso where also, in another hand, two Tibetan texts are written in between the Chinese characters. The fi rst (PT 840/2) is on the “view of yoga” and the second (PT 840/3) is the text described here. The handwriting style of these texts is a form not seen in the Tibetan imperial period, and probably dates to the tenth century.

198 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

How great was the divine kindness of this divine son!52

Here the text equates the tsenpo with the legendary King Tsa (or Dza in other sources), associated with tantric Buddhism.53 As with text (ii), there is only minimal reference to the tsenpo’s divine at-tributes, and the emphasis is fi rmly on his Buddhist activities.

In a similar vein, PT 149 depicts Khri Srong lde brtsan in terms drawn almost entirely from the Buddhist tradition. More than any of the above manuscripts, this text also helps us to sketch in more detail the post-imperial view of the people and places under his rule. The depiction of the tsenpo here references the three princi-pal achievements that characterize his reign in the later historical tradition: overseeing the translation of Buddhist texts, building the Bsam yas temple, and patronising monastic Buddhism.

First, the tsenpo’s extensive translation project, which encom-passed works like the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra,54 is alluded to in PT 149 with the names of three translators working during his reign: Ska ba’ Dpal rtsags, Cog ro Klu’i rgyal mtshan and Rma Rad na ya kra. The fi rst two translators are well known, and their numerous works well attested in the Tibetan canons. The last translator does not play a prominent role in traditional histories, and has tended to be confl ated with Dpal dbyangs from the Sba bzhed onwards.55 The earlier, eleventh-century Dba’ bzhed depicts him as a distinct per-son: Dba’ Rad na, the fi rst Tibetan monk and the son of Dba’ Rma

52 PT 840/3, ll. 2–3: rgyal <ka> po tsa zhes bya ba de // lha’i rigs la byang chub sems dpa’i rgyu // lha sras khri srong lde brtsan gyis//dam chos slobs dpon rgya gar yul nas spyan drangs te // mun nag dkyil du sgron bzhin // rgyal khams phyogs kyang stsod par gnang // byang cub mchog gi lam la bkod // lha sras lha’i drin re che //

53 Karmay discusses King Tsa / Dza and his relationship to the tantric king Indrabhūti in his study of this text (Karmay 1988).

54 Steinkellner 1995: 15–17.

55 See Pasang and Diemberger 2000: n. 263 and n. 30.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 199

gzigs.56 In PT 149 the translator appears with the clan name of Rma rather than Dba’.57 Coupling this fact with the Tibetan translation of ratna, rin chen, we could tentatively identify Rma Rad na (ya kra) with Rma rin chen (mchog).58

This would, of course, be only a literary identifi cation, not an historical one, since neither person is found in imperial sources. The Dba’ bzhed makes no mention of Rma rin chen mchog, but he plays a more important role in later histories. Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer, for instance, makes him part of the very same trio (with Ska ba’ Dpal rtsegs and Cog ro Klu’i rgyal mtshan), this time travelling to India to invite Vimalamitra to Tibet.59 The same tradition, plac-ing these three translators together, may be behind both PT 149 and this part of Nyang ral’s history. In any case, PT 149 adds extra weight to the Dba’ bzhed’s depiction of Dba’ Rad na and Dba’ Dpal dbyangs as diff erent people, strongly suggesting that the earliest Tibetan literary tradition distinguished these two Buddhists.

Khri Srong lde brtsan’s second great religious achievement was the building of the great Bsam yas monastery, mentioned in our manuscript as the site of relations between the tsenpo and Dba’ Dpal byams.60 The longer Bsam yas edict, contained in Dpa’ bo Gtsug lag ’phreng ba’s Chos ’byung mkhas pa’i dga’ ston (but prob-ably dating to the eighth century), mentions that the minister Stag sgra klu gong was among those who swore that the practice of the

56 Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 70, 79.

57 It is possible that the fi rst part of the name Dba’ Rma gzigs was added by the redactors of the Dba’ bzhed.

58 The translators of the Dba’ bzhed also suggest that Dba’ Rad na’s name had other synonyms, giving Dba’ rin po che (another word for ratna, jewel) as one of his aliases (Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 73).

59 Zangs gling ma: 47b6ff .; Chos ’byung me tog snying po: 338.19ff .

60 For a translation of Khri Srong lde brtsan’s Bsam yas edicts, see Rich-ardson 1985: 26–31 and 1998: 91–98.

200 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

Buddha’s religious law would never be abandoned or destroyed.61 PT 149 mentions Ngan lam Stag sgra klu gong only as the elder brother of Ngan lam Rgyal mchog skyong, who plays a part in the narrative.

The high status of Ngan lam Stag sgra klu gong is confi rmed by the inscription on the north side of the Zhol pillar in Lhasa, which records an oath taken by Khri Srong lde brtsan to confi rm the en-noblement (dku rgyal) of Stag sgra klu khong and his descendents in the Ngan lam clan.62 In contrast to the Bsam yas edict, later Buddhist and Bon historical traditions identify Stag sgra klu gong as a Bon po.63 Our text makes no specifi c reference to his religious persuasion, but it seems unlikely that the text would mention this fi gure in an introduction to a great spiritual practice if he was con-sidered an enemy of Buddhism at the time when it was written. In any case, PT 149 appears to be the only source to provide a specifi c familial relationship between Stag sgra klu gong and Rgyal mchog skyong/dbyangs, two important early fi gures from the Ngan lam clan.

Thirdly, in PT 149, the tsenpo is shown to privilege his monks’ spiritual practices over their court duties, allowing Dba’ Dpal by-ams to go into retreat at, or near, ’Ching pu. It is evident that even at this stage the ’Ching pu caves were becoming important Buddhist sites in Tibetan literature. The earliest important reference to this site is the early ninth-century Skar cung inscription, which states that a temple was built at Mching phu during the reign of Khri Lde

61 Richardson 1985: 92–93.

62 Richardson 1985: 16–25.

63 For early indications of this traditional Tibetan depiction, see Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 61 and n. 194; Grags pa gling grags 36a3. Christopher Beckwith has discussed the role of Klu khong in the turmoil preceding Khri Srong lde brtsan’s enthronement in Beckwith 1983: 1–2.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 201

gtsug brtsan (704–?754).64 The Dba’ bzhed seems to agree with this in its statement about a temple built, and a bell buried, at ’Ch-ing phu during the middle of the eighth century.65 The specifi c cave known in PT 149 as ’Ching pu brag rgye’u, has been linked with Padmasambhava’s religious practices ever since Nyang ral’s hagi-ography had him going into retreat there.66

Although the temporal power of the tsenpo is not emphasized in PT 149, his spiritual authority over Dba’ Dpal byams is made quite clear. Dba’ Dpal byams petitions the tsenpo to interpret his dream, and it is the tsenpo who approaches the Indian abbot Bodhisattva to enquire about the dream. In conversation with the Indian abbot, the tsenpo calls Dba’ Dpal byams “my student, a monk.”67 However, the text also describes a respectful and even intimate relationship between the tsenpo and his priest. The tsenpo accompanies Dba’ Dpal byams on the fi rst day of his journey, a gesture of great re-spect. Finally, before they part, Khri Srong lde brtsan and Dba’ Dpal byams stand facing each other, each with a hand on the oth-er’s heart, reciting the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna. This striking image carries the implication that outside of the imperial court, and in the purely religious context of prayer, the two fi gures are equal.

64 The reference appears on l. 11 of the inscription. See Richardson 1985: 74–75.

65 Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 34 and 37, spelled ’Ching bu both times. Two other early religious histories mention a temple at ’Ching phu/bu in the list of temples established during the reign of Khri Gtsug lde brtsan. See Uebach 1990: 396–397. These sources strongly suggest that ’Ching pu/phu/bu is an older spelling than ’Chims phu.

66 See Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer’s Zangs gling ma: 58b2–4; though it now reads ’chims phu bre gu dge’u (Zangs gling ma: 58b4), this is probably a result of the rnam thar’s long recensional history. The site, now known as brag dmar ke’u tshang (the red rock treasury), is described in Dowman 1998: 230.

67 bdag gi slob ma dge sbyong zhig (PT 149 r.8).

202 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

Other elements in the story

The last master mentioned in PT 149, Sgro snya Ye shes byang chub, is unknown to us. He is obviously outside the tradition of abbatial succession represented by IOL Tib J 689/2. He may have been an important fi gure in the original author’s lineage, but to our knowledge he is not listed anywhere besides PT 149.68 He is said to have lived in Sho ma la, which is probably the Sho ma ra of Skyi mentioned in the Old Tibetan Annals as the site of three winter councils, held in 729, 731 and 744 C.E.69 Sho ma ra was also the administrative seat of the minister Mgar Stong brtsan and the site of the fi rst writing-down of the Tibetan law codes in 655. As Sørenson has noted, Sho ma ra seems to have been a key site for administration during the whole of the Tibetan imperial period.70 Later accounts show that a “Great Dharma College of the Glorious Sho ma ra” (Dpal sho ma ra’i chos grva chen po) was an important centre for the Bka’ gdams pa school from the eleventh century. In the twelfth century Sho ma ra was the site of the ordination of Stag lung Thang pa.71

Certain geographical elements of the narrative in PT 149 remain problematic. The tsenpo travels with Dba’ Dpal byams for the fi rst day of his journey, parting at a place called Spa dro. This name is

68 Note that a Mngan lang Gro snya brtsan khong lod appears in the Old Tibetan Annals (IOL Tib J 750: ll. 227–228).

69 See IOL Tib J 750: ll. 254, 260 and 298; Bacot et al. 1940: 48, 49 and 52.

70 Sørenson 1994: 184.

71 According to Sørenson and Hazod (2005: 47 n. 37 and 237 n. 44), Sho ma ra is located in the Dbu ru lung district, on the upper course of the Skyid chu. The location of Sho ma ra and its occurance in the early literature is explored more fully in Hazod forthcoming. He points out that while the Blue Annals appears to speak of a Sho ma ra in Stod lungs (Roerich 1988: 728–729), this should be read as two separate toponyms. He accepts a location for Sho ma ra in the lower Skyid chu region, “downwards from Klung shod or northern Mal gro.”

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 203

close to Spa gro, the valley of that name in western Bhutan that was part of the territory granted to ’Gos Khri bzang by the tsenpo Khri Gtsug lde brtsan in the ninth century, and was thereafter known as ’Gos yul.72 In the eleventh century Spa gro came under the control of the Nyos clan, thanks to the activites of Nyos Lo tsa ba (born c.973) and Lha nang pa (1164–1224).73 Another early source men-tions the same place in the context of Gayādhara’s fi rst trip to Tibet in the mid eleventh century.74 Obviously Spa gro in Bhutan does not match the location of PT 149’s, between Lha sa/Bsam yas and ’Ching pu. There is a distant possibility that Spa dro may be a mis-spelling of Ma(r) dro, where Srong brtsan Sgam po was born (ac-cording to some traditions) and founded a temple.75 This is a more fi tting place for a tsenpo and his commitment-holder to say their farewells, yet it is still not en route between Lha sa/Bsam yas and ’Ching pu.

4. Conclusion

PT 149 is a remarkable example of the kinds of materials that must have been available to the early Buddhist historians. Later writers gathered together such sources to form a coherent Buddhist nar-rative of the imperial period. Indeed, such a collation may have already been taking place at Dunhuang. As mentioned earlier, the other manuscripts in the same hand as PT 149 include another Bud-dhist narrative connected with the imperial period in Tibet, The

72 See Sørenson and Hazod 2005, II.382–383, n. 35.

73 See Sørenson and Hazod 2005, II.441–443.

74 See Stearns 2001: 91 and 214 n. 40.

75 In PT 149 the spa and ma share a similar orthography. In the earliest source for this toponym, the Old Tibetan Annals (Or. 8212.187) we fi nd two spellings, mal tro (l. 42) and mar dro (l. 70), referring to the same place (Ba-cot et al. 1940: 53, 58 and 65). On the birthplace of Srong brtsan Sgam po, see Sørenson and Hazod 2000: 36–37 n. 92. On the founding of the temple and other religious activities at this site, see Sørenson and Hazod 2005: 50–51 n. 49, passim.

204 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

Prophecy of the Khotanese Arhat(s), as well as two Buddhist cos-mological texts. There is an intriguing suggestion here of a tenth-century inhabitant of Dunhuang collecting materials for a narrative placing Tibet in the Buddhist cosmological and historical tradition. It is just such a narrative, combining cosmology and Tibetan impe-rial history, that we fi nd from the eleventh century onward, both in the early historical ‘treasure’ literature of the Bka’ chems ka khol ma and the Ma ṇi bka’ ’bum and in the fi rst historical accounts of the ‘arising of the dharma’ (chos ’byung).

We hope to have showed the importance of PT 149 for the ‘miss-ing period’ of Tibetan historiography in Tibet’s time of fragmenta-tion. This manuscript suggests a steady movement, not a sudden jump, from royal to religious history in Tibet. The Old Tibetan An-nals and eighth-century edicts may be a fi rmer base from which to investigate contemporary imperial hierarchy. However, in this text we see the emphasis on spiritual lineage and hierarchy gradually taking shape out of the ashes of the empire – as Buddhism’s embers continued to smoulder.

Appendix:

Translation and annotated transcription

Translation

The narrative of the fi rst teaching of this Āryabhadra caryā pra ṇi-dhā narāja:

There was the son of a śreṣṭhin called Sudhana. Because his in-tellect became supremely sharp, he learned by heart an inconceiv-able amount of the concise and extensive [teachings of] the sublime dharma. After that, his faith became supremely great. Since he had not yet received the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna, he went to see

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 205

101 spiritual friends. All of them said, “I don’t know [it], and since I don’t, you are not destined to be my disciple.” The distance be-tween [each of] these spiritual friends was a half-day’s journey for a horseman, a whole day’s journey on foot.

[Sudhana] met 100 teachers, and [then] saw the face of Mañjuśrī. He requested [the prayer] from Mañjuśrī, who said: “I don’t know [it], and since I don’t, you are not destined to be my disciple. In India, in Mahābodhidvīpa, lives Samantabhadra. Make a request to Ārya Samantabhadra.” This was his prophecy.

Then the son of a śreṣṭhin called Sudhana [went and] made the request to Ārya Samantabhadra in Mahabodhidvīpa. Ārya Saman-ta bhadra said: “It is contained in the Ārya Gaṇḍavyūha, also known as the Buddhāvataṃsaka, the Mang po ’dus pa, the Rdza plags pa, the Snyan gi gong rgyan and the Rma ga chad.” And he taught it. Afterwards the son of a śreṣṭhin called Sudhana received [the prayer] as a commitment and practised it ardently. As a result he saw the fi rst bhūmi, ‘utter joy.’ In the same way, others in India took the Ārya bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna as a commitment and con-sequently achieved the siddhi of Samantabhadra.

Subsequent to that, [the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna] was translated by Ska ba’ Dpal rtsags, Cog ro Klu’i rgyal mtshan and Rma Rad na ya kra, among others. In the lifetime of tsenpo Khri Srong lde brtsan, the tsenpo’s commitment-holder, a certain Dba’ Dpal byams, received [the Āryabhadracaryāpraṇidhāna] as a commitment, and afterwards, one night in a dream, saw crowds of people in a series of seven golden courtyards. When [Dba’ Dpal byams] petitioned the tsenpo, the tsenpo could not interpret [the dream]. Not far away there was an Indian abbot called Bodhisattva, and the tsenpo asked him, “If someone dreams a dream like this, what does it mean?”

The Indian abbot asked the tsenpo, “Who was it [that had the dream]?”

“He is a student of mine, a monk.” replied [the tsenpo].

206 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

[The abbot] then commanded “He should recite Ārya bha dra-caryā praṇidhāna and thereby gain the siddhi of Ārya Samanta-bhadra.” Then the tsenpo repeated this to Master Dpal byams, and the abbot explained extensively that [Dba’ Dpal byams] should chant for more than three days and three nights.

Not long afterwards, [Dba’ Dpal byams] made a request to the tsenpo: “Since I am emaciated and my aggregates have deteriorated, I have not been properly upholding my commitment to the tsenpo. Therefore may I have permission to travel to a holy place?” Straight away [the tsenpo and Dba’ Dpal byams] left Lha sa [and] Bsam yas [respectively] and travelled a half-day’s journey for a horseman, a whole day’s journey on foot. At Spa dro temple [Dba’ Dpal byams] was encouraged by the tsenpo again. They each placed a hand on the other’s heart and recited the prayer. Then [the tsenpo] left.

Not much later, at a nearby place called ’Ching pu brag rgye’u, lived Ngan lam Rgyal mchog, the younger brother of Ngan lam Stag sgra klu gong. At Sho ma la lived the Master Sgro snya ye shes byang chub. [One day] these two had certain omens that they couldn’t understand, such as a rainbows appearing in the sky. Then they heard the words “Go and meet Master Dpal byams!” So they left.

When these two met [Dba’ Dpal byams] on the path, they paid their respects and exchanged news, and then they asked each other “Where are you going?” [Dba’ Dpal byams] said, “Three nights ago, I had a dream prophecy like this…” Since this was concordant with the omens [experienced by] the two masters, they went as es-corts. Master Dpal byams recited his commitments.

When the time of my death comes

When he recited this, [they all] spoke in one voice.

Then by purifying all my defi lements

As they recited this, they ascended [into the sky].

When I directly perceive Amitābha

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 207

As they recited this, accomplishments such as rainbows arose, just like the signs that had [previously] arisen for the two masters, and they cast off the shackles of the body.

May I go to the land of Sukhāvati

Having arrived there, they recited these prayers and departed.76

The above is the narrative setting.

Annotated transcription

[recto, l. 1] ’phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam gyi rgyal po ’di dang por bshad pa’i gleng gzhi ni / tshong dpon gi bu nor bzangs zhes bya bas / shes rab rno ba’i mchog du phyin pa ’s ni dam pa’i chos mdo dang rgyas pa’ bsam gis myi khyab pa zhig thugs su chud nas / dad pa che ba’i mchog du phyin pas ni / ’phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon [l. 2] lam ’di ma gsan pa’i slad bzhin du / dge ba’i bshes gnyen brgya rtsa gcig zhal mthong ba’ las / kun gi zhal nas ngas myi shes pa ni ma yin na / nga ’i ’dul skal du khyod ma gyur ro // gsungs pas ma gsan nas / dge ba’i bshes gnyen de rnams kyi bar thag ni rta pa’i gdugs tsam / rkang thang gi zhag lam tsam zhig mchis so77 // [l. 3] dge ba’i bshes gnyen brgya tham ba’ la thug pa dang / ’phags pa ’jam dpal gi zhal mthong nas / ’phags pa’ ’jam dpal la zhus pa las / ngas myi shes pa ni ma yin na nga’i ’dul skal du ma bab pas / rgya gar gi yul byang chub chen po ma ha bo de’i gling na ’phags pa’ kun tu bzang po bzhugs pas / ’phags pa kun tu [l. 4] bzang po la zhu zhig par lung bstan to // de nas tshong dpon gi bu nor bzangs gyis ma ha bo de byang chub chen po’i gling78 du ’phags pa kun tu bzang po la zhus pas / ’phags pa kun tu bzang pos / ’phags pa stug po bkod pa zhes kyang bya / sangs rgyas phal

76 The lines in italics are equivalent to verse 57, towards the end of the prayer.

77 This phrase is repeated below with a minor variation at v.2.

78 Here the name of the Mahābodhi temple appears in both transliterated and translated forms.

208 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

po che zhes kyang bya / mang po ’dus pa zhes kyang bya / rdza plags pa zhes kyang bya / [l. 5] snyan gi gong rgyan zhes kyang bya / rma ga chad zhes kyang bya ba de’i nang nas bsus te bshad nas / tshong dpon gi bu nor bzangs kyi thugs dam du bzhes pas / mos par spyod pa las sa dang po rab du dga’ ba’i bden ba’ mthong / de dang mtshungs par rgya gar gi yul du yang ’phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam thugs dam du bzhes pas / [l. 6] mang pos ’phags pa kun tu bzang po ’i dngos grub brnyes so // de’i ’og tu ska ba’ dpal rtsags dang cog ro klu’i rgyal mtshan dang / rma rad na ya kra las bsogs pas bsgyur nas / btsan po khri srong lde brtsan gi sku ring la / btsan po thugs dam ba’ dba’ dpal byams zhes bya ba zhig gis thugs dam du bzhes nas / nub gcig gi [l. 7] myi lam na / gser gi sko ra bdun dbu la breng ’dug par rmangs pa las / btsan po ’i snyan du gsol79 nas / btsan pos dpyod ma mkhyen nas / khad myi ring ba’ zhig na rgya gar gi mkhan po bo de sat tva zhes bya ba bzhugs pa de la btsan pos g.yar lam80 ’di lta bu zhig rmyis na / ’di ci lags zhes zhus pa dang / rgya gar gi mkhan pos de su lags [l. 8] zhes btsan po la zhus pa dang / bdag gi slob ma dge sbyong zhig lags so zhes gsol pa dang / ’di ni ’phags pa’ bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam ’don pas / ’phags pa kun tu bzang po ’i dngos grub thob pa zhig ces bka’ rtsal pa dang / btsan pos slobs dpon dpal byams la bzlas pa dang / mkhan pos lhag par yang spro ba bskyed nas /

[verso, l. 1] nyin lan gsum mtshan lan gsum bas kyang lhag par zhal [s]ton du mdzad do // de nas ring ma lon ba dang / btsan po la zhus pa’ / bdag ni rad pa81 phung po yang dgud82 pas / btsan po ’i

79 The phrase snyan du gsol is found in several Old Tibetan texts, and the specifi c phrase btsan po’i snyan du gsol appears in part of the Old Tibetan Chronicle (IOL Tib J 1375: r.2) See also Thomas 1951: 53–55.

80 g.yar lam is an alternative, more archaic word for ‘dream,’ but can also mean ‘in the presence of.’ In view of the syntax of this sentence, it seems that the former meaning is intended here.

81 Read rid pa for rad pa.

82 Read gud for dgud.

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 209

thugs dam dngo83 myi thog pas / bdag ni dgon gnas gcig du mchi bar ci gnang zhes zhus pa dang / de tsam na ni lha sa bsam yas84 na bzhugs pa’ [l. 2] las / de nas rta pa’i gdugs lam rkang thang gi zhag lam tsam na / spa dro dgon pa na zhes bya ba der btsan pos kyang bskul nas / gcig gi thugs kar gcig gi phyag bzhag nas / sa sar85 smon lam btab nas gshegs so // de nas ring zhig ma lon ba tsam na / khad kyis myi ring ba zhig na / ’ching pu brag rgye’u zhes bya ba de na / [l. 3] ngan lam stag sgra klu gong gi gcung po / ngan lam rgyal mchog skyong bzhugs / sho ma la la ni slob dpon sgro snya ye shes byang chub bzhugs pa las / gnyis gi sku ltas86 sam rtogs pa la nam ka’ las gzha’ tshon las bsogs pa byung nas / slobs dpon dpal byams bsur ’gro ’o zhes thos pa las / gnyis ka slobs dpon la zlor [l. 4] gshegs pa las lam du gnyis ka mjal nas / zhe sa bgyis nas bka’ mchid87 bgyis nas / gar gshegs so sor zhus pa dang / mdang gsum g.yar ltas88 ’di lta bu zhig byung ngo zhes gsol ba las / slobs dpon gnyis ka sku ltas mthun nas / zlor gshegs pa dang / slobs dpon dpal byams thugs dam ’don pa las / bdag ni chi ba’i [l.

83 Read dngos for dngo.

84 This seems more likely to refer to Lha sa and Bsam yas as two separate places than to one confused location in the mind of the original author.

85 Read so sor for sa sar.

86 We have not found the phrase sku ltas elsewhere. To judge from the context, it indicates a kind of sign or omen.

87 bka’ mchid is used in a diff erent context here to either the ‘authorita-tive account’ in Khri Srong lde brtsan’s eighth-century edict (Richardson 1998: 92–93) or the Dba’ bzhed’s ‘formal discourse by a king’ (Pasang and Diemberger 2000: 9 and 23 n. 1). However, unlike PT 149, the edict and Dba’ bzhed use ’bka’ mchid in a nearly identical phrase: sangs rgyas kyi chos bod yul du / snga phyir [Dba’ bzhed: bod khams su] ji ltar byung ba’i bka’ mchid kyi yi ge. It is seems that, outside of this rare but apparently stock phrase, the honorifi c term bka’ mchid (bgyis) might have carried the more general mean-ing of “(to give one’s) news.”

88 We have not found the term g.yar ltas elsewhere. It seems to be an ar-chaic term for an omen received in a dream, to be distinguished from sku ltas, an omen received while awake.

210 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

5] ba’i dus byed gyur pa na /89 gsung tsam na gsung lan gcig chad / de nas sgrib pa thams cad ni phyir bsal te /90 gsung tsam na / gcung tsam yang ’phags / mngon gsum snang ba’ mtha’ yas de mthong na gsung tsam na /91 slob dpon gnyis kyi sku ltas la byung ba bzhin du gzha’ tshon la bsogs pa’ dngos grub byung nas / lus gdos pa’ can [l. 6] bor nas / bde ba can gyi zhing der rab du ’gro /92 der song nas ni smon lam ’di dag kyang / zhes zlos shing gshegs so / de yan cad ni son gi gleng gzhi ’o // ∵ //

General Abbreviations

D Text in the Derge Bka’ ’gyur, quoted according to Ui Hakuju et al., Chibetto Daizōkyō Sōmokuroku / A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Canons (Bkaḥ-ḥgyur and Bstan-ḥgyur). Sendai: Tohoku Teikoku Daigaku Hobun Gakubu 1934.

IOL India Offi ce Library collection (now British Library)

Or. Oriental collections of the British Library

P Text in the Peking Bka’ ’gyur, quoted according to Suzuki, Daisetz T. (ed.), The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking edition. Reprinted under the supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo; Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute 1955–1961.

PT Pelliot tibétain (Bibliothèque nationale de France)

Bibliography

Dunhuang manuscripts

Many of these manuscripts are now available in transcription on the Old Tibetan Documents Online website (http://otdo.aa.tufs.ac.jp), and images

89 Received version: bdag ni chi ba’i dus byed gyur pa na /

90 Received version: sgrib pa thams cad dag ni phyir bsal te /

91 Received version: mngon sum snang ba mtha’ yas de mthong nas /

92 Received version: bde ba can gyi zhing der rab tu ’gro/

THE PRAYER, THE PRIEST AND THE TSENPO 211

can be found at the International Dunhuang Project website (http://idp.bl.uk).

IOL Tib J 370/6: The Dharma that Fell from Heaven: an account of the fl our-ishing of Buddhism in Tibet.

IOL Tib J 466/3: A prayer paying homage to Khri Srong lde brtsan.

IOL Tib J 689/2: A list of spiritual friends and the Bsam yas and Lha sa ’Phrul snang temples.

PT 149: The narrative of the fi rst teaching of the Āryabhadracaryā pra-ṇidhānarāja.

PT 840/3: On the fl ourishing and decline of Buddhism in Tibet.

Old Tibetan Annals

Version 1: PT 1288 (lines 1–53), IOL Tib J 750 (lines 54–307)

Version 2: Or.8212/187

Old Tibetan Chronicle

PT 1287, with related manuscripts PT 1286, PT 1144, IOL Tib J 1375 (vol. 70, f. 15)

Tibetan texts

Bka’ chems ka khol ma = Smon lam Rgya mtsho. Bka’ chems ka khol ma. Lanzhou: Kan su’i mi rigs dpe skrun khang 1989.

Grags pa gling grags = Dran pa Nam mkha’ (attributed). G.yung bon gyi sgra sgrags pa rin po che’i gling grags bzhugs so. In: Ben Jiao “Dan zhu erh” da zang jing [= Bon po bstan ’gyur] vol. 74. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang 1998, 1–110.

Chos ’byung me tog snying po = Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer. Chos ’byung me tog snying po sbrang rtsi’i bcud. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang 1988.

Chos la ’jug pa’i sgo = Bsod nams rtse mo. Chos la ’jug pa’i sgo zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos. In: The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism [Sa skya bka’ ’bum] vol. 2: 318-3-1–345-3-6. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1968.

212 SAM VAN SCHAIK AND LEWIS DONEY

’Phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam gyi rgyal po = Āryabha dra caryā-pra ṇidhānarāja. Three versions: P 716; P 1038; D 1095.

P 716 contained in the Peking Bka’ ’gyur volume ya 268a2–71b4 [vol. 11, 285-3-2–286-5-4].

P 1038 contained in the Peking Bka’ ’gyur volume phe 296b1–99a7 [vol. 45, 236-5-1–37-5-7].

D 1095 contained in the Derge Bka’ ’gyur volume aṃ 262b5–66a3.

Zangs gling ma = Ngodrup and Sherab Drimay. Slob dpon padma ’byung gnas kyi skyes rabs chos ’byung nor bu’i phreng ba zhes bya ba bzhugs so rnam thar zangs gling ma’o. In: Ngodrup and Sherab Drimay (eds), Rin chen gter mdzod chen mo : a reproduction of the Stod-lun Mtshur-phu re-daction of ’Jam-mgon Kong-sprul’s great work on the unity of the gter-ma traditions of Tibet, with supplemental texts from the Dpal-spuns redac-tion and other manuscripts. Paro: Ugyen Tempai Gyaltsen 1976.

Li shi’i gur khang = Ka rma lo tsā ba Rin chen bkra shis. Dag yig li shi’i gur khang. In: Tibeto-Sanskrit Lexicographical Materials, ed. Sonam Angdu. Leh: Basgo Tongspon Publications 1973.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' (THE GREAT

VEHICLE) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE AGAMAS*

JOSEPH WALSER

Though a considerable amount of work has been done on early Mahayana, one of the questions that has received relatively less at­tention in Western language sources is why Mahayanists chose the word mahiiyiina' to begin with. While there is a growing consensus that the term "Mahayana" did not refer to a single set of doctrines, practices or propositions, the fact remains that at a certain point in history a set of authors gravitated toward the term "Mahayana" (trailing a penumbra of affiliated terms such as sre~thayiina, bodhi­sattvayiina, tathiigatayiina, agrayiina, ekayiina, etc.) as a kind of brand name for their project. Presumably there was a reason for the choice - or at least some reason why this moniker stuck and oth­ers did not. What did the term mean to those who first used it? We have become so accustomed to hearing about the "Great Vehicle," that few have stopped to consider that there may be something odd about identifying a religion with what is essentially a carriage. In this paper I argue that early Mahayanists may well have adopted the term from a non-technical usage found in passages from the JiiY}us­sOy}isiitra of the Sa1?1yuktiigama and the MahiiparinirviiY}asiitra of the Dfrghiigama. In these contexts, we find the term enmeshed in a

* An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the lABS Conference in Atlanta, GA. in June of 2008. I would like to thank the numerous schol­ars who gave me extensive feedback on various drafts, especially Jim Egge, Richard Gombrich, Ronald Davidson, Daniel Boucher, Sing-chen Lydia Chiang, Jan Nattier and Birgit Kellner.

1 In the following I will capitalize Mahayana when referring to the reli­gious movement. I will use the lower case italic mahayana when I am simply referring to the word in a non-technical sense.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 219-250

220 JOSEPH WALSER

complex metaphorical nexus spanning Buddhist and, non-Buddhist literature. This nexus blurs together the Upani~adic concept of the "path leading to the gods" with the Vedic metaphor of the sacrifice as chariot and then infuses the whole with some pan-Indic ideas of a great vimiina chariot as a post-mortem reward for meritorious behavior. While these three ideas - the devayiina patha, the yajiiii as ratha and the vimiina - may appear to have no obvious connec­tion, I will argue that there was a precedent within non-M.ahayana Buddhist literature connecting these ideas and that all three are specifically referenced in early Prajiiiipiiramitii literature.

The term mahilyilna in Mahayana literature

The place to begin our discussion of the term mahiiyiina should be with the Mahayanasfltras themselves. While the term may not have been as important at the beginning of the movement as it would become later, and not all texts that we would consider Mahayanist even use the term,2 the fact remains that the term is there, scat­tered among our earliest translations of Mahayana texts, its mean­ing largely taken for granted. Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, there are no Mahayana texts that introduce the term as if its audience had never heard it before. In every case, our texts assume that the audience is already familiar with the term and its positive connota­tions. Since the term would take on great significance later on, it is worthwhile inquiring into its origins and early connotations to ask what early audiences heard in the word mahiiyiina. For this we need to look at a relatively early Mahayana text that discusses the term itself at some length.

I would like to begin by looking at what has been argued3 to be the earliest extended discussion of the term mahiiyiina, and if not

2 The term is, for example, notably missing from every Indic manuscript of the Vajracchediktisatra.

3 See Edward Conze, The Prajfitiptiramitti Literature, 2nd edition, (Tokyo: The Reiyukai 1978), 9; and "The Development of Prajfitiptiramitti Thought."

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 221

the earliest at least the earliest discussion in Prajfiiipiiramitii litera­ture - namely the excursus on the subject found in the first chapter of the Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines. Though this may not be the earliest Mahayana text,4 it is nevertheless one of the earliest to provide us with an etymology (if not an etiology) of the term itself. If we look at the earliest Chinese translation of the first chapter, we find the Venerable Piirl!a asking, "What is the rea­son for saying that bodhisattvas are mahii-sarrmiiha-sa1?1naddha (armed with the great armor) and are mahiiyiina-sa1?1prasthita (set out for the Mahayana)?"5 After a discussion of what it means to don the great armor, Subhiiti asks the following:

SubhUti said to the Buddha, "For what reason does one set out in the Mahayana? What is the Mahayana? Where should one abide in the yana? From where should one depart in the yana? Who will perfect this yana?

The Buddha said to Subhuti, "[To say] 'Mahayana, Mahayana' is not correct. It cannot be delimited."

. [428a] Subhuti asked the Buddha, "I wish to know where the yana comes from. From the triple world ... it goes forth. It spontaneously abides in omniscience, and nothing comes forth from it. Nothing will come forth in the future. Why, Deva of Devas?

The Buddha said, "If there are two dharmas of that which actually arises and that which will arise in the future, then both cannot be ap­prehended. If dharmas are not apprehended then from what dharmas do they come forth?"

In Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer 1968), 124.

4 Indeed, Tilmann Vetter has argued that the A~ra was not originally af­filiated with the Mahayana at all. See esp. his "Once Again on the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Siidasiens 45 (2001) 59-90.

5 The translation here and in the following section is from Egil Fronsdal, The Dawn of the Bodhisattva Path: Studies in a Religious Ideal of Ancient Indian Buddhists with a particular Emphasis on the Earliest Extant Perfec­tion of Wisdom Sutra (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University 1998),44.

222 JOSEPH WALSER

Subhuti said to the Buddha, "The Mahayana is unsurpassed and with­out equal among the heavenly beings and among the beings below heaven. This yana is equal to the sky. As the sky covers countless peo­ple, so the Mahayana covers countless beings. This is why it is called the Mahayana. And one cannot see when the Mahayana comes, or when it goes, or see its dwelling place. Nor can its center or edges be seen. Nor can it be seen or heard in this [discourse]. It cannot be seen anywhere and it cannot be seen in the triple world. Deva of Devas, this is why it has the name Mahayana."

The Buddha said, "Well done, Subhuti! That is why it is called the Mahayana."6

Parallel to this passage we find the following two verses from the Ratnagu1J.asaYJ1cayagatha:

Great as a giver, as a thinker, as a power, He mounts upon a vessel (yana) of the Supreme Jinas. Armed with the great armour he'll sub­due Mara the artful. These are the reasons why 'Great Beings' are so called ...

What then again is said to be 'the vehicle of awakening' [bodhiyana]? Having mounted it one guides to NirvaIfa all beings. This vehicle [yana] is a Great Chariot [mahii-vimana] like space. Those who attain safety, delight and ease are the most excellent of beings?

6 Ibid., 46-7. I have chosen to use T. 224 here, but the same points can be made with any of the extant versions of the A~ta. The last paragraph quoted here became the standard formula for Mahayana in Prajiiaparamita litera­ture. It is quoted with some minor variations (and usually introduced with the phrase, "mahayanal'{t mahayanarrt itrdarrt bhagavann ucyate," in all versions of the 8000 P.P., as well as all versions of the 25,000 P.P., the 18,000 P.P. and the 100,000 P.P.

7 Edward Conze, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & its Verse Summary (Dehli: Sri Satguru Publications 1994), 11; Sanskrit: E. Obermiller, Prajiia Paramita-Ratna-Gul!-a-Sarrtcaya-Gatha (Sri Satguru Publications, reprint 1992), 13-14.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 223

Yiina as path/yiina as vehicle

Since my interest in the bulk of this paper lies in the origins and significance of the trope of the spiritual vehicle in Indic thought, I need to digress briefly to address arguments stating that it never was a vehicle in the first place. From the context of the A.~ta and the Ratnagur:wsaf!lciiyagathii, it makes sense to translate mahii-yiina as the "Great (mahii) Vehicle (yiina)." However, Tilmann Vetter,S has argued for interpreting the second member of the compound, yiina as a "path" or an "approach" rather than a vehicle - an al­ternative that can be found in every Sanskrit dictionary.9 In this case, yiina would be a synonym for miirga and mahiiyiina would mean something like "the great path." To support his claim that the A~ta was not originally affiliated with the Mahayana, he points to the fact that Lokak~ema renders the term as .~iiJ:j>f moheyan and continues to represent the word yiina by the phonemic :j>f yan rather than translating it. The one time Lokak~ema does appear to translate the term (at the beginning of T. 418) he translates it as 7\. m "great way" instead of "great vehicle."l0 Vetter also points to the same rendering in other early Chinese translations such as the anonymous Han dynasty translator of the Kiisyapaparivarta,u All of this leads Vetter to the conclusion that Lokak~ema and other ear-

8 See Vetter, esp. pp. 62-70.

9 See, for example, Monier Williams who cites a few examples of this usage from the Upani~ads. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v.

10 For what its worth, the translation ::k:ili appears quite a number of times in the verse portion ofT. 418, which was probably completed by Lokak~ema's school in 208 CE. [See Paul Harrison, The Pratyutpanna Samildhi Sutra Translated by Lokak~ema (Berkeley: The Numata Center for Buddhist Trans­lation and Research, 1998), 8 and also Jan Nattier, A Guide to the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Translations: Texts from the Eastern Han *5l and Three Kingdoms =l@ Periods (Tokyo: Soka University, The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology 2008),81-83].

11 Vetter, 62-63.

224 JOSEPH WALSER

ly Chinese translators understood mahayana to be a "great way" and not a "great vehicle." ,

Vetter may be correct about Lokak~ema's understanding of the term in T. 418, but it is not clear to me that we can generalize from this one instance. Transliterating the term in his translation of the A.na did not allow Lokak~ema to avoid interpreting it. In the un­derlined passage of the A~ta translation above, Lokak~ema made a clear choice to interpret the mahayana as a vehicle. This is because the Sanskrit itself forces the vehicle imagery. The Sanskrit reads as follows:

anena bhagavan paryayelJa mahayanam idal!l bodhisattvanal!l maha­sattvanam 1 naivasyagamo drsyate, naivasya nirgamo drsyate, napy asya sthanal!l sal!lvidyate 112

In such a manneris the mahayana of the bodhisattvas, the mahasattvas. Its coming isn't seen, nor is its going seen, nor is its abiding perceived.

To understand the yana here as a path is untenable, since vehicles come and go while paths do not. The vehicle nature of the yana becomes even clearer in Lokak~ema's Chinese:

mt&OSJLJ¥~tiJ1>JJ¥~tiJfJ~W\/F ~*B~W\/F5t*B~W\/f ~{±~ ... 13

Here, the repetition of the character 8~ adds a temporal dimension to the sentence, ("it is not seen when it comes, it is not seen when it departs ... ") that would simply not make sense if he understood the mahayana to be a path. Thus, we can infer that at least in this translation, Lokak~ema understood mahayana as a vehicle and not as a path.

Vetter is, of course correct that there were translators in Lokak~ema's school who rendered mahayana as ::k:ti[t but if so, they were followed not long after by Kang Senghui and ZhI Qian in

12 P.L. Vaidya, A~tasahasrika Prajiiiipiiramita (Darbhanga: Mithila Insti­tute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960), 12, lines 18-19.

13 T. 224, p. 428a9-1O. All references to the TaishO Tripitaka throughout this paper are from the CBETA version.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 225

the first half of the third century who habitually render it with **, "great chariot." If anything, I prefer to interpret Lokak~ema's con­sistent transliteration as Eric Frondsal does, as simply an indication that Lokak~ema understood his audience to be already familiar not only with the foreign term mahayana as a compoundl4 but also with the foreign term yana as a well established technical term.

In the end, it is difficult to know what to make out of the Chi­nese translators' choices. On the one hand, it should be remem­bered that the term Great Dao (*m) was certainly a religiously weighted term in Chinese culture at the time these translators were working and may have been chosen for reasons other than techni­cal precision. Finally, some translators are inconsistent in how they translate yana. Kumarajlva's Lotus siitra translation, for example, may render Buddha-yana as {~mI5 while still rendering mahayana itself either as *:ijf16 (Great Cart) or as ** (Great Chariot). In­deed, he makes a clear distinction between yana and path in his translation of the Dazhfdulun (T. 1509) when he translates an un­named source as saying, "The Buddha's omniscience serves as a great vehicle (travelling) the Noble Eightfold Path that leads into nirvat;la."17

14 See Fronsdal, 48.

IS Seishi Karashima, The textual study of the Chinese versions of the Saddharmapw:u!arzkasutra in the light of the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions (Tokyo: Sankibo Press 1992),31.

16 Ibid, 69.

17 T. 1509, p.72aI4: {~-t)]'W1.!!l*. )\lEm1:iA5!E~. Another theory has been proposed by Karashima Seishi, who argues that we frequently find the word jiiana in Central Asian manuscripts of the Lotus sutra ih places where much later Nepalese Sanskrit manuscripts have the word yana. He argues that the word mahayana may be an incorrect back-formation result­ing from an attempt to Sanskritize a Prakrit form of "maha-jiiana" (Great Knowledge). [See Karashima, Seishi, "Hokekyo ni okeru jo (yana) to chie (jiiana) - daijo bukkyo ni okeru yana no gainen no kigen ni tsuite." In: Taga Ryugen (ed.), Hokekyo no juyo to tenkai (Kyoto: 1993): 137-97.] Karashima's argument delves into considerable detail regarding the manuscripts of the

226 JOSEPH WALSER

Nevertheless, if we look at non-technical uses of the word yana in Pali and in the Sanskrit Epics, the meaning of '''vehicle'' is by far the most common. Thus, while the term yana may admit some ambiguity such that it may have even been possible for some native speakers to be confused as to its intended connotation depending on context, there are specific contexts in Mahayana literature that force us to understand the yana· as a vehicle not as a path. The mahayana of the bodhisattva in the A~ta is that which will depart (niryasyati) from the triple world - niryasyati here functioning as an etymological play on words with yana.18 Though it is of an un­certain date, this vehicular nature of the Mahayana is even further

Lotus siUra and this is not the place for a full critique of his argument. As much as his hypothesis may apply to the Lotus slUra, however, I have three main concerns as to whether his hypothesis applies to Mahayanasrrtras more broadly:

1) Since, presumably, the earliest Mahayanists aspired to become Buddhas, we would expect to find the Buddha lauded as one with Great Knowledge in some authoritative non-Mahayana text. Mahayanists could then tap into the legitimacy of the already established text through the adoption of the term. I have not been able to find the term mahiijiiiina applied to the Bud­dha in early biographies, though it does appear in later sources.

2) Barring (1), we should at least expect to find the Buddha's enlightenment experience to be described as a special kind of jiiiina, preferably a mahii­jiiiina, in some other authoritative non-Mahayana text (preferably in an abhidharma treatise if not in one of the biographies of the Buddha). Again, this appears to be the case only in much later texts.

3) Finally, in the absence of (1) and (2), at the very least we should expect to find some Mahayana text to make a big deal aboutjiiiina, preferably about mahiijiiiina. If the term had been so foundational to the early Mahayana movement, we should expect to find residual evidence of this fact in exist­ing Mahayana texts. Though the term mahiijiiiina does appear in some early Mahayana texts its significance is certainly eclipsed by other terms like prajiiiipiiramitii.

18 Vaidya, A~ta. 12, line Sff.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 227

amplified in the RatnagulJasayt2caya Giitha, which associates the yiina with the term vimiina. 19

Mahayana as vehicle

What kind of vehicle is it? Like many Mahayana texts, the A~ta describes the bodhisattva mahiisattva as one who is armed in the great armor and set out on the great vehicle. The juxtaposition of these two ideas, whether intentional or not, gives the overall impres­sion of going into battle. The martial imagery also becomes ampli­fied in the RatnagulJasayt2cayagiithii, which states that the one so mounted and armed will subdue Mara, and that the Mahii-yiina is a mahii-vimiina. It adds that this war chariot belongs to the "Supreme jinas," meaning of course the Buddhas, but amid the extended war metaphor, we might be forgiven for translating Jina as "conqueror" here. In this regard, it is perhaps not insignificant that, outside of the Buddhist context, the word mahiisattva is often used to refer to the heroes in the Mahiibhiirata, who do battle mounted on yiinas of their own. On the other hand, when the RatnagulJasayt2cayagiithii presents the Great Vehicle as a "great vimiina," it is alluding to the celestial mansions that took the shape of vehicles driven by gods

19 The term vimiina can, of course, mean quite a few things. It can be an estate or a palace, but the more common meaning is as a kind of flying vehicle (such as Raval).a's pu~pavimiina). But to say, as the RatnagulJasal'{tcayagiithii does, that the mahiiyiina is a mahiivimiina constrains the semantic possibili­ties of both words to mean "vehicle."

228 JOSEPH WALSER

and siddhas in Buddhist,20 Jain21 and BrahmanicaP2literature. This would explain its size and why in both texts the yaria is a great one that is vast like space.

What are the origins of vehicles as a spiritual metaphor in the South Asian context? Such a metaphoric use of the word yana is rare in the Vedas,23 and non-existent in the Upani~ads and the Ep­ics. Similarly, there are no such references in Abhidharma texts prior to the Mahiivibhii~a (which for its part seems to take the idea of "the three vehicles" for granted).24 Where did the 'vehicle' rheto-

20 The Pali canon devotes an entire work to vimanas, namely the Vimana­vatthu [see Peter Masefield, Vim ana Stories (London: Wisdom Publications 1989)]. Though a similar collection does not appear to have been employed by other sects, there are enough references to vimanas in avadana literature to suggest that the idea of vimanas was probably fairly widespread at the beginning of the Common Era.

21 Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra, 4.16 (SS 4.17) mentions that the fourth class of gods (the vaimanika gods) ride vimanas, though they are not the only ones to do so. Umasvati, Tattvartha Satra: That Which Is, Nathmal Tatia, trans. (San Francisco: Harper Collins 1994), 104.

22 See MBh 13.110 (= section 107 in Ganguli's translation).

23 I have only been able to locate two instances in the Vedas where the yana in devayana could be read as "vehicle." At f!.gveda 10.51.2, Agni's fire sticks are said to be devayanfin which Mitra and Varul).a reside. Again, at f!.gveda 10.181.3 the Yajus is said to be the first devayana to have fallen. In both cases, reading yana as "path" is also possible, but reading it in the sense of "leading to" is a bit more awkward. There may be other examples, but in the vast majority of cases (and always in the Spaniards) devayana modifies some other word, usually patha, pantha or adhvan.

24 See, e.g., T. 1547, p. 445cllff. and T. 1545, 735b-c. The latter is trans­lated by Fa Qing in her dissertation: The Development of Prajiia in Buddhism from Early Buddhism to the Prajiiaparamita System: With Special Reference to the Sarvastivada Tradition (Ph.D. diss., University of Calgary, 2001), 87-88. Coincidently, the idea that arhants, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas constitute three separate spiritual attainments shows up in the archaeological record in a Gandharan inscription dating from 55 CE; see Sten Konow, "A new Charsadda inscription." In: D. R. Bhandarkar Volume, ed. Bimala Churn

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAyANA' 229

ric that culminates in the term mahayana come from and what was its significance for those who adopted it?

The most likely hypothesis, and the one that I wish to expand on here, was first suggested by Surendranath Dasgupta25 in 1932 and expanded upon by Richard Gombrich26 sixty years later. The hypothesis is that the term mahayana is somehow derived from the devayana patha and pitryana patha of the Brhadarmyaka- and Chandogyopani~ad. The idea of the two paths is in fact much older - appearing already in the Atharvaveda27 - but the point is still a valid one. The gist of Gombrich's argument is that there is one text in the Pali Canon, the lalJ-ussolJ-isutta of the Samyutta Nikaya, that "puns" on the Upani~adic idea of 'yana' (which he argues should otherwise be taken as "way" rather than "vehicle") to read it as a chariot, and that passages such as the above passage from the A~ta merely extend the punning that was already in the canon. Let me state from the outset that I think that both Gombrich and Dasgupta are correct, but that they are correct in ways that perhaps neither anticipated.

I would like to begin with the Upani~adic passages to which Dasgupta and Gombrich refer because the Buddhist appropriation

Law (Calcutta: Indian Research Institute 1940), 305-10. This is certainly close to the time period of the Mahiivibhii~ii. Note however, that the inscrip­tion itself does not refer to the three attainments as "vehicles."

25 Surendranath Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, vol. I (Delhi: Mo­tilal Banarsidass 1975), 125, note 2: "The word Yiina is generally translated as vehicle, but a consideration of numerous contexts in which the word occurs seems to suggest that it means career or course or way, rather than vehicle .... The word Yiina is as old as the Upani~ads where we read of Devayiina and Pitryiina. There is no reason why this word should be taken in a different sense."

26 Richard Gombrich, "A momentous effect of translation: The 'vehicles' of Buddhism." In Apodosis: essays presented to Dr W. W. Cruickshank to mark his eightieth birthday (London: St. Paul's School 1992): 34-46.

27 See Atharvaveda 6.117.3 and 12.2.10.

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of the concept of the devayiina patha is not always as direct as it might seem. In the Brhadiira~Lyakopaniifad we find the statement: "For we have heard even the saying of the seer: I have heard of two paths for men, the one that leads to fathers and the one that leads to the gods. By these two all that lives moves on, whatever there is between father (heaven) and mother (earth)."28 Gombrich states that this may be one of the earliest articulations in India of a post-mor­tem soteriology.29 Whether it is the earliest or not, it is cer,tainly an articulation that held great authority in subsequent Indian thought. Authority, however, does not mean consensus. It appears that there were differing interpretations of these paths among Upani~adic authors. The Kauifztakz Briihma~opaniifad for instance depicts the devayiina pantha as leading up through successively higher tiers of gods until the ultimate world of Brahma (brahmaloka) is achieved in which one may converse with. a thoroughly anthropomorphic Brahma.30 On the other hand, the Brhadiira~yakopaniifad depicts the devayiina as the path leading ultimately to the brahmaloka where its traveler, " ... becomes (transparent) like water, one, the seer without duality. This is the world of Brahma."31

Radhakrishnan translates yiina in this passage in the sense of "leading to" instead of as the object of the verb itself. Indeed, in the Vedic context starting from the ~gveda onward devayiina is usu­ally used as a bahuvrzhi compound modifying something else, usu­ally patha, pantha or adhvan. In these contexts, yiina is read in the sense of "leading to the gods." Reading it as a genitive tatpuruifa in the sense of path of the gods is also possible (something like "the path that is the way to the gods") but a "path that is a vehicle

28 Brh. 6.2.2; S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upani~ads (Delhi: Indus Publications 1994), 310. See also Chilndogya 5.3.2 and (later) MU1}4 3.1.6.

29 Gombrich,36.

30 Kau~ 1.5-7. Radhakrishnan, 758-60.

31 Radhakrishnan, 266: "Sa lila eko dra~ta-iidvaito bhavati, e~a brahma­lokal:z."

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 231

of the gods" is awkward (how can a path be a vehicle?), and I can find no early text that continues the discussion as if the devayana is a vehicle.

It is well known that Buddhists so thoroughly appropriated the idea of the brahmaloka, that few Buddhist texts make mention of it in its non-Buddhist context. Unlike the brahmaloka, appropriation of the devayana by which one arrives at the brahmaloka is much less pronounced and always retains something of its non-Buddhist flavor. Nevertheless, the few examples in which the term appears in the Pali Canon seem to represent a progressive distancing of Buddhist interests away from this Vedic norm. Still, the lingering authority of this idea even for Buddhists is attested by the fact that no early Buddhist text simply rejects the idea outright.

Perhaps the earliest Buddhist reference to the devayana is found in the Sutta Nipata. In a discourse in which the Buddha argues with a Brahmin that caste is no obstacle to spiritual progress, the Buddha reminds the Brahmin of the untouchable named Matanga who was revered by Brahmins and K~atriyas alike. According to the sutta, Matanga:

... set out on the unpolluted great way which leads to the devas, (and) having discarded passion and sensual pleasures he reached the world of Brahma. Birth did not keep him from being born in the world of Brahma.32

This sutta references an explicitly Vedic idea (the devayana maha­patha) to argue that the one who follows Buddhist morality is the real Brahmin. It denigrates neither the Vedic Hindu goal of the devayana patha nor the brahmaloka but simply says that it is the Buddhist practitioner who really achieves that goal.

32 K.R. Norman, 16; SN verse 139 (= PTS p. 24): devayiinaT[! abhiruyha, virajaT[! so mahiipathaT[!; kiimariigaT[! viriijetvii, brahmalokilpago ahu; na naT[! jiiti niviiresi, brahmalokilpapattiyii. Throughout the article, I have used the CSCD CD-ROM version of the Pali Canon, except where noted.

232 JOSEPH WALSER

When the term appears again in the Kevaddhasutta of the Dzgha Nikiiya the stance is more critical. There,· the Buddha tells of a monk who "attained to such a state of mental concentration that the way to the deva-realms (devayaniyo maggo) appeared before him."33 He then proceeds to pose a question to the gods of succes­sively higher heavens, but receives no answer. Then in a separate concentration, the path leading to Brahma (brahmayiiniyo maggo) appears to him. That this text divides the path into two ~uggests a shared worldview with early abhidharma which relegates all heav­ens below that of Brahma's retinue to the devaloka, which is ac­cessible via the "8 skillful states of mind motivated by non-attach­ment, friendliness and wisdom (kusala-citta)."34 By contrast, the heavens from Brahma's retinue upward are only accessible via the dhyiinas. The two concentrations employed by the monk are surely to be understood as proper Buddhist fare, and yet the fact that none of the gods encountered along either path can answer the monk's question displays a kind of parodic critique of the system's Vedic parentage.

In neither of these references to the devayiina can the yiina be reasonably read as "vehicle." This way of reading the compound only occurs late in the Pali Canon. The only canonical reference to the devayiina that can be interpreted as a "vehicle of the gods" can be found in a passage from the Apadiina. There an untouch­able gives a couch (mafica) to the Buddha AnomadassI. As a re­sult of that gift, the Buddha predicts that whether he be reborn among the gods or among men, he will attain (patilabhissati) a yiina in his future birth that will be the "counterpart (patibhiiga)

33 Walshe, The Long Discourses, 177. DN I 215: Atha kho so, kevatta, bhik­khu tathiinrpaT[l samiidhiT[l samiipajji, yathiisamiihite citte devayiiniyo mag­go piiturahosi. The passage is virtually identical to that of the Dfrghiigama at T. 1, p. 102a26ff.

34 See Rupert Gethin, "Cosmology and Meditation: From the Aggafifia­Sutta to the Mahayana," History of Religions 36.3 (1997, 183-213): 194.

THE ORIGIN OF THE 1ERM 'MAHAYANA' 233

of the devayiina."35 This passage seems to be blurring the idea of the devayiina as that which leads to a post mortem reward with the pan-Indian idea of a magnificent vimiina, or "estate," as the fruit of meritorious activity.

We find a similar idea in the Milindapaiiha, albeit in one of the sections generally considered to be late. Here again context requires us to read devayiina as "vehicle of the gods" and, as in the Apadiina, the vehicle is explicitly said to be result of meritorious giving.

Suppose, 0 king, there were some virtuous Samana or Brahman, of high character, and he were paralysed, or a cripple, or suffering from some disease or other, and some man desirous of merit were to have him put into a carriage, and taken to the place he wished to go to. Would happiness accrue to that man by reason thereof, would that be an act leading to rebirth in states of bliss?

Yes, Sir. What can be said (to the contrary)? That man would thereby acquire a trained elephant, or a riding horse, or a bullock-carriage, on land a land-vehicle and on water a water-vehicle, in heaven a vehicle of the gods (devesu devayiinaf(l) and en earth one that men could use, - from birth to birth there would accrue to him that which in each would be appropriate and fit, - and joys appropriate would come to him, and he would pass from state to state of bliss, and by the efficacy of that act mounting on the vehicle of iddhi he would arrive at the longed-for goal, the city of NirvaI).a itself.36

It is only in this passage that there appears to be no reference to Brahmanical practice, though even here it is the "iddhiyiina" that takes him to nirvaI).a and not the devayiina. Regardless, we have in this text and in the Apadiina, the idea of a spiritual vehicle (a devayiina or an iddhiyiina) as a postmortem reward for merito­rious behavior - just like a vimiina. That yiina as practice might

35 Apadlina, vol. 2. p. 147: devaloke manusse vli, nibbattissati puiiiiavli; devaylina-patibhligal'(!, ylinal'(! patilabhissati.

36 The Questions of King Milinda, T.W. Rhys-Davids, trans, (Oxford: Clar­endon Press 1890),336-7.

234 JOSEPH WALSER .

blend with the idea of yiina as vimiina is not as far fetched as it might seem. Though not all vimiinas are vehicles; some certain­ly are. More important for our purposes, size figures into some of these reward vimiinas - some of which are explicitly said to be either mahii-rathas or mahad-yiinas. One such vimiina in the Vimiinavatthu is said to be a mahiiriitha measuring forty leagues on each side and one in the Mahiibhiirata is referred to once as a "mahad yiina."37

Further, as Jim Egge points out, most Buddhist texts discuss the vimiina as a reward for meritorious giving, although this is not always the case. The fact that some in the Vimiinavatthu receive their vimiina in the brahmaloka suggests that one could merit a vimiina from the practice of meditation as well, since rebirth in the brahmaloka can only occur through meditation.38 For its part, the Mahiibhiirata passage referred to above offers different levels of austerities as an explicit alternative to expensive sacrifices. Each successive level of austerity results in a grander vimiina -thus not necessarily being the results of meritorious giving. Certainly the activities that lead to the awarding of a vimiina - diina and prajiiii -

37 MBh: 13, 110, 44; Vimanavatthu, 92. Most scholars consider MBh chapters 12 & 13 to be later additions to the Mahabharata. While I have no intention of getting into that debate, the passage in question does not display allY obvious influence from Mahayana texts and so should be considered at least to be an independent, even if later, tradition.

The connection of the idea of a mahayana with the vimana tradition may help to explain a curious fact pointed out by Vetter (p. 66): "I have further not found the idea of joint travelling in a great vehicle in connection with the word mahayana even in the basic texts of the Pure Land tradition, where it might be expected." It is noteworthy in this regard that the size of the vimanas in this literature is simply to reward past behavior. There is no fur­ther discussion of those so rewarded transporting anybody.

38 See James Egge, Religious Giving and the Invention of Karma in Thera­vada Buddhism (Richmond, u.K.: Curzon Press, 2002), 86-7. For the argu­ment that the brahmaloka is attainable only through meditation, see Visud­dhimagga, 415.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 235

are consonant with those stressed in MahayanasfLtras teaching the bodhisattva path.39 The idea that one's spiritual accomplishments will result in the magnificence and/or the size of one's spiritual ve­hicle may well be behind the RatnagulJasaf!lcayagatha's reference to the Mahayana as a mahavimana. Further, this would explain the appearance of the word in early inscriptions and manuscripts. When the word mahayana does begin to appear in the archeological record (I am thinking particularly of one of the Niya documents,40 the Inscription of Arp.goka,41 the Copper Scroll of the son of Opan­da in the Sch0yen Collection,42 and the Huvi~ka fragment43), the phrase "one who has mounted the mahayana" appears to be a term of prestige.44 Finally, the only other parallel use of the word

39 As Jan Nattier has argued: " ... even in texts like the Ugra that do contain the standard list [of six perfections] it is rare that equal attention is devoted to each. Indeed, most bodhisattvasUtras seem to fall into one of two basic cat­egories: those (like the Ugra) that emphasize dilna, and those (like the sLitras belonging to the "perfection of wisdom" category) that emphasize prajfiil." Nattier, A Few Good Men, 153.

40 Thomas Burrow, A Translation of the Kharosthi Documents from Chi­nese Turkestan. London: The Royal Asiatic Society 1940: 79-80.

41 Richard Salomon, "A Stone Inscription in Central Asian Gandhara from Endere (Xinjiang)," Bulletin of the Asia Institute, n.s. 13 (1999), 1-13.

42 Gundrun Melzer and Lore Sander, "A Copper Scroll Inscription from the Time of the Alchon Huns." In Buddhist Manuscripts vol. 3, Jens Braarvig, ed. (Oslo: Hermes Publications 2002), 251-278.

43 Richard Salomon. "A Fragment of a Collection of Buddhist Legends, with a Reference to King Huvi~ka as a Follower of the Mahayana." In Bud­dhist Manuscripts vol. 2, Jens Braarvig, ed. (Oslo: Hermes Publications 2002), 255-267.

44 For the most part, even its latter day detractors refrain from attack­ing· it using the name Mahayana, preferring to refer to the movement by the more pejorative designations of "Sunyavildin" (advocates of emptiness), "Nilstivildin" (advocates of non-existence), or "Khapu~pavildin" (advocates of 'sky-flowers'). A notable exception being a report of an anonymous edi-

236 JOSEPH WALSER

yiina is in the context of the "three vehicles" of the sriivakayiina [meaning the attainment of the arhat], pratyekabuddhaYiina, and buddhayiina. At least one discussion contrasting the three vehicles in the Mahiivibhii:jii makes it clear that the three yiinas refer to the end results of practice, not to the paths leading to those results.45

Given the echoes of vimiinas, we might understand mounting the mahiiyiina to be less about getting somewhere than as a mark of prestige and power awarded for prior spiritual accomplis~ment.

Great vehicles in the Sutra Pitaka

The liilJussolJisutta: yiina as sacrifice

Indeed, the image of vehicle as a mark of prestige is also very much apparent in the liilJussorJisutta - the sutra which inspired Gombrich's study. But even here, I would argue that the Vedic as­sociations seem to linger as well. The Vedic connotations of the devayiina are, in this case, amplified by what appears to be a refer­ence to the Vedic idea of the chariot as a metaphor for the sacrifice. The following is from the translation of Bhikkhu Bodhi:

At SavatthI. Then, in the morning, the Venerable Ananda dressed and, taking bowl and robe, entered SavatthI for alms. The Venerable Ananda saw the Brahmin JaI).ussoI).i departing from SavatthI in an all­white chariot drawn by mares. The horses yoked to it were white, the reins, goad, and canopy were white, his turban, clothes, and sandals were white, and he was being fanned by a white chowry. People hav­ing seen this, said: "Divine indeed sir is the vehicle! It appears to be a divine vehicle indeed, sir!"

tor of the Ra~trapalapariPrcchasiitra, who records the condemnation of Mahayana by his teachers. See Daniel Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the For­est and the Formation of the Mahayana: A Study and Translation of the Ra~trapalapariprccha-n7tra, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press 2008), 137 and discussion on p. 109-10.

45 See note 24 above.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 237

Ananda reports all of this to the Buddha and asks if there is any­thing in Buddhism that would be like this brahmanical vehicle. He asks:

" .. .Is it possible, venerable sir, to point out a divine vehicle in this Dhamma and Discipline?" ... the Blessed One said. "This is a designa­tion for this Noble Eightfold Path: 'the divine vehicle' and 'the vehicle of Dhamma' and 'the unsurpassed victory in battle'."

"Right view, Ananda, when developed and cultivated, has as its final goal the removal of lust, the removal of hatred, the removal of delu­sion. Right intention ... Right concentration, when developed and cul­tivated, has as its final goal the removal of lust, the removal of hatred, the removal of delusion."

"In this way, Ananda, it may be understood how this is a designation for the Noble Eightfold Path: 'the divine vehicle' and 'the vehicle of Dhamma' and 'the unsurpassed victory in battle' ... "

[verses:]

Its qualities of faith and wisdom Are always yoked evenly together. Shame is its pole, mind its yoke-tie, Mindfulness the watchful charioteer. The chariot's ornament is virtue, Its axle jhana, energy its wheels; Equanimity keeps the burden balanced, Desirelessness serves as upholstery. Good will, harmlessness, and seclusion: These are the chariot's weaponry, Forbearance its armour and shield, As it rolls towards security from bondage. This divine vehicle unsurpassed Originates from within oneself. The wise depart from the world in it, inevitably winning victory.46

JaJ)ussol!i's vehicle is initially described as a va!aviibhiratha, not a yiina. It is the crowd of onlookers that use the latter term, praising

46 Bodhi, Bhikkhu, trans. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Somerville, Mass: Wisdom Publications 2000, 1525-6.

238 JOSEPH WALSER

his carriage as being like a divine vehicle (brahmayana-ruparrt). Ananda, seeing how the people are attracted to this brahmayana, asks the Buddha to describe what among his dharma and vinaya would be like this vehicle. The prose section has the Buddha saying that it is the Noble Eightfold Path that is "a brahma vehicle,a dhar­ma vehicle and an unsurpassed victory in battle" ('brahmayanarrt' iti pi, 'dhammayanarrt' iti pi, 'anuttaro sangama vijayo). The vers­es, on the other hand, make no reference to the Noble Eightfold Path, but rather portray a seemingly random collection' of Bud­dhist virtues as the unsurpassed brahmayana. Note that the Pali text does not use the term devayana. Gombrich nevertheless takes the term brahmayana as an allusion "to that 'path to Brahman' that the text of the B!hadaraJJyakopani~ad calls the devayana." He might be right here, and it is worth noting that the Chinese version of the same sutra does have the Buddha call the vehicle (among other things) both a devayana (~*) and a brahmayana (Yt*).47 Nevertheless, I think it best to read the brahmayana here not as a punning reference to the devayana (or even as a reference to the brahmayana magga of the Kevaddhasutta) but as a direct reference

47 T. 99, p. 201al. It is certainly anomalous that this verse would pres­ent the devayiina, brahmayiina, mahayiina and the Noble Eightfold Path as synonymous since most of the later texts in the Canon assign distinct roles to these paths. In addition to the roles of the deva- and brahmayiinas dis­cussed above in regard to the Kevaddhasutta, we find a more developed paradigm in the ~if:og:fii (T. 310 (26)) ascribed to KumarajIva. It de­scribes two different versions of the three vehicles. In the first version the three vehicles are the devayiina, the brahmayana and the aryayiina. The devayiina consists of the four dhyiinas, the brahmayana consists ofthe first three brahmaviharas (karUlJii, maitrf and pramuditii - for the idea that the brahmavihiiras were sometimes seen as yiinas, see note 57 beloW). The high­est vehicle is the aryayiina which consists of the Noble Eightfold Path. This taxonomy of three vehicles is distinct from the next set of three vehicles consisting of the Sriivakayiina, pratyekabuddhayiina and Mahayana. The liilJussOIJisutra, on the other hand gives us no indication that the devayana, brahmayiina and mahayana represent distinct phases of the path, perhaps reflecting a cosmology more like that behind the Sutta Nipata verse dis­cussed above. My thanks to Jan Nattier for pointing this passage out to me.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 239

to the use of chariots as a literal vehicle for Brahman in the Srauta sacrifice. We find this in the Gopatha Brahmana's commentary on the Agnyadheya Srauta ritual. There the text asserts that the es­sence (or "rasa") of Brahman becomes the chariot (ratha) on which the fire is to be carried to the appropriate altar in the agnyadheya rite.48 This is cited as the reason why the chariot (in addition to gold and cows) is to be given to the Brahman priest.49 Indeed, as M. Sparreboom has amply shown, the chariot is not only used as a metaphor for religious and martial prestige50 in Vedic texts, but it is also used as a metaphor (or one could even say metonym) for the sacrifice itself.51 Thus, the connection between Brahman and the chariot should not be surprising - the heart of the sacrifice lies in the chariot that carries the fire. Under this reading, when Ananda asks the Buddha to point out the Brahma-vehicle in Buddhism his question is tantamount to asking what the core or essence of Bud­dhism is.

Here we have what is, in the Pali Canon, the use of the yana metaphor that is closest to its usage in the Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines. JaI:LUSSoI!i's yana is a chariot employed as a met­aphor for a spiritual essence. Further, just like the A~ta and the RatnagulJasamcayagatha, the lalJussolJisutta presents its yana as alternately a war vehicle and a posh mode of transportation. Yet, since the text falls short of actually using the term mahayana itself we would be hard pressed to say that Mahiiyanists looked to this text as a precedent for their use of the term mahayana. For that we will have to turn to the Chinese translation of the same text.

48 The agnyadheya rite is the status rite required for any who wish to es­tablish the three fires in their household.

49 B.R. Modak, The Ancillary Literature of the Atharva-Veda: A Study with Special Reference to the Pari§i~tas (New Delhi: Rashtriya Veda Vidya Pratishthan 1993), 35.

50 M. Sparreboom, Chariots in the Veda (Leiden: E.J. Brill 1985), 13-27.

51 Ibid. 75-82.

240 JOSEPH WALSER

The equivalent satra in the Northern tradition is found in the SalfLyuktiiganw (T. 99) translated by GUI).abhadra, between 436 and 443 C.E.52 Here, we find a number of differences from the Pali, but for our purposes it will suffice to focus on the Buddha's response to Ananda's query: .

The Buddha said to A.nanda, "This common vehicle is not my dhar­ma, vinaya nor a divine vehicle: A.nanda, my saddharma and vina­ya vehicle is a vehicle of the gods (~* presumably "dev,ayana"), a divine vehicle (~HF~* "brahmayana"), and a great vehicle (** "mahayana") capable of subduing the army of klesas. Listen care­fully, ponder well, and I will explain to you. A.nanda, how is the sad­dharma and vinaya a vehicle of the gods, a divine vehicle, a great vehicle capable of subduing the army of kldas? It is said to be the Eightfold Noble Path [comprising] Right View, up to Right Concen­tration. A.nanda this is the so-called vehicle of the true dharma and vinaya, the vehicle of the gods, Brahma's vehicle Cj~t*), the great vehicle, capable of subduing the army of afflictions. The Blessed one then uttered these verses:

Faith and morality serve as dharma's yoke, Shame acts as its tether. Right mindfulness protects well and serves as a good charioteer. Upek~a (~) and samadhi serve as the poles (on either side of the horse). Wisdom and valor are the wheels. Detachment and patience are the armor. Tranquil, like the dharma itself, it moves. Charging straight ahead without turning. Forever advancing to the place without sorrow. The wise gentleman mounts this battle chariot that crushes igno­rance and hatred. 53

What is important for our purpqses is the high probability that there was a Northern Indic version of the Jii1}usso1}isiltra that refers to the

52 For a discussion of GUJ;labhadra's dates, see Etienne Lamotte, "Trois Sutra du S81pyukta sur la Vacuite," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 36/2 (1973, 313-323): 313.

53 T. 99, p. 200c25-201a8.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 241

Noble Eightfold Path as the "mahayana." I do not think there is suf­ficient reason to argue that what we have here is a "contamination"54 or an "interpolation"55 inserted by an overeager Mahayanist parti­san.56 There is no obvious Mahayana agenda anywhere in this text

54 Jonathan Silk has argued that the Agamas in general are contaminated with Mahayana material: "The materials to which we are comparing our ex­tant Mahayana Buddhist literature may well have been written or revised in light of that very Mahayana Buddhist material itself, and vice versa ad infini­tum. Even theoretically, there is no way to produce a clean schematic of the relations in question, any more than it would be possible to clarify a mixture in a glass after orange juice had been poured into soda, that mix poured into coffee, then added back into the orange juice, and so on. The contamina­tion is complete, its history irreversible." ("What, if Anything, Is Mahayana Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications," Numen 49/4 (2002, 355-405): 397-8.) Dealing with the issue of authenticity and contamination is indeed difficult (see note 56 below) and should not be underestimated. At the end of the day, we can ohly speak in probabilities concerning the authen­ticity of any text. However, to claim that the task is impossible is simply to ignore how much can be said about these texts - even if the end result falls somewhat short of "proof."

55 Etienne Lamotte, for example, states that the "Mahayanist interpola­tions" in the Ekottariigama are "easily discernible." History of Indian Bud­dhism: From the Origins to the Saka Era, Sara Webb-Boin trans. (Louvain: L'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 1988), 156.

56 I say "high probability," since GUI}-abhadra's many other translations were of indisputable Mahayana texts, and it is well known that Kumarajlva - a contemporary of GUI}-abhadra - may have been a bit overzealous in his translation of terms like agrayiina and sre~thayiina, jye~tadharma and agra­dharma with the same "**" in his translations of the Lotus sutra (see Frons­dal, 59-61) and in his translation of the Vajracchedikii [see T. 235, p. 750c13]. More to the point, Jan Nattier has pointed out that GUI}-abhadra's transla­tion of the Sal!!yuktiigama (T. 99) consistently translates the phrase ekiiyana maggo with -*m which points to the One Vehicle, a term that ordinarily populates Mahayana texts such as the Lotus sutra, the Srlmaladevlsutra, and the Angulimiilanttra. Indeed, she argues that GUI}-abhadra's choice of transla­tion terms in this Agama text was colored by his translations of Mahayana texts that legitimately contained the term ekayiina. Nevertheless, I think it would be hard to argue that GUI}-abhadra harbored some covert agenda to slip

242 JOSEPH WALSER

Mahayana terms into a canonical text, nor does Nattier claim that he was act­ing in bad faith. At the end of her investigation, she states, "the translation of ektiyana as yisheng dao is simply a mistake. Conditioned by his expDsure to the term ekaytina in Mahayana texts, and perhaps unfamiliar with the very rare word ekayana, GUl).abhadra may well have assumed that his source-text was mistaken and amended it to read ekayana, which he then rendered into Chinese using the by then well established translation of yisheng." (Jan Nat­tier, '''One Vehicle' (-*) in the Chinese Agamas: New Light on an Old Problem in Pali," Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University 10 (March 2007): 197).

Unlike the ekayana/ekayana translation mistake, we cannot make sense of the presence of the term ** in GUl).abhadra's translation of the ltil}-ussol}-isutta by a similar appeal to homophony, since we would either have to postulate a term that GUl).abhadra could have misheard as mahtiytina, or would have to explain how the ltil}-ussol}-isutta lends itself to some kind of Mahayanist agenda. There are a number of terms that theoretically could have been confused with mahayana, like mahtijiitina, mahadhyana, etc. [For a good discussion of possible homophones, see Daniel Boucher, "GandharI and the Early Chinese Buddhist Translations Reconsidered: The Case of the Saddharmapul}-fj.arfkasutra" Journal of the American Oriental Society 118.4 (1998): esp. pp. 492-3.] Nevertheless, homophonic substitution is constrained by syntagmatic context, and this story is clearly about a chariot. Further­more, the Pali refers unambiguously to ytinas.

Could GUl).abhadra have simply played author here and inserted the terms mahtiytina, devaytina and brahmaytina into his text? Probably not. Marcus Bingenheimer has done a close comparison between the anonymous transla­tidn of the Sal'{lyukttigama found in T. 100 with that of GUl).abhadra as well as with Pali parallels where available (Bingenheimer, Marcus. "A Digital Com­parative Edition and Translation of the Shorter Chinese SaIp.yukta Agama (T.lOO)." http://buddhistinformatics.ddbc.edu.twIBZA/ [accessed July 14, 2008]). While T. 100 does not include the Jtil}-ussol}-isutra, Bingenheimer's work does tell us a lot about GUl).abhadra's translation style. In his compari­son of extant copies of the Sal'{lyukta collections he found that T. 99 and T. 100 were very close, and every time T. 99 differed from the Pali Canon, the difference was also there in T. 100. He noticed no places where GUl).abhadra inserted extraneous material and no instances of obvious Mahayana inter­polation - assuming, of course, that we take his -* translations simply as mistakes. (Marcus Bingenheimer, personal communication 7/25/08). Finally, GUl).abhadra's use of the word mahayana in this text does not mesh well with

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM' MAHAYANA' 243

since the Noble Eightfold Path is not a particularly Mahiiyana idea. Nor is there any indication in this text that the term mahayana is the most important of the epithets for the Buddhist path. Once the metaphor of spiritual practice as a vehicle was in place, to call the Buddhist yana a "great yana" is hardly a surprising development.57

the doctrine of the other Mahayanist texts he translated. His translation of the JiilJussOl:zisiitra uses the term ** to describe the Buddha's dharma itself. It does not distinguish Mahayana from any other form of Buddhist doctrine and, moreover, explicitly states that it is the Noble Eightfold Path. It is tempt­ing to see this text identifying mahiiyiina with Buddhism itself as a subtle allusion to the doctrine of the One Vehicle found in the Srfmiiladevfsiitra and the Aligulimiilasiitra. Both texts state that the three vehicles are all found in the Great Vehicle and hence the Great Vehicle is the One Vehicle. However, despite an apparent nod at ecumenicity both siitras are keen to make a firm distinction between Mahayana doctrine and that of the sriivakas and pratyekabuddhas. More to the point, the Aligulimiilasiitra explicitly states that the sriivakayiina's Noble Eightfold Path is not Mahayana and the Mahayana's Noble Eightfold Path looks nothing like the one described in the JiilJussolJisiitra. (See esp. T.l20, p.532a24-bl). Thus, the term mahiiyiina in the JiilJUSSolJlsiitra of T. 99 was probably not inserted by GU1).abhadra since it conveys a picture of Mahayana that contradicts the other Mahayana texts he was interested in. Carrying this argument a bit further, we can also say that the picture of mahiiyiina we glean from the JiilJussolJisiitra is unlike that of any other Mahayana text of which I am aware. All of this suggests to me that this word was in the text prior to the advent of Mahayana, since it would be difficult to imagine someone consciously using an already loaded term in such a contextually naIve way.

57 There is one other context in the Pali canon where "yiina" may be inter­preted as a spiritual practice. There are quite a number of passages in which the stock phrase "[x] bahulfkatii yiinfkatii vatthukatii ... " (x is made great, is made into a yiina, is made into a ground ... ) occurs. This phrase is used in two contexts. The first occurs in the MahiiparinibbiilJasutta (and all the texts that reference this conversation), in which the Buddha tells Ananda, " ... whoever has developed the four roads to power (iddhipiidii), practiced them frequently, made them his vehicle, made them his base, established them, be­come familiar with them and properly undertaken them, could undoubtedly live for a century. The Tathagata has developed these powers ... " [Walshe, The Long Discourses, 246; DN II 103].

244 JOSEPH WALSER

Nor do we find here any distinction being made between this prac­tice and any other form of Buddhist practice. The' only contrast· here is between Vedic Hinduism (JiII)USso:Q,i is a stock Brahmin character in the Tripitaka) and Buddhism. The only available read­ing of this passage is that Buddhism itself (especially the Eightfold Path) !§. the Great Vehic1~.58 In other words, we have here a text

The second context is discussions of the "six elements leading to del~verance" (the cha nissaralJiyti dhtituyo), these are referenced quite a number of places as well [e.g. DN III 244-5, AN III 324-6, IV 300, Patisal'{!bhidtimagga II 13IJI: etc.]. The basic structure of the passages reads as follows:

Six Elements making for deliverance (nissaralJzya dhtituyo): Here, a monk niight say: (a) "I have developed the emancipation of the heart (ceto-vimut­ti) by loving-kindness (mettti), expanded it, made it a vehicle and a base, established, worked well on it, set it well in train. And yet ill-will still grips my heart." He should be told: "No! do not say that! Do not misrepresent the Blessed Lord, it is not right to slander him thus, for he would not have said such a thing! Your words are unfounded and impossible. If you develop the emancipation of the heart through loving-kindness, ill-will has no chance to envelop your heart. This emancipation through loving-kindness is the cure for ill-will." [Walshe, The Long Discourses, 500; DN III 247-8].

This is repeated for each of the six nissaralJzya dhtituyo, pitting each of the six techniques to achieve ceto-vimutti (i.e., mettti, karulJti, muditti, upekhti, animittti, and aversion [vigata] to the idea of titman) against each of the respec­tive hindrances to liberation (bytiptida, vihesti, arati, rtiga, nimitta-anustiri and vicikicchti-kathankathti-salla). Unfortunately, neither the occurrences of this term in the root texts nor the commentaries thereupon give any indica­ti6n whether ytina as path or ytina as vehicle is being indicated in this phrase.

58 Vetter points out one more verse in Pali that is similar in imagery. This occurs in the BhikkhunI Subhii's verses in the Therzgtithti (verse 389 in PTS, verse 391 in CSCD): Stihal'{! sugatassa stivikti, maggatthangikaytinaytiyinf; uddhatasallti antisavti, sufifitigtiragatti ramtimahal'{!o Caroline Rhys-Davids translates this as, "Yea, the disciple am I of the Welcome One; onward the march of me. Riding the Car of the Road that is Eightfold. Drawn are the ar­rows out of my wounds, and purged is my spirit of drugging Intoxicants. So I am come to haunts that are Empty. There lies my pleasure." [Caroline Rhys­Davids, Psalms of the Early Buddhists (London: Pali Text Society, 1980), 153]. Regarding this verse, Vetter (p. 64, note 23) makes some interesting ob­servations on this verse: " ... the demands of metre and the attempt for tonal

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 245

that uses the word Mahayana, which does not in fact appear to be what we would call "a mahayana text." Does it pre-date the advent of (what we wbuld call) Mahayana? I think that it does, but even if this cannot be established, this sutra still presents us with a usage of the word mahayana that remained quite independent of what we would call Mahayana even in the 5th century.

The Mahaparinirval}asutra: yana across the river

The idea that Buddhism itself is a great vehicle shows up in one other agamic text. It occurs in the Mahaparinirval}asutra, although again only in Chinese translations. The episode occurs at the point when the Buddha wishes to cross a river outside of Rajagrha. The earliest translation of this episode into Chinese is ascribed to ZhI Qian59 sometime in the second quarter of the third century. The passage in question reads as follows:

At that time there was a crowd of people who boarded boats to cross (the river). There were those who boarded small boats, and boarded bamboo rafts and wooden rafts to cross. There were many such travel­ers. The Buddha sat in samadhi and thought: "In the past when I had not yet become Buddha, I came here repeatedly and boarded these boats more times than I can count. Now that I am emancipated, (I) no longer board them, but I will enable my disciples to be free of them." When the Buddha awoke, he said the following verses: .

The Buddha is the Capitan of the ocean ship. The Dharma Bridge crosses the river. The Great Vehicle is the carriage of the Way.

effect result in maggattmigikayanayayinf expressing, rather awkwardly, the fact that a nun treads the eight-fold way. yana here is not something with which she has herself transported; rather, she herself effects her movement, i.e., by her practice of an eightfold discipline. This discipline is normally indicated by the word magga, but magga of the relevant compound, its mean­ing superseded by that of yana has become only a superfluous qualifier for atthmigikayana. "

59 For the ascription of this to ZhI Qian, see Nattier, A Guide to the Earli­est Chinese Buddhist Translations, 126-8.

246 JOSEPH WALSER

Each delivers gods and men and indeed produces liberation, deliv­ering (those gods and men) to the (other) shore to attain transcen­dence. They enable my disciples to loosen their bonds and attain nirVQlJa.60

The same verse can also be found in Buddhayasas' translation of the Dlrghiigama, completed between 408 and 412, though the prose prelude differs somewhat.61 This pericope of the Mahiipari­

nirviiIJasutra plays upon the etymology of the word saf[lsii.ra. "Saf[l­siira" comes from the root {Sr, meaning "to flow."62 The "flow" of the river itself is saf[lsiira. With the river as saf[lsiira, Buddhism is the "great vehicle" (mahiiyiina - here perhaps as a boat instead of a chariot) ferrying men and gods across to the other side. The verse also picks up on another common theme in the Trip itaka ,

namely that the Buddha's dharma is that which one holds onto in order to cross the "flood" (Pali, oghaf[l63). Again, as with the

60 T. 6, p178a24-b3. The verse in ZhI Qian's translation appears as:

{~~)Bj:f,j1dgffi $t£5)j}lJ5f: **mZ~ -t)]51lf5'(A v)\~ElJW§)t Jj'~l~H{llJ W~~~T ~~~n!Z5Jb5li

Buddhayasas' translation of the same verse is virtually identical in the first two lines with the exception that he substitutes ~ for T. 6's ~. This makes better .sense to me in context and I think it is likely that ~ is a copyist' mis­take. I have translated the verse accordingly.

61 There area actually anumberof different versions of this scene. Ernst Wald­schmidt, in his study of the different versions of the MahtiparinirvillJilsatra, gives the greatest attention to Millasarvastivadin sources. Though he sum­marizes three Chinese versions of this scene, he fails to mention that two of them liken the path to a great vehicle. See Ernst Waldschmidt, Die Uber­lieferung vom Lebensende des Buddha, first part, groups I-IV (Gottingen: Vandehoeck & Ruprecht 1944), 60-65

62 Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary, "-{sr," s.v.

63 See, e.g., SN 1069, "Alone (and) without a support, Sakyan', said the venerable Upaslva, 'I am not able to cross over the great flood. One with all-round vision, tell me an object (of meditation), supported by which I may

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYiiNA' 247

Sal!lyuktiigama passage, the image of a "great vehicle" appears to be quite natural to the setting (it has to be large, after all, to convey both gods and men across) and like the liilJussolJi passage, does not appear to be forwarding any obviously Mahayana agenda. Indeed, this passage may well have been the inspiration for cases such as the Dasabhumikasutra in which the Mahayana is referred to as the mahiiyiinapiitra (the Great Boat).64 Thus, to the extent that we can establish that this verse accurately reflects an lndic original65

we can argue that as early as the first half of the third century (and probably earlier), there was at least one version of the river crossing episode that included a verse in which the Buddha refers to Bud­dhism itself as a "great vehicle" capable of delivering gods and men across the waters of sal!lsiira. Like the liilJussolJi passage discussed above, the passage in question has nothing to do with Mahayana in contradistinction to any other form of Buddhism. Rather it is Bud­dhism itself that is referred to as "the Great Vehicle."

Conclusion

At this point, I would like to offer a few observations by way of a conclusion and to suggest fruitful avenues for future inquiry. My argument can be divided into two parts. The first part traces vari-

cross over this flood.'" Norman, 120. [=CSCD paragraph 1075:] Eko ahaY(! sakka mahantamoghaT[l, (iccayasma upasfvo) anissito no visahami tarituy(!; arammalJaT[l brahi samantacakkhu, yaY(! nissito oghamimaY(! tareyyaY(!.

64 P.L. Vaidya, ed. DasabhamikasfUram, (Darbhanga: The Mithila Insti­tute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning 1967) 40; T. 286, p.521b19-20.

65 The issues surrounding the accuracy or authenticity of Zhi QUin's trans­lation is much more complicated than that of GUl).abhadra's, and a number of variables must be taken into consideration. In all, I believe that this verse probably does accurately translate an Indic original, although there is still considerable room for doubt. For a full discussion and arguments for and against, see my, "On the Authenticity of a verse from the MahaparinirvalJa Satra" (forthcoming).

248 JOSEPH WALSER

ous contexts in early lndic literature that had to be in place in order for a term like mahayana as Great Vehicle to become meaning~ ful. While the term mahayana does not appear in the Pali Canon proper, the metaphoric complex into which it fits was certainly in place among its later strata. It appears to be an organic outgrowth of specifically Buddhist appropriations of the Upani~adic idea of the devayana patha cross-pollinated with Srauta metaphors of the sacrifice as chariot and more generally lndic ideas of vehicle vimanas as a reflection of religious practice. Thus, when'the term actually does appear in Chinese translations of the Dlrgha- and Saf!Lyuktagama, we should not rush to see its presence there as an interpolation or xenotype of a partisan nature but rather consider the possibility that it appears there as a non-technical term, an organic development of elements that were already there. Further, when we find Mahayana texts talking about the mahayana, they may well be referring to a term that was already in vogue among Buddhists who were not in pursuit of the bodhisattva path. On the other hand, the fact that we find this usage in texts translated between the first half of the third and the beginning of the fifth centuries suggests that Buddhists continued to use the term mahayana in a non-Mahayana way even after the proliferation of Mahayana texts.

This part of the argument has a few implications for the fu­ture study of early Mahayana and the origins thereof. For the term mahayana to be coined as a spiritual metaphor, other ideas on whose authority it draws would have to be in place. The devayana patha of the Upani~ads alone would probably not be sufficient since it is far from clear that early Brahmanic sources "heard" its yana as a vehicle. The literary context most conducive to the use of the term mahayana in the semantic range that we have come to expect would have to have already normalized the term devayana as a vehicle of the gods. Further, if I am correct that such a tech­nical usage only occurred in the context of discussions of post­mortem vimanas, then we should also look for a context in which a corresponding belief in such vehicles was du jour. Placing early Mahayana in the context of the Vimanavatthu, the Tattvarthasutra,

THE ORIGIN OF THE TERM 'MAHAYANA' 249

the Santi Parvan of the Mahabharata and the later chapters of the Milindapafiha, of course, hardly helps us in dating the origins of the movement since it opens up more chronological cans of worms than I care to deal with here. But it is a different tub of worms than scholars of Mahayana are used to wading through and so at least presents a change of scenery. Nor would our work be completed even if we could date the invention of the word "Mahayana." It is quite probable that a movement that we can meaningfully call "Mahayana" pre-existed the term itself. Nevertheless, the invention of the term does appear to be an important piece of the puzzle since it reflects something of the worldview of those who adopted it and the expectations of (imagined) audiences whom they addressed.

The second part of the paper argues that two passages in the Chinese translation of the Agamas contain usages of the term mahiiyana that appear to be a kind of missing link between earlier ideas such as the devayana patha and the term "Mahayana" used as a designation for the bodhisattva path in contradistinction to the Sravaka path. Though my argument for the authenticity of its pres­ence in the Agamas is not unassailable, neither can it be ruled out easily: If the word mahayana does occur there - and I have argued that these passages would be rather odd as conscious interpolations by Mahayanist partisans - its presence would be independent of (and oblivious to) the any kind of partisan form of Mahayana. For that reason I see no reason to assume that it post-dates the advent of such a movement. If the term "Mahayana" was used in some Buddhist texts in a non-sectarian way independent of (or prior to) its adoption as a moniker by any particular Buddhist group, then we must be open to the possibility that the word mahayana evolved within the Agamas themselves. By the same token, if the word mahiiyana evolved in the Tripitaka itself, and (if, as Paul Harri­son has argued)66 our earliest Mahayana texts are second genera-

66 Harrison has discussed this problem in two works: "The Earliest Chi­nese Translations of Mahayana Buddhist Siltras: Some Notes on the Works ofLokak~ema," Buddhist Studies Review 10/2 (1993, 135-177): 139-40; and,

250 JOSb"'PH WALSER

tion texts then the first generation of Mahayana texts might not be Mahayana texts at all, but rather texts from the Agamas themselves; put to a different purpose.67

Bibliography

CBETA - Chinese Electronic Tripitaka Collection (CD-ROM), Taipei: Chi­nese Buddhist Electronic Text Association, April 2009.

CSCD - Chattha Sangliyana CD-ROM Version 3, Igatpuri: Vipassana Re­search Institute 1999.

Fronsdal, Egil. The Dawn of the Bodhisattva Path: Studies in a Religious Ideal of Ancient Indian Buddhists with a particular Emphasis on the Ear­liest Extant Perfection of Wisdom Sutra. Ph.D. diss., Stanford University 1998.

Gombrich, Richard. "A momentous effect of translation: The 'vehicles' of Buddhism." In Apodosis: essays presented to Dr W. W. Cruickshank to mark his eightieth birthday (London: St. Paul's School 1992): 34-46.

Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1999.

Nattier, Jan. A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path According to the In­quiry of Ugra (Ugrapariprcchli). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 2003.

Norman, K.R. The Group of Discourses (Sutta-Niplita), vol. II. Oxford: The Pali Text Society 1992.

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli. The Principal Upani~ads. Delhi: Indus Publica­~.; tions 1994.

,;;.o~

Vetter, Tilmann. "Once Again on the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism," Wie­ner Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 45 (2001) 59-90.

Walshe, Maurice trans. The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dzgha Nikliya. Boston: Wisdom Publications 1995 ..

"Searching for the Origins of the Mahayana: What Are We Looking For?" The Eastern Buddhist, n.s. 28/1 (1995, 48-69): 55-56.

67 This was a suggestion first made by Jan Nattier in regard to the Jatakas, but may apply equally well to a number of other texts in the Siitra Pitaka. See Nattier, A Few Good Men, 186.

Buddhist Studies in North America Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 23-28 June 2008

Guest editor

Charles S. Prebish

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES:

A CURRENT SURVEY OF THE FIELD

CHARLES S. PREBISH

Introduction

In 1959 and 1960, Edward Conze wrote three segmented articles, published in the Middle Way, entitled "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies." These were collected and eventually published in his vol­ume Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays by Edward Conze. By that time two geographic "schools" of Buddhology had been identified: the so-called Anglo-German and Franco-Belgian schools. To these, Conze added a third: the Leningrad school. Each school was essentially defined not only by location, but also by emphasis. Conze was not the only scholar to research the nature of the Buddhist Studies discipline. Jan de Jong published two ar­ticles, in the 1974 and 1984 issues of the Eastern Buddhist, which were eventually collected into his book A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America. While offering much interesting data, a consideration of Buddhist Studies in America was virtu­ally absent from the volume, despite its title. More recently North American scholars have begun to investigate the discipline of Bud­dhist Studies. In 1983, Charles Prebish published "Buddhist Stud­ies American Style: A Shot in the Dark" in that year's Religious Studies Review. More than a decade later, in 1994, he published "The Academic Study of Buddhism in the United States: A Cur­rent Analysis" in Religion. That same year Malcolm David Eckel published "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion" in the Journal of the American Academy of Religion. The following year, the Journal of the International As­sociation of Buddhist Studies devoted an entire issue to the topic

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 253-282

254 CHARLES S. PREBISH

of Buddhist Studies as an academic discipline, including insightful articles by David Seyfort Ruegg, Jose Cabezon, and Luis Gomez. Coupled with the success of the Buddhism Section of the Ameri­can Academy of Religion, the rapid growth of the number of Bud­dhist Studies scholars on the North American continent, and the large number of venues for Buddhist Studies publication in North America, it was becoming clear that a "North American School of Buddhist Studies" was developing which rivaled, and perhaps even surpassed, the earlier schools noted above. This rapid growth and development has literally begged for analysis and evaluation. This paper, and the three that follow it are the products of a panel entitled "The Academic Discipline of Buddhist Studies in North America presented at the Xyth Congress of the International Asso­ciation of Buddhist Studies," held at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia (USA) from June 23-28, 2008.

In the Winter 1991 issue of the Journal of the American Acad­emy of Religion, former editor Ray L. Hart was afforded 112 pages to present the results of a survey entitled "Religious and Theologi­cal Studies, in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study."l Thirty­five pages of his "report" were devoted to a presentation of the statistical evidence gleaned from a questionnaire distributed to 678 faculty members at 11 types of institutions; the rest of the space was devoted to Hart's interpretive narrative. Interestingly, he de­votes an entire section of that narrative to a consideration of the key questions: "What is the relation between the study of religion and theology and the practice of religion?" and "What should the relation be?" Perhaps as expected, he could find only one statement on which all faculty everywhere agree: "One who practices religion

1 See Ray L. Hart, "Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Education: A Pilot Study," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 59,4 (Winter 1991), 715-827.

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 255

needs to study it."2 This of course begs the larger question, and Hart tries to clarify the three obvious positions he elicited:3

1. The first view is that the study of religion and the practice of religion are two integral "terms;" each has its "site" and the two are not internally related.

2. The second view is that "the relation is completely open."

3. The third view will by now be obvious: the study of religion presupposes practice, and is undertaken to prepare for and enhance practice.

Hart's useful findings have already been widely utilized in the dis­cipline, clearly reflecting the perceived importance of self-defini­tion and self-recognition within the broad profession of Religious Studies.

Curiously, Hart's findings were nearly chronologically coinci­dent with a five-year administrative review of the Buddhism Sec­tion of the American Academy of Religion, arguably the largest academic arena for Buddhologists in North America (if not the entire world). AAR's external evaluator for that review, Professor Malcolm David Eckel of Boston University, noted in his December 1991 report:

The most important achievement of the Buddhism Group and Sec­tion at the AAR in the last 10 years has been to create a safe and reliable forum for Buddhist scholars who represent a wide variety of approaches, disciplines, and geographical orientations to exchange views and build bonds of cooperation and understanding that create an active and imaginative scholarly community.4

2 Hart, "Religious and Theological Studies in American Higher Edu­cation," 779.

3 Ibid., 780-81.

4 Malcolm David Eckel, "Review and Evaluation of the Buddhism Section of the American Academy of Religion," 1991, 2.

256 CHARLES S. PREBISH

In a later article,5 Eckel revealed that in the five years between 1986 and 1991, the attendance at the Buddhism Section's annual busi­ness meeting grew from 60 to 140, and the mailing list expanded from 106 to 600!

With interest piqued by the data included in Hart's report and the suppositions inherent in Eckel's, in October 1992, I set out to gather materials from the North American community of Bud­dhologists that would afford this community data similar to Hart's upon which to conduct a second level of self-reflection. It was clear from the outset that the 600-member mailing list mentioned above contained, in addition to so-called Buddhologists, a large number of scholars of other Asian religions, many non-specialist compara­tivists, and a profusion of "others." After careful sorting and syn­thesis, a list of 125 scholars whose primary teaching and research work fell within the discipline of Buddhist Studies was compiled, and these individuals were sent requests soliciting both data and narrative statements about the discipline. Following two additional requests, and with a rather surprising response rate of 69.6 percent (compared with Hart's 64 percent), the received material was col­lated. The preliminary results were presented in a paper at the 1993 AAR annual meeting in Washington, D.C. and published in the fledgling electronic journal Gassho, with the full results appear­ing slightly later in Religion,6 jointly published in England and the United States.

I should mention that my methodology then, and now, was a bit unusual. Most surveys simply ask a series of forthright questions: How many refereed articles have you published? In which journals

5 Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62, no. 4 (Winter 1994), 1088.

6 See Gassho, "The Academic Study of Buddhism in America: A Cur­rent Analysis," Volume 1, No.2 (January-February 1994), and Religion, "The Academic Study of Buddhism in the United States: A Current Anal­ysis," Volume 24 (1994), 271-78.

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 257

have you published? How many books have you authored or edit­ed? How many major honors and/or grants have you been awarded? Tabulating results from questions such as these is a daunting task, complicated by the fact the various scholars have differing notions about what constitutes a refereed publication, what might be con­sidered a "major" grant or fellowship, and so forth. Having served on more search committees than I care to remember, I am also well aware that scholars tend to exaggerate their credentials whenever possible, and I wanted to avoid that dilemma. I wanted to achieve as much consistency with regard to standards as possible. As such, I chose not to offer standard questions on a standard form. Instead, I simply requested a copy of each scholar's curriculum vitae (along with any commentary they wished to provide). In this way, I could standardize the overall tabulation by determining in uniform fash­ion which journals could be counted as "refereed," which awards could be considered "major," and the like.

Later, a second survey was conducted, beginning in Fall 1995. In the intervening years, the survey list was updated, revised, and refined, reflecting the arrival of new scholars into the Buddhologi­cal community, the death of others, and shifting interests. Thus, the initial list of requests in the second survey numbered 140, with 106 responses received (or 75.7 percent). On an individual level, the results collected provided an ample view of the demographics of Buddhist Studies in America. With regard to individual train­ing, I was able to document the gender, educational background, language facility, and the like for those polled. Institutionally, I tracked the respective academic rank of the respondents, the type of university in which they teach, and the specific department that employs each. I collected data on memberships in professional or­ganizations, editorships held, geographical area(s) of specialization, grants and fellowships received, professional papers presented, honors awarded, and various categories of publications (including books, refereed articles, and book reviews). From the narratives in­cluded with many of the responses, I was able to determine a sense of the sample's collective perception of those issues deemed critical

258 CHARLES S. PREBISH

to the continuing development and advancement of the discipline. It was also possible to compile information on universities with extensive resources for the study of Buddhism.

In the years following the 1995 survey, no other scholar contin­ued this line of empirical data collection, so in 2006 I decided to once again collect new materials to update and augment my earlier findings. In the intervening decade, one significant factor impacted the methodology for this new study overpoweringly: the Internet. It was no longer necessary to rely on the good wishes and patience of colleagues to collate and print out a copy of their latest cur­riculum vitae, send it along through the postal service, investing valuable time in the process. Now with a couple of mouse-clicks at their computer, they could dash off a Microsoft Word or Adobe PDF file of their materials in less than the time it takes me to read this sentence. Equally, on my end, it was no longer necessary to pour through page after page of cumbersome printed documents. Instead, I could scroll through the submitted materials, tally the results, post them to a computerized spreadsheet, and even have the totals .calculated by my unfailing Microsoft Excel program. By 2006, my list of colleagues to be invited for participation in the study had grown to 189. Clearly, I am making no claims that this sample is unwaveringly comprehensive. Nonetheless, after four de­cades in the discipline of Buddhist Studies, and with numerous edi­torial duties for a number of professional societies - including the International Association of Buddhist Studies and the American Academy of Religion - I am confident that I have a thoroughly rep­resentative sample. Following my initial invitations, several follow­up reminders posted in early 2007, and a final invitation posted on H-Buddhism, I ended the study with 152 submissions (only six of which submitted hard copy versions); that is, an 80.4 percent sub­mission rate. Because I changed professional positions during the 2006-2007 academic year, I delayed tallying the results until May 2007. At that time I was assisted in data processing by Mr. Joshua Pineault, my research assistant at Utah State University. It was his

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 259

significant investment of time that allowed me to bring the study to a final conclusion in the summer of 2007.

Individual Results

Regarding basic demographics, in Hart's survey, 85.4 percent of the respondents were male, 14.4 percent female, with .2 percent not answering (p. 796). In my 1995 sample, 83 percent were male, 17 percent female, representing a small increase in percentage of females from my previous investigation (which was 85.1 percent male, 14.9 percent female). The 2006 survey yielded 76.8% males and 23.2% females, clearly indicating a rise toward gender parity in the previous decade. Hart's survey revealed 90 percent of the respondents with one or more doctoral degrees; 9 percent with no doctoral degree; and I percent expecting the doctoral degree (p. 800). In my initial sample, 99.1 percent (105 of 106) had a Ph.D/ Th.D. This was quite consistent with my 1995 survey, which re­vealed a 98.8 percent rate for doctoral degrees. My 2006 survey revealed a 98.0% rate for doctoral degrees. Not surprisingly, my 1995 sample seemed to suggest a slightly younger discipline overall than my initial sample: my first sample yielded 1975.9 as the aver­age year for the granting of the terminal degree, whereas my 1995 sample showed 1980.0 as the average year. My latest 2006 sample shows 1989.3 as the average year. As expected, the newest survey yields the youngest rate for the overall discipline. In decades, the breakdown yields:

260 CHARLES S. PREBISH

Decade Ph.D/Th.D 1995 Respondents 2006 Respondent.

Granted

2000s 0 27 1990s 21 49 1980s 45 42 1970s 25 24 1960s 12 5 1950s 1 0 1940s 1 0

Unlisted 0 5

The majority of the respondents in my studies earned their docto­ates at the following universities:

University 1993 Survey 1995 Survey 2006 Surve.

University of Chicago 8 14 19

University of Wisconsin 10 12 10

Harvard University 10 . 10 20

Columbia University 5 10 14

Yale University 6 7 6

University of Virginia 7 7 9

Stanford University 0 6 9

University of California 4 5 10 (Berkeley)

Princeton University 3 4 6

Temple University 5 4 4

Northwestern University 3 3 2

University of Michigan 0 3 7

University of Washington 0 2 0

Tokyo University 0 2 1

Leading the way in this category was Harvard University, whid produced 20 Ph.D.s, doubling its 1995 total. The University of Chi cago was close behind with 19 degrees, representing an increas"

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 261

of 35.7% from its 1995. Third place honors go to the Columbia University with 14 degrees, a 40% increase from the last survey. New to the 2006 survey were the University of California (Santa Barbara) and McMaster University, with 3 Ph.D.s each, as well as McGill University, the University of California (Los Angeles), and the Australian National University, with 2 Ph.D.s each.

In my 1993 survey, 44.9 percent of those responding taught in various public institutions, while 55.1 percent were employed by private institutions. The 1995 sample closely mirrors that result, with 44.4 percent of those responding teaching in various public institutions, 52.8 percent employed by private institutions, and 2.8 percent employed in other professional settings. In the 2006 sample 50.7% taught in public institutions, 47.4% in private institutions, and 1.9% in other professional settings. Regarding rank, the fol­lowing results were obtained:

Rank 1993 Survey 1995 Survey 2006 Survey

Emeritus 2.8% 4.6%

Full Professor 36.0% 33.0% 38.2%

Associate 31.4% 33.0% 27.0% Professor

Assistant 22.1% 22.7% 23.0% Professor

Lecturer 3.8% 2.0%

Other 10.5% 4.7% 5.2%

In the 1993 survey, the emeritus rank was combined with Lecturer, Adjunct Professor, Dean, and Acting Dean. In the 1995 and 2006 surveys a separate category for Emeritus is listed.

In terms of specialization, any comparison between samples would be incongruous because, for the 1993 sample, only one pri­mary specialization was recorded for each respondent, while in the 1995 sample, it became clear that in many cases, multiple special­izations were emphasized. As such, in 1993, 37.0 percent of the

262 CHARLES S. PREBISH

sample reported specializing in Japan/East Asia, while 29.6 pr­cent reported India/South Asia, 23.5 percent Tibet/Inner Asia, ;.2 percent China/East Asia, 2.5 percent Korea/East Asia, and 1.2 pr­cent indicated other choices. Bearing in mind that multiple listi~s were allowed in the 1995, yielding a total in excess of 100 percelt, the survey showed Japan/East Asia and India/South Asia leadilg the way, with 36.8 percent and 34.9 percent respectively, follo\\d by Tibet/Inner Asia with 20.8 percent, China/East Asia with II percent, Korea/East Asia with 1.9 percent, and 2.8 percent indit­ed other choices. For the 2006 sample, one primary specializatn only was recorded, yielding 35.5 percent indicating India/Soh Asia, followed by Japan/East Asia (27.6 percent), China/East Aa (14.5 percent), Tibet/Inner Asia 11.8 perecent), Korea/East Aa (2.0 percent), and 8.6 percent indicated other choices.

Area 1995 Percent 2006 Percent Respondents Respondents

Japan/East Asia 39 36.8 42 27.6

India/South Asia 37 34.9 54 35.5

Tibet/Inner Asia 22 20.8 18 11.8

China/East Asia 16 15.1 22 14.5

Korea/East Asia 2 1.9 3 2.0

Other Areas 3 2.8 13 8.6

Language facility seems to be rather consistent with area speci<t­ization, taking into account that many scholars develop a multipli!­ity of language skills, and that Sanskrit appears to be the consistet foundation language from which other studies in Buddhism pr!­ceed:

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 263

Language 1995 Respondents 2006 Respondents

Sanskrit 59 48

Japanese 49 38

Pali/Prakrit 43 38

Chinese 37 34 Tibetan 33 37

Korean 2

Other languages cited in 1995 include Hindi, Sinhalese, Nepali, Thai, Mongolian, Sogdian, and Vietnamese. In addition to these, the 2006 sample also yielded citations for Gandhari, Khotanese, Khmer, Newari, Lao, Uighur, and Burmese.

With regard to membership in professional and learned societ­ies, Hart's study (p. 809) produced extremely surprising results, considering the nature of his sample. Of the seven most populated professional organizations,four had traditionally Asian constituen­cies: the Association for Asian Studies (2nd; 22 percent), Ameri­can Oriental Society (4th; 17 percent), International Association of Buddhist Studies (tied for 6th; 8 percent), and the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (tied for 6th; 8 percent). Not unexpectedly, the American Academy of Religion topped the list with 67 percent, while the Society of Biblical Literature was third with 19 percent. In the Buddhist Studies sample, a wide variety of professional societies was noted. Presented below is a comparison of the 1993, 1995, and 2006 results:

Organization 1993 1995 2006 Percent (No.) Percent (No.) Percent (No.)

Amer. Academy of 75.9% (66) 87.7% (93) 67.1% (102) Religion

Association for Asian 57.5% (50) 57.8% (61) 42.1% (64) Studies

264 CHARLES S. PREBISH

Organization 1993 1995 2006 Percent (No.) Percent (No.) Percent (No.)

International Assoc. 43.7% (38) 47.2% (SO) 32.9% (SO) of Buddhist Studies

Society for Buddhist- 19.5% (17) 20.8% (22) 12.S% (19) Christian Studies

Society for Asian and 17.2% (IS) lS.1% (16) 7.9% (12) Compo Philosophy

American Oriental 16.1% (14) 12.3% (13) 11.8% (18) Society

Society for the Study 10.3% (9) 11.3% (12) 12.S% (19) of Japanese Religions

Society for the Study 8.0% (7) 11.3% (12) S.9% (9) of Chinese Religions

Society for Tantric 9.4% (10) 2.6% (4) Studies

International Assoc. 6.9% (6) 8.S% (9) 3.3% (S) of Shin Buddhist St.

Pali Text,Society 6.9% (6) 4.7% (S) 9.2% (14)

Other societies garnering multiple mention by the respondents in the 2006 sample, in decreasing order, include the International Association for the History of Religion, American Philosophical Association, American Society for the Study of Religion, and Bud­dhist Peace Fellowship. As expected, most respondents reported multiple, and often many, memberships. Many respondents in the most recent Buddhist Studies sample reported significant offices and administrative positions in the above societies. These include:

President (24)

American Academy of Religion: Midwest Region, Southeast Region, West-ern Region (1 each)

American Society for the Study of Religion (2) Association of Peer-Reviewed Electronic Journals in Religion (1) Australian Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy (1) Canadian Association for Studies of Asia (1)

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES

Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies (2) International Association of for Tu-Yung Studies (1) International Association for Wonhyo Studies (1)

International Association of Shin Buddhist Studies (1) International Association of Tibetan Studies (1)

Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism (1)

Sakyadhita: International Association of Buddhist Women (1) Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (4) Society for the Study of Japanese Religions (4)

Vice President (15)

265

American Academy of Religion: Middle Atlantic Region, Southeast Region, Western Region (1 each)

American Society for the Study of Religion (1) Association of Peer-Reviewed Electronic Journals in Religion (1) Australian Society of Asian and Comparative Philosophy (1)

Canadian Association for Studies of Asia (1)

Canadian Association of South Asian Studies (1) Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism (1)

Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies (3) Society for the Study of Japanese Religions (3)

Treasurer (3)

American Academy of Religion: Japanese Religions Group (1) American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (1) Society for Tantric Studies (1)

Secretary (5)

American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (1)

International Association of Buddhist Studies (1)

Sakyadhita: International Association of Buddhist Women (1) Society for the Study of Japanese Religions (2)

General Secretary (4)

International Association of Buddhist Studies (3) Institute of Ethics and Politics (1)

Board Member (28) American Academy of Religion (1) American Association for the Study of Religion (1)

American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (4) American Institute of Indian Studies (1)

266 CHARLES S. PREBISH

Association for Asian Studies (2) Buddhist Peace Fellowship (1) International Association of Buddhist Studies (6) International Association of Tibetan Studies (1)

Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism (3) Mongolia Society (2) Nepal Studies Association (1) Society for Asian and Comparative Studies (1)

Society for Buddhist Christian Studies (4)

Executive Council (9)

American Academy of Religion: Sri Lankan Studies Group (1) American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies (1) American Society for the Study of Religion (2) Association for Asian Studies-Korea (1)

Institute for the Study of Religion and Culture (1)

International Association of Buddhist Studies (1)

International Council of Thai Studies (1) Society for Buddhist Christian Studies Advisory Council (1)

Chair/Co-Chair (32)

American Academy of Religion (26) Asian Religions (1)

Buddhism Section (9) Buddhist Critical Reflective Group (1) Buddhist Philosophy Group (1) Chinese Religions Group (1) History of Religions Section (1) Japanese Religions Group (4) Lesbian and Feminist Issues in Religion (1)

Mid-Atlantic Region-East Asian Chair (1) Ritual Studies Group (1) Sacred Space in Contemporary Asia (1)

Steering Committee of the Academic Study and Teaching of Religion Section (1) Tibetan and Himalayan Heritage Group (2) Women's Caucus of the Mid-Atlantic Region (1)

Association for Asian Studies (3)

Committee on Korean Studies (1) Southeast Asia Council (1)

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES

Sri Lankan Studies Committee (1)

International Association of Buddhist Studies (1)

Committee on Buddhist Studies and Computers (1)

International Society for Buddhist Studies (1)

Society for Tantric Studies (1)

Steering Committee (1)

267

In addition, 3 respondents served as regional representatives to in­ternational societies, 53 served as members of steering commit­tees, and 9 served on various councils of these societies.

The 1995 and 2006 samples have shown a remarkably high level of activity in presenting scholarly papers at the annual meetings of the above professional societies listed above. Additionally, those sampled have been very active in presenting scholarly papers (not simply "lectures") in other professional settings such as interna­tional conferences, regional professional meetings, and thematic conferences sponsored by various institutions. Adjusting the re­sults to reflect those who did not respond with information on this item, the findings show:

Papers at Annual Meeting

Other Scholarly Papers

1995 Sample

4.4 per respondent

12.2 per respondent

2006 Sample

6.4 per respondent

10.5 per respondent

Thus, the average respondent in the 1995 sample made 16.6 profes­sional presentations during their academic career, while the aver­age respondent in the 2006 sample has made 16.9 professional pre­sentations during their academic career. These figures are slightly lower than the 19.8 figure reported in the 1993. The 1995 sample reflects the earlier supposition that this sample is slightly junior to the previous group of respondents. The same suggestion applies to the 2006 sample.

268 CHARLES S. PREBlSH

Buddhist Studies as a discipline presents a high magnitude of success in grant and fellowship acquisition, both during graduate training and after the granting of the Ph.D. degree. For example, and adjusting for those who did not respond with information in this category of inquiry, the 1995 sample reported 2.2 grants per respondent at the graduate school level. This included such items as National Defense Education Act Fellowships, Fulbright awards, and the like, but not assistantships of any kind. With Ph.D. in hand, all samples then reported:

Grant/Fellowship Agency 1993 1995 2006 Sample Sample Sample

(Number) (Number) (Number)

Nat. Endowment for the 57 73 53 Humanities

Fulbright 35 24 51

Amer. Council of Learned 14 24 20 Societies

Japan Foundation 13 17 20 Social Science Research 8 8 20

Council

American Academy of 5 15 Religion

Lilly Foundation 4 3 Pew Charitable Trusts 4 1

In the 1995 sample, grants from the Ford Foundation, Mellon Foundation, Danforth Foundation,· and Rockefeller Foundation were cited, along with hundreds of grants internally administered by the various faculty members' host institutions. In the 2006 sam­ple, Mellon Foundation grants grew enormously (to 18), followed by grants from the American Institute of Indian Studies (13), the Bukky6 Dend6 Ky6kai (Numata Foundation; 9), and Association for Asian Studies (7). In 1995, national and international grants yielded 2.1 awards per respondent, while internal university grants

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 269

totaled 2.4 awards per respondent. In 2006, national and interna­tional grants yielded 3.9 awards per respondent, while internal uni­versity grants totaled 1.1 awards per respondent.

Just as the Buddhist Studies samples yielded highly active in­volvement in professional societies, and significant success in grant and fellowship acquisition, they also have demonstrated a high de­gree of accomplishment in securing meaningful editorial positions with leading academic presses and journals. In 1995, no less than 6 individuals were editors for book series with university presses, while another 10 sat on university press editorial boards. Presses represented in this group include Oxford University Press, Indi­ana University Press, University of California Press, University of Michigan Press, Princeton University Press, University of Virginia Press, and the State University of New York Press. Additionally, 19 respondents edited book series for commercial/trade publish­ers, while another 7 were editorial board members. Some of the presses cited in this category include Snow Lion, Shambhala, Mo­tilal Banarsidass, Curzon Press, Wadsworth, Buddhica Britannica, the Kuroda Institute Series (published by the University of Hawaii Press), and the AAR Monograph and AAR Texts & Translations Series (both published by Scholars Press). In the 2006 sample, 9 respondents edited or co-edited book series for university presses. Presses represented include Oxford University Press, Stanford Uni­versity Press, Princeton University Press, University of Chicago Press, and the University of Hawaii Press. Another 13 edited or co-edited book series for commercial/trade publishers. Some of the presses cited in this category include Macmillan, Motilal Banarsi­dass, Wisdom, Routledge, E.J. Brill, Scholars Press, as well as the Kuroda Institute (associated with the University of Hawaii Press) and the American Institute of Buddhist Studies (associated with Columbia University).

Many respondents in the 1995 survey reported major editorial positions with journals, including:

270 CHARLES S. PREBISH

Editor-in-Chief/Co-Editor (14)

Buddhist-Christian Studies

Buddhist and Tibetan Studies

Critical Review of Books in Religion

History of Religions

Indo-Judaic Studies

Japanese Journal of Religious Studies

Journal of Buddhist Ethics

Journal of Buddhist Literature

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Korean Culture

Pacific World

Associate/Assistant Editor (9)

Critical Review of Books in Religion

The Eastern Buddhist

History of Religions

Journal of Asian Studies

Journal of Ecumenical Studies

Journal of Indian Philosophy

Journal of the Inti. Assoc. of

Buddhist Studies

Journal of Religious Ethics

As well, 9 individuals held Book Review Editorships at Buddhist­Christian Studies, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Pacific World, Philosophy East and West, and Religious Studies Review. Another 2 held Guest Editor positions at Cahirs d'Extreme-Asie, and Jour­nal of Religious Ethics. Finally, 45 respondents cited positions on the editorial boards of many of the journals listed above, as well as the Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies Journal, Garuda, Gender and World Religion, Journal of Asian Philosophy, Journal of the Ameri­can Academy of Religion, Journal of Chinese Religions, Journal of Comparative Sociology and Religion Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, Numen, Soundings, Studies in Central and East Asian Religion, T'ang Studies, and The Tibet Journal. In the 2006 sample, we found:

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 271

Editor-in-Chief/Co-Editor (15)

Buddhist Literature

Critical Review of Books in Religion

Japan Studies Review

Japanese Religions Bulletin

Journal of Buddhist Ethics

Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion

Journal of Global Buddhism (3)

Journal of the Barre Center for Buddhist Studies

Journal of the International Association of

Buddhist Studies (2)

Korean Culture

Sakyadhita: International Association of Buddhist Women

Associate/Assistant Editor (20)

Buddhist- Christian Studies (2)

Buddhist Studies Review

History of Religions (2)

Journal of Asian and African Studies

Journal of Asian Culture

Journal of Asian Studies (2)

Journal of Buddhist Ethics

Journal of Developing Societies

Journal of Ecumenical Studies

Journal of Indian Philosophy

Japanese Journal of Religious Studies

Journal of the International Assoc. of Buddhist Studies

Theosophical History

Korea Journal

Religious Studies Review (2)

Review of the Canadian Studies Association

Sophia

Additionally, 18 held Book Review Editorships at the Journal of the

American Academy of Religion, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Jour­nal of Global Buddhism, Philosophy East and West, Pacific World,

Religious Studies Review, Religion, Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies, Buddhist and Tibetan Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sophia,

Cognitive Science, and Nous. Finally, 65 respondents cited posi-

272 CHARLES S. PREBISH

tions on the editorial boards of many of the journals listed above, as well as the Harvard Journal of Asian Studies, Journal of Religious Ethics, and numerous others.

Although it has never been clear how to report scholarly publica­tion data with precision, Ray Hart's study utilized three categories: (1) Books, (2) Articles, Essays, Chapters, and (3) Book Reviews. Hart was only concerned with the immediately past five-year pe­riod. In other words, Hart presented no career publication data, a statistic which may well be more revealing than his five year infor­mation. Thus, in this study, I have confined myself to presenting only career data. The categories are at once problematic in that Hart did not distinguish between refereed and non-refereed publi­cations, a distinction now made in virtually all colleges and univer­sities. Equally, Hart made no distinction between books authored and books edited, another distinction that is part of the politically correct protocol of the American system of higher education.

In an attempt to address the exigencies of that system, I have sought to refine Hart's categories somewhat in favor of presenting more meaningful statistics. In so doing, I have separated the book category into two sub-categories: (a) Books Authored/Co-Authored and (b) Books Edited/Co-Edited. I have also pared Hart's Articles, Essays, Chapters category into Refereed Articles and Chapters (tak­ing the stand, not shared in all university evaluations, that most, if not all, chapters are indeed refereed in some fashion, quite often bringing to bear a higher standard than in many refereed journals). In my schema, the following career results can be reported:

7 This category was not separated in the first survey, but redesigned in the second.

8 Only 72 respondents listed book reviews, and this is reflected in the statistical average.

9 Only 116 respondents listed book reviews, and this is reflected in

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 273

Category of 1993 Sample 1995 Sample 2006 Sample Publication Average (No.) Average (No.). Average (No.)

Books Authored/ 2.4 (209) 2.3 (239) 2.4 (367) Co-Authored

Books Edited/Co- 1.7 (148) 1.1 (116) 1.6 (245) Edited

Refereed Articles 16.8 (1462)1 7.3 (769) 6.2 (944)

Refereed Chapters 6.5 (689) 8.2 (1243)

Book Reviews 12.7 (1105) 12.9 (962)8 7.6 (1154)9

Allowing adjustment of the sample to reflect career duration, the three sets of results are remarkably similar. Further, by refining the data collection in the 1995 sample it was possible to determine that 126 of the 355 books reported were published with univer­sity presses. In the 2006 sample, 239 of the 612 books reported were published with university presses. Allowing for multiple au­thorship/editorship, it was possible to name and rank those book publishers most often utilized as publication avenues for Buddhist Studies. As such, we can offer the following ranked list:1O

the statistical average. Calculated on the basis of the actual number of respondents who submitted book reviews, the average is 9.95.

10 To some extent, in the 1995 Sample, with regard to trade/commer­cial publishers, the personal favorites of a number of prolific authors are reflected. As such, the citations for Prentice-Hall and Tungta reflect the publications of Robert Ellwood and Charles Fu, respectively. Other uni­versity presses mentioned include Indiana University Press, University of Virginia Press, Stanford University Press, and the University of Michi­gan Press. Other trade publishers mentioned frequently include Allen & Unwin, Harper & Row, M.D. Gunasena, Peter Lang, St. Martin's Press, Curzon Press, HarperCollins, Beacon, Wadsworth, Scholars Press, Ani­ma, Eerdmans, Munshiram Manoharlal, Mellen Press, Westminster, and Mouton. In the 2006 Sample, Ellwood's publications again supported Prentice-Hall, while Steven Heine's and Dale Wright's publications sup­ported Oxford University Press.

274 CHARLES S. PREBISH

UNIVERSITY PRESSES

1995 Sample

1. State University of New York Press

2. University of Hawaii Press

3. Princeton University Press

4. University of California Press

5. Oxford University Press

6. University of Chicago Press

7. Columbia University Press

8. Cambridge University Press

9. Penn State University Press (tie)

University of S. Carolina Press (tie)

TRADE PRESSES

1995 Sample

1. Snow Lion

2. Prentice-Hall

3. E.J. Brill (tie)

Motilal Banarsidass (tie)

5. Tungta (tie)

Wisdom Publications (tie)

7. Shambhala (tie)

Greenwood Press (tie)

Orbis (tie)

2006 Sample

1. University of Hawaii Press

2. State University of New York Press

3. Oxford University Press

4. Princeton University Press

5. University of California Press

6. Columbia University Press

7. University of Chicago Press

8. Wilfrid Laurier University Press

9. Harvard University Press (tie)

Penn State University Press (tie)

Cambridge University Press (tie)

2006 Sample

1. Snow Lion

2. Wisdom Publications

3. Roudedge/Curzon

4. E.J. Brill

5. Prentice-Hall

6. Harper Collins

7. Shambhala

8. Motilal Banarsidass

9. Peter Lang (tie)

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES . 275

Asian Humanities Press (tie)

Macmillan (tie)

Asian Humanities Press (tie)

Continuum (tie)

Orbis (tie)

Allen & Unwin (tie)

It is also possible to determine a ranked list of refereed journals most often utilized as a publication outlet by the overall sample. Comparison of the 1995 and 2006 Samples shows remarkable con­sistency in the journals most favored by the scholars in the survey. One notable addition to the journals list in the 2006 sample is the online Journal of Buddhist Ethics, the first such journal to join this exclusive list. This list includes:ll

JOURNALS

1995 Sample

1. History of Religions

2. Buddhist-Christian Studies

2006 Sample

1. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

2. Buddhist Christian Studies

11 In the 1995 Sample, at least two cases, journals cited reflect the per­sonal favorites of two prolific scholars: Journal of Chinese Philosophy (for Charles Fu) and Studia Missionalia (for Alex Wayman). Other journals receiving significant numbers of citations include: Cahiers d'Extreme­Asie, Religious Studies Review, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Journal of the Pali Text Society, Journal of Feminist Studies of Religion, Indo-Iranian Journal, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Journal of Religious Ethics, Buddhist Studies Review, and Korean Culture. In the 2006 Sample, other journals receiving significant numbers of citations include: Cahiers d'Extreme-Asie, Religious Studies Review, Journal of Chinese Religions, Journal of Contemporary Buddhism, Indo-Iranian Journal, Religious Studies, Japanese Religions, and Journal of Chinese Philosophy.

276 CHARLES S. PREBISH

1995 Sample 2006 Sample

3. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

4. Philosophy East and West

5. The Eastern Buddhist

6. Journal of the American Academy of Religion

7. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies

8. Journal of the American Oriental Society

9. Pacific World

to. Tibet Journal

11. Numen

11. Journal of Indian Philosophy

13. The Journal of Asian Studies

13. Religion

13. Monumenta Nipponica

13. Journal of Religious Studies

13. Studia Missionalia

13. Journal of Chinese Philosophy

Institutional Results

3. Japanese Journal of Religious Studies

4. History of Religions

5. Journal of the American Academy of Religion

6. Philosophy East and West

7. Pacific World

8. The Eastern Buddhist

9. Journal of Indian Philosophy

to. Journal of Buddhist Ethics

11. Journal of Religious Ethics

12. The Tibet Journal

13. Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion

14. Journal of Asian Studies

14. Journal of the American Oriental Society

15. Monumenta Nipponica

On the surface, it would appear that tracking institutional programs in Buddhist Studies should be quite easy. One might simply turn first to those universities, listed earlier, which produced the largest numbers of doctoral degrees among the respondents to the individ­ual portion of the survey. By cross-referencing with the latest Di­rectory of Departments and Programs of Religious Studies in North

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 277

America (edited by David G. Truemper), and with the appropriate portion of the World Wide Web pages maintained by these major universities, the results ought to be readily apparent. One could then add to the tracking process by following where the recipients of these doctoral degrees are currently employed. To some extent, that was how I compiled my 1993 results, although the World Wide Web was far less useful at that time.

In 1993, I reported that only two North American universities had more than three full-time faculty members whose work falls within the discipline of Buddhology: the University of Virginia and the University of Chicago. Additionally, I reported that Har­vard University, Columbia University, the University of Michigan, Princeton University, and McMaster University had three full-time Buddhist Studies faculty members as well; a much larger list of universities with two Buddhist Studies faculty was cited.

However, like all disciplines, Buddhist Studies is continually changing, primarily as a result of faculty relocation, altered in­terests, retirement, and new hires from the continually increasing number of newly minted scholars entering the field. In the latest (2006) survey, Harvard University now has nine faculty members actively involved in Buddhist Studies. Columbia University has six scholars, while the University of Washington and the University of Wisconsin have five. Many universities, including Princeton, Vir­ginia, Chicago, UCLA, Emory, and the University of California at Berkeley have four. This represents a huge move forward overalL Jose Cabezon accurately points out: "For about a decade or so, bud­dhologists in North America have found employment in increasing numbers in departments of religious studies and schools of theol­ogy. Often this has meant that we have had to expand our pedagogi­cal repertoire beyond courses in Buddhist Studies to accommodate the curricular need of these institutions."12 After surveying a num-

12 Jose Cabez6n, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18, no. 2 (Winter 1995), 255.

278 CHARLES S. PREBISH

ber of issues having impact on Buddhist Studies, Cabezon goes on to conclude:

All of these factors have contributed to what we might call the di­versification of the buddhologist: a movement away from classical Buddhist Studies based on the philological study of written texts, and toward the investigation of more general, comparative and often theoretical issues that have implications (and audiences) outside of Buddhist Studies. Some colleagues have resigned themselves to this situation: a set of circumstances that must be tolerated for the sake of gainful employment. Others - and I count myself in this camp - have found the pressure to greater diversification intellectually stimulating, affording an opportunity to enter into broader conversations where Buddhist texts are one, but not the only, voice.13

Thus it is no longer completely clear what constitutes a full-time Buddhologist, and when one factors in the movement in the oppo­site direction - scholars from other disciplines incorporating Bud­dhist materials into their work - the entire issue of listing the num­ber of full-time Buddhologists in any unit becomes quite murky.

One such attempt to at least begin the task of surveying insti­tutions was undertaken by Duncan Williams (while at Harvard University). Williams devised a number of classificatory categories (with his choice of institutions to be appropriately placed):14

Practitioner-Friendly Institutions California Institute of Integral Studies Graduate Theological Union Hsi Lai University Institute of Buddhist Studies Naropa Institute

Most Comprehensive Programs Harvard University Indiana University

13 Ibid., 255-56.

14 Williams, "Where to Study?" Tricycle: The Buddhist Review 6, no. 3 Spring 1997),68-69, 115-17.

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES

University of Chicago University of Hawaii at Manoa University of Michigan University of Virginia

Institutions with Strength in East Asian Buddhist Studies Princeton University Stanford University University of Arizona University of California at Los Angeles University of California at Santa Barbara University of Pennsylvania Yale University

Institutions with Strength in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Studies Harvard University University of Michigan University of Virginia University of Washington

279

Institutions with Strength in Southeast Asian Buddhist Studies Harvard University University of Chicago

Other Noteworthy Programs Columbia University University of California at Berkeley University of Texas at Austin University of Wisconsin

While the attempt was admirable, then and now, the results re­flect precisely the kind of dilemma of uncertainty suggested by Cabez6n: what to include and what not to include, and who counts where? For example, it might be possible to argue that the Nyingma Institute and Barre Center for Buddhist Studies each have far more developed Buddhist Studies programs than the more academical­ly diversified Graduate Theological Union (whose faculty listing notes ''Access to professors at The Institute of Buddhist Studies" ... hardly an endorsement for inclusion in this list) or California Insti­tute of Integral Studies. In some cases, Williams' choices appear

280 CHARLES S. PREBISH

rather arbitrary as well.15 To further complicate the circumstance, because of changing employment patterns, by 2006, many of Wil­liams' classificatory judgments are clearly no longer accurate or appropriate.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that the 2006 sample of Buddhist Studies scholars in North America shows some obvious and expected sta­tistical deviance from the earlier samples, each conducted more than a decade ago. The new study shows a significant change in gender status with almost one-fourth of the field now occupied by women. Additionally, the sample is almost one full decade younger with respect to the date at which the terminal degree was earned. On the other hand, the sample seems quite stable with respect to the leading Ph.D. producing universities, with Harvard, Chicago, Columbia, Wisconsin, and the University of California at Berkeley continuing to lead the way. Equally, employment remains almost

-15 When Williams's list was published, the University of Wisconsin,

which was one of only two universities in the United States to offer a Ph.D. in Buddhist Studies at that time, was omitted from the "Most Com­prehensive Programs" list and cited only as a "Noteworthy Program." Impending or recent retirements notwithstanding, the University of Wis­consin continues to offer a complete and comprehensive curriculum in Buddhist Studies with several primary faculty and several other ancillary faculty. In some cases, an institution was listed on the basis of one very strong scholar, while others were omitted despite several strong scholars. There were omissions, too. Some scholars who merited inclusion in his tally were simply left out. Finally, it is clear that when Williams uses the term "America," he actually means "United States," as no mention at all was made of Canadian universities, a number of which boast strong Buddhist Studies faculties, such as McMaster University. The University' of Calgary could easily have been included as well. The above critique should by no means be construed as demeaning. Rather, it merely high­lights that the problem of identifying and classifying the Buddhist Stud­ies academic landscape is significantly more difficult than first meets the eye. Quite simply, there is no easy way to synthesize faculty size.

NORTH AMERICAN BUDDHIST STUDIES 281

evenly split between public and private universities. India/South Asia continues to lead the way in area specialization, with Japan/ East Asia, China/East Asia, and Tibet/Inner Asia following. Curi­ously, there is a significant drop in Japan/East Asia specialization. Language training follows a similar path with Sanskrit dwarfing the other languages, while Pali, Chinese, Japanese, and Tibetan remain almost equal. As expected, the American Academy of Reli­gion, Association for Asian Studies, and International Association of Buddhist Studies lead the way in professional affiliations. Bud­dhist Studies scholars play a markedly leading role in these and other societies with 24 members having held the role of president, 15 vice president, 28 board members, and 32 as Chair/Co-Chair of individual units (with 26 of these in AAR). Those surveyed also played a significant editorial role for book publishers and profes­sional journals. In the latest sample, 9 members edited book se­ries for university presses, while another 13 served in this role for trade/commercial publishers. Another 15 were Editor/Co-Editor of scholarly journals, with 20 serving as Associate/Assistant Editor, representing a significant rise from the 1995 sample.

Scholarly activity has seemed remarkably similar in all three surveys. With respect to book publication, the three surveys tallied 4.1 books, 3.4 books, and 4.0 books chronologically. The leading university presses, in order, were Hawaii, SUNY, Oxford, Princ­eton, University of California, and Columbia; while the leading trade presses include Snow Lion, Wisdom, and Routledge/Curzon. Similarly, combined articles and chapters yielded 16.8, 13.8, and 14.4 chronologically. The leading journals include (in ranking or­der) Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Buddhist-Christian Studies, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies, History of Religion, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Philosophy East and West, Pacific World, Eastern Buddhist, and the Journal of Buddhist Ethics. In the 1995 sample, scholars presented a total of 16.6 papers, while the 2006 sample yielded 16.9 papers. Grant activity was significant as well, with National Endowment for the Humanities and Fulbright awards leading the way, followed

282 CHARLES S. PREBISH

by the American Council of Learned Society, Social Science Re­search Council, and the Japan Foundation.

There is little doubt that the latest sample demonstrates that the discipline of Buddhist Studies is growing, thriving, and making a most significant impact on the study of religion in North America. Its impact can be witnessed in the overwhelming success of the Buddhism Section of the American Academy of Religion which, in its twenty-five year history has grown to become perhaps the most influential unit in the AAR. Although not reported in any data collected to date, it is also significant to note that the overall dis­cipline has shown an enormous growth in the number of "scholar practitioners" now teaching in universities and colleges throughout North America. The implications of this development have yet to be fully studied. Clearly, it will be interesting to note how the next decade of Buddhist Studies scholars fares with respect to the above categories studied.

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST

STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA

JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

This paper focuses on some of the changes that have taken place in the field of Buddhist Studies in North America 1 during the last three decades. After a brief overview of the past of the field to provide some context for these shifts, the discussion turns to some of the more salient intellectual and insti­tutional changes that have taken place in Buddhist Studies - changes in what we study, and in how we study it, but also the institutional transformations taking place. While generaIIy optimistic about the direction that Buddhist Studies is taking in the United States and Canada, this essay also points to some challenges that lie ahead.

I. The past of the field2

To understand the intellectual and institutional changes that have taken place in Buddhist Studies in North America, we need to re­hearse something of the past of the field. As is by now well known, the founding figures of Buddhology were concerned almost exclu­sively with texts, and not with "texts" in the broad way we under­stand the term today, but with written documents. Early Buddholo­gists were interested in these documents not so much because of what they told us about the people or societies in which the texts were written, but because of the ideas (the doctrines and philoso­phy), contained within them. Classical Buddhology, therefore, was principally the study of the ideas found in classical Buddhist texts.

1 While the focus ofthis paper is North America, some of the trends men­tioned below will also be found in European scholarship, as will be attested to by some of the references found in the notes.

2 This section of the paper draws on the essays that appeared in the Jour­nal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 18, no. 2 (1995), especially those by Gomez, Cabezon and Tillemans.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 30· Number 1-2·2007 (2009) pp. 283-298

284 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZ6N

The method for accessing these ideas was, of course, philology. Classical Buddhology presupposed that its goal and method were relatively straightforward and unproblematic: to gain a sense of the earliest (and therefore the "purest") form of Buddhism - a form of Buddhism unsullied by later "cultural developments" - through methods that, being modeled on the natural sciences, were seen as relatively objective. Just as the subjectivity of the scientist was irrelevant to the doing of science, so too the subjectivity of the Bud­dhologist was seen as more or less irrelevant to the study of Bud­dhism. The "science of philology" would provide the scholar ac­cess to the text as it had "left the hands either of its author, editor or translator."3 Once the text had been "established," its meaning - the author's intention - could be gleaned. Throughout this process, the Buddhologist was (at least ideally) transparent, like a piece of glass, neither adding to nor subtracting anything from what was already present in the text itself.4

3 Christian Lindtner, "Editors and Readers," in Lama Doboom Tulku, ed., Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives (New Delhi: Mano­har, 1995), p. 197; see also p. 194.

4 In Lindtner's words: "A Buddhist philologist['s) ... highest authority ought to be reason and common sense. He is willing to go wherever these authorities intend to lead him. He wants to study these ideas and their de­velopment in a given context from a historical point of view. His personal beliefs about the value of these ideas is irrelevant to his professional work ... It goes without saying that a Buddhist philologist would never even dream of reading feminist or other modern ideas into his text." ("Editors and Readers," pp. 193-94.) Although Lindtner recognizes that gleaning a text's meaning in­volves an act of interpretation, he hastens to add: "When I speak of interpre­tation, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I do not mean that we should look upon the old texts through the dim and coloured glasses of, say, Marx, Freud, Adler, Jung, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Chomsky, Neils Bohr, Levi-Strauss, or other neo-intellectuals whose rather peculiar way of thinking has had, in my opinion, a most obnoxious impact on modern academic life." ("Editors and Readers," p. 198.) Lindtner, of course, is a contemporary scholar, but his words reflect the earlier philological perspective I am attempting to charac­terize here.

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 285

Early Buddhology was concerned not with just any set of texts and ideas. It was concerned with classical texts largely because of the (often unspoken) presupposition, inherited from the European Renaissance, that ancient and classical culture was more pure and worthy of study, a highpoint in civilization, the pinnacle of human achievement from which point there had been a steady decline. To the extent that there was a concern with non-texual culture at all, there was a concern with elite institutions: with the culture of the writers of texts, which in the case of Buddhism were almost ex­clusively monks. Because of the preoccupation with origins, early Buddhology also tended to privilege Sanskrit and Pali Buddhist literature, with the study of Chinese Buddhist texts a close second. The study of Buddhism in other societies - societies in which Bud­dhism entered at a later date - tended to be neglected, or even when not, these subfields were seen at best as handmaidens of Buddhist Indology. Hence, Tibetan Buddhist Studies, to take one example, was not seen as an autonomous area of Buddhology, but was in­stead considered a suppliment to the study of Indian Buddhism. As late as the 1970s we find David Seyfort Ruegg arguing for the autonomy of Tibetan Buddhist Studies, indicating the persistence of this mind set up to recent times.5

For all its concerns with origins, classical Buddhology was largely ahistorical. Being focussed principally on texts and on the ideas found in them, early Buddhologists were usually concerned

5 David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Study of Tibetan Philosophy and Its Indian Sources," in Louis Ligeti, ed., Proceedings of the Csoma de Koras Memorial Symposium Held at Matrafiired, Hungary, 24-30 September, 1976 (Buda­pest: Akademiai Kiad6, 1978), pp. 378-391. As Professor Seyfort Ruegg (pp. 384-85) states, "it is a striking fact that even in a large number of institutions which pursue Asiatic studies that require or could benefit from its repre­sentation Tibetology, far from having acquired full droit de cite, has still to establish so much as a foothold ... [a] rather circumscribed recognition ... To make regular progress Tibetology must be adequately established as a sub­ject of enquiry in its own right, rather than as a mere appendage of another SUbject."

286 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZ6N

at most with dating the authors of these texts and with issues 01 relative chronology. They were not concerned with history in our sense of the word today. For example, very few scholars wrote on the social, political and economic context of the societies in which Buddhism flourished even in classical times, much less in the mod­ern period.

Early Buddhologists were also usually armchair scholars who worked with texts that had been sent to Europe and North America by missionaries and colonial officers. Rarely did they go into the field. And rarely did they speak the languages that they read. All of this, of course, led to a strong dichotomy between scholars and the object of their study. Whether Buddhism and Buddhists were idealized or denigrated, one thing was clear: "we" were not "them." There was little meeting ground for the twain.6

Finally - and this perhaps hardly needs saying, given the tech­nology of the period in question - there was one medium for schol­arship, the printed word; and one repository, the physical library.

The picture I have painted is of course simplified. There were always, among the early Buddhologists, exceptions to the rule.7 But

6 Hence, there was often a privileging of the textual sources and a dispar­agement of the interpretations of living representatives of the tradition - and this despite the words of one of the founding figures of Buddhist Studies, who believed that consulting "living oracles," i.e" infomants, could on occa­sion be valuable: "Whatever may be the general intellectual inferiority of the orientals of our day, or the plastic facility of change peculiar to every form of polytheism, let him [the scholar] not suppose that the living followers of Buddha cannot be profitably interrogated touching the creed they live and die in." Brian Houghton Hodgson, Essays on the Languages, Literatures, and Religion of Nepal and Tibet (New Delhi: Manju§rI Publishing House, 1972, repro of the 1841 ed.), p. 100.

7 One thinks here, for example, of Alexander Csoma de K6ros (1784-1842), arguably the founder of modern Tibetan Studies, who not only lived his entire scholarly life in India and the Himalayas, but who also learned spoken Tibetan, working closely with native informants. Although he was one of the earliest writers on the Tibetan Buddhist canon, Csoma also wrote

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 287

although painted in broad strokes, the picture is not, I think, inac­curate.

II. Intellectual shifts in the field

How then has Buddhist Studies changed? The shifts that most con­cern me here are ones that have occurred principally in the last three decades, which is to say in our own lifetime. These changes have been quite profound. They are transformations in what we study, in how we study it, in the tools at our disposal, and in the media we use to disseminate our research.

First, what we study. The notion of "text" has exploded. This is not to say that we no longer study written doctrinal and philosophi­cal texts. Certainly we do. Indeed, in just the past few years there has been something of a renaissance in doctrinal studies. But today we are as interested in the context as we are in the content of such texts.8 For example, we not only study what the great texts say, but how they were produced and used: the use of texts in educational institutions, the patterns of patronage, the historical evolution of book production, and so forth.9 And alongside doctrinal texts, we also now study narratives, poetry and plays.1O We still study the

on a variety of other subjects.

8 An attempt to provide such a multi-disciplinary context is to be found, e.g., in John Cliff or Holt, The Religious World of Kirti Sri: Buddhism, Art and Politics of Late Medieval Sri Lanka (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

9 See, for example, Anne Blackburn, Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture (Princeton: Princ­eton University Press, 2001); Justin McDaniel, Gathering Leaves and Lifting Words: Intertextuality and Buddhist Monastic Education in Laos and North­ern Thailand (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); and Kurtis R. Schaeffer, The Culture of the Book in Tibet (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

10 See Paula Richman, Imagining a Place for Buddhism: Literary Culture and Religious Community in Tamil-Speaking South India (Oxford: Oxford

288 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

works of elite monks, but increasingly we also study the oral and literary traditions of the Buddhist laity.u We not only study what Buddhists have written and what they think, but also what they do - from complex monastic rituals to popular practicesY We also now explore non-verbal "texts," reading Buddhism through the lens of material culture.13 In short, realizing that our studies had yielded a very incomplete picture of Buddhism, one that excluded most of what Buddhists actually did, we have increasingly turned our attention as a corrective precisely to those areas that had previ­ously been neglected.

University Press, 2001); and Sarah J. Horton, Living Buddhist Statues in Early Medieval and Modern Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), which, inter alia, relies on popular tales and poetry as source materials.

11 See, for example, Mark Halperin, Out of the Cloister: Literati Perspec­tives on Buddhism in Sung China, 960-1279 (Harvard: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006).

12 One thinKs here of two volumes edited by Donald S. Lopez, Buddhism in Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Religions of Tibet In Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), but also of a variety of other works that emphasize ritual and practice in Buddhist Asia: e.g., Esben Andreasen, Popular Buddhsim in Japan: Buddhist Religion and Culture (Surrey: RoutledgeCurzon, 1998); Rita Langer, Buddhist Rituals of Death and Rebirth: Contemporary Sri Lankan Practice and Its Origins (New York: Routledge, 2007); Donald K. Swearer, Becoming Buddha: The Ritual of Image Consecration in Thailand (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, ed., Tibetan Ritual (Oxford: Oxford Uni­versity Press, forthcoming).

13 See, for example, Kevin Trainor, Relics, Ritual and Representation in Buddhism: Rematerialising the Sri Lankan Theravada Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); John Kieschnick, The Impact of Bud­dhism on Chinese Material Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Fabio Rambelli, Buddhist Materiality: A Cultural History of Objects in Japanese Buddhism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and David Germano and Kevin Trainor, eds., Embodying the Dharma: Buddhist Relic Veneration in Asia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 289

Classical Buddhology, as already mentioned, was largely tex­tual and antiquarian, and its focus was on elite institutions. Bud­dhist Studies today, by contrast, is also concerned with non-elite institutions and practices that are in many instances hybrids of Buddhist and non-Buddhist religious elements.14 We continue to be interested in classical Buddhist institutions (for examples, monas­teries) but also now in new religious movements, movements that are often non-monastic and that are considered (by elite Buddhists at least) to transgress the bounds of orthodoxy. From an almost exclusive concern with men and monks, we are now also interested in the religiosity of Buddhist women and nuns.15 And we are also interested in the way that Buddhism crosses national boundaries, including its particular manifestations in the West.16

If what we study has changed, so too has how we study it, which is to say that there has been a shift in our methods. Eschewing broad generalizations, our studies now deal with more specific pe­riods, places, individuals and institutions. The relative ahistoricism of early Buddhology has also been replaced by a keen historical

14 See, for example, John C. Holt, The Buddhist Vi$~u: Religious Transof­rmation, Politics and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); and Robert DeCaroli, Haunting the Buddha: Indian Popular Religions and the Formation of Buddhism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

15 See, for example, Paula Arai, Women Living Zen: Japanese Soto Bud­dhist Nuns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Kim Gutsehow, Being a Buddhist Nun: The Struggle for Enlightenment in the Himalayas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Janet Gyatso and Hanna Havnevik, Women in Tibet: Past and Present (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); and Tessa J. Bartholomeusz, Women Under the Bo Tree: Buddhist Nuns in Sri Lanka (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

16 See, for example, Charles S. Prebish, Luminous Passage: The Prac­tice and Study of Buddhism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Charles S. Prebish, Westward Dharma: Buddhism Beyond Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Sally Meara, Land of Beau­tiful Vision: Making a Buddhist Sacred Place in New Zealand (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007); and a variety of articles in the Journal of Global Buddhism at http://www.globalbuddhism.org.

290 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

consciousness that seeks to contexualize Buddhist doctrines, prac­tices and institutions within multiple contexts - social, political and economic. Moreover, scholars no longer sit in armchairs. They go into the field, and they often learn the spoken languages of the cultures they study. Methodologically, Buddhologists increasingly find themselves asking questions about rhetoric, power, material culture, the production of goods, and forms of exchange, thereby bringing the methods of literary theory, political science and eco­nomics to bear on their studies.

Finally, information technology has revolutionized the field in ways that we never could have imagined. Those of us who con­tinue to work on classical texts now have at our disposal resources unimaginable when we were beginning our graduate work. In the subfield of Tibetan Buddhist Studies, to take the example with which I am most familiar, we now have available a wealth of texts and reference works that make our work easier and more efficient. These include catalogues and databases of huge textual corpuses, some of which had never even been previously catalogued. We are also jus.t a click away from important collections of scanned books and journals, Buddhist texts in PDF format, and (perhaps most important) digitized searchable texts that make possible in a few moments the answer to questions that would have previously taken months if not years - for example, finding every instance of a single term throughout the entire canon.

Most of the Buddhist canonical collections in the major Bud­dhist languages - Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese, Korean, and Tibetan -are either already available in digital form or else are in the process of being input, sometimes even in multiple languages side-by-side. Large bodies of post-canonical literature also exist as searchable text. While we are still a long way from seeing all available Bud­dhist literature as digital text, this is now at least imaginable.

The internet, moreover, has made possible the dissemination of a vast amount of non-textual material that was previously inac-

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 291

cessible to scholars: art,17 of course, but also important historical archives of photographs,18 films,19 and cartographical resources,20 some of them even interactive. These digital tools are also radi­cally transforming pedagogy. Searchable dictionaries and online video language-teaching tools are changing the nature of language instruction. Online multimedia resources provide students with the ability to hear and see what they are being exposed to in the me­dium of the written word. We now even have our own digital text­books in Buddhist Studies.21

The next step, one which we have yet to take to any great extent, is to think more systematically about the dissemination of research in refereed digital publications. This is going to be a major issue in years to come. University presses are increasingly loathe to pub­lish specialized academic monographs, and scholars are going to have to find alternative venues for their work. Or rather, we are go­ing to have to create the infrastructure for new forms of academic publishing, like peer-reviewed journals and digital monograph se­ries. The web is an ideal place for publishing specialized academic work, not only because of its relatively low cost, but also because of the possibility of incorporating multi-media resources (images,

17 See, for example, Himayalan Art Resources at http://www.himala­yanart.org; and the Huntington Archive of Buddhist and Related Art at http://kaladarshan.arts.ohio-state.edu/.

18 See, for example, The Tibet Album: British Photography in Central Tibet 1920-1950 at http://tibet.prm.ox.ac.uk/index.php.

19 The Frederick Williamson Collection of films about Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet is available at http://www.digitalhimalaya.com/collections/wil­liamson/williamsonfilms.php.

20 See, for example, an interactive map of the hermitages that surround Sera Monastery in Tibet: http://www.thlib.org/places/monasteries/sera/ hermitages/. This is part of the author's Sera Project.

21 See, for example, Charles S. Prebish and Damien Keown, Buddhism: The Ebook, described at http://www.jbeonlinebooks.org/Buddhism/in­dex.htm.

292 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

video, etc.) into scholarly publications. Some examples of this al­ready exist,22 but we are going to have to be more intentional about moving this process forward - for example, by creating the appar­tus for the peer-review of digital publications, the chief mechanism for quality-control within the field.

Broadly speaking, what the field has shifted to can perhaps be subsumed under the rubric of Culture Studies. There has been in Buddhist Studies, just as there has been in the Humanities general­ly, a "cultural turn." But over and above the turn to culture broadly speaking, there has been a turn to Cultural Studies, a unique field (or perhaps better perspective) with a number of distinctive attri­butes. In Buddhist Cultural Studies we find, first, a flattening out of data hierarchies. Rather than privileging the classical and textual as data, we are now interested in Buddhist culture in all its mani­festations, elite as well as kitschy, "pure" as well as hybrid, classical as well as modern, and not just in Asia, but everywhere that Bud­dhism is found. The Cultural Studies approach has also brought with it a certain amount of self-reflection and self-criticism, as we have turned our attention from the study of Buddhism to the study of the study of Buddhism (that is, to the study ofthe field), and from the study of Buddhists to the study of those who study Buddhists (namely, Buddhologists).23

22 The Journal of Buddhist Ethics (http://www.buddhistethics.org), the Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies (http://www. jiats.org), and Revue d'Etudes Tibetaines (http://www.digitalhimalaya. com/collections/journals/ret/).

23 Several works come to mind as representative of this approach: Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Co­lonialism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), and Donald S. Lo­pez, Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-la: Tibetan Buddhism and the West (Chicago: University of Chicago. Press, 1999). But see also Thierry Dodin and Heinz Rather, Imagining Tibet: Realities, Projections and Fantasies (Boston: Wis­dom Publications, 2001); Martin Brauen, Dreamworld Tibet: Western Illu­sions (Trumbull, CT: Weatherhill, 2004); and David L. McMahan, The Mak­ing of Buddhist Mondernism (New York: Oxford University press, 2008).

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 293

In addition to the transformation of the field already mentioned, we have also seen the emergence of unexpected new areas of study within the North American academy. Buddhist Theological Studies,24 for example, includes a variety of subfields such as Femi­nist Studies, Ethics, Contemplative Studies, and Buddhist Ministe­rial Studies.

None of the shifts just described, including the digital and cul­tural turns, and perhaps especially Cultural Studies, are of course, without their problems. One sometimes wonders whether it is all for the good. Will the field become fragmented: those who special­ize in texts and doctrines, those who focus on culture and practices, and those who specialize on the study of material artifacts? As we move into increasingly smaller and more specialized ghettoes, will this lead to balkanization? Will the cultural turn lead to decreased mastery of the great texts? For all the tedium involved in searching for a quote or a term through hundreds of pages of texts, the fact remains that previous generations of scholars were forced to read those hundreds of pages. What are the implications of the point and click approach (as I call it in my more cynical moment) to textual studies? And what are the implications of what I have called the flattening out of data hierarchies? Will studies of the meaning of plastic squeeky buddhas replace the study of the Buddhist "great books"? Finally, will our present self-reflection on the field and on the Buddhologist degenerate into a kind of narcissism? There is no denying that these are all dangers, but in truth I do not see these dangers materializing, at least not yet. Instead, the various shifts mentioned, I believe, have been quite salutary for the field as a whole.

24 See John Makransky and Roger R. Jackson, eds., Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (Surrey: Routledge­Curzon, 1999).

294 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

III. Changing institutional patterns

The field has changed intellectually, but it has also changed insti­tutionally. Initially located almost exclusively within area studies departments, or in language and literature programs,25 in North America graduate Buddhist Studies has increasingly moved in the direction of Religious Studies.26 While most of the area-studies graduate programs are still active, we find graduate programs in­creasingly housed within religious studies department. 27 Some pro­grams28 straddle the area studies/religious studies divide, with one foot in each camp.

Not only have North American Buddhist Studies graduate pro­grams moved into Religious Studies departments, the graduates of Buddhist Studies programs increasingly find employment in Reli­gious Studies departments - often in small, liberal arts colleges. Whereas a generation ago it was rare to find Buddhologists in the religion departments of smaller colleges, this has today become the rule rather than the exception. Aside from simply providing employment opportunities for recent PhDs, I have elsewhere ar-

25 One thinks here of the programs at Wisconsin, Michigan, Washington, Harvard, UCLA and UC Berkeley.

26 Compare the situation in North America to what Max Deeg has to say about the institutional location of the field in parts of Europe, namely that it will be some time before "the professional study of Buddhism be­comes integrated in the Religious Study programs of German-speaking universities, closing the gap between the pure historical study of Bud­dhism as a text-restricted tradition and the religious reality in Buddhist countries." Max Deeg, "Buddhist Studies and its Impact on Buddhism in Western Societies: An Historical Sketch and Prospects," online at http:// www.chibs.edu.tw/exchange/CONFERENCE/4cicob/fulltext/Deego htm#jtnref85, last accessed January, 2009.

27 The Buddhist Studies programs at Virginia, Stanford, Columbia, Princeton, Santa Barbara, Yale, Toronto, McMaster and Emory are examples of those housed within Religious Studies departments.

28 These include, most notably, those at Chicago and Harvard.

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 295

gued that the movement of the field in the direction of Religious Studies has been beneficial on intellectual grounds, broadening the agenda of Buddhist Studies, forcing us to think more compara­tively, and pushing us to learn to speak to colleagues outside our own area of speciality. But the move into Religious Studies has also posed its own practical challenges. In terms of graduate training, it has meant that students have had to master an additional body of theoretical literature and to learn a new set of skills on top of the already weighty linguistic, historical, doctrinal and other re­quirements that have traditionally constituted a graduate education in Buddhist Studies. How individual programs balance these de­mands is an important question - at least it is at my own institution and in my own mind.

Let me conclude by mentioning what I see to be the newest and most interesting institutional shift within Buddhist Studies in North America. This has to do, on the one hand, with the emer­gence of accredited Buddhist institutions of higher learning, and on the other, with the relationships being created between Buddhist religious organizations and North American universities.

Degree-granting Buddhist institutions are nothing new in the United States: the Jodo Shinshu-affiliated Institute of Buddhist Studies in Berkeley was founded in 1964 and joined the Gradu­ate Theological Union in 1985. Naropa was founded a decade later in 1974 and was accredited in 1986. Since then, several Buddhist groups have founded new universities or institutes. Two of these, both in Los Angeles, have already received accreditation:

• Soka University, which was founded in 1987 and accredited in 2005,29 and

• The University of the West (formerly Hsi Lai), founded in 1991, and affiliated with Fo Guang Shan (Taiwan).

29 It should be noted that Soka University does not portray itself as a Bud­dhist institution but rather as a secular liberal arts college. Its students are mostly young people from Japan.

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Three more specialized institutes are currently in the process of being accredited, or else have arrangements with other accredited institutions:

• Dharma Realm Buddhist University, founded in 1976 • The Won Institute of Graduate Studies, founded in 2000 • The Maitripa Institute, founded in 2006.

By my reckoning, there are already seven institutions of higher learning founded by Buddhist groups in the United States.3D I ex­pect this trend - the institutionalization of Buddhism into the fabric of North American higher education - to increase in the years to come. Several of the existing institutions have for some years now been a source of very qualified graduate students for the more well established North American Buddhist Studies graduate programs. These new Buddhist institutions are also beginning to absorb new PhDs from mainstream Buddhist Studies graduate programs. If the trend indeed continues, as I believe it will, we may one day see across the North American landscape something like a network of Buddhist u,niversities and divinity schools not unlike those of other religious traditions. If this indeed comes to pass, it will have profound implications for Buddhist Studies, for Buddhist ministry, and indeed for Buddhists in North America.

There is one other way in which Buddhists, Buddhist "symtap­thizers," and Buddhist organizations are affecting Buddhist Studies graduate education in North America - through the funding of pro­fessorships and curricular initiatives. One thinks here of the Numa­ta Visiting Professorships, of the chairs funded by Barry Hershey at Harvard and by the Khyentse Foundation at Berkeley, and of the 2006 gift of $4 million (Canadian dollars) by Mr. Robert Ho to the University of Toronto in support of Buddhist Studies. These initia­tives are already having a profound effect on the character of Bud-

30 Similar institutions are not unknown in Europe: for example, the Buda­pest Buddhist University, which offers both BA and MA degrees, was found­ed in 1991 and was accredited in 2001.

THE CHANGING FIELD OF BUDDHIST STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 297

dhist Studies in North America, causing the field to take certain directions it might not have otherwise taken.

IV. Conclusions

Within our own lifetime we have seen the field of Buddhist Studies in North America undergo some fairly profound intellectual and institutional shifts. Many of these shifts - e.g., the cultural turn and the move to greater self-reflexivity - seem natural to us in hind­sight, but as with all historical processes, it is far from clear that we could have predicted them while we were living in and through the earlier paragidm. Likewise, it is probably impossible to predict what Buddhist Studies will look like a generation from now. Are the intellectual shifts outlined in this essay a permanent part of the fab­ric of Buddhology, or, like a pendulum, will we see the field swing back and forth between different poles - for example, between the doctrinal/philosophical and the cultural/material- at times empha­sizing one, and at other times the other? Even if Buddhist Studies ends up oscillating in this way, it seems clear that, like Foucault's pendulum, we never return to precisely the same point where we started, the new arc being influenced by all the forces that continue to operate unceasingly in and around the field. And, indeed, there is already evidence for something like this in the work of a new generation of doctrinal specialists who insist that doctrine cannot be understood apart from history, politics and context generally. As Buddhist Studies has moved back toward doctrine and philosophy, the endpoint of the new arc is a very different place from where the pendulum began its journey. Put another way, although it is futile to predict what the field will look like a generation from now, we can be certain of one thing: that it will never again be precisely what it was in the past.

And what of the institutional shifts outlined in this paper? What will be the upshot of the new Buddhist institutions of higher learn­ing and of the partnerships between mainstream universities and Buddhist institutions? What new traditions of scholarship and what

298 JOSE IGNACIO CABEZON

new scholarly identities will result from this? It is not inconceivable that such institutional shifts will give rise both to new subfields and to new scholarly vocations - for example, to something like academic Buddhist theology, a field that, although situated within (a broader) mainstream Buddhology, is also responsible to a Bud­dhist constituency. Given the history of the institutionalization of other religions into the fabric of North American intellectual life, new modes of academic inquiry and new scholarly identities are to be expected. But only time will tell, of course, which of these "many possible worlds" will be instantiated. Amidst these many uncertainties, however, there is one other thing that we probably can be sure of: that our own work and concerns will one day seem as archaic to our scholarly heirs as the work of prior generations seem to us today.

THE DISCIPLINES OF BUDDHIST STUDIES

NOTES ON RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT

AS BOUNDARY-MARKER

OLIVER FREIBERGER

In their contributions to the 1995 special issue of the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies on method, Jose Cabezon and Luis Gomez masterfully analyze the state of Buddhist Studies and discuss the implications, challenges, and opportuni­ties of reflecting on method and theory in the field.! Their analysis shows that there is a strong coherence in Buddhist Studies: It fea­tures a common subject matter, "Buddhism" (- however that term may be defined in academic practice), various institutions (profes­sional associations, peer-reviewed journals, professorships and chairs, graduate programs, etc.), and a recorded academic history.2

! Jose Ignacio Cabezon, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory," in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18 (1995): 231-268; Luis O. Gomez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field," in: Journal of the International Associa­tion of Buddhist Studies 18 (1995): 183-230.

2 The most comprehensive survey up to 1990 is Jan Willem de Jong, A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America (Tokyo: Kosei Pub­lishing Co., 1997). See also Edward Conze, "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies," in: Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies: Selected Essays by Edward Conze (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968), 1-32 [first pub­lished in 1959/60]; George D. Bond, "Theravada Buddhism and the Aims of Buddhist Studies," in: Studies in the History of Buddhism, ed. A. K. Narain (Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corp., 1980), 43-65; Charles S. Prebish, "Buddhist Studies American Style: A Shot in the Dark," in: Religious Studies Review 9.4 (1983): 323-330; David Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations on the Pres­ent and Future of Buddhist Studies," in: Journal of the International Asso­ciation of Buddhist Studies 15 (1992): 104-117; Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (ed.),

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 30' Number 1-2' 2007 (2009) pp. 299-318

300 OLIVER FREIBERGER

On the other hand, Buddhist Studies shows an extremely diverse variety of methodological and theoretical approaches. In this paper I shall argue that for conceptually organizing this "hodge podge" (Cabezon),3 it is useful to view Buddhist Studies as a field of in­quiry rather than a single discipline.

The nature - or, rather, the construction and conceptualization -of academic disciplines has been discussed in various ways. David Shumway and Ellen Messer-Davidow outline an approach for the study of 'disciplinarity' that is particularly useful for discussing Buddhist Studies. According to them, two major aspects, which go back to the classical Latin term disciplina, characterize an aca­demic discipline: knowledge and power. A discipline's knowledge is the content of its academic inquiry and teaching; its power - the ways in which students are "disciplined" and proper succession is established - materializes in its institutions.4 Today's disciplines show a variety of such institutions: departments and centers, pro­fessional associations, accepted publication forums such as spe­cialized journals, a peer-review system, and funding agencies.5

But in addition to featuring a common subject matter and common institutions, a discipline needs to be rhetorically constructed: "[D] isciplinary practitioners, who consider themselves to be members

Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism (Chica­go: The University of Chicago Press, 1995); Charles S. Prebish, "The Silent Sangha: Buddhism in the Academy," in id., Luminous Passage: The Practice and Study of Buddhism in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 173-202; Frank E. Reynolds, "Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies in the United States from 1972 to 1997," in: Journal of the International As­sociation of Buddhist Studies 22 (1999): 457-483. See also Birgit Kellner's useful bibliography, "Buddhist and Tibetan Studies: publications about their history and methodologies," http://www.birgitkellner.org/index.php?id=135 (access: June 9, 2008).

3 Cabez6n, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline," 236.

4 David S. Shumway, Ellen Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity: An Intro­duction," in: Poetics Today 12 (1991): 201-225, here: 202.

5 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 207f.

THE DISCIPLINES OF BUDDHIST STUDIES 301

of disciplinary communities, engage in a differentiating activity called 'boundary-work.' Boundary-work entails the development of explicit arguments to justify particular divisions of knowledge and of the social strategies to prevail in them."6 Shumway and Messer-Davidow observe that boundary-work is performed to es­tablish or protect a discipline, to expand into new territory, and to regulate disciplinary practitioners? Here the power aspect comes in. Boundary-work includes control over what is considered ap­propriate within a discipline. For example, "[t]he 'refereeing' of manuscripts not only limits what can be said to the confines of a discipline, but also serves as the principal means of rewarding or punishing researchers and as the basis for subsequent rewards or punishments."8

Clearly, the rhetorical construction of a discipline by way of boundary-work is not static. It is an ongoing process that often en­tails controversies within a discipline.9 But all interdisciplinary (or

6 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 208. The term 'boundary­work' as denoting the social construction of science was first introduced by sociologist of science Thomas F. Gieryn in his article "Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Pro­fessional Ideologies of Scientists," in: American Sociological Review 48.6 (1983), 781-795. See also his more recent chapter on "Boundaries of Sci­ence," in: Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, ed. Sheila Jasanoff et al. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), 393-443.

7 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 209.

8 Shumway/Messer-Davidow, "Disciplinarity," 212. For studies on disci­plinarity in several disciplines (unfortunately, none of them close to Buddhist Studies or Religious Studies), see also Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, ed. Ellen Messer-Davidow, David R. Shumway, Da­vid J. Sylvan (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993); see, in particular, the editors' introduction (1-21).

9 For the distinction between descriptive and programmatic portrayals of disciplines see Oliver Freiberger, "1st Wertung Theologie? Beobachtungen zur Unterscheidung von Religionswissenschaft und Theologie," in: Die Iden­fitat der Religionswissenschaft: Beitriige zum Verstiindnis einer unbekannten

302 OLIVER FREIBERGER

crossdisciplinary) work presupposes that the respective disciplines are rhetorically constructed - only boundaries that exist can be crossed.lO

I shall argue that because Buddhist Studies lacks the activity of boundary-work, which is required for the construction of a disci­pline, it may better be viewed as afield in which several disciplines work. I wish to examine the ways in which boundaries between dis­ciplines are drawn in this field by discussing one issue that is used by some as a boundary-marker: religious commitment in scholar­ship. This exemplary discussion shows, I believe, that identifying the disciplines of Buddhist Studies and being aware of their bound­aries illumines the nature of certain tensions and helps to clarify scholarly standards.

Insider and outsider perspectives: A historical example

In 1877 Thomas William Rhys Davids' book Buddhism: Being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha was published in London; its American edition appeared only one year later in New,York,u In this book the famous Pali scholar describes the later development of Buddhism in India, especially the emer­gence of Tantra, as follows:

[U]nder the overpowering influence of these sickly imaginations the moral teachings of Gautama have been almost hid from view. The theories grew and flourished; each new step, each new hypothesis de­manded another; until the whole sky was filled with forgeries of the brain, and the nobler and simpler lessons of the founder of the religion

Disziplin, ed. Gebhard L6hr (Frankfurt/M.: Peter Lang, 2000), 97-121.

10 See Julie Thompson Klein, Crossing Boundaries: Knowledge, Discipli­narities, and Interdisciplinarities (Charlottesville: University Press of Vir­ginia, 1996).

11 Thomas William Rhys Davids, Buddhism: Being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha (New York: Pott, Young, & Co., 1878).

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were smothered beneath the glittering mass of metaphysical subtle­ties.

As the stronger side of Gautama's teaching was neglected, the de­basing belief in rites and ceremonies, and charms, and incantations, which had been the especial object of his scorn, began to live again, and to grow vigorously, and spread like the Blrana weed warmed by a tropical sun in marsh and muddy soil. As in India after the expUlsion of Buddhism the degrading worship of Siva and his dusky bride had been incorporated into Brahmanism from the wild and savage devil­worship of the dark non-A. ryan tribes; so as pure Buddhism died away in the north, the Tantra system, a mixture of magic and witchcraft and Siva-worship, was incorporated into the corrupted Buddhism .... [T] he Tantra literature has also had its growth and its development, and some unhappy scholar of a future age may have to trace its loath­some history. The nauseous taste repelled even the self-sacrificing industry of Burnouf, when he found the later Tantra books to be as immoral as they are absurd.12

It has become trendy to quote meaty passages from 19th-century works on India, often taken out of context, in order to show that those scholars constructed a narrative that imposes Western views and values on colonized cultures and that thus served colonial dom­ination. The general accusation of "Orientalism" - which is some­times brought in by prosecutors whose own historical-philological expertise is shaky at best - knows no presumption of innocence, not even the benefit of the doubt, because the accusation is iden­tical with the verdict from the very beginning. Even though fac­tual evidence is thus not really required, the passage quoted above would probably serve this purpose very well. My admiration for Rhys Davids' expertise, knowledge, and contribution to the study of Piili and Buddhism, however, prevents me from being that kind of prosecutor.!3

!2 Rhys Davids, Buddhism, 207-209.

13 I do not mean to suggest that we should be uncritical of our scholarly ancestors' work but that our evaluation should be thorough and fair. A good example of a thought-provoking study that highlights important aspects of

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Instead of making bold assumptions about Rhys Davids' "Ori­entalist" and colonialist agenda, I confine myself to looking at the quote itself. It is located in the eighth chapter of the book, entitled "Northern Buddhism." The first seven chapters discuss the life of the Buddha, the "essential doctrines," Buddhist morality, the sangha, and the Buddha legend; the ninth and last chapter explains the further spread of Buddhism. It is obvious, I think, that Rhys Davids is disgusted by what he perceives as Tantric Buddhism. He makes value judgments by using expressions such as "sickly imagi­nations," "forgeries of the brain," "debasing belief in rites and cer­emonies," "nauseous taste," "immoral and absurd," and "corrupted Buddhism" - as opposed to "the nobler and simpler lessons of the founder of the religion." Generally, Rhys Davids' portrayal of Bud­dhism is based on the P~i1i sources, which he knew very well, and it is telling that the chapter on "Northern Buddhism," which includes the quote, is the shortest of all nine chapters - it has exactly twelve pages (out of 252).

To a certain degree this view of later developments in Bud­dhism can be explained by the limited availability of Mahayana and Tantric texts before 1877 - when the book was published - and by the interest in origins that was common in the second half of the 19th century. But this contextualization does not explain every­thing, as becomes apparent when we consult a different, contempo­rary portrayal of Indian Buddhism. I refer to Hendrik Kern's work Geschiedenis van het buddhisme in Indie, which was first published in Dutch and in German only a few years after Rhys Davids' book, in 1882-84. A shorter English version appeared as the well-known Manual of Indian Buddhism in 1896. Kern's book is outlined very

Rhys Davids' work is Charles Hallisey's "Roads Taken and Not Taken in the Study of Theravada Buddhism," in Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),31-61. For a general analysis of the postorientalist critique, see David Smith, "Orientalism and Hinduism," in The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism, ed. Gavin Flood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 45-63.

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much like Rhys Davids' work, but his portrayal of Tantra reads differently:

The development of Tantrism is a feature that Buddhism and Hinduism in their later phases have in common. The object of Hindu Tantrism is the acquisition of wealth, mundane enjoyments, rewards for moral actions, deliverance, by worshipping Durga, the Sakti of Siva - Prajiia in the terminology of the Mahayana - through means of spells, mut­tered prayers, Samadhi, offerings &c. Similarly the Buddhist Tantras purpose to teach the adepts how by a supernatural way to acquire desired objects, either of a material nature, as the elixir of longevity, invulnerability, invisibility, alchymy; or of a more spiritual character, as the power of evoking a Buddha or a Bodhisattva to solve a doubt, or the power of achieving in this life the union with some divinity.14

I do not want to discuss the historical accuracy of these accounts. My point is that Kern abstains from value judgments of the sort we found in Rhys Davids' work.15 As both authors were writing roughly at the same time, we cannot explain Rhys Davids' scolding and disgust by simply referring to lacking sources or to an interest in origins, or by bellowing the buzz-words "colonialism," "Orien­talism," or - most precisely - "19th century." Note also that the authorized German edition of Rhys Davids' book - published years after Kern's English version - includes our quote unaltered.16

I wish to suggest that the main drive of Rhys Davids' color­ful rejection of Tantric beliefs and practices is religious in nature. But unlike some of his contemporaries, he does not condemn them

14 Hendrik Kern, Manual of Indian Buddhism (Strassburg: Triibner, 1896), 133.

15 I do not claim that Kern's book is free of value judgments, but the reader notes significant differences regarding the quantity and the quality of such judgments.

16 Thomas William Rhys Davids, Der Buddhismus: Eine Darstellung von dem Leben und den Lehren Gautamas, des Buddhas, nach der 17. Auflage aus dem Englischen ins Deutsche iibertragen von Arthur Pfungst (Leipzig: Reclam, 1899), 214-216.

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from a Christian perspective, but from a Buddhist one. His depre­ciation of Tantra is, at the same time, an apologia of a form of Bud­dhism that is based on the texts of the Pali canon. We may recall that Rhys Davids was the founder and first president of the Bud­dhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland, whose objectives were, among other things, to propagate Buddhism in the West, to form a lay brotherhood, and to establish a sangha of monksP We may therefore conclude that his presentation is based on an insider view, while Kern's largely matter-of-fact style represents an outsider per­spective.18 Note that I do not take 'outsider perspective' to imply objectivity; the term merely denotes the methodological decision not to describe religious phenomena from within the tradition one studies. For the sake of argument, I ignore for the moment other biases and agendas that may come into play.

Religious commitment in Buddhist Studies today: Some obser­vations

This historical case demonstrates that both insider and outsider perspectives have been present in Buddhist Studies since its early days.19 While-apologias that include negative value judgments such

17 See Ananda Wickremeratne, The Genesis of an Orienta list: Thomas William Rhys Davids and Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Delhi: Motilal Banarsi­dass, 1984), 197-201,231.

18 Again, the two short passages quoted here are not necessarily represen­tative of the works they are taken from, nor is the conclusion meant to assess the works in a comprehensive way. See, for example, the critical discussion of Kern's interpretation of the Buddha as a solar deity in comparison with other works of the time (Senart, Rhys Davids, Oldenberg) in: de Jong, "A Brief History," 28-32.

19 Similarly, a compiler's religious commitment can also be a factor in selecting textual passages for creating an anthology of Buddhist texts in Western languages. See the discussion in Oliver Freiberger, "Akademische Kanonisierung? Zur Erstellung von Anthologien buddhistischer Texte," in: laina-Itihiisa-Ratna: Studies in Honour of Gustav Roth on the Occasion of his 90th Birthday, ed. Ute Hiisken, Petra Kieffer-Pillz, Anne Peters (Swisttal-

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as Rhys Davids' account of Tantra have become rare, religious commitment in scholarship on Buddhism has remained observable to this day. In 1999 Charles Prebish noted that a significant num­ber - in his estimate at least 50% - of North-American scholars of Buddhism are "scholar-practitioners."20 While some have encoun­tered surprise and ridicule when they came out as Buddhists to their non-Buddhist colleagues, most seem to feel comfortable with stating their religious commitment among other scholars of Bud­dhism.21 Malcolm David Eckel speaks of the "delightful feeling" that "one enters the academic gatherings of the Buddhism section [in the American Academy of Religion, O.F.] with the sense that one is joining a group of people for whom the Buddhist tradition has, once had, or may some day have significant religious meaning."22 Let me mention some random observations that seem to support this impression.

The Buddhist Scholars Information Network, H-Buddhism, is a highly specialized academic discussion list and an invaluable re­source. Unlike other lists, H-Buddhism has been kept by the editors strictly academic. Still, attentive readers note that once in a while subscribers introduce their - otherwise purely academic - mes­sages with the phrase "Dear friends in the dharma," or close with phrases like "Yours in the Dharma" or "Namo Buddhaya."23 To my knowledge, neither subscribers nor list editors have ever found this worthy of discussion. But it is conceivable that the subscribers and

Odendorf: Indica et Tibetica Verlag, 2006), 193-207.

20 Prebish, "The Silent Sangha," 180.

21 Prebish, "The Silent Sangha," 180-183.

22 Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Bud­dhism and the Study of Religion," in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion 62 (1994): 1085-1110, here: 1098. He also mentions problematic aspects and suggests an approach similar to Buddhist Theology (see beloW).

23 See, for example: Feb 26, 2002 (Shakya); Oct 29, 2003 (Heng Tso); Feb 17,2004 (Tu); Dec 13,2005 (Jantrasrisalai); May 2, 2006 (McRae); Dec 22, 2006 (Skilling); June 18, 2007 (Shakya).

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the editors of H-Buddhism would not be able to maintain this level of tolerance if someone began closing his or her postings with the phrase "Yours in Christ."

Today most academic books include, on their back covers, a short blurb and information about the authors or editors. Besides data on academic training and major publications, some scholars provide the reader with additional information such as the following: "He has been a practising Buddhist for over thirty years;"24 "he was thirteen years in monastery practice as an ordained Rinzai monk;" or: "he was ordained as a dharmachari in the Western Buddhist Order and currently serves as the Buddhist chaplain for the XYZ Chaplaincy Service."25 These are not edifying coffee-table books but academic works whose readers are, most likely, primarily aca­demics. The question is, of course, what purpose does a statement about an author's religious practice serve? The rationale seems to be that being a practitioner is a particular qualification that goes be­yond mere academic education, beyond earning a Ph.D. degree and writing scholarly books. What exactly this qualification adds to the scholarly analY,sis is rarely discussed; but that it is mentioned in a blurb insinuates some kind of profound authenticity. No-one seems to complain about this practice, but it is unlikely that a Muslim cleric can expect the same degree of trust in his authenticity when he writes about Islamic history.26

In 2007 Mikael Aktor and Suzanne Newcombe conducted an online survey on the religious commitment of scholars of Buddhism and Hinduism among subscribers of H-Buddhism and RISA-L. Its

24 From Robert Bluck, British Buddhism: Teachings, Practice and Devel­opment (London: Routledge, 2006).

25 Both from Teaching Buddhism in the West, ed. Victor S6gen Hori, Rich­ard P. Hayes, and J. Mark Shields (New York: Routledge, 2002).

26 If someday someone conducts an empirical study that examines the ways scholars of religion (and, in particular, scholars of Buddhism) perceive Buddhism vs. how they perceive other religions, the results should tell us a lot about our preconceptions.

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preliminary results are published online. In a section of the survey that was meant for further comments on the subject, one scholar wrote: "It is hard for me to understand scholars that study Buddhism and don't practice. It is like writing about swimming without ever putting a foot in the water, or '" being a couch anthropologist."27 This pithy statement illustrates the sense of authenticity that defines the insider perspective in Buddhist Studies. It reminds scholars of religion of Rudolf Otto's influential work, The Idea of the Holy, in which Otto claims that in order to fully understand religion, a scholar must have had "intrinsically religious feelings."28 One stan­dard response to this position is: Does one have to be a politician to be a good political scientist? Or, more polemically put: Does one have to be very old to study medieval history?29

27 See http://e-tidsskrift.dk/rel/Preliminary _results_Budd ism_ vs_Hinduism. pdf, p. 3 (access: May 8, 2008).

28 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, transl. by John W. Harvey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 8. The German original, Das Heilige, was first published in 1917.

29 The respective controversy between Religious Studies and Christian Theology is of long standing and ongoing. Today a common counter-argu­ment to the last point is that scholars of religion who claim to be objective have biases too, but that theirs are hidden - as opposed to those of theo­logians who openly declare their religious affiliation. This argument has, again, been countered by pointing out that 'bias' refers to rather complex combinations of mental and social factors that are related not only to one's religious commitment but also to one's gender, sexual orientation, childhood trauma, the novels one has read, the music one likes, the emotions one lives through when caring for an ailing aunt, etc. It is impossible - and clearly not practical- to fully disclose all one's biases. Some argue, therefore, that refer­ing to the individual scholar's biases, as some theologians do, obscures the fact that declaring one's religious affiliation in theology denotes the specific programmatic decision for an insider perspective that scholars of religion deliberately do not want to make. For further discussions, see my "1st Wer­tung Theologie?" See also Francisca Cho, "Religious Identity and the Study of Buddhism," in: Identity and the Politics of Scholarship in the Study of Religion, ed. Jose Ignacio Cabez6n and Sheila Greeve Davaney (New York:

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One can find this sense of authenticity also in statements about academic teaching. Not only would a majority of undergraduate students prefer to be introduced to Buddhism by a Buddhist profes­sor, since in their view such a person can teach Buddhism more "authentically." (This is according to my occasional informal in­quiries among students.) More importantly, a number of scholars in Buddhist Studies believe that in the classroom the insider perspec­tive is helpful, if not essential. As I have discussed elsewhere, some claim that, "One must first be still in order to teach and learn Bud­dhism. In no other way can its essence truly be known or shown. Seen from this point of view, teaching and learning Buddhism, if it is not filtered by meditation, is not worthy of attention." The de­sired outcome is that "the spirit of Buddhism may rub off on [the students]."3o

At first glance, all these pieces of anecdotal evidence seem to prove that the insider perspective is a way of approaching Bud­dhism that is well-accepted in today's Buddhist Studies. But argu­ing from silence is problematic. There may be various reasons why no-one complains about those statements and approaches; unlike in Buddhist monastic law, silence does not necessarily indicate con­sent. One possible reason may be that because the respective disci­plinary discourses on methods - in Buddhist philology, art history, sociology, etc. - rarely address the issue of the scholar's religious

Routledge, 2004), 61-76. Cho's description of the possible dimensions of re­ligious identity in Buddhist Studies and her discussion of other factors that may play into scholarship are interesting, whether or not one agrees with her criticism of Robert Sharf's work.

30 O'Hyun Park, "Moving Beyond the 'ism': A Critique of the Objective Approach to Teaching Buddhism," in: Teaching Buddhism in the West: From the Wheel to the Web, ed. Victor S6gen Hori, Richard P. Hayes, and James Mark Shields (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 57-68, here: 59 and 68. For the insider perspective in the classroom, see also the other chapters in that book. For further discussion, see my "The Buddhist Canon and the Canon of Buddhist Studies," in: Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27 (2004): 261-283, here: 269-271.

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commitment, some scholars do not regard this issue as one that concerns their own work. In other words, some scholars of Bud­dhism might ignore the above-mentioned statements and approach­es because they consider them as belonging outside the boundaries of their own disciplines (philology, art history, sociology, etc.). I will come back to this point below. Some disciplines in the field of Buddhist Studies, however, do discuss the religious commitment of the scholar and, furthermore, use it for their 'boundary-work.' 1\vo of these are Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies.

Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies: Determining bound­aries

For more than ten years a group of scholars has been producing a discourse that they most appropriately call "Buddhist Theology." In a volume edited by Roger Jackson and John Makransky seventeen Buddhologists discuss and employ this new approach. The blurb summarizes the enterprise succinctly: "This volume is the expres­sion of a new development in the academic study of Buddhism: scholars of Buddhism, themselves Buddhist, who seek to apply the critical tools of the academy to reassess the truth and transforma­tive value of their tradition in its relevance to the contemporary world."31 The academic standards are high. In his programmatic chapter Jose Cabezon calls for a commitment to breadth of analy­sis, to an "all-pervasive and all-penetrating critical spirit," and to the use of a formal apparatus, such as a systematic presentation of

31 Roger Jackson, John Makransky (eds.), Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Scholars (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2000), back cover. See also the short definition given in the preface: "Speaking from within Buddhist traditions as contemporary scholars, they employ two kinds of reflection: critically analyzing some aspect of Buddhist thought toward a new understanding in our time, or analyzing some aspect of contemporary thought from the critical perspective of Buddhism" (ibid., ix). Before the term 'Buddhist Theology' was coined, Malcolm David Eckel had called for developing this approach within Religious Studies; see his "The Ghost at the Table."

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arguments as well as proper annotation and citation.32 He insists that methodologically Buddhist Theology must be grounded in -and compatible with - the Western academy, but he also calls for recognizing - and building on - the achievements of traditional Buddhist theology.33

What we are witnessing here is the formation of a new disci­pline in the academy. Buddhist Theology should be classified as a 'discipline' rather than a 'field of interest' or the like, because it features the above-mentioned characteristics: institutions, sub­ject matter and objective of inquiry, and the activity of rhetorical construction, including boundary-work. The institutionalization process has begun; the young discipline has already carved out an institutional place in the academy, namely the "Buddhist Critical­Constructive Reflection Group" in the American Academy of Reli­gion, which met for the first time at the annual meeting in 2006.34 It may only be a matter of time before Buddhist Theology - just like Christian Theology - will also be institutionally integrated into the education of clerics, in the existing Buddhist chaplaincy pro­grams, for example.3: Secondly, the discipline has been described programmatically - its subject matter, its methods, and its objective of inquiry: "to reassess the truth and transformative value of [the Buddhist] tradition in its relevance to the contemporary world." No other academic discipline does that. While the chapters of the volume on Buddhist Theology mark out a range of questions and approaches for the new discipline, Luis Gomez' "critical response"

32 Jose Ignacio Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology in the Academy," in: Jack­son/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 25-52, here: 34-38.

33 Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology," 40-43.

34 See the message on H-Buddhism, Thu, 09 Feb 2006; the founding co­chairs are the editors of the volume mentioned above, John Makransky and Roger Jackson.

35 Such programs are currently offered by the University of the West, the Institute of Buddhist Studies at Berkeley, or the Sati Center for Buddhist Studies.

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- fairly challenging at times - demonstrates the depth of potential scholarly controversy in the disciplinary discourse.36 Finally, rhe­torically constructing a discipline - or, boundary-work - includes determining its relations to other disciplines. Some authors discuss parallels to Christian theology and, in particular, distance their ap­proach from Religious Studies. Jose Cabez6n writes:

[T]he Religious Studies academy in general, and Buddhist Studies in particular, has shown itself to be somewhat allergic to the idea of normative, especially theological, discourse. . .. I take this to be an irrational and unsupported bias ... 37

And in his introduction John Makransky claims:

Under the rubric of religious studies, the functionally secular Western academy mines world religions for its use: to generate research fin­dings, publications, conferences to explore whatever may be of cur­rent interest and benefit to the academy. The 'value neutral' method of religious studies was of course never value neutral. Rather, it implic­itly established a value in religions divorced from the normative inter­ests of their own religious communities: a value found exclusively in their capacity to fulfill the intellectual, social, and economic interests of the Western academy.38

Religious Studies responded accordingly, if you will, in Richard Pilgrim's review of the book. He writes:

Is it not risky to reinsert a theological enterprise into Religious Stud­ies in the academy just when we have begun to make the case with the larger community that Religious Studies and theology are distinct enterprises? Do we not lend credence to the current critique of Reli-

36 Luis Gomez, "Measuring the Immeasurable: Reflections on Unreason­able Reasoning," in: Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 367-385.

37 Cabezon, "Buddhist Theology," 46 (note 21). Here Cabezon seems to view Buddhist Studies as part of Religious Studies. \

38 John Makransky, "Contemporary Academic Buddhist Theology: Its Emergence and Rationale," in: Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, 14-21, here: 15.

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gious Studies as a 'crypto-theology' by bringing theology (Buddhist or otherwise) back into the fold?39

This dispute results from the idea that both parties define the same discourse. It might be more useful, however, to view the arguments as boundary-work, performed to construct Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies as two separate disciplines. Viewed this way, complaining that Religious Studies was allergic to theology and accusing it of ignoring normative interests of Buddhist theologians is beside the point, as is the fear, in Religious Studies, of being perceived as crypto-theology - there is nothing cryptic about Bud­dhist Theology, and it does not claim to be Religious Studies.

Some would argue, however, that Religious Studies is not a discipline at all, but merely a convenient administrative category. After all, Religious Studies departments house philologists, theolo­gians, philosophers, and other sorts of scholars.40 Viewed descrip­tively, this is certainly correct, but denying the disciplinary status simply for this reason ignores the fact that Religious Studies - or, the Academic Study of Religion - has also been programmatically constructed in marry different ways. One approach that uses the issue of the scholar's religious commitment for boundary-work is manifest in Bruce Lincoln's 13th thesis on method:

When one permits those whom one studies to define the terms in which they will be understood, suspends one's interest in the tem-

39 Richard B. Pilgrim, Review of Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, in: Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002): 228.

40 Also most contributors to the volume Buddhist Theology are institution­ally affiliated to Religious Studies: Fifteen out of seventeen taught in some sort of Religious Studies environment at the time or have done so since (pro­gram or department). Exceptions are John Makransky, who teaches at the Department of Theology at Boston College, and Kenneth Tanaka, who has not taught in a Religious Studies environment so far (personal communica­tion, May 15, 2008). The institutional affiliation of the agents, however, is secondary when it comes to constructing a new discipline rhetorically. And there are a number of scholars in that volume who, judging only from the nature of their publications, have two or more disciplinary identities.

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poral and contingent, or fails to distinguish between 'truths,' 'truth­claims,' and 'regimes of truth,' one has ceased to function as historian or scholar. In that moment, a variety of roles are available: some per­fectly respectable (amanuensis, collector, friend and advocate), and some less appealing (cheerleader, voyeur, retailer of import goods). None, however should be confused with scholarship.41

We may grant Lincoln that by "scholarship" he means an approach that is acceptable within the boundaries of Religious Studies. Simi­larly, Russell McCutcheon envisions scholars of religion to be "crit­ics, not caretakers." He writes:

[O]ur scholarship is not constrained by whether or not devotees recog­nize its value for it is not intended to appreciate, celebrate, or enhance normative, dehistoricized discourses but, rather, to contextualize and redescribe them as human constructs.42

These programmatic constructions of Religious Studies clearly demand an outsider perspective, while the before-mentioned con­struction of Buddhist Theology requires' an insider view. If we let these constructions, for the moment, represent the two disciplines Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies,43 we may conclude that

41 Bruce Lincoln, "Theses on Method," in: Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 8 (1996): 225-227.

42 Russell T. McCutcheon, "Critics not Caretakers: The Scholar of Reli­gion as Public Intellectual," in: Secular Theories on Religion: Current Per­spectives, ed. Tim Jensen and Mikael Rothstein (Copenhagen: Museum Tus­culanum Press, 2000), 167-181, here: 178.

43 Because a discipline's rhetorical and programmatic construction results from an ongoing discourse, these examples have to be selective. To make my point I have chosen straightforward statements which some scholars would probably want to debate further. Robert Orsi, for example, discusses the issue of religious commitment in Religious Studies with regard to an­thropological fieldwork slightly differently in his book Between Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who Study Them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). He suggests a "third way, be­tween confessional or theological scholarship, on the one hand, and radically secular scholarship on the other," especially in view of moral judgment: "a

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both demands make sense within their respective disciplinary dis­courses but clearly have different objectives. The editors of Bud­dhist Theology put it this way: "By and large, scholars trained in Religious Studies ... critically analyze the data of a religion at a distance from tradition, to develop theories of interest to the West­ern academy. By contrast, contemporary theologians who have been trained by and stand within a religious tradition use the same tools for a different purpose: to draw critically upon the resources of tradition to help it communicate in a new and authentic voice to the contemporary world.'~4

Buddhist Studies: A field of many disciplines

Both Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies are present in the in­stitutional framework of Buddhist Studies, as are many other disci­plines: Philology, for example, as in the identification and edition of fragments of Buddhist manuscripts from Central Asia;45 Sociology, as in an in-depth study of one Buddhist temple in a North Ameri­can city; or Archaeology and Art History, as in the interpretation of stiipa complexes in India - all such studies pass as research in Buddhist Studies.46 But the peers qualified to evaluate this research and to negotiate its academic quality are members of the respective

disciplined suspension of the impulse to locate the other ... securely in rela­tion to one's own cosmos" (198). Although being less blunt than Lincoln and McCutcheon and acknowledging the personal challenges for the researcher, in the end Orsi still advocates a - somewhat modified - outsider approach: "Religious studies is not a moralizing discipline; it exists in the suspension ofthe ethical, and it steadfastly refuses either to deny or to redeem the other" (202f.).

44 Jackson/Makransky, Buddhist Theology, ix.

45 I use 'Philology' here as an umbrella term for the various, philologically oriented disciplines of Indology, Tibetology, Sinology, etc.

46 For a survey of past and current approaches, and suggestions for future avenues of research, see Seyfort Ruegg, "Some Observations," and Cabez6n, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline."

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disciplinary communities - for these examples: philologists, soci­ologists, archaeologists, and art historians. Certainly, many studies do have an impact beyond disciplinary boundaries and are read by a variety of scholars of Buddhism. But I am not aware that anyone has ever attempted to establish a universal standard by which all research in Buddhist Studies could be evaluated - that is, an all­encompassing theoretical framework that rhetorically constructs Buddhist Studies as a discipline and clearly distinguishes it from other disciplines.

Therefore I propose that we conceptualize Buddhist Studies not as a discipline but as a field of inquiry, in which various disciplines operate. As such, it is roughly comparable in structure to area stud­ies such as Asian Studies. This does in no way devaluate its existing (interdisciplinary) institutions - on the contrary: Buddhist Studies must be interdisciplinary. But acknowledging, understanding, and respecting each discipline's discursive rules and values is crucial for crossing disciplinary boundaries successfully.

In lieu of a conclusion I wish to highlight two particular benefits of conceptualizing Buddhist Studies as a field rather than a disci­pline. First, in this conception the performance of boundary-work is an expected activity and can be identified more easily. This helps us to appreciate the peculiarities of the respective disciplinary dis­courses, to understand the nature of certain tensions, and to avoid unnecessary disputes. The debate between Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies is a case in point.

Second, relating all research to specific disciplines - rather than to the broad and obscure category of 'Buddhist Studies' - clarifies scholarly standards. The above-mentioned accounts of religious commitment may serve as examples. Few scholars in Religious Studies today would consider Rhys Davids' description of Tantra an example of good scholarship, but it might pass in Buddhist The­ology, as a statement made in its sub-field of polemics;47 certainly,

47 See Cabez6n, "Buddhist Theology," 42.

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whether or not it meets the standard there would have to be dis­cussed within that discipline. But what about the other unsolicited testimonies of religious commitment - on e-mail discussion lists, on book covers, or in calls for authenticity in research and teach­ing? Whether these have a place in Buddhist Theology, or to what degree they can live up to its standards of critical reflection, is also up to Buddhist Theologians to discuss. I am rather inclined to be­lieve that this piety resides in a twilight zone of Buddhist Studies that remains unclaimed, uncontested, and uncontrolled by any of its disciplines - a space created by the Western enthusiasm about Buddhism that has flourished since the 19th century and that as­sumes the fundamental, deeply rooted, pre-critical agreement in the Buddhist Studies academy that 'it's cool to be a Buddhist.' De­termining disciplinary identities may help to illumine this shadowy space as well.

STUDYING BUDDHISM AS IF IT WERE NOT

ONE MORE AMONG THE RELIGIONS

LUIS O. G6MEZ

Preliminaries

The present paper began as a response to a panel titled "The Aca­demic Discipline of Buddhist Studies in North America," presented at the XVh Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Atlanta in June 2008. My efforts, however, soon became less reactive, and led to a reflection on the presuppositions that have set the direction for the study of Buddhism in the Academy, par­ticularly in North America.!

In the interest of disclosure, I must begin by stating the obvi­ous: the title of this paper is meant to be facetious - the intent of the irony being to call attention to the way in which the study of Buddhism in the Academy tends to be self-centered, treating Bud­dhism as a phenomenon so unique or self-contained that we need not imagine the subject (or the mUltiple subjects) of our intellectual endeavors as in any way interconnected with broader problems of human behavior, culture and life in society that obviously lie be­hind our notions about Buddhism and our notions about the task of the scholar.

1 Needless to say, the panel participants implicitly use the term North America to refer only to Canada and the United States of America. They also failed to reflect on the parallelism and divergences between the academic and religious histories of both countries, or the odd fact that these histories and cultures are dominated by the cultural preferences of middle-class, educated, mostly liberal, Anglophone North Americans.

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 30· Number 1-2·2007 (2009) pp. 319-343

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I realize that this observation is not new - it is, after all, be­hind the now common complaint about traditional Western "Bud­dhology." I do not wish to return to what arguably would be best described in the colloquial language as a "gripe," and a polemical stance at times based on a caricature of the efforts of the founding fathers and mothers of Buddhology, their methods, and their con­tributions (without which we would not be where we are). What I would like to do is try to understand, rather than polemicize.

We need to understand the temptation to see the academic study of Buddhism as a discipline with clear boundaries, a unique subject or well-defined field, and, in its most extreme forms a self­contained intellectual endeavor not open to cross-fertilization with other intellectual projects. This tendency is in many ways the central theoretical issue behind the papers in this panel, because it has shaped the institutional manifestations of Buddhist Studies, it has shaped the real or imagined conflicts between the Academy and Buddhist "theology," and it is the focus of Freiberger's critical paper.

The issues behind the problem of defining the field

This temptation possibly arises from four sources.

(1) The study of literate religions and of geographically defined cultural spheres, by the very nature of the way they are imagined, tends to create circumscribed spaces - of material textuality, lan­guage, and physical spaces. "Religious Studies" (more appropriate­ly, the academic study of religion and religions), like "Area Stud­ies" (academic studies organized around special competences in particular linguistic and cultural spheres), tend to be by their very nature more or less closed spheres of academic discourse. Thus, the academic study of Buddhism, which by necessity combines el­ements of both "Religious Studies" and "Area Studies," tends to

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appear in specific places in the academic imaginary and within academic institutional structures.2

We are tempted to accept the internal assumptions of identi­ty and coherence held by apologists for the tradition, despite our knowledge to the contrary, perhaps because it would be difficult to find an institutional home if our public face were as nuanced - not to say, as tentative and blurred - as our scholarly understanding of cultural and religious identity.3 A similar phenomenon can be observed in the case of the academic study of so-called Abrahamic religions (to make use of the self-referential term that reinforces this identity), despite their apparent closeness to general assump­tions about religion in North America.

Needless to say, the apparent transparency (to North American eyes) of identity and belief in Abrahamic religious is deceptive; but institutionally it spares the academic teacher and students of these traditions the permanent identity crisis we feel in Buddhist Stud­ies. As any historian worth his or her salt knows, "our" Abrahamic traditions and our past can be as foreign to us (not exclusively to the younger generations) as those of other lands. But we can ignore, at least in presenting our public and institutional face, this distance, pretending that the study of our own culture is transparently the study of what we are. That is not so easy to do in the case of Bud­dhism or Asia - for historical as well as sociopolitical reasons.

(2) The apparent and undeniable sense of otherness generally felt by a North American observer of Buddhism is in fact the sec-

2 It should be noted that this description applies mostly to the North American academic enterprise. The same is not completely true of Europe, where the picture is more complicated. Disciplines like Religionswissen­schaft, histoire des religions, etc., are not exact parallels to Religious Studies, and traditional philology, Tibetology, Sinology, Indian and Buddhist Studies, etc. are generally not conceived as "Area Studies."

3 Such assumptions are also held by detractors of the tradition and by those who have found some semblance of neutrality in their discourse about Buddhism.

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ond reason for our difficulties defining ourselves as students of Buddhism in the Academy.

(3) This sense of otherness generates a reaction in the opposite direction - which has become part of many apologetic moves, both by believers and academicians, the move to "naturalize" Buddhism in the Western Academy.

The clash between, on the one hand, those who, despite their sophistication in the study of culture, continue to see Buddhism as other (the majority, I suspect) and, on the other hand, those who, despite their historical and philological sophistication, would like to see Buddhism as altogether "not other,''4 is one of the roots of our ambivalence towards Buddhist Studies.

As long as Buddhism is seen as wholly other, it is not threaten­ing, it remains an exotic or archaic, if not arcane, subject of study. Under these conditions it can stay on the margins of mainstream intellectual conversations and the marketplace of ideas - in this way we can cover "Buddhism" with the protective cloak of neutral­ity worn by so 1Jlany academic disciplines.

As long as Buddhism is seen as wholly not other, it can be pro­tected from historical scrutiny; and one can adopt new voices, not recognized in the tradition's past, without having to account for or justify the transformation.

(4) These two extreme moves intertwine with a fourth factor: the attempt to separate religion from the academy and the academy from religious apologetics. The underlying ideal or goal- academ­ic neutrality with a modicum of objectivity - is commendable and worth preserving, but it is an ideal impossible to reach (as so many other ideals are likewise never reached, it is a beacon, a North Star, not a destination); and we would do well to recognize this fact.

4 Needless to say, this attempt to "naturalize" Buddhism is not always successful- it is not easy to transcend the effect of the mystification of Bud­dhism, which has served both the interest of the religious apologist and the interest of some academic students of Buddhism.

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The distance we try to create between our work as scholars and the tradition is much greater than the distance a social scientist is required to maintain from his or her social and political ideals. We maintain a greater distance in the study of Buddhism for fear of offending our colleagues in the Academy. And for fear that our work may be confused with the program - conscious, unconscious, or surreptitious - of the Christian scholar. We do not want to be perceived as proselytizing.

Conveniently for us, it is in fact a common myth of the Buddhist identity that Buddhism is not a religion as such, and that, therefore, it does not pursue a program of conversion. This leads to a confu­sion regarding the real distinction between the way in which, on the one hand, Buddhist traditions have advocated their own cause, and, on the other hand, the way in which some of the Abrahamic religions have adopted exceptionalism, exclusivism and proselytis­tic strategies as integral and structural elements in their self-defi­nition. Understanding the strategies of apologetics and the tactics of conversion in Buddhism is in fact part of our task as scholars, a task that requires, obviously, that we recognize the presence of such strategies even as we recognize the peculiar way in which many (though not all by far) forms of Buddhism tend to blur the program or enterprise of advocating the cause of their religious be­liefs and practices. The difference between the Buddhist forms and the way other religions set out to defend and expand their influence requires subtle and problematic distinctions, but their subtlety does not allow us to pretend that Buddhism is less of a religion or lacks a will to convert and persuade others, and, above all, that it has no interest in arguing for the falsehood of other religious beliefs.

The consequences have been that for long the study of Bud­dhism was conducted as if it were not a manifestation of the life of religious communities, but some sort of abstraction, either a histor­ically disembodied textual tradition or an ideal, rarefied world of ideas seen alternatively as a world of "non-discursive" (and hence

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unassailable) experiences and as a very subtle rationality, somehow consonant with but surpassing scientific argumentation.

These attitudes thwart our will and capacity to reflect on and debate the purpose of our scholarly enterprise.

The papers

Now, how are we to begin the necessary examination of our dis­cipline or field? The papers under review offer several models. Although their contribution is far from complete, the papers open several avenues of inquiry, and above all reflect, albeit at times in­directly, some of the identity problems of the field.

The papers here published as a set are accurate mirrors of "the field of Buddhist Studies" (and I use the phrase without any intent of closing debate on the three terms and their possible referent -Freiberger's paper offers an excellent opening into this debate). As an example of the actual practice of Buddhist Studies (or the prac­tices that constitute the field) the panel, and the resulting collection of papers, offer a plethora of facts, they present a cross-section of points that imitate the field of Buddhist Studies, in that, in the end they leave open the question of the boundaries and goals of the field - other than to mention the names of the institutions that support our work or to mention the languages we study. In short, the papers suggest an extensional definition of the field, but do not offer the intensional definition that Freiberger is seeking.

I will first indulge in some reflections on my colleagues' papers as examples of modes of knowledge as a way of clarifying the na­ture of Buddhist Studies as organized, rational discourse.

The papers range from collections of facts to a very thoughtful reflection on the nature of the field of inquiry that we call Buddhist Studies. They reflect several of the major modes of organized, ra­tional knowledge, namely, knowledge as the accumulation of ob­servations, knowledge as the assimilation of previously accumu­lated observations (assimilation being here a combined process of

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understanding, explanation and prediction), and dissemination of knowledge.

By accumulation, I mean the counting and collection of facts.

This activity is not as mindless as it sounds (or at least it should not be mindless). Of all three styles of knowledge, this is the one that comes the closest to the acquisition and possession of knowl­edge; it gives us the strongest sense of control and possession; but, beyond this dimension of epistemological avarice, it also helps pre­serve what others may find useful in other ways, it serves to pre­serve and organize so we can further digest knowledge.

Anyone familiar with stamp collecting, or, more appropriately, bird watching, will know that accumulation and ordering of data can lead to something more than the mere gathering of data. A shepherd who counts his sheep, does so not simply to keep himself busy, celebrate his success or fall asleep; he must make sure that none have run astray - counting and collecting therefore can serve as a way of preserving and caring for something of value.

But the shepherd may also observe the reproductive cycle of sheep and thus increase his flock and his income; and to be able to observe the most effective way of breeding he must also keep count of his sheep.

In the study of Buddhism, some of us sometimes collect and count, and do so in order to preserve, whereas others among us, or the same persons at other times, will use this scholarly counting in order to account for patterns, motifs and paradigms.

However, if we return to the example of the smart shepherd, turn him into a cow maid or a cowherd, and have one of them ob­serve the course of cowpox, we begin to see an example of a more subtle assimilation of data. For, this person could observe what would later lead to the systematic development of vaccines - once knowledge of cowpox is generalized to knowledge of smallpox, and this, in turn is generalized to knowledge of other infectious diseases, a different sort of knowledge takes shape. At this point,

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our not-so-fictional cowherds and cow maids have laid the ground­work for the scientist who will theorize on the mechanism behind diseases and inoculation, and later the natural mechanisms behind both phenomena.

Thus, one can go from counting or description to analysis and generalization and to prediction (which in the Humanities is almost invariably retrospective, and hence not prediction in the strict sense of the word). Nothing as dramatic occurs in Buddhist Studies, but one can theorize on both the nature and function of religious be­haviors and on the nature and methodology of the scholarly work that makes Buddhist traditions its focus of study.

In the papers under consideration one can almost see the gradi­ent from one form of knowledge to the next, if we order the papers in the sequence Prebish, Cabez6n, Freiberger.

Lastly, of course, one shares the fruits of other modes of know­ing, we disseminate, we teach, we participate in conferences, and by doing so hope to change the way people study our subject mat­ter. Needless to say, the conference papers and their subsequent publication exemplify this last form of knowledge.

In the academic study of Buddhism we accumulate to preserve and organize, and this is good. And if we do this critically, that is, not just count books or manuscripts, but compare them so as to produce new texts (the philologist), then that is even better.

But, we seldom develop applied knowledge, if ever (as in the ex­ample of the shepherd and or the vaccine); but we do theorize and generalize (I suspect skipping too quickly the intermediate step of understanding the processes that we study), we generalize about Buddhism and hopefully about religion and culture generally. This is, of course, the aspect of the discipline that was not well repre­sented in this panel.

However, we do generalize and apply generalizations to new knowledge, that is what we call method after all - method is of

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course mostly prescriptive rather than predictive, and occasionally it is retrospective.

The absence of explicit reflection on method does not imply that Buddhist Studies does not involve disciplines. Here I use the word in a sense not noted by Freiberger, discipline as rigor, as reflection arising from a critical stance ... even if the rigor is not formulated in a clear disciplinary methodological plan.

Particulars

As already noted, Prebish's contribution is primarily descriptive. However, the description goes beyond the numbers assembled in the paper. Of the three papers, his paper is, in some peculiar way, the one that best reflects the field. The panel as a whole does some­thing similar, but Prebish's paper, best exemplifies the way in which the field is diverse and disconnected.

If one could find fault in Prebish's paper it is to be found in two points. The paper does not offer a means by which its descrip­tive statistics could be used to generate statistical analysis for the claims of trends and tendencies (too many categories of data may render this goal unattainable). And, second, the data collected does not include much on the interface between Buddhist Studies and other disciplines in either the institutions in which the discipline of Buddhist Studies is practiced, in the work of individual scholars, or in the training of the scholars of future generations.

Prebish also highlights implicitly the fact - still to be under­stood - that Buddhist Studies scholars do not contribute much to theoretical work in other fields. It is not clear that Buddhist Stud­ies has much of an impact (at least, we have no measure of such an impact) on the study of culture and society generally, or on the study of other religious traditions. Perhaps this tells us something about Buddhism and the problems involved in studying Buddhism. To the problems mentioned at the beginning of this paper, one may add an additional factor that was suggested to me by Prebish's pa-

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per: "Buddhism" itself is not, cannot be, the subject of study for a single discipline, let alone a single individual. It is a conglomerate of traditions so complex that even the study of one fraction of it is enough to consume most of the energies and attention of many scholars - not much time is left to seek interfaces and implications that may produced the desired cross-fertilization. It is in this sense perhaps that Buddhist Studies, without constituting a single disci­pline or field has its own peculiar identity.

Prebish also notes that in his pool of North American scholars a number of Buddhist scholars (or should we say "scholars studying some aspect of Buddhist traditions and literatures"?) have some sort of commitment to Buddhism; and he notes that the relative number does not seem to have changed from the time of his first survey to the time of his most recent survey. This already raises the issue that seems to be most problematic to the authors of all three papers, and which seems to be especially characteristic of North American Buddhist Studies.

The tightrope that seems to be the only road to the academic study of religiorr in North America, especially in departments of so-called "Religious Studies," is represented by a quotation from the departmental policy at the University of Calgary. The Depart­ment, we are told, "neither sanctions nor censures religious behav­ior nor belief." One can already see that the neutral, or middle of the road, perspective can be advocated only as long as we imagine two extremes: advocacy or rejection. In other words, the neutral position is defined by the religious, especially Abrahamic, defini­tion of truth: one is either for or against a particular truth claim.

Calgary's departmental statement continues by asserting that teaching and research must be "based on the assumption that a critical analysis of religious systems and practices is basic to the study of social and cultural phenomena." This part of the statement defines the aspirational goal of the enterprise: to produce knowl­edge about social and cultural phenomena. But, is this satisfactory? I would argue that, not only is this insufficient for the so-called

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practitioner or believer, it is not enough from a purely scholarly point of view; because it assumes that one can understand religious behavior without raising the question of whether religion is some­thing more than social and cultural phenomena, and that one can understand our material without raising issues of truth.

I do not advocate a simple answer to these questions; yet, it seems to me that it is incumbent on us to raise them, and consider them. Yet, the institutional, historical and socio-political framework of North American secular universities constrains our freedom in ex­ploring such issues.

The trap (which, in the interest of fairness, one must recognize was inherent to the religious enterprise before it became an aca­demic problem) is that "truth" or the possibility that at least some religious phenomena are unique or sui generis are ideas that seem to lead inevitably to forced personal choices. As the Calgary state­ment expresses it, even as it denies its appropriateness in the Acad­emy: teaching in the university is "not designed to foster personal religious commitment or to evaluate to that end the relative merits of various religious practices, traditions, and points of view." These two activities of fostering and evaluation are inherent to most, if not all, forms of religious discourse.

This quotation evidences a frequent occurrence of key prob­lematic words and ideas that reappeared in the remaining papers. Some of these words surfaced again during the discussion follow­ing the panel presentation at the XVh Congress: fostering, commit­ment, confession, evaluation, sanction and censure, belief, practice, a practicing Buddhist, a believer, a devout Buddhist. Behind these apparently transparent, but in fact complex (if not confused and ob­scure and simplistic) terms lie the questions that form a good part of the subject of inquiry in Buddhist Studies, and surprisingly, they are bandied about without critical reflection, usually to tell us that these are not within the purview of critical academic reflection for the student of Buddhist traditions.

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It is difficult to consider these questions if one has a strong in­vestment in Buddhist truths, but a strong investment in truth is, in fact, unavoidable, for the scholar as well as for the "believer." As I shall argue presently, to claim otherwise is to be at best naively op­timistic and at worst disingenuous. Thus, even seemingly narrow or tangential issues hide issues of authority and professional (as well as religious) identity.

In what appears to be a digression, Cabez6n raises the issue of the impact of the Internet on Buddhist Studies. This digression is perhaps only a passing or casual remark, yet, it reminds us of how jealous we can be of our own sense of order and control over truth. In defense of Internet users, let us not forget that the Internet is not the Academy; it is far from being committed to the ideals of academic disciplines, or, for that matter to the ideals of the Calgary statement. But, being free from the scholar's fantasy of ordered neutrality, it offers a richer sampling of the many ways in which academic and religious discourses diverge and intertwine.

Cabez6n seems, to be, like many academics, wary or leery of the influence of the Net, especially on teaching, but also on research. One may invoke Michael Gorman's contention that the "net is like a huge vandalized library."5 I find the metaphor at best puzzling, and I am not persuaded that we need fear the Internet as a negative influence on critical research or higher education.

Libraries, like much of the material that is the center of our activity as scholars, are fragmented and unwieldy collections - as much as our activity and "production" is fragmented and centrifu­gal. Integration, order, authority are not only negotiable, they are fluid and fleeting. It should not surprise us that the Internet, and for that matter, our own sense of "the field" are collections of bro­ken pieces - we do not need vandals for this. Scholarly work is

5 Ironically this is found in an article about cataloging, where it is assumed that the act of cataloging is in some way a natural integration of knowledge. Gorman, Michael. "The Corruption of Cataloging," Library Journal 120 (September 15, 1995): 34.

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not always as cohesive as we like to think - if it were, perhaps, scholarly research would not be necessary. After all, the impulse to investigate is born to a great extent from an awareness of gaps, inconsistencies, peculiarities that make no sense.

Cabez6n also speaks of "trends," borrowing a term from sta­tistics (using the word "statistics," as before, in a soft sense). The word "trend" is a convenient tool to express a supposition about the future without committing oneself to a prediction that may be chal­lenged or subject to rigorous testing. But predictions are often (as they have been since the days of the oracle bones and are still today in the era of opinion polls) ways of influencing outcomes or, more humbly, ways of expressing a wish. This is the way I understand the word when applied to the question of the future of Buddhist "theology" in the Western Academy. Furthermore, even if "Bud­dhist Divinity Schools" should arise and succeed, their presence would not resolve the tension between "theology" ("Divinity") and the critical-historical study of Buddhist practices and institutions. The tension is inherent to the subject matter, and not only in North America, where it is of course rooted in the history of Anglophone North American.

More importantly, even the existence of such schools would not necessarily lead to a satisfactory solution of the parallel problem: the presence of academicians, who are not avowed theologians or theologians by profession or avocation, but are nonetheless practi­tioners of some form of the Buddhist religion.

One thing that struck me about Cabezon's paper (and I trust by now it will be evident that I do not mean this pejoratively) is that it is prescriptive at the same time that it is rhetorically descriptive. It is evidently very different from Prebish's presentations, where, it seems to me, prescription is by implication, not necessarily by intention. Thus, Cabezon begins to raise the issues that were ei­ther seen as non-relevant or skirted in Prebish's paper. These are in part, but not wholly, the issues raised by Freiberger.

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Freiberger's paper is explicitly normative or prescriptive. He calls for a redefinition of the field in a move that is frankly correc­tive. Freiberger seems concerned with the field being some times a hodgepodge of projects, not a discipline, but a vaguely defined field of inquiry. Buddhist Studies, he notes, is not "a discipline." But one wonders at times whether he realizes that the identity and the methods of well-established disciplines are constantly re-negotiat­ed; they do not happen without constant flux and contention. His point however is well taken, even if it requires some fine-tuning: Buddhist Studies is at one extreme (if it is not almost an outlier) in the continuum of disciplines. Buddhist Studies, like Area Studies and Religious Studies, is defined by its objects of study, rather than by its methods; and those objects are bound to the cultures where Buddhism arose, and bound by the intellectual traditions that de­fined rational reflection in and on those cultures.

Freiberger describes what he calls the "rhetoric" and "boundary work" of disciplines, concepts that he uses as the axis for his criti­cism of the notion of Buddhist Studies as a discipline. I would add to his apposite and perceptive observations on the problem of disci­pline formation as intellectual and social processes that these pro­cesses are always fluid - even in the well-established disciplines. Note, for instance, the shift in biology from taxonomy to molecular biology and evolutionary biology. The "Human Sciences" have un­dergone similar, arguably equally dramatic, shifts.

Perhaps Buddhist Studies has not always kept abreast with such shifts, but it is nonetheless a contended field at least in North Amer­ica (as the region is implicitly defined by the authors of all four papers). This contention - for influence, authority and identity - is implicitly acknowledged in our use of the language of conquest and rule. Fields have boundaries and territories, they can lay claim to particular territories, they can be threatened or have to be defended from the incursions (real or imagined) of another discipline. And, they may be absorbed into another discipline.

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The language of identity is present throughout Freiberger's pa­per, and it shows in a peculiarly interesting and relevant way in his reflections on the "disgust" expressed by Rhys Davids when speaking about Buddhist Tantra. In his observations on this dis­gust, Freiberger points to an important issue in the study of reli­gion: the extent to which our judgments, however carefully cloaked in the language of rationality they may seem, are shaped by our own sense of what is proper, normal or healthy. Are we not disgust­ed by whatever offends our sense of moral order or, by whatever threatens our sense of bodily and moral integrity? To what extent is the struggle to define a discipline parallel to the struggle to gener­ate, construct, and protect our own sense of individual and social identity? Can we observe with an even mind what appears to our own cultural eyes as bizarre, tolerating it long enough to reach an understanding that is fair to the human beings behind the observed behavior or belief?

This to me is not strictly speaking a religious, much less, a meth­odological, issue. It is more a question of fundamental, unexamined attitudes, deeply ingrained in all of us. Or, to put it in other words: feelings of threat are an integral part of human life, not simply a matter of religious belief or of scholarly endeavor, and they are feelings that affect our scholarly work as much as they shape other aspects of our social and psychological life. What is more, these are feelings that gentleman scholars do not like to admit.

Hence, part of the problem facing the study of Buddhism in the Academy is our reluctance to admit that many of the apparently methodological issues arise from certain assumptions about what is right and proper, feelings about pulchritude and propriety, what is seemly and what is not. For instance, the panel did not raise (al­though the issue surfaced in the ensuing discussion) the question of whether it is "proper" or not, and if not, why not, for a scholar to offer incense and flowers before a Buddha image in the morning and deliver in the afternoon a well researched paper at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.

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At this point in the discussion I am not so much interested in arguing for or against the "propriety" of such peculiar behavior. I only wish to note that it is very difficult to discuss the matter with any degree of equanimity - so much so, that the issue is seldom discussed, it is "resolved" without careful reflection. Note that this question is prior to the question of whether it makes sense for this scholar to "do theology" with his scholarship, or "do theology" in the classroom or at a scholarly conference.

Freiberger wonders, rhetorically, whether one has to be a poli­tician to be a political scientist. The answer has a simple answer, no. But the question is simplistic, and hence the reply (the simple, obvious and categorical "no") rings true only provisionally, and perhaps in the end is only deceptively true. After all, a person who has not experienced the thrill of politics or who believes politics is irrelevant and absurd, a figment of the imagination, would be hardly motivated to study Political Science.

I would add by the way, and not simply to be facetious, but be­cause it is relevant, that one could advocate two parallel axioms: we do not want Political Science to be dominated by politicians, and we do not want politics to be dominated by political scientists.

In the same way one does not have to be a Buddhist (practitio­ner, believer, proselytizer, whatever) to be a student of Buddhist traditions, and above all, we do not want a field of Buddhist Studies dominated by Buddhists (whichever way we define the term). And, likewise, we do not want the practice of Buddhism dominated by scholars.

Even if some enlightened institution could open departments of Buddhist Studies dominated by well-meaning practitioners who could both defend there beliefs and keep academic neutrality, dis­agree among themselves and keep their composure, the field (to say nothing of the religious traditions themselves) would become stale and sterile in the absence of alternative critical voices.

After all, departments of Political Science invite former or se­nior statesmen to teach, with the understanding, of course, that

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their teaching is open to criticism; and occasionally, intelligent politicians consult political scientist with the understanding that it is the politician who will assume the responsibility of the political decision.

The problem has no simple solution (perhaps the obsession with a solution or resolution is the worst part of the problem); because the problem, tension or conflict is centered in the last two require­ments: that the practitioner-turned-scholar be open to criticism, and that the scholar who is not in the role of practitioner defer to the practitioner in matters of practice. These requirements gener­ate strong dissonances (of identity and authority, more than simply of cognition) for the religious person; but the dissonance is just as disquieting for the academician. I cannot see an easy way to overcome the natural tendency of the believer to attribute cynicism (if not arrogance) to the scholar's methodological suspicion, or for the scholar to interpret as naiVete or disingenuousness (if not arro­gance) those motivations that appear to the believer as convictions born of a deep personal experience.

And yet, I would argue that there should be room (and there often is, despite all the arguments to the contrary) for Buddhist theology or the participation of practitioners in the Academy. The existence of some sort of compromise solution may be a natural outgrowth of the North American compromise between sectarian religion and religious tolerance (of sorts). What would be counter­productive (to both the Academy and Buddhist traditions) would be the use of religious authority as a basis for academic work (and decisions) and, above all, the appeal to such authority in academic teaching.

Furthermore, Buddhist Studies is not a science of inanimate ob­jects, it cannot aspire to exist apart from the life of the tradition. Its disciplinary and scientific mission has as an inevitable side effect, if not as one of its objectives (and an important, though not the most important one) the fertilization of religious life. What makes the Academy unique is that this fertilization is a cross-fertilization,

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that it is open to challenges from all rational voices. It is the pres­ervation of these mechanisms for dialogue that is at the heart of the study of religion in the Academy. This open dialogue can be threatened by placing traditional voices in a privileged position, but it is also threatened by the exclusion of traditional voices or the exclusion of constructive theology as a rational endeavor; and it is also threatened by a wish to close the boundaries of the "field" or "discipline." These boundaries are constantly negotiated precisely because the field is the place where we negotiate, constantly and necessarily, the nature of out subject matter.

Freiberger invokes Bruce Lincoln and Russell McCutcheon, with mixed approval, on the need for a clear and sharp distinction between the work of the historian (and the disciplines) and reli­gious thought. He quotes McCutcheon's pithy statement claiming that scholars of religion are "critics, not caretakers" of religious discourse. A point well taken, but requiring important qualifica­tions. First, theologians are not necessarily caretakers, if by this is meant someone who serves as a mere custodian. Theologians can be, not only critical, but also committed to growth.

Secondly, the word "critic" has several meanings. I am sure the intent in the quote is not to describe the scholar as a professional faultfinder. One calls into question, critically, a particular under­standing of a phenomenon or behavior, not simply because it is there to be criticized, but because one is interested in an alterna­tive understanding - a possibility still open to a responsible theo­logian.

Apart from the peculiar meaning of "critic" as one who calls something into question, a critic also judges the merits and the value or truth of ideas and practices. There is no reason why the theologian could not have such a role. Similarly, a critic also evalu­ates and appreciates works of art or literature, or reflects on the meaning of his or her own critical program. There is no reason why the theologian could not serve any of these functions. Lastly, criti­cism for criticism's sake (that is, to raise doubts) can benefit from

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dialogue with those less inclined to think critically (in this sense of criticism).

McCutcheon further states that "scholarship is not constrained by whether or not devotees recognize its value for it is not intended to appreciate, celebrate, or enhance normative, dehistoricized dis­courses but, rather, to contextualize and redescribe them as hu­man constructs." Certainly one should not be constrained by the approval or disapproval of the believer, but one would hope this does not mean one should not be concerned with the opinion of the believer. In any attempt at understanding it is helpful to test one's understanding of the other person by listening to that person.

Again, one must agree that the scholar is not there to celebrate (which does not mean he or she is not at liberty to do so). This is certainly true, but it is not the whole truth about the relationships between secular scholarship and religious thought. The historian does not have to appreciate, celebrate or enhance religious life, this is true, he or she does not HAVE to do so; but neutrality can go just so far before it becomes deaf or, if criticism is taken one step further, before it becomes the disgust we have noted before.

Furthermore, one cannot pretend that critical studies have no impact on religious life or the life of the religion, hence, a meth­odological constraint on appreciation can easily turn into a posture of deprecation, or a reluctance to celebrate, a posture that can eas­ily make us look askance with contempt, and as one succeeds in abstaining from any enhancement, it is not so easy to avoid under­mining.

The religious person deserves the opportunity to make a con­structive use of criticism. The scholar faces the same problem that the theologian faces when he or she begins to feel like only he or she can speak about the truth or value of religious beliefs.

The believer may want to speak for Buddhism, and such a claim is a construct. As a comment from the floor stated, Buddhists want "to claim some of the ground ... to speak for Buddhism." What struck me about this comment, however, is that the same expres-

338 LUIS 0. GOMEZ

sion is heard sometimes in academic discourse, where the so-called neutral scholars, pretending to be safe because they believe they can speak with an authoritative voice without making truth claims about religion - a claim that seems to me absurd. But more than that, we have to ask ourselves what is meant by the metaphor of claiming some ground. What is meant by "claiming"? What is meant by "ground"? To say nothing of the qualifier "some of the" (which is in itself revealing of the impossibility of establishing the ground to begin with).

Lastly, we must recognize that the fact that the study of a re­ligious tradition inevitably will lead us to some sort of religious reasoning, that is, to some sort of destructive or constructive or de-constructive speculation about religious truths, assumptions as to what is rational (read "proper and allowable" and within the pa­rameters of good taste, of what is "becoming of" a scholar) and that it leads inevitably to some sort of theological claim. To say that something is a human construct inevitably is a theological state­ment.

Anyone participating at meetings of the International Associa­tion of Buddhist Studies or of the (North) American Academy of Religion knows that a good number of papers, and a good number of participants, are religious, that a good number of papers are try­ing to prove some kind of religious point (some times under the guise of historical analysis). This is of course especially character­istic of Buddhist Studies in North America, but it has been true of Buddhist Studies in the English-speaking world since the inception of the discipline (or field, if you prefer).

Freiberger's paper can be easily linked to one of the opening paragraphs in Prebish's paper, where he paraphrases Ray Hart in asking the question of what exactly is the connection between re­ligion and the scholarship of religion. Hart's three options for Re­ligious Studies (scholarship and the practice of religion each have "its 'site' and the two are not internally related, or the relation is completely open, or the study of religion presupposes practice, and

STUDYING BUDDHISM 339

is undertaken to prepare for and enhance practice") occur as the fo­cus of debate in reflecting on the nature of Buddhist Studies. I can see how these three possibilities (which are very much in the spirit of abhidharma formalism) represent logical possibilities, but I am not persuaded that they represent actual attitudes and practices, or that the issue can be categorized so neatly.

Freiberger's paper is in fact a good example of how these dis­tinctions cannot be maintained. Freiberger applies the useful con­cept of boundary work, arguing against a real opposition between Religious Studies and Buddhist Theology. The illusory dispute, he argues, "results from the idea that both parties define the same dis­course." He views Buddhist Theology and Religious Studies as two distinct "disciplines." Freiberger hints at another problem, however, and that is, that his fine distinction is often ignored, by both sides of this debate,

I agree that the distinction is valuable, but it has its limitations. One could be critical of a Buddhist Theology claiming that the Buddhist tradition says something about psychology, cognitive sci­ence, and neuroscience or about anyone of the natural sciences without validating those claims historically and scientifically - that is, the claims cannot be made without appealing to criteria outside of theology. Similarly, although in principle the academic study of religion cannot (and should not) speak to theological questions di­rectly (that is, in the form of statements about theological truth), the fact that scholars do speak about what is or is not consistent or historically accurate places them in a peculiar relationship vis a vis theological truth claims, which makes neutrality difficult, if not im­possible. In other words, even if the two "discipline" do not share the same discourse, the two discourses, inevitably, overlap.

Most religious traditions do make claims about their own history and claims about what believers actually do, as well as claims about what texts actually do. There the boundary has to be crossed.

Furthermore, it seems at least problematic to me to assume that there is no value in understanding religious thought from the in-

340 LUIS 0. GOMEZ

side, and not simply by explaining it from the outside. By inside I do not mean the inside of the committed believer, but the inside of the processes of imagination, belief and the construction of mean­ing - processes that, arguably, may be peculiar or unique to the religious imagination.

As I read a religious text, I often need to "think religiously" - I need to empathetic ally attempt to think like the religious person, even if it is not my preferred way of thinking. This effort lies astride the boundaries of commitment, excitement (the thrill of under­standing and sharing), and the equanimous observation of a critical mind. To understand I still have to imagine how a tradition, a par­ticular form of discourse, or certain individuals construct meaning, how they think of their world and themselves; this includes reflect­ing on what a particular discourse, attitude or statement is "intend­ing to make me believe." There is, in many of the activities of the Human Sciences, and even in some of the Social Sciences, a rule of empathy (which should apply equally to communication with other scholars): one needs begin with the assumption that the person or persons who produce and participate in the human behavior under study have ways of making sense of their own behaviors, and that these ways of making sense are worth our attention and under­standing - even if, in the end, we do not share them.

One has to remain astride the fence between understanding and disagreeing - this is at the heart of critical thinking. The so-called secular specialists of religion are trapped between these two equal­ly problematic roles. On the one hand, they could take on the role of mouthpiece for the religion, or in its softer mode, as the true exegete for the religion. On the other, they could take on the role of the secular critic of religion. Either way they cannot avoid taking sides on a religious issue - or, if you will, on a "secular issue" (the historical and constructed nature of culture) which is nonetheless deleterious to the interests of some religious persons. One needs to retain the right to disagree, but one needs to zoom out of the

STUDYING BUDDHISM 341

discussion to observe with empathy and equanimity the behavior (including their discourse) of religious persons.

It is not my intention here to defend the position of any such re­ligious person, or, for that matter, of religion or a religion (whatever it might be). Rather, I only want to point out that we may have to live with the fact that religious and scholarly personae tend to be protean and amorphous, as well as often overlapping. As long as there are different kinds of secular scholars and as long as there are different kinds of religious scholars and as long as some scholars will have distinctly religious preferences (not to mention prefer­ences hostile to religion), we will live in the midst of a conflict between religion and scholarship.

Furthermore, let us not forget that secular scholars who wish to define themselves as secular are already taking a religious stance that may clash with that of practitioners; religious scholars who wish to assume the role of scholar/believer inevitably will have to account for, or defend their position against, the views of those who understand differently the tradition they themselves cherish. And ostensibly neutral, like openly antireligious, scholars cannot act as if their work said nothing about religious truth. But the scholars who wish to follow the deceptively clear middle road of the secular scholar sympathetic to the tradition find themselves in a similar quandary. Of course one could imagine a scholar who is, or wishes to be, somehow within the tradition but also wishes to maintain his or her critical freedom. Such a scholar is faced, likewise, with the impossible task of fighting off (or denying his or her affiliation with) particular forms of the tradition at the same time that his or her work has implications as to the value (truth value, ethical value or some other value) of the tradition he or she studies. Each of these quandaries is different, yet similar. These are the risks we take any time we talk about religion.

342 LUIS 0. GOMEZ

Concluding Remarks

Needless to say, the papers in this collection could not possibly ac­count for all aspects of, and all issues in Buddhist Studies in North America. But the papers reveal several important points that invite further reflection.

The great diversity of methods and topics of study is at the same time symptomatic of the fragmented nature of the subject itself and of the frazzled edges in the vast and complex set of traditions that we call Buddhism.

The reluctance to address the issue of the goals of our academ­ic efforts reflects an ambivalence towards religion and its public role that may be uniquely North American, but this ambivalence is transferred in part from other fields. Religious Studies and Area Studies are still rooted, and draw some of the life from the interests of missionaries and colonialists, even as they oppose proselytism and colonialism (in the broadest sense of these terms).

We are still c<?nflicted over the exact nature and role of a pre­sumed "neutrality" (to avoid the more problematic term, "objectiv­ity") of academic endeavors. Our difficulty finding a middle ground between the so-called "celebration" and the presumed "disparage­ment" that are attributed, respectively, to theology and critical in­quiry, cloud an important question. Taking "neutrality" for granted (as if it were a self-evident and attainable goal) does not help us with the fundamental issue of the field which is to understand a pe­culiar form of human behavior in which neutrality is probably im­possible, and commitment is hailed as necessary for the fulfillment of human aspirations. The study of religion, Buddhism included, demands of us understanding of behaviors (our own or those of others), even those we may regard as not worthy of praise or im­possible to emulate; it demands that we understand such behaviors with a critical view of our own assumptions as well, even when they include behaviors we would not adopt for ourselves or commend to

STUDYING BUDDHISM 343

others. And, needless to say, we must be ready to examine critically those behaviors that we would adopt or recommend to others.

We need to acknowledge that the aspirations of the field remain vague, and will remain problematic, given the nature of the subject of study. It is therefore not surprising that the boundaries, goals and methods remain not just debatable, but often remain obscure and tentative - even as people forge ahead with their work, and seem to make significant contributions to our knowledge of Buddhist tradi­tions and to the life of the Academy.

As a final, perhaps not-so-parenthetical, remark I wish to add that it would be of help to our efforts to see a panel similar to the one described in this brief review but dedicated to a broader view of the field, a panel that would include past models of Buddhist Studies, and the models followed in different parts of Asia and Eu­rope. This panel could also examine more closely the impact of the social and political histories of the countries in which Buddhist Studies is practiced - a relevant problem I have already noted in the first footnote to this paper.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Jose Ignacio Cabez6n is XIVth Dalai Lama Professor of Tibetan Buddhism and Cultural Studies at the University of California Santa Barbara. He is author, editor or translator of eleven books and over fifty articles. His most recent books include, Freedom from Extremes, with Geshe Lobsang Dargyay (Wisdom Publica­tions, 2006), and an edited volume, Tibetan Ritual (Oxford, 2009). Cabez6n works chiefly in the areas of Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan cultural studies, and the study of Buddhism and sexuality.

Jose Cabezon • Religious Studies • University of California at Santa Barbara' Santa Barbara, CA 93106-3130· USA

Lewis DONEY is an AHRC-funded doctoral candidate and occa­sionallecturer in the Study of Religions Department at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. His current research concerns the narrative representation of kingship in early Tibetan histories. His thesis will chart the Buddhist trans­formation of Tibetan historiography between the eighth and the twelfth centuries, through an analysis of the changing depictions of the late eighth-century ruler of Tibet, Khri Srong Ide brtsan.

Lewis Doney· 101 Evering Road· London N16 7SL • UK

Oliver FREIBERGER is Assistant Professor of Asian Studies & Re­ligious Studies at The University of Texas at Austin. His research interests include Indian Buddhism, asceticism, and comparison in the study of religion. His most recent publication is Der Askesedis­kurs in der Religionsgeschichte (Harrassowitz, 2009).

Oliver Freiberger· Department of Asian Studies • The University of Texas at Austin • 1 University Station G9300 • Austin, TX 78712 • USA

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 • Number 1-2 • 2007 (2009) pp. 345-348

346 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Louis 6. GOMEZ is A. F. Thurnau Emeritus Professor of Asian Lan­guages and Cultures, Religious Studies and Psychology and for­merly The Charles 0. Hucker Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Michigan at Arm Arbor. He is currently Professor Investigator at EI Colegio de Mexico, Mexico. His research inter­ests include Mahayana Buddhism in India, siitra and sastra litera­ture, Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutics, as well as Psychology of Religion. His most recent publication is Camino al despertar: el Bodhicaryavatara de Santideva, traducci6n castellana del tex­to sdnscrito, estudio y notas. Ediciones Sirueia, Madrid, Espana (forthcoming, November 2009).

Luis Oscar G6mez Rodriguez • Centro de Estudios de Asia y Africa • EI Colegio de Mexico • Camino al Ajusco Num. 20 • Mexico DF, Mexico 01000

Tao JIN is an assistant professor of religion at Illinois Wesleyan University (USA). He specializes in Chinese Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutics. His current research examines the re-presentation of a 6-century text, entitled the Awakening of Faith in Mahayana (Qixinlun), at the hands of its classical commentators; his research also concerns East Asian Buddhist views on the meaning of inter­pretation (jie) as articulated and/or implied in Buddhist treatises, commentaries and biographies.

Tao Jin • Religion Department· Illinois Wesleyan University· PO Box 2900' Bloomington, IL 61702-2900 • USA

Ryan Bongseok Joo is an Assistant Professor of East Asian Reli­gions at Hampshire College. He holds a B.A. in Religious Stud­ies from the University of California, Berkeley (1996), an M.T.S. from Harvard Divinity School (1999), and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Princeton University's Department of Religion (2007). A native of Korea, Ryan Joo has studied in China, Taiwan and Japan with funding from the Fulbright-Hays fellowship program, the Japan Foundation, and the Center for Chinese Study at the National Tai­wan Library. His recent scholarly interests include the practice of

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 347

ordination certificates in medieval China and Korea, the appear­ance of udumbara flowers in Korea and Taiwan, and the influence of Western Buddhism on contemporary Korean Buddhism. He is currently working on a book provisionally titled Buddhist Immor­tals, Eminent Ancestors and Disguised Bodhisattvas: the' Cult of Arhat in Medieval China.

Ryan Bongseok Joo • 893 West St. (HA) • Hampshire College· Am­herst, MA 01002 • USA

Chen-kuo LIN is Distinguished Professor of Buddhist Philosophy ,in both the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate Institute of Religious Studies at National Chengchi University, Taiwan. His research interests include Buddhist philosophy, Chinese philoso­phy and comparative philosophy of religions. Currently he serves as President of Taiwan Philosophical Association.

Chen-kuo Lin· Department of Philosophy· National Chengchi Uni­versity • 64, Zhinan Road, 2nd Sect., Wenshan District· Taipei 116, Taiwan

Charles PREBISH is the Charles Redd Professor of Religious Stud­ies at Utah State University, and Professor Emeritus of Religious Studies at the Penrisylvania State University, where he taught for more than thirty-five years. He has published more than twenty books and nearly one hundred articles and chapters. He is best known for his work on the Indian Buddhist monastic and sectarian traditions and his pioneering work in the study of Western forms of Buddhism. He was co-editor and a major contributor to the re­cent Routledge Encyclopedia of Buddhism, and his latest article is "Cooking the Buddhist Books: The Implications of the New Dating of the Buddha for the History of Early Indian Buddhism" (in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics).

Charles S. Prebish· Utah State University· Director, Religious Stud­ies Program· 0710 Old Main Hill • Logan, Utah 84322 • USA

348 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Eviatar SHULMAN earned his PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He currently teaches in a number of Israeli universities, among them the Hebrew University and Tel-Aviv University. His research focuses on philosophical innovation in the development of Indian Buddhism, primarily in early Buddhism and in Madhya­maka.

Eviatar Shulman· Department of East Asian Studies· Faculty of the Humanities· Tel Aviv University, P.O. Box 39040 • Tel Aviv 69978, Israel

Sam VAN SCHAIK is a Senior Researcher for the International Dun­huang Project (IDP) at the British Library. His current research project, sponsored by the Leverhulme Trust, concerns the palreog­raphy of manuscripts from Dunhuang. Publications include the book Approaching the Great Perfection (Wisdom 2004), a cata­logue co-written with Jacob Dalton entitled Tibetan Tantric Manu­scripts from Dunhuang (Brill 2006), and a volume co-edited with Matthew Kapstein entitled Aspects of Esoteric Buddhism at Dun­huang: Rites and Teachings for this Life and Beyond (Brill 2009).

Sam van Schaik • The British Library • 96 Euston Road • London NWI2DB· UK

Joseph WALSER is an associate professor of Religion at Tufts Uni­versity, Medford Massachusetts. He received his Ph.D. in History of Religions from Northwestern University and is the author of Nagarjuna in Context: Mahayana Buddhism and Early Indian Cul­ture (New York: Columbia University Press 2005). He is currently writing a social history of early Mahayana.

Joseph Walser' Department of Comparative Religion· Tufts Univer­sity • 126 Curtis Street· Medford, MA 02155 • USA

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