JIABS 17-1

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EDITORIAL BOARD

Donald S. Lopez, Ir. Editor-in-Chief

Robert Buswell Steven Collins

Collett Cox Luis O. G6mez

Oskar K. von Hiniiber Padmanabh S. Iaini

Shoryu Katsura Alexander Macdonald

D. Seyfort Ruegg Ernst Steinkellner

Erik Ziircher

Editorial Assistant Alexander Vesey

Journal of the International Association of

Buddhist Studies Volume 17 • Number 1 • Summer 1994

HUGH B. URBAN and PAUL J. GRIFFITHS

What Else Remains in Sunyata? An Investigation of Terms for Mental Imagery in the Madhyantavibhaga-Corpus 1

BROOK ZIPORYN

Anti-Chan Polemics in Post Tang Tiantai

DING-HW A EVELYN HSIEH

Yuan-wuK'o-ch'in's (1063-1135) Teaching ofCh'an Kung-an Practice: A Transition from the Literary Study ofCh'an Kung-an to

26

the Practical K'an-hua Ch'an 66

ALLAN A. ANDREWS

Honen and Popular Pure Land Piety: Assimilation and Transformation

ROGER JACKSON

Guenther's Saraha: A Detailed Review of Ecstatic Spontaneity

96

111

Contributors to this issue:

ALLAN A. ANDREWS is Associate Professor in the Department of Religion at the University of Vennont. His is currently preparing a book-length study of the life and thought of Honen.

DING-HW A EVELYN HSIEH is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of East Asian Languages at the University of California, Berkeley. She is currently doing research on the "transmission of the mind" in the battle for legitimacy in Confucianism and Ch' an Buddhism during the Sung period.

ROGER JACKSON is Associate Professor of Religion at Carleton College. He is author of Is Enlightenment Possible? Dharmakirti and rGyal tshab rje on Knowledge, Rebirth, No-Self and Liberation. His current research is focused on dGe lugs and other Tibetan approaches to MahamuQra.

HUGH B. URBAN is a doctoral student in the History of Religions at the University of Chicago's Divinity School. PAUL J. GRIFFITHS is Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Religions at the same institution.

BROOK ZIPORYN is a Ph. D. candidate in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan, currently. writing his dissertation on "Value and Anti-value in Tiantai Thought and its Antecedents."

HUGH B. URBAN and PAUL 1. GRIFFITHS

What Else Remains In Sl1nyata?

An Investigation of Terms for Mental Imagery in the Madhyantavibhaga-Corpus .

PROLEGOMENA

In 1978 Gadjin Nagao published a short paper called '''What Remains' in Sl1nyata: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness." There he argued that, according to the views expressed in the texts of the classical Indian Yogacara, "emptiness" (tanyata) does not denote simple absence or nonexistence (abhiiva); rather, there is always something left over or remaining (avaJi~ta) in emptiness, something that is identified with the basis for or locus of all human activity, and that is otherwise called the "dependent" (paratantra) aspect of experience. This remains even for Buddha: the realization of emptiness, claims Nagao, does not entail the end of the flow of experience, of what the Yogacara calls abhUtaparilwZpa, the comprehensive construction of what is unreal. Rather, this constructive activity continues, though it is now radically different, and is called "perfected" (parini~panna).

Our goal in this paper is to make this formal thesis more specific. If it is true that Indian Yogacara texts do want to argue that the flow of experience does not end with the attainment of awakening (bodhi); which technical terms do they use to denote what remains? Can more be said, logically or phenomenologically, about what "what remains" in emptiness is like and which terms are used to describe it? As a first step toward answering these questions we shall look at terms for mental imagery in one particular corpus: the Madhyantavibhiiga (MY), comprising a root-text in verse together with two prose commentaries, a bhii~a (MV -bh) attributed to Vasubandhu and a .tim (MV -t) attributed to Sthiramati. We shall attempt to see whether the patterns in which these terms are used suggest anything about whether Buddha's experience is taken to be constituted by mental images, and if so what these

1

2 JIABS 17.1

might be like. We shall also try to gain more precise ideas than are yet available to anglophone scholars about the semantic range of technical terms in this area, as well as about the relationships among them. A glance at secondary literature in this field shows that this is much needed. There are no standard translations for the technical terms, no clear sense of which are approximate synonyms and which bear signifi -cantly and consistently different meanings; and the translations that are given indicate that their users have widely and vividly different understandings of what these terms mean. We hope that this essay will clear up some of this confusion, as Bruce Hall's work on vijiiapti has done in connection with that term, and as one of us (Griffiths 1990) has tried to do with terms for omniscience in an associated corpus of Buddhist texts.

THE MADHYANTAVIBHAGA-CORPUS.

The MY-corpus comprises a root-text in verse divided into five chapters, together with a commentary and a subcommentary as mentioned. Many things about the corpus-authorship, date, verse-enumeration and verse-division-are either disputed or unknown. We offer brief comments here.

As to authorship and date: the explanation given in MY-t of MVbh's abhyarcana, or opening dedicatory verse, attributes MV to one Maitreyanatha, whom some traditions treat as a bodhisattva destined to become the next Buddha for this world-realm, and some as a human teacher. The colophon of the Tibetan translation of MY attributes it to Aryamaitreya. The colophon of MY -bh, in both its Tibetan and Sanskrit versions, attributes it to Vasubandhu, a Buddhist scholastic thinker who may have flourished in the fourth century CEo The colophon of the only Sanskrit manuscript of MY -t to have been recovered attributes it to Sthiramati, who may have been active in the sixth century. The corpus as a whole therefore dates from roughly the fourth to the sixth century, and represents classical Indian Yogacara.

The Sanskrit text is available in the following complete and partial editions: V. Bhattacharya & Giuseppe Tucci (MY -t, first chapter); Gadjin Nagao (1964, MV-bh, complete); Nathmal Tatia (MY-bh, complete); Susumu Yamaguchi (1934, MY-t, complete); Ramchandra Pandeya (MY -t, complete with the text of MV alone as an appendix [194-202]). There are Tibetan versions of all three texts. That of MV is called Dbus dang mtha' mam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa (Tohoku #4021);

URBAN and GRIFFITIlS 3

that ofMY-bhis called Dbus dang mtha' mam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa (Tohoku #4027); and that of MY -t is called Dbus dang mtha' mam par 'byedpa'i 'grel bshad (Tohoku #4032). There is one Cl'Jnese version of MY, called Bian zhong bian lun song (TaishO #1601), translated by Xuanzang; there are two different versions of MY -bh: one, the Zhing· bian fen bie lun (TaishO #1599), was translated by Paramartha, and the other, the Bian zhong bian lun (TaishO #1600), was translated by Xuanzang. There is no Chinese version of MY -to

There are translations of various segments of the corpus into modern languages. Th. Stcherbatsky long ago translated the first chapter of MV-t into English, as also (independently) did David Friedmann; Susumu Yamaguchi (1935) translated the entire MY-t into Japanese; Paul O'Brien translated the third chapter of MV-bh (with extensive notes on MY-t) into English); Erich Frauwallner (324-326) translated parts of the first chapter of MY into German; and David Ruegg (97-100, 426-427) translated parts of the first and fifth chapter of MV into French. All these translations were made more than twenty-five years ago. More recently, Stefan Anacker has translated the second, fourth, and parts of the fifth chapter of MV -bh into English; and Thomas Wood has translated the fIrst chapter of MY into English.

There are, unfortunately, various problems and disputes about the number of verses in the MV, and about their proper division. These disagreements mean that the enumeration of verses in the editions and translations mentioned is often significantly different (especially in the first, third and fifth chapters). This makes reference quite complicated. We shall not try to resolve these questions here, but shall instead refer to the texts of the corpus using, with very minor modifications and additions, the sectional divisions and titles given in MY-bh (and followed by MV-t). These are set out in an appendix, with the page-numbers of the three most easily available editions (Nagao [N], Yamaguchi [Y], Pandeya [P]) given in parentheses following each sectional title. The first number of each section-number indicates the chapter to which it belongs.

TERMS FOR MENTAL IMAGERY IN TIlE MADHYA.NTAVIBHA.GA-CORPUS

We have chosen to deal with the following terms: derivatives of the root k~rp- (among which we find most commonly kalpana, kalpita, vikalpa,

4 nABS 17.1

parikalpa, and parikalpita); the nominal items vijiiapti (here making use as much as possible of the work already done by Hall), pratibhasa, and nimitta. Comments on the semantic range of these terms, and possible translations for them, will follow in part four.

Our method has been, first, to find all instances of these terms in the verses of MY and the prose of MV -bh. To do this we read through the text in Nagao' s edition of MV -bh (in which all the verses of MV are quoted in full), making use also of the trilingual (but not complete) index oftechnical terms given in an appendix to that edition (80-231). We also gained some help from the even more partial index of Sanskrit technical terms in Pandeya's edition of MV -!. We then consulted MV -!' s comments upon all these text-places, making use principally of Yamaguchi's edition, but also consulting Pandeya's edition at times. Where the relevant terms in MV or MV -bh are commented upon by MY -t using one or more of our terms we have included that text -place in our list; but we have not done so when MV -! simply quotes MV or MV -bh rather than explains them. We have also added a fairly extensive (though not comprehensive) list of the occurrences of these terms in MV-t outside the context of immediate commentary upon the text-places in MV or MV -bh isolated as described above.

Based upon this method the list below is divided into four parts. The first gives terms derived from k~rp-; the second vijfiapti; the third pratibhiisa; and the fourth nimitta. Within each of these subdivisions the terms are listed alphabetically, following Sanskrit alphabetical order. Where they occur in compounds the compound is given in fuJI (alphabetized by its first member), with the elements separated by hyphens, vowel coalescence removed where its presence would prevent such division, and the final member of the compound given in stem form. When a compound contains more than one of our chosen terms it is given in all relevant subdivisions of the list, and is marked with an asterisk to indicate this fact Terms are located by text (MV, MV-bh, MV-t), and by section-number.

Terms Derived From Kl.rpakalpana-MV-bh 5.2.3.3 ak3Ipita-MV-t 1.1.3 aneka-parikalpa-praV[tti-MV-! 5.2.3.2 abhl1ta-kalpa-MV 1.1.3 abhuta-kalpana-MV 1.1.8

URBAN and GRIFFITIIS 5

abh11ta-parikalpa-MV 1.1.1; MV -bh 1.1.1 (x5), 1.1.2, 1.1.3 (x2), 1.1.5; MV-t 1.1.2 (x2), 1.1.3 (x5), 1.1.8,1.1.9 (x3)

*abhfita-parikalpa-pratibhasa-bheda-MV -t 1.1.2 abh11ta-parikalpa-matra-MV-bh 1.1.3; MV-t 1.1.3, 1.1.5 abh11ta-parikalpa-matrata-MV -t 1.1.2 abhUta-vikalpa-MV-! 5.2.3.2 avikalpa-MV-bh 3.10.9; MV-t 3.10.9 avikalpa-jiiana-MV -t 3.10.9 avikalpa-dhatu-MV -t 1.2.2 avikalpanata-MV-bh 5.2.3.3 (x2); MV-t 5.2.3.3 avidyadi-pratyaya-pravrtti-kalpana-MV -bh 3.10.4 aviparyasa-kalpita-MV-t 5.2.3.2 ahaituka-kalpana-MV-t 3.10.4 kalpana-MV-bh 5.2.4; MV-! 5.2.3.3 kalpana-matra-MV-t 1.1.4 kalpayata-MV-bh 5.2.4 (x2) kalpayati-MV-bh 5.2.4 (x2) kalpayanti-MV-t 5.2.4 kalpita-MV 1.1.3; MV -t 3.2, 3.4 (x2), 5.2.3.2 kalpitatva-MV-t 5.2.3.2 kalpita-svabhava-MV-t 3.1, 4.1.8 kalpyeta-MV-! 3.10.4 klesa-parikalpita-mala-dvaya-santi-MV -t 3.4 gu~a-do~a-avikalpa-MV 3.10.9; MV-t 3.10.9 grahaka-vikalpa-MV -t 1.1.1 grahya-vikalpa-MV-t 1.1.1 grahya-grahakMi-kalpita-vyavahara-asrayatva-MV -t 3.1 grahya-grahaka-vikalpa-MV~bh 1.1.1; MV-t 1.1.1, 1.1.4,5.2.3.2 grahya-grahaka-vikalpa-asraya-MV -bh 5.2.3.2 (x2) grahya-grahaka-vikalpita-MV -t 1.1.1 ni1).samarthya-kalpana-MV-bh 3.10.4 *nimitta-vikalpa-MV -bh 3.8 nirvikalpa-MV-bh 2.4.3,5.2.3.3,5.2.4; MV-t 3.8, 4.1.7 (x2), 5.2.1

(x2), 5.2.3.2 (x2), 5.2.4 nirvikalpa-jiiana-MV-bh 5.2.1; MV-! 0 (x5), 5.2.1, 5.2.3.2 nirvikalpa-jiianaparigrhrtva-MV -bh 5.2.1 nirvikalpa-jiiana-vaSita-MV -t 2.4.3 nirvikalpa-jiiana-vi~ayatva-MV -15.2.3.2 nirvikalpata-MV -t 1.1.4

6 nABS 17.1

nirvikalpatva-MV-t 1.2.0,5.2.3.2 (x3), 5.2.4 nirvikalpa-vaSita-MV-bh 2.4.3; MV-! 2.4.3 nirhetukatva-kalpana-MV -bh 3.10.4 parikalpa-matra-MV -t 1.1.4 parikalpa-vikalpa-artha-clharmata-artlia-MV 3.10.0 parikalpita-MV-bh 1.1.3, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4,3.8,3.10.0 (x2); MV-t 1.2.3,

3.3,3.4 (x2), 3.6, 3.8, 3.10.0 parikalpita-avaboclha-MV-t 3.2 parikalpita-atmaka-MV-! 5.2.3.2 parikalpita-atmatva-MV -! 3.3 parikalpita-clharma-vikalpa-MV -! 5.2.4 parikalpita-paratantra-l~~-MV -bh 3.9, 5.2.3.3 parikalpita-rupa-MV-! 1.1.4, 3.10.0 (x2) parikalpita-lak~aJ).a-MV-bh 3.1,3.3; MV-! 3.3 (x2) parikalpita-svabhava-MV-bh 3.6; MV-! 1.1.3 (x2)' 3.1, 3.2, 3.4 parikalpita-svabhava-abhiniveSa-vasana-MV-bh 3.4 parikalpyata-MV-bh 3.3; MV-! 1.1.3 parikalpyate-MV-bh 3.3; MV-! 1.1.2,3.10.0 parini~anna-parikalpita-paratantra-akhya-MV -bh 5.2.3.3 bhava-abhava-vikalpa-rahita-MV -! 5.2.3.2 boclhi-nirvikalpa-MV -! 4.1.6 mana-udgraha-vikalpa-akhyana-MV -! 3.10.10 *yatha-ukta-nimitta-svabhava-vise~a-vikalpaka-MV-! 3.8 rupa-vikalpa-MV -bh 3.10.0 vikalpa-MV 3.8; MV-bh 3.10.10, 5.2.4 (x5); MV-! 1.2.3, 3.5, 3.8

(x3), 3.10.0,5.2.4 (x8) vikalpa-antara-kalpita-MV-! 1.1.3 (x2) vikalpakatva-MV -bh 3.10.10 vikalpa-klesatva-MV-! 5.2.4 vikalpa-trasa-kausidya-vicikitsa-upaSanti-MV-bh 1.2.5 vikalpa-dvaya-anta-MV-bh 5.2.4 (x5); MV-! 5.2.4 vikalpa-dvaya-antata-MV 5.2.4 vikalpa-prabheda-MV-t 5.2.4 vikalpa-prabheda-pradarsana-artha-MV -! 5.2.4 vikalpayati-MV-bh 5.2.3.3 vikalpa-vi~aya-atikranta-svariipatva-MV -! 5.2.3.2 vikalpita-MV-bh 3.10.0 vikalpita-clharma-trasa-MV -! 5.2.4 *vi jfiapti -antara-parikalpita-MV -! 1.1.2

vi~ama-hetu-kalpana-MV -bh 3.10.4 vyapara-kalpana-MV-bh 3.10.4 sarva-kalpa-apraYftli-MV 5.2.3.2 sarva-vikalpa-MV -bh 5.2.3.2

URBAN and GRIFF1TIIS 7

sarva-vikalpa-apraYftli-MV -t 5.2.3.2 sarva-vikalpa-prah~a-artha-MV -t 4.1.8 savikalpatva-MV -14.1.7 saSa-vi~~a-kalpana-MV-! 1.1.1 hetutva-kalpana-MV -t 3.10.4

Vijflapti *artha-sattva-atma-vijfiapti-pratibhasa-MV 1.1.2; MV -t 1.1.2 (x2) para-vijfiapti-MV 4.1.7 l~aJ).a-vijfiapti-Suddhi-samyak-prapannata-MV 3.9 vijfiapti-MV-t 1.1.4 *vijfiapti -antara~parikalpita-MV -! 1.1.2 vijfiapti-asambhava-MV -bh 5.2.4 vijfiapti-tattva-MV-bh 3.9; MV-t 3.9 *vijfiapti-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-t 1.1.2 vijfiapti-matra-MV-bh 1.1.4; MV-t 1.1.4 (x2) vijfiapti-matra-upalabdhi-MV-bh 1.1.4; MV-t 1.1.4 vijfiapti-matra-upalambha-MV -t 1.1.4 vijfiapti-matra-jfiana-MV -t 5.2.4 (x4) vijfiapti -matra-jnana-lqta-MV -1 5.2.4 vijfiapti-matrata-MV -t 3.9 vijfiapti-matratva-MV-t 1.1.4 *vijfiapti-matra-pratibhasa-MV-t 3.5

Pratibhiisa abhuta-artha-pratibhasata-MV -bh 1.1.4 * abhUta-parikalpa-pratibhasa-bheda-MV -t 1.1.2 atma-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-! 1.1.2 artha-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2 artha-pratibhasatva-MV-t 1.1.4 *artha-sattva-atma-vijfiapti-pratibhasa-MV 1.1.2; MV-! 1.1.2 (x2) artha-sattva-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-t 1.1.2 (x2) grahya-grahaka-pratibhasa-MV -1 1.1.2 grahya-grahaka-pratibhasa-bhranti-MV -1 3.2 grahya-grahaka-pratibhasa-bhranti-sadbhava-MV-t 5.2.3.2

8 JIABS 17.1

ghata-patadi-pratibhasa-MV -t 1.1.4 tat-pratibhasa-bhranti-sadbhava-MV -bh 5.2.3.2 tat-samudaya-pratibhasa-MV -! 1.1.4 param~u-pratibhasa-MV -! 1.1.4 pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-! 3.10.0 pratibhasatvam-MV 5.2.3.2 pratibhasate-MV-bh 1.1.2,5.2.3.2; MV-t 1.1.2,1.1.4,5.2.4 pratibhasamana-MV-! 1.1.4 pratyeka-pratibhasa-MV-! 1.1.4 rupadi-pratibhasa-MV-t 3.5,3.10.0 sattva-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-t 1.1.2 svakara-pratibhasa-vijfiana-karaJ;latva-MV-! 1.1.4 *vijfiapti-pratibhasa-MV-bh 1.1.2; MV-t 1.1.2 (x3) *vijfiapti-matra-pratibhasa-MV -! 3.5 vitatha-pratibhasatva-MV -bh 1.1.2 vi~aya-pratibhasa-atma-MV-! 1.1.4 (x2)

Nimitta animitta-MV 1.2.2; MV-! 1.2.2,2.4.3,5.2.4 (x3) animittatva-MV-t 1.2.2,2.4.3 anyonya-nimitta-bhava-MV-! 3.8 upe~a-nimitta-MV-! 4.1.7 (x2) jfiana-animitta-MV-! 5.2.4 (x3) jfiana-nimitta-MV-! 5.2.4 (x2) jfieya-animitta-MV-! (x3) jfieya-nimitta-MV-! 5.2.4 dul).kha-satya-nimitta-MV -bh 3.10.8 nimitta-MV 3.8, 3.10.0,4.1.3.2; MV-bh 3.10.10 (x2), 4.1.3.2,

5.2.3.1; MV-! 1.1.4, 2.4.3,3.8 (x6), 5.2.3.1 nimitta-abhava-MV-t 2.4.3 nimitta-abhavatva-MV-! 2.4.3 nimitta-ruambana-MV -! 1.1.4 nimitta-lq1a-MV-! 2.4.3 nimitta-gata-MV-! 2.4.3 nimitta-graha-MV-t 1.2.3 nimitta-nirodha-artha-MV-bh 1.2.2 *nimitta-vikalpa-MV -bh 1.2.2 nimitta-vik~epa-MV-bh 5.2.3.1; MV-! 5.2.3.1 nimitta-samudacara-abhava-MV-! 2.4.3 (x3)

URBAN and GRIFFITIIS 9

nimitta-vigata-MV -! 2.4.3 nirnimittata-MV -bh 2.4.3 pragraha-nimitta-MV -! 4.1.7 praSrabdhi-nimitta -MY -! 4.1.3.2 bhranti-nimitta-MV-! 3.8 *yatha-ukta-nimitta-svabhava-vi~a-vikalpaka-MV-! 3.8 ragadi-nimitta-MV-t 5.2.4 (x3) vik~epa-nimitta-upaSamana-MY -! 4.1.7 viparyasa-tan-nimitta-tat-pradarsana-artha-MV -! 3.1 vedana-nimitta-lVN -bh 3.10.8 vedana-sanimitta-artha-tan-nimitta-pratipattita-MV 3.10.8 vyavahara-nimitta-MV -! 1.1.7 samathMi-nimitta-MV-bh 4.1.7; MV-! 4.1.7 samatha-nimitta-MV-!4.1.7 sarva-nimitta-MV-t 2.4.3 sarva-nimitta-abhava-MV -bh 1.2.2 sarva-nimitta-eka-rasa-akara-MV-! 2.4.3 sarva-nimitta-prah~a-karma-MV -t 1.2.5 siitradi-dharma-nimitta-MV -! 2.4.3 siitradi-dharma-nimitta-nanatva-asamudacara-MV -bh 2.4.3

INTERPRETATION

Terms Derivedfrom K{rp: The Construction of a Mental World The root k{rp- denotes most generally the process of ordering or regulating, of giving an intentional shape or structure to something, and by so doing fitting it for or making it conformable to some purpose. Its range extends on the one hand in the direction of artistic creation (kavikalpana means something like the constructively creative activity of a poet), and on the other in the direction of simple constructive or ornamentational activity, as in building a house, trimming a beard, or 'caparisoning an elephant' (Monier-Williams 263). In general, lexical items derived from this root suggest an activity the point of which is to alter its object, by ornamenting it, analyzing it, dividing it, bringing it together with other things, and so forth. Derivatives of this root occur most often in this corpus (as is obvious from the lists above) with a prefix, either pari- or vi-; we shall turn to those in a moment, but shall focus to begin with on forms without a prefix.

10 nABS 17.1

Among these there are relatively few instances, including simple nominal items (kalpa or kalpana), some active verbal forms (kalpayati, kalpayanti) , and a rather large number of participial forms (mostly kalpita). Among the nominal items, Kalpa occurs only in the verses of MV, and then only for metrical reasons: it is glossed once with parikalpa and once with vikalpa, and has no independent semantic significance. Kalpana, though, is more important. In a cluster of cases (3.10.4) it is best understood to mean "false judgment"-that, for example, conditioned things can be produced by unlike causes (samskiiradfnalJ'L vi~amahetukalpana) or that there are no causes at all (nirhetukatvakalpana). That a false judgment with propositional content may be the product of kalpana is made explicit by the introduction of an iti clause at this same text-place: kalpana that there are no conditions such as ignorance for the coming into being of conditioned things ( ... na santy avidyadipratyayal; samskiiradaya iti kalpanat). The MY -t to this same text-place also uses an iti-clause with an active verbal form (kalpyeta), as also does the MV -bh elsewhere (5.2.4), in a context in which the object of kalpayati is the judgment that the ground of the real might be defiled or purified (. . . dharmadhatul; samklisyate va visuddhyate yeti kalpayati).

This emphasis on the unreality of the objects of kalpana is also evident in MY -t' s use of the same term in connection with a hare's hom-a standard example of a nonexistent object (SaSavi~linavikalpa, 1.1.1). This instance is especially striking because it occurs ina context where vikalpa and parikalpa are widely used with slightly different connotations (to be turned to in a moment); that kalpana was chosen for this purpose suggests its special appropriateness for the labelling of an activity that produces unreal objects, whether these are judgments whose content is false, or percepts whose content is nonexistent.

Much the same can be said of the participial form kalpita. If kalpana denotes a constructive activity productive of false judgments or unreal percepts, then kalpita denotes the status of such things: they have been constructed by their subjects, but are entirely fictive. This is said, for instance, of each of the four kinds of objects that figure, whether as concept or percept, in the flow of experience-sensory organs, their objects, selves, and mental representations with phenomenal properties (artho 'tra rilpadayas cak~uradaya atmli vijftaptayas ca / sa ca kalpitena svabhavenabhUtaparikalpa nllstfti, MV-t 1.1.3; compare MV-t 5.2.3.2, where the property of being kalpitatva is predicated of objects perceived

URBAN and GRIFFITHS 11

dualistically, in terms of the split between subject and object). All of the participial uses of k{rp without a prefix fall into this pattern.

Very similar patterns are evident in the uses of k{rp and derivatives coupled with the prefix pari-. The prefix here has the sense of completeness or comprehensiveness: if kalpana denotes specific instances of a constructive mental activity whose objects are false or unreal, then parikalpa[na1 denotes a complete or comprehensive version of that same activity, a version whose scope is universal.

Most frequently, pari + kZ.rp- terms occur in the participial form parikalpita. This is a technical term used to denote one of the three 'aspects' (svabhava) under which experience may occur, the other two being paratantra and parini~anna. There is already an extensive secondary literature on this set of ideas (Sponberg; Kochumuttom; Griffiths 1986) since it constitutes one of the central and distinguishing categories of Yogacara metaphysics, and some of the primary sources analyzing it are available in English translation (Tola & Dragonetti). We shall not, therefore, go into this scheme in detail here, but shall simply note that MV -bh 3.6 identifies parikalpitasvabhava with the agreement among ordinary people, arrived at upon the basis of habit, as to what things should be called, and as to when it is important to distinguish one thing from another-the text gives the specific example of distinguishing earth from fire and physical form from sound (yasmin vastuni sanketas01J1.stavanupravi~.taya buddhya sarve~alJ'! laukikanalJ'! darsanatulyata bhavati / prthivy eveyalJ'! nagni rupam evedalJ'! na sabda ity evamadi , MV -bh 3.6). The point here is that parikalpita denotes that to which names and their correlative concepts have been applied (the same point is made at 3.8 and 3.10.0); and parikalpa[nal denotes the activity of applying names and concepts to the flow of experience.

The status of the objects of this activity is the same as that of the activity of kalpana: they are completely unreal (atyantam asattva, MV-! 3.10.0), or without essence (svabhavaSunya, MV-! 1.1.1). Also, as with kalpana, such objects may be either concepts or percepts: the image of the hare's horn is used again (MV-! 3.3), and we also find the judgment that dreaming consciousness must have as its object something previously experienced dismissed as parikalpamatra ( ... tasmat parikalpamatram evaitad anubhatarthavi~ayam svapne vijfianam iti, MV-! 1.1.4). Graphically, the status of those objects subjected to parikalpa is likened to the objects of false reports, like that of a tiger's presence where there is no tiger ( ... yatha vijfianenarthaJ:z parikalpyate

12 nABS 17.1

tathiirthasyiibhiivo vyiighriidisrutiidi~v iva vitathiilambanatviid vitathapratibhiisatii, MV -t 1.l.2).

The other main locus for the use of pari + k(rp- is in the compound abhUtaparikalpa. The MV -t explains this compound in the following way:

abhiitam asmin dvay3.I!l parikalpyate 'nena vety abhiitaparikalp~ / abhiitavacanena ca yathay3.I!l parikalpyate grahyagrahakatvena tatha nastIti pradarSayati / parikalpavacanena tv artho yatha parikalpyate tathartho na vidyata iti pradarSayati / (MV-t 1.1.1)

The compound 'unreal comprehensive construction' may be understood to indicate that the duality comprehensively constructed either by it or in it is unreal. The term 'unreal' indicates that the extent to which something is comprehensively constructed in terms of a dichotomy between subject and object is the extent to which it does not exist. The term 'comprehensive construction' indicates that the extent to which an object is comprehensively constructed is the extent to which it is not found.

This is very clear: the objects of parikalpa, in so far as these are phenomenally marked by a distinction between subject and object, have no reality at all. But the comprehensively misleading results of the constructive activity labelled by pari + k~rp- do themselves have reality, as MV clearly says (abhUtaparikalpo 'sti, MV 1.1.1). There is, throughout this corpus, an especially close relation between abhataparikalpa and the relative (paratantra) aspect of experience (abhUtaparikalpal) paratantral) svabhiiva iti, MV-t 1.1.3); and this in tum suggests that when a nominal form of pari + kZrp- is used (parikalpa or parikalpana), rather than a participial form with a passive sense such as parikalpita, it may sometimes denote, descriptively, the simple fact of the flow of experience, with all its finally illusory phenomenal properties of division between subject and object, "appearances," as MY -t puts it, "that consist in objects, living beings, and selves and representations" (arthasattvaatma-vijfiaptipratibhiisam, MY-t 1.1.9). Such locutions leave open the possibility that the phenomenally rich series of mental images that usually constitutes the flow of experience may occur without being accompanied by a sharp phenomenological distinction between subject and object. We shall return to this, but in so far as it is the case we might say thatparikalpa[nal and abhataparikalpa have a dual use: they can be used to denote both an undefiled nonerroneous flow of


experience, and a defiled and mistaken set of percepts and concepts that results from constructive action upon that flow. In the first use, parikalpa means simply para-tantra, the way things really are The MY -! equates abhiltaparikalpa with dharma to make just this point. In the second, it means pari-kalpita, the way things are when the usual conceptual, affective, and perceptual constructions have been made. The MV-! (1.1.1) makes this distinction, identifying abhUtapafikalpa with error (bhrlinti) when it is defiled (saitkli~.ta), and with emptiness (Siinyatii) when it is not

Vikalpa-and other ki.rp- terms with vi-, an essentially distributive prefix-introduces a slightly different set of connotations. Vikalpa, which we shall provisionally translate "discriminative construction," is above all an active function: it is something that sentient beings do, an activity whose objects can be both mental images and words (MY-! 3.8). It produces the artificially constructed awareness of specific objects, and in so doing produces experience whose phenomenal properties correspond to nothing (kim artham punar ayalJ1. vikalpita1J1. riipam ucyata iti ata liha I tatra hi rupavikalpaJ:! kriyata iti I yasmlid riipakhylitavijflline 'd.r~tatattvair aparijfilitarupasalJ1.jfiatvlid ruplibhiniveSaJ:!, MV -! 3. 10.0). These phenomenal properties consist essentially in separateness, a separateness that is sometimes construed in terms of dualities (as when seven kinds of vikalpa are distinguished according to a list of seven pairs of contradictory concepts in MV-! 5.2.4), and sometimes in terms of trinities (as when, in MY -1 5.2.1, the absence of vikalpa is identified with nonapprehension of such linked threefold sets as gift-giver-recipient or possessor of awareness-object of awareness-act of awareness).

There is a very close link between the activities denoted by vikalpa and the experience (perceptual or conceptual) of particular individuated objects (sval~m:za). It is in contexts where this connection is emphasized that the proper relation between pari + k~rp- and vi + k~rp - begins to become clear. Things that have been subject to the former-things that can be qualified with the term parikalpita-have been given names, reified, and sorted into categories; the latter (vikaZpa) requires the former's operations before it can engage in its paradigmatic function, which is to constuct an opposition between subject and object ( ... yaj jfllina1J1. sarvavikaZpasya pratipa~a ity aya7J7. svalak~a7}a 'viparylisa iti parikalpitadharmamukhena sarvadharme~u sarvavikalpapravrttiJ:! I ato nlimamlitraprativedhajfilinalJ1. sarvavikalpapratipak~aJ:! svala~a7}e 'viparyasa ity uktam, MV-! 5.2.3.2). It follows, then, that it is precisely

14 JIABS 17.1

an awareness that penetrates to. the misleading functions of parikalpa that will dispose of vikalpa.

The obverse of this is the claim that the way things really are-the "ground of the real" (dharmadhiitu)-is inaccessible to awareness characterized by vilwlpa (svasiimiinyala~a7}ayor aviparyliSo dharmadhiitiiv eva / tasya vilwlpavi~ayiitikriintasvarupatviit, MV-t 5.2.3.2). There are no individuatable particulars in the dharmadhiitu, and so vilwlpa can work on it only by creating concepts and percepts that in fact are absent from it. To put this rather differently: awareness free from vilwlpa is identical with emptiness (sanyatii) which in turn is called the 'sphere in which there is no vilwlpa' (avilwlpadhiitu, MV -t 1.2.0, 1.2.2). Parilwlpa, as we have shown, has the potential to be pure and error-free; vilwlpa does not: it is what produces defilement and error in the flow of concepts and percepts. Paul O'Brien (242 n.) has put the point in simi-1ar fashion.

Awareness in which there is no vikalpa is, therefore, properly conformed to the nature of things. It is free from concepts and percepts whose objects are unreal, as well as from all misleading phenomenal properties. Is it then free from all concepts and all percepts? Consider this:

viparyaso hi vikalpaJ;1 I vikalpanaIambanatvan na viparyasavastu I nimittanirodhad animittam iti I atranimittatvaIp- nimittanirodha ucyate I etad eva pradarsanartham aha I sarvanimittabhavad iti I sarvair eva samsIqtasamslq1animittaiJ? siinyata siinyety animittam iti I (MV-t 1.2.2)

Error is discriminative construction. [Emptiness, understood as] free from error is so because it is not an object for discriminative construction. [Emptiness, understood as] free from mental images is so because mental images have ceased in it. This means that it possesses the property of being without mental images, which in turn is indicated by the words 'because of the absence of all mental images.' Emptiness is empty of the mental images of all things, conditioned and unconditioned: this is what it means to say that it is free from mental images.

. We have translated the technical term nimitta in this passage as "mental images"-a point to which we shall shortly return. For the moment we simply note that this passage clearly equates the absence of discriminative construction with the absence not only of misleading qualia in particular moments of experience, but of all qualia, all mental images with


phenomenal properties of any kind (if this is indeed what nimitta means here).

So far we have been translating k~rp- terms by "construct" and derivatives. It is time to note that this is not the most common choice. Since the time of Stcherbatsky that has probably been "imagination" and derivatives. Thomas Kochumuttom, Bimal Matilal, and others, have regularly made this choice. According to Matilal, for example, vikalpa or kalpana has a specific technical and philosophical use in Indian thought which gives it very significant commonalities with the technical use of "imagination" by Hume or Einbildung by Kant. It is, he sug gests, the faculty that organizes the raw data of perception, differentiating such data into classes and conceptual categories: it is the '''connecting or uniting power which operates in two dimensions'. It is the instrument of our perceptual awareness of both kind-identity and individualidentity, concept-identity, and object-identity" (309). Moreover, as we have shown, in the MY -corpus the objects created by vikaZpa are often said to be simply nonexistent

The functions ofvikaZpa mentioned by Matilal, as well as k~rp-'s connections with illusionism, certainly provide some overlap with the semantic range of "imagination" in English. Both imagination and ~rpcreatively construct new concepts and percepts; and the objects constructed by both may be taken to be illusory, not present where they appear to be (or indeed anywhere). But there are also very significant differences. K~rp- terms do not have to do only-or even mostly-with the manipulation of images. They more often denote either phenomenal properties of the flow of experience, properties (such as the division between subject and object) that may have no connection with images; or the activity of the mind in creatively constructing such properties. We suggest, therefore, that a translation such as the one we have adopted, focussing as it does upon the constructive elements of kl.rp-, may be more revealing: the exercise of k~rp- is more like the act of building a house than the act of manipulating mental images, and its primary result is a comfortably habitable mental world comprising mental images whose essential property is that they appear to belong to a subject and to intend an object It should be quite clear from what we have said so far that mental images of this kind db not remain in emptiness. Are there other kinds that might?

16 nABS 17.1

Representations, Appearances, Mental Images The terms under consideration here are vijiiapti, pratibhlisa, and nimitta. Bruce Hall (8-9) has pointed out that vijfiapti is a technical term appropriated from the Sarvastivada abhidharma by Yogacara theorists for their own uses. It is derived from the causative form of the root jfia-, "to know," with the same distibutive prefix (vi-) as that found in vikaZpa. Vijfiapti connotes, then, a communicative act, something that makes something known to someone. Yogacara theorists generally use it to denote any mental event that communicates something, any mental event with phenomenal properties. A possible translation, therefore, and the one that we shall adopt here, is "representation."

The MY -corpus emphasizes, as do other Yogacara works, that representations-mental events with phenomenal properties-are all there is, usually using some form of vijfiapti + mlitra ("representation-only") to indicate this. This point is given its most detailed statement in the MY -corpus at 1.1.4. Technically, the MY-corpus says that vijfiaptaya(i are one of the four kinds of appearance (pratibhiisa-a term to which we shall return) in which the comprehensive imagination of the unreal consists (1.1.2). The other three are nonsentient objects (artha), sentient beings (sattva), selves (iitma), and the four are linked with the Yogacara theory of the eight kinds of consciousness, a theory whose exposition is beyond our scope here. But in addition to this technical sense, there is also a broader sense of the term in which the last three of the four categories just mentioned can be understood as kinds of vijfiapti. And in so far as the term is taken in this way, every instance of vijfiapti must, in virtue of the fact that it "represents" something to someone, have phenomenal properties that are in prinCiple accessible to description. But this does not entail-nor even suggest-that vijfiaptaya(i simply cease for an awakened one (buddha). Vijfiapti can be used in a sense neutral as to this possibility. Further help might be gained from looking at the usage of pratibhiisa and nimitta.

Pratibhiisa-"appearance" or "manifestation," from the root Mas-, "to shine," "to appear," "to be manifest"-together with its verbal forms (pratibhiisate and so forth) occurs in the MV -corpus mostly in 1.1.2 and 1.1.4. It almost always indicates a phenomenally rich but false or misleading appearance. MV-corpus 1.1.2 is concerned with the modes in which the comprehensive construction of what is unreal may appear to those for whom it is an experiential fact. It is explained there that the four kinds of appearance referred to in the preceding paragraph are all

· URBAN and GRIFFITHS 17

comprised in the second of the four truths, that which explains how it is that suffering arises (etiiny arthasattviitmavijfiaptipratibhiisiiny ~tau vijfiiiniini sasamprayogiini samudayasatyasangrahiit, MY -! 1.1.2), and so are more or less unreal (vitatha). If suffering is to be abandoned, they too must be abandoned. In all these respects, pratibhiisa is like vilwZpa: both it and its products are systematically misleading and to be abandoned.

But does the removal of systematically misleading appearances mean the removal of all appearances, the removal of all mental events with phenomenal properties? MY-corpus 5.2.3.2 contains a discussion often kinds of non-erroneousness (aviparyiisatva), one of which is freedom from error about objects (artha). Pratibhiisa figures prominently in that discussion. Objects, we are told, appear (pratibhiisate) with a dualistic mode of appearance (iikiira), and they do not exist as they appear because they are naturally without duality (advayapralqtitviit) (MV-bh 5.2.3.2). But this does not mean that objects are completely without existence: on the contrary, they exist precisely as misleading appearances (pratibhiisabhriintisadbhiiva, MV-bh 5.2.3.2), and it is precisely in virtue of being aware of this fact that, as MY -! puts it, the bodhisattva penetrates to the reality of all things, which is just that they are essentially free from the duality of subject and object (aneniiviparyiisajfiiinena bodhisattvo griihyagriihakasvabhiivarahitiin sarvadharmiin pratividhyati, MV-! 5.2.3.2). Notice that it is not said that such penetration, such freedom, consists in or is produced by the absence of appearances with specifiable phenomenal properties-not even by the absence of appearances with the phenomenal property of subject-object dualism. Instead, penetration consists in not being misled by this phenomenal property-by, in effect, knowing enough about the real nature of these phenomenal properties not to be misled by them. The possibility that appearances continue (though not, of course, erroneous judgments about them) for the bodhisattva who has penetrated to emptiness is thus left. open: the occurence of appearances does not entail the presence of error.

A somewhat similar case can be made for nimitta, which we are here translating "mental image." This term is sometimes used to mean something close to "cause," as when MV-t glosses it with kiirat/a (vi~epanimittopaSamaniic chamathaJ:z / samathiidinimittOJf1. samathiidi kiirat/am, MV-! 4.1.7; compare 3.10.8). But it more often means the image of an object in the mind (arthapratibimba is used as a gloss for it in MV-! 1.1.4); and even when its connection with chains of cause and

18 nABS 17.1

effectis emphasized (MV-! 3.8: anyonyanimittabhiivad nimittam), the context is always that of explaining the causes that produce particular affective or cognitive states in an experiencing subject. And primary among such causes is the presence of some mental image-understood broadly, to comprise both concepts and percepts. The discussion of the six kinds of distraction (vik~epa) in 5.2.3.1 is typical. One of these six is nimittavi~epa ("distraction by mental images"), and the reference appears to be to mental images arising in meditation that might produce distraction. A practitioner might, for example, experience a mental image that she takes to be her Self (dhyayy ayalJl mahiitmety eVQl}l sambhavanatmanfty anena nimittena samadhau prayuktasyliSayavilayatvalladbhiid alabdhlid va kusalapa~lid vi~epo nimittavi~epa ity ucyate, MV-! 5.2.3.1), and be distracted by it.

In our discussion of vikalpa we have already noted that emptiness is said to be animitta, free from mental images (1.2.2); this might seem to be the strongest piece of evidence we yet have for the conclusion that there can be no mental images therein. But let us look a little more closely. In 2.4.3 there is an interesting analysis of the obstacles (avarm:za) to progress on the part of the bodhisattva through the ordered stages (bhiimi) of the meditational path. In the discussion of the seventh stage MV-bh says that in it one removes diversity (nlinatva) in one's experience because one no longer has any mental images (nimitta). MV -! explains that since there is no diversity in the ground of the real (dharmadhiitu) all mental images-even those that have aided !he practitioner in penetrating to it-must become undifferentiated therein, and one will have an awareness in which all mental images are of the same kind (sarvanimittaikarasilkarajfilinena, MV-! 2.3.2). One enters a condition, it seems, in which mental images are in some significant respect all of the same kind, and so one no longer fights against or is concerned about conventional reality, which consists precisely in mental images that are of different kinds (yataf! sarvanimittliny animittatvena pratividhyati nimitta~rtalJl ca vyavahiirQl}l na virodhayati, MV-t 2.3.2). This condition, the texts go on to say, becomes effortless or spontaneous (anoohoga) on the eighth stage.

But this is not precisely a condition in which there are no mental images of any kind. It is, rather, a condition in which, in the most important respect of all, every mental image shares the same property: that of not producing cognitive or affective error, which requires that every mental image be free of phenomenal properties that might produce


such error. The prime candidate here, of course, are those properties produced by the discriminative construction that the MY -corpus calls vikalpa. The predicate "imagelessness" (nimimittata) then has a double meaning: there are no images in emptiness if by nimitta is meant an image with error-producing phenomenal properties; but there are images in emptiness ifby that is meant a phenomenally rich flow of experience in which all objects are experienced directly and without distortion. The MY -corpus in fact goes on to suggest just this when it says that in the ninth stage the practitioner gains mastery (vaSita) over certain kinds of awareness as a result of her effortless entry into "imagelessness." The kinds of awareness in question here have to do with such phenomenally complex matters as knowledge of the grammar, meaning, syntax, and lexica of natural languages (technically, the four pratisamvit: of dharma, artha, nirukti, and pratibhiina), and such awareness necessarily involves the presence to its possessor of rich phenomenal content

A strong case can be made, then, for the conclusion that phenomenally rich mental images-designated by vijfiapti, pratibhiisa, nimitta, or abhiitaparikalpa-do remain in emptiness but that these cannot have been subject to the constructive activity denoted by vikalpa.

CONCLUSIONS

We began with the question of whether more can be said than was said by Nagao about what 'what remains' in emptiness is like. We hope at least to have shown that the technical terminology employed in the MY -corpus for mental imagery suggests strongly that one can say that unconstructed nimittlini, vijfiaptayaJ:!. and pratibhiisiiJ:! remain in sunyatii; and that the freedom from constructive mental activity that characterizes these mental events is evident in the fact that they neither give rise to nor are constituted by error. Most important, they do not give rise to the error of thinking that there are experiencing subjects and experienced objects, nor to the error of experiencing the world in terms of such a dichotomy.

But what would consciousness of this kind, the consciousness possessed by Buddha, be like? It would not simply rest in an imageless void, but would continue to experience a flow of mental images (nimitta), appearances (pratibhiisa), and representations with phenomenal properties (vijfiapti). It would not, however, experience any sort of conceptual construction (vikalpa), since this necessarily involves the

20 nABS 17.1

reification of these illusory appearances, the separation of their phenomenal properties, the formation of names and categories, and their bifurcation into subject and object. In more standard Yogacara terms, Buddha would still perceive the pure flow of phenomena which constitutes the paratantrasvabhava, but without the dualities and distinctions which constitute the parikalpitasvabhava. However, this raises the further question of just how an awakened being could continue to function without the operations of vikalpa. Wouldn't the absence of such conceptual constructions impose a rather strict limitation upon Buddha's experiences and actions?

One of us (Griffiths 1990) has raised a similar question with regard to the Yogacara doctrine of omniscience (sarvakarajfiatli). If we understand omniscience to be a kind of awareness based on the direct unmediated presence of an appearance, free of conceptual construction, then this would seem to impose certain serious limitations on the content of such knowledge. Not only would an omniscient being not know any volition or temporal change; such a being would also not know the experience of a duality between subject and object

In the MV -corpus a similar paradox is raised by the attainment of nirvikaZpajfiana-a state in which the conceptual distinction between subject and object is absent, as also is its phenomenal correlate. At least from our own deluded and unawakened viewpoint, an experience in which there could be no distinction between subjects and objects would seem to be rather restricted. Moreover, in the event that one could attain such a form of nonconceptual, nondual awareness, would such awareness bear any resemblance to the way in which ordinary deluded human beings experience the world, or would it be entirely different? This question has very direct and very serious soteriological implications. For if an awakened being experiences reality without conceptual distinctions or their phenomenal correlates, how then is it able to interact with, instruct, and aid ordinary human beings, who still dwell within a world of subjects and objects? A being who could not perceive the world as a subject confronting an object would appear to be oddly limited-particularly if its goal were to help ferry sentient beings to the further shore of awakening. Attempting a systematic account of the nature of Buddha that would deal with these problems was, it seems to us, one of the main impulses behind the development of systematic theorizing about Buddha after about the third century CE.


But there are also more strictly philosophical problems raised by the MY-corpus's treatment of mental imagery after awakening. This treatment, as we have expounded it, rests upon the claim that there is such a thing as experience prior to and independent of conceptual activity (which means also prior to and independent of linguistic and every other kind of cultural activity). This view is not easy to defend-it runs counter to much (probably most) contemporary English-language philosophy, as it did also to much philosophical thinking in India-and it has extremely complex philosophical ramifications. One dimension of these was worked out in the epistemological analyses of the differences between pratyak~a and anumiina offered by Buddhist thinkers after Dignaga; and another was explored in the debate between Yogacara theorists after Sthiramati as to whether consciousness is inherently sakara or niriikiira. It does not appear likely to us that the position can, in the end, be successfully defended; but our purpose here has not been to explain why this is, but only to clarify the usage of technical terms in a particular corpus on the topic of just why experience does not end in emptiness.

WORKS CI1ED

Anacker, Stefan. 1978. "The Meditational Therapy of the Madhyantavibhagabhlli?ya." Mahayana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice. Ed. Minoru Kiyota. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 83-113.

Bhattacharya, V. & Giuseppe Tucci, ed. 1932. Madhyantavibhiigasutrabha~yapka of Sthiramati. Part one. Calcutta Oriental Series 24. London: Luzac.

Frauwallner, Erich. 1956. Die Philosophie des Buddhismus. 2d. ed. Berlin: Akademie-verlag;

Friedmann, David. 1937, trans. Sthiramati: Madhyantavibhagapka. Utrecht: Utrecht Typ. Assn.

Griffiths, Paul J. 1986. On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.

Griffiths, Paul J. 1990. "Omniscience in the MahayanasutralaiJkaraand its Commentaries." Indo-Iranian Journal 33: 85-120.

Hall, Bruce C. 1986. "The Meaning of Vijiiapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind." Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 9: 7-23.

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Kochumuttom, Thomas P. 1982. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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Nagao Gadjin. 1964, ed. Madhyantavibhliga-Bha~ya. Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation.

______ . 1978. "'What Remains' in Siinyata: A Yogacara Interpretation of Emptiness." Mahliyana Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice. Ed. Minoru Kiyota. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 66-82. An earlier version of this piece (in Japanese) appeared as "Amareru mono," Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu 16.2 (1968): 23-27.

O'Brien, Paul. 1953-54. trans. "A Chapter on Reality from the Madhyantavibhaga.sastra." Monumenta Nipponica 9: 287-303; 10: 227-269.

Pandeya, Ramchandra, ed .. 1971. Madhyanta-Vibhliga-Sastra. Delhi: Banarsidass.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1969. La tMorie du tathligatagarbha et du gotra: etudes sur la soteriologie et la gnoseologie du bouddhisme. Publications de l'Ecole Fran<;aise d'Extreme-Orient 70. Paris: Ecole Fran<;aise d'Extreme-Orient

Sponberg, Alan. 1982. "The Trisvabhava Doctrine in India and China: A Study of Three Exegetical Models." Bukkyo bunka kenkyujo kiyo 21: 97-119.

Stcherbatsky, Th., trans. 1977. Madhyanta-Vibhanga: Discourse on Discrimination Between Middle and Extremes, Ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and Commented on by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati. Bibliotheca Buddhica 30. Tokyo: Meicho fukyiikai. (First published 1936.)

Tatia, Nathmal, ed. 1967. Madhyantivibhligabhli~am. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Tola, Fernando & Carmen Dragonetti, trans. 1983. 'The Trisvabhava-karika of Vasubandhu." Journal of Indian Philosophy 11 :225-266.

Wood, ThomasE. 1991. Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijiianavada. Monographs of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy 9. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Yamaguchi Susumu, ed. 1934. Madhyantavibhliga!lkli: exposition systematique du Yogacaravijiiaptivada. Vol. 1 (Sanskrit text). Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku.


Yamaguchi Susumu, trans. 1935. Madhyantavibhliga.tlkli: exposition systematique du Yogacaravijiiaptivooa. Vol. 2 (Japanese translation). Nagoya: Librairie Hajinkaku.

APPENDIX: SYSTEM OF REFERENCE FOR THE MY -CORPUS

o sas1Ia.sarIra (N 17; Y 1-9; P 3-9) 1 lak~~a (N 17-27; Y 10-63; P 9-50)

1.1 abhUtaparikalpa (N 17-22; Y 10-45; P 9-35) 1.1.1 sadasall~~a (N 17-18; Y 10-16; P 9-14) 1.1.2 svalak~~a (N 18-19; Y 16-21; P 14-18) 1.1.3 sailgrahalak~~a (N 19; Y 22-23; P 18-19) 1.1.4 asallak~~anupraveSopaya1ak~~ (N 19-20; Y 23-29;

P 19-24) . 1.1.5 prabhedal~~a (N 20; Y 29-31; P 24-25) 1.1.6 paryayal~~ (N 20; Y 31-32; P 25-26) 1.1.7 pravrttilak~~a (N 20-21; Y 32-35; P 26-28) 1.1.8 sailklesa1ak~~a (N 21-22; Y 35-44; P 28-34) 1.1.9 abhUtaparikalpap41<;Iartha (N 22; Y 44-45; P 35)

12 sunyata (N 22-27; Y 45-63; P 35-50) 1.2.0 sunyata: prologue (Y 45-46; P 35-36) 1.2.1 sunyatalak~~ (N 22-23; Y 46-49; P 36-38) 1.2.2 siinyataparyaya (N 23-24; Y 49-51; P 38-40) 1.2.3 siinyataprabheda(N 24-26; Y 51-59; P40-47) 1.2.4 sunyatasadhana (N 26-27; Y 59-61; P 47-49) 1.2.5 sunyatapiI).c;lartha (N 27; Y 61-63; P 50)

2 avar~a (N 28-36; Y 64-109; P 51-82) 2.1 paficavaraI).a (N 28; Y 64-68; P 51-53) 22 prayoganavasamyojanavar~a (N 28-29; Y 69-75; P 53-57) 2.3 bodhisattvavar~ (N 29-33; Y 75-89; P 57-68)

2.3.1 da.sa.subhadi~v avar~a (N 29-32; Y 75-83; P 57-64) 2.3.2 da.sakar~ani (N 31-33; Y 84-89; P 64-68)

2.4 bodhip~aparamitabhUmi~v avar~a (N 33-36; Y 89-107; P 68-81) 2.4.0 bodhip~aparamitabht1mi~v avar~a: prologue (N 33) 2.4.1 bodhip~e~v avaraI).a (N 33; Y 89-94; P 68-71) 2.4.2 paramitasv avar~a (N 33-34; Y 94-97; P 72-74) 2.4.3 bhUmi~v avar~a (N 34-36; Y 97-107; P 74-81)

24 nABS 17.1

25 avar~asamasa (N 36; Y 107-108; P 81-82) 2.6 avar~apil!<;Iartha (N 36; Y 108-109; P 82)

3 daSavidhatattva (N 37-49; Y 110-165; P 83-124) 3.0 daSavidhatattva: prologue (N 37; Y 110-111; P 83-84) 3.1 miUatattva (N 37-38; Y 111-113; P 84-86) 32 l~aJ!atattva (N 38; Y 114-116; P 86-87) 3.3 aviparyasatattva (N 38-40; Y 116-119; P 87-91) 3.4 phalahetutattva (N 40-41; Y 119-123; P 91-93) 35 audarikasuk~matattva (N 41-42; Y 123-127; P 94-97) 3.6 prasiddhatattva (N 42; Y 127-129; P 97-98) 3.7 visuddhigocaratattva (N 42; Y 129-130; P 99) 3.8 saIigrahatattva (N 42-43; Y 131-133; P 99-101) 3.9 prabhedatattva (N 43-44; Y 133-135; P 101-103) 3.10 daSavidhakausalyatattva (N 44-48; Y 135-163; P 103-123)

3.10.0 kausalyatattva: prologue (N 44; Y 135-142; P 103-108) 3.10.1 skandhartha (N 45; Y 142-143; P 108-109) 3.10.2 dhatvartha(N 45; Y 143-144; P 109) 3.10.3 ayatanartha (N 45; Y 144-148; P 110~112) 3.10.4 pratityasamutpadartha (N 45-46; Y 148-150; P 112-

113) 3.10.5 sthanasthanartha (N 46; Y 150-154; P 113-116) 3.10.6 indriyartha (N 46-47; Y 154-157; P 116-118) 3.10.7 adhvartha (N 47; Y 157-158; P 118-119) . 3.10.8 catuJ:1satyartha (N 47; Y 158-159; P 119) 3.10.9 yanatrayartha (N 47-48; Y 159-160; P 120-121) 3.10.10 samslqtasamslqtartha (N 48; Y 160-163; P 121-123)

3.11 tattvapi:g.9artha (N 48-49; Y 163-165; P 123-124) 4 pratip~abhavanavasthaphala (N 50-59; Y 166-198; P 125-148)

4.0 pratipak~abhavanavasthaphala: prologue (Y 166; P 125) 4.1 pratipak~abhavana (N 50-55; Y 166-187; P 125-140) 4.1.0 pratip~abhavana: prologue (N 50; Y 166; P 125)

4.1.1 catvansmrtyupasthanani (N 50; Y 166-170; P 125-127) 4.1.2 catvansamyakpraha:g.ani (N 50; Y 170-172; P 128-129) 4.1.3 catvara rddhipa~ (N 51-52; Y 172-176; P 129-132)

4.1.3.0 catvararddhipada1).: prologue (N 51; Y 172-173; P 129-130) 4.1.3.1 paficado~a1). (N 51; Y 173-174; P 130) 4.1.3.2 ~!apraha:g.asaI!1skara1). (N 51-52; Y 174-175;

P 130-132)


4.1.4 paficendriyani (N 52; Y 176-177; P 132-133) 4.1.5 paficabalani (N 52-53; Y 177-180; P 133-135) 4.1.6 saptabodhyangani (N53-54; Y 180-182; P 135-136) 4.1.7 ll{ltamargangani (N 54-55; Y 182-185; P 136-139) 4.1.8 pratipak~abhavanaprabheda (N 55; Y 185-187;

P 139-140) 42 pratipak~abhavanavastha (N 56-57; Y 188-192; P 140-144) 4.3 pratip~abhavanavasthaphala (N 57-58; Y 192-195; P 144-

146) 4.4 pratip~abhavanavasthaphalapi1)<;lartha (N 58-59; Y 196-198;

P 147-148) 5 yananuttarya (N 60-77; Y 199-262; P 149-193)

5.1 trividhanuttarya (N 60; Y 199-201; P 149-150) 52 ~a<;lvidhapratipattyanuttarya (N 60-73; Y 201-251; P 150-186)

5.2.0 ~a<;lvidhapratipattyanuttarya: prologue (N 60; Y 201; P 150-151)

5.2.1 paramapratipatti (N 60-62; Y 201-209; P 151-156) 5.2.2 manasikarapratipatti (N 62-64; Y 209-213; P 157-160) 5.2.3 anudharmapratipatti (N 64-69; Y 213-233; P 160-173) 5.2.3.0 anudharmapratipatti: prologue (N 64; Y 213-214; P

160) 5.2.3.1 ~a<;lvidhavi~epapari1)ata (N 64-65; Y 214-216;

P 160-162) 5.2.3.2 daSavidhaviparyasa (N 65-68: Y 216-226;

P 162-169) 5.2.3.3 daSavidhavajrapadani (N 68-69; Y 226-233;

P 169-173) 5.2.4 antadvayavarjanapratipatti (N 69-73; Y 233-251;

P 173-186) 5.2.5 visi~tavisi~tapratipatti (N 73; Y 251; P 186)

5.3 aIambananuttarya (N 73-74; Y 252-254; P 186-188) 5.4 samudagamanuttarya (N 74-75; Y 255-258; P 188-190) 55 sastninamavylikbyana (N 75-76; Y 258-259; P 191) 5.6 yananuttaryapi1)<;lartha (N 76-77; Y 259-262; P 192-193)

BROOK ZIPORYN

Anti-Chan Polemics in Post-Tang Tiantai

Introduction: Historical Background The period following the death of the sixth Tiantai patriarch Jingxi Zhanran (711-782) has been described as the second "dark age" of Tiantai. 1 It was a prolonged state of crisis extending from the Tang into the Five Dynasties and Northern Song, an age marked internally by the deterioration of distinctive Tiantai ideas and marked externally by the loss of crucial texts and monastic institutions, especially after the persecution of 845 (a period that saw the increased influence of Chan). Zhanran's reconstitution and revival of Tiantai had succeeded in part on the strength of his incorporation of Huayen "nature-origination" (xingqz) thought2 into the further development and schematization of the "natureinclusion" (xingju)3 conceptions that Zhanran saw in classical Tiantai. Zhanran seems to have regarded this incorporation as a method by which Tiantai nature-inclusion could be reinstated while sublating the Huayen strains of thought which had been gaining ground. 4 After the persecution, however, with the dispersion of texts and loss of institutional supports, the Tiantai school found itself in need of reconstitution. The non-dialectical and idealistic trend of "tracing principle and cutting off the nine realms of delusion" had come to dominate the world of Chinese Buddhist scholasticism by this time, making inroads into TIantai thought as well. This influence is evident already in the teaching of Zhanran's disciple Dao Sui,S and becomes more pronounced in syncretist figures such as Zhi Yuan (768-844) (who studied first at Mt

1. Ando Toshio, Tendai seigu shisio ron, trans. Yenpei fashi (Taipei: . Tianhua chubanshe, 1989) 174.

2. The doctrine that phenomenal dharmas "arise from" the buddha nature, but are not inherently included in it, such that it remains forever pure and undefIled by any determinate phenomena. 3. The doctrine that all phenomenal dharmas are inherent to the buddha nature. Both of these conceptions· will be explained in more detail below. 4. Ando Toshio 185. 5. Ando Toshio 178.

26

ZIPORYN 27

Tiantai and then at Mt Wutai, combining Heze Chan with TIantai teach -ings)6 and Daochang Ningfen (754-828) (who also combined Chan and Tiantai tendencies, and made his home at Mt. Tiantai).1 Mer the persecution, the Chan elements of this synthesis came into prominence. Even Deshao (881-972), renowned in his time as a reviver of Tiantai, was closely associated with the Fayen branch of Chan. 8 His student Yongming Yenshou (954-974) took this synctetic tendency even further, attempting to unify Tiantai, Huayen and Yogacara teachings under the auspices of a form of Chan theorizing emphasizing the "one pure formless mind,"9 a notion owing much to the Awakening of Faith, the Perfect Enlightenment Satra, and especially Guifeng Zongmi's (780-841) adaptation of the "numinous awareness" of the Heze school of Chan. Zongmi's infatuation with Heze Chan had all but eliminated the Tiantai influences, especially the notion of the evil inherent in the buddha nature (xing e), evident in the thought of his teacher, the fourth Huayen patriarch Qingliang Chengguan (738-839), who had spent some time studying under Zhanran himself and whose work incorporates elements of both Chan and Tiantai traditions. Zongmi moved the pure undefiled buddha nature, identified with undifferentiated and objectless awareness, to center stage. lO Indeed, as Peter Gregory has shown. Zongmi radically reinterpreted the Huayen tradition, taking away the centrality and ultimacy of "the non-obstruction of phenomenon with phenomenon" (shi shi wu ai) characteristic of Fazang's (643-721) teaching and replacing it with an ultimacy of ''the non-obstruction of phenomenon with principle" (li shi wu ai).1l For Zongmi, "principle" was identical with "mind" or rather the "numinous awareness" of the Heze line of Chan. In earliest proto-Huayen thought, as found in the works attributed to Dushun, on the contrary, prinCiple equals emptiness. 12 Fazang at times identifies prinCiple with the mind as suchness, and phenomena with the mind of birth and death (a distinction deriving from the Awakening of

6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 179. 8. Ibid. 181. Deshaobowever appears to have been highly critical of the

Chan claim to have a "special transmission outside the teachings," as can be seen from Shimen Zhengtong, juan 5, and Ando 181-2.

9. Ibid. 182-3. 10. Ibid. 184. 11. Peter N, Gregory, Tsung-mi and the Sinijication of Buddhism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 157-165. 12. Ibid. 7.

28 JIABS 17.1

Faith),13 thereby beginning the trend toward tathagatagarbha idealism that would come to culmination in Zongmi's Chan-friendly teaching. In Tiantai, principle is equivalent to the three truths and practice is centered, as we shall see, on contemplation of not the mind but of the nature of mind (xin xing) as identical with this principle. In Zongmi's own classification of teachings, this Tiantai system was made to appear quaint and cumbersome, falling short of a new trend which seemed to have carried the day: the emphasis on the undefiled numinous awareness. To further complicate matters, alternate versions of crucial texts attributed to Zhiyi were being recovered, mainly from Japan, giving normative authority to sometimes diametrically opposed doctrines and assertions. 14

It was in this atmosphere that an embattled llantai tried to reconstitute itself. Two opposite paths were taken to meet these challenges. One approach tacitly admitted the superiority of these new elements (the one pure mind, the original absence of defIlement, etc.) by claiming that these were originally Tiantai doctrines. The other approach held that the view of the Tiantai tradition was different from and superior to the Zongmi I Chan view. The first approach was that of what was later polemically designated as the "Shanwaijia" (Masters Outside [Tiantai] Mountain, i. e., the heterodox), while the second was taken by the "Shanjia" (Home Mountain Masters, i. e., the orthodox). It is in the polemics between these two opposed representatives of the Tiantai tradi tion that some of the most developed Tiantai critiques of strains of thought identified with Chan are to be found, as they battled each other for the mantle and the name of "TIantai."

The texts left in the wake of such disputes present interpreters with many daunting difficulties. Present day readers may well wonder, when making their way through these writings, what exactly is at stake in these convoluted debates. It is clear from examining the social and institutional setting in which these texts were produced that abbotships, donor patronage, and official imperial support, for example (which were often directly dependent on a monk's prestige and reputation) were at stake. A monk's scholastic reputation was also instrumental in gaining

13. Ibid. 157. 14. The direct impetus of the debates hinged on the long and short versions of Zhiyi's Jinguangming xuan yi, which seemed to imply different attitudes toward the contemplation of the mind. The former versions (embraced by the Shanjia) called for detailed contemplation of all the deluded phenomena of mind, while the latter recommended, for those of highest ability, the direct contemplation of the true mind, ignoring the deluded pheonomena. See the account in the FOlutongji, juan 8 (T. 49.192b), and also Anda, op. qt. 186.

ZIPORYN 29

entrance to the dharma-lineage of a particular tradition, which, once gained, brought material advantages in this life. There were post mortum benefits from such a position in the lineage as well, for one would be sacrificed to and cared for as part of a dharma line, if, of course, one was considered not to have already achieve enlightenment in this life -time. Furthermore, the authority granted by the tradition's validation of one's achievement (represented by one's final place in the gallery of dharma-ancestors) would fulfill one's "filial" obligations to one's teachers as well as one's vows on behalf of one's "descendants." All of this was something worth fighting for, especially if the prestigious dharmaheirship of a particular line of transmission that carried with it a certain degree of prestige became a matter of scholastic dispute. By means of a highly arcane discourse, the members of a particular class of monks were able to define themselves and maintain their positions by excluding those who had less perfectly mastered its literary conventions, thereby maintaining their position, their niche in the food-chain, and their monopoly on their particular type of power.

Their texts, of course, represent the stakes of these disputes very differently. According to their own declarations, the participants in these debates were seeking the accurate transmission of the experience of truth discovered by Sakyamuni, clarifying the highest teaching, contributing to the salvation of all sentient beings. They claimed to be seeking and explicating the truth, a truth which had soteriological significance. Understanding and practicing in accord with this truth would lead to enlightenment and liberation from samsara. In their endeavor to clarify this salvific truth, these polemicists systematically developed philosophical positions, which they were forced to explicate in much more rigorous detail than was the custom under less contentious conditions in China. These claims have a considerable philosophical interest in their own right Yet even from this perspective, the import of the texts is far from clear, and it takes some patience and induction to unravel the implications of some of the Song and post-Song Tiantai polemics against certain aspects of the Chan tradition.

Most of these polemics emerged as a kind of overflow from the infighting between the two contending branches of the Tiantai tradition referred to above. According to the texts that passed between represen -tatives of these two branches, the Shanjia felt the Shanwai had been unduly influenced by Huayen and Chan, especially by Zongmi (with his Huayen-flavored version of Chan "doctrine" or Chan-flavored version of Huayen doctrine), thereby polluting and diluting the distinctive, and

30 JIABS 17.1

moreover, true and salvific Tiantai tradition. Almost all of the . attacks on Chan "doctrine" discussed below appear in the context of this TIantai infighting, focusing particularly on Zongmi's version of this doctrine, a version especially influential among the Shanwai exegetes. Where Chan is attacked directly (for example, in the works of Siming Zhili [960-1028], the most eminent and vitriolic advocate of the Shanjia position), it is typically presented as a counterattack, with allusion to Chan sympathizers having disparaged Tiantai as inferior to the teaching of Zongmi and his sympathizers. IS The Chan tradition itself is accepted by Zhili as a legitimate part of the Buddhist heritage, and thus has its place, like other teachings, in his jiaopan (classification of teachings): itis part of the "special teaching" (biejiao). Zhili seems to have no particular vendetta against Chan per se; 16 he is annoyed only when claims are made that it surpasses the Tiantai "perfect" or "rounded" teaching (yuanjiao).

Main Points o/the Tiantai Critique The critique put forward by Zhili and his followers attacks Chan on a number of distinct but related fronts, which may be summarized as follows:

1. The excessive emphasis on meditation at the expense of doctrine, allegedly advocated by many Chan masters, was disparaged. The Tiantai polemicists claim to value doctrine and meditation equally. TIlis issue has little real content; it was for the most part a mechanical comparison of the slogans of the two traditions; with little interest in the actual content of these slogans. Indeed, there was far greater attention given to the precise mechanics of sitting meditation in TIantai than there was in Chan. 2. The Tiantai exegetes were harshly critical of Chan's alleged rejection of words, which grew, they said, out of a failure to see that words are a necessary vehicle to enlightenment. Although it can be argued that Chan writers advocated nothing of the kind (or at least had more

15. See for example Zhili's correspondence with Chan Master Tiantong Ning in Siming jiaoxing lu, (Taisho 46, 891-897 [=T. 46.891-897]) 16. Indeed, as Wang Zhiyuan has pointed out, there is evidence that Zhili's teaching technique was deeply influenced by methods we would now associate strongly with Chan, e. g., shouts and blows leading, according to the hagiography, to sudden enlightenment experiences. See Wang, Sungchu Tiantai Foxue qinmao (Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chuban she, 1989) 63-64.

ZIPORYN 31

subtle understandings of it than what was portrayed in Tiantai this polemic), many in the Chan tradition did seem to take the famous slogan about "a special transmission outside the teaching, not depending on words and letters" in a way that would not have been satisfying to a Tiantai exegete. Also involved here is a charge of a fundamental misunderstanding of the whole concept of upiiya, which is central to the TIantai view of the ultimate reality. In traditional Tiantai, the truth to be realized itself includes both the means to its realization and the process of realization. The three-fold buddha-nature described in the NirviilJa Sutra are the three causes of enlightenment: (1) the cause proper (zhengyin), that is, the objective truth to be realized, (2) the "revealing" cause (liaoyin), the process of coming to know this truth, and (3) the "conditioning" cause (yuanyin), the process of cOming to act according to this truth, and in such a way that furthers one's knowledge of it. These cannot be subtracted from the final effect, buddhahood, without causing a misapprehension of its fundamental nature. Indeed, the term "buddha-nature" must be taken to include all three of these aspects. The doctrine of upaya as expressed in the Lotus Sutra, as interpreted by Zhiyi, the de facto founder of the TIantai tradition, is also important here: the perfect teaching is typically distinguished from the special teaching in that the former "opens up" all previous upiiyas to "reveal" their ultimate truth (kaiquan xianshi). This is taken to mean that the perfect teaching sees all the upiiyas as necessary parts of the ultimate truth and its realization, inseparable from it and indispensable, such that all of them are "upaya which are intrinsic to the entity (of truth) itself (tineifangbian)." Part of what enlightenment consists in, according to this view, is an understanding of the entire Buddhist tradition itself (i. e., panjiao), in other words, how all the teachings, sutras, upiiyas, fit together into one coherent whole with one single flavorof enlightenment throughout. Such an understanding obviously depends strongly on the existence and understanding of specific texts. 3a The Shanjia exegetes were critical of Zongmi' s version of Chan doctrine (putatively representing the Heze line of Shenhui), which cast this doctrine in terms of Huayen thought, because it depicted all phe -nomenal reality as included in buddhahood, but only indifferently. In other words, for Zongmi, all that is, whatever it is, is the ultimate reality, the unchanging dharmakaya, subject to various conditions (sui yuan ) (the finite determination of which is external to the dharmakaya). The various differentiated things in the world are the dharma-

32 nABS 17.1

kaya. Here the fundamental model of wave and water is stressed. All waves are water, but the specific shapes of the different waves is not what is "watery" about them. It is irrelevant what shapes there are; it would be equally water whether or not there were waves. For the Shanjia, however, all that is, as it is specifically, is the ultimate reality, the dharmakaya. It is the nature of ultimate reality, not merely to assume any shape at all, but to be precisely these ten realmsP these three thousand suchnesses. 1S Buddhahood inherently includes all the other realms, all the other finite determinations in the universe. This makes the Shanjia in one sense much more firmly attached to traditional Buddhist cosmology; it is the Buddha's nature to be these ten particular realms, with their ten particular suchnesses, etc. We are told not only that anything is the Buddha, nor only that everything is the Buddha, but rather that Buddha is this everything that can be delimited into three thousand suchnesses. We are told what Buddha is, not only that he is whatever there is. The absolute is not to be conceived as an indifferent, indeterminate blank, capable of taking on any finite determination that happens to come its way, as Zongmi's mirror analogy and mind metaphor suggest Its nature is determinate; it is precisely the world that is the absolute, nothing more and nothing less. Distinctions and determinations are not merely an effect of delusion; they do and should exist. They are, in fact, part of the substance of tre dharmakaya, which differentiates itself and comes to know itself in all its finite determination, by means of this process of delusion and sub-

17. The realms of purgatory, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras, humans, devas, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and buddhas. 18. There are ten "suchnessness" (rushi) to each realm: appearance, nature, entity, power, activity, primary cause, secondary cause, effect, response, and consistency from beginning to end. The terms come from Kumarajiva's translation of the "Upaya" chapter of the Lotus, and come to be applied to each realm by Zhi Yi in the Fahuaxuanyi and elsewhere. There are said to be three thousand suchnesses because each realm contains all the others (10 x 10), each of which has the ten suchnesses (X 10), all of which is applied to the world as skandhas, as sentient beings or as physical environment (X3). 10 X 10 X 10 X 3 =3,000. The "three-thousandness" in particular is stressed by Zhili, as his renegade disciple Renyue derisively noted after going over to a modified Shanwai position. The specificity of this three thousand in the thought of Zhi Yi is much more problematic, as can be seen by his treatment of the Ten Thusnesses in the Fahua xuanyi, where they are treated as one scheme among many for categorizing what exists. Zhi Yi says, in effect, that all things can be integrated into one dharma (mind), or two (name and form), or three, or four, or a hundred million, as you wish, but the Lotus does it according to these ten (T. 33.732);

ZIPORYN 33

sequent enlightenment, which do not fall outside of it As Zhili puts it, "Our teaching makes clear that the substance with its three thousand dharmas follows various conditions to give rise to the Function (phenomena) with its three thousand dharmas. When it is not following these conditions, the three thousand are still there just the same. Thus the differentiated dharmas and the substance are not two, because even when delusion is eliminated, the distinctions remain."19 3b. Strenuous exception was taken to Zongmi's version of the Chan doctrine of the status of mind, which Zhili considers to have been a corrupting influence on the so-called Shanwai Tiantai monks. The point of contention is whether mind, however construed, has some special ontological status among all dharmas, as their source or ultimate ground, or whether it is in principle on equal footing with any other given dharma. The latter is Zhili's position, and he interprets the statements about the primacy of mind in Zhanran and Zhiyi to refer to a particularly effective meditation technique, selected because mind happens to be what is closest to the practitioner. Mind, here, is the ordinary, deluded mind of one who has not yet practiced meditation, rather than a purified or original mind. The mind is indeed the "source" of all other dharmas, to which everything can be reduced and by which everything else can be explained, but the same could be said of any other dharma, including any speck of dust or sound or smell. To contemplate mind is the easiest way to come to this understanding. Zhili alleges that the Shanwai have adopted the provisional "special teaching" (biejiao) of the Huayen school, which is also Zongmi's version of the underlying doctrine behind Chan's "special transmission." Indeed, the "mind" that is transmitted through the Chan lineage is this pure, ontologically ultimate mind, according to Zongmi. 4. The Chan lineage claimed a special authority deriving directly from Sakyamuni himself and forming a special transmission of the buddhamind outside of that recorded in the siitras. The TIantai polemicists hold this claim to be historically unfounded and religiously misguided

Siming Zhili's Critique of GUifeng Zongmi: Three Types of Identity Between SaTflSara and Nirvli1Ja Let me explicate these points now in greater detail. Zhili explicitly targets Zongmi and his version of the Chan lineage and doctrine in the f01-

19. Zhili, Shi buennen zhiyao chao, T. 46.715b. Emphasis added.

34 JIABS 17.1

lowing passage from the Shi buermen zhiyao chao ("Notes pointing to the essentials of [Zhanran's] 'The Ten Gates of Nonduality"'):

Question: It has been passed down to us that three of Bodhidharma' s disciples attained the dharma, but at different depths. Nizongchi said, "[Your teaching is] to cut off defilements and realize enlightenment." The master said, "You have got my skin." Daoyu said, "Deluded, it is defilements; enlightened, it is enlightenment." The master said, "You have got my flesh." Huike said, "Fundamentally there is no defilement; it is originally enlightenment." The master said, "You have got my marrow ." [Your] present [thesis], that "Defilement is identical with enlightenment," and so on, seems to be the same as the "skin" and "flesh" views. How can it be called unsurpassably perfect and sudden?

Answer: Scholars of our teaching, because of these words, are confused by names and miss the meaning. To use that to make determinations about this entraps and dissipates our teaching. Truly, it is because they do not exhaust the meaning of the character ji ("identical"). It should be made known that our understanding of "identical" is forever different from that of all the [other] teachers. This is because [for us] it is not a matter of two objects joined together, nor of two sides of something turned over. Rather, to be called "identical," this very substance [before us, just as it is] must be completely [the other] (dangti quanshi). And why? Defilement and saJ!lsara are manifested [lit., practiced] evil (xiu e); their whole substance is the dharma gate of inherent evil (xing e). Hence there is no need to cut off and excise them, nor to tum them over. Since the other schools do not understand inherent evil, they need to tum evil into good, or cut off evil and realize good. Thus even the "extremely sudden" still say, "Fundamentally there is no evil; it is originally good." Since they are not able to take the complete [manifested] evil as [inherent] evil, none are able to perfect the meaning of "identical." Thus (Zhanran) says in the Miaofa xuanhuajing xuanyiji,juan 7, "Since in their carelessness they have never even heard the name 'inherent evil,' how could they believe there is such a thing as the practice of inherent meritorious properties (xingde zhi xing)?"

[Question]: In that case, why not say "Defilement is identical to defilement," and so on? Why do you speak instead of enlightenment and nirv3I)a?

Answer: Truly it is not a separate meaning; it is just because inherent evil is all-penetrating and all-fusing, and quiescent, that it itself is given the names enlightenment and niTVli!!a. These names are ·set up [for this inherent evil] from the point of view of the ultimate truth. How is this similar

ZIPORYN 35

to the "skin" and "flesh" views? Moreover, since defilement and so on are completely inherent evil, how could one just say categorically, ''Fundamentally, there is none"?

But this story you have quoted, where Bodhidharma gives his seal [authorizing genuine dharma transmission] to Master Ke, with his "Fundamentally, there is no defilement, it is originally enlightenment" and so on, is all Zongmi's heretical explanation, which has led later people to take this as the ultimate, thus abandoning the three [evil] paths20 and only contemplating the "true mind." The Zutangji just says, "The second patriarch bowed three times, and stood in his position.,,21 Where does he say that defilement exists and enlightenment does not? Thus we should not use Zongmi's heretical explanations to make determinations about our school's marvelous doctrines.22

20. The "three paths" (san dao) is a peculiar Tiantai expression, used by Zhi Yi to refer to duJ;kha, karma and klefa, and thus to defiled, unenlightened samsaric existence as such. These three are meant to cover the entire nidana chrun, with ignorance, attachment and appropriation comprising "klefa," dispositions and becoming comprising "karma," and the rest comprising "duJ;,kha." The three paths are identical to the three tracks and finally to the three virtues of enlightenment (dharmakaya, prajiiil and liberation). They are not to be confused with the three lowest paths of samsara (usually called santu in these contexts), i. e., purgatory beings, hungry ghosts and animals. Zhill's point here as that evil, deluded existence, the deluded mind, must not be abandoned in meditative praxis; rather, it is to be the focus of that praxis, the nature of which is to be revealed and realized rather than left behind. 21. The extant version of the Zutangji includes neither version of this story. Instead, Bodhidharma simply states that these three disciples had attained his skin, flesh and marrow respectively, and moreover prophesies that his dharma heirs will begin to get worse and worse after six generations. (See Feng Minzuo, Chan yulu, vol. 2 (Taipei: Xingguang chuban she, 1982) 551. In the Jingde chuandeng lu,juan 3, the story appears as follows: "Bodhidharma said to his disciples, 'The time is at hand; let each of you speak of what you have attained.' Daofu said, 'As I understand it, to neither cling to language nor leave language behind is the function of the way.' The master said, 'You have attained my skin.' Nizongchi said, "As I now comprehend it, it is like beholding with joy the buddha-land of Ak~obhya, which one sees only once and then never beholds again.' The master said, 'You have attained my flesh.' Daoyu said, 'The four great elements are all empty, the five skandhas do not exist, and so, as I see it, there is no dharma that can be attained.' The master said, 'You have attained my bones.' Finally, Huike bowed, and then stood in his position. The master said, 'You have attained my marrow.'" This version of the story seems to derive from that which was available in Zhili's time. 22. In the Taisho the original version says: 'This transcends even the explanation that 'got the marrow.' Even if the intention behind Master Ke's view was based on this, the way of expressing it was imperfect Question: In your present explication of the perfect teaching, how could it be that you do not speak of cutting off delusion to realize principle, and of turning over delusion

36 nABS 17.1

Now we speak of "cutting off' from the point of view of this identity, so there is nothing to be extinguished. We speak of enlightenment from the point of view of this, so there is nothing to turn over. Defilements and srupsara are the dharmas of the nine realms [of hell beings, hungry ghosts, asuras, animal, humans, devas, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas]. Since [the teaching] is only called perfect if the ten realms [of the above nine plus the realm of buddhas] mutually inhere and contain one another, how could the buddhas destroy or transform the nine [other realms]? Only thus can [the Buddha] be said to "have mastery within evil" and only then can it be said that "The realm of the demons is itself the Buddha." Thus the perfect teaching's cutting off, realization, delusion, and enlightenment are spoken of only with respect to [subjective] taint [i. e., attachment] and purity, not with respect to [objective] good, evil, purity, or impurity. Since the other teachings do not understand that the [buddha-] nature inherently possesses all ten realms, they lack the perfect [teaching's understanding of the] meaning of cutting off and enlightenment. Thus they have attained the word "identical" but not the sense. This is the great path of the whole teaching of our school. 23

This passage sets forth the doctrinal foundations of the Shanjia case against Zongmi's version of Chan, but it will be necessary to untangle Zhili's own doctrinal position to get a sense of what exactly he is objecting to here. ZhiH's dilemma is that one of the positions that Zongmi's Chan (represented here by Huike) claims to have transcended sounds very much like the Tiantai position.· ZhiH must in effect prove, first of all, that there is no genuine scriptural authority for the story that Bodhidharma approved of this evaluation of the relative merits of the teachings. The fact that he bothers to do this suggeSts that Bodhidharma

to approach enlightenment? If you do speak of these things, how is it any different from Chiyu's explanation? Answer: How could it be, even with Master Ke, that there is no cutting off or overturning of delusion? And yet how could that make his view the same as that of the former two? Thus we can know that whenever there is talk of divisions between gradual and sudden, it is a matter of the motivations and methods of the cutting off and overturning." According to the Siming zunzhe jiaoxing lu (T. 46.896c), Zhili replaced this passage from the original version with the passage beginning, "But this passage you have quoted ... " after Zhili's correspondence with the Chan master Tiantong Ning. The new passage identifies the source of the quotation, which had been contested, and at the same time more specifically targets Zongmi. The target of the attack is not Bodhidharma, Huike, or the other luminaries of the early Chan lineage, but rather Zongmi's later misconstrual thereof. Zhili claims that Zongmi put forth the version refuted here in his GUifeng houji. 23. T. 46. 707.

ZIPORYN 37

was to him a figure whose authority mattered, while Zongmi was not. This is important, for it indicates the underlying ambivalence of Zhili's polemic against what we are here calling "Chan." For it seems that he is not targeting the entire Chan tradition and everyone in it, nor even every explicit doctrine of those included in this lineage, which are quite multifarious.24 Rather, it is Zongmi's authority and doctrine which are questioned. He has no authority to speak for the tradition, Zhili asserts, and moreover his own doctrine is fundamentally wrongheaded. It is he who arbitrarily characterized and ranked the teachings in this way, and he is not to be trusted. 25

Zhili's Critique o/Zongmi's Concept o/Mind In particular, Zhili objects to the influence of Zongmi's idea that "The one word 'awareness' (ziti) is the gate to all marvels," and that "What Bodhidharma transmitted was just this numinal awareness (lingzhi) and nothing more."26 Let us look at this objectionable doctrine of Zongmi' s in more detail. In the Chanyuan zhuquanji du xu, juan 2, he writes:

All sentient beings have the empty, quiescent, true mind, the nature of which is naturally pure from beginningless time, bright and undarkened, clear and ever aware. Ever dwelling undestroyed throughout future time, it is called the buddha-nature. . .. This awareness is not the same as that involved in coming to realize or know something. The point [of calling it awareness] is to make clear that the true [buddha] nature is not the same as empty space or trees and stones; hence it is called 'awareness.' It is not the consciousness of following objects and making distinctions, nor is it the wisdom which reflects on the essence and fully comprehends it. It is simply the single nature of true suchness, which is spontaneously always aware. Thus the bodhisattva Asvagho~ said, "True suchness is in its own substance true and substantial, conscious and aware." ... Wisdom and

24. Indeed, the authority of Yongjia Xuanjue (675-713), a figure associated with both Tiantai and Chan teachings, is respected elsewhere in this same text, and great pains are taken to show that Zhili is not contradicting him. Zhiyao chao, T. 46.709b. 25. Indeed, Zhili's contemporaries also noticed that this rejection of Zongmi did not entail a refutation of Chan as a whole. The Chan master Tiantong Ning, in his correspondence with Zhili, seems, if I understand him correctly, freely to admit that Zongmi's works contained many contradictions, and moreover that he had unjustly exalted Heze Chan and underemphasized the teachings of Niutou Chan. See Jiaoxing lu, T. 46.895. 26. Both statements can be found in Chanyuan zhuquanji du xu, juan. 2 (T. 48.405b). Tiantong Ning seems to be in complete agreement with Zhili on this objection to Zongmi.

38 nABS 17.1

awareness differ in that wisdom is restricted to the sages and does not reach to the ordinary, whereas awareness is possessed by everyone, sage or ordinary ... , The Ratnagarbha Sastra says, "Knowing being is perishable, knowing non-being is corruptible"-this is all merely the wisdom which knows being and non-being-"but knowing true awareness does not recognize being or non-being"-since it does not recognize being and non-being, it is the non-discriminating awareness of the self-nature. The mind of numinous awareness thus revealed is the true [buddha] nature, no different from the Buddha. ... This is the "third type" of Chan in its entirety, directly revealing the mind-nature. . . . Why then do the partisans of "destroying marks" [such as Madhyamika] only speak of quiescence and disallow the teaching of true awareness, while the specialists in "explaining marks" [such as Yogacara] cling to the notion that the ordinary differ from the buddhas, and will not allow the teaching that [ordinary beings] are identical to the Buddha? ... This teaching uses the single true mind-nature to transcend and also to encompass all tainted and pure dharmas. It transcends all as discussed above: it is concerned only with the substance, directly pointing to the numinal awareness, which is the mind-nature. Everything else is delusion. Thus it is said, "It is not cognized by consciousness, not an object of the mind," and so on, up to, "not a nature, not a mark, not the Buddha, not sentient beings, apart from the four possible propositions, cutting off all negations." It encompasses all in that all the tainted and pure dharmas are mind. When mind is deluded, it delusively gives rise to karma, thus leading to the four types of birth and the six paths of existence, and all the impure lands and realms. When mind is enlightened, it gives rise to function in accord with its substance, the four virtues [kindness, pity, joy, and equanimity] and the six perfections, and on to the four differentiations and ten powers, marvelous bodies and pure lands, all manifest in it. Since this mind manifests all dharmas, all dharmas are entirely identical (quan ji) to this true mind. It is just as when a person dreams: all the things he manifests in the dream are that person himself. When vessels are made from gold, all the vessels are gold; when images appear in a mirror, all the images are the mirror.27

This awareness, also called the true mind, for Zongmi transcends being and non-being, good and evil, all of which however it manifests or "cre~tes" as the objects of its awareness. At the same time, it is carefully distinguished from ordinary discriminating consciousness, the apprehension of external objects, logical thought, and from the specifically enlightened consciousness of the Buddha. All these particular forms

27. T. 48.404c-405a.

ZIPORYN 39

and characters are manifested in and by it, but by clinging to or concentrating on them, one misses the awareness itself, which is at the base of them all. The absolute nature itself is characterless and quiescent, differing in substance from all phenomena, and hence neither sacred nor profane, good nor evil, and so 011. Deluded thoughts and enlightenment are both equally manifestations of this mind, equally dependent on it and transcended by it

As Zongmi puts it, "The dao is the mind itself. . .. Evil is the mind itself." The mind is ever aware and this alone is important; whatever the object of awareness is, it is illusory compared to the mind. The object derives its importance and its reality solely from the fact that it is manifested in the mind, which alone is the Buddha. It is true that all phenomena are thus nothing but the absolute nature, that is, the mind, but this is not because of what they are in particular; but only because whatever they are, they are actually just this mind, which is the absolute. This is Zongmi's interpretation of "understanding that all characters are no characters"-all specific characteristics are reduced to illusory configurations of the mind, which alone is real. Objects are real in their substance, which is mind, but unreal in their qualities. As Peter Gregory puts Zongmi's point, "[T]his doctrine meant that all phenomenal appearances (hsiang [xiang]) only had reality insofar as they were seen to be manifestations (ch'i [qi]) of the nature (hsing [xing])."28 Thus one can see the Buddha everywhere, not so much because the Buddha "is" everywhere, but more importantly because seeing itself is the Buddha. The Buddha is seen equally in each object, the same operation is repeated over and over. Hence he can say, "Originally there is no defilement." for impurities, the differentiations of things, the suffering of finitude, are all illusory manifestations of the true mind itself; all of them are only real in that they are mind, which is in reality all they have ever been from the beginning. Hence, "Originally it is enlightenment" The true awareness, the mind, is in and of itself devoid of all characters, but all characters are manifest in it

1his mind is to be understood directly from one's constant experience of it. Intellectually, however, "mind" is not a simple concept, but rather a complex of ideas, and this way of speaking, saying that all things are the manifestation of the true awareness, suggests how the world is to be encountered. The fact that the absolute is characterized as "mind" implies that its relationship to all finite things is analogous to the rela-

28. Gregory 251.

40 JIABS 17.1

tionship between a perceiving mind and the things it perceives. The single perceiving mind is complete in each of its many perceptions. It "negativizes" (i. e., de-absolutizes) them, "transcends" them as Zongmi puts it ("not a nature, not a mark," etc.), for whatever it perceives is only a perception, rather than the mind or the thing itself; everything in mind is a relation; a perception is a manifestation of the relation between the object and the mind; everything in it refers to something outside itself. It is always aware, and yet always must be aware of something. The mind, in ordinary perception, both is and is not all the things it perceives, and those perceptions are both it and something else. In Zongmi' s description of the situation, all objects are both posited and superseded by the absolute, in the same way that objects are both posited and superseded by the perceiving (but not the cogitating) mind. The mind can abstract from any of its perceived objects and still be the mind, and yet all the objects are in the mind. In order to be itself, the mind is therefore not dependent on any of its objects, and yetit must have some object. However, the objects retain their independence-that they appear is due to the mind, but not what they appear as. This is understandable in the case of the metaphor, the ordinary perceiving mind, but in the case of the absolute, we are left to wonder where these particular determinations come from. The principle of relativity is here constricted to the dependence between mind and objects; the mutual dependence of objects, which gives them their particular characters, is left out of the account. Zongmi of course claims that the absolute, the mind, produces the individual forms it manifests, due to "deluded thoughts from beginningless time"; the mind is itself neither enlightened nor deluded, but can be enlightenment or delusion. Still, the manifestation of enlightenment is "the arisa! of function in accord with substance," while the manifestation of delusion is the "confused production of karma." There is some sense in which the substance is more similar to the enlightened manifestation than it is to the deluded manifestation, although it is the same mind in either case. The inner nature of the absolute bears a closer resemblance to some of its manifestations than to others, and this would seem to suggest that it is in fact "marked" by certain characteristics, leaving the deviations from these original characteristics inadequately explained.

For Zhili, this is not the ultimate teaching, although it does have a place among the legitimate doctrines of Buddhism. It is one form of the "special teaching," the second highest of the four general divisions of the Buddha's teachings, according to Zhiyi's classification of teachings. It falls short of the perfect teaching for two main reasons. First, it gives

ZIPORYN 41

special status to something called mind or awareness. True, the claim is made that this mind has no characteristics, i. e., is not a "something" at all, is no particular dharma. Nonetheless, it is described as manifest in certain types of activity, for example, in the sentience of sentient beings, as perceptivity, which is a certain type of dharma, although perhaps a peculiarly problematic one, as discussed above. This distinction goes back to Zhanran's doctrine (put forth in the lingang Bei) that inanimate objects possess the buddha nature, a doctrine which would seem to present difficulties for this identification Of the buddha nature with the activity of awareness.

For 1:he Tiantai school, as Zhili interprets it, the buddha nature is not to be identified with the any dharma simply called "mind" or "awareness." It is conceived first and foremost as the three truths: emptiness, provisional positing, and the mean (kong, jia, <hong). These are interpreted in different ways in each of the four teachings. In the perfect teaching, these three truths are claimed to be of equal value, none more "ultimate" than the other two. Each is said to imply the other two, and any two can be reduced to the other one. Emptiness signifies the lack of self-nature due to conditioned arising. Provisional positing signifies the conditioned arising due to lack of self-nature. The mean signifies the harmonious conflict or non-obstruction of these two opposed points of view, the fact that they express exactly the same thing, while still being opposites.

The special (or separate) teaching is said to cling to "only the mean" (danzhong), a view of the union, and thus transcendence, of these opposites. The absolute is understood in the perfect teaching, on the other hand, to be "not only the mean" (budanzhong), a unity of opposites in which the opposed pair remain opposed although reconciled, "sublated" rather than left behind. Anyone of the three truths brings with it the other two; one cannot speak of emptiness without thereby admitting provisional positing, and its harmony with emptiness. One cannot speak of provisional positing without thereby admitting emptiness and its harmony with provisional positing. According to Zhili, the truth of provisional positing in the perfect teaching signifies, more specifically, neither the conditioned arising nor merely the "establishment" or positing of dharmas, as in the lower teachings, but rather "inherent inclusion," Uu), the integration of all dharmas by each dharma, the fact that each dharma "avails itself' (jia) of all other dharmas

42 nABS 17.1

to become what it is.29 This is the basis of the claim, found in Zhiyi's Sinianchu and derived from the prajfiaparamitii sl1tras, that "all dharmas go to [i. e., are reducible to] form, to scent, to each speck of dust," etc., so that we can speak of "form only, scent only, sound only" as well as the more usual "consciousness only." Consciousness is emphasized only because of its greater utility for purposes of contemplation and cultivation. As Zhili puts, any dharma, chosen at random, is the totality, the single unifier of all dharmas (Suiju yifa jie de wei zong).30

Any given dharma is thus to be regarded as (1) thoroughly negated (other-referenced, passive, dependent), and also as (2) provisionally posited as a certain particular entity with specific characteristics, and at the same time, one is to see (3) the perfect harmony, indeed mutual implication of these two views of the same dharma. To view the perfect harmony is to preserve the particular characteristics of a given dharma while seeing that this phenomenon is the center and essence of everything else, a self-creative power, the one explanatory principle to which everything else can be reduced, availing itself of everything else (selfsufficient, independent, irreducibly what it is).

These three truths are correlated in Tiantai with "the three tracks" (sangui), i. e., the track of subjective consciousness (guanzhao, contemplation), action (zicheng, literally, what is depended on for becoming and completion, i. e., practice) and objectivity (zhenxing, the true nature). In Zhiyi' s Jinguangming xuanyi, ten triads are correlated, representing ten stages along the three tracks. 31 Each triad, therefore, contains one member correlating with each of these three general ideas: subjectivity, action and objectivity. These range from the "three paths," i. e., karma (action), defilement-vexations (subjective consciousness) and suffering (objectivity, i. e., the truth about what exists), to the three buddha natures: the active cause (yuanyin) of the achievement of buddhahood, the revealing cause (liaoyin) and the objective cause (zhengyin), and finally to the three virtues: liberation (action), prajfia (subjective consciousness) and dharmakaya (objectivity). 32 Here we see all phenomena analyzed into an omnipresent trinity of action, subjectivity and objectivity. The moment of negation, of emptiness among the three truths, is correlated with subjectivity, provisional positing is correlated

29. See Zhili, Siming shiyi shu, T. 46.836a. 30. Zhiyao chao, T. 46.708b. 31. The ten triads are also discussed in the Fahua xuanyi, T. 33.744a. 32. See Wang Zhiyuan, Sungchu Tiantai Foxue qinmao (Beijing: Zhongguo jianshe chuban she, 1989) 16-25, for a fuller discussion of these ten trinities.

ZIPORYN 43

with action. Their mutual non-obstruction and inclusion, the mean, is the element of objectivity, the ultimate truth about them. The three truths give us the inner structure of all the terms in the three tracks, understood in terms of the root idea of conditioned arising.

The status of mind is conceived very different! y here than it had been by Zongmi. The phenomenon of awareness as manifested in human beings and other sentient beings is a form of one of the three tracks, subjective consciousness, necessarily bound up with and implying the contrary tracks of objectivity and action, each of which also implies the unification of the other two. All of these are regarded as unfoldings of the implications of the simple doctrine of conditioned arising. Hence consciousness has no special or prior status relative to physical form, or to anything else. It is indeed the absolute itself, but this is equally true of any other given dharma Indeed, the only consciousness experienced is not a "numinal awareness," but something thoroughly conditioned, and it is precisely this fact that makes it "marvelous"; it is this conditionedness that is the basis of all the three truths as manifested in everything. The momentary joining of object and sense organ in the deluded consciousness makes this consciousness a useful object of contemplation. Zongmi says of the numinal awareness, "the mind is self-knowing, not dependent on conditioned arising, not arising due to the object The one word awareness is the gate to all marvels." 33 But this would make it a useless object of contemplation for Zhili, since what is to contemplated is precisely conditioned arising and the necessary implication of all three truths and all they entail. The goal of all practice and contemplation is to see the three truths, not to see mind, which is just a special instance thereof.

This is a point of great importance for Zhili: Zongmi's doctrine is pernicious because of its negative effect on practice. To enjoin beginners to contemplate the true mind is to cut off their entry into the truth, for the purpose of completed contemplation and practice is finally to perceive this true mind, which is necessarily also to perceive true form, true scent, true skandhas and so on. This absolute is indeed everywhere, as "even a child knows," but this is merely the "identity of name," (the first and lowest of Zhiyi's six levels of identity between samsara and nirvana) not the final identity of realization (the last). Zongmi describes the cultivation of this "awareness":

33. Zongmi, Chanyuan zhuquanji du xu, juan. 2. (T.48.405b)

44 nABS 17.1

Non-cutting, non-cultivating, freely following [the mind-nature]--only this is called libemtion. The nature is like space, neither augmented nor diminished; what need is their to add to or repair it? Simply extinguish karma in all times and places and nourish the holy embryo, and it will increasingly manifest, naturally divine and marvelous. This is true awakening, true cultivation, true realization. ... Awareness is without any [determinate] thought or form-where then can· there be any mark of self or other in it? When one realizes that all marks are empty, the mind is without thought. When a thought arises, one becomes immediately aware of it, and once one is aware of it, it becomes nothing. The marvelous gates of practice all depend on this .... After one realizes that all marks are no marks, one naturally cultivates without cultivation .. ."34

The essence of cultivation is here portrayed as seeing that any determinate fonn or thought that might arise in consciousness is actually nullified because it can be seen as simply the mind itself, rather than that particular fonn. The mind itself is without any determinate character. To see that all determinations are manifestations of this indetermination (marklessness) is enlightenment; this is to reduce the particular determinations to indetermination, giving them value only in that determination per se is in fact a manifestation of indetermination, and hence is the absolute. This absolute is equally accessible through any perception, and the procedure in any case is the same: to ignore the determination itself (see it as "no determination," "no mark") and reduce it to the markless mind. What particular thing it is simply does not matter. The recognition of this ever-present awareness is, according to Zongrni, what all the Chan patriarchs up to Shenhui had been obliquely indicating, and it was what Shenhui openly proclaimed, because he could not find anyone of sufficient karmic acuity to understand it through silent direct pointing. 35 In the elaborate meditation techniques advocated by the Tiantai patriarchs, attention is directed specifically to particular types of phenomena, dealing with them in their finite determination and offering a different analysis of each, showing how this particular dharma is a manifestation of the structure described by the three truths. To claim that one need only be constantly mindful of this mind is to imply that these techniques are unnecessary. Such an implication is unacceptable to Zhili.

34. Ibid. 35. Ibid.

ZIPORYN 45

The authors of these polemics, both Tiantai and Chan, accepted many of the same texts, but interpreted them according to their school's individual doctrines. Thus, Zhili and Zongrni would agree on the identity of defilement and enlightenment. Zhili' s point in his critique of Zongmi is the mere claim of identity tells us very little because it can be taken in a wide variety of ways. When Zongmi claims that all things, every scent and sight, are the absolute, he is, according to Zhili, taking this to mean that since they are all actually mind, and mind is the absolute, scent and sight are the absolute. That is, they are mediated by another term, mind, in attaining their status as absolute. This speck of dust is absolute, not in that it is a speck of dust, but in that it, like everything that manifests, is manifested in mind, has no being other than that of the mind, and hence is absolute. There is nothing absolute about "dustness" per se. As Zhili says of the Zongmi-influenced Shanwai scholars:

They directly point to the dharma of mind and call it principle [i. e., the absolute]; they do not point to [all] phenomena as being identical with principle. Only because the two phenomena, sentient beings and buddhas, are reduced to mind do they call them identical to principle. For them, each dharma does not immediately, right here, possess the three thousand dharmas [comprising the universe]. Thus we know these teachers, although they quote [Zhiyi's] dictum about "form only," twist it so that it only means [an instance of] "only the true mind."36

Here we have the problem of what identity means for these various exegetes, as discussed by Zhili in his discussion of Bodhidharma' s three disciples. This identity is conceived by Zhili as consisting in the fact that the three thousand dharmas, the determinate features of the entire universe as seen from every point of view, are implicitly contained in every particular dharma, both in principle and in phenomena. Any given dharma, for example, a speck of dust, is the universal totality (zong), and every other dharma is its particular manifestation or part (hie) in two senses:

1. In principle, all the three thousand, including all the phenomena in the experience of buddhas and hell beings, mutually inhere in any given speck of dust-its nature is the three-thousandness of the three thousand, including all their mutual connections and determinations; they are what make it what it is, they are its innermost essence. To

36. Zhili, Zhiyao chao, T. 46.709a.

46 JIABS 17.1

look at this one dharma is to look at all actually existing dharmas. To speak of this dharma is to speak of the entire totality of the universe as manifested here and now, with this particular aspect forming the focal point and all the others fonning the background. To speak of another dharma is to speak of this same totality, but with a different focal point highlighted. This relationship is what is elucidated by the three truths, the simultaneous being-itself and being-others of every dharma, and the ten tracks that grow out of them. This is the "root of nondwelling,"37 the mean which is neither emptiness nor positing-byavailing (jia), but is both. Without this speck of dust, the absolute (which is itself three thousandness) would not be the absolute; part of what it is to be the absolute is to include this speck of dust, which has a particular place in the system of the three thousand dharmas. As such this dharma, even if it is an experience of a being in the lowest hell, can never be eliminated

2. Each dharma is equal to the totality in phenomena in the sense that, as the Vimalakfrtinirdesa Sutra says, the defilements are the seeds of buddhahood. 38 That is, this speck of dust can develop into any other of the three thousand; it has the potential to become any of them without exception, it is the starting point from which any other can be attained, merely by developing, in actual fact, (some ot) the potentialities of its own inner nature, which is in fact just this three-thousandness. For a buddha-dharma to become a hell-dharma, or for a helldharma to become a buddha-dharma, does not require any perversion of its own inner essence as such, nor even a relinquishing of its particular finite detennination; it is merely a change in focus in the totality. From this point of view, defilement is identical to enlightenment in that whatever detennination is in defilement, in the phenomenal world, all the three thousand phenomena, is also in enlightenment, and in the absolute which is neither and both, in the essence of things, and can never be eliminated. The absolute includes the realms of both hell being and buddha, both ultimate and provisional teachings, and in fact these all include each other, since the totality is the essence of each. Any particular dharma, with all it characteristics and distinctions, is

37. See Mou Zongsan, Foxing yu Bore, vol. 2 (Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1989) 675-760, for a full discussion of the importance of the concept of the "root of non-dwelling," a notion taken from the Vimalikfninirdesd Satra, in Tiantai thought. 38. See Zhili, Shiyi shu, T. 46.835b.

ZIPORYN 47

fully accounted for in the essence of any other particular dharma. Dustness per se is an essential part of the absolute itself, which cannot be correctly conceived without dustness, without this particular speck of dust. Moreover, dustness (or better, this dustness) is an essential part of deluded mind, of buddhahood, of asura experience, of deva experience, of hell being experience, and vice versa, they are all essential to this dustness. This finite determination is itself an exemplification of the essential threefoldness, of the three tracks, of the three truths, of the mutual implication of negation and positing, of Ire moments of subjectivity, objectivity and action, all of which are involved in a specific way in each particular dharma. Thus by comprehending thoroughly (via contemplation of the three truths in medi -tation) the nature of this speck of dust or this moment of thought per se, of its particular determinations, we understand the absolute.

Whatever may be the problems involved in this line of thought, it is clearly very different from that embraced by Zongmi. We can now understand the criticism of the latter view quoted at the. beginning of this essay. Zhili speaks of three types of identity. First, there is the union of two separate things. According to Zhili's follower Kedu, 39 this corresponds to Nizongchi's position that delusion is to be cut off in order to realize principle, that is, that the two are joined together in everyday experience, and one can be eliminated, leaving the other intact. Next there is turning over of a single thing which has two sides, which Kedu says corresponds to Daoyu's view that when one is deluded, all is delusion, but when one is enlightened, it is the way-that is, one object is seen from now one angle, now another, but the object itself apparently has these two distinct aspects, which can be seen in separation from one another. It is this position which sounds dangerously close to the Tiantai view; the difference is that for Tiantai both versions must be present and visible simultaneously, with no change in the object. This means that ZhiU did not say what kind of identity was implied by the position put forth by Huike, i.e., the poSition of Zongmi himself. He merely says that this type of identity is unable to take (manifest) evil as (inherent) evil, and hence does not reach the complete meaning of identity, that is, the total identification of this thing just as it is with its opposite.

39. In his Shibuermen zhiyao chao xiangjie, ZZ 2-5-2. (Xuzang jing, vol. 100 [Taipei: Xinwenfeng] 339-341).

48 nABS 17.1

It would seem then that the Zongmi I Huike view would involve an identity where one of the terms was asserted to be a complete illusion, or a misperception of the other thing, as if one were to mistake a rope for a~ snake; the rope and snake are identical in that there is no snake, and what you were perceiving as the snake was in fact precisely the rope. Here the misperceiving supplies the determination "snake," and this falls outside the rope itself, in the observer, who somehow stands apart. For Zhili, on the contrary, it is part of the nature of the rope that it be perceived as, and manifest itself, as a snake. This snakeness itself is in fact part of what the rope is, and in fact, if thoroughly understood through correct practice, contains the whole nature of the rope; to understand the snake is to understand the rope. The nature of snakeness is the nature of ropeness, and this nature is not a blank marklessness, but includes the determinations of both snake and rope.

Zongmi uses the metaphor of the mar;.i jewel in his critique of the Hongzhou school of Chan. The jewel represents "the one numinous mind; its perfectly pure luminous reflectivity, empty tranquil awareness; and its complete lack of coloration, the fact that awareness is intrinsically without any differentiated manifestations." 40 The colorless jewel reflects any color it comes into contact with, as the mind "follows condi tions." For Zongmi, the Hongzhou doctrine that all ordinary activities are manifestations of the original mind is like seeing a jewel that is next to a black object, and concluding that blackness is the jewel's marvelous reflectivity. Consequently, the Hongzhou take any similar black object to be the jewel, and can never apprehend its true colorless state, reflecting nothing, as in the mind's state of "no thought."41 Zhili's poSition differs from both the putative Hongzhou position (with its potential antinomian consequences) and Zongmi's critique thereof. For Zhili, there can never be a time when the jewel is reflecting nothing; it is always colored. To apprehend its "colorlessness" means rather just to see the whole array of contrary colors it is capable of reflecting, all of which, in their particular differences from one another, are intrinsic to the notion of reflectivity. "Reflectivity as such" makes no sense; to understand reflectivity is to understand all that can be reflected, including blackness. To understand that the color seen in the jewel is only a reflection is to see that the jewel, even in its blackness, is capable of whiteness with no change at all in its nature, such that, since all black is reflected black,

40. Gregory 245. 41. Ibid. 246.

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black has white intrinsically "in it" and white has black intrinsically "in it" Neither white nor reflectivity need be sought outside the blackness presently being reflected. There is still a premium set on whiteness here, rather than on reflectivity as such (as in Zongmi) or the putative wertjreiheit of the Hongzhou school, which values neither whiteness nor blackness nor reflectivity above anything else. For Zhili, it is simply that this whiteness is intrinsic to blackness, and vice versa, and when this is realized, the blackness is identical to whiteness (not only to "reflectivity").42 This is taking evil as evil, and seeing complete identity in the thing just as it is.

'This is why Zhili lays such stress on the doctrine of inherent evil (xing e), or the evil inherent in the buddha nature, for only this makes the particular evil determinations themselves the whole absolute. This evil phenomenon itself is inherent in the absolute, and it may thus be called inherent evil; since this inherent absolute includes all the three thousand dharmas, penetrating even to the buddha-dharmas, it is "marvelous" in its own right Indeed, the Buddha is only the Buddha due to his having realized his identity with the other nine realms; he could not relinquish them without destroying his own nature, and ceasing to be the Buddha. They are eternal parts of the essence of the Buddha himself, who can never eliminate his inherent evil. Moreover, each of these parts contains the whole, and hence every evil dharma is itself, just as it is, the absolute. Elsewhere Zhili elaborates on the importance of inherent evil in his conception of identity:

We discern the difference between different types of identity by means of whether or not there is inherent inclusion [of all, including evil, determinations]. How is this? If the dharmadMtu about which one is deluded does not in itself inherently possess the three obstacles [karma, defllement and retribution], and only has these three obstacles because of [one's own] tainted [understanding, ran], then even if we speak: of the one [buddha] nature following along with conditions, the taint and delusion are still considered self-sufficient (zizhu), and the poison and harm are creative of something new; to go back to the source, the three obstacles must be destroyed, and thus the meaning of identicalness is not complete. This cannot yet be called the poison which is identical to principle and the [buddha] nature, and thus this doctrine belongs to the special teaching. ... If, however,

42. From this we can see how Zhili might have criticized the Hongzhou school, which in spite of its historical ascendancy within Chan was never as influential among Shanwai theorists as Zongmi's ideas, and hence is not directly confronted in these polemics.

50 nABS 17.1

the dharmadhatu about which one is deluded originally and inherently includes the three obstacles, which manifest because of one's tainted[understanding, which is itself inherently included therein], then the taint and delusion are dependent [on the buddha nature], and the poison and harm create nothing that was not already there. When one returns to the source, the taint and poison are still there as always. Only this perfects the meaning of identity .... Thus we should know that the substance inherently possesses the three obstacles, and when it gives rise to the function of the three obstacles, it still functions in accordance with substance. ... In the perfect teaching, since inherent evil has been explained, delusions of view and thought, large and small, are poisons which are identical to the [buddha] nature. This being the case, these poisons themselves are that which is capable of overcoming and destroying [poisons]. Since the poisons are what can destroy poisons, they can be absolute just as they arewhere is there any differentiation between that which destroys and that which is destroyed, that which traces and that which is traced? Poison and harm are identical to the mean, all dharmas are reducible to harm, the awareness that negates it and posits it are mutually identical. . .. 43

Here Zhili goes so far as to assert that the defilements, in that they are "identical" to buddhahood and other defilement-conquering dharmas, contain in themselves their own conquest. TIlis conception can be traced back to Zhiyi's comparison of evil to a piece of bamboo, which includes in its own nature the potential for fire (good), which, when manifested, in fact consumes the bamboo; moreover, when the bamboo is gone, the fire also vanishes.44 In practical terms, there is no need to go in search of something outside of the defilements to overcome them; in meditation, one merely concentrates on the deluded mind itself, not by contemplating it by means of or in terms of some other pure mind, but merely by seeing what is only implicit in this suffering, that is, the true nature of this suffering, which will become manifest through this practice of concentration. Implicit in this suffering and delusion are the three tracks, grounded on the three truths. When fully manifest, these three tracks are called dharmakaya, prajfia and liberation. When still implicit, they are called samsara, delusion and karma. In either case, the entire sequence

43. Zhili, Shi Qing Guanyin shu zhong xiaoju san yong (T. 46.872c, Jiaoxing lu, juan 2). 44. Fahua xuanyi, T. 33.743c-744a. Cf. also Zhanran's statement: "Not only are the substance and nature of ignorance and dharmata one in what is contemplated; the consciousness doing the contemplating is itself ignorance." (Quoted by Zhili in Ibid.)

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of implicit and explicit states are inherent in each, and the final stages, when fully explicit, are not to be understood apart from the prior implicit ones, nor from the entire process of revelation of what had been implicit According to Zhili, only this relationship between phenomenal suffering and ultimate liberation can be called a relation of identity.

Zhili thus asserts that the resemblance between his teaching and that which is transcended in Zongmi's story is only superficial; There is a crucial difference in understanding between the two doctrines in question: what is lacking in the rejected views of Daoyu and Nizongchi is, in sum, the peculiarly Tiantai doctrine of inherent evil. Without this notion, in Zhili's view, all understandings of the relationship between the opposites of delusion and enlightenment, and specifically what is meant by their identity, are superficial and fall short of the perfect teaching.

The Status of Upaya and the Nature of Dharma Transmission This notion is closely linked with the Tiantai doctrine concerning upliya. For just as the Buddha contains within himself all the other realms, and would not be the Buddha if hell beings and hungry ghosts did not also inhere in him, so the ultimate truth cannot be separated from provisional truth, and would not be itself without the lesser teachings that precede it The provisional truth can never be eliminated or left behind, because the ultimate truth would then fail to be the ultimate truth; it is only ultimate by virtue of its mutual inherence in the provisional truth, which is also, therefore, ultimate. In Tiantai, upliya is seen as having a profound ontological significance as the most perfect manifestation of the three truths. Hence the Lotus, with its focus on upliya, is honored by them above all other scriptures. Huaize, a Yuan dynasty follower of Zhili's, in his Tiantai Chuan Foxinyin ji, quotes the Lotus as saying, "The real ultimate mark of all dharmas is none other than provisional upaya and real ultimacy." (zhuja shixiang buchu quanshz), which he glosses by saying:

"All dharmas" are the good and evil active cause and revealing cause [or buddha natures, that is, the second and third causes of buddhahood, corresponding to the second and third of the three tracks, provisional positing and emptiness], sharing the same substance within upltya; the realmark is the good and evil objective cause [or buddha nature, the f"Irst of the three causes of buddhahood, i. e., the objective cause proper, corresponding to the rrrst of the three tracks, the mean] sharing the same substance within ultimacy.,,45

45. Xuzangjing, vol. 101 (Taipei: Xinwenfeng) 802.

52 nABS 17.1

Here the real nature of all phenomena is asserted to be none other than the principle of upiiya itself, of a provisional positing which is perpetu"', ally exposed as false and superseded. The truth, in other words, is the ' process of falsehood [partial truth] leading to truth. 46 All dharmas are here characterized as quan, provisional, upiiya, a term used originally to apply to types of teaching; the application of this concept thus overflows from the pedagogical into the ontological. The logic behind this overflow is seen in the notion that the phenomenal world is a "cause" of buddhahood. Technically, it is two of the three causes (identified in the Nirvii1}a Sutra) associated with consciousness and action. These two causes pertain to the moral sphere of practice, as opposed to the "object" of cultivation, the truth to which one is to become awakened. In both cases there is necessarily "good and evil," since these are all considered necessary conditions for the accomplishment ofbuddhahood.47 Indeed, the direct cause, the truth, the real -mark, turns out to be nothing more than the two other causes. The provisional steps along the path, seen in their necessary totality in their mutual non-obstruction as the third truth (the mean), is nothing but the relationship of the other two truths. Thus Huaize is able to speak of "Universally manifesting the form body from the position of the fruit [of buddhahood] , hanging down and forming the nine realms, playing in the six paths of existence." Here the nine realms (everything there is besides the Buddha) are depicted as something put forth by the Buddha as a teaching device, on the model of the provisional teachings described in the Lotus. Moreover, Huaize insists that this "putting forth" is not a deliberate miraculous act by the Buddha, but is rather a direct and natural expression of his own innermost nature, for

46. If taken seriously, and put, for example, into mathematical terms, this suggests a very strange situation, since one of the two terms is said to be equal to itself plus something else. That is, if X=ultimate truth and Y=provisional truth, we are here told that X=X+Y. This reduces to, X= Y +(Y +(Y +(Y +(Y .... )))), and so on ad infinitum. If we were to be so foolish as to "solve" this equation, we would find only that Y =O,and that X= this infmite structure of mutually superceding zeroes, and this, indeed, reveals something important about the Tiantai notion of the absolute. The provisional phenomenal world is nothing more than the absolute, nothing in addition to it, and thus nothing in a sense, in that it is nothing in its own right; but at the same time it is an intrinsic part of the definition of the absolute itself. 47. Huaize goes on to specify that the good causes are the ten thusnesses of the buddha realm, while the evil causes are the ten thusnesses of the nine other realms, all of which necessarily mutually inhere.

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the real-mark includes provisional positing within itself. This, he explains, is what is meant by "non-creation" and "non-doing." The world is thus to be experienced as a teaching device, something that is in itself false if taken literally but true in that it is manifested by and in fact inherent in the truth itself. The world is a means devised skillfully to lead one to the truth, which will turn out to be this principle of truth and half-truth itself, fully elaborated.

TIlis doctrine is important in the Tiantai attitude toward Chan, and toward the attitude toward upiiya expressed in Chan rhetoric. Indeed, Huaize's work ends with an extended critique of the Chan tradition concerning the transmission of a special doctrine to Mahakasyapa Interestingly, it does not deny that Mahakasyapa received the transmission of the dharma, for this had been declared at the beginning of Zhiyi's Mohe miguan, with Mahakasyapa identified as the first patriarch of the Tiantai lineage. Instead, he denies that what was given to this patriarch was a "special transmission outside the teaching." Huaize reasserts the ultimacy of the Lotus, the importance of the doctrine of inherent evil as a cause of realized buddhahood,48 and thus defines "transmission" as what was given to all those about whom the Buddha prophesied in the Lotus, which ultimately includes all sentient beings. Those who receive the transmission are described as:

diligently studying the buddha-vehicle and broadly transmitting the holy transforming [teaching]; or in the presence of their teacher, earnestly receiving instruction-this is known through meeting with him; or studying the subtleties and searching out the secrets of the siitras and commentaries-this is known through hearing him. Between the meeting and the hearing, the two minds shine on each other, with a mysterious comprehension and silent tallying-this is called transmission. My mind originally possesses it, it is not attained from others-this is called non-transmission. Although mind originally possesses it, it only becomes known when indicated and shown. This is called transmitting this non-transmitted marvel, like a seal stamped on the mind-this is called the mind-seal.

48. As he says later in the same text, "The man of the perfect teaching inherently includes both good and evil, just as 'The superior man is not a specialized vessel' [Analects 2:12]. He is capable of both good and evil, his substance and function are not two. But the man of the special teaching does not inherently include both good and evil, just like a purely good man who is unable to create evil. Only when he is fettered by delusion can he create evil." Ibid. 833.

54 nABS 17.1

Huaize goes on to say that this mind-seal is associated with enlightenment from the side of self-practice, and that it was passed on to all the bodhisattvas in the Lotus Sutra, which he quotes in support of his claim. He goes on to assert that a special charge was indeed given to Mahakasyapa, but that it concerned only "transformation of others," that is, the spread of the teaching, the beginning of a lineage, and quotes many texts in support of this distinction. This charge was given generally to the whole assembly and also especially to Mahakasyapa. The latter received a special charge for a number of specific reasons. For example, his ascetic practices would make the dharma long endure, and that by attaching this charge to someone with small CIDnayana) attainment' it would lead more easily to practice and transformation of others. In other words, this transmission of the dharma to Mahakasyapa was wholly a matter of upiiya, which according to Tiantai doctrine is always necessarily both provisional and ultimate, like all other parts of the doctrine. It was not that he had some special realization that the others lacked, but just that he was the one who could pass on the dharma to later ages-in other words, his selection had to do solely with the transformation of others. Huaize asks, "How could it be that the transmission of the seal of the buddha-mind was given to Mahakasyapa alone, and all the others did not comprehend it? The people of the world, being unclear about this, have cheated the saints and sages, and deludedly given rise to pernicious doctrines, unable to know the meaning of transmission of self-practice and transformation of others." This parry, like ZhiH' s attack of Zongmi, is, by Huaize's own account, a response to a critique of the Tiantai doctrine by Chan sympathizers, and seeks to turn the tables. In his description of the transmission of the mind seal, aspects like self-practice and the transformation of others are carefully distinguished and their textual referents identified. The stress is clearly on long study and specific practices, a characteristic of the Tiantai approach that stands in stark contrast to Chan rhetoric on this issue.

For the Tiantai tradition, this relationship between self-practice and transformation of others, stressed in the last line quoted above, is of crucial importance; the two have a specific, determinate relationship, corresponding to particular stages on the Buddhist path and supported by specific texts, and must be clearly distinguished. At the same time, according to Tiantai notions of the ontological status of upliya, the two are in fact mutually inherent. Both sides of this relationship, their distinction and their identity, are to be kept in view; only then is their true structure understood. This is analogous to the conception of the three

ZIPORYN 55

truths, where the true structure of emptiness and provisional positing is understood only by seeing their distinction and simultaneously seeing their mutual non-obstruction, the mean-this is to see "not oruy the mean." Hence the transmission of a "direct pointing," which purportedly did away with upaya, separating self-practice from the transformation of others and treating the latter as inessential, is not the transmission of the whole truth. By a familiar TIantai paradox, dispensing with upaya is just what marks it as upaya, as holding to "only the mean," the "special" or "separate" teaching. The rounded or perfect teaching is characterized by "not only the mean," which must include upiiya, the means for teaching others, within itself. Thus Huaize does not mean to denigrate Mahakasyapa; rather, he undercuts the Chan tradition by saying that he was indeed great, but only in that he alone understood the importance of upaya, the mutual inherence of self-realization and transformatiQn of others. He alone realized that true enlightenment was inseparable from the process of going on to teach others employing the full range of upiiya used by the Buddha throughout his career. It is for this reason that he is credited with founding the lineage. Thus, the tables are turned on the Chan tradition: what made Mahakasyapa the patriarch was not that he had some special transmission outside the teachings which could dispense with upaya. Rather, he was the patriarch precisely because he mastered all the teachings, that he alone, of all who had become enlightened, understood and utilized upaya exhaustively.

1his line of attack is perhaps even clearer in the Southern Song monk Fadeng's work, Yuandwz zongyen, the central concern of which is just this issue. Fadeng's work begins as follows:

The [Mohezhiguan] says, "[The dharma that was preached] fIrst in the Deer Park, next on Vulture Peak and finally in the Crane Grove [where Sakyamuni died]-this dharma was given to Mahakasyapa." This shows that the Tathagata's treasury of the true dharma-eye was given to MahakaSyapa, which was then passed on [to his dharma-heirs] in sequence and never cut off. The reason it was given to MahakaSyapa was because of his advanced years and eminent virtue, his ascetic practice of cleansing disciplines (dhuta), which made him able to propagate [the dharma]. It was also because the proper karmic conditions were with him. But wherein lies [the essence of] the dharma passed on to him? How was it passed on? What was its size [i. e., its place in the classification of teachings, from "small" (Hinayana) to "large" (Mahayana)]? Here I will try to put forth [the answers to] these [questions].

56 nABS 17.1

Some say, "At the dharma meeting on Vulture Peak, the World-honored one held up a flower, and Kasyapa smiled; this is the mark [of the dharma he received]." But this theory has no basis at all in the Indian scriptures, and must be considered merely a metaphor created by later people.

Some say, "In the prajiil1pl1ramitl1 siitras there is preaching through another [that is, the Buddha speaks through one of his disciples]; t1!is is the passing on of the dharma." But this theory still does not specify what it is that is transmitted. Moreover, in the prajila siitras it is Subhiiti and Sariputra who receive [the Buddha's miraculous power in this way], not KaSyapa

Some say, "The Tathagata was giving out [the dharma] constantly, everywhere he went; how could it be restricted to one time and place?" This theory is extremely vague and unfocused. ...

But if the explanation of the passing on of the dharma is not made clear, we do not know what dharma it is that is being transmitted, nor how it is that the patriarchs passed it on to each other. Not knowing its essentials, it is difficult to [further] transmit it. In this way, we have only the words "transmitting the dharma," but not the actuality. Alas! To "hear it on the road and then immediately go speaking of it in the streets" (A reference to Analects 17:14) was already ridiculed by the ancients; how much more [would they ridicule those] who do not even know the reason? The glory of the teaching of the buddhas and patriarchs is flourishing especially in the present age; how cotild there be no reason for it?

People of later ages gave rise to heretical views, and thus we have the "special transmission outside the teaching," also known as "[The transmission is] simply holding up a flower and that is all." But among students of the Buddha, although there is a difference between Chan [meditation] and doctrine [teachings], since they all depend on the Buddha, they must all take the buddhadharma as their standard. The buddhadharma is precisely that which was transmitted to Kasyapa. What was transmitted to Kl1syapa was nothing but that Dharma that was first [preached] in the Deer Park, next on Vulture Peak andfinally in the Crane Grove; when was there an additional "special transmission"? If we seek out the reason [for this erroneous theory], it is that [these people] did not comprehend the source, and fearing that Chan and doctrine wotild be mixed together, they came up with this theory of the "special transmission," not knowing that the "special" [teaching, in the Tiantai classification] is itself unacceptable . . . . Some say, "We transmit the mind with the mind." But I would like to know, how is it that they know this mind can be transmitted? Is it not through the explanations given in the teachings? How much more so in that "Words and letters are free of any self-nature; they are identical to liberation"? (Quoting from the Vimalikirti Sutra.) From this we know that Chan and doctrine both point to what was given on Vulture Peak.

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How could what KaSyapa transmitted be in conflict with the buddhas and patriarchs? ...

The transmission of the dharma is the transmission of the essence of the buddha-mind. You should know that this essence can be looked at in its wholeness or in its division into parts. Its parts are all the teachings that were preached throughout the Buddha's career . ... In its wholeness, it is the Lotus Sl1tra's "opening of the provisional to reveal the real," which explains the Buddha's wisdom and vision, and reveals the source and selfnature of all dharmas. All earlier preaching was upiiya. But now that the real has been revealed, it all becomes Buddha's wisdom and vision. KaSyapa did not understand the ftrst time. The next time, it was explained with the parable of the "high, vast, great cart" and Kasyapa heard it and rejoiced in his heart, and thus truly received it. Truly it is because this wisdom and vision of Buddha includes and integrates all knowledge and all views that it is said, "The unexcelled correct dharma is given to Kasyapa. "49 ••. This shows that the mark of passing the dharma was right there on Vulture Peak, and has no other explanation. It just refers to the Buddha's wisdom and vision. Although the dharma includes Hmayana and Mahayana, at this point they all revert to a single path. ... When the ancients said the World-Honored One held up a flower and KaSyapa smiled, was it not this [wisdom and vision of the Buddha conveyed in the Lotus] they were symbolizing?

This wisdom and vision of Buddha-what person does not possess it? What Q.harma is not thus? The essence of what was given on Vulture Peak lies in this alone. What the patriarchs transmitted was just this dharma. What Zhiyi was greatly enlightened to was just this dharma, and the vast river of his discerning explanation was all the explanation of this dharma The ultimate truth propagated by Nagilljuna with words and letters was this dharma. The inconceivable three contemplations with the one mind in [Zhiyi's] Mohe zhiguan is simply reflection on this dharma. Riding the bejeweled chariot straight to the bodhima!1-4a is to realize this dharma. When Bodhidharma exclusively transmitted the mind-seal, he was transmitting this dharma. How great this dharma is! It is the source of both Chan and doctrine. Although its streams differ, the source is the same. The essence of what all [these streams] reduce to is also only one. Those who chase after the streams and lose the source are ignorant of the essentials of what is transmitted. This is to betray the Buddha's appearance in the world, since the enlightenment he transmitted will be destroyed by this.50

49. A reference to the Buddha's commendation of Kasyapa in the "Prophecies" (shouji) chapter of the Lotus, after KaSyapa has recited the verse version of the story of the "prodigal son." 50. Xuzangjing, op. cit., 399-400. Emphases added.

58 JIABS 17.1

There is much that is noteworthy in this passage. Leaving aside for the ... -moment the typical Tiantai interpretations of other figures in Buddhist hagiography, we notice that, again, the transmission to KaSyapa is recognized as legitimate; it is the nature of what was transmitted that is contested Kedeng wishes to assert that what MahakaSyapa and all who followed him (including, presumably, Bodhidharma) transmitted was none other than the buddhadharma as recorded in the scriptures; it is not a special transmission outside the doctrine. The acknowledgment of KaSyapa in the Lotus ensures that this transmission is indeed legitimate. Nonetheless, it is only one of the many forms that this teaching took, one of the "parts" (bie) of the Buddha's teaching, the totality of which is given in the Lotus, which in fact revealed that the parts were all parts of a whole. The parts are naturally no different from the whole; the whole, divided, is the parts and the parts, together, are the whole. But no one part can replace the whole. The error of these Chan exponents is to take Kasyapa's transmission as sufficient unto itself; in truth it must be considered in its proper context with all the other teachings, compared to the discourse in the scriptures, which, Kedeng asserts, are utilized by the Chanists themselves quite freely for their fundamental conceptions. For Tiantai, the intellectual acquisition of these conceptions, although not the ultimate realization of truth, are a necessary and integral part of the process of that realization.51 Hence words and letters cannot be considered external to the ultimate truth transmitted, as Chan rhetoric seems to claim. Indeed, the career and teaching methods of the Buddha are intrinsically not separable from the content of the ultimate truth that is transmitted The truth that is transmitted includes the determinations of being "first [preached] in the Deer Park, next on Vulture Peak and finally in the Crane Grove." It must include all parts of the teaching, even those that have been superseded; these are not to be left behind, but included in the final realization of truth. Thus the ultimate is described as "the Buddha's wisdom and vision," characterized as the integration and inclusion of all knowledge and views, that is, the points of views of all other sentient beings. These are constitutive of the Buddha's wisdom, which is simply the integration of all of them, overcoming their mutual exclusivity while omitting none. The content of the Buddha's wisdom includes the views of all beings, which serve as the conditions

51. It is, for example, classified as the second of the "six identities," i. e., the identity of name. This consists simply in hearing or reading the words that tell one that one is in fact identical with the Buddha.

ZIPORYN 59

for the various distinct teachings he put forth during his career. Hence Kedeng says, "All earlier preaching was upiiya. But now that the real has been revealed, it all becomes Buddha's wisdom and vision."

The Tiantai view is inherently syncretic, since it claims that the truest teaching is the one that excludes no other. It is no surprise, then, that here, as in Zhili, there is no attempt to place Chan completely outside the pale of Buddhism; rather, it must be "put in its place." . But there are many ways of putting all the parts together, and many types of syncretism. Although Kedeng's rhetoric and tone may be more accommodating than Zhili's, both probably advocated the same position for Chan in the overall system of teachings.

Tiantai in Zongmi's Classification o/Teachings But there are other ways of accommodating Tiantai and Chan. Almost every school of Chinese Buddhism that employed a classification of teachings included competing teachings but relegated them to a nonultimate status. It is instructive to consider Zongmi's own treatment of Tiantai, which he seems to consider a particular type of Chan. Zongmi, contrasting the "three truths" of the Tiantai school, as representative to the "nature teaching," with the "two truths" of the Madhyarnika, representative of the "emptiness teaching," to show the superiority of the former, writes:

The emptiness teaching says that all worldly and superworldly dharmas do not escape the two truths. . .. The nature teaching integrates all natures and marks and own-substances into the three truths. All physical form and other dharmas arise through conditions; this is the worldly truth. Causally arisen dharmas have no self-nature, and thus all dharmas are empty; this is the supermundane truth. ... The one true mind-substance is neither emptiness nor.jorm, but is capable of being either emptiness or form. This is the middle way, the ultimate truth. It is like a bright mirror, which also can be viewed from three perspectives. Of the images reflected in the mirror, we cannot call the green yellow; the beautiful and ugly are naturally distinguished. This is like the worldly truth. These images have no selfnature, each of them is completely empty. This is like the supermundane truth. The substance [of the mirror] is always bright, and is neither empty nor green or yellow, but is capable of being empty and of being green or yellow. This is like the ultimate truth. . .. Thus the Tiantai school cultivates the three types of concentration and insight according to these three

60 nABS 17.1

truths, in order to accomplish the three virtues [of nirviiJ;la, i. e., prajiia, liberation, and the dharmakaya].52

The characterization of the mean here is especially worthy of notice: it is called the "one true mind-substance" (yiz/len xinti). Thus Zongmi integrates the Tiantai way of thinking into his own; the ultimate truth is characterized as specifically "mind," and conceived on the model of a mirror which can reflect all forms without itself being attached to or stained by any of them. This teaching is honored by Zongmi as a nonultimate form of the ultimate teaching, the content of which is identical to that advocated by Zongmi's version of Huayen and Chan, but expressed in a less felicitous way.

It was this conception of the mean as "mind" that so irked ZhiIi, who insisted that the "mind" mentioned by Zhiyi in connection with the contemplation of the mean referred to the ordinary unenlightened mind, and was not meant as a characterization of the mean itself. The mean could be described equally well by any dharma; mind itself is to be considered no more than a dharma among dharmas, with no greater or lesser a claim to ultimacy than any other. To call the absolute "mind" is to link it intimately to one particular type of dharma, the dharma of mind, at the expense of all others. Even if this mind is asserted to be fundamentally different from the phenomenal dharma we ignorantly call "mind," this use of the term "mind" indicates at least a kind of root metaphor by which the absolute is to be conceived. Zhili stresses that in coming to understand the absolute, there is no choice but to start from what is nearest in ordinary experience. The process of understanding and transcending and integrating these dharmas of direct experience are part of what enlightenment is.

Zongmi's conception of the absolute, as something which is neither X nor not-X, but capable of performing as either X or no-X, echoes a conception that goes back at least to the Huainanzi, and probably much further. This is the conception that the Tiantai exegetes would characterize as "only the mean," characteristic of the "special teaChing." The determinations themselves fall outside the absolute; the X that the absolute is not but is capable of being could be anything at all. The metaphor of the mirror is taken originally from Zhili's Mohe zhiguan. There, however, we find the following:

52. Chanyuan zhuquanjidu xu,juan 3 (T. 48.407b). Emphasis added.

ZIPORYN 61

It should be known that one moment of thought is identical to emptiness, to provisional positing, to the mean. All of these are ultimate emptiness, all are the tathagatagarbha, all are the real mark. They are not three and yet three, three and yet not three. They are neither joined nor separate, and yet joined and separate, and not not joined and not not separate. They cannot be identical or different, and yet they are identical and different. It is like a bright mirror: the brightness symbolizes being identical to emptiness, the image symbolizes being identical to provisional positing, the mirror symbolizes being identical to the mean. These are neither joined nor separate, and yet their togetherness and separateness are there as always. They are not one, two or three, and yet their twoness and threeness is not impeded.53

The mirror simile here serves to illustrate the relationship between the three truths, asserting their mutual implication and identification. The idea being stressed is that, although these three aspects can be picked out and isolated in thought, they are in reality inseparable. There can be no talk here of "only the mean," that is, only the mirror is real. The simile is meant to suggest that, when considering any particular image in the mirror (the context here has to do with meditating on a particular moment of thought in the mind), one cannot separate the image itself from the light reflected by the mirror or from the substance of the mirror which is doing the reflecting; when looking at this image, it would be absurd to ask, "Which are you looking at, the image, the light, or the mirror?" To look at any is to look at all three. Nonetheless, one can understand what is meant by the question, keeping the three meanings distinct in one's mind Hence the three are joined and not joined, separate and not separate. 'This is the point of Zhiyi's simile.

Zongmi takes it in a very different sense, stressing the sole ultimacy of the mirror (the mean), and identifying it with the mind. There is nothing intrinsically yellow or green about the mirror; the fact that these particular forms appear in it is dependent on something other than the mirror. The absolute is a kind of pure potentiality, which remains unchanged and unstained by any of its accidental differentiated actualizations. Hence the two earlier aspects remain one-sided here, and neither in itself seems to imply the other two; they must wait for the third truth to be integrated and related, and once that third truth is reached, they are no longer in force. Zongmi was thus able to take the Tiantai teaching of three truths as characteristic of the teaching he wished to advocate, a step that was to have, from Zhili' s point of view, disastrous results among

53. Mohe zhiguan, juan 1(T. 46.9a).

62 JIABS 17.1

scholars who claimed to belong to the Tiantai tradition itself, who would confuse this version of the Tiantai teaching with that of the Tiantai patriarchs.

Conclusion From the above, we can perhaps come to understand some of the com -plex issues involved in the Chan / Tiantai confrontation, a confrontation which left its traces in the texts and elsewhere. Many other relevant issues and texts will have to be left unexplored for the moment. When pressed to do so, Tiantai exegetes criticized Chan claims to a special kind of transmission superior to any other, and were highly critical of a particular formulation of Chan doctrine, which also claimed a special preeminence over highly exegetical and doctrine-specific teachings, such as those favored in Tiantai circles. The conception of the absolute advocated by this formulation of Chan doctrine, and indeed underlying the claim to a special transmission of the buddha-mind outside the teachings, was criticized by the Tiantai writers for its lack of specificity, and for its ability to be conceived apart from the whole of the Buddhist tradition and teachings, and apart from the specific universe of three thousand particular types of dharmas that conditioned the process of gaining enlightenment. From this we can see, in a wider perspective, that of all Buddhist schools the Tiantai was perhaps more deeply committed to certain aspects of the mythological Buddhist universe, the a priori necessity of which they worked into their general theory of the absolute with great subtlety and sophistication. For these exegetes, the realization of the absolute necessarily involves the understanding of asuras, hungry ghosts and so on; without these, the absolute cannot be what it is. For other schools, it would be easier to say instead that whatever there is, the absolute is not that but is capable of functiOning as that; the essential thing about the absolute is its ability to be neither this nor that, and also both this and that, whatever the this and that might be. The Tiantai writers prided themselves on a more richly determined conception of the absolute, but ironically this may have limited their appeal, and allowed the competing doctrines to make inroads with the many educated people who were sympathetic to an articulated theory of the absolute such as this, but were not convinced of the literal truth of the Buddhist description of the cosmos. The durability of the Tiantai doctrine over years of changing social conditions and increased knowledge of the world would thus perhaps have been limited by the thoroughness and profundity of their doctrine.

ZIPORYN 63

The Chan tradition profited from opposite features; ties to specific practices, world-pictures, and even doctrines were systematically minimized, a condition which made it both versatile and durable. Zongmi's version of Chan doctrine was one of the more definitive and influential formulations (although it had its Chan critics) and therefore served as the most common target of Tiantai polemics. Yet it is important to remember that Zongmi did not exhaust the positions and practices of the traditions called Chan. In practice, the "absolute" in Chan was even more indeterminate than Zongmi's version of it. Zongmi's was a definite doctrine that openly proclaimed itself, but even his version was much too indeterminate for the Tiantai writers. What the Chan writers were definite about, however, was their lineage and their special transmission. This was the source of their authority. Thus the Tiantai attacks on the doctrinal presuppositions behind the Chan view of a special transmission, and its implications for upaya, may be considered the most enduring aspect of the polemics considered here.

64 JIABS 17.1

CHARACTER LIST

hie hiejiao hudanzhong dangti quanshi dan zhong guanzhao Guifeng Zongmi ji jia jiaopan Jingxi Zhanran ju kaiquan xianshi kong, jia, zhong Ii shi wu ai liaoyin Iingzhi panjiao qi quan quan ji ran rushi sandao sangui santu shi shi wu ai Siming ZhiIi suiju yifa jie de wei zong suiyuan tinei fangbian xiang xing xing e xingju

xingqi xin xing xing de zhi xing xiu e yizhen xinti yuanjiao yuanyin

. zhengyin zhi ZhiYi zhenxing zhufa shixiang buchu quanshi zicheng zizhu zong

ZIPORYN 65

DING-HW A EVELYN HSIEH

Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in's (1063-1l35) Teaching of Ch'an Kung-an Practice: A Transition from the Literary Study of Ch'an Kungan to the Practical K'an-hua Ch'an

INTRODUCTION The compilation ofCh'an kung-an (public case) texts during the Sung

. dynasty (960-1279) was aimed at producing literati literature.1 Once the iconoclastic styles of Ch' an pedagogy had been written down as texts annotated with elusive poetryand polished prose, only people with substantialliterary credentials-dominantly male-<:ould approach them. This delimitation is further reflected by the fact that Ch' an monks of the Sung had close associations with Sung literati (shih-ta-fu). Ch'an Buddhism in the Sung may thus be generally labeled as a type of "literati Buddhism."2 The literary approach to Ch'an (wen-tzu Ch'an), however, would seem to contradict Ch' an' s doctrine of "not depending upon words and letters" (pu-li wen-tzu). This paper is a study of the practice ofCh'an kung-an taught by Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in (1063-1135), a monk of the Lin-chi school from the Szechuan region. He played a significant role in transforming the literary approach to kung-an into the practical k' an-hua Ch' an (Ch' an of investigating the critical phrase or word, hua-t'ou, of kung-an). Moreover, it is in part through the teachings of Yuan-wu that the Ch'an tradition of Szechuan which had been

1. See Robert M. Gimello' s discussion of the relationship between Ch 'an and literati culture during the Sung in "Marga and Culture: Learning, Letters, and Liberation in Northern Sung Ch'an," Paths to Liberation: The Marga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Ir. and Robert M. Gimello; Studies in East Asian Buddhism 7 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992) 371-437. 2. This term is derived from Erik Ziircher; see his definition of using "gentry Buddhism" to label Chinese Buddhism in the fourth and the fifth centuries, in The Buddhist Conquest of China: The Spread and Adaptation of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959) 4-6.

66

HSIEH 67

marginalized (both geographically and culturally) strove to merge into the mainstream of Sung religious and cultural life.

In recent decades, much has been written about Ch' an kWlg-an and k'an-hua Ch'an. Scholars have discussed the use of kWlg-an in the Lin-chi Ch' an school, ascribed the emergence of k' an-hua Ch' an to Tahui Tsung-kao (1089-1163), and analyzed the process of using hua-t'ou in Ch' an kung-an praxis. However, little attempt has been made to link an individual Ch'an monk's regional background with his treatment of Ch' an teaching and practice, nor has there been much focus on the transition from the literary study of kung-an to the practical k'an-hua Ch' an. Moreover, some scholars, who have held the view that Ch' an during the Sung was in a period of decline, blame the deterioration of Ch'an on the emergence of wen-tzu Ch'an by using Yuan-wu's Pi-yen lu (Blue Cliff Record) as an example. 3 The present paper, then, aims to introduce Szechuan as an important place in the case of Ch'an's response to Sung literati culture and to give much more positive recognition to Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in, the master of Ta-hui Tsung-kao, in the evolution of the mature k'an-hua Ch'an.4

CH' AN IN SZECHUAN: A SHIFT TOWARD LITERARY ENGAGEl\1ENT AFTER THE FOUNDING OF THE SUNG

Geographically, Szechuan was a peripheral, landlocked area that had not been brought under effective central control until the founding of the Sung empire. Though Szechuan had long been in contact with Central Plain culture, geographical seclusion and the lack of central regulations and restraints allowed the local people to pursue their own cultural and religious life, which might even appear "unorthodox" to those who in the capital region .. Moreover, without the patronage of the central authorities, Buddhism, Taoism and even the local elite had to rely more on the support from the common people and, therefore, paid more attention to their needs.

3. See, for example, Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964) 403-4. 4. Furuta ShOkin, however, recognizes the great importance to Yuan-wu's teaching ofCh'an kung-an in the evolution of kung-an practice, in "Koan no rekishi-teki hatten keitai no okeru shinrisei no mondai," in BukkyiJ no lwmpon shinri, ed. Miyamoto ShOson (Tokyo: Sanseido, 1956) 820-6.

68 nABS 17.1

In the case of Buddhism, both Tao-hsuan's (596-667) Hsu kao-seng chuan (Further Biographies of Eminent Monks) [645-667] and TsanDing's (919-1001) Sung kao-seng chuan (Biographies of 'Eminent Monks compiled during the Sung) [988] indicate that among the thirtythree eminent monks in Szechuan during the T'ang dynasty (618-907), those who were engaged in translating the Buddhist scriptures (1) and interpreting the Buddhist doctrines (6) were less numerous than those who were famous for mystical communication (8), reciting the scriptures (5), practicing meditation (4), producing merit (4), and so on. 5 Apparently, in Szechuan Buddhism during the T' ang the common people were the target audience, in particular, in the Buddhists' struggles with the Taoists. 6 The Ch'an history in T'ang Szechuan further shows that during the eighth century the major tendency in the Ch'an school here was toward a radical anti-textual, antinomian movement.7

We do not know much about the development of Buddhism in Szechuan under the two independent regimes, the Former Shu (907-925) and the Latter Shu (934-965). The extant historical records focus mainly on the Five Dynasties in north China and the kingdoms around the Lower Yangtze Valley such as the Wu-yueh (907-978) in Chekiang, the Min (909-960) in Fukien, and the Southern T'ang (937-975) in Nanching (in the Kiangsu province).8 All one can say is that during this

5. See the statistics by Kiyoshi Fuji, in "TOdai Shoku chiho ni okeru shomin to Bukkyo," in Bukkyo shigaku 3:4 (1953), 19. 6. See HKSC, in T. 50, 530c-531a, 600b-601b, 642b-643a, 688a-b, 698a, etc. Also see Kiyoshi Fuji, ibid., 20-2. 7. See the study by Yanagida Seizan, "The Li-taifa-pao chi and the Ch'an Doctrine of Sudden Awakening," trans. Carl Bielefeldt, in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, ed. Whalen Lai and Lewis Lancaster, Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series 5 (Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, 1983) 13-49. 8. The kingdoms in southeast China were regarded as the most flourishing regions for Buddhism during the period of Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms. See Chih-p'an (1220-75), Fo-tsu t'ung-chi (A Comprehensive Chronicle Record of the Buddhas and the Patriarchs; hereafter cited as F7TC) [1269] 51, T.49.451b, 453a, 454b; Nien-ch'ang (1282-1323), Fo-tsu Ii-tai t'ung-tsai (A Comprehensive Record of the Successive Generations of the Buddhas and the Patriarchs; hereafter cited as FTLTIT) [1341] 17 & 18, T.49.650b-659c; so can be seen in Tsan-ning's SKSC. Indeed, the biographies of the Szechuan monks (including those who were from and those who were active in Szechuan) between the ninth century to the mid-tenth century recorded in the large, officially-sponsored Buddhist historical texts are very few; Kuan-hsiu (832-912) [in SKSC 30, T.50.897a-b] and Ta-sui Fachen (833-919) [in CTL 11, T.51.286a-b] were probably the most eminent

HSIEH 69

period of disunity, Ch'an in Szechuan did not playa prominent role in Chinese Ch' an Buddhism. In terms of the development of the use of "encounter dialogue" (chi-yuan wen-ta), which became mainstream in the Ch' an movement during this time, Ch' an in Szechuan was neither significant nor influential. Though, as Yanagida Seizan has pointed out, Ma-tsu Tao-i (709-788), the founder of the Hung-chou school and the pioneer of the use of the "encounter dialogue," came from Szechuan and was deeply influenced by the Szechuan Ch'an movement of his time, his school later flourished mainly in the Kiangsi region, far away from Matsu's native place.9

This point becomes even clearer as we examine the two early Ch'an lamp texts: the Tsu-t'ang chi (Collection from the Patriarchal Hall; hereafter cited as TTC) [952] and Tao-yuan's (n. d.) Ching-te ch 'uan-teng lu (The Record of the Transmission of the Lamp Compiled in the Chingte Era; hereafter cited as CTL) [1004]. The TTC was the earliest of the Ch' an lamp histories extant in complete form. It was compiled at Fukien by two disciples in the lineage of Hsueh-feng I-tS'un (822-908). It contains some two hundred cases of the exchanges betweenCh'an Buddhists in the form of "encounter dialogue," with the main focus on Fukien,Kiangsi, Hunan and Chekiang. to The geographical seclusion of Szechuan was certainly one reason why the compilers of the TTC included very few Szechuan Ch'an figures. But even in the CTL, a comprehensive, state-sponsored Ch'an historical text that records the biographies of some nine hundred and sixty Ch' an monks, the Ch' an

ones, but Kuan-hsiu was actually a native of Chekiang and went to Szechuan until the founding of the Shu regime. For the modem studies of Buddhism in this period, see Michihata RyoshU, ChUgaku bukkyoshi (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1958) 175-8; Makita Tairyo, Gadai sMkyo kenkyil (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1971). 9. Yanagida Seizan, Shaki zenshU shisho no kenkyil (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1967)

335-347; and idem, "The 'Recorded Sayings' Texts of Chinese Ch'an Buddhism," trans. John R. McRae, in Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, 185-205. 10. TTC, compiled by Ching (n. d.) and Yun (n. d.) of Southern T'ang. Reedited by Yanagida Seizan, in Zengaku sosho 4 (copied by Kyoto: ChUbun shuppan sha, 1984). I only found out five biographies of Szechuan monks included in TTC: 2.31-36, 108-110; 2.44, 114; 4.33-44, 260-5; 5.34-35, 330-1; and 5.107,367. Among them, actually only Ta-sui Fa-chen was from and active in Szechuan during the Five Dynasties period; the other four were from Szechuan but active outside the Szechuan regions in the T'ang.

70 nABS 17.1

monks in Szechuan who had sayings recorded were still very few, especially compared to those in south-east China. 11

The situation in Szechuan changed after the founding of the Sung. The state was now eager to bring Szechuan under more effective central control. The huge project of the Sung ruling house to print the entire Buddhist canon in Ch'eng-tu, was certainly not simply because Szechuan by the end of the T' ang had developed into an important center of wood-block printing; 12 it had political considerations: to strengthen central surveillance over Szechuan and to unify both Han and non-Han peoples in this area by using Buddhism as an ideological tool. In addition' the imperial patronage of printing the Buddhist canon was also a result of the early Sung court's decision to establish a civil (wen) order through promoting literary learning and activities extensively.13 Thus in 972, orders were given by Sung emperor T' ai-tsu (r. 960-975) that the task of cutting woodblocks be started in Ch'eng-tu. In 983, the printing of the first edition of the Chinese Trip(taka was completed. 14

While the state wanted to integrate the Szechuan region with the rest of the empire, the Szechuan literati, who had been on the margins of the Chinese culture for hundreds of years, were also eager to joih the mainstream of all aspects of Sung Chinese life. For many descendants of the "great families," whose ancestors had fled from the Central Plain to

11. The number of the monks in or of Szechuan during the ninth and the tenth centuries recorded in CTL is less than twenty; see CTL, T.51: 11, 285c, 286a-b, 287c; 12, 296b-c; 17, 339b; 19, 359c; 20, 365a; 22, 387a-b; 23, 390c, 393a-b, 395a and c, 397a; 24, 404c, 405c; 26, 421b. 12. Chiu Wu-tai shih [6 vols.], compiled by Hsueh Chii-cheng (912-981) et al. (Beijing: Chung-hua shu-chil, 1976) chUan 43, in vol. 2, 588-9. For the reference to the privately printed almanacs in Szechuan, see Wang Tang (fl. 1101-1110), T'ang yU-lin (reprint, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1939) chUan 7,203-4. In English, see Thomas F. Carter, The Invention of Printing in China, 2nd ed. (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955); Ancient China's Technology and Science, compiled by the Institute of the History of Natural Science, China Academy of Science (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1983) 383-91. 13. Peter K. Bol, "This Culture of Ours": Intellectual Transitions in T' ang and Sung China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992) 150-5. 14. FTTC 43, T.49.396a, 398a-b; ibid. 53, T.49.463b. For the Sung records about the tasks of translating the Buddhist scriptures and the monasteries built for translating scriptures, see Sung hui-yao (The Important Documents of the Sung) (copied by National Pei-p'ing Library, 1936), "Tao-shih" (Taoism and Buddhism), vol. 200, 2/4-9. Also Ch'en, Buddhism in China, 374-5.

HSIEH 71

Szechuan in the rebellions of An Lu-shan [744-757] and Huang Ch'ao [874-884] and during the period of turmoil that followed the end of the T'ang empire, they saw in this newly reunited Sung Chinese empire a chance to resume their leading political and cultural roles. According to the Szechuan T'ung-chih (Szechuan Gazetteer) [1816], the biographies of the Sung shih (Sung History) included more Szechuan men than did those in the preceding dynastic histories. is Winston W. Lo's study of Sung Szechuan officials furthermore suggests that Szechuan literati played a relatively important part in Sung political life. 16

The tendency toward literary pursuits among Szechuan men as a response to the new Sung civil order is found not merely in the secular circles but also in the Ch' an circles. And if Sung Szechuan literati were anxious about participating in the mainstream of Sung culture and poli -tics, Ch' an monks of Szechuan might also have felt an urgent need to move from their obscure situation to a dominant position in Sung religious life. The creation of kung-an literature with its distinctive language and elegant style was therefore a result of Ch' an' s response to the Sung court's promotion of literary endeavors. That poetry, the apex of Chinese literary products, became an indispensable element in Ch' an kung-an anthologies is an indication that men of the letters were the target lay audience of Ch' an kung-an texts. Moreover, although it was the emperor who patronized the huge task of printing the Buddhist canon, scholar-officials must have played an influential role in the selection of Buddhists texts. The production of refined literary writings by Ch' an Buddhists of the Sung, then, aspired to the secular standard and tastes of their contemporary literati, in the hope that their works could be included in the Sung Tripi/aka. All this accounts for a shift toward literary engagement in the Ch' an of Szechuan after the founding of the Sung.

Hsueh-tou Ch'ung-hsien (980-1052), the fourth patriarch and reviver of the Yun-men Ch'an school, is a good example of a Ch'an monk from a humble family in the marginal Szechuan region who eventually became well known in national literati circles. 17 A native of Sui-chou, Hsueh-

15. SCTC, compiled by Yang Fan-ts'an et al.; infonnatioili is drawn indirectly from Winston W. Lo, Szechuan in Sung China: A Case Study in the Political Integration of the Chinese Empire (Taipei: The University of Chinese Culture Press, 1982) 157-8. 16. Lo, ibid., 148-156. 17. For Hsueh-tou's biography, see his tomb epitaph, in T.47.712a-713b; also Ruth Fuller Sasaki and IssM Miura, Zen Dust: The History of the Koan

72 nABS 17.1

tau was one of the two Ch' an masters of his time engaged in compiling kung-an anthologies; the other was Fen-yang Shan-chao (947-1024), a Ch' an master of the Lin-chi school who was active in Shansi of north China. IS With his extraordinary poetic talent, Hsueh-tou was fond of using poetry as a vehicle to express his appreciation for the gist of Ch' an kung-an. His kung-an text, the Pai-tse sung-ku (One Hundred Old Cases and Verses [to the Cases]; hereafter cited as PTSK), demonstrates both his literary effort and talent It is a collection of one hundred most representative "old cases" to which Hsueh-tou also added his own explanatory verse; approximately eighty-two were taken from the 1700 cases in the Ching-te ch 'uan-teng lu and eighteen were drawn from the kung-an originated by Yun-men Wen-yen (864-949), the founder of the Yun-men school. Hsueh-tou's PTSK, together with his other works, earned him a literary reputation and a successful monastic career.19 More than this, Hsueh-tou brought his way of Ch' an to the Sung cultural center; he lived in Chekiang, which was one of the most prosperous provinces in south China, for thirty-one years until he died in 1052.

Literary activity no doubt facilitated Ch'an's growing acceptance within the literati circles. But it might well have resulted in the degeneration of the spirit of Ch' an and hence put an end to Ch' an. The task of revitalizing the written Ch' an kung-an in the context of Ch' an praxis was what Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in, a tenth-generation heir in the Yang-ch'i [Fang-hui (992-1049)] branch of the Lin-chi school and a native of Szechuan, sought to accompliSh.

Study in Rinzai (Lin-chi) Zen (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1966) 159-160. 18. The collections of kung-an is in Fen-yang's yU-lu (in T.47.595b-629c), chUan 2. Also see the discussion in Zen Dust, 12 and 355-6. 19. There is no independent version of the Pai-tse sung-ku in the Taisho canon or Dai Nihon zokuzokyo (hereafter cited as ZZ). The independent version in one volume, however, can be found in Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an (Various Collections in the Four [fraditional Bibliographic] Categories), ser. 2, vol. 370 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1935). For a study of Hsueh-tou's Pai-tse "Sung-ku, see Yanagida Seizan, "Kaisetsu," in SetchO juko, Zen no Goroku 15 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobO, 1981) 281-311; also Zen Dust, 12-3. For Hsuehtou's other works, see T.47.712c29-713a2.

HSIEH 73

YUAN-WU K'O-CH'IN'S MONASTIC CAREER AND HIS ASSOCIATIONS WITH LITERATI ELITE

Yuan-wu was born into the Lo family of P'eng-chou, Szechuan, in 1063. From the record, we know that his family "had been studying Confucianism for generations" and that "in his early youth he could memorize one thousand words every day."2o The brief description of his family background and his acquisition of elementary literacy suggests that, fIrst, some of his ancestors or contemporary family members may have obtained minor official positions through passing the civil service examination (they were certainly not so exalted as to be recorded in his biography); and, second, Yuan-wu may have received his literary education for the purpose of taking civil examinations. As for his devotion to Buddhism, we are told: "When he occasionally visited the Miaochi Monastery near his home, he read the Buddhist scriptures and felt very moved. He, then, said to himself: 'In my previous lifetime, I must have been a Buddhist monk.' Yuan-wu then left home and received the tonsure in the Miao-chi Monastery."21

Considering the overwhelming influence of the examinations on the lives of numerous youth during the Sung period, we may also speculate Yuan-wu did not do well in the civil examinations, and chose with his parents' permission to enter the Buddhist monastery, a center that could provide him with the best conditions for continuing his intellectual pursuits without too much secular (i. e., Confucian) restraint and pressure. Whatever the truth of Yuan-wu's motive to become a monk, his later engagement in the teaching of kung-an practice demonstrates that what he opposed most was exactly the study of the "dead words" (ssu-chii), words that led only to literary knowledge and textual mastery.

When Yuan-wu fInally fInished his study under Wu-tsu Fa-yen (1024?"II04) and began to build his national reputation, he was in his forties. On the whole, Yuan-wu had a very successful monastic career; not only did he have close connections with some powerful scholarofficials but he also, mainly on their recommendation, received patron-

20. Wu-teng hui-yuan (The Collated Essentials of the Five Lamp [Records]; hereafter cited as WTHy) [1252] 19,7Z 2B.11.4, 369d5-6. 21. WTHY 19, 369d6-7. According to Abe ChOichi, Yuan-wu became a Buddhist monk probably at the age 17; see Abe, Chugoku zenshii no kenkyu (Tokyo: Seishin shooo, 1963) 435.

74 JIABS 17.1

age from the Sung court. Kuo Chili-chang (n. d), who was a chin-shih (metropolitan graduate) of the year 1065 and a military commander of Ch'eng-tu at that time, had supported Yuan-wu's Buddhist activities in Szechuan; he invited Yuan-wu to preach in the Chao-chueh Monastery near Ch'eng-tu when the latter returned to Szechuan to take care of his old mother during the Ch'ung-ning period (1102-1106).22 Chang Shang-ying (1043-1121), a former Chief Councilor, met Yuan-wu in Heng-chou, Hunan, during the Cheng-ho period (1111-1117); Chang was very impressed by Yuan-wu's teachings. Later, Yuan-wu was further invited by the prefect of Li-chou (Hunan) to reside in the Lingch'uan Monastery at Mount Chiao 23 Teng Hsun-wu (styled Tzu-ch' ang; 1055-1119), a Palace Secretary, was impressed by Yuan-wu's distinctive teaching and reported to Emperor Hui-tsung (r. 1100-1125); the emperor then bestowed upon Yuan-wu a purple robe and the honorable title "Fruition of Buddha" (Fo-kuo ) in 1114.24 In 1127, mainly owing to the recommendation of the Prime Minister Li Kang (styled Pochi; n. d.), Yuan-wu was appointed by Emperor Kao-tsung (r. 1127-1162) to the T'ung-yu Monastery in Chin-shan, Kiangsu.25

An examination of Yuan-wu' s private instructions or letters also indi -cates that he was closely involved in the literati circles; more than onethird of his letters were written to laymen who were men of letters or civil bureaucrats.26 Yuan-wu was well acquainted with Keng Yen-hsi (n. d.) and Chang Chiln (1079-1164); the former was a court academician and the latter a chief military officer leading the Imperial Armies against the Jurchen invasion. Both of them studied Ch'an with Yuanwu and each wrote a preface for Yuan-wu's Recorded Sayings (yii.-lu)

22. WTHY 19, 370aI2-13. Kuo, Sung shih, 355122B. 23. WTHY 19, 370a13-bI2. Chang, Sung shih, 351/2B. 24. WTHY 19, 370bI2-13. Teng, Sung shih; 329/5. 25. FTLTIT 20, T.49.686b13-14. Li's biography, Sung-shih, 358/1. 26. Yuan-wu's instructions or letters written to individuals, about 145 pieces altogether, were collected under the title Fo-kuo K'o-ch'in ch'an-shih hsin-yao (Essentials of Mind [Expounded] by Ch'an Master Fo-kuo K'o-ch'in), 2 fascicles, in ZZ 2.25.4, 349c-395c. It was compiled by Yuan-wu's disciple Hung-fu Tzu-wen (n.d.) after Yuan-wu's death and published during the Chiahsi era (1237-1240). All thefa-ya (Dharma-teaching delivered to the individuals) in Yuan-wu's Recorded Sayings, in T.47.714a-81Oc, can be found in this Hsin-yao text

HSIEH 75

published in 1134.27 In addition, the scholar-officials with whom Yuanwu was associated include: Ch'en Huan (1057-1122), who had been appointed as Erudite of National University and called himself Layman Hua-yen; Hsu Fu (1075-1141), a Han-lin Academician; Li Mi-hsun (1089-1153), a chin-shih of the year 1109; Su Fu (d. 1156), who was a grandson of the famous literary man Su Shih (1036-1101);Chao Lingchin (d. 1158), who was a descendant of Sung royal family and called himself Layman Ch'ao-jan; and so on.28

During his monastic career, moreover, Yuan-wu had been summoned by the emperors and was frequently assigned by imperial orders to reside in several major monasteries. In 1128 when Emperor Kao-tsung (r. 1127-1162) journeyed to Yang-chou (Kiangsu), he summoned Yuan-wu and furthermore bestowed him with the name "Ch'an Master Perfectly Enlightened" (Yuan-wu ch'an-shih), which became a wellknown name in Ch'an history. After Yuan-wu's death in 1135, tre posthumous title "Ch' an Master Truly Enlightened" (Chen-chueh ch 'anahih) was bestowed upon him. 29

As the above account shows, Yuan-wu made a candid alliance with power and stood successfully between the two leading groups-the emperor on the one hand and the scholar-officials on the other. Apparently, Yuan-wu understood well that without official patronage his Buddhist mission would be hard to carry out and that to seek patronage from the ruling classes, he should rrrst cultivate close contacts with the local elite, in particular, his fellow Szechuan citizens. A survey of Yuan-wu's monastic career further reveals that he had a strong sense of regionalism; though he went to many other provinces, he finally still returned to Szechuan and stayed there for the rest of his life from 1129 to 1135. Thus we find that among Yuan-wu's lay associates, Chang Shang-ying, Teng Hsun-wu, Ch' en Huan, Chang Chiln and Su Fu were all natives of Szechuan. Moreover, not only was Yuan-wu's master,

27. Keng's preface (1133) in T.47.713b20-c28. For his biography, see Sung shih hsin-pien (Revised Edition of the Sung History), 12219B. Chang's preface (1134) in T.47.713c29-714aI5. For his biography, Sung shih, 361/1. 28. Sung shih: Ch'en Huan, 345/lOB; Hsu Fu, 37217; Li Mi-hsun, 382/20; Su Fu, 338/18; Chao Ling-chin, 244/20. 29. WTHY 19, 370b; and FTLTTT 20, T.49.686a-b

76 nABS 17.1

Wu-tsu Fa-yen, a native of Szechuan but also many of his disciples were from the Szechuan region. 30

The sense of regionalism, or the concern for making alliance with men from Szechuan also helps explain why Yuan-wu would use the Yunmen master Hsueh-tou Ch'ung-hsien's PTSK, not his Lin-chi predecessor Fen-yang Shan-chao's kung-an anthology, as his basis for teaching Ch'an kung-an. Yuan-wu's specific emphasis on the proper kung-an practice might also have been a deliberate move to distinguish his branch from the Huang-lung [Hui-nan (1002-1069)] branch of the Lin-chi school, or to differentiate himself from his contemporary Chueh -fan Hui-hung (1071-1128), a third generation of the Hung-lung line who was an active advocate of wen-tzu Ch' an and had close associations with Kiangsi literati)1

Starting from the year 1112 on, some sixty years after Hsueh-tou's death, Yuan-wu then began to give a series oflectures on the PTSK. The result is the Pi-yen lu, the most famous of all kung-an anthologies. 32

And as we shall see, in terms of content and structure, the Pi-yen lu was very different from the kung-an texts written by Fen-yang and Hsuehtou; that is, instead of indulging himself in writing elusive poetry or elegant prose, Yuan-wu provided his audience with clear instructions not only about the correct approach to Ch' an kung-an but also about the proper way to read Hsueh-tou's appended verses.

30. Abe ChOichi has listed twenty-four disciples of Yuan-wu; the number of disciples who were from Szechuan is six, the highest portion of this group. But Abe also points out that mosCof Yuan-wu's disciples were active in the Chekiang province (Ta-hui, who was a native of Anhui, was one among them), i. e., thirteen out of twenty-four; see his Chagoku zenshu, 442-453. 31. For Hui-hung's biography, see WTHY 17, 342c2-343a7; Nukariya Kaiten, Zengaku shisoshi, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Genkosha, 1923; reprint, Tokyo: Meisho kankosha, 1969) 219-228. For the alliance between the Huang-lung branch and Kiangsi literati, see Abe ChOichi, Chagoku zensha, 284-335. This is not to suggest that Yuan-wu and Hui-hung attacked each other; Yuan-wu had a high regard for Hui-hung's literary talents and eloquence; see Tsu-hsiu (n. d.) of the Sung, the Seng-pao cheng-hsu chuan 2, ZZ 2B.1O.4, 291d6. Nor does this mean that Hui-hung had no alliance with the literati outside the Kiangsi region; Chang Shang-ying, for example, was one of his supporters. 32. T.2003.48.140a-224b. The Pi-yen lu was published in 1128 and was said to have been burned by Ta-hui Tsung-kao around 1140. The present version in the TaishO is a Yuan (1280-1368) edition published in 1300. The complete text has been translated by Thomas and J. C. Cleary, The Blue Cliff Record, 3 vols. (Boulder: Shambhala, 1977). For a general analysis of the Pi-yen lu, see Sasaki and Isshii,Zen Dust, 356-8.

HSIEH 77

FROM HSUEH-TOU'S PAI-TSE SUNG-KU TO YUAN-WU'S PJYENLU

Hsueh-tou's Real Intention/or Writing the PTSK In his commentaries and annotations, Yuan-wu tried hard to elevate the value and function of Hsueh-tou' s literary composition in the context of Ch' an kung-an instruction and praxis. He admired Hsueh~tou as an excellent writer who could grasp the key points of each kung-an and expressed them in a clear and concise way.33 In some cases, he would explain to his audience why Hsueh-tou selected that case in particular and made a verse for it. Or, he pointed out to his students the particularly outstanding poems in the PTSK 34 But fearing that some people would not benefit from reading these poems and would become entangled in them, Yuan-wu usually annotated the poems line by line. Indeed, many of these poems are not only highly symbolic but also rich in allusions to both Chinese secular literature and Ch'an history; one can hardly understand them without Yuan-wu's additional annotations.

As a monk of the Ch'an school, however, Yuan-wu did have more to do with such a refined literary Ch'an work. One urgent task for Yuanwu was to exculpate Hsueh-tou from the charge of making Ch' an merely a literary activity. He explained to his students the real intention of Hsueh-tou's literary engagement:

If Hsueb-tou were not so compassionate [in the attempt] to make people see [the import of the kung-an] by bringing it out in verse, bow could be obtain fame as a good friend [of eh'an practitioners]? When men of the past acted like this, it was all something they bad to do. Because later practitioners become attached to their words and give rise to conceptual interpretations (ch'ing-chieh), they fail to see the former masters' intention.35

For Yuan-wu, Hsueh-tou was unselfish in the sense that after he achieved his own enlightenment, he stin tried to help others obtain awakening, even though he would bear the notoriety for violating the Ch'an tradition of "not depending upon words and letters." Hence the motive behind Hsueh-tou's PTSK was nothing more than the hope to

33. PYL 1, T.48.I47c21-3; 2, I59c25-6; 6, 189c18-20; etc. 34. PYL 10, T.48.215a26-27; 3, T.48.165b14-5; etc. 35. PYL 1, T.48.I48c17-19.

78 JIABS 17.1

annihilate people's habitual ways of thinking and to let them see into their intrinsic buddha-minds. 36 In other words, it was because· of Hsueh-tou's fear that people would pursue intellectual understandings of the kung-an that he picked up the ancient cases, put forth his own explanations, and composed the verses.

In the view of Yuan-wu, moreover, it was not Hsueh-tou who should be blamed for "depending upon words and letters"; rather, the people who misunderstood the master's intention behind his words should take the responsibility for the deterioration of Ch' an. "If you produce words upon words, phrases upon phrases, and meaning upon meaning, making .. up interpretations and conceptualization," Yuan-wu warned his audience, "you will not only get me into trouble, but you will also turn your back on Hsueh-tou." Yuan-wu certainly understood well that he was doing what he himself warned against, but he maintained that an enlightened Ch' an master's explanation of the real message of Ch' an was different from a practitioner's conceptual interpretation of the kung-an. His defense of Hsueh-tou in the Pi-yen lu was a self-defense; as he went on to say, "Although the phrases of the men of the past appear so [contradictory to Ch'an doctrine], their intention is not so; they never create any principle to dominate people."37

The Attempt to Legitimize and Consolidate the Ch' an Tradition Through a: series oflectures on Hsueh-tou's PTSK, Yuan-wu thus clarified that this Yun-men Ch' an master's intention was much more than the display of his own literary skill and poetic talent. But as a member of the school of Ch' an, Yuan-wu also felt an urgent need to consolidate Ch'an's legitimacy and perpetuate Ch'an's tradition. In his lectures in the Pi-yen lu, Yuan-wu then made apologies for his religion.

The school of Ch'an, Yuan-wu argued, was transmitted by a living succession of human exemplars. Ch'an, therefore, could be practiced by students of various levels of understanding under different circumstances and hence was superior to other Buddhist teachings, which appeared bookish and static. And since the experience of enlightenment was supposed to be personal and intuitive, "none of the teachings con-

36. PYL 3, T.48.162b6-7; 2, 155cl-2. 37. PYL 1, T.48.145b29-c2.

HSIEH 79

tained in the Trip(taka can explain it thoroughly," Yuan-wu said. 38 Or, he would say to his audience:

The men of the past clearly told you: "In terms of this matter [i. e., enlightenment], it is not in words and phrases." If it is in words and phrases, then, do not the twelve parts of the teaching of the three vehicles contain words and phrases? What further need is there for Bodhidharma [the first patriarch of the Chinese Ch' an school] to come from the West?39

For Yuan-wu, Ch' an' superiority to other Buddhist schools lay mainly in its unique pedagogical methods. Yuan-wu argued for the efficacy of Ch' an teaching devices, saying: "In all the great teachings of Trip~taka, in the five thousand and forty-eight fascicles of the Buddhist canon, they cannot avoid discussing the mind, the nature, the sudden, and the gradual. Still, has there ever been this kind of information [like Ch'an that would awaken people to the truth]?"40 Or, after explaining a kung-an about Yun-men Wen-yen, Yuan-wu then pointed to the students:

As soon as [Yun-men] picks up his staff, we immediately see the boundless, marvelous function [of this gesture]. ... Monk Ch'ing (n. d.), who was in charge of the Tripi/aka Hall, had said, "Has there ever been such teaching in the five thousand and forty-eight fascicles [like Yunmen's]?,,41

In order to emphasize the supremacy of Ch'an Buddhism, Yuan-wu also told his audience about the glorious history of the Ch' an school whenever he had the chance. For example, Yuan-wu mentioned that the T'ang Emperors Su-tsung (r. 756-762) and Tai-tsung (r. 763-779) not only liked to study Ch'an but also showed their respect to National Ch'an Master Hui-chung Nan-yang 0-776).42 Apparently, by using these T' ang emperors as exemplars, Yuan-wu tried to provide a legitimate precedent for a good relationship between Sung rulers and Ch'an monks.

From a Confucian viewpoint, however, the bold language used by Ch'an monks was often regarded as disrespectful to the emperor, or

38. PYL 1, T.48.141b23. 39. PYL 2, T.48.155b4-6. 40. PYL I, T.48.148b6-8. 41. PYL 6, T.48.192b29-c1. 42. PYL 2, T.48.158a5-1l; also, 10, 222b.

80 nABS 17.1

even subversive to the state. In the poem appended to case three, Hsueh-tou wrote:

The sun faces the Buddha, the moon faces the Buddha; What were the so-called Five Emperors and Three Kings?43

When Emperor Shen-tsung of the Sung (r. 1068-1085) was on the throne, he refused to include this verse in the Buddhist canon for the reason that the above lines subordinated the emperors to the Buddha. Yuan-wu, then, explained, "People generally do not see Hsueh-tou's meaning [behind his words], but only blame him for ridiculing the state. Such conceptual interpretation is really a misunderstanding [of his verse]."44 In Yuan-wu's view, the message behind Hsueh-tou's verse was simply to tell people that because every one in essence is equal and has the same potential to achieve enlightenment, any ordinary person can become a sage-king.

The whole process in forming the Pi-yen lu itself demonstrates an ironical phenomenon in the development of Ch' an Buddhism: Ch' an monks eventually had to pile words upon words in an effort to explain clearly the nonconceptual essence of Ch' an doctrine. The Yun-men Ch'an master Hsueh-tou Ch'ung-hsien frrst collected one hundred kungan to which he also appended his own explanatory verses. Since the elegant poetry in the PTSK by Hsueh-tou easily led people to assume that Ch'an was nothing but a literary game, Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in of the Lin-chi school now had to provide introductory remarks, additional commentaries and interlinear annotations to elucidate the soteriological intents of the original cases and Hsueh-tou's verses as well. Thus came the Pi-yen lu.

But on the other hand, we may also see the Pi-yen lu as a Ch'an master's effort to rectify people's tendency toward the literary approach to Ch' an kung-an. Instead of writing elegant poetry to epitomize the main gist of kung-an, as the former Ch'an masters had done, Yuan-wu endeavored to explain and annotate the original old cases and also the appended verses. Throughout the Pi-yen lu, Yuan-wu taught that a kung-an anthology should not be read as a collection of "dead words" but should be used effectively as "live words" (hua-eM), words that can

43.PYL 1, T.48. 142c29-143al. 44. PYL 1, T.48.143a5 & 21-2.

HSIEH 81

lead to true insight into the enlightened nature of the mind. The distinction between "investigating the meaning" (ts' an-z) and "investigating the word" (ts'an-chii) then played a pivotal role in Yuan-wu's teaching of kung-an practice. Yuan-wu's emphasis on the investigation of the "live words," moreover, had significant impact on Ta-hui Tsung-kao, a native of Anhui who is known as the most vigorous advocate of k'an-hua Ch' an during the Southern Sung period.

FROM YUAN-WU'S TEACHING OF KUNG-AN PRACTICE TO TA-HUJ TSUNG-KAO'S K'AN-HUA CH' AN

"Live Words" versus "Dead Words" The polemical issue in kung-an practice exists in the tension between "investigating the meaning" and "investigating the word." The former concerns understanding the kung-an in terms of conceptual, rational analysis whereas the latter is to renounce conceptual thoughts and to discover the ultimate truth, which is literally inconceivable and is originally present in all sentient beings' minds. 45 But since a Ch' an kung-an consists of these two elements- "words" (chii) and "meaning" (i)-we might wonder how the practitioner could investigate the word without becoming entrapped in the danger of "investigating the meaning."

45. The distinction between the "live word" and the "dead word," as Chang Chung-yuan has pointed out, was ftrst made by the Yun-men Ch'an master Tung-shan Shou-ch'u (?-990); see his Original Teachings olCh'an Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1969) 271.· But the source is found not in the CTL, the text on which Chang's translation is based, but in Chueh-fan Huihung's Lin-chien lu (Records Drawn from [Ch'an] "Groves") [1107], ZZ 2B.21.4, 299bl1-13. In addition, Te-shan Yuan-mi (n. d.), a contemporary of Tung-shan and also a disciple of Yun-men Wen-yen, was said to teach students to investigate the "live words"; see WTHY 15, 281cl-2. For a discussion of the distinction between the "live word" and the "dead word," see Robert E. Buswell, Jr., "Ch'an Hermeneutics: A Korean View," in Buddhist Hermeneutics, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., Studies in East Asian Buddhism 6 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988) 246-248; idem, "The 'Shortcut' Approach of K' an-hua Meditation: The Evolution of a Practical Subitism in Chinese Ch'an Buddhism," in Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, ed. Peter N. Gregory, Studies in East Asian Buddhism 5 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987) 348. Robert M. Gimello also discusses this issue in "Marga and Culture," 376.

82 HABS 17.1

Yuan-wu's teaching of kung-an practice enables us to see how he tried to resolve this tension in Ch' an kung-an practice.

For those who approached Ch'an kung-an practice, Yuan-wu's suggestion was: "Hear clearly the words outside the voice; do not seek for anything within the meaning (wen-ch'ing sheng-wai chU; mo-hsiang ichung ch'iu)."46 He often took his own enlightenment experience as an example. One day when Yuan-wu was studying with Wu-tsu Fa-yen, an official came to visit Wu-tsu with questions about the way of Ch' an. Wu-tsu gave him a verse of which two lines read as follows:

Repeatedly calling Hsiao-Yii actually has nothing [to do with her]; All this is only to let Lover T' an (T' an-lang) recognize my voice.

The verse was about a lady who, when her lover came, felt too shy to leave her bedchamber and therefore called her serving girl, Hsiao-yii, as a means to let her lover know that she was in. Although the official might not have gotten the point of this verse, Yuan-wu, who was beside them, immediately understood what his master intended to say. 47

Yuan-wu's caution against "seeking for anything within the meaning" in kung-an practice becomes clearer with his example which indicates that the "truth" was comprised "outside the voice." Were one to use the ordinary, conceptual way of thinking to analyze why this woman called the name of her maid, Hsiao-yii, one would be led to the false presumption that the woman had need of her maid when in fact she did not. By the same token, if one approached the paradoxes or riddles in Ch' an kung-an by "investigating the meaning," this would reveal but "dead words" since conceptualization is useless and would furthermore lead the practitioner to be entrapped by the words.

Yuan-wu's attitude toward the proper approach to kung-an can be further seen from his interpretation of the dialogues between a monk and the Yun-men Ch'an master Chih-men Kuang-tso (d. 1031) in kung-an twenty-one of the Pi-yen tu.

One monk asked, "What is the lotus flower like when it has not yet come out of the water?"

Chih-men said, "A lotus flower."

46. Yuan-wu ya-lu 2, T.47.719M. 47. WTHY 19, 370a1-6; also Yuan-wu ya-lu 13, in T.47.77Sb1-4.

HSIEH 83

The monk asked, "How about after it has come out of the water?" [Chih-]men said, "Lotus leaves."

Yuan-wu then said to his students:

Tell me, what does the master in the past try to mean [in this kung-an]? Actually there are not so many concerns. . .. If you pursue words and follow after phrases, there will never be any connection [with awakening]. If in the midst of words you can penetrate through words, in the midst of meanings you can penetrate through meanings, and in the midst of encounters you can penetrate through encounters, letting yourself be unbound, only then can you see the point of monk Chih-men's response .... Practitioners these days do not realize the intention of the men in the past; they just go forward to argue, trying to distinguish "[the lotus flower that] has come out of the water" from "[the lotus flower that] has not yet come out of the water." What is the connection [with spiritual awakening]?48

1hrough the above case, Yuan-wu warned his audience that the correct approach to kung-an was not to give a logical solution to the "meaning" of Jamg-an but to penetrate to the real message of the kLmg-an. Implicitly, Yuan-wu seemed to suggest that if one recognized that the "encounter dialogues" contained in the kLmg-an cases were intended to transmit the nonconceptual essence of Ch' an doctrine, one would realize that any attempt to analyze the paradoxes or riddles of the kWig-an in terms of ordinary conceptual thought was actually meaningless. One would, then, reject any kind of intellectualization of the kWig-an.

The futility of "investigating the meaning" warned against by Yuanwu becomes even more significant when the vast number of Ch'an kWig-an published during the Sung is taken into account. Yuan-wu admonished Ch' an practitioners that the textual study of numerous Ch'an kung-an as a means of assimilating the enlightened minds of ancient Ch' an masters would itself become an obstacle to enlightenment. As he said, "If you only look for phrases and mysteries [of the kungan], when will you achieve enlightenment? There were thousands of persons, and each of them had different ways of interpretation [of the kWig-an]. So whose words should you follow?,,49

48. PYL 3,. T.48.161c18-20 and 161c29-162a28. 49. Yuan-wu yU-lu 13, T.47.772b6-7.

84 JIABS 17.1

Yuan-wu's practical teaching of kung-an arose as a result of his attempt to spread the correct approach to Ch' an among Sung literati. In a letter to anEdict Attendant surnamed Chiang (Chiang tai-chih), Yuanwu criticized the attitude the scholar-officials generally held towards the practice ofCh'an:

Every time I met with the scholar-officials, many of them said that they are entangled in mundane things and do not have free time for this [i. e., the practice of Ch'an]. When these [mundane] things have been taken care of, they said, they will then wholeheartedly engage themselves [iri Ch' an practice]. Although what they said is honest, they only regard [their] secular pursuits [of fame and wealth] as important and so busily run in and out of a pile of the rotten bones (the "dead words"; here probably refers to the ancient Confucian classics). Having become well-versed [in these classics], they merely call this the mundane task; [they feel] only when they further clear away all the involvement in the mundane world can they turn to [Ch'an practice]. Well, this [kind of attitude toward Ch'an practice] is exactly what we [Ch'an Buddhists] would say: "[Even if] he practices [Ch'an] all day long, he has never [truly] practiced; [even if] he uses [his mind] all day long, he has never [really] used it." How can there be any other great causes and conditions [for achieving enlightenment] outside the mundane world?50

The above words of Yuan-wu were certainly addressed to Confucian scholar-officials, who pursued "dead words" and regarded Ch'an as something totally unrelated to their everyday activities. These men failed to realize that the mundane world was the only true ground for practicing Ch' an and attaining enlightenment. And even if they did practice Ch' an. they would usually approach kung-an in one of two ways: either through rational, logical analysis, or through simple memorization. Yuan-wu told those who studied Ch' an kung-an through logical analysis that conceptualization could never enable them to transcend the perception of birth and death; as he said, ''To transcend birth and death, one has to open and penetrate the mind-ground (hsin-ti). The kung-an is, then, a key to opening the rnind-ground."51 By the same token, he cautioned those who simply memorized the entire kung-an that memorization was not unlike "drawing cakes" as a means of overcoming starva-

50. Ibid. 15, T,47.784c28-785a4. 51. Ibid. 15, T.47.785a21-4.

HSIEH 85

tion and that the result would be nothing but "a pile of bones" (kutung).52 Literary study of Ch'an kung-an, Yuan-wu thus repeatedly warned, would be a great hindrance to awakening.

Nonconceptualization, that is, investigating the "live words," was therefore the path to the proper use of the kung-an. As Yuan-wu said:

Hold your tongue and do not give rise to any conceptualization. One should investigate the "live words" and not investigate the "dead words." What is realized and achieved through the "live words" will ensure that one never forgets for an eternity of kalpas. What is realized and achieved ihrough the "dead words" cannot even make one save oneself.53

For Yuan-wu, only when one renounced ordinary conceptual thinking could he be said to investigate the "live words." The "live words" are thus the words that directly point to one's enlightened mind and readily manifest one's intrinsic wisdom.

An even more concrete illustration of the purpose of using kung-an in Ch'an practice was given by Yuan-wu as follows:

For the neophytes or the senior students, who wanted to practice [Ch'an] but had no way to get the point, the former virtuous masters showed their kindness by asking them to investigate the ancients' kung-an. They tried touse this means to bind [the practitioner's] wild thoughts and perverse plans, causing him to calm his consciousness and anxiety so as to reach the state of concentration and oneness. He, then, would suddenly discover [the fact] that the mind was not obtained from outside. The kung-an is always [used as] nothing but a tile to knock the door .... You should keep quiet, serene, calm, and observant before you dwell upon (eha) and investigate [the kung-an]. After [investigating] a while, you then should know where your root exists. If you use language and words to interpret language and words, you merely get the benefits of understanding more, but you do not have the conditions to enter into this [Ch'an] Dharma gate.54

As an interpreter of Ch' an kung-an himself, Yuan-wu thus warned his students that though the teacher's teaching of kung-an was instructive

52. Hsin-yao, 358b7-9. 53. YU-lu 11, T.47.765bI2-14. In WTHY, however, the language similar to Yuan-wu's is found in the section of Te-shan Yuan-mi; see WTHY 15, ZZ 2B.l1.3,281c1-4. . 54. Hsin-yao, 385a7-13.

86 nABS 17.1

and necessary, the attainment of enlightenment still had depended on the practitioner himself. .

Soteriological Role of Faith and Doubt in the Kung-an Practice So far we have seen that Yuan-wu taught Ch' an practitioners not to conceptualize Ch' an kung-an by advising them to investigate the "live words." Still, we might wonder how people who were so used to habitual ways of thinking could totally relinquish all random or false thoughts in a single moment during the course of kung-an investigation. In other words, though the practitioner now understood well the futility resulting from conceptualization, about which Yuan-wu cautioned, he might still have the problem of how to effectively keep himself "quiet, serene, calm. and observant before he dwells upon and investigates the kung-an." Here, we may take a look at the differences between Yuan-wu's soteriology and that of his disciple Ta-hui Tsung-kao.

It should be said that Yuan-wu did not go beyond the Lin-chi tradition in which the cultivation of faith (hsin) was regarded as the most essential foundation of Ch' an practice. 55 Like Lin-chi, Yuan-wu simi-1arly emphasized that one should believe in one's intrinsically enlightened mind and that the "faculty of faith" (hsin-ken) was of vital importance for one's achieving enlightenment.56 By developing faith in his originally enlightened mind, one simultaneously generates "counterillumination" (hui-kuang fan-chao).57 That is, the practitioner, motivated by sufficient faith, is now able to "trace back the radiance emanating from the mind," 58 and comes to realize his inherent buddha nature.

55. For Lin-chi's teaching of faith, see Chen-chou Lin-chi Hui-chao ch'an~ shih ya-lu (Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Lin-chi Hui-chao of Chenchou), T.47.496b29cc2; 497b5-10; 499a4; 501b14; etc. Also see Yanagida Seizan, "Kanwa Zen ni okeru shin to gi no mondai," in BukkytJ ni okeru shin na mandai, ed. the Nihon Bukkyo Kyokai (Kyoto: Heirakuji shoten, 1963) 147-8; and Miriam L. Levering, "Ch'an Enlightenment for Laymen: Ta-hui and the New Religious Culture of the Sung," diss., Harvard University, 1978,288-293. As Buswell further concludes, Lin-chi's emphasis on the cultivation of faith can be seen as an attempt to repair Ma-tsu Tao-i's radical subitism, in "K'an-hua," 338-343. 56. Hsin-yao, 358d18-359al. 57. Yuan-wu ya-lu 5, T.47.737b14-15, etc. 58. This translation is Robert Buswell's; see "K'an-hua," 347.

HSIEH 87

The emphasis on faith ;uso led Yuan-wu to assert that the practice of kung-an was not so crucial in Ch' an training as long as one had sufficient faith in one's self-nature. As Yuan-wu once said:

If one is endowed with the great faculty [i. e., faith], one does not need to look into the ancients' words or kung-an. [Every day] starting in the morning one just needs to rectify the precarious thoughts and to tranquilize the precarious mind; no matter what one encounters, one achieves [this task] without fail. After achieving this, one then further picks up [the kungan] to investigate it more closely. One [now] understands where it comes from and what it is made of.59

What Yuan-wu means here is that if one has sufficient faith in the innate wisdom of his own mind, he will then fully develop the enlightened source of the mind in the midst of ordinary life. As a result, every aspect of one's daily conduct is a natural expression of the enlightened mind. By the same token, one's practice of kung-an may also be seen as one of the phenomenal activities (shih) guided by the inherent principle (li) of the mind. Hence, only when one believes sufficiently that the mind is always enlightened and untainted are one's activities in the phenomenal realm truly validated. In this sense, then, the kung-an in Yuanwu's teaching is used more like a test, rather than a catalyst, for one's attainment of enlightenment. As a corollary to his emphasis on the faculty offaith, Yuan-wu regarded "doubt" (0 as the primary obstacle that Ch' an practitioners should make an effort to overcome. That is, in the view of Yuan-wu, the "sensation of doubt" (i-ch'ing) was harmful to one's faith and should never occur in the mind, let alone during the course of kung-an investigation. In Yuan-wu's teaching, the word "doubt" was thus still treated in its traditional, negative sense as a great mental hindrance to enlightenment 60

The main difference between Yuan-wu and his disciple Ta-hui Tsungkao, the most active proponent of k' an-hua Ch' an, lies in the fact that tre latter, without precedent, gave the "sensation of doubt," rather than the "facu1ty of faith," a role to play in Ch' an kung-an investigation. That is, in the view of Ta-hui, the sensation of doubt was not only a powerful

59. Yuan-wu ya-lu 15, T.47.758a6-9. 60. For Yuan-wu's use of "doubt," see ibid. 3, 723c12; 6, 74Oc24-25; 8, 750b20-21; 14, 776b4-6; etc.

88 nABS 17.1

antidote to one's conceptual thinking but also the indispensable force which drove the adept toward awakening.

On the whole, the mind is not enlightened through reading scriptures or doctrinal teachings, nor through reading the causes and conditions by which the virtuous masters in the past entered into the way. [Rather,] it is only at the time when you feel confused, frustrated, and bored-just as if you were biting an iron bar-that you can rightly make effort [for achieving enlightenment].61

Ta-hui thus claimed: "A great doubt will definitely be followed by a great awakening."62

For Ta-hui, the investigation of hua-t' ou (the critical phrase of Ch' an kung-an) was exactly the most effective way of generating doubt. TIrrough the single-minded investigation of the hua-t'ou, the practitioner would find that his rational, conceptual ways of thinking were really useless at this moment. The illogical hua-t'ou, then, worked as a catalyst which enabled the practitioner to foster in his mind the sensation of doubt to the maximum extent The pressure of doubt in turn forced the person's mind urgently to seek a sudden breakthrough. As Ta-hui taught his students:

Just investigate a single hua-t' ou of [the kung-an by which] men in the past entered the way. Shift the mind which day after day produces deluded thoughts here [to the hua-t'ou]. [Focus your attention] on the hua-t'ou, then no [conceptual thought] would ever be generated. A monk asked Chao-chou [Ts'ung-shen (778-897)]: "Does a dog have buddha-nature or not?" Chou said: "No!" (wu) Just this one word (i. e., wu) is exactly "the knife that cuts off the road leading to birth and death" [i. e., the way to transcend birth and death]. Just dwell upon this word wu. Dwell on it over and over again. Abruptly information [through conceptual thought] is severed. It is then at this point that you return home and sit fIrmly.63

61. Ta-hui P'u-chueh ch'an-shih yu-lu (Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Ta-hui P'u-chueh) 19, T.47.891a22-23. This, however, does not mean that Ta-hui did not value faith. As Yanagida Seizan has pointed out, Ta-hui also fIrst emphasized the signifIcance of faith in his teaching of Ch'an practice, and it was from his emphasis on faith that he developed the theory of doubt in k' an-hua meditation; see Yanagida, "Kanwa Zen," 152. 62. Ta-hui yU-Iu 17, T.47.886a28. 63. Ibid. 22, T.47.903b29-c5.

HSIEH 89

Unlike Yuan-wu, who did not specifically mention the investigation of hua-t' ou in his teaching, Ta-hui consistently taught his students· to investigate the hua-t' ou rather than the entire kung-an.

But although Ta-hui should be credited with providing a systematic theory of the role of doubt in k'an-hua soteriology, Ta-hui himself nonetheless attributed the idea of doubt to his master Yuan-wu. According to him, when he was studying under Yuan-wu,the latter gave him several kung-an to work on and warned him: "It is not easy for you to get to this stage. [However,] it is a pity that you, having died, are unable to be alive. Not having doubt for words and phrases is a great illness."64 But since we find no mention of this anecdote in Yuan-wu's sayings and writings, we may assume either that doubt here did not yet have the technical sense in Yuan-wu's mind, or that the story was Tahui's deliberate attempt to portray his idea as deriving from the orthodox transmission of Ch' an teaching through his teacher, Yuan-wu.

The differences between Yuan-wu and Ta~hui regarding the teaching of kung-an now become clearer. While doubt in Yuan-wu's terms means lack of faith in one's inherent buddha-nature, in Ta-hui's interpretation it came to mean the loss of confidence in the conceptual and intellectual approaches to attaining ultimate enlightenment. For Yuanwu, innate faith was the preliminary requirement for Ch' an practice, but for Ta-hui, the force in the process of "counterillumination" was mainly derived from doubt through encountering the hua-t' ou of the kung-an. Whereas "counterillumination" might appear as a more static term in Yuan-wu's teaching of meditation practice, it was definitely regarded by Ta-hui as a dynamic process in which doubt served as an introspective force drawing the meditator to look into his inherently pure and enlightenedmind.

A comparison of Yuan-wu and Ta-hui, moreover, shows that Yuanwu, while teaching the practitioner of kung-an why he should eliminate the mental tendency toward conceptualizing kung-an, failed to provide an effective solution of how one could succeed in doing so. That is to say, although Yuan-wu provided Ch' an practitioners with a concrete explanation of those terms like ts' an-chiil ts' an-i and huo-chiil ssu-chu, he did not specifically value the practice of hua-t'ou as a primary means to enlightenment, as did Ta-hui. Ta-hui, on the other hand, was more understanding of human beings' difficulties in casting away habitual

64. Ibid. 17, T.47.883a21-22.

90 nABS 17.1

patterns of perception and so was more practical in the approach he taught in meditation practice. His advocacy of hua-t'ou investigation appeared as the most effective way in which one could avoid the danger of investigating the "meaning" of kung-an and attain, via the sensation of doubt, the enlightened mind

CONCLUSION: YUAN-WU'S SIGNIFICANCE IN TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF CH' AN KUNG-AN PRACTICE

The practice of Ch'an kung-an taught by the Szechuan Ch'an monk Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in presents us with a case ofCh'an's attemptto integrate itself into the mainstream of Sung literati culture without losing its identity and integrity. Yuan-wu used a highly literary kung-an text-the PTSK by Hsueh-tou Ch'ung-hsien-as his stepping stone to spread Ch'an within the cultured elite. But rather than merely making himself a famous monk of his day, Yuan-wu made great contributions to both his religion and sect. In the Pi-yen Iu, Yuan-wu thus tried hard to shift people's attention from the literary meaning and value of the PTSK to its instructive aspects and practical function. By so doing, he revitalized the Ufe of this collection of Ch' an words; that is, they were not "dead words" but "live words." From Yuan-wu's Pi-yen lu on, the pedagogical and meditative function of Ch' an kung-an texts became both more visible and more feasible.

In order to direct Ch' an practitioners toward the proper approach to kung-an practice, Yuan-wu furthermore gave a clear explanation of tre differences between "investigating the word" and "investigating the meaning" in the course of kung-an practice. Although Yuan-wu was not the first monk to teach that any attempt at conceptualization should be renounced in Ch'an practice, he was the first Ch'an master in the Y ang-ch' i branch of the Lin-chi school to adopt the term "live words" to refer to "nonconceptualization" and to explain clearly why one should investigate the "word" and not investigate the "meaning."65 His advo-

65. This point is clear as we read the Recorded Sayings of Yuan-wu's predecessors: Yang-ch'i Fang-hui's Recorded Sayings, in T.47.640a-648c; Pai-yun Shou-tuan's (1025-1072) Recorded Sayings and Kuang-lu (A Comprehensive Record [of Sayings and Writings)), in ZZ 2.25.3, 191a-200a and 200d-225a; and Wu-tsu Fa-yen's Recorded Sayings, in T.47.649a-669a. In

HSIEH 91

cacy of "investigating the word" exerted significant influence on his disciple Ta-hui's teaching of hua-t'ou investigation, an approach through which one concentrated on the critical phrase of the kung-an and hence might avert the mind from being distracted by the "meaning" of the case.

Yuan-wu K'o-ch'in's teaching of kung-an practice thus marked a turning point in the evolution of Ch' an kung-an practice; the task of systematizing the k'an-hua technique by giving "doubt" a specific soteriological role had to wait for his disciple Ta-hui Tsung-kao. While Yuan-wu's instructions of Ch'an kung-an practice indicated his awareness of the crisis of the ossification of Ch'an's soteriology and his consequent attempt to resolve this perceived crisis within the Ch'an movement, Ta-hui's advocacy of hua-t'ou investigation with a systematically elaborated theory revealed a further sensitivity among Ch'an masters to the practical need for narrowing such a gap in Ch' an praxis. Finally, it can be said that Yuan-wu's engagementin the teaching ofCh'an kungan practice proved to be a decisive move, for neither the Yun-men school nor the Huang-lung branch of the Lin-chi school could retain their prominence in the next generations. Later, Ta-hui Tsung-kao further succeeded in spreading k' an-hua Ch' an to the important cultural centers of the Lower Yangtze Valley. The Lin-chi Yang-ch'i branch eventually became the most dominant Buddhist school in Southern Sung China.66 In this regard, k'an-hua Ch'an may also be viewed as a successful attempt by the Lin-chi Yang-ch'i masters to revitalize the life of the written Ch'an kung-an.

their teachings of Ch'an, none of them used terms like huo-chat ssu-cha, ts'an-chat ts'an-i, etc. 66. Tao-jung, Ts'ung-lin sheng-shih (The Glorious Events in Ch'an Monasteries) [1197], in ZZ 2B.21.1,45c4.

92 JIABS 17.1

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HSIEH 93

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HSIEH 95

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ALLAN A. ANDREWS

Honen and Popular Pure Land Piety: Assimilation and Transformation

This study will explore one of the many complex issues in the development of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism. From a broad perspective Japanese Pure Land can be seen as a component of the East Asian Pure Land tradition. It was based on Chinese texts, ideas, and practices, some of which had been derived from India and central Asia. Yet the Japanese did not simply preserve what they had received from China; they made distinct contributions to East Asian Pure Land Buddhism. Japanese modifications of the received tradition began in the Nara period (646-794) soon after the introduction of Pure Land Buddhism to Japan (Shigematsu 1964, 13-60), continued during the early Heian period (794-ca. 1000; Inoue 1975, 83-156), and in the late Heian (ca. 900-1185) and early Kamakura periods (1185-ca. 1250) produced major transformations. The thought of Honen-bO Genk11 (1133-1212) is especially remarkable for its departures from earlier Pure Land. His innovations and those of his disciples not only greatly altered the Pure Land tradition, they initiated a new phase of Japanese religious history called Kamakura New Buddhism. Whence did Honen derive his new ideas? Did he get them directly from Chinese texts as he claimed, or was he influenced by indigenous Japanese thought?

It was posited several decades ago by both Hori Ichiro and Ienaga Saburo that Honen was the inheritor of a rich fund of popular Japanese ideas and practices which he systematized into the thought of his Pure Land School (Jado shU) on the basis of continental, i. e., Chinese, Buddhist doctrines and texts. 1 Like these two scholars, Japanese histo-

An earlier version of this study was delivered to an Association for Asian Studies panel on Japanese Pure Land Buddhism in March 1993. I wish to thank respondent Jacqueline Stone, fellow panelists and my colleague Kevin Trainor for helpful suggestions. 1. Hori 1953, 324-25; Ienaga 1963, 26-28. Hori actually locates the sources of Honen's systemization in the Ojoyosha and criticizes Honen for an incom-

96

ANDREWS 97

rians in general have tended to emphasize the importance of Honen's indigenous, popular legacy (Ienega, Akamatsu and Tamamuro 1967-68, 1.327-41,2.31-32; Inoue 1975, 315-18), while Pure Land denominational scholars have tended to deemphasize the Japanese components of Honen's thought and accentuate his debt to continental ideas (Ishida 1952,96-103; Fujiwara 1957, 215-21; Ishii 1969, 158-60). I would like to begin sorting out what Honen derived from late Heian Popular Pure Land piety, what he acquired from continental thought, and how he related these diverse influences. Here I will explore the origins of just one of Honen's ideas, his view on effective practice for PUfe Land rebirth.

Honen taught that the only practice necessary for rebirth into Amida Buddha's Pure Land was vocal nembutsu, that is, calling upon Amida (Sanskrit, AmitabhaJAmitayus) with the invocation, "namu Amida Butsu," "Homage to Amida Buddha," or, "I take refuge in the Buddha of Limitless Light and Life." My thesis is that Honen derived from popular2 Pure Land piety this position on sole nembutsu cultivation, augmented and systemized it by means of continental thought, and related this systemized thought to a Pure Land scriptural canon, enhancing its credibility and emphasizing its autonomy.

For information on the popular piety which may have influenced Honen I will refer to Japanese scholarship on Heian period "accounts of rebirth" (ojoden); I will consider Shan-tao (613-81) the major continental influence upon Honen; and I will utilize Honen's Passages on the Selected Nembutsu of the Original Vow (Senchaku hongan nembutsu shaY as the most important and only fully authenticated formulation of his thought

Honen and Popular Pure Land Piety of the Late Heian Period It is well known that Honen claimed sole cultivation of vocal nembutsu as the best practice for Pure Land rebirth. In Chapter 2 of his Passages

plete systemization. Ienega was primarily concerned with the derivations of Shinran's ideas, but the systemization which he credits to Shinran began, of course, with Honen. I might add that while Honen discovered continental Pure Land thought in the Ojoyoshu, he then bypassed that text and drew directly upon continental thinkers like Shan-tao. 2. By "popular" I mean the religion of both clergy and lay persons of all classes and occupations except that of the nobility and upper echelon warriors; see Inoue 1975, 158, n. l. 3. See References for fuller bibliographic information.

98 nABS 17.1

he maintains that exclusive Pure Land cultivation is much more effective ~. than "adulterated practices" (zogyo), and that among Pure Land practices, calling on Amida Buddha's name is the "assured act" (shojo no gO) certain to bring about rebirth (T. 83.2c14-4b20);4 in Chapter 3 he claims that vocal nembutsu is the sole practice selected by Amida and guaranteed by his eighteenth original vow for the rebirth of all sentient beings (T. 83.4b-6c); in Chapter 6 this nembutsu is presented as the best practice for an age of final Dharma (mappo; T. 83.8b-9a); and in Chapter 12 Honen explicitly rejects meditation, observance of precepts, recitation of scripture, filial behavior, the performance of good deeds and other "meditative and non-meditative meritorious acts" (josan nizen) because he claims they were not selected by the eighteenth vow (T. 83. 14c-17a). In short, Honen maintained that calling the BudcJ!1a's name was the best and only practice necessary for rebirth.

As we have indicated, our concern is to determine whence Honen derived these views. He claimed that he obtained them from the Mahayana scriptures as interpreted by the continental master Shan-tao (T. 83.19a5-12). In a moment we will examine to what extent this claim was justified, but first let us summarize the popular Pure Land piety of Honen's time and especially its beliefs on how to be reborn in the Pure Land

Some of the most revealing glimpses into popular Buddhism of the late Heian period, the eleventh and twelfth centuries, are provided by six collections called "accounts of Pure Land rebirth" (ojoden). The earliest. Nihon Gokuraku ojoki, was compiled in 985 by Yoshishige no Yasutane, and was followed over a century later by the Zoku honcho ojoden of Oe no Masafusa in 1101-04, by the ShUi ojoden and GoshUi ojoden of Miyoshi no Tamayasu compiled between 1111 and 1139, the Sailge ojoki by Shami Renzen soon after 1139, and the HonchiJ shinshU ojoden by Fuji no Munetomo between 1134 and 1139 (Inoue and Osone 1974, 711-760). All together they contain some 340 vignette describing the faith, practices and rebirth of mostly contemporaneous persons into Amida's Pure Land. And while these stories cannot be taken as histori -cal fact, they nonetheless give us considerable insight into the views of the compilers and of their contemporaries on the availability and means to Pure Land rebirth. Hori, Ienaga, Shigematsu and Inoue have conducted extensive studies of these compilations (Hori 1953, 304-17;

4. This reference is to volume number 83, page 2, tier "c," line 14, to page 4, tier "b," etc., of "T.," the Taishif shinshU daizokyo.

ANDREWS 99

I!!naga 1963, 1-44 and 201-218; Shigematsu 1964, 122-309; Inoue and Osone 1974,711-760; Inoue 1975, 158-265).5 They find that the subjects of the rebirth tales are persons of all classes and circumstancesnobility and commoners, warriors and free cultivators, lay persons and clergy, women as well as men-but that those from the lower ranks of society are more numerous, that women, both lay and clerical are well represented, and that hijiri and shami, the evangelists and leaders of popular Buddhism, are prominent. The hijiri were clergy who left the degenerating centers of monastic Buddhism to pursue an ascetic, fervid religious life either as recluses dwelling at monastic retreats (bessho), or as itinerants circulating among the populace in towns and villages. The shami were unordained "householder novices" (zoku shami) or "wayfarers" (nyudo) who, while remaining married and in lay occupations, assumed an austere lifestyle, engaged in assiduous devotions and performed various religious functions for their fellow townspeople and villagers (Hori 1958; Ito 1969; Inoue 1975,215-56).

As depicted in the accounts of rebirth, the Pure Land piety of this mixed populace had the following features: belief in the advent of the final age of the Dharma (mappo), conviction of heavy karmic burden, anxiety about reincarnation in hell, simultaneous participation in an eclectic Lotus Sutra, Kannon, Miroku, Amida and Jizo devotionalism, as well as practice of various austerities and esoteric rituals, all in pursuit of this-worldly benefits as well as Pure Land rebirth. The practices depicted most frequently as eventuating in Pure Land rebirth are Lotus Sutra veneration, especially chanting and copying the sl1tra, and Pure Land nembutsu, especially ontemplation of Amida. 6 Frequently both kinds of devotion are pursued by the same person (Shigematsu 1964, 171-232).

These collections also reveal shifts in beliefs and practices from the earlier compilation of 985 to those compiled in the twelfth century. They show a heightened sense of personal evil and an increased anxiety, amounting to almost a certainty, of falling after death into a Buddhist hell. Amida and Jizo come to be emphasized as soters who have vowed

5. Moreover, Kotas 1987 summarizes much of the Japanese scholarship on the ojtJden and translates a number of tales. 6. The locus classicus of this exercise is the Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo ching I Kan Muryojubutsu kyo; see Ryukoku University 1984 or Muller, Sacred Books of the East, vol. 49. For discussions of this exercise in Japan and China, see Andrews 1973 and 1993.

100 JIABS 17.1

to save their devotees from this fate. 7 Exclusive devotion, especially to'~' .. Amida or the Lotus Sutra, becomes more frequent. Vocal nembutsu becomes more common, and these later collections also show a tendency toward cultivation of huge quantities of vocal nembutsu---,-lO,OOO or 100,000 nembutsu per day or 1,000,000 during a fixed period. Sole cultivation of vocal nembutsu makes its appearance in a few tales as well. 8 There is a noticeable increase in the incidence of rebirth of "evil persons" (akunin)-butchers, warriors, skeptics, and flagrant offenders-and especially of their conversion upon their deathbeds and rebirth by just a few utterances of the Buddha's name. 9 And finally, fanatical rebirth-suicide-devotees immolating or drowning themselves in expectation of immediate Pure Land rebirth-are more frequently depicted as well.

These eleventh century accounts also reveal a shift in the types and activities of the hijiri and shami. The hijiri more frequently emerge from their retreats and interact with laymen as itinerants who travel about from village to village (Ito 1984). Both hijiri and shami become more involved with Pure Land piety and in general they assume the roles of evangelizers and leaders of popular Buddhism, instructing and organizing the populace as preachers, healers and magicians in the style of the famous "hijiri of the market place," Kuya (893-972). For example, they serve as priests of local temples and shrines, organize Pure Land and other devotional groups (nembutsu shu, etc.), lead pious ceremonies (nembutsu kiJ, mukae kiJ, etc.), collect meritorious donations for temple and village projects, conduct funerals, exorcise malevolent spirits, heal the sick, organize social service projects, and in general serve the many needs of the populace while recruiting them to Buddhist faith and especially to Pure Land piety (Inoue 1975,226-56). However, despite these tendencies the rebirth accounts nonetheless reflect a Pure Land piety at the close of the Heian period that continued overwhelmingly to be incor-

7. Found by Inoue (1975, 230-254) also in the contemporaneous tale collection, Konjaku nwnogatari shU. 8. Inoue (1975, 250-51) identifies only four instances in the ojoden and two in the Konjaku monogatari shu, but because all these cases describe the practices of commoners, including those leaders and evangelizers, the hijiri and shami, he maintains that such exclusive devotion to Amida and sole nembutsu cultivation must have been fairly common in this period. 9. Ienaga (1963, 14-18) identifies 19 such cases in the twelfth century ojoden. .

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porated into an eclectic popular devotionalism of many faiths and practices.lO

When we compare this popular Pure Land piety with Honen's teachings on sole cultivation of vocal nembutsu it is clear that several of its tendencies coincide with Honen's positions: emphasis on the vows of Amida, on exclusive Pure Land devotion, on vocal nembutsu, on affIrmation of the rebirth of commoners, women and even: evil persons by vocal nembutsu, and their emphasis on sole nembutsu cultivation. It would seem reasonable to conclude, as some Japanese historians have, that Honen was strongly influenced by his contemporary, popular milieu.

We should also note that during his lifetime Honenhad ample opportunity to absorb popular influences. Much of his clerical career was spent among the rural populace and close to those popular evangelists, the hijiri and shami. From the age of nine until his mid-teens he served in a provincial temple and was no doubt exposed to all sorts of popular piety. At age fifteen he received priestly ordination upon Mt. Hiei, but within a few years retired from Tendai's ecclesiastical center to a rural .ffionastic retreat (bessho) on the western slopes of Mt. Hiei, called Kurodani, where he dwelt for twenty-five years (Tamura 1972, 61-103). Kurodani, like all such monastic retreats, served as a center where hijiri congregated and from whence they departed to preach and evangelize in the towns and villages (Takagi 1973, 357-375; Kikuchi 1982). While Honen himself does not appear during those twenty-five years to have left Kurodani to proselytize, he was nonetheless in close contact with these leaders of popular piety (Ito 1981,42-72). Moreover, after his departure from Kurodani in 1175 Honen established a teaching center at Yoshimizu in the suburbs of the capital where he taught scores of disciples and followers. 11 Many of these adherents then went out into the city and countryside in hijiri fashion, spreading the sole-nembutsu faith among the populace (Ohashi 1972, 143-47; Tamura 1959, 148-56; Ito 1969 and 1981, 73-136). Throughout his career, Honen was well

10. We must keep in mind that the rebirth accounts by their very nature emphasize Pure Land piety and tell us less about important trends in other varieties of popular religion. Thus our claim is not that they reveal an overall shift toward Pure Land piety, but just that they show some trends within popular piety as a whole and within Pure Land devotionalism in particular. 11. In 1204 some 170 disciples and followers indicated their assent to Honen's teachings by signing his Shichikajo seikai (Seven Article Pledge); see Tamura 1959, 146-48 and Nakano 1985.

102 JIABS 17.1

positioned both to be influenced by, and exert influences upon, popular piety.

Honen and Shan-tao on Practice Yet, whatever popular influences we may detect in Honen's thought; as we have noted, Honen himself claimed that his teachings were based on the interpretations of Shan-tao. Thus we must examine Shari-tao's position on effective practice.

Shan-tao twice concisely formulated correct and effective Pure Land practice, once in his Wang-sheng li-tsan chieh (Hymns in Praise of Pure Land Rebirth) and again in his Kuan Wu-liang-shou-fo-ching shu (Commentary on the Amitabha Contemplation Siitra). The former (T. 47.438c-439a) urges (1) veneration of Arnitabha with offerings of incense and flowers, (2) singing the praises of Arnitabha, his entourage and his Pure Land, (3) contemplating Amitabha, his entburage and his land, (4) vowing and praying to be reborn in the Pure Land, and (5) dedicating all one's own karma and the good karma of others to mutual rebirth in the Pure Land. This formulation completely omits the practice of calling on the name, except perhaps as an implicit accompaniment to veneration or contemplation. The Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra formula (T. 37.272a-b) 12 gives priority to invoking the Buddha's name, but also recommends accompanying this with the practices of reciting the Pure Land siitras and contemplating, venerating, and praising Amitabha. In another of Shan-tao works, his Kuan-nien Acmi-t'o-fo hsiang-hai san-mei kung- te fa-men (Methods and Merits of Samadhi of Contemplation and Reflection upon Amitabha), he prescribes contemplating the auspicious signs of the Buddha's physical body, but also urges as many as ten thousand to one hundred thousand daily invocations of the Buddha's name, interspersed with other devotional acts such as reciting scripture, making offerings and siriging praises (T. 47. 23b8-14). In general, Shan-tao was an austere monastic and a fervent devotee who insisted on total dedication to Amitabha through constant, ardent engagement in an array of devotional activities.

Yet, fundamental to Shan-tao's thought were two tenets: First, that he and virtually all of his contemporaries were helpless, morally degenerate "ordinary persons" lfanfu) living in an age of final Dharma, and second, that for such persons the practice most certain to result in Pure Land rebirth was the act empowered by the eighteenth vow, calling on the

12 .. Cited by Honen in Chapter 2 of his Passages, T. 83.2c16-22.

ANDREWS 103

Buddha's name. I 3 Shan-tao's position on practice was, therefore, ambivalent. While on the one hand he frequently urged constant performance of the most arduous contemplations and devotions, on the other hand he thought that most persons were capable of little more than calling on the Buddha's name.

Honen himself (T. 83.14<.:17-20) and modem Pure Land denominational scholars (Ishida 1952, 96; Fujiwara 1957, 215 and 218; Ishii 1969,526-27) have heavily based their claim of Shan-tao's advocacy of sole invocational nembutsu on a passage in Shan-tao's Commentary on the Contemplation SiJtra interpreting Sakyamuni's final transmission of his Contemplation Satra discourse to Ananda. This passage reads,

[The section of the Contemplation Sutra] from, "The Buddha said to Ananda, 'Keep these words well! [To keep these words is to keep the name of the Buddha of Limitless Life.']," rightly reveals the bestowal of Amitabha's name for transmission to future generations. Even though [Sakyamuni] had hitherto taught the benefits of the meditative and nonmeditative Dharma-gates, [he] saw that the meaning of [Amitabha] Buddha's original vow consisted in sentient beings calling solely and exclusively on the name of Amitabha Buddha.14 .

Here Shan-tao seems to be saying thatSakyamuni Buddha wanted Ananda to convey to sentient beings in the future not the contemplations and ethical practices which he had just taught in the Contemplation Satra, but rather the sole practice of invocational nembutsu urged by Amitabha himself in his eighteenth vow. However, this is but one terse and ambiguous passage in all of Shan-tao's voluminous writings, and to use it to relegate categorically buddha-contemplation to the status of an inferior practice would be to overSimplify Shan-tao' s rich thought. IS

13. In the first section of his Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra, T. 37.245-251, Shan-tao argues at length for the degeneracy of his age and the decadent condition of his contemporaries. He interprets the eighteenth vow as urging invocation at T. 47.27a16-19 and T. 47.447c23-26. 14. T. 37.278a23-26 by Shan-tao, interpreting T. 12.346b15-16 of the Contemplation Sutra, cited by Honen in his Passages at T. 83.14c17-20. 15. Some Pure Land denominational scholars also claim that the Commentary on the Contemplation Sutra was Shan-tao's fmal and most mature work (for example, Fujiwara 1957, 204-09), and therefore that its position on the priority of the eighteenth vow's vocal nembutsu should take precedence over passages in Shan-tao's other works urging contemplative and other practices. While the Commentary on the Contemplation Satra is probably Shan-tao's most mature work, there is no historical evidence that it is his last composition.

104 JIABS 17.1

Although there are scattered about in Shan-tao's writings passages which urge invocation to the exclusion of contemplation (e. g., T. 47. 439a24-26), we should keep in mind as well fIrst that Shan-tao frequently urged observance of the Buddhist precepts and performance of rites of repentance, and secondly that three of his five works are liturgi -cal, designed for use in ritualistic worship services.

Was Honen therefore justified in ascribing his position on sole nembutsu to Shan-tao's interpretations? On the one hand, Shan-tao did interpret the practice of the eighteenth vow as calling on the Buddha's name and urge this practice as best for his contemporaries. On the other hand, his writings enthusiastically encourage the cultivation of buddhacontemplation and other Pure Land devotional practices. Thus, while Honen did not find "sole nembutsu" per se in the writings of Shan-tao, he was clearly influenced by Shan-tao's powerful arguments for the special status and efficacy of invocation.

However, aside from Shan-tao's position on buddha-recollection itself, there was another feature of his thought, a more basic feature, which was a prerequisite for Honen's formulation of a sole nembutsu doctrine. Before Honen could conceive of nembutsu as among all prac -tices a superior practice which should be cultivated solely, it was necessary for him to perceive Amida as a special object of devotion to be worshiped to the exclusion of all other soters and sacralities. In Japan, the tendency had been to subsume Pure Land piety within either nonPure Land doctrinal systems or, as we have seen, within an eclectic popular matrix. Moreover, even by the twelfth century exclusive devotion to Amida, according to the accounts of rebirth, had barely begun to emerge. In China, on the contrary, the line of Pure Land teachers from T'an-luan (ca. 488-554) to Shan-tao had for centuries been exclusively focused on Amitabha Buddha. Shan-tao rejected totally any spirituality except that committed to Amitabha and Pure Land rebirth. Thus tre practices he recommends, as we have seen above, were all practices expressing devotion to Amitabha. Honen encountered in Shan-tao this exclusive commitment to Pure Land rebirth and exclusive reliance on practices in devotion to Amitabha. And this exclusive focus on Amitabha made it possible for Honen to formulate the even more thoroughgoing exclusiveness of his sole nembutsu position. 16

16. Honen develops his exclusive Pure Land stance initially in Chapter 1 of his Passages, basing his position on citations from Tao-ch'o (562-645) and

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Honen's Transformation of Popular Pure Land Piety As I proposed above, it is my view that Honen drew from both his contemporary religious milieu and from continental thought and that he synthesized these influences so as to systemize a unique doctrinal position. Let me make three points: First, that Honen used continental thought to extract the sole nembutsu idea from its Japanese multi-faith, multi-praxis popular matrix; secondly, that he borrowed from Shan-tao certain of Shan-tao's notions on Pure Land praxis and used these to formulate a system of doctrines around the idea of sole nembutsu; and thirdly, that Honen related his teachings on sole nembutsu practice to a Pure Land scriptural canon, thus supplying them with some legitimacy and considerable autonomy.

Regarding the first point, based upon Shan-tao's exclusive commitment to Amitabha and his insistence upon the cultivation of Pure Land practices only, Honen was able first to extricate in theory Pure Land piety from its eclectic popular mix. Then based upon this exclusive Pure Land devotionalism and Shan-tao's high regard for buddha-invocation he was able to develop his subsequent poSition of just one Pure Land practice, thereby extracting vocal nembutsu also from its eclectic amalgam. In some ways the highly focused Pure Land exclusivity Honen derived from Shan-tao was more important for Honen's historical role than his better known position on sole nembutsu, because it made possible, after centuries of co-option and subordination, the formulation by Honen of autonomous forms of doctrine and praxis essential for the development of the various Kamakura period Pure Land sectarian groups.

My second point is that Honen borrowed from Shan-tao certain of Shan-tao's notions on Pure Land praxis and used these to formulate a system of doctrines around the idea of sole nembutsu. As noted above, by the seventh century in T' ang China Shan-tao had already devised a rich system of Pure Land praxis. He saw the nienjo, i. e., nembutsu, empowered by the eighteenth vow as the major act establishing a nexus of mutual devotedness between sentient being and buddha (T. 37.268a4-13), an act to be cultivated with sincere, deep and focused faith (T. 37.270c-273b), reverently, exclusively, constantly and to the end of one's life (T. 47.439a7-18). All this, as well as the identification of the nien-fo of the eighteenth vow with the utterance of the Buddha's name

other continental masters, and subsequently amplifies this doctrine drawing heavily on Shan-tao.

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ten times as described in the Contemplation Satra, had already been worked out by Shan-tao. These systemic ideas and others were borrowed by Honen, enriching his notion of sole nembutsu and providing a rationale for its effectiveness.!7

My third point is that Honen associated his teachings on sole nembutsu with a Pure Land canonical corpus, thereby enhancing their legitimacy and establishing their autonomy in relation to other doctrinal systems. There can be no question that a major concern of Honen in his Passages was to authenticate his teachings by showing how they were based upon Pure Land and other Mahayana scriptures. In the opening chapter he claims for his Pure Land School a canon called "the three part Pure Land scripture" (jodo sambukyo), consisting of the Wu-liang-shou ching / Muryoju kyo (Sl1tra of Limitless Life), Kuan Wu-l~ang-shou-fo ching / Kan Muryojubutsu kyo (Sutra of Comtemplation on the Buddha of Limitless Life, or Amitabha Contemplation Sutra), and the O-mi-t'o ching / Amida kyo (Amitabha Sl1tra).18 Subsequent chapters of the Passages, with the exception of chapters 2,9, 14, and 15, begin with a citation from one of these scripture intended to justify a particular claim regarding sole nembutsu or some related doctrine. (Chapters 2, 9, 14, and 15 begin with citations from the works of Shan-tao, which for Honen also had canonical authority.) This direct link to a defined set of scriptures associated with the Buddha Amitabha was also intended to liberate Pure Land doctrines from dependence on the canons of other schools, thereby giving these doctrines autonomy as well as legitimacy.

Conclusion Let me conclude by reiterating that Honen did not simply adopt the raw features of popular faith into his teachings. He returned to the Chinese sources of much of Japanese popular Pure Land piety 19 and used those texts and teachings to modify, systematize and defend popular Japanese

17. See Honen's Passages on the Selected Nembutsu, T. 83.9a23-b7; 9c3-12b25; 12b27-c10; 4b26-c6. 18. The influence of Shan-tao is apparent here also. These three siitras were the ones he recommended reading and reciting in one of his formulations of Pure Land practice (see section 3 above and T. 37.272b2). On Honen's formulation of this canon and other features of his Pure Land School, see Andrews 1987. 19. Inoue and others (Shigematsu 1964; Sato 1956; Andrews 1989, 1990, 1991) have documented the impact of Chinese Pure Land upon early and midHeian Japanese Pure Land devotionalism, especially upon the Djoyosha, and the impact of this text in turn upon popular piety.

ANDREWS 107

beliefs and practices. Moreover, this hybrid character of Honen's thought was important for the further development of Japanese Buddhism: Because it was based upon popular ideas and practices, Honen's thought had great popular appeal, and because it now constituted a system of doctrines invested with credibility and autonomy, it was able to serve, with later modifications of course, as the basis for several institutionalized Buddhist sects-the Jooo Shu, the JisM and the Jooo ShinsM.

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______ ,. 1990. "Genshin's Essentials of Pure Land Rebirth and the Transmission of Pure Land Buddhism to Japan, Part Two: The Third Phase of Transmission of Pure Land Buddhism to Japan-A Quantitative Survey of the Resources Utilized by Genshin's Essentials of Pure Land Rebirth for the Cultivation and Efficacy of Nembutsu." Pacific World: Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies. (N. S.) 6.

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CHARACTER LIST

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ROGER JACKSON

Guenther's Saraha: A Detailed Review of Ecstatic Spontaneity

Herbert Guenther. Ecstatic Spontaneity: Saraha's Three Cycles of Doha. Nanzan Studies in Asian Religions 4. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1993. xvi + 241 pages.

Saraha and His Scholars Saraha is one of the great figures in the history of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. As one of the earliest and certainly the most important of the eighty-four eccentric yogIS known as the "great adepts" (mahasiddhas), he is as seminal and radical a figure in the tantric tradition as Nagarjuna is in the tradition of sutra-based Mahayana philosophy.l His corpus of what might (with a nod to Blake) be called "songs of experience," in such forms as the doha, caryligfti and vajragfti, profoundly influenced generations. of Indian, and then Tibetan, tantric practitioners and poets, above all those who concerned themselves with experience of Mahamudra, the "Great Seal," or "Great Symbol," about which Saraha wrote . so much. He is reckoned as a spiritual ancestor by oral traditions in all of the "second wave," gSar rna pa, Tibetan Buddhist schools,especially the bKa' brgyud, and his teachings were known, too, by those who transmitted and promulgated the "first wave" rNying rna pa tradition of the "Great Perfection," rDzogs chen. And, though the Indian Buddhist culture of which Saraha was a part perished in the fourteenth century, echoes of his songs are to be found in non-Buddhist Indian traditions that survive to this day, especially those influenced by the Naths and

1. For the traditional late Indian account of Saraha, see, e. g., Keith Dowman, Masters of Mahiimudra: Songs and Histories of the Eighty-Four Buddhist Siddhas (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985) 66-72; and James B. Robinson, Buddha's Lions: The Lives of the Eighty-Four Siddhas (Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1979) 41-43.

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Sants, from the Bauls of Bengal, to the Kabir Panth of the Hindi-speaking north, to the Warkari movement of Maharashtra. 2

Even more than Nagarjuna, though, Saraha is historically obscure and linguistically and philosophically elusive. We ~ow virtually nothing with certainty about his life or times, and the vast majority of his works are available only in Tibetan translation. There is an extant Apabhrarpsa version of his best-known work, the Dohlikosagiti, which has served as the basis of analysis andlor translation by, most notably, M. Shahidullah,3 P. C. Bagchi,4 D. B. Dasgupta, 5 Rahul SlUplqtyayan 6 and David Snellgrove. 7 This Apabhrarp.sa version of the "People Dohas," however, is almost certainly incomplete, and even if Apabhrarpsa is the original language in,which Saraha composed, his thought cannot seriously be studied without taking into consideration the works under his name that are found only in Tibetan. Over a score of works are attributed to Saraha in the bsTan 'gyur, 8 the most important of which are the so-called ''People,'' "Queen" and "King" doha-collections that later were grouped together as the Three Cycles of Doha (Do ha skor gsum)9; three collections ofvajragiti (the "Treasuries" of body, speech

2. See, e. g., June McDaniel, The Madness of the Saints: Ecstatic Religion in Bengal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), esp. 166-179; and Karine Schomer and W. H. McLeod, eds., The Sants: Studies in a Devotional Tradition of India (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987); Schomer's essay, "The Dohii as a Vehicle of Sant Teachings" (61-90), is one of the best discussions in English of the poetic form used by Saraha. 3. Les Chants Mystiques de KllT}ha et de Saraha: Les Dohii-ko~a et les Caryll (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1928) 123-225. 4. Dohiikosa, Calcutta Sanskrit Series 25c (Calcutta, 1938). 5. Obscure Religious Cults, 3rd ed. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1976 [1969]), esp. 3-109; and An Introduction to Tllntric Buddhism, 3rd ed. (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1974). 6. Doha-kos (Patna: Bihar Rastr-bMsa Parisad, 1957). 7. Edward Conze, ed., Buddhist Texts Through the Ages (New York: Harper & Row, 1954) 224-239. 8. See, e. g., James Robinson's list in Buddha's Lions, 291-292. 9. The "People DoMs" (S. Dohiikosa-glti; T. Do hii mdzod kyi glu) is Peking catalogue no. 3068, found in Daisetz T. Suzuki, ed., The Tibetan Tripi!aka, Peking Edition [hereafter PTI1, vol. 68 (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripi(:aka Research Foundation, 1957) 256/1/6-259/1/1 (= bsTan 'gyur, mi 74b-81b); and Tohoku [sDe dge] catalogue no. 2224, found in A. W. Barber, ed., The Tibetan Tripi/aka, Taipei Edition [hereafter DT], vol. 28 (Taipei: SMC Publishing Co., 1991) 921140(6)-941153(3) (= bsTan 'gyur, wi 70b-77a). The "Queen DoMs" (S. Dohllkosa-upadefagUi; T. Mi zad pa'i gter mdzod man ngan gyi glu) is Peking no. 3111, found in PTT, vol. 69, 85/5/3-88/1/6 (= tsi 34a-39b); and Tohoku no. 2264, found in DT, vol. 28, 173/56(6)-175/66(4) (= zhi 28b-33b). The "King DoMs" (S. Dohiikosa-nllma-caryagiti,

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and mind)lO; and a song of instructions on Mahiimudra, the Dohakosanama-mahamudra-upade1a. 11 What is more, Saraha's writings must be set in their theoretical and practical context, as an expression (and often radical condensation) of a great many strands of Indian Buddhism, from Madhyamika and Yogacara philosophizing, to classical meditation theory, to-most importantly-the complexities and subtleties of tantric theories, contemplations and rituals, especially those related to what came to be known as the yogini tantras of the anuttara yoga class.

Very few scholars possess the linguistic and philosophical credentials to approach, let iUone to engage and translate Saraha, but Herbert Guenther-for over forty years a pioneer in the study of Indian and TIbetan Buddhist tantra-certainly is one of them. In Ecstatic Spontaneity he has fulfilled a long-standing desideratum in tantric and Buddhist studies: a complete translation of Saraha's Three Cycles of Doha. It undoubtedly will stand as one of the most important and chal -lenging publications of his distinguished career. This is not, of course, Guenther's first presentation of Saraha. In 1969, he published The Royal Song of Saraha, 12 an annotated translation of the shortest of the Three Cycles of Doha, the "King Dohiis," together with the commen-

T. Do hli mdzod ces bya ba spyod pa'i glu) is Peking no. 3110, found in PTT, vol. 69, 84/5/3-8515/2 (= tsi 31b-34a); and Tohoku no. 2263, found in DT, vol. 28, 173/52(6)-173/56(6) (= zhi 26b-28b). 10. These are tbeKliyakosa-am.rta-vajragiti (T. sKu'i mdzod 'chi med rdo rje'i glu), Peking no. 3115 and Tohoku no. 2269; tbe Vlikkosa-rucira-svaravajraglti (T. gSung gi mdzod 'jam dbyangs rdo rje'i glu), Peking no. 3116 and Tohoku no. 2270; and tbe Cittakosa-aja-vajragiti (T. Thugs kyi mdzod skye med rdo rje'i glu), Peking no. 3117 and Tohoku no. 2271. All tbree are found in vol. 69 of PTT (103/3/3-108/112 [= tsi 77b-89b) and vol. 28 of DT (196/212[4]-199/233[2] [= zhi 106b-117a]). 11. T. Do hli mdzod ces bya ba phyag rgya chen po man ngag, Peking no. 3119 (PTT vol. 69, 110/2/2-111/116 [= tsi 94b-97a) and Tohoku no. 2273 (DT vol. 68, 200/243[3]-2011247[7] [= zhi 122a-124a]). The autborship of tbis text is in some doubt. In botb lhe sDe dge and Peking editions, lhe colophon states lhat lhe text was composed by ri khrod chen po saraha. If lhis is taken to mean "lhe great mountain hermit Saraha," lhen lhe aulhor is our Saraha. Guenlher ansi Barber botb read it tbis way. If tbe yxpression is taken to refer to Maha-Sabara Saraha, tben it may point to Sabaripa, tbe mahlisiddha who was a disciple of Saraha. The Peking follows tbis assignment, as do Robinson (op. cit., 291) and Jampa Thaye, who has translated the text into English as "The Doha Treasure Mahamudra Instructions" (A Garland of Gold: The Early Kagyu Masters in India and Tibet [Bristol: Ganesha Press, 1990] 80-86). 12. The Royal Song of Saraha: A Study in the History of Buddhist Thought (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1969).

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tanes of sKye med bde chen (= Bal po A su, eleventh century) and Karma 'phrin las pa (1456-1539).13 The Royal Song was both the fIrst serious study of the historiography of Saraha and a fascinating portrait of the ways in which later thinkers understood the "King DoMs." In The Tantric View of Life (1972),14 perhaps his most eloquent discussion of Buddhist tantra, Guenther quoted copiously from many important Indian tantric works, including, quite prominently. all three of Saraha's Cycles of Doha. Now, after nearly two decades in which his attention has been devoted primarily to translating and explaining the rDzogs chen tradition of the rNying rna school, Guenther has, with Ecstatic Spontaneity, returned to Saraha. The book is divided into two general sections' ''Ecstatic Spontaneity," which provides historical and philosophical background for understanding Saraha's writings, and "Saraha's Three Cycles of Doha," a heavily annotated translation of the Tibetan versions of the "People DoMs" (Dohakosa-gUi), "Queen DoMs" (Dohakosa-upadeiagUi) and "King DoMs" (Dohiikosa-nlima-caryagm), followed by a bibliography and trilingual index. I will discuss each of the two main sections of the book in turn.

Guenther's Introduction: General Reflections The introductory section, "Ecstatic Spontaneity," is divided into four chapters: "Saraha," "Wholeness," "The Body" and "Complexity." The chapter on Saraha is, as Guenther admits, but a slightly revised republication of the first chapter of The Royal Song of Saraha, the reincarnation of which is justified by the fact that the earlier study has, regrettably, gone out of print. In the chapter, Guenther translates the biography of Saraha from Karma 'phrin las pa's commentary on the Three Cycles of Doha, and then proceeds to argue that, the claims of previous scholarship notwithstanding, we know virtually nothing of Saraha's life, time or provenance. His arguments to this effect are convincing, as is his claim that "the ApabhraIpsa text [of the 'People DoMs'] is a bowdlerized and fragmented version of an earlier work that has been lost" (9). Guenther also analyzes Tibetan scholastic disputes about the authenticity of the "Queen" and "King" Dohiikosas, letting Karma 'phrin las pa, in affIrmation of their legitimacy, have the last word. He concludes the chapter by tracing the lineage of the Three Cycles from India to Tibet,

13. Do hli slwr gsum gyi .tikl1 'bring po sems kyi roam thar ston pa'i me long (Thimphu, Bhutan: Druk Sherig Press, 1984). 14. Boulder and London: Shambhala, 1976 [1972].

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again with considerable assistance from Karma 'phrin las pa, as well as 'Gos 10 tsa ba's Blue Annals. Though nearly a quarter century has passed since The Royal Song, nothing has come to light in the intervening years that would cast serious doubt on the conclusions or details Guenther presented there. Granted, his arguments would be even more persuasive had he occasionally referred to the efforts of other scholars (there is one brief, dismissive reference to the work of Shahidullah and Snellgrove), but this objection notwithstanding, the chapter on "Saraha" in Ecstatic Spontaneity stands, as did its predecessor, as the most definitive and convincing available account of the historical and textual problems presented by Saraha.

The next three chapters treat, respectively, three topics crucial for understanding the Three Cycles of Doha. "Wholeness" is concerned with exploring the various ways in which Saraha sings of "a wholeness whose presence we somehow sense as the driving force in our quest for its recovery" (16), via an analysis of the most important and difficult terms in the doha's: the four mudras, especially Mahamudra, which Guenther explains as "a wholeness that can be experienced in the immediacy of ecstasy as a conneCtedness with the beingness-of-being" (19); "complementarity-in-spontaneity" (sahaja; lhan skyes); "the inmost mentor" (bla ma); "pristine awareness" (gnyug ma'i sems); "ownmostness" (svabhltva; rang bzhin); the "fourfold function of mind" as outer, inner, arcane and "holistic" (phyi, nang, gsang and de kho na . nyid); and the "four dimensions of symbolic expression," L e., memory, nonmemory, non-origin and transcendence (dran, dran med, skye med and blo'das). In the chapter, Guenther draws primarily on other works by Saraha to support his discussion, especially the Kayakosa-am.rtavajra-gfti, from which he quotes extensively. For secondary support, he draws on a number oftexts from the rDzogs chenisNying thig tradition, and the by now familiar range of modern Western writers, including lung, Bateson, Whitehead and the physicist David Bohm. "The Body" deals primarily with what is usually called the "subtle body" (sulqmasarira), with its interrelated systems of cakras, nlif/ls, prartas and bindus, which are not only descriptions, but symbols, embedded in richly evocative two- and three-fold semiotic schemes. The chapter's broader theme is the tantric view of human beings as "the outcome of numerous, hierarchically interlaced processes, not unlike a standing wave generated on a field of intersecting energies" (44), a "living and embodied ... center of a constellation of ... forces" (ibid.) that has its

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roots in the "mental" dimension of the "lumen naturale (' od gsal) ... that constitutes us in our ownmostness (rang bzhin)." (53) Here, Guenther bases his discussion almost entirely on literature from the rDzogs chen/sNying thig tradition. "Complexity" is an exploration of the symbolism of the five ''resonance domains" (rigs), which are refractions of Kun tu bzang po, ''the openness/nothingness (stong pa) of Being . .. [which is] a veritable matrix of both its own radiant intensity ... and that of the lumen naturale of the human individual" (59). These resonance domains constitute a complex m~9ala containing-as one's perspective shifts-paired male and female "regents" (rgyal balrgyal rna), "instinctive sensibilities" (nyon mongs), pristine awarenesses (ye shes), aggregates (phung po), "supportive cosmic forces" (khams), sensory apparatuses (dbang po), empowerments (dbang bskur) and colors (kha dog). Not only may each "domain" of the ma1,l9ala be seen in a variety of ways, but the five domains themselves may be understood as constituting a hierarchy, whether cosmogonically, as stages in a process of cosmic becoming, or soteriologically, as stages'in a spiritual progression. In "Complexity," as in "The Body," Guenther bases his dis- . cussion primarily on the rDzogs chen/sNying thig tradition.

Taken together, these latter three chapters of the introductory section are a remarkably concise, yet comprehensive, treatment of most. of the major themes of tantric Buddhism. They also serve to display both the strengths and weaknesses of Guenther's approach to Buddhist tantra in general and Saraha in particular. It has long been Guenther's contention that Buddhism, especially in its tantric forms, is virtually unique among pre-modern philosophical/spiritual traditions in its uncompromising espousal of precisely the kind of "holistic," "hermeneutical," "process" approach to reality that in one way or another informs such modem Western enterprises as the "New Physics," existential phenomenOlOgy, process philosophy and analytical psychology. Leaving aside for the momept the possible incompatibilities among these various ways of approaching the world, or the degree to which they mirror the concerns and perspectives offrrst-millennium Indian Buddhists, one cannot but be impressed by the passion and erudition with which, over the years, Guenther has woven together a variety of strands, Buddhist and Western, humanistic and scientific, into a complex and apparently seamless tapestry that depicts at once the message of Buddhism, a scientific understanding of the nature of the world, and an existential assertion the possibilities for authenticity open to human beings. It may well be that,

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a century from now, Guenther will be remembered as a great and visionary thinker, who more than any other scholar or philosopher of his time was able to bring Asian and Western ways of thinking together into a creative and ennobling synthesis. What is more, there undoubtedly is a good case to be made that there really are correspondences or analogies among the various approaches to the world invoked by Guenther-he is far from the only interpreter of Buddhism (though he was among the ftrst) to notice that it may fruitfully be compared to certain modem Westem perspectives on reality.

Correspondence, analogy and comparison, however, are not the same as complete identification, and if there is a. crucial weakness in Guenther's approach, I think it is in his tendency not to rest content with "suggestive juxtapositions" of different world-views, but to treat them as if they are identical, or at the very least perfectly complementary. Thus, it is not sufficient to point out that a figure like Saraha may pre-figure one or another modem understanding of the world; for Guenther, Saraha is that understanding, but in a different guise. As a result, Saraha's mode of expression is perfectly interchangeable with certain modern modes of expression: his thought may be stated using modem concepts and language, and his words may be translated into the language of, e. g., contemporary hermeneutics, or cosmology, or both. IS When Saraha is seen thus, he may become a very cogent figure for suffering beings of the late twentieth-century West, but he loses his status as a historically situated figure: he takes on meaningful content at the cost of his context. If Guenther were merely asserting a correspondence among, say, Saraha, the New Physics and existential philosophy, then the possible differences between the two Western perspectives, or between them and Saraha, could merely be accepted as inevitable, minor flaws in a nevertheless suggestive set of analogies. When identity is asserted or assumed, however, we must look rather more carefully at the

15. Guenther would deny what I have just asserted. Indeed, in the introduction to From Reductionism to Creativity: rDzogs-chen and the New Sciences of Mind (Boston & Shaftesbury: Shambhala, 1989), he says: "My use of modem scientific terms ... is not an attempt on. my part to show that Buddhism is somehow another form of science, but is meant as a tool to bring to light that which has remained unsaid in what has been said and thereby to show that Buddhism still has 'something to say,' and that this something is significant" (6). Nevertheless, to the degree that Guenther actually gives us Buddhist thinkers through modem concepts, rather than simply comparing the two, he seems implicitly to treat them as if they were virtually identical.

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terms and systems that are being identified, lest the importation of a term from one system seriously distort our understanding of the terms of another system. Thus, one must ask whether, in fact,the New Physics and existential philosophy even are complementary ways of approaching the world, let alone identical. For instance, is the insistence, by some existential thinkers, upon the ambiguity and absurdity of human existence compatible at all with the often strongly teleological character of some proponents of the' New Physics? Maybe, maybe not; but the case for their compatibility needs to be demonstrated rather than merely asserted or assumed.

Even if one can make a case for the perfect complementarity or identity of various modem perspectives, there still remains the even more important question of whether it is legitimate to explain and translate Saraha via those perspectives. Are there differences of outlook or terminology sufficiently important that they vitiate the identification? Again, the answer is uncertain, but there are at least two areas of possible discrepancy that deserve mention: (1) "Being"-talk and (2) the language of cosmogony.

(1) Guenther long has argued that, as process-oriented thought, Buddhism cannot and should not, as Eliot's Prufrock has it, be fixed in "a formulated phrase ... formulated, sprawling on a pin ... pinned and wriggling against the wall." In line with this belief, Guenther has modified his terminology and translation-equivalents again and again over the years, as new books passed across his desk or new perspectives opened up to him. Amidst all this change, however, there has been a constant, a sort of terminological pole star, which is Guenther's injection of the word "Being" into both discussions and translations of Buddhist texts. It is, of course, a rich and malleable word; for Guenther, it seems to suggest the source and the fundamental nature of the world and its beings, an appreciation of which will bring one into harmony with oneself and all that is. Guenther always has been careful to specify that Being's nature is "openness/nothingness" (stong pa nyid), and that it should not be confused with the metaphysical absolute of Western theology and philosophy. Unfortunately, "Being" (especially when it is capitalized) carries with it a great deal of precisely the sort of metaphysical baggage Guenther would like to shed. It is very difficult to read the word without hearing echoes of Parmenides, Aristotle and Aquinas, and even if the reverberations are from a more recent figure, like Heidegger, there remain difficult questions about whether anyone writing in the

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Western tradition can escape the hypostatization the term inevitably seems to invite.

More importantly, for all his many uses of the word over the years, Guenther never has convincingly explained what term in the Indian or Tibetan Buddhist lexicon "Being" is supposed to translate. In his analyses, Guenther generally uses the term without specific justification, as if it were perfectly natural; in his translations, he usually places it in brackets. Any term that must is bracketed as often as "Being" is by Guenther will begin, to the skeptical reader, to look like a candidate for Occam's razor. Furthermore, in those few cases where the term is translated without brackets, one still wonders what its equivalent is in the source language. For instance, Guenther translates a synonym for Mahamudra, namely, gzhi rtsa med pa, as "Being-a ground that is without a ground" (17). Lexically, at any rate, it is only when one eliminates "Being" from the translation that the Tibetan phrase is approximated. Again, he translates de kho na nyid (tathata) as "Being-in-itsbeingness" (26); a lexical translation yields only "thusness" or "suchness." The point here is that Buddhist writers most often chose the words they did, and their negative and/or indirect rhetorical style, as a way of avoiding terms that were susceptible to essentialization or hypostatization. Certainly, early writers self-consciously eschewed terms like brahman, litman, jiva, etc., precisely so the dynamic outlook of Buddhism could be mirrored in its language; and even if later writers, whether in the Sl1tra- or Tantrayana traditions, became more comfortable with "affirmative" terms and metaphors, these more often than not received carefully "negativized" interpretations. One might argue that in the Tathagatagarbha literature, certain tantras, and the writings of the rDzogs chen and the gZhan stong traditions, affirmative language is not explained away. This may be, but the problem of what term "Being" is supposed to translate remains unsolved; and even if a candidate is supplied from this corpus (kun gzhi? gshis? kun tu bzang po?), the question remains whether (as Guenther does in his chapters on "The Body" and "Complexity") one should read one style of Buddhist predominantly through the lenses of another-should Mahamudra really be read via rDzogs chen, or Saraha via kLong chen pa?

(2) If the language of "Being" in Saraha seems largely to be a Guentherian interpolation, so, too, do the less numerous, but nevertheless noticeable, references to what might be described as an "onto-cosmogonic vision"-a notion of Being as manifesting, concretizing, or

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intensifying itself, whether synchronically or diachronically. "The idea," says Guenther, "is that a rupture occurred within the unity and symmetry of Being, and that this rupture gave rise to the space-time continuum. This eruption of Being into space and time was accompanied by a massive wave of intense, supracognitive energy that found its way into the heart of every embodied being ... , where it serves as the organizing principle for the bodily evolution of that being" (24, n. 25). Once again, the reader is likely to be surprised, for nearly as often as they have been depicted as avoiding language suggestive of metaphysical absolutes, Buddhist thinkers have been regarded as uninterested in issues of cosmogony, which would seem more properly to be the preoccupation of those for whom some conception of "God" (or gods) is centrally important It is Guenther's contention, however, that "[t]he perennial quest for Origins-still present today in humanistic cosmologies-also marks the treatment of hominization by the thinkers of the sNying-thig tradition. For them, the 'beginning' contains the code for all human becoming, and decoding it gives us understanding of the human individual" (58). In a footnote, Guenther identifies "humanistic cosmologies" as those of Teilhard de Chardin and proponents of the "anthropic prinCiple." The former is explicitly, if unconventionally, theistic, while the latter has often been interpreted as justifying a theistic world-view. (This, in turn leads to questions about what Guenther means by "Being" that cannot be pursued here.) The hermeneutical key to the last-quoted passage is the reference to "the sNying-thig tradition." There can be little doubt that the question of origins has been an important one for sNying thig, which Guenther regards as "probably the most profound examination of wholeness to be found in non-Western intellectual history" (ibid.); and if, as Guenther suggests earlier, "wholeness" is an appropriate translation of both mahlimudra and rdzogs pa chen po (16-17), then isn't it reasonable to view Saraha, for whom Mahamudra: is a central theme, through sNying-thig lenses, and therefore as implying (or even stating) an onto~cosmogonic vision? I think not, unless one is willing to assume, as Guenther here appears to, a homology between Mahamudra: and rDzogs chen so strong that obvious terminological and systemic differences may comfortably be ignored-and I do not think that differences among Buddhist traditions ought to be written off any more blithely than those among Western traditions or between (one or more) Buddhist tra-

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ditions and (one or more) Western traditions. 16 Again, Guenther's tendency toward "identification" creates problems.

Before passing on to the translation, I want to touch briefly on one other general issue raised by the introductory chapters: the way in which Guenther treats his philosophical or scholarly "foils." Guenther is an eloquent advocate of a "holistic," multi-dimensional approach to the world and living within it, and a tireless translator of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist thinkers who seem to endorse such an approach, so one cannot but be struck by the irony that, despite his (and his sources') rejection of such intellectual bugaboos as "dichotomic thinking" and "reductionism," he seems on occasion to fall prey to just these tendencies. Thus, in the Preface to Ecstatic Spontaneity, he delineates a number of general oppositions that help to shape his approach: representational vs. hermeneuti cal thinking, speculative vs. experiential mysticism and static vs. dynamic views of reality (xiv-xv). Polarities such as these certainly have heuristic value for purposes of analysis, but they do have the disadvantage, if wielded carelessly, or taken too seriously, of imprisoning those who would use them inside a cage of, yes, dichotomic thinking, whereby any system or thinker must be placed on one or another side of a great spiritual and intellectual divide. Guenther has invoked such dichotomies often in the past, setting up oppositions between, inter alia, Eastern and Western philosophy, 17 HInayana and Mahayana. 18 Sl1tra and Tantra,19 Indian and Tibetan thought, 20 dGe lugs and rNying malbKa' brgyud thought, 21 or even all other Buddhist philosophical views and that of

16. On the question of the relationship between Mahmnudra and rDzogs chen, see, e. g., The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Kindness, Clarity and Insight (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1984) 200-224; Samten Gyaltsen Karmay, The Great Perfection: A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988) 197-200; and David Jackson, "Sa-skya PaI)cJita the 'Polemicist': Ancient Debates and Modem Interpretations," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (13.2: 1990), esp. n. 28, 75-78 and n. 87, 95-96. 17. See, e. g., The Life and Teaching of Naropa (London: Oxford University Press, 1963) 124-130 .. 18. See, e. g., From Reductionism to Creativity, 125. 19. See, e. g., Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice (Baltimore: Penguin, 1971) 169-170. 20. See, e. g., Meditation Differently: Phenomenological-psychological Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist (Mahamudra and sNying-thig) Practices from Original Tibetan Buddhist Sources (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992) xi. 21. See, e. g., Mind in Buddhist Psychology (with Leslie S. Kawamura; Berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1975) xii.

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rDzogs chen.22 The inevitable result of overvaluing this kind of dichotomy is reductionism, with its built-in tendency to overlook exceptions and nuances. In Ecstatic Spontaneity, for instance, Guenther deliberately sets up an opposition between Saraha, who celebrates "the immediacy of experience" and his purported disciple, Nagarjuna, founder of the "much overvalued Madhyamaka system of philosophy," which Saraha is said to have criticized for its "logical reductionism" (9). Saraha does make a passing, unflattering reference to Madhyamikas in the Kayakosa-am.rta-vajragiti, but his disparagement, in verse 6 of the "People Dohas," of those who "run after the Mahayana" does not, Guenther's contention notwithstanding, seem directed specifically at the Madhyamaka (see 91 and 161, n. 12). Even if it is, it is hardly proof that Saraha and Nagarjuna stand on opposite sides of a great chasm: Madhyamaka, after all is a long and complex tradition of thought in both India and Tibet. Simply to write it off as "logical reduc tionism" (and I'm not convinced that Saraha actually does this) is to overlook the degree to which Madhyamika thought came to be intertwined with the tantric outlook, and even the Mahamudra literature, to which Saraha's work is so basic. Conversely, it also overlooks the degree to which Saraha himself is steeped in the discourses of "conventional" Siitrayana Buddhism, whether it is negative rhetoric of Prajfiaparamita and Madhyamaka, affirmation of the three or four buddhakayas, or tre vocabulary of meditative concentration.

This proclivity toward reductionism also is evident in Guenther's attitude toward scholars working in his field: he tends either to ignore or dismiss them. Thus, one will hunt in vain in the bibliography to Ecstatic Spontaneity for references to the work of, e. g., Agehananda Bharati,23 David Seyfort Ruegg,24 Per Kvaeme,25 Alex Wayman26 or Michael

22. See, e. g., From Reductionism to Creativity, 184. 23. The Tantric Tradition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970 [1965]). 24. E. g., "A Karma bKa' brgyud Work on the Lineages and Traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu rna (Madhyamaka)," in Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata (Serie Orientale Roma, 56,3, 1249-1280); and Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1989). 25. An Anthology of Buddhist Tantric Songs: A Study of the Caryligfti (OsloBergen-Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1977); "On the Concept of Sahaja in Indian Buddhist Tantric Literature," Temenos 11 (1975): 88-135. 26. E. g., The Buddhist Tantras: Light on Indo-Tibetan Esoterism (New York: Samuel Weiser, 1973).

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Broido.27 Guenther does refer (8, n. 14) to earlier work on Saraha by M Shahidullah and D. S. Snellgrove, but the former is passed over quicldy, while the latter is dismissed for his "less than adequate" understanding of Apabhnup.sa and Tibetan-an assessment that, whatever the defects of his translation of Saraha, hardly does justice to Snellgrove's large and well-respected TIbetological oeuvre. 28 What is perplexing in all this is that Guenther clearly is an immensely learned and subtle scholar, capable of analyzing philological nuances or historiographical problems as adeptly as he employs Heidegger or Jung or David Bohm-yet he persists in oversimplifying complexity and "reducing reductionists." In doing so, he threatens to undermine the very values he so eloquently defends, to belie by his style the vital and visionary content he very much wants us to take to heart One wishes sometimes that Guenther would hearken to the words of a poet with whom he should have a great deal of sympathy, Blake, who advised his readers to embrace the complexity symbolized by "fourfold vision," and to overcome the temptation to "single vision, arid Newton's sleep."

The Translation: General Comments The second part of Ecstatic Spontaneity features a translation of the "People," "Queen" and "King" Dohiikosas, organized and numbered according to the text-divisions supplied by Karma 'phrin las pa. Guenther never makes it entirely clear which version of the Tibetan

. translation of Saraha he is working from. His bibliography lists only the Peking bsTan ' gyur volume and folio numbers, yet he follows Karma 'phrin las in accepting the sDe dge arrangement of the "Queen Dohas." I can only presume that in preparing his rendition of ''the nowadays standard Tibetan translation preserved in the bsTan-'gyur" (159, n. 6), he probably has drawn on both the Peking and sDe dge editions (which are generally-but not always-identical in their readings). The translation of the "Queen Dohas" is, so far as I know, the first into any Western

27. E. g., "Padma dkar-po on Tantra as Ground, Path and Goal," The Journal of the Tibet Society (4: 1984): 5-46; "Padma dkar-po on the Two Satyas," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (8, 2: 1985): 7-60; "Sa-skya p~"ita, the White Panacea and the Hva-shang Doctrine," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (10, 2: 1987): 27-6. 28. E. g., Buddhist Himalaya (Oxford: Cassirer, 1957); The Hevajra Tantra, 2 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959); and Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: Indian Buddhists and Their Tibetan Successors, 2 vols. (Boston: Shambhala, 1987).

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language, while the "People DoMs" is given a complete translation for the first time. The translation of the "King Dohas" is a lightly revised version of that published in The Royal Song of Saraha-almost all 1re emendations are for the purpose of updating translation tenninology. Here, I will comment briefly on the translation's general features, then point to some particular passages where alternative readings or renditions might be proposed.

If Guenther's vision of Buddhism and his approach to scholarship have been-and may legitimately be~uestioned, his understanding of the Tibetan language has not. Indeed, what has frustrated more than a handful of Guenther's readers over the years was the sense that here was a Westerner who could read Tibetan as well as any non-Tibetan alive, yet whose published translations were so encoded in the author's idiosyncratic terminology that they were virtually inaccessible to anyone who did not have before them the Tibetan original and all the books Guenther had ever read. Readers expecting to find Guenther's rendition of Saraha' s Three Cycles of Doha any easier than his previous translations will be disappointed. He does not, after all, see himself as in the business of providing "easy" translations. Buddhist (and especially tantric) thought, he has pointed out again and again, is not easy: it is richly evocative and complex, and only a suitably complex translationscheme can begin to convey the full sense of the original. In line with his long-standing approach, therefore, Guenther translates Saraha into English that befuddles the eye and stumbles off the tongue, and is undeniably complex and evocative-though whether the complexity and evocativeness of Guenther's Saraha are the same as the complexity and evocativeness of the original is, of course, debatable. Guenther argues that because we have lost the melodies of Saraha's songs, and because "the natural rhythms of [his] language disappear in the Tibetan translation ... we must rely heavily on the notions of wholeness, body and complexity to capture the flavor of Saraha's work" (85). In other words, since the "true original" is forever beyond our ken, we may as well translate according to later commentaries or concepts that seem to capture the original's "spirit." The practical effect of this is that Guenther's reading of Saraha is shaped as much by his reading of Karma 'phrin las pa's sixteenth-century commentary and by his own synthesis of Buddhism, hermeneutics and the New Physics, as by the Tibetan text Thus, though the syntax, grammar and overall sense of the Tibetan are (in general) faithfully rendered, the reader must work

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through one or two other layers of discourse to approach what a more "straightforward" version of the original might convey. I put "straightforward" in quotes out of deference to Guenther's contention that the belief that there is any such thing as a "straightforward translation" is delusive. I agree, but in the same breath would argue that there are at least degrees of straightforwardness, and that when in doubt, translators ought to hew closer to literalism; add less, rather than more, to their renditions; and, as much as possible, keep commentary identifiably separate from translation.29

These theoretical qualms notwithstanding, I want to emphasize that a careful comparison of his translation with the Tibetan editions of til:! originals available to me-those published in Taipei (sDe dge) and Tokyo-Kyoto (peking), 30 respectively-<:onvinces me that Guenther has construed the syntax, grammar-and sense-of Saraha with remarkable fidelity. What is more, although his translation terminology is as challenging as ever, Guenther makes a much greater effort here than in some of his earlier works to apprise the reader of what in the Tibetan original a particular word or phrase may translate, as well as his reasons for translating it thus. Indeed, the entire apparatus of notes to the translation is superb, incorporating detailed discussions of alternative readings of Saraha's text found in various commentaries (with all of which Guenther seems familiar), and intriguing, provocative analyses of difficult and important terms. This kind of detailed annotation makes it far easier to approach the translation itself, and Guenther and/or his editors are to be congratulated for the care they have taken with this crucial aspect of the book. .

It also must be said in favor of the translation that on the one Dohlikosa for which alternative translations are available, the "People Dohas," Guenther's effort marks a real improvement over its predecessors. In comparison to Snellgrove's, for instance, Guenther's translation is more complete (since it incorporates the full Tibetan text, rather than just those verses that have been found in Apabhrmpsa), and appears to offer more accurate renditions of a number of important passages. To take just two instances, Guenther translates verse 119 (rdo rje pa dma gnyis kyi bar gnas pa I bde ba gang gis roam par rol pa yin I ci ste de

29. For an articulate summary of this view, written over two decades ago, and with Guenther even then in mind, see R. A. Stein, Vie et Chants de 'Brug-pa Kun-Iegs Ie Yogin (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1972) 29-36. 30. For bibliographical information on these editions, see above, n. 9.

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bden nus pa med pas na / sa gsum re ba gang gis rdzogs par 'gyur) as: "He who enjoys the pleasure that / Resides in between the diamond and the lotus-/ So what! since there is no capacity [to effect anything] in this pleasure / With what will he fulfil the expectations people have in the triple universe of theirs?" (116). Snellgrove, on the other hand (perhaps following Shahidullah), misses the irony of the original: "That blissful delight that consists between lotus and vajra, / Who does not rejoice there? / In the triple world whose hopes does it fail to fulill?" (his verse 94, in Buddhist Texts Through the Ages [BIT A], 237). Similarly, in translating verse 142 (stong pa'i sdong po dam pa'i snying rje min / gang la slar yang rtsa ba me tog 10 'dab med / de la dmigs par byed pa gang yin pa / der lhung bas ni yan lag med par ' gyur), Guenther has: "Ifin someone this solid tree of [Being's] nothingness is such as not to show compassionate concern / It will not even have roots, leaves, and flowers./ Anyone who makes this [barren tree] the object of his concentration/ Will fall into [the extreme of nihilism] and become one who is without the tools [to extricate himself from it]." This may not be mellifluous poetry, but is, overall, better attuned to the nuances of the text than Snellgrove's rendition: "So the fair tree of the Void also lacks compassion, / Without shoots or flowers or foliage, / And whoever imagines them there, falls down, /Forbranches there are none" (verse 109, BITA 239). These are important examples of Guenther;s improvement upon Snellgrove (and Shahidullah's) translation; there are many others that could be cited, and the overall effect is a rendition of the text that is considerably more faithful to the syntax and grammar of the original than we have had before.

Guenther's translation is a remarkable one; let nothing detract from that basic fact. There are, however, just a few passages where his rendition struck me as imprecise or potentially misleading in relation to the Tibetan of Saraha' s doMs, and a few others that reveal apparent incon -sistencies in terminology or awkwardness of grammatical construction. In addition, I have detected several instances where lines of Tibetan are not reflected in the translation, and a number of typographical errors. In what follows, I will catalogue most, but not all, of these passages. My suggestions are not to be taken as "corrections" of Guenther, but, rather, as "queries" about alternative readings of the text, about which I am quite ready to be corrected. The "People DoMs" will be abbreviated as "P," the "Queen D6has" as "Q," the "King Dohas" as "1(." the Peking

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edition of the bsTan ' gyur as ''Pe,''31 the sDe dge edition of the bsTan 'gyur as "D" and Guenther as "G." It should be noted that Guenther does not usually make it clear which version of a particular line or verse of Tibetan he is uSing for his translation. A comparison of his translation with the Peking and sDe dge versions available to me usually has permitted identification of the original Tibetan from which he is working, but there may be instances where Guenther and I are not referring to the same verse(s)-and in those cases, my comments may require revision.

The Translation: Analysis of Specific Passages In considering passages where I think the translation may be either imprecise or misleading, I will not generally address Guenther's systematic translation choices ("egologically predisposed awareness" for yid, "complementarity-in-spontaneity" for lhan slcyes, "the beingness-ofBeing" for de kho nanyid, etc.), or the problems raised by his bracketed interpolations, (e. g., of "Being" -talk). I have discussed some of these issues generally above, and to examine all of them in detail would require a book----:-and even that probably still would fail to settle all the issues involved. Rather, I will simply point to some of those instances where I think that Guenther's rendition may lead the reader away from a "straightforward" sense of the original verses even within the parameters of his own translation-scheme.

P 26d reads: srid dang mnyam nyid tha das rna 'byed par; G's translation reads: "Without differentiating between samsara and nirvana" (95). "Nirva-lla" may be a connotation of mnyam nyid (samata), espeCially when it is paired with srid [pal (= bhliva, smp.sanc becoming), but the denotation is something more like "sameness." As in the Samadhiraja Satra, mnyam nyid certainly refers to the tru~ nature of things, and by extension to the realization of that nature that a Buddha (who has, at the very least, attained nirvfil).a) enjoys, but this seems to me not completely to "translate" into the idea of nirvfil).a.

31. In sections ''The Translation: Analysis of Specific Passages," and "Some Technicalities," I will usually cite the Peking version of Saraha, since that is the edition listed by Guenther in his bibliography; variant readings found in the sDe dge will be indicated in footnotes.

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P 36ab reads: sems ni nam mkha' 'dra bar gzung 32 bya ste I nam mkha'i rang bzhin nyid du serns gzung 33 bya; G's translation reads: "One's psychic background ... must be understood to be like the sky ... and fIhe sky must similarly be understood [to be like] one's psychic background" (97-98). The first line is unproblematic; in the second, however, it seems to me that the du postpositional to rang bzhin is likelier to make it the object rather than the subject of the sentence which, rather than reversing the sentence of the first line, intensifies it: "Mind is to be apprehended as like the sky; I As the very nature of sky is mind to be apprehended." Here, the "natural" (rang bzhin du) identity of mind and sky asserted by the second line is even stronger than the mere simi -larity asserted by the first G's reading ofP 36b is far from impossible, but it seems marginally the less likely of the two.

P 60d reads: soms34 so zhe na gcig gi mam pa las35 mi bskyod; G's translation reads: "If you know [that sensation or thought or action] ... I Is [your] mentation, [you win have realized that] there is nothing that has not sprung from it" (103). While I agree that Saraha's point here is that there is nothing that has not sprung from mind, the Tibetan here does not clearly justify G's double negative construction. More importantly, G (perhaps following a commentarial emendation) seems to read bskyod (shaken, moved) as bskyed (sprung, generated), and therefore the last part of the line simply as a reiteration Of the first half. The second part of the line is difficult to construe, but if we accept bskyod as the correct form, then the whole line would be translated by something like: ''When you [know] that [sensation or thought or action] is mind, you will not be shaken from that single perspective."36 Alternatively, one might take sensation, etc., as the subject and translate: "When you [know] that [sensation or thought or action] is mind, [you know that] they are not shaken from that singular aspect"

P 77cd reads: gang tshe rlung rgyu 37 de ni mi g.yo ste I 'chid38 ba'i tshe na mal 'byor pas ci bya; G's translation reads: "Even while the

32. D: bzung. 33. D: bzung. 34. D: sems, which seems preferable. 35. D: lao 36. This is the sense conveyed by Snellgrove (BITA, p. 231), though he follows Shahidullah in translating the frrst part of the line by "Abandon thought ... ," reflecting a translation of the ApabhraIp.sa ma{Ul cha4cju-the latter imperative verb is not reflected in the Tibetan translation. 37. D: rgyud, which seems preferable. 38. This probably should be 'chi.

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biotic forces may stir, the innermost mentor remains unshakable. I At the time of your dying, what can the Lady of Enchantment (mal 'byor ma) do?" (107). In line d, G (at least following Molq;akaragupta; see 174, n. 87) reads a feminine suffix where Pe and D have the masculine; a translation based on the latter would ask what at the time of death a yogi (mal 'byor pa) can do. Line c-following as it does two lines that describe the guru's ability to comprehend the cessation of mind (sems) imd winds (rlwzg) without ever closing his eyes-may refer implicitly to the guru in the terms described by Guenther, but his reading seems to me to leave line d somewhat isolated from the rest of the verse. If one takes the last two lines as disjunctive from the first two, emphasizing the contrast between the guru and a mere yogI, and takes the yOgi of line d as the subject of line c, then the lines read: "[But] when the flow of winds moves no more, I Then, at the time of death, what is a yogI to do?" One cannot, of course, give this translation if one follows G's reading of line d; if one does, then his translation is probably the more plausible (though I think that there is an ironic edge to the ci bya construction that Guenther's translation, and his note, miss).

P l06c reads: chags dang chags bral spangs nas dbu mar mugs; G's translation reads: ''Enter [and reside in] Being's immanent wholeness in you, once it has discarded this attachment and [its] attachment-free phase" (114). G states in a footnote that his rendering is based on a version of the doha "as commentated upon by Karma 'phrin las . . ., Mok~akaragupta, ... and Advaya Avadh11ti" (188). This leaves ambiguous whether the particular verse in question is preserved by these commentators in a different form from that of Pe and D; if not, it is difficult to see how dbu mar mugs can be taken as "Enter ... Being's immanent wholeness"--denotatively, it seems to refer to the anuttara yoga tantrasalJ1pannakrama "entry" of the yogI'S energies and awareness into the central "psychic channel" (dbu ma). The phrase may have connotations like those drawn out by G, but if it is based on the same wording as found in Pe and D, his rendering strays far enough away from a straightforward reading of the original that it obscures at least one important sense that is conveyed.

P 138b39 reads: sems ni ngo bo nyid kyis dag pa na; G's translation reads: "Since mind's 'stuff' (sems kyi ngo bo) is by virtue of the 'stuff' [the universe is made of, ngo bo nyid kyis] pure" (121). Here, the ngo

39. This is actually line c in Pe, which reverses lines b and c, and gives a truncated version of (its) line b; G appears to be following D here.

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bo that is implied parenthetically to modify serns is not present in the original: it is just "mind" (sems) that is the subject, and what is predicated of it is simply that it is ngo bo nyid kyis dag pa, "naturally" or "essentially" pure. Even if G's interpretation in terms of the "stuff of the universe" is not grammatically unwarranted by the original, it does seem to add considerable semantic (and metaphysical!) complications to it

P 141 reads: stong pa'i sdong bo40 dam pa me tog rgyas I snying rje dam pa sna tshogs du rnar [dan I lhun gyis grub pa phyi rna'i 'bras bu ste I bde ba 'di ni gzhan pa'i sems min no; G's translation reads: "On the solid tree of [Being's] nothingness a flower has opened I With many varied [petals expressive of Being's] genuinely compassionate concern. I [Though being Being's] complementarity-in-spontaneity it later bears fruit that is I Ecstasy. This [ecstasy] is not some other mind" (121). In line c, "complementarity-in-spontaneity" (G's standard translation for lhan cig skyes pa) seems an inappropriate equivalent for lhun gyis grub pa, which usually has the sense of "spontaneously accomplished" or "spontaneous accomplishment." Granted, lhan skyes is lhun grub, but the latter's rendition as "complementarity-in-spontaneity" seems to me to miss the original verse's strong use of contrast: although the tree is "nothing," it still bears flowers of compassion; although ecstasy (or is it compassion?) is spontaneously accomplished, it bears fruit later. line d certainly can be read the way G proposes-it helps to underscore the identity of stong pa nyid, snying rje and bde ba-but Snellgrove's suggestion is possible, too: "This joy has no actual thought of others" (his verse 108, BTIA, 239).

Q 3a reads: dpyad pas rna 'ongs de bzhin nyid kyi ye shes ni; G's translation (his verse 3b) reads: "Of this pristine awareness of Being's beingness [which is this beingness] one cannot have enough, however much one may indulge in it ... " (124). I confess I cannot understand the derivation of G' s translation of dpyad pas rna 'ongs, which modifies de bzhin nyid kyi ye shes: a more straightforward translation of this characterization of the "pristine awareness of Being's beingness" would seem to me to be something like "which does not come about (rna 'ongs) through analysis (dpyad pas)."

Q 7 reads: dngos por skye ba dngos po med par rab zhi zhing I de yi phyogs dang bral ba mkhas pa de nyid kyis I blon po rnams kyi blo la rang gis dpyad bya na I skad cig grol ba de la chos kyi sku zhes bya; G's translation reads: "What has become 'existence' comes to rest in

40. D:po.

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'non-existence' and / When this very knowledge that is dissociated from either alternative / [Though already present even] in the intellect of stupid people, is investigated by itself [in its emerging], / The moment [the external and internal] dissolves [in the immediacy of Being's] dynamic freedom, is said to be Being's meaning-rich gestalt" (125). Aside from the introduction to line d of the unbracketed "dissolves," which is not reflected in the Tibetan, G's translation is certainly a possible' one. It is possible, however, to construe the mkhas pa in line b as referring to a knowledgeable or skillful person, and to suggest that when such a person investigates what even fools have in (or as) their minds, the Dharmakaya ensues; the doha might thus be translated: ''What arises as entity comes to rest in non-entity; / When those same wise persons who are impartial about [entity and non-entity], / Themselves investigate what is in the minds of fools, / Then instantaneously they will be freed-that is called Dharmakaya."

Q 34d reads: chos mams thams cad rkyen med par ni skye rna yin; G's translation reads: "All these entities of your reality are in the absence of conditions [to the contrary], not [something that] is being born" (134). This is an ambiguous line, which might be taken either as negating or asserting the arising of the sense-objects on which, in the previ-0us line, one has been advised to depend. It may, with equal grammatical plausibility, be translated: "No dharma lacking conditions arises" or "All dharmas, lacking conditions, do not arise." Given the general tenor of Saraha's rhetoric, one would be inclined toward the latter. This seems to be the direction of Guenther's translation, but his bracketed interpolation of "to the contrary" confuses me: wouldn't the absence of conditions to the contrary assure that something would be born, while the absence of conditions assure that it wouldn't?

Q 41ab reads: ye shes skyes pa'i mal 'byor gang la'ang dogs med pas / dbang phyug rtags [D: thabs] dang ldan pa-,41 mthar skyes gtsal bar bya; G's translation reads: "A [Saivite] yogi in whom a [pseudoexistential] pristine awareness [allegedly imparted to him by Siva himself] has come about, [and hence] in whom there is no fear, / Will, whilst wearing the insignia of Siva [as a charm] look for a woman born in the outskirts. / [Or, a Buddhist yogi in whom the pristine awareness of the unity of masculine and feminine forces (that are working in and through him) has come about, should look for an anima-figure ( rig rna) born in the border region (of his consciousness and the uncon-

41. D: pas.

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scious) who will impart lasting bliss and who has the excellent indications of inner spiritual wealth.]" (135-136). It is evident from G's note (204, n. 51) that he has drawn his reading from Karma 'phrin las pa, who takes the two verses in question as referring critically to a Salva yogI's search for a consort in external border-regions, and then interpo -lates a contrasting description of a Buddhist yogI's inner search. The mooted term here is dbang phyug (ifvara), which often has Saiva connotations. This undoubtedly posed a problem for Saraha's Buddhist commentators, but may not have much preoccupied Saraha himself: he might have found it perfectly conceivable for a Buddhist yogI to wear Saiva insignia, especially if Bharati is right that Saraha and the other mahiisiddhas originated in a rustic, mixed (or proto-) Buddhist-Hindu milieu, and were considerably less doctrinaire than their commentators. 42

A second solution is provided by the fact that dbang phyug need not invariably have Saiva connotations: it may simply refer to something or someone powerful. Either reading frees us to give a more straightforward reading to line a, whose subject now can be taken as a Buddhist yogI, whose ye shes need not be bracketed away as G (and apparently Karma 'pOOn las pa) have insisted it be. The passage thus would read: "A fearless yOgi in whom gnosis has arisen / Should, with powerful [or: Siva's] insignia [or-if we accept D-with powerful methods], seek [a woman] born on the outskirts."

Q 45cd reads: yon tan bzung nas43 rang gis rig pa'i ye shes sbyin / skabs su TO snyoms gnyug ma'i phyag rgya bzung; G's translation reads: "Taking in her qualities he will [reciprocate by] offering his pristine awareness, / Reverberating with the intensity of [their] immediate experience, and, / For the time being, he will take this pristine awareness-heightened in its sensibility through Being's genuineness [operating in it], approximating in flavor [Being's nothingness replete with everything in highest perfection]-as the Mahamudra experience" (137). G's translation adds a full line of English ("Reverberating .... ") that is neither found in Pe or D, nor noted by G to occur in any other recension of the dohil. Also, his rendition of line d distinguishes less clearly than usual what material is in the Tibetan and what is not; a more

42. The Tantric Tradition, 29-30. It must be noted, however, that the preponderance of Buddhist technical terminology in Saraha's works leave little doubt that he was, in fact, an educated Buddhist-regardless of whether all the ideas imputed to him by later commentators were actually intended by him. 43. D: na.

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streamlined version of his own translation would read: ''For the time being, he will take Being's genuineness, approximating in flavor [Being's nothingness ... ] as the [maha]mudra." One might also translate the two lines in a way that brings out the language of "give-andtake" more strongly; hence: "Having taken on her qualities [faith, etc.], he gives her the gnosis he himself knows; / At that time, he takes the seal of the original single flavor." Granted, the seal referred to is probably Mahamudra, and the "original single flavor" needs to be filled outperhaps along the lines suggested by G-to be comprehensible, but any expansion of the material ought to indicate clearly what is in the original and what is not, and in this case, G has failed to do so.

Q 62ab reads: dngos grub kun gyi rtsa ba rdo rje slob dpon te 44 /

legs par sbyangs pa'i45 rgyu nyid 'bras bu kun kyi Ius; G's translation reads: "The root of all achievements is the rdo-rje slob-dpon, who / From [the perspective of] our thoroughly cleansed [disposition to wholeness] is the cause-factor of why all realizations as its fruition occur in our bodily existence." (143) The translation of the first line is unproblematic. G's version of line b, however, does not seem justified by the syntax: if rgyu nyid were modifying 'bras bu kun gyi Ius, it would probably be found at the end of the line; furthermore, if fruitions were to occur "in" bodily existence, one would expect the last phrase to read, e. g., lus su 'bras bu kun. My own reading of line b is: "[The rdo,. rje slob-dpon] is the very cause of [our] thorough purification, the body [sic.] of all results." I confess that I do not know quite how to take Ius here, except perhaps in the metaphorical sense of a structure, or support, in the sense that the tantric master is both the source and support of our achievement of spiritual results.

Q 63-65areads: ehos dang longs spyod rdzogs dang sprul pa'i sku 46

/ ngo bo nyid kyi sku ni rgyu 'bras rab shes bya / sgro bskur gnyis kyis stong pa gnyis med ehos yin te / ngo bo nyid kyi bde ba de nyid47 longs spyod ehe II sna tshogs pa yi 'gro ba thams ead sprul pa yang48 / dbyer med ye shes ngo bo49 nyid ni kun gyi bdag / skye bar byed dang bya ba'i50 rang bzhin mi dmigs kyang / goms pa'i mthu yis dogs pa thams

44. D: yin. 45. D:pa. 46. D: ehos kyi sku dang longs spyod rdzogs dang sprul pa'i sku. 47. D: ni, which seems preferable. 48. D.las. 49. ngo bo missing from D. 50. D: skyed par bya dang byed pa 'i.

134 JIABS 17.1

cad zil mnan nas / 'bras bu nyid ni rang dang gzhan gyi51 phun tshogs yin. G's translation reads: "chos-sku, longs-sku, sprul-sku, ngo-bonyid-sku [and by implication bde ba chen po'i sku) are to be known as standing in a cause-effect relationship. / [The pristine awareness in which] there is no duality, devoid of positive and negative imputations, is the chos-sku, / [Its open-dimensional field-character is] the ngo-bonyid sku, [its feeling-tone of ecstasy] is the bde-ba chen-po'i sku, [its spanning the individual's spiritual dimension] is the longs-sku, / And [its self-manifestation in concrete guiding images] according to the varied inclinations of all living beings is the sprul-sku. / The pristine awareness modes of [these five gestalts in their] indivisibility is the 'authentic Self' [hidden] in [and being] the whole [of Being]. / Although in these pristine awareness modes] nothing whatsoever of something to be created and someone creating is to be observed, / It is through the power of your having become accustomed to [ the working of your dichotomizing mind that this duality with its apprehensions and] fears [has come about], but once these have been overcome [by these pristine awareness modes] / A double repercussion [is intimately felt and brought to life]: invaluable self-fulfillment and other-enrichment." (143-144) This important and difficult passage contains one of Saraha's few explicit references to the buddhakliyas. The greatest difficulty posed by G's trans- . lation-and in this I take him to be following Karma 'phrin las pa-is its introduction of a "tantric" fifth kaya (the bde ba chen po'i sku) into a passage that, on the surface, appears to mention only the four kayas of later Sl1trayana Mahayana-though Saraha's account of the four certainly does not lack tantric referents. An alternative translation might read: "The Dharmakaya, perfect Sambhogakaya, Nirm~akaya / And Svabhavakaya are clearly known as cause and result: / Nonduality void of both eternalism and nihilism is the Dharmakaya, / [One's] natural bliss is the Sambhogakaya, / Manifestation for all the various sentient beings [is the Nirm~akaya], I And the Svabhavakaya, the gnosis of the inseparability [of bliss and voidness?], is the lord [or self] of all. / Although [by] nature no creator or created is observed in arising, / By virtue of one's accustomation [to that fact?], one suppresses all doubt, / And the result is the exaltation of oneself and others." Again, this is a difficult passage, which could itself be the subject of a whole article (exploring, for instance, Saraha's interweaving of imagery from both the Sl1trayana and Tantrayana traditions). Quite apart from the question of

51. D: don.

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the number of kliyas asserted, there is the problem of the nature of 1he "cause-result" relationship that obtains among the kiiyas that are asserted. G maintains (209, n. 86) that the Dharmakaya, Svabhavakaya and Mahasukhakaya (bde ba chen po'i sku)· are the causes, and the Sambhogakaya and Nirm~akaya the results. My own interpretation suggests that the Mahasukhakaya is not mentioned, and that there are two possible readings of the relationship among the remaining four. In reading (a), the Svabhavakaya is asserted as the "cause" (kun gyi bdag) of the Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya and Nirm~aya, and although it is their "cause," there is nothing in it related to creator or creation, while at the same time one's familiarity with it will lead to all good results for oneself and others. This would seem justified by the placement of statements regarding the non-existence of creator and created immediately after the definition of Svabhavakaya-Ianguage relating to causation follows logically on mention of a "lord of al1." This, however raises the difficult doctrinal issue of how the nondual voidness that is the Dharmakaya could be a result. Therefore, I would be somewhat more inclined to an alternative reading, (b), in which the Dharmakaya stands in causal relation to the Sambhogakaya, Nirm~akaya and Svabhavakaya. In a series of verses that is based strongly on structural parallelisms, this would allow the cause-result ordering of the kliyas to mirror the order in which they first are asserted (63b: rgyu 'bras), and, by making the "lord of all" subordinate to pure voidness, it also would eliminate the doctrinal inconsistency that reading (a) seems to entail-it must be admitted, however, that where tantric terminology is invoked, the "classic" patterns of Sutrayana traditions are not always respected!

K 5 reads: ji ltar Chu52 ' dzin gyis ni rgya mtsho las I chu blang nas ni sa gzhi gang byas kyang I de nyiJ53 rna nyams nam mkha' dag dang mnyam I 'phel ba med cing 'grib pa dag kyang med; G's translation reads: "As a cloud that rises from the sea I Absorbing rain the earth embraces, I So, like the sky, the sea remains I Without increasing or decreasing" (151). Line b here is not entirely clear; exactly what is the earth "embracing"? Is it the cloud or the rain? For that matter, where in the original is the word for "embracing"? An alternative translation, which might clarify these issues, is: "A cloud absorbs water I From the sea, [or] the earth may [absorb rain], yet I [The sea] does not shrink; it is the same as the sky: I It does not increase, nor does it decrease." My

52. D: chu'i. 53. D: ni.

136 JIABS 17.1

translation of lines a and b is not much more literal than G's--a literal rendition would read: "[When] a cloud absorbs water I From the sea, whatever the earth may do, yet .... " TIlis literal version fails fully to bring out the point that the verse seems (if we believe the commentators 54) to be making, namely, that even when ocean water evaporates into clouds, or the rain from the clouds is absorbed by the earth, the ocean does not increase or decrease, any more than the sky grows when it is clear or shrinks when it is clouded-the implication being that the same may be said of the mind of sahaja.

K10cd reads: phun tshogs rna yin phun tshogs brtan pa'i sems I yang m"55 phun sum tshogs pa skarn par 'gyur; G's translation reads: " ... [in] a mind that is firm I But full of qualities that are not perfect; I These imperfections will in time dry up" (152). At issue here is the translation of phun sum tshogs pa in line d as if it had a negative prefix, hence "imperfections." TIlis leaves it unclear whether Saraha is suggesting that what will "dry up" are qualities that are useless to enlightenment (underdeveloped phun tshogs) or qualities that are hindrances to it (nonor anti-phun tshogs, such as klesas). If we leave out the negative prefix, however, the line straightforwardly makes the former point: "[In] a mind based on perfections that are not perfect, I Those 'perfections' will dry up."

K 13ab reads: dang potha rna de bzhin gzhan na med I thog ma tha rna bar du gnas pa med; G's translation reads: "It is in the beginning, the middle and I The end; yet end and beginning are nowhere else" (152). If the problem in the previous stanza was the interpolation of a negative prefix not in the original, here it is in the omission of a negative that is there. The second line (= G's first) clearly states that "It is not in the beginning, end or middle."56 The first line is rather more difficult: we may follow G in taking it disjunctively ("But beginning and end are nowhere else"), or we may follow the syntax more closely and, taking "it" as the subject of both lines, read them as in apposition: "It is not fIrst or last or otherwise; I It abides not in the beginning, end or middle."

K 19ab reads: gti mug gsaZ bas ye shes mi gsaZ te I gti mug gsaZ bas sdug bsngaZ gsaZ ba57 bzhin; G's translation reads: "Knowledge shines

·54. RSS, 99-101. 55. D: na .. 56. Of the commentators cited by Gin RSS, Karma 'phrin las pa seems to support this reading (126), while sKye med bde chen seems inclined toward the intexpretation reflected in G's translation (124). 57. D: pa.

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not in the dark, but when the darkness I Is illumined, suffering disappears [at once]" (153). Given the ambiguity and richness of the term gsal-which may mean, inter alia, "shine," "appear," "illuminate" or "be illumined"-G's translation is by no means implausible. It is based on seeing a shift in the meaning of gsaZ from the first line to the second, such that in line a it simply means "appear," while in line b it means "is illumined" -in effect, "lit up and seen for what it is." If, on the other hand the gsal ba is read similarly in all four instances, the result is: When darkness shines, gnosis does not shine; I When darkness shines, suffering shines." The second half of the dohli goes on to cite the farniliar example of cause-and-effect, seeds producing shoots producing leaves, but I do not think that this points decisively toward one reading or the other, as "causation" may be invoked in support of either.58

K 21cd reads: gang mig khyirn nas byung nos. sgo drung du I kit rna rU pa'i gtam ni 'dri bar byed; G's translation reads: "Like a man who leaves his house and standing at the door I Asks [a woman] for reports of Sensual delights" (153). It may well be that kit rna ra pa has connotations of "woman," or, more specifically, the kannamudrit.59 Kit rna ru pa, however, also may refer to Assam, and it is possible to read the verse-whose first two stanzas criticize those who take "the delights of kissing" (kha sbyor bde ba) as an ultimate (don dam)-as saying that such people are like a man who stands in his doorway and "asks for news of Assam," i. e., concerns himself with distant externals when all he needs is right before him, that is, in his own body (for which, of course, the house is frequently a metaphor in Buddhist writings).

K 24c reads: 'ching bar byed pa shin tu dkrungs byed60 de; G's translation reads: "[Those who are attached to certain inner yoga practices] confuse I That which fetters with that which gives release" (154). The implication of the verse is certainly that expressed by G, but there is no mention of "release" in the original, which simply asserts that these misguided "yogIS" "bind themselves, utterly confused."

58. Of the commentaries quoted by G in RSS, that by sKye med bde chen seems to support G's reading, that of Karma 'phrin las pa my own (140-142). 59. This seems to be the view of both commentators cited in RSS (146-152); I can only presume that they are interpreting the same Tibetan word, rather than one that more overtly denotes a woman. 60. D: byas.

138 nABS 17.1

K 29ab reads kun rdzob bden pa dran pa med pa ste / sems gang 61 sems ni med par 'gyur ba'o62; G's translation reads: "Convention's truth is 'memory' that [on closer inspection] turns out to be 'nonmemory' / And [thus a] mind that has become no-mind" (155). This important and difficult passage is taken by G, following sKye med bde chen and Karma 'phrin las pa (RSS, 169-173), to refer to Saraha's views of conventional and ultimate truth, in terms of the "four dimensions of symbolic expression" (dran, dran med, skye med and b 10 'das). G's translation here captures the full sense of the commentarial view, but is somewhat mi~leading about what is and is not in the original' which makes no explicit mention of "memory"; in fact, G's earlier translation seems more closely to reflect Saraha's verses: "Nonmemory is convention's truth, / And mind which has become no-mind [is ultimate truth]" (RSS, 69). In light of the "four dimensions," it may well be that the conventional truth expressed as "nonmemory" is "memory" that has been rightly understood, but G's indication of this would have been clarified had he moved his bracket to left of "memory." The second line makes no explicit reference to ultimate truth, and it is possible that the "mind that has become no-mind" is simply a further description of the process involved in the conventional recognition of "nonmemory"although the next line's characterization of "that" (no-mind, presumably) as "utterly pure, the highest of the high" (yongs su dag par mchog gi mchog)63 does give it the unmistakable ring of "ultimacy."

In D,64 K 39ab reads: gang gis gang du gang 65 la de dag med / de yis66 de ru de la dgos pa byas; G's translation reads: "What has been done and where and what in itself it will become / Is nothing: yet thereby it has been useful for this and that" (157). This is a difficult verse, susceptible of more than one reading. G's translation is quite plaUSible, and seems to me to capture the overall sense of the original. He has, however, added verbiage to lines that are quite concise: neither "will become," "has been done," nor "nothing" is clearly indicated in the

61. D: dang. 62. D: gyur pa'o. This appears to be the reading followed by G. 63. Or, as G, seeming to follow D (yongs su gyur pa mchog gi mchog), has it: "This is fulfilment, this is the highest good." 64. I opt for D's reading here because it appears to be the one followed by G, and because it is more symmetrical than Pe's. Though we cannot, of course, be certain that this symmetry was present in the original, it is not an atypical structure in the Buddhist poetic tradition. 65. Pe: de. 66. Pe: yi

JACKSON 139

original, nor, for that matter, is a subject, "it." Also, he does not reflect as closely as he might have the parallel structures found in the Tibetan; he chooses to read the de yis at the beginning of line b as providing an instrumental (''thereby'') that links the clauses, but he sacrifices thereby any real play with the parallelisms of the Tibetan: gang gis / de yis, gang du / de rn and gang la / de lao An alternative reading might be: "There is no 'by what,' or 'for what' or 'in what'; / 'By that,' and 'for that' and 'in that' are entailed." The disadvantage of this reading is that it leaves lines a and b somewhat unconnected, and it is surely the intent of the original to assert that negation not only does not contradict affirmation,

. but may be its very basis. The Tibetan of line a lacks the final kyang or pas that would establish a connection while preserving the parallel structures, so G's solution is a possible one; I would opt for preserving the parallels and adding a bracketed "yet" or "so" at the end of line a. Alternatively, one might accept an unspoken "That" as the subject, and translate: "[That] has no 'by what,' or 'for what' or 'in what,' [yet/thus] / By that, for that and in that [all things] are entailed."

The reader who has followed the rather detailed discussion in this section will recognize that in most cases where I have suggested alternative translations, G's version is certainly a plausible one-the more so when the commentaries on which he relies are taken into account. I have simply sought to draw attention to those passages where my own reading convinces me that he has significantly added to or subtracted from what is in the original Tibetan verses. Here, I have attempted to supply "straightforward," non-commentary based readings of these passages, while acknowledging (a) that wholly "straightforward" readings are in principle impossible, and espeCially problematic when the texts are tantric, and (b) that the debate over the degree to which commentarial perspectives-whether from later Buddhist tradition or modem Western philosophy and science-ought to be incorporated into translation, is far from settled. Still, as must be clear, my own inclination is to argue (a) that there really are (relatively) more and less straightforward readings of texts, and (b) that the less encumbered by extrinsic perspectives a reading is, the better.

Some Technicalities In this section, I will note a number of rather more minor technical points where corrections might be proposed: (a) some instances where

140 nABS 17.1

G seems to have missed a line of Tibetan, (b) some awkward constructions or phrases, (c) some informational and terminological inconsistencies or overlaps and (d) some typographical errors.

(a) G's translation ofP 94 reads: "In each and every house, people talk about it, I But the abidingness of ecstasy is not at all known. I Saraha says: All living beings are confused about it" (111). Both Pe and D, as well as the Apabhrrupsa, 67 there is fourth line, the Tibetan of which is de ni bsam med sus kyang rtogs ma yin: "That non-thought is understood by no one." Guenther's translation of P 131 reads: "Imagination [that pertains to one's egologically predisposed awareness] operates with having an objective reference and without having an objective reference, I [In either case] it is an aspect of ecstasy" (119). In both Pe and D, there is a line in between the two translated by G, which reads: sgom dang mi sgom tha snyad med: "there is no designation: 'imagination' or 'non-imagination.'" In Q, each set often verses is preceded by e rna mkha' 'gro gsang ba'i skad; G translates this, appropriately, as ''E-ma-The mystical language of the Qaka I QakinIS" each time it occurs, but it is unclear from his placement of this refrain-italicized along with Karma 'phrin las pa's section titles-that it is, in fact, found in the Tibetan text

(b) P 60 (103) would read more clearly if line a ran: "If you know that what has become seeing ... Is [your] mentation, [you will have realized that] there is nothing that has not sprung from it." K 12 (152) would be less ambiguous if line a read "Though it is ineffable, never is one unsatisfied." K 23(154) would seem less like a fragmentary sentence if line a read: "It is as when a bralunin, who with rice and butter .... "

(c) On two different occasions (p 113b and Q 79d), Saraha refers to the bcu bmi pa'i sa, which G renders, appropriately, as "the fourteenth level" (115, 149). His notes on the two occurrences, however give differing' if not necessarily contradictory, accounts of what the "fourteenth level" denotes: on 190 (n. 134), it is identified as the "detection threshold" that is the last of the levels numbered by adding the six levels of the world of desire to the four levels each of the worlds of form and form-1essness; on 210 (n. 98), it is said to be the experience of ecstasy (bde ba), a "supraordinate level" above the traditional ten bodhisattva levels and the superadded tshogs lam, sbyor lam and "'Buddha'-experience." Is Saraha using the term differently in the two different cases? G does

67. See Shahidullah, 154, and his translation on 178; cf. Snellgrove's in BTIA,234.

JACKSON 141

not indicate. I would be more inclined to follow the second reading, since the first would seem to place one within sllI!lSara, in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non perception, and the condition Saraha is describing hardly seems srupsaric. 68 G generally is consistent in translating one TIbetan term by one English expression, but there are at least two instances in which the same English phrase reflects different TIbetan originals: "Being-in-its-beingness," the usual translation for de [kho na] nyid (see 26 and, e. g., PIa, 89] is used to translate rang bz/lin nyid from P 20d (93)-the latter is more often taken by G to refer to Being's "ownmostness"(see 28-30); while (as noted above) "complementarityin-spontaneity," the usual translation for lhan cig skyes pa (see 21-23 and, e. g., P 7b) is used to translate [hun [gyis] grub [pal in P 141cthe latter is more often translated by, e. g., "pure spontaneity" (see 59). Finally, G refers often in his notes to P (e. g., 159, 171, 173, 181,183) to the "original" ApabhrrupSa of the text, in spite of having argued earlier (9) that the ApabhraIJ1sa version we have is "bowdlerized and fragmented version of an earlier work that has been lost"; only once (182) does G refer to the text to which he is referring as the "standard" version, which would seem to be closer to his view of it

(d) On 11, line 7, for: Doha" read: Doha. On 12, line 13, for: 'Gos read: 'Gos. On 42, n. 72, line 5, for: 'Phrin-la's read 'Phrin-las'. On 94, verse 21, line 2, for: (mam-rtog) read: (mam-rtog)]. On 94, verse 21, line 3, for: (sems), evolving read: (sems), [evolving. On 142, verse 61, line 8, for: complementarity-in-spontaneity read: Complementarityin-spontaneity. On 143, verse 63, line 2, for: sku) read sku]. On 169, n. 54, line 3, for: Avayavajra read: Advayavajra.

Concluding Remarks Let me summarize my main points:

(1) The worlds of Indology, TIbetology and Buddhology are greatly in Herbert Guenther's debt for this careful and erudite, yet immensely

68. An alternative explanation of the fourteen stages may be arrived at by adding to the basic ten bodhisattva levels the traditional three kayas of Mahayana buddhology, with the fourteenth level then being, e. g., the Mahasukhakaya. In still another version (listed in both the Kalavlra Tantra and the Dharmasa1J1graha), the three bhamis beyond the traditional ten are called samantaprabhli, nirupamli and jiilinavatz; the fourteenth would presumably transcend even these (see Gustav Roth, "The Symbolism of the Buddhist Stiipa," in Anna Libera Dallapiccola, ed., The Stiipa: Its Religious, Historical and Architectural Significance [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980] 196).

142 nABS 17.1

stimulating study and translation of the three most important works of one of India's greatest poet-yogi-philosophers, the mahasiddha Saraha. As he consistently has over the years, Guenther provides learned historical and philological analyses of the subject-matter, suggestive comparisons between the world views of pre-modem Buddhists and contemporary Western thinkers in both the humanities and sciences, and annotated

. translations of Buddhist texts that closely reflect the grammar and syntax of the original, while offering terminological equivalents that incorporate Guenther's own distinctive and challenging ancient -cum-modem idiom.

(2) Neither Guenther's general approach to Saraha nor his translation is beyond reproach. Questions may legitimately be raised about his tendency to, e. g., uncritically confiate ancient Buddhist and modem Western views, adopt suspiciously reductive views of "reductionists," ignore or dismiss most other scholars in his field, and overburden his translations with "commentarial" interpolations that both reflect eras and ontologies different from Saraha's and drain nearly all "poetry" from the original. Further-though this may safely be said of any translator-he provides some readings of the original for which alternatives might be proposed. .

(3) Guenther is not about to apologize for his approach, let alone change it. He has argued for decades now that "objective," "representationalist" translations of Buddhist texts are based on a misunderstanding both of the "dynamic" and "processive" nature of the world and the way Buddhists, realizing this, use language. And, for decades, he has struggled to find a lexicon that could capture what is essentially elusive and no-thing at all, utilizing terminology and perspectives from any thinker or field that seemed to offer some approximation. The result has been a body of work that is always difficult, occasionally frustrating-but which is based on a coherent, consistent and hermeneutically sophisticated vision that has irreversibly affected the way in which scholars think about Buddhism and the translation of Buddhist texts.

(4) The Saraha we meet in Ecstatic Spontaneity is unmistakably Guenther's Saraha: philosopher more than poet, an ancient voice speaking in modem words. Guenther certainly has left room for other translators who might give us a more poetic, I\1ore "traditional" or more historically situated Saraha; and, in any case, any figure as great and complex as Saraha deserves-indeed requires-more than a single translation. It is probably safe to say, though, that we will wait a very long time before

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we see a translation as philosophically challenging as Guenther's or one whose vision resonates so suggestively backwards and forwards across eras, cultures and disciplines.

JIABS 17-1

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