JIABS 11-1

THE JOURNAL

flt'fHE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

CO-EDITORS-IN -CHIEF

Gregory Schopen .

Indiana University

Bloomington, Indiana, USA

EDITORS

Peter N. Gregory

University of Illinois

Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA

Alexander W. Macdonald

Universite de Paris X Nanterre, France

Steven Collins

Indiana University

Bloomington, Indiana, USA

1988

Roger Jackson Fairfield University

Fairfield, Connecticut, USA

Ernst Steinkellner

University of Vienna

Wien, Austria

Jikido Takasaki

University of Tokyo

Tokyo,japan

Robert Thurman

Amherst College

Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

Number 1

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATIO' ·N·C;.z;Sf" OF B UDDHIST'-STUDIES, INC. . .··.~l

",·,,1.\ ": '<~T]><4

This Journal is the organ of the International Association of BUddhist St;;~f~~ Inc. I.t is .governed .b( the objectiv~s of th.e ~ssociation a~d accepts sCh~~ill~; contnbutlons pertammg to BuddhIst StudIes m all the vanous discipline '. t;IY';i as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, ~nthro~ology, ~rt, archae61~U,~~;j psychology, te~tual studIes, etc. The JIABS IS publIshed tWIce yearlYinarN: summer and wmter. ' ... e .

Manuscripts for publication (we must have two copies) and corresponde}ii~;l concernin.g articles should be submitted to t~e fIABS editorial office atffi~;+ address ~IVen below .. Pl~ase refer to the gmd:lmes for contributors toth~~, JIABS prmted on the InsIde back cover of every Issue. Books for review shoiild:: als~ be sent to t~: address below. The Editors cannot guarantee to publi~h'~ revIews of unsolICIted books nor to return those books to the senders.';.;~.1

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the vi~0i~ expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other re\af~d.': publications.

Andre Bareau (France)

M.N. Deshpande (India)

R. Card (USA)

B.C. Cokhale (USA)

Gregory Schopen JIABS clo Dept. of Religious Studies 230 Sycamore Hall Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47405 USA

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Jacques May

Hajime Nakamura

John C. Huntington (USA)

P.S. Jaini (USA) E. Zurcher

Both the Editors and Association would like to thank Indiana Univeii" sity and Fairfield University for their financial support in the produc~ tion of the J ournal.,",

The Editors wish to thank Mr. Kevin Atkins for his invaluable help: in the preparation of this issue. '

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1988 ISSN: 0193-600X

Indexed in Religion Index One: Periodicals, American Theological Li:: brary Association, Chicago, available online through BRS (Biblio: graphic Retrieval Services), Latham, New York, and DIALOG Infor-< mation Services, Palo Alto, California_

Composition by Publications Division, Grote Deutsch & Co., Madison, WI 53704 .. Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.

CONTENTS

1. ARTICLES

Four Levels of PratztyaSamutpada According to the Fa-hua hsuan i, by Carl Bielefeldt 7

the Possibility of aN onexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvastivadin and Dar~tantika Theories, by Collett Cox 31

lYUL,,"'~'~' Upaya in the Vimalakzrtinirde.sa-sutra, by Edward Hamlin 89

\A~~"'U Sanskrit in the Kalacakra Tantra, byJohnNewman 123 New Fragments of Buddhist Sanskrit Manuscripts from Central Asia, by Richard Saloman and Collett Cox 141 Reflections on R.S.Y. Chi's Buddhist Formal Logic,

by TomJ.F. Tillemans 155

II. BOOK REVIEWS

Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, by Peter Mansfield (Charles Hallisey) 173

Studies in the Buddhist Art of South Asia, ed. A. K. N arain (Robert L. Brown) 175

Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism, ed. Peter N. Gregory (Henrik H. Sorensen) 179

OF CONTRIBUTORS 185

~~ti'e Fo.ur Levels of Pratity~~sam.utPada ~~~~ordlng to the F a-hua hsuan l .1-",>')' "

:liz ,i:\%l~(~;> ' t,the historical status of the Madhyamika school in China and iJ~pan,like its famous doctrine of the middle way, is not easy iograsp.l On the one hand, of course, all the major traditions t&fEast Asian Buddhism claim Nagarjuna as a patriarch and 2a~im to embrace his madhyamaka teaching; on the other hand, j~){~ept for a few scholastics of medieval China and early Japan, fliohe of the East Asiatic traditions have identified themselves :4ir'ectly with the Madhyamika school or made the works of its ;efotmder-let alone of its later representatives, of whom they ~;W~re largely ignorant-the primary textual basis of their sys~t~!Ils. The Madhyamaka-karikas, which modern scholarship has ;'$ade so famous in the West, may have been basic reading for. r;inost well-educated Buddhists, but it rarely attracted prolonged ~,itfention, and it is probably fair to say that most who read it ,aid so less in search of ultimate answers than in preparation for ~~hat were considered more sublime expressions of the :¥ahayana. J, • Already in the fifth century, even as the Karikas and other ~arly treatises of the major Indian schools were becoming availtable in China, scholars there were turning their attention to the ~question of the relationship among these schools; and by the '~ixth and seventh centuries, when the country was learning the flew literature of the Y ogacara, they were creating their own 'original syntheses of the Indic materials. While the content of these new systems inevitably owed much to the imported sastm literature, their structure was often built on indigenous interpretative categories-like substance and function (t'i yung) , prin-

7

8 JIABS VOL. II NO.1

ciple and phenomena (li shih), sudden and gradual (tun h:}~~~ and the like; and while they could not fail to take into a;cle~),;.;~ the. fa~ous praJna-~ararnita doctrine of.em~tin;ss and its e~1.lh~.~ catIOn m Madhyamlka, they were more msplrea by certains-P:0

f . 1 1·· Ch· . 11 h utras: o partlcu ar p~pu anty_ m . .m~, espeCla< y t ose-like the sad~fj dharrna-pur;rja~z~a, ~ahdparznz~var;,a, and Avata'f[lsaka -thateiq.~ pressed a posItIve mterpretatlOn of the absolute, as aSiinya ii~;x; the dharrna-kaya, and tathagata-garbha, and so on, and that offei&"i hope o~ a single great vehicle, or ekayana, in which all forms~f;' BuddhIsm could be resolved. The so-called Three Treatise (S<! lun) school of Chi-tsang, supposed to represent East As&n~!. Madhyamika, was itself such a synthetic system. .Th·;

Of these new Chinese systems, none was more characteristi1 of the age nor more influential than that of the great sixth-cell]; tury T'ien-t'ai scholar Chih-i (538-597). Inspired as it wasby.~ the Lotus Sidra, none was more committed to the higher Bud"; dhism of the one vehicle. Yet probably none was mote sympath~~\ tic to (what its author took to be) the insights of Nagarjunajs; middle way. In what follows, I want to explore some feature{. of this system - in particular its famous schema of doctrinal classification (p'an chiao) - to give a sense of how it sought tg'~ incorporate the teachings of the middle way into its visiondt~ the one vehicle. Rather than try here to discuss the schemain;l the abstract, I shall focus on a single concrete example - a cor:6 sample, as it were - of how Chih-i's system actually functioned~ in the analysis of a specific Buddhist doctrine; I shall then goJ on to make one or two more general observations aboutihe; principles at work in the example.

II.

The doctrine I want to use for this sample is the famous. Buddhist teaching of prat'itya-sarnutpada, or conditioned origination, especially as this is expressed in the classical formula of. the twelvefold chain of causation. Few doctrines are more ven~ erable or more centrally placed in Buddhist tradition than the. dvadafanga-pratftya-samutpada. It was, after all, supposed tobe, the insight into the truth of this chain that most occupied th~i Buddha himself as he sat on the bodhi-marpja; and the sutras

LEVELS OFPRATiTYASAMUTPADA 9

:~~ti» etirnes said that to see this t'ruth was itself to see the dharma affldto see the Buddha. 2 .Nagarjuna himself, though of course i.~1h";:arguments for emptmess are based more on the general ) IS . 1 .. h h ··fi d f£ ):'%~"'nciple of re atlVlty t an on t e speo lC cause an e ect re-',pfl .c ld h . ;~I~donships of.the twelvelo c am, n~vert~eless ~eems to have :~j)tlen the anCIent formula of the cham qUlte senously and de-J:~:ta 1 d' . . 3 Y f 11 h' b bi f .•..•. '~.·!.·.;).: .. ).·.;t·.ed severa ISCUSSIOns to It. et, or a t IS, pro a y ew )v'VO :~;aQctrines would seem less immediately susceptible to interpreta-~';'tloh as an expression of the sort of supreme Mahayana en;:!,~fsioned by Chih-i. Buddhist contemplative tradition had regu:t\larly consigned the investigation of the twelvefold pratitya-samut'i::ipada -:- along wit~ mindfulness of breat~in.g, reflecti?ns, on ui>jinpunty, and t~e lIke - to the lowly, prehmmar~ medltatIOns ,{intended as antIdotes to unwholesome states. 4 IndIan commen,;Ctj;lwrs on Nagarjuna (including Pingala, whom Chih-i read) had rf:tended to dismiss his discussion of the chain as merely conven;~:li6nal (sarrz,vrti) teaching, intended for the edification of the ·;~:sravaka.5 No less than the Lotus Sidra itself (at least in ;:j!;.Kumarajlva's version) identified the doctrine as a teaching in?itended for the relatively unsophisticated understanding of the ftfratyeka-buddha. 6 Hence it is crucial to Chih-i's vision of the intel;~lectual and ethical coherence of the one great vehicle that he ;'::beable to show why this doctrine was so central to the tradition SiaIid hO-N, despite appearances to the contrary, it could function \~,¢y~n at the highest levels of the religion, ~'~ Chih-i's extensive corpus contains quite a few discussions ;:'of pratitya-samutpada, many of which reflect traditional ways of \'~'haildling the twelvefold chain. In his influential organization Y2p£ contemplative technique, for example, he treats meditation 'Qil conditioned origination as one of the five techniques for ; generating wholesome states (shan ken);7 like the Lotus Sidra, he \associates the twelvefold chain with the pratyeka-buddha-yana. 8

. Yet he also has a more exalted reading of the chain that extends .: its significance across the entire range of the buddha-dharma, 'from the basic teachings of the Hlnayana through the supreme, . perfect enlightenment of the Buddha himself. For my purposes :;.here, the most important example of such a reading occurs in 'the Miaoja lien-hua ching hsuan i, his extended commentary on .;the "dark import," or deeper meaning, of Kumarajlva's version ···.of the Saddharma-pur.u;larika. The work is largely organized

10 JIABS VOL. 11 NO.1

aro.und a ~etailed analysis of ~he theoretical.impl~cations of the~~ Chmese title of the sidra. In Its second fasCicle, m the Conte' of his discussion of the first word of the title, Chih-i distinguish~tu;, six. objects of Buddhist wis~om (ching-miao) , as the second~{': whICh he takes up the docirme of prat'itya-samutpada. 9.<5

Chih-i divides his interpretation of prat'itya-samutpada int>; four cate~ories, or levels: of understanding, to: which he assign~}; the followmg rather unWIeldy names: (1) conceIvable origination;;' and cessation (ssu-i sheng mieh), (2) conceivable non-origination::. and non-cessation (ssu-i wu-sheng wu-mieh) , (3) inconceivabl{; origination and cessation (pu-ssu-i sheng-mieh), and ( 4) inconceiv_'" able non-origination and non-cessation (pu-ssu-i wu-sheng wu-', mieh). As the names suggest, the ~our. a:-e ar~anged in two groups} of two: first, prat'itya-samutpada IS divIded mto the conceivable' and inconceivable; then, each of these is sub-divided into origi-:i; nation and cessation and non-origination and non-cessation ..... ' .

The hermeneutical categories of the conceivable (cintyii) , or what can be grasped by the reason, and its opposite (aci~tyii) are common, of course, not only throughout Chih-i's writings, but in Buddhism in general. This epistemological dichotomyis.'; identified by Chih-i here with what is more properly a religious> or moral distinction between the mundane (chieh-nei; laukika)' and transmundane (chieh-wai; lokottara). These terms derive from the traditional Buddhist distinction between the state of those dominated by the defilements (yu-lou; siisrava) and the pristine state of the iirya, who has attained the anasrava stages. Thus, Chih-i's analysis of prat'itya-samutpiida begins with a distinction between two spheres of application or understanding of the doctrine-that of the defiled world of ordinary experience, .•..•• and that of the immaculate world of the advanced adept.lo

Each of these spheres is again divided into two, according to two ways of treating them-in terms of origination (utpiida) .... and cessation (nirodha) , and in terms of non-origination and non-cessation. These two kinds of treatment, says Chih-i, are' intended for those of dull (tun) and acute (li) faculties respec-',

. tively. Though he does not elaborate the point here, areferenc~; near the end of his discussion to the terms "phenomena" (shih)

. and "principle" (li) indicates that he also identifies the two with. these metaphysical notions, commonly used in T'ien-t'ai and other Chinese exegesis for the Buddhist categories of sarrtvrti-;

LEVELS OF PRATiTY ASjiMUTP ADA 11

;f~~tya (su ti), or conventional truth, and paramartha-satya (chen ti), ~r u.ltimate truth. II Thus, both the mundane and trans mundane W\eres can be discussed for the dull in the more easily undert:~~od terms of the phenomena that comprise them, and for the t~cute in the more subtle terms of the principle that underlies ~!uch phenomena. These identifications, then, allow Chih-i to ;,~'treat pratftya-samutpada on four levels of discourse: (1) mundane ::vphenomena, (2) mundane principle: (3) transmundane :~'phenomena: and (4) transmundane pnnClple;. and we can expect !»itrelationshlp among the four such that (1) IS to (2) as (3) IS to #,{1-). As we shall see, this relationship is central to the T'ien-t'ai ;(p'an chiao system. ':t:.;"

i;L, III,

, ':{

;:'1 Well over half of Chih-i's discussion of pratitya-samutpada is ;ii~oncerned with his first level of understanding, that of conceivUble origination and cessation. Since this represents what he ;'i(:onsiders the lowest understanding, the space devoted to it i;'might seem somewhat surprising, and one might have expected ;'hiffi to move quickly on to the higher and more sublime realms :i{)f interpretation. In fact, however, the attention paid here to lithe details of the basic teaching appears quite characteristic of ~;Chih-i's approach. Elsewhere in his writings as well, it is precisely :;;the lower teachings that seem to receive the most detailed and :'thorough treatment, while the higher understanding is often ,;passed over quite quickly. In one sense, of course, this imbalance 'may be inevitable, since the lowest level is usually, as here, con

)cerned with the more detailed scholastic teachings of the ~abhidharmikas; but it is also suggestive of the importance Chih-i . placed on a firm grounding in the basic doctrines of Buddhism , and a measure of the conservative, classical approach he took ,'to the religious life. This approach gives to his teaching a strong sense of what the Chinese like to call "gradualness" (chien) as opposed to the flashier "sudden" (tun) style that is often held

. up as more characteristic of East Asian Buddhism. , The section on the first level of pratftya-samutpada is com~iPosed of two parts: a general explanation and a discussion of ',some additional considerations. The former provides a basic


definition of the doctrine and identifies it as the charact .;tH!ii'r;' d d · .c l' h d" , h erlstlc" un ersta~ mg 01. casua Ity t a.t IstmgUls es Buddhism fto~~

the theones of the non-BuddhIsts. . tn' ;' ':l~-:,:~-:

This [teaching of pratftya-samutpiida] differs from thatp~rf~ infidels (wai-tao) , They falsely maintain that phenomena ori 0, J~;f

-, . " , gInatet' from Isvara, or from nature (shzh-hszng; prakrtz,) or from at 'J)f,;

(wei-ch'en; a1',lu), or from male and female, or without cause, Thom~,;,.·. , fl h' d d'hh' .eSeJ

v( anol~) s Ba se th,eones 0 n[dot ac~or Wf]lt t e prmciple of the'v~y;f tao- z, . ut t IS correct octnne 0 pratftya-samutpiida dif£"i

from such false notions, It holds simply that ignorance (avJ~j'i in the past produces in the perverted mind (tien-tao hsin-Y~"';i paryasta-citta) the predispositions (sa'f[lSkiira), which bring forih~t(~, the present ~he fruit of sufferin~ in the s.ix destinies in differe~1'1 ways accordmg to [whether one s karma IS] good or evil,I2'j

,;;',:<;'

On the basis of the Smrtyupasthana-sutra, Chih-i draws a~i analogy between the first three members of the twelvefold.; chain-avidya, sar(tskiira, and vry'nana-and a painter, his paint; and his picture: the ignorant mind is like a painter, using th¢;; various shades of good and evil karma to produce the rebirth, consciousness (pratisandhi-vijnana) in the six destinies, 13 He theh' summarizes the first level by saying that the chain revolv~s: through the three times like a wheel, the members arising and' ceasing again and again in moment after moment-hence, th~'} designation "twelvefold pratZtya-samutpada of originationand.~ cessation," >:};

In the rather lengthy section devoted to additional considerations, Chih-i takes up several traditional t~chn:ical topics oIl,;' the twelvefold chain that we find in the abhidharma literature,': including various approaches to the distinctions between depen~: dent production (prat'itya-samutpada) and dependent origination, (prat'itya-samutpanna) , the division of the twelve members into the three times (san shih) and their application to the maturation: of the individual, the simultaneous occurrence of the twelve id, a single moment, the cause and effect of the first and last mem~; bers respectively, the members occurring in each of the three loka (san chieh), and so on.14

LEVELS OF PRATiTYASAMUTP ADA 13

V,i~~r:,:; ~l1r' .

~rf The second section deals with the pratftya-samutpada of con)~I/;vable non-origination and non-cessation, intended for those ,.:tel I . I h h d" . ~\itacute facu ties. n s arp contrast to t e prece mg, It IS very ~§fiefand direct, stating simply that all members of the twelvefold :t'h'ain are like empty space (hsu-k'ung), like an apparition (huan,~Xta) and t~erefore ungraspable (pu-k'e-te). Chih-i does not ~bbther to gl:: here any argu~ents for the emptiness of con~ditioned entitles but merely CItes the Suvarr;,a-prabhiisa-siitra to ';fi;e effect that avidya does not exist of itself but only in depen/!dence on deluded ideas (wang hsiang; vikalpa), or false thinking ;~{ju-shan ssu-wei; ayoniso.-manask~ra).15. Thus, he leaves it to :he ;,reader to supply the major premiSe-l.e., that dependently eXlst~~hg entities are empty-and the conclusion-that, therefore, I~a~idya is empty. He then covers the remainder of the chain by ~pointing out-as the popular simile has it-that, just as the ;inagician produces elephants, horses, necklaces, and people, ;Which the deluded take to be real, so avidya magically produces .,sfue karma of the six destinies. Finally, by means of another ~Well-known simile, Chih-i explains the religious significance of "{rYon-origination and non-extinction: "When one realizes that hhe vine [he has taken for a snake] is not a snake, fear of it will that originate, and not originating, it will not cease. This is called ;/the twelvefold pratitya-samutpada of conceivable non-origination I~nd non-cessation."16

:V'.

The third section, that dealing with the pratitya-samutpada ;{)f inconceivable origination and cessation, is perhaps the most }nteresting and difficult. This level of interpretation is said to .refute the "lesser" (hsiao) understanding and reveal the "greater" (ta), teaching the transmundane dharma for the sake of those of both dull and acute faculties. The discussion here concerns the cittamatra teaching that the mind is the cause of all dharmas. This teaching is introduced by a quotation from the Avatar[Lsaka-siitra, which employs the same painting simile we have seen in the first section: "The mind is like a painter producing the various


five skandhas. Throughout all worlds, there is nothing not")i:¥~~ d d f h . d "17 I 1" h' pro;o,\ ~ce . rom t e mm. n exp l~at~n~ w ~t It means fOfth/~~

mmd to produce phenomena, ChlP-I fIrst cItes two confli' .,.;~~ views of the alaya-vi:jrulna: "Some 'say' that the alaya prodJt~~g;~ all d~armas is the. true conscious.ness (~hen.shi~); ~thers sayiWal~ the alaya producmg all dharmas IS the unsmkmg conscious .'{r,:,! (wu-mo shih) that is neutral (wu-chi; avyakrta) and ignoranf~~~i~ Neither Chih-i nor his famous com~entator Chan-jan identifi~~~ here the proponents of these two VIews, but the text does ret/;:!; us to another discussion of them in the author's Mo-ho chih-kud~~;[ from which it wo:xld appear that he assigns ~hem respecti-yg~f~i to the so-called TI-lun and She-Iun schools-I.e., the SIxth ceitl tury Chinese exegetical traditions emphasizing, in the forrn¥ti~ case, Vasubandhu's commentary to the Dafabhumika-sutra (Shih1; ti ching lun) and, in the latter, the Mahiiyana-sar(lgraha (Sheta~f sheng lun). In the same discussion, Chih-i rejects the views~£~ both schools, arguing in effect that the former mistaken.ly ide~L~ tifies citta with the ultimate dharmata, while the latter failst~; account for any relationship between the tWO. 19 The probleili;~ he says in our text, comes from attachment to the reality ofth~¢ svabhiiva (hsing), which leads to a satkaryavada understandingo~~ casuality akin to the Sar:p.khya theory of the evolution of th~Y world from prakrti (ming-ch'u)-an understanding we hdveal~'{ ready seen Chih-i reject in the first section.i;'!

Having thus dismissed these two views, Chih-i goes onip' state what he holds to be the correct understanding of the Bud-" dhist teaching that the mind produces the dharmas. . .,.

Not by themselves, not by another, not by both, and not without' cause [do the dharmas arise.] According to these four propositions,~ [the production of the dharmas by the mind] is inconceivable. Yeti; given the conditions of the four siddhiinta, fPrat'itya-samutpiida]' can still be explained.20 . "

Here Chih-i employs the opening verse of the Karikiisto' establish that the occurrence of dharmas is inconceivable-i,e.,\ that they have only provisional reality and in their own rtatur~; are ungraspable. 21 Their occurrence, he says, is like the arising of images in a dream: though we say that the dream produces," images, the nature of the dream itself cannot be grasped; siIIl:i~.;

LEVELS OF PRATITYASAJv1UTP ADA 15

~Y~!;?r. though we say that avidya produces the other members of ~*k~~'~~elvefold chain, the status of avidya itself cannot be grasped ;t;~fny of the four propositions (ssu chu; catU$koti). 22 Nevertheless, ~:~t~accordance with the four siddhanta (ssu hsi-t'an), or heuristic ~~~hods of the Buddha's teaching, we can still discuss the arising ~.:narrzskara and the rest of the twelvefold chain from the mind ,:,~-.\. 93 .

~;ijf(Jvidya: -.. . :.~~,i{With thIS remmder that the teachmg of trans mundane phe- . ~I;';;birtenal pratitya-samutpada is established only as a device for ~~esake of the practitioner, Chih-i proceeds to a consideration ;1~fthe actual content of this teaching as it applies to those ad);'~~riced bodhisattvas of the anasrava-dhatu, who, although freed Wr()lll the mundane realm of the klesas, still transmigrate in the ~:@nomayakaya (i-sheng shen). Here he relies on the Ratnagot!:::!ta~ibhaga doctrine of the four spiritual obstacles to ultimate ~!Hb<;:tation-conditions (yuan; pratyaya), causes (yin; hetu), origina~;ti9h(sheng; utpada), and cessation (mieh; nirodha)-to draw out ~;thehigher significances of the twelvefold chain. 24 .

. '< ~1~lr~:;::.' if'Y!

~1~~/ ;}::::,:X~j,

"Conditions" refers to avidyii; ["cause"] to sar[lSkiira; "origination" to niima-rupa and the rest of the five [present effects]; (the three members, tr$r;ii, upiidiin, and bhava, are to be understood as above;) "cessation" to jiiti and jarii-marar;am. These twelve are numerically the same as those of the mundane [prat'itya-samutpiida] , but their meaning is very different.25

Chih-i then uses the traditional division of the twelvefold ';i:hain into klesa, karma and vastu (or duhkha) to show the relation:~hip between its members and the Ratnagotravibhaga's doctrine \8fthe four higher inverted views (tien-tao; viparyasa) - impurity (pu-ching; asuddhi) , selflessness (wu-wo; anatman), suffering (k'u quMha), and impermanence (wu-ch'ang; anitya)-that still charac.terize the understanding of even the advanced bodhisattva: the ~klesa of condition (i.e., avidya, etc.) prevents the realization of clmrity; the karma of cause (i.e., sar[lskara, etc.), the realization of sdfhood; the vastu of origination (i.e., vij'nana, etc.), the realizaJion of bliss; [the vastu of] cessation (i.e., jara-mararJam), the ;tealization of permanence. 26


1;7.

Finally, our text briefly consip.ers the fourth and h;ht~~~ level of pratitya~samutpada, th.at?f inconceivab~e ~on-o:igi~~ti~~;i and non-cessatIOn. Here Chl~-I quotes ~he ~l:va1J,a-sutratoTh.~' effect that t~e twelvefol:I pra~lf:Ja-~amu.tPada IS Itself the bUddil~~ nature (jo-hszng).27 The IdentIfIcatIOn IS worked outby mean'<,.: cor~esp?ndenc~s between the three divisions of the twelvelomil cham-mto klesa, .karma and vastu-and the three aspects'9f:~ causes, under whIch the Nirva1J,a-sutra treats the bUddha-ni: ture-the cause of apprehension (liao yin), the cause of cond~~~ tions (yuan yin), and the cause proper (cheng yin)-i.e., the int~:~:,~ lectual, ethical, and metaphysical causes identified with b6dh;'~

h" mokJa, and dharma-kaya respectively.28 Thu~, the klda membef~'~ (i.e;, vijiiana, tr)1J,a and upadana) are assoCIated with bodhi;th~'; karma members (sar(l,skara and bhava) with mokJa; and the remain.~: ing, the vastu members, with dharma-kaya. On the basis ofthes~'~l correspondences, the three divisions of the chain are furthei; identified with the four gu1J,as (ssu te) of nirva1J,a taught inthe~ same sutra. The argument runs somewhat as follows: the klesas" are themselves bodhi; bodhi is by definition free from defilementj~: ,_:,/,

hence, the kleSas are themselves the ultimate purity (ching; suddhi)i or nirva1J,a. In like fashion, karma is identified with the ultimate'; self (wo; atman) of nirva1J,a,and vastu with the bliss (lo; sukhd)1' and permanence (ch'ang; nitya).29 .•... ~

VII.

In the sections immediately following his analysis of th~/' four levels of pratitya-samutpada, Chih-i goes on, in a pattern typical of his exegetical methods, to make several general points, about the character and significance of this analysis. In a section on "distinguishing the coarse and subtle" (p'an ts'u miao), he makes explicit its hierarchial structure, pointing out that, while. there are no levels in the object (ching) of pratitya-samutpada itself, there are more or less profound understandings of the object, which, like the famous Nirva1J,a-sutra simile of the refinement of milk, progress from the "coarse" to the "subtle." From the perspective of the fourth level, corresponding to the ultimate

LEVELS OF PRATiTYASAMUTPADA 17

'(shih) of the middle way taught in the one vehicle of the all three of the lower levels are "coarse" because

expedient (ch'iian).30 . succeeding section, on "opening the coarse to reveal

(k'ai ts'u hsien miao), reminds us of another, rather implication of the one vehicle: that the classification

teachings as coarse is itself based on a coarse under. Chih-i here quotes the line from the Lotus Sutra in

• the Buddha says, "My dharma is subtle (miao) and difficult " Since all three of the lower teachings are part

buddha-dharma, the argument goes, it follows that even as they are the expression of the Buddha's miracu

are subtle and inconceivable. 31

his last section, on "discerning the mind" (kuan hsin) , . points out the religious implications of his analysis: to

one moment of ignorance (wu-ming) is itself enlighten(ming). Each moment of thought contains all twelve mem-

. of the chain, and, since these members are ultimately the virtues of nirvar;a, to discern them is itself to discern inher

'permau'eIHX, bliss, selfhood, and purity. In such discernthe mind constantly abides in the womb of the aryas (sheng

from which it is destined to emerge into full enlighten-

." Such, in outline, is Chih-i's multi-faceted account of the chain. His basic notion that the doctrine of pratftya

./sarnut;paGta could be thus distributed over several levels of inis by no means without precedent: the Nirvar;a-sutra

for example-one of Chih-i's favorite scriptures and the .pne he cites as authority for his final section-has its own four'(~i~red division of the doctrine, associated with the four types of ;!;Buddhist adept: sravaka, pratyeka-buddha, bodhisattva, and buddha;33 similarly, the Ta-chih-tu tun, which East Asian tradition )ttributes to Nagarjuna, and which regularly provides the source ·for so much of Chih-i's material, identifies three types oftwelvefold chain: for the prthagjana, for those on the two vehicles and bodhisattvas not yet established in emptiness (anutpattika-


dharma-k$anti), and for the advanced bodhisattva. 34 Such scrit;jjitft~~ precedents no doubt provided inspiration for the treatmP~~~1J!~ pratZtya-sam~tPada ~n ~ur passage, but .the structure of this i~,~.~~~ ment remams Chlh-I s own and de. arly reflects the part'. rl~t~.;.~

. . I f h· I . b· h h leu at·t pnnClp :s o. IS arger prOject to nng t e w ole of Buddhis'>t;;~~ mto a smgle coherent system. Here I want to add just a£m:Bf w~rds about those principles as they relate to the statusOft~~{~l mIddle waY.~.Y'l}l

In recent years, there has been some debate about theel(';t;~j~~i natur.e of Chih-i's classificati~n s'ystem and its relation tOt~!~ doctnnal schemas through whICh It was taught by later T'ieI1t;i~ ~radition,35 but there is no dou?t that th~ most originala~j{;ii Important feature of that system IS the doctrme-of the so-eal1¢d\.2 "four teachings" (huaja ssu chiao ).:..-that divides the buddhd~\; dharma into ''pitaka'' (tsang) , "common" (t'ung) , "distinct" (pieh)~~ and "complete" (yuan). Put very briefly and schematical1y,i~~N; first corresponds to the Hinayana teaching on dharmas, intende4;1 for friivaka and pratyeka-buddha vehicles, the second to the basic!;'. Mahayana teaching of funyatii that Jeads onto the bodhisattvaA~)l yana, the third to the advanced Mahayana teaching of citta-mat;~;~ that is "distinctive" of the bodhisattva-yana, and the last toth~;~~ "complete," perfect understanding of the Buddha that both·i~ transcends and unifies all the other teachings. It should be irn_,it

mediately obvious that such a fourfold division stands behlnd% our pratftya-samutpiida passage; and, in fact, though he doesnqt~: make the connection in our text, later on in the same wor~J' Chih-i explicitly assigns his four levels of interpretation to tne~ four teachings.36ci:'

While we may (or may not) want to applaud Chih-i'sin .. ::i;: genuity in bringing pratftya-samutpiida into accord with his own system, S0 far removed in time, space, and spirit from the ancienf~ Buddhist formula of the twelve nidiina, for the Tien-t'ai master; himself, this success must have seemed only a natural elaboration'! of the passage on dependent origination by Nagarjuna that is' supposed to have provided the metaphysical basis for the system," This is the verse, Madhyamaka-kiirikiis 24: 18, in which, according; to Kumarajlva's translation, it is said,

Phenomena produced by causes and conditions, We declare to be empty;

LEVELS OF PRATiTYASAMUTP ADA. 19

:,,;'.Again, ~hey are called pr<?visional names, . 3l,Or, agam, they are what IS meant by the mIddle way.37 .;,)\

j;::(;~:;',;:,. ';' particular understanding of this famous passage (the only

as far as I know, in which the Kiirikiis actually uses the term fhyarna~pratipat) is s~id to ha.ve provid~~ th<; ~nspir.ation for teachlllgs of the FIrst PatrIarch of T len-t aI, HUl-wen (fl.

;,550), and to have been handed down to his disciple, Hui-ssu '1i,515-577), by whom it was transmitted to Chih-i. The under~'iinding in question is formulated by the T'ien-t'ai teachers as ~mMrcharacteristic doctrine of the three truths (san ti). This ~ddctrine understands Nagarjuna's verse to be describing con-1aitioned phenomena in terms of three levels of truth: the empty !(i(k'ung; sunyatii), the provisio~al (chia; prafiiapti), and the middle !{(thung; rnadhyama). Very brIefly put~ .the three truths can be i;~~pressed somewhat as follows: condItIOned dharmas, when un~aerstood on the fitst level, are empty of svabhiiva; on the second ~l~vel, this emptiness is seen not as the total negation of the ~dhl1:rmas but as the affirmation of their conditionality, or "provihgf~ilally" real status; on the third level, the two categories of the ?~mpty and provisional are understood to be nondifferent-or, ,{pli,t in other terms, the ultimate truth about the dharmas is un~!aerstood to lie in a middle ground, free from the extremes of '%le empty and provisional. ~i,' What is most immediately striking and most peculiar about ~this reading of Nagarjuna's verse is that it seems to isolate his ;;tamous teaching of sunyatii as but one pole, set off from both ~Jhe conditioned phenomena of the first line and the provision':aIly established phenomena of the third, an extreme that is itself ~to be overcome, or resolved, by his middle way. Such an under-2standing of emptiness, quite common in East Asian exegesis, is ~ell expressed in the other formula by which Chih-i most fre,quently discusses the movement among the three truths. This ~is adopted from the P'u-sa ying-lo ching, an important sutra gen;erally thought to have been written in China in the fifth century, which explains the relationships among the three truths in terms

;()f (1) entering the empty from the provisional (ts'ung chia ju k'ung), (2) entering the provisional from the empty (ts'ung k'ung Uk chia), and (3) the ultimate middle way (chung-tao ti-i i).38

Though at first glance it appears here that the empty and


the provisional are merely two opposing poles, Chih-i tedi;~~ read the "~rovisional" of t~~ first line in the S~tra forrn~1~,~q'1~ correspor:dmg to the condltloned',ph.enomena m the firsdi~~i~ of NagarJuna's verse; hence he gIves the formula a stroIl.p,~,~ dialectical character, such that it moves through four ,,9'!Yl;: ments"-froIn the thesis of dharmas, to the antithesis of sunll\~1!; h h h · h h' f h . ,'-. yalall; t roug a Ig er synt eSlS 0 t e two m praJnaptl, to the fi,,:1fc,'

h . (f . d h .. 1)' ,lUab· synt eSlS /_ 0 ~~ptmess ax: ,; e prov,~s~ona . m. madhyair:t;z', C.learly,,, sur:ya.ta IS" the cr~cl.al m~~ent m thIS dIalectic, tIi~l hlghe: pnnCIple, as Chlh-l calls It m our example, that lead~t! both mto and beyond the transmundane phenomena ofth": Maha.rana. As suc~: it is not merely t~e opposite of the dharmfs$ but, lIke the provlSlonal, must functIOn on two levels: firstil;~; opposition to the dharmas as their mere negation; and seco~:'~; as the higher negation of the opposition that accounts for tRci: ultimate unity of the two poles. Whether or not Nagarjull~! himself would still recognize himself in this dialectical interpre~; tation of his verse, it is probably possible to read it as an interest;,t ing extension of his reminder that emptiness is also emptYof svabhava. 39 'j:,

, 'i; ;i~,;'~\,

IX. /",','/

There is one final feature of Chih-i's pratitya-samutPiid~: teaching to which I should like to call attention in closing. If' the metaphysical levels we have seen here are supposed tob~' supplied by Nagarjuna's verse, the logic of these levels and th¢ religious significance attached to them seem to come from what strikes me as an extremely interesting coalescence in Chih-i's' thought of two ancient Buddhist formulae. The first is the well~ known rhetorical device of the catwkoti or "four propositions.:' This device, through which the speaker is thought to exhaust all meaningful positions on a topic, was of course much ap~' preciated by Nagarjuna, and in fact we have seen his use ofiC quoted in our example to establish the merely provisional nature, of citta-matra. As in this case, Nagarjuna tends to use the formula to negative ends, as a means to the refutation of others' views. 40,

Chih-i, however, also has a more positive, more metaphysical reading of the four propositions that assigns to each member a

LEVELS OF PRA TiTYASAM UTPADA 21

of truth exactly corresponding to our four levels of pratitya.ttpiida. Th?ugh .he. does not in~o~e the form~la i~ ou~ J?as~.\~?'the relatlOnshlp IS made explICIt elsewhere ill hls wntmg, ~~f::;e each of the teachin?s is assigned .a basic metaphysical ~~xKosition; su~h that ~he pztaka asser~s bemg (y~); the common ~gi>ting, emptmess (k ung, here ObvIOusly eqmvalent to non"ileac . d· . b h d h .c . h 4 ~fB~ing[WuJ); the Istmctasserts ?t ; an t : per.lect, nelt er. I

~,:rsciJn recent years, the catu$kotz has occupIed a number of com~~~;ntators, who have been particularly disturbed by the third ~iJrle .. . b h· h fl·· h h 1 f :cra 'fourth mem ers, w lC seem to con lCt WIt t e aws 0

l/~~n_contradition and of the excluded middle respectively.42 It ~~aywell be. th~t it wa~ his own awareness of such logical conflicts ~;rnatled Chlh-l to assIgn these two members to the realm of the '~'in:conceivable." Yet, whatever we may say of other uses of the t~br1llula, Chih-i's actual application of it to his fbur teachings (~Sl~arly resolves these difficulties. The apparent contradiction of "ithethird proposition disappears in the distinction, central to i~his"distinct" teaching, between paramiirtha and sar(tvrti realms i'bLdiscourse-a distinction we have seen reflected in Chih-i's ~ifs~ertion that, while the mind itself cannot be ultimately estab~li~hed, it can still be treated for heuristic purposes as the cause ~6fphenomena. The "distinct" teaching here is precisely that ;iform of Buddhism that seeks to "straddle" the two realms of ;aiscourse, for the sake of the advanced bodhisattva, who, though ;~lready established in emptiness, still needs to cultivate the ~higherdharmas of the transmundane path. The fourth propo>sition, according to Chih-i, does indeed transcend the two>v:a1ued logic presupposed by the law of the excluded middle; it ,'Floes so on the basis of the "complete" teaching of the buddha itehicle, which specifically posits a higher "middle" ground to \~hich the predicates "being" and "emptiness" do not apply . . ' As interesting as Chih-i's hierarchical reading of the catu$koti ;may be in itself, perhaps more striking is the way in which he 'is able, once the formula is read in this way, to lay its logical pattern over the seemingly quite unrelated spiritual hierarchy .~epicted by the traditional Buddhist model of the miirga. In this gverlay, as should be apparent from our example, the assertion pfbeing, characteristic of the first level of teaching, is associated :'with the laukika path; its denial, with the insight into emptiness <that leads one to the lokottara plane; the higher affirmation of


both being and its denial then guides the bodhisattva alo' \'~l~~i upper bh'L7.mis of the bhavana-marga; and the still higher nen~tlh~~~ of both leaves him at the ultimate ~iddle way of the asaiks~~P:::!~ of the BuddhaY . . Path·;!

In this kind of overlay, then, the spiritual developme .: .... : ... :' '.' each individual adept on the stages of the marga is but an inst~t~l:'(~ ., f h d 1 f B ddh' . . . nee,,; m mIcrocosm 0 t e eve opment 0 Uism Itself-a C·!2j;~.

ase·" as it were, of ontogeny ~ecapitula~ing phyloge~y. Or to putt~~~; matter from th~ other sIde, the kmd .of analysIs of the levels6t1~ Buddh~st doct.r~ne th.at we have seen III o~r exam~le of pratit/ds!j~ samutpada enVISIOns (If I may be allowed thIS confusIon of ancie'?;:1 tongues) a sort of "meta-marga," in which both the formalt~}) lationships of the various conflicting Buddhist doctrines~~1ri~:\ the concrete historical development of the disparate BuddhiSt.~ doctrinal literature recapitulate the inherent metaphysical ana;;: spiritual structure of the one great vehicle on which eachiridi}!': vidual Buddhist must make his way to the final goal ofBuddhi~:.;~ hood promised by the Lotus Sidra');;0

NOTES

l. A version of this paper was originally presented to the pan~li6~!; "Middleism: Nagarjuna and His Successors," Fifteenth Annual Conferel12e~t on South Asia, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1986. I should like to expre~sj! my thanks to Profs. Roger Jackson and Jose Cabez6n for comments offCr'ed'; at that reading.vii

2. E.g., Maha-sarrtnipata-sutra (Ta-chi ching, T.397: 13a15-16). :"'_>".-+:,;;;

3. E.g., in chapter 26 of his Madhyamaka-karikas (Chung lunji\~ T1564:36b-c); and in his Pratitya-samutpada-hrdaya-karikas (Yin-yuan hsinlun;~t see TI651-1654). For an excellent study of Nagarjuna's treatment of the" chain in the latter, see Kajiyama Yuichi, "Chukan ha no juni shi engi kaishak~,"?'! Bukkyo shiso shi 3 (1980), 90-146. '.;.

4. Especially in the common schema of the five samatha contemplatio~s" known as the wu ting-hsin kuan, among which meditation on pratftya-samutp~: is recommended as an antidote to moha. A discussion of these practices can be found in Ominami Ryusho, "Go teishin kan to go mon zen," in Sekiguclii: Shindai, Bukkyo no jissen genri (1977), 71-90. . J

5. Chung lun, TI564:36bI8; similarly, Bhavaviveka's Prajiia-pradiPa~, vrtti (Pan-jo teng lun shih, T.1566:131bI3). .'.

6. T.262:3c23-24. Here, as elsewhere in the literature, the dvadasiinga-y pratitya-samutpada is set in contrast to the four aryan truths, taught for the';. sr(ivakas, and the six paramitiis, intended for the bodhisattvas. For a generah,'

LEVELS OF PRATiTYASAMUTP ADA 23

'nt of some of the various interpretations given the twelvefold chain , ~l.!trn~ahayana literature, see Mitsukawa Toyoki, "Daijo butten ni mirareru ~t\\~~;f:ngi,,, inEngi no kenkyu, Bukkyogakukenkyu (toku-shlt) 39-40 (1985), 19-49. l!~t"7. See, e.g., his popular Hsiao chih-kuan, T.1915:469clOff. The five ,~:';l.,:d~spond to'the wu tmg-hsm kuan. ·',:8. E.g., in his Tz'u-ti ch'an men, T.1916:480cl5.

" 9. T.1716:698b29ff. This section has recently been translated by Paul nson, in his "The Two Truths Controversy in China and Chih-i'sThreefold

<!,th Concept" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1985), 530-561; '''slations appearing herein below are my own. The other five objects dis

".d by Chih-i in this section are the ten "suchnesses" (shih ju) of the Lotus 8csutra, the four [aryan] truths.(ssu til, the two truths (erh til, the three truths ~;;"'iiti), and the one truth (z tz). ~(~:q;'10. In technical T'ien-t'ai parlance, chieh-nei refers to all states within mi;{three worlds (san chieh), prior to the elimination of the so-called chien-ssu ~;i'i'ffl;ctions (i.,e., the darsana-heya and bhiivana-heya kleiavara1Ja, as distinguished f;!r'orU the two types of jiieyavara1Ja that Chih-i calls ch'en-sha and wu-ming). ;li%::JIL E.g., at 700a17. ~?/k; 12. 698c6-11. All the views of the infidels here, with the exception of ;.?l:r~ther and mother" (ju mu), appear in Pingala's list of false doctrines corrected ~:~ythe teaching of pratftya~samu:pad~, Chung lun, T. 1564: Ibl8ff. ,);~;}; 13. Paraphrase of Nzen-chu chmg, T.721:135aI7. f,;i~ 14. 698c28-699b28. For a discussion of some of Chih-i's material in this ~r:~~~ion, see Nitta Masaaki, "Chugoku Tendai ni okeru inga no shiso," in ,~iB:Ukkyo Shis'o Kenkyukai, ed., Bukkyo shiso 3: Inga (1978), 253-272. :t;~i:,i/ 15. After Chin kuang-ming ching, T.663:340bI5, with some omissions; ':f6rthe literature on this notion that the twelvefold chain depends on false ::,t~inking, see Mitsukawa, op cit., 35-44. u~ 16. 699c7-8. 'tf:~' 17. After Hua-yen ching, T.278:465c:26-27. yC'., 18. 699cl4-16. The term wu-mo here comes from one traditional intJ~rpretation of alaya as alaya, "not sinking." ;~;;. 19. Mo-ho chih-kuan, T.1911 :54a23-b6. The argument 'of this passage :,,~ould seem to be that, if, following (what Chih-i takes to be) the Ti-lun ,~;po~ition, we identify the source of phenomena with dharmata, which is neither ,,;~iibject nor object, then we cannot explain in what sense it is citta that produces :'phehomena; on the other hand, if, following the (reputed) She-lun position, i1Ve identify this source with an alaya distinct from dharmata, we cannot explain :<the relationship between the dharmas and the dharma nature. : 20. 699c20-22. ~r 21. Chung lun, T.1564:2b6. ;: 22. Chih-i applies the catu~koti to the dream in the Mo-ho-chih-kuan :;(T.l911:54b8ff), to show that the dream cannot be understood as arising from ,the mind of the dreamer, the condition of sleep, both or neither. The dream, "inthis analogy, is to the mind as the alaya is to dharmata ..

23. And see the parallel passage at Mo-ho chih-kuan, T.19ll:54c7. The siddhanta here derive from the Ta-chih-tu lun (T.1509:59b18ff), in which


it is said that the Buddha uses four types of teaching: the worldly ( h }."i .• · to encourage practice; the individual (wei-jen), to promote virtue; th~ I !~~h ( , h") 'I d h d' 1 " anti tUI-C Z, to counteract eVl ; an t e car ma meanmg (tl-i i), to bri '"". enlightenment. The Fa-hua hsuan i (686bff) d~scusses the four at som n1a\ interpreting them according to ten different aspects and relating th e ell

, . ern to four aryan truths, the four levels of practitioner, and so on. For discu < h ,. h' K k "'f "Sh' h" SSlOn:', t e~e reJ~tIOns lpS, S~~ awa atsu lV, amoru, 1 s ltan gl to kyoso rOIl(~(:""~:~

Seklguchl, Bukkyo no JZssen genrz, 303-318. ' 24. For the Ratnagotravibhaga teaching (of which Chih-i's passag~~'

~~ a~ abbr~via~ion), see Chiu-ching i-shengpao-hsing lun, T.16~ 1 :830a28f[ cl _ 1 S dISCUSSion IS marred by the fact that throughout he conSistently substi"Jtf(! h . ('" k") r h' - , ' h' tutes'~. szang mar lor t e sastra S yzn- slang.. ....•••••.. ;

25. 700a4-7 (the parenthetical clause here is Chih-i's). The relationsh:·j~i·}~.~ being established i.n ~his passage .d~~end upon the common organization~~t:~; the twelvefold cham mto three dlvlsIOns (san tao or san lun) distributedgv'ii the three times, (This tripartite division, found in the Mahavibh~a, Abhidhar~~.;~i kosa, etc., is also employed by Nagarjuna in his PratZtya-samutpiida-hrd Chih-i's schema here can be shown as follows: .

PAST PRESENT pratyaya: kleSa: 1) avidya 8) tr~7Ja

9) upadana hetu: karma: 2) sar[!Skara 10) bhava utpada: vastu: 3) vijnana

4) nama-rupa 5) Ja(iayatana 6) sparia 7) vedana

nirodha:

26. 700a7-16; paraphrasing the Sastra at T.1611:830bI3ff. 27. Ta-pan nieh-p'an ching, T.374:524b7. 28. For this teaching, see T.374:530aff. 29. 700a16-27, The gU7Jas here are, of course, the four original

paryasas. The relationships among the members of these lists can be as follows:

liao yin: bodhi: kleSa:

yuan yin: mo~a: karma:

chengyin: dharnza-kaya: vastu:

iuddhi:

atman:

sukha:

nitya:

1) avidya 8) tr~7Ja 9) upadana 2) sar[!Skara

10) bhava 3) vijnana 4) nama-ntpa 5) ;a(iayatana 6) sparia 7) vedanii

11) jati 12) jara-marar;am

LEVELS OFPRATiTYASAMUTPADA 25

700a27ff. 31. 700b22ff; the Lotus Sutra line occurs at T.262:6cl9.

'32. 700c5ff. 33.T.374:524b2. The Sutra goes on here to identify the twelvefold chain the Buddha-nature, with paramiirtha-sunyatii, with the middle way, Budood and nirviir}a. 34:. 'T.l509:a27ff. 35. The arguments have been brought together in Sekiguchi, Tendai kuno kenkyu (1978). 36. 709b; and see Chan-jan's sub-commentary, Hsuan i shih-chien,

717:S48b26, ell, etc. In the T'ien-t'ai system, the second teaching is "com-"u"to all three vehicles, in the sense that all realize sunyatii-the two vehicles, oligh what is called "analytic emptiness" (hsi-k'ung); the bodhisattva, through "utial emptiness" (t'i-k'ung). .

37. T.1564:33bll. "'38. T.1485:1014bI9-21. . 39. E.g., at Kiirikiis 12:10-11, 8:8. Chih-i's notion here that Nagarjuna's die way corresponds to the higher, self-negating function of emptiness

iM*gflects the sort of statements one finds in the Nirviir}a Sutra: e.g., "The ~b3Jadha~nature is called emptiness in its cardinal meaning (ti-i i k'ung; ~:~Fk~arnartha-sunyatii). !hi: emptine:s is c~lled wisdo.m (chih-hui). The e.mptiness ~;!§~q~en of here conSIsts m .not seemg eIther emptmess ?r non-emptmes~ (pu!r~'un:~)" .. To see everythmg as empty and not to see It as non-empty IS not ~!whatis called the middle way." (374:524bI2ff) A general discussion of the i:tbhiuese notion of the middle way as a third, higher truth appeared some !.;~!ear~ago in .the. p~?es of this j~urnal, . ir: Whalen L~i, "Non-duality of ;he 'Jf;[~1() Truths m SmItIc MadhyamIka: Ongm of the ThIrd Truth," 2:2 (19/9), l4~..-65. For more specific comparison of the T'ien-t'ai and Indian interpreta~J(;ons of Karikiis 24: 18, see Nakamura Hajime, "Chud6 to kukan," in Yuki ky8ju ~{fh9jukinen: Bukky8 shis8 shi ronshu (1964),139-180. ;3.;40. The closest study of Nagarjuna's uses of the cat~koti in the Kiirikiis :ihas been done by Tachikawa Musashi; see, e.g., his recent Ku no k8z8: Churon kit~ronri (1986). 1,"41. E.g., in Ssu-chiao i, T.1929:73a. This sort of hiararchic reading of i:tiie cat~koti in the Kiirikiis is not without its Indian parallels. Candraklrti, for ':e~ample, uses it to explicate verse 18:8, the only passage in which Nagarjuna .:'~imself employs the four propositions in an affirmative sense to claim that ;theBuddha teaches that everything is real (shih; tathya) , not real (jei shih; na :;tathya), both and neitHer. The first, says CandrakIrti, is intended to impress 'hhe worldly with the Buddha's complete knowledge of the world; the second, '!O cure the believer of his belief in realism; the third, to distinguish the ordinary .arid enlightened views; the last, to free the advanced practitioner from the 'grial traces of the iivarar}as. (Prasannapadii 370-371) , 42. While the logic of the catu5koti has been discussed by Robinson,

Jayatilleke, etc., perhaps the clearest statement of the basic logical problems n,vas given by Frits Staal, in Exploring Mysticism (1975); for a discussion of the 'actual implications of the schema in Mahayana literature (and additional bibliography on the topic), see David Ruegg, "The Uses of the Four Propositions

'.of the Cat~koti and the Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahayana


Buddhism," Journal of Indian Philosophy 5: 1-2, (9-1211977), 1-71. 43. In Chih-j's standard terminology, the second member of the

corresponds to the wisdom eye (hui yen) .of the two vehicles that attainCU'tL~kM'" jiwtii (i-ch'ieh chih); :he third member repTesents the dharma eye (fa yen; bodhtSattva that achIeves miirga-}iiatii (tao chung chzh); and the last is the cient buddha eye (fo yen) that has realized sarviikiira-jiiatii (i-ch'ieh chung

Glossary

A. Names and Terms

c:h'ang ~ Chan-jan ~~r:,::' cheng yin £ \11 ch'en-sha It '/Y chen shih t!. ~%\' chen ti ~i~ chia ~~;C chieh-nei i}Jl chieh-wai '1f}~ chien-ssu Jt~. chih-hui ~"M-\., '......::.

Chih-i ~r~~ ching :., ching 1"t ching -miao j:-l: *y Ch' --r:fii.' I-tsang \7,I~\

ch'uan 1t chung ~ chung tao,~i-i i '<f 1, ~ ~~' erh ti :;.. ~ fa yen \~I B~ fei shih ~fl fo-hsing lit'I'!. fo yen At~El fu mu Ii...~

hsiang "#l hsiao ta ,j'K. hsi-k'ung ¥T\~ hsing r\'! , hsu-k'ung 11. \1

hua-fa ssu chiao ilL;~,\"27%K huan-hua ~1 ill Hui-ssu ~i-~-Hui-wen ~J3

\~ ''-

hui yen ~t-§&:... i-ch'ieh chih ~ -tl} fU' i-ch'ieh chung chih ~ -u7 ;ft1\i i-shenK ~hen ~ 1- ~ •. ...-;''k 1 tl ~ ;)1" , ",

k'ai ts'u hsien miao ?~Jt, %!~ iry[ k'u t ...... ' .. . kuan hsinll'G

).-,-.

k'ung \'): liao yin J III Ii shih "ff .flo ~ miao ,h.y mieh :/~ ming DR , ming-ch'u~iI'n p'an chiao{'jl( p'an ts'u miao ~) Ii 4-1/ pieh F'J pu-ching /),:t pu-k'e-te 1-"01t pu-k'ung /)' 't

. pu-shan ssu-wei /j"~~'\'~ .,;

pu-ssu-i sheng-mieh /\,~~~,'t;~ pu-ssu-i wu-sheng wu-mieh ",

i'I'~~~!*.il1\: .

LEVELSOFPRATITYASAMUTPADA·

wei-ch'en4Kl wei-jen JJ:;!,--wo1\:(' wuk: wu-ch'ang -k~ wu-chi ~~;"G wu-ming ~_ uA wu-mo shih ~ ;,~~~ wu ting-hsin kuan ~~1j-I~~~u wu-wo~l\ yin \{l

yin-hsiang \17-;\:8 yu 11

.. ~i! yuan ".zJi ..

yuan III yuan yin ~~ \1]

yu-lou ilj ---rfi

27


B. Authors and Titles

Bukkyo Shiso Kenkyukai ~47i!l~~·l~ 1M· ,Bukkyo shiso: Inga nllM-ZA&\1i'~

Bukkyo shiso shi Ill( "%):. ~ ~ 'j:.. Chin kuang-ming ching i"t, e~ ~l}. .

Chiu-ching i-s~eng pao-hsing lun'W.. l.,--*'l'j,t My Chung lun '1'~, Engi no kenkyu ~iP14~ ,Bukkyogaku kenkyu (tokushu) /1~!"'\)1,

~~~~ , . U Fa-hua hsuan i %~~ ~ . Hsiao chih-kuan '\'\\::~~..J Hsuan i shih-chien ~\ ~ ff ~ Hua-yen ching -t rnd,if Kajiyama Yuichi J\;t~:Ii1t- ,"Chukan ha no juni shi engi .' .

kaishaku" <t iWL.;;\K.dJ t:::.. 9-.~~ ~H~ Kawakatsu Mamoru H\ f%- ~ , "Shi shit an gi to kyoso ron"

it ~ ~~f.if§~ Miaoja lien-hua ching hsuan i #~111i~~~1)~ Mitsukawa Toyoki '1u)l\ t t ,"Daijo butten ni mirareru juni

-K -t /11>. ~ \:'-:If 7 ft.-"1- f::. ~1;g; Mo-ho chih-kuan P\f%4 Y: 'tt Nakamura Hajime '>fHfu, "Chudo to kukan" '4'Jtt.I1;i&~u Nien-ch'u ching~; fh.~ft NittaMasaaki ¥Jw1l1tt ,"ChugokuTendainiokeruingano

\:f~ r.. ';j. 1:'-h'Ii} 11/ lQJ %..-~-Ominami Ryusho -K\~~UL "Go teishin kan to go mon zen"

1 ~~ I~·~'W., ~ 3d'1~'~ Pan-jo teng lun shih t-fl~~~5f;~"t P'u-sa ying-lo ching ~h. 7-'t.~~'+f Sekiguchi Shindai F~ \I 11... ,Bukkyo no jissen genri X IA~ fl 'I.

l-\'~.J1 Sekiguchi Shindai, Tendai kyogaku no kenkyu 1 ... :~ %K"} cfJ 7r~ IW,. She ta-sheng lun th·;t.:1J;:.Mr Shih ti ching lun t :l1!!...illi Ur Ssu-chiao i \1J11/r'f.-~ Ta-chi ching ·t ...... ~_~,rt Tachikawa Musashi t'l\~ ~ ,Ku no koZOi Churon no ronri

'~<1"1 t~ft:, 'If ~ a, ~~ tl Ta-chih-tu lun 1.. ~ ~1- ~~ Ta-pan nieh-p'an ching -r ... ffZfl llli:l1l

LEVELS OF PRA TiTYASAM UTP ADA 29

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INDIA AND CHINA

Heinrich Dumoulin Translated by James W Heisig and Paul Knitter

This is the newly revised and greatly expanded edition of the claimed history of Zen Buddhism, updated to take into the wealth of historical studies published during the past decades.

The first of a two-volume set, this book offers a detailed account of ..... the history, development, ideas, and image of the Zen school of Mahayana Buddhism. Here, Heinrich Dumoulin explores the earliest beginnings of Zen, from its roots in the Buddhist and Yoga traditions of ancient India to the influence of Taoism on its forma-. tion and development in China. He also invokes the . personalities of Zen Buddhism, among them Sakyamum Huineng, Lin-chi, Ma-tsu, Shih-t'ou, and others. In addition: Dumoulin discusses the many and varied expressions of Zen in the art and culture of China.

Also included are six appendices: a list of abbreviations; a chronological table; Chinese characters; genealogical tables; an index of names; and an index of subjects.

This superb study captures the essence of Zen Buddhism, clarifying its origins and revealing a richer picture of its history as a whole.

Volume Two, on Japan and Tibet, will be published in 1989. 349 pages g $14.95, paper

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the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object iGonsciousness: Sarvastivadin and ;f~tantika Theories

"Collett COJC

In the first five centuries e.E., both Buddhist and non-'(Whist philosophical schools increasingly turned to the

f .klysis of perception and specifically of the locus and existential ;.\jtt~tltsof objects of perception. These schools! elaborated their l'~t.b.e::ories on the dynamics of the perceptual process as a whole ¥f:t@6ugh an examination of seemingly minor issues. Among ~l!!these, the question of whether or not a nonexistent object can ~l~f9duce perception, and the explanations offered for the perr~f~ption of objects of questionable existential status such as illu~ij~tons and dream images, had significant ramifications for their ~~nJerpretations of ordinary external or internal perception and l:i¢bgnitive functioning. On the one hand, admitting that nonexis';l';t~,.nt objects can stimulate the arising of perception not only ~:'~ndermines the existential status of the objects of ordinary per;;;~eption, but also jeopardizes the possibility of certain knowledge. '~~9nthe other hand, demanding that all perception depend only li'.~pon existent objects makes it extremely difficult to account for !f;t~~ perception of these objects that have questionable existential ii;sta:tus . . :: Within Buddhism, this issue of a nonexistent object of per(;~eption was extensively treated in northern Indian Abhidharma .i,t~xts. These discussions not only reveal the position of Buddhist t;·t\bhidharma schools, but also provide the indispensable backi~i~ound and context for understanding the epistemological po~I§i,tions of the later Buddhist logicians. 2 The Sarvastivada3 and !1;l)ar~tantika-Sautrantika4 schools have particular importance be-

31


cause their positions best represent the two logically co .T;';i,~~ views on this issue. The Sarvastivadins hold that all perc~lr~,l")') ~equires. an existent obj.ect, .whil) th: Dar~tanti.kas admit ~h~~' In certaIn cases, the object IS nonexlstent. 5 ThIS differen" ,Acl

. . ' . ICe .of! OpInIOn reflects a broader dIsagreement· concerning .' li,e; dyna~ics of t~e perceptual process and its relation to othe~::' cognItIve functIOns, such as memory and conceptual thou ···h··. •·· ...•..•• · .... : ... i.i

O h · h' h '. g t ntIs, as on many ot er Issues, t e opposmg VIews orih'i,) S~rvas~ivadins and Dar~tanti~as generated a c?mplex and rich) dIal~ctlc of argument. As wIll. be shown, thel~ recurrent and' detaIled arguments can be reduced to two basIC concerns:d~~t veloping a defensible model of the perceptual process, and a.·t~ counting for the perception of objects of questionable existenti~(' status. The important texts that present theSarvastivadin pOS!-'" tion include the early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma canon,6 t W: Vibha~a commentaries,? and the later Sarvastivadin expositoty} works, notably Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhii5ya, Sanghabh¥_.r dra's Nyayanusara, and the Abhidharmadlpa.8 The Vibha~a com'}! mentaries an~ Sa~g~abh~dra's Nya~anusara ~erve as t?e p.rimaI'Y;· sources for Dar~tantlka vlews. 9 Hanvarman s TattvaszddhzSiis{ral~.: is also a valuable source for views often identical to those ofili~. Dar~tantikas presented elsewhere. II;;:,

Like many of the controversies between the Sarvastivadins': and Dar~tantika-Sautrantikas, their debates about percepti6tii often seem to revolve around minor, obscure, and inherited doctrinal issues. Closer inspection, however, shows that these>: debates, including those over perception, are actually structur~~.~ according to two fundamental disagreements .. The first concern~!. the way in which constituent factors of experience (dharma) are, thought to exist. 12 The Sarvastivadins argue that factors exist ai real entities (dravya) in the three time periods of past, present, and future. As such, they are defined as intrinsic nature; (svabhava), characterized by a particular inherent characteristic (svalak)a1J,a). Given appropriate causes and conditions, these existent factors manifest a particular activity (karitra), which theIl' defines them as present. However, since factors also exist as past or future, they are capable of serving as conditions in those, states as well. Sanghabhadra defines this past and future fune:

. tioning of a factor as capability (samarthya), thereby distinguishing it from that factor's activity (karitra), which occurs onlyin

A NONEXISTENT OBJECT 33

~~I~~.'t~sen t. l;~~>~ycontra~t,. the Dar~tantikas equa.te a factor:s ~xist~nce with i{/R'~~;' esent actIvIty. One cannot meamngfully dlstmgmsh a faci~ft!srintrinsic nature from its activity, and thereby speak of its :~~;,. tence in the past or future. Further, they argue, factors do l'elClS ." . 1 d . f' . . h . r :*);li'exist as ISO ate umts o. mtnnslC nature t at mam.lest a ·~9¥ticular activity through the influence of other isolated condi"~~sFor the Dar~tantikas, the process of causal interrelation rrth~only fact of experience; the fragmentation of this process ~S,Ctddiscrete factors possessed of individual existence and unique ~~4tacy is only a mental fabrication. il~';.The second fundamental area of disagreement between the fS'£rvastivadins and the Dar~tantikas concerns the dynamics of ~f~~ditionality.13 The Sarvastivadins allow both successive and Mfuultaneous models of causation: certain causes (hetu) or con~a;it:i?ns (pratyaya) arise prior to their effects, while others, which ~~~ert a supportive conditioning efficacy, arise simultaneously ~Nith them. The Dar~tantikas, however, allow only successive ~r~usation; a cause must always precede its effect. These basic 'i~isagreements about the nature of existents and causality conlsi~qllently set the framework within which the Sarvastivadins f~rrtd Dar~tantikas conducted their debates. :t'~!~i3;::'

/;\',:;;;,~(

;II.iThe Sarvastivadin Model of Perception

!~;[Jn order to construct their model of perception, the north;i~fnIndian Abhidharma schools begin from the description of lperception found in the scripture. There, a given type of percep~tl.lalconsciousness (vry'nana) is said to arise in dependence upon ~KS~nse organ and an object. 14 Both the sense organ and the . ;~bject are necessary conditions; if either is lacking, perceptual :S9nsciousness will not arise. 15 There are six such sense organs ~~nd six corresponding objects, referred to as the twelve sense spheres (ayatana) , which together with their six corresponding ~ypes of perceptual consciousness constitute the eighteen ele:tneuts (dhatu), of which all experience is composed. These eigh;~~rn elements include the five external objects, the five exter~ally directed sense organs, and the five corresponding types pf externally directed perceptual consciousness. Internal mental


awareness is also analysed according to the model of e t . h' f Xe sensory perceptIOn: t e prevlOus moment 0 perceptu I,'

sciousness, which serves as the mental organ, and mental ~.S~ d · . h . . f 'd' acto con ItIOn t e ansmg 0 a correspon mg moment of III .• :7i.

1 . 16 enta,!ii' Perceptua consCIousness.' . .t .•. ,ini: ..... ; .•. ;,~ In their attempts to clarify aspects of the perceptual pr'r;~~t~

1 f b · . h . Abh'dh' oceSS;! e t a~ l?,UOUS m t e s.cnpture, 1 a~ma texts focusth~if:;'; exammatIOn of perceptIOn on three questlOns: 1) what nas.·tL.:i·.}! .... iJ~

f . h b' h ·.!te'h' Power 0 sensmg teo 'lect: t e sense orllan, pe.rceptua·l .. · ..... >;.,6." •. '.' J U con'.,.,,;; sciousness, or some other mental faculty; 2) what is the cna"r ';iM

ac-·· ter of mental perceptual ~onsciousness, and how does it diff6¥#J from the five externally dIrected types of perceptual conscioti.;Sf;, ness; and 3) in what sense do the sense organ and object aa~Y;j ~onditions .for the arising of perceptual con~ciousness, and wn~t~~l IS the speCIfic character of the object perceived? In their diyei~i~ gent answers to these questions, the northern Indi~}~ Abhidharma schools developed different models of the proce~~.~ of perception'f.A~

For the Sarvastivada school, the perceptual process begiA~!;3 with the sense organ (indriya) , or basis (asraya) that senses.Sfi, grasps an object-field (vi5aya) appropriate to it. A given seris~~:: organ grasps an object-field, only when supported by percept~'ii)}; consciousness;17 nevertheless, this function of grasping theob~.;' ject-field is attributed only to thesense organ, and not to percep~~ tual consciousness, or to some other thought concomitarie,~ (caitta)18 associated with perceptual consciousness. 19 The fun8-;'; tion of perceptual consciousness consists simply in being aware, of (vij"anati), or generically apprehending (upalabdhi) the natute; of the object-field grasped by the sense organ. 20 In this way, th~~

. function of perceptual consciousness is distinguished from thafi of its associated thought concomitants (caitta). Perceptual con~1 sciousness generically apprehends the nature of a particular" object-field: for example, visual perceptual consciousness grasps.; an object as visible material form. The associated thought con-; comitants, however, grasp the particular characteristics of the' object-field: for example, whether that object is pleasant or un· pleasant, male or female, and so on. 21 In other words, perceptual' consciousness apprehends only the particular characteristic of an object-field in its generic category as a sense sphere (ayatanasvalak5a'/fa): for example, as form, sound, and so on. It does not·


"ehend the distinguishing particular characteristic of a given """",iP,f,t' field as an individual real entit,y (dravyasvalaksana) within f,l beC - , . . ~t~~rgeneric category. These individual particular characteristics ~~t~~pprehended only by the ass~ciated thought conc~mita~ts. 22

~'t~:iiEach of the five externally dIrected sense organs IS restncted ~t\~:itsfunctioning to one object-field: the eye can grasp only ~~'Yble material form, the ear only sound, and so on. The object~~~l~of the sense or.g~n exists ~s.a real entity (dravyata~), an~ ~!;{bfmerely as a prOVIsIOnally eXIstmg compOSIte (ho-ho, samagrz, ~~ihiita?!-23 Further, the appropriate. sense organ g~asps a 1?arpii~?larobJect-field only when both are m the present tIme penod. ;!rliepresent sense organ and present object-field then serve as , &'~iJhditions for the arising of a corresponding simultaneous in(:~ta:nce of perceptual consciousness. 24 When apprehended in the ~Rt~sent moment.by perceptu~l con.scious~ess a~d its associated rtI1pught concomItants, the object-fIeld (vz$aya) IS referred to as i;fue.object-support (iilambana).25 'j>~, '

I~l:<,' When the Sarvastivadins assert that the externally directed 'f€hse organ, the external object-field, and the resulting extert~aIly directed perceptual consciousness must be present in the "Jarne moment, they assume a simultaneous model of conditiontirig. Indeed, to support their contention that conditions may ;arise simultaneously with their effect, the Sarvastivadins cite the f~triptural statement that perceptual consciousness arises in de'pendence upon two conditions. 26 The Sarvastivadins further "invoke the fact of direct perception as proof of the simultaneity :?fthe sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness. :Indirect perception (pratyak$a) , a momentary external objectfield is grasped by a momentary externally directed sense organ and apprehended by an equally momentary instance of one of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness. ;'This is possible only if the object-field, sense organ and percepNal consciousness are simultaneous.27

, Mental perception differs from external perception in several significant respects. The mental organ (manas), which conditions the arising of a present moment of mental perceptual Consciousness, is defined as the immediately preceding moment of perceptual consciousness, regardless of its type. 28 That is to say, any of the six varieties of perceptual consciousness may be designated as the mental organ for a subsequent moment of


mental perceptual consciousness. Unlike the other five 'k';~i,; . . . exter"'"

?-~nydlrected sense o~gans, thIS me?-tal.a~gan.' precisely becall;~~ It IS past, cannot be saId to perform Its dlstmctIVe activ~ty (ka . '>;:7i

f · . h b' . f h ntra)." o sensmg or graspm!S teo 0ect-suppor~ 0 t e pre~ent mome@'\ of percept~al con.scIOusness .. Instead, It s~~ves SImply asth~l;~ door, or Immediately contiguous condItIOn (samanant"i.\ pratyaya) f?r the arisin~ of the present moment of ~ental per:a~:; tual conscIOusn.ess, which then apprehe.nds the obJect-suPPort~~';t Therefore, .unlIke the five externally dl~ected sense organs arid'.~ correspondmg types of perceptual conSCIOusness, the priormen_;' tal organ and its resultant present mental perceptual conscio1.l~;i( ness are not simultaneous, and do not necessarily share the sa~;; object-support.3o Nevertheless, the two requisite conditions fo~:i . . . r". the ansmg of a present moment of mental perceptual conscio~s}: ness, that is, a basis (iisraya) and an object-support (iilambana)s are still provided through the past mental organ and the object~;.; support.;!;;

Mental perceptual consciousness also differs from the five' externally directed types of perceptual consciousness in its model of operation. Mental perceptual consciousness not only ap:~: prehends the particular characteristic of an object-field in its I.' generic category, for example, visible material form like thei• color blue, but also apprehends the designation, "this is blue.;' .• ; Thus, unlike the five externally directed types of perceptu~C consciousness, mental perceptual consciousness operates by: means of designation (adhivacana), or namesY .

In addition, mental perceptual consciousness is distinguished from the five externally directed types of perceptuaIi consciousness on the basis of the differennypes of conceptual: thought (vikalpa) with which each is associated. According. t6 the Sarvastivadins, there are three types of conceptual thought:32 '

1) simple conceptual thought, or conceptual thought in its intrin-' sic nature (svabhiivavikalpa) , which is identified with initial in~ quiry (vitarka);33 2) conceptual thought through discrimination (abhinirupat;avikalpa); and 3) conceptual thought through recol~ lection (anusmarat;avikalpa). Even though the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness are said, by tradition, to be without conceptual thought (avikalpika), the Sarvastivadins interpret this as indicating that only the last two types of concep-. tual thought, that through discrimination and that through re-


"lectlOn, are absent. 34 Each moment of perceptual consciousis associated with both insight (prafiia) and mindfulness

rti). When they are associated with mental perceptual con'6usness they are strong and are identified, respectively, with 'hceptual thought through discrimination and conceptual btlghtthrough.recolle~tion. H~wever, when in~ight and mindIness are assoCIated wIth the fIVe externally dIrected types of rceptual consciousness, their activity is weak; therefore, the

c,:./g'rtesponding types of conceptual thought are said to be ab~%.f~nt.35 Nevertheless, since inquiry (vitarka) still characterizes f;~;,these five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, ~~!they can still be said to have the first variety of conceptual tj:;.t~ought in its intrinsic nature. By contrast, moments of mental ~~~'p~rceptual consciousness. associated with s~r~ng insight and ~)&.,rUif1dfulness are charactenzed by all threevanetles of conceptual F~':'·. jI1'lhought. ~tn\'ii. Sanghabhadra36 offers a further explanation of the charac-~.ifierization, "without conceptual thought (avikalpika)" as it is ~~~pplied to the five externally directed types of perceptual con(;:l~§Si6usness. A given type of perceptual consciousness can be said '1:lit4have conceptual thought under two conditions: 1) that a given i'il;fype of perceptual consciousness can apprehend, within one ~~tIIloment, an object-field of more than a single category, or 2) ~Y:.ithat a series of many moments of the same type of perceptual ~;;~fonsciousness can occur with regard to the same object-support. :,/,0The five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness l;:;fail to meet these two conditions: they apprehend only a present :t;'9bject-field of a single category, and a subsequent moment of ,.,the same type of perceptual consciousness cannot apprehend ':;that same object-support. However, since mental perceptual .,jconsciousness is unrestricted with regard to both the category ,.'and time period of its object-field, it may apprehend an object;2 field of more than a single category in one moment, and several ;',;fnoments of mental perceptual consciousness can apprehend i:.the same object-support. Therefore, Sanghabhadra concludes :;,~that it can be said, in agreement with tradition, that only mental J;perceptual consciousness has conceptual thought. , . Further, the scope of the object-field of mental perceptual i(:()nsciousness is much broader than that of the five externally 'i,directed types of perceptual consciousness. Within the tradi-""':,

~~~~~~-----------


tional classification of eighteen elements (dhatu), the of the mental organ and mental p~rceptual ~~"~"'-.H dharma element, or all constituentlfactors (dharma) not in any of the other five object-field categories. The ten directed sense organs and their corresponding types of tual consciousness are restricted to present obj single category. The mental organ and merital np1rr~"~~_"~<' sciousness have no such restriction. Mental sciousness can apprehend all factors (dharma) ~~"~LJL'" of the eighteen categories of elements. Therefore, the nal object-fields may be apprehended.by both their own tive perceptual consciousness and mental perceptual ness. The other thirteen elements, that is, the six sense the six types of perceptual consciousness, and the ment, which includes the three unconditioned (asa'f[l,Skrtadharma), are apprehended only by mental consciousness.37 Mental perceptual consciousness also prehend factors of any of the three time periods, past, or future. s8 Therefore, mental perceptual consciousness, unrestricted in both the category and time period of its field, is said to be capable of apprehending all factors. 39

. In addition to these eighteen categories of ~~ •• u. ....... ~.u tors, which exist as -real entities (dravyasat) in the periods,the scope of the object-field of mental .... "',rr~'"'h' sciousness includes composite entities (ho-ho, sa.magrf, sar.rJ.{rn~m whose existence is merely provisional (prajiiaptisat).40 composites are apprehended only. by conceptual through discrimination (abhinirupa1J,avikalpa) , they are ject-field of mental perceptual consciousness alone.

III. The Dar~tantika Model of Perception

The Dar!?tantikas also accept, as a provisional rlp"rrtnt1l

the Sarvastivadin model of perception as involving a sense object, and perceptual consciousness, hu.t they differ from Sarvastivadins on the following points: 1) the process . which perception occurs; 2) the temporal relation among. provisionally designated sense organ, object, and . consciousness; and 3) the nature of the object perceived.


the first point of disagreement, concerning the process ~eption, th~ .Mahiivibha~ii notes that according to the ntika view, It IS not the sense organ, but rather the collo

n(samagri) of t~e sense organ, ,and so o~, that can be said iihse or percelveY The Abhzdharmakosabha~ya and the ')~nusara elaborate upon this Dar~tantika model ofperceptfrerception, like all experience, can be described only

~isionally as consisting of individual factors possessing Hue activities; actual~y, in t~e .case of perception, as in. all kal relations, there eXIsts no dIstmct agent or cause possessmg bwnactivity of producing a distinct effect.43 Instead, there is

Sl¥fi{plya stream of experience, or more precisely, a stream of ~~t:seand effect (hetuphalamatra). These provisionally designated kf@iVidual causes and effects can be said to have activity only in ~1h'e~ense that they constitute a conventionally existing collocarlt?r'(of factors. 44 In the experience of perception, words such :~liJsense organ, object, or perceptual consciousness can be used 1Srtlyfiguratively to refer to moments abstracted from the causal ~~tbcess as a whole; there is no single factor that perceives or ~dthers that are perceived .. ~i~i.;Jn the ninth chapter ofthe Abhidharmakosabha~ya, Vasubani,a~~presents a model of the perceptual process which, though ~6tattributed explicitly to the Dar~tantikas, similarly refuses to il!I§cate distinct activity to any of the components through which fth'eprocess is described: 45 ",::,:,

. In that case, when it is said in the scripture that "perceptual consciousness (vijnana) is aware (vijanati)," what does perceptual consciousness do? It does not do anything. Just as it is said that the effect conforms to the cause since it attains its existence (iitmalabha) through similarity (sadrsya) [to its cause] even without doing anything, in this way also it is said that perceptual consciousness is aware since it attains its existence through similarity

. [to its object] even without doing anything. What is [this that is referred to as] its "similarity"? It is the fact that it has the aspect of that [object]. For this reason, even though that [perceptual consciousness] has arisen due to the sense organ, it is said to be aware of the object-field and not of the sense organ. Or, just as the series of perceptual consciousness is the cause with regard to a given [moment of] perceptual consciousness, so there is no fault in saying that perceptual consciousness is aware, since one can apply the word "agent" to the cause,


Thus, for Vasubandhu,perceptual consciousness should . d f h' . . . not mterprete as a actor avmg umque actIVIty: that is,as;i~:;I:i awfareness of a d1 isti~ct 0fbject-field. Tfhe w~rd awareness~ril~r~~ re ers to a causa senes o· moments 0 conscIOusness that '.' ~/:l'~

. h h . 1 f h . f d arIses>'·" WIt t e partlcu a:r .aspect 0 w. at IS re erre to as its ob'Jt>c~i~ One can also provlsIOnally descnbe perceptual consciousnJt·~<.,.t.il

. h h' d' . h .. ess as·· aware m t e sense t at It con ItIOns t e ansmg of subseq···.j •.. 'J.!.· f 1 · Th f uenv •• moment~ 0 perceptua conSCiousness. ere ore, as in .th~t!r:!;

Dar~tantlka model, Vasubandhu suggests that one can;'~ sharply distingui~h the activit~ of ~he object from that ofiW~::J perceptual consCiousn~ss that IS saId to apprehend it; inste~~',~;\ one must view perceptIOn as a causal process..!:J:.;~;i

~an?h~bhadra's response to this D.a:~tantika model ofp~;~1~; ceptIOn IS sImple: eve~ though all condltIOne~ ~actors do indeea't. anse from a collocatIOn of causes and condItIOns, each factbi~\ within the collocation has a distinct particular characteristic ctnd):j activity.46 Similarly, even though perception results from a cql-.B location, the existence of its individual causes and condition~~sjs real entities each having a distinct intrinsic nature and activity may be proved through scriptural references and argument. .:.

On the second point of disagreement concerning theierri-:,; poral relation among the provisionally designated componenl~';) of perception, the Dar~tantikasalso reject the Sarvastivadi~~ claim that, in the case of the five externally directed typesQf/( perceptual consciousness, a simultaneous temporal relation ob:;t tains among the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual corf-' sciousness. Their rejection is a consequence of their refusaltct( accept any type of simultaneous causal relation: the Dar~tantikas· .. claim that there is no possibility of a relation of producer an~'i produced (janyajanakabhava) between factors that are simultane-;:' ous (sahotpanna). If such simultaneous causal relations were pos- . sible, then the generative factor (janakadharma) would be without any generative capability, since the factor that it supposedly produces arises simultaneously with it. Therefore, the factor that is designated as the generative cause must exist at a time different from (bhinnakiila), that is, specifically prior toits effect. Consequently, the two provisional conditions for the arising of perceptual consciousness, the sense organ and the object, must exist prior to, not simultaneously with their effectY .

This refusal to accept the simultaneity of the sense organ,


~f~~:!'bject, and the perceptual consciousness results in a model ~i!~Wv~rception as a su~cessive caus~l process. 1his model is attrib~}~ifd to the Dar~tantlka-Sautrantlka master Sri:iata.48 The sense ~i~')f'J'n and the object-field in the first moment condition the i~ ... !~ ... O.~.E .•. p.···~n<.g of perceptual consciousness in the second moment. '''mS! ~~heri, with the assemblage ~sarrtnipiita) of the sense organ, object-Iffi~Jd, and p~rceptual CO~sclOusness, the thr~:_thought con~~m;RlZlits-feelmgs (vedana) , concepts (sarrtJna) , and vohtlOn '~~ittnii)-ari~e in the third and subsequent ~?r.nen,ts~ i,\I{i,;C\.Both Sanghabhadra and Vasubandhu cntICIze Snlata's suc~~~~}sive model of perception. In their view, it results in a multi,;f~~elstructure of cognitive functioning, in which the various ::iii~ntal activities such as perceptual consciousness, feelings, and ;~~6on, that occur in the same moment ?ave different object-sup):~9rtS. They claim that, accor~ing to Srllata's ~~~el, ar: .obje<;:t~'fj~ld and sense organ present m one moment A condItlOn the ~;~rising of the corresponding perceptual consciousness of that (p,articular object-~eld in the subsequent r.n0ment "B." For examS.p,le,vi~ible mate.r~al form. and the eye m one ~oment wo~ld :!~9IlditlOn the ansmg of visual perceptual conSClOusness of Its ~~articular object-field. in the next moment. This assemblage ;(s~m.nipiita) or collocatlOn (siimagr'i) of these three over two mo;lnents49 acts as a cause to produce feelings with regard to that :6riginal object-field in the third moment "C." However, in this f~cond moment '~B" another object-field and sense organ, for "example, sound and the ear, occur and condition the arising of ~Uditory perceptual consciousness in the third moment "C." a'his auditory perceptual consciousness in this third moment I'g" would have sound as its object-support, while the concurrent ;thought concomitant, feeling, would be supported by the prior yjsual object-field. In this way, moment after moment, percept)lal consciousness and its associated thought concomitants ~ould have different object-supports. This model then contradicts the Sarvastivadin provision that perceptual consciousness, or thought, and its associated thought concomitants must share the same object-support.5o

This first criticism of the Darstantika position is valid only if one accepts the Sarvastivadin model of cognitive functioning through both thought (citta) and thought concomitants (caitta). Each moment of experience contains one factor of thought

42 JIABS VOL. 11 NO. I

(citta) , or perceptual cons.ciousnes~ (vij~iina), .in addition to('~'!;! least ten ~~ought concomlt~nts (c~ztta), mcludmg feelings,cc)~~;~ cepts, volItIOn, and so on. Smce thought and thought con~';\? tants exist as distinct real entities with different particular c~orpJ~)~~ teristics and activities, they can exist simultaneously and fun atr:a~!i;ii~ . d d 1 . h .. h h . C IOU,m epen ent y WIt one restnctIOn: t ose t at Occur within6rlg~:i; m?m~nt. must function having the same object-s~pport. Tlr@;!~·. DarHantlkas, however, assert that thought concomItants do'i~}r.'! exist as entities distinct from thought or perceptual conscio~~~2'~ ness. They claim that the various mental functions perform~g;:J by these supposed thought concomitants are actually function";,; of thought itself.5l Therefore, each of the cognitive functi6ri~'~ indicated by the so-called thought or thought concomitant:Sj1"!' occur only successively. 52 A particular object-field and sen~~;li organ in one moment "A" would give rise to perceptualcon~';:; scious?ess in t~e subse.quent moment,-:vhich :vould then pr9~.\~ duce, m succeSSIOn, vanous mental functIOns With regard torhat, , object-field. Thus, from the Dar~tantika perspective, the Sarv~~:_1i: tivadin criticism that perceptual consciousness and its associated";.: thought concomitants have different object-supports is uri5\i~ founded. ';"

, ,'<'f.'

Throughout the Nyiiyiinusiira, Sanghabhadra raises a second";' criticism of this successive perceptual model, a criticism th~t1': reflects the controversy concerning the possibility of a nonexis ... ·y~ tent object of perceptual consciousness. If perception is succes~j,: sive, as the Dar~tantikas claim, then even in the case of the fiv~; externally directed types of perceptual consCiousness, the object-,\\ field would be past when its corresponding perceptualcod<~'~ sciousness arises. 53 The Dar~tantikas must then explain whya:;f given moment of perceptual consciousness takes as its SUppatt'! only the immediately preceding object-field, and not all p~st;, object-fields. If the Dar~tantikas claim that a present moment,' of perceptual consciousness perceives only its own cause, thatJ is, the immediately preceding moment, then they must explaill': why an object-field of the distant past is not also consideredtoi. be its cause. They might respond that the object-field of th~: immediately preceding moment is the cause because it alone' has a connection (sarrtbandha) with that present moment of per:, ceptual consciousness. However, since the immediately preced-, ing object-field, like that of the distant past, is, in their opinio~,g

A NONEXISTENT OB ]ECT 43

~,Xally nonexistent, how can they justify a special "connection" ~gtween consecutive, moments? ~he Dar~tantik~s might defend ~thlsunique connect~on by replymg that the ob~~ct-field of the ~rnediately precedmg moment acts as a condItIOn when that rj~I'tceeding moment of perceptual consciousness is on the point 'Sll . h' S ' h bh d ' ~t;;f;arising, In t IS case, ang a a ra argues, the Dar~tantlkas ~gb~trOvert their initial claim that a present moment of percep'!'t;i~lconsciousness perceives only past objects; for their reply ~:l:i~tails that a future visual perceptual consciousness, that is, one i,e . ,. ~fuat is about to anse, perceIves a present object-field. Thus, the i~ar~tantika theory of a successive perceptual model requires 1;~orne explanation for the unique character of the immediately ¥feceding obj.ect-field, a ch~ract~r that distinguish,es it fr?m all :tpiher past objects and speCIfies It as the only possIble object of ~~tesent ~erceptual. consc.i~~sness. . i~i;;,~' In hIS concludmg cntICIsm, Sanghabhadra argues that the '%proponents of this successive perceptual model have made their [ppsition completely untenable by rejecting the existence of past :~and future factors. 54 When the sense organ and object-field exist, Illieir corresponding perceptual consciousness has not yet arisen, ~~d hence does not exist; when perceptual consciousness arises, :)!the sense organ and object have already passed away, and hence ~tio longer exist. Since no causal interaction can be established ::between a factor that exists and one that does not exist, the ,'previous sense organ and object-field can have no causal effect ~upon perceptual consciousness. Thus, in Sanghabhadra's opin:ion, this successive model of perception leads to the conclusion I either that perception occurs without its two requisite conditions, ~thereby contradicting the scripture, or that perception is con:ditioned by nonexistents, which, from the Sarvastivadin perspec'live, is absurd. 55 In either case, the Dar~tantika position results ''in a denial of direct perception,56 and an implicit admission that ;,all perception depends upon a nonexistent object.

elV. The Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness -;j'

• The Sariputrabhidharmasastra is one of the first northern (Indian Abhidharma texts that explicitly raises the issue of the possibility of a nonexistent object of knowledge or perceptual


consciousness. 57 Regarding the possibility of knowledge th~;,!i~~ without an existent object-field, the text offers two oPi'):~~i;~ 1) such knowledge is not possible;' or 2) particular kno nI19n~1 .. ·.i;.

. wed";: of past and future factors can be saId to have a none ';'~~i~il

. .. f XIstenr" object-field. The eXIstentIal status 0 past and future fact;)'l~~ O~}:~ts o! knowledge is also discussed in the first .fascicle ~I~~~0~i Vz;nanakaya. 58 Here, th.e author argues for the eXistence of pis~.·~ and future fac~ors agamst an opponent, Maudgalyayana,59wh6';~ allows the eXIstence only of present and of unconditio :,£;, (asarrtskrta) factors. 5o In defending his view, the authorcttF numerous scriptural passages that refer either to the call~jJ;:; activity of past factors, or to the percept~on ~nd knowledg/~£t; both past and futu~e factors. The author, m usmg these passages'f to support the eXIst~nce of past and future factors, implicitlY.") assumes that only eXistent factors can exert causal efficacy,and;'; that knowledge or perception ~rises only with an ~xistent object~;~\ support. Maudgalyayana replIes that thought WIthout anexis~;; tent object-support is indeed possible: precisely, that thoughf.~ which depends upon past and future factors. 51 If this is the casei~' the author responds, the definition of thought or perceptu(li:~, consciousness given in the scripture must be rejected. Perceptu(ilk; consciousness is defined as intentional awareness; that is, as that} which is aware (vijiiniiti) of visible material form, sound, and.sO'; on up to mental factors (dharma). If the object-support wefkt;, nonexistent, there would be no object of awareness and aware.! ness itself would be impossible. Further, the scriptural passage'j; stating that perceptual consciousness arises on the basis of two;~ conditions, the sense organ and the object-support, would be. contradicted. If a nonexistent object-support were allowed, these. two conditions would not be present. Here the author again assumes that only. existent factors can function as conditions. . .....

The Mahiivibhii$ii further develops the arguments of the ViJiiiinakiiya; it supports the position that perception and knowledge depend only upon an existent object-support,52 and that, only actually existing entities can function as conditions. 63 This opinion of the Mahiivibhii$ii is evident in an argument with the Dar~tantikas and other schools concerning whether instances of knowledge (jiiiina) or its objects are more numerous. 54 For the Mahiivibhii$ii, all knowledge depends upon an existent object.·· Further, knowledge itself can become an object for subsequent


ts of knowledge. Therefore, the objects of knowledge numerous. However, the Daqtantikas apparently con

instances of knowledge more numerous, since they assert knowledge can depend upon nonexistent object-fields, in

illusions, sky-castles, circles made from whirling fireand mirages.

, and other cases of nonexistent object-fields given by tikas indicate that by the time of the Mahiivibhii$a,

of possible objects of knowledge or perceptual conwhose existence was disputed exceeded that of simply

and future factors. For example, the Mahiivibhii~a cites the ::IT~L,U'LH"'~~ as rejecting the existence of objects of mistaken c;...~,t1n,n 65 such as the snake that is cognized in place of the

rope, or the human being in place of the pillar, or the that is seen to exist within one's own body (satkayadr~.ti). The

!".in~rsltanllK(i::; also reject reflections and echoes,66 dream images,67 (maya) and magical creations (nirma1J,a),68 negative ex, such as impermanence,69 and denials. 70 In the opinion

Mahiivibhii~a, such examples do not prove that knowledge perceptual consciousness may depend upon a nonexistent

Instead, the Mahiivibhii~a concludes the con: because such things act as supporting conditions in the

. n of perception, there must in each case be some exis-object-field. . Among the post-Vibha~a nor~hern Abhidharma texts, the

. Abhidharmakosabhii~ya, Nyayanusara, and fAbhidharmadzpa all contain extensive discussions of the possibility :'ofa nonexistent object of perceptual consciousness. In these texts, as in the Vijiianakaya, the impetus for raising this issue is ~the controversy concerning the existence of past and future . factors. Each text, regardless of its particular stance on this controversy, appeals to both scriptural references (agama) and arguments (yukti) as reasons to support its position. The similarity between the reasons and examples employed by the Abhidharmakosabhii~ya, Nyayanusara, and Abhidharmadzpa, which have documented historical connections, with those cited in the TattvasiddhiSastra suggests a shared store of arguments and scriptural references on the topic, a common source, or intentional borrowing.

Among the reasons offered by these texts in support of the

46 JIABS VOL. 11 NO. 1

existence of past and future factors, particular importan >;!~" , kId eelS' accorded to the fact tnat now e geor perceptual conscious "Ii

d 1 . b' 7 . ness . . epends on y ~po~_ an eXIstent 0 ~ect~.support. 1 For exarnplg.~ III the Tattvaszddhzsastra, out of the nmeteen reasons fortht~ existence of past and future factors presented by the opponel~:; seven require the existence of an object of perceptual conscioCt{~ ~ess. The followi~g four are relevant here:7~ 1) since thougJti IS produced only wIth regard to factors that eXIst; 2) since menrn perceptual consciousness takes the immediately past mome~ of perceptual consciousness as its basis (iisraya) and may depen~ upon future factors as its object-support (iilambana), if past ana' future factors did not exist, mental perceptual consciousne;s"/ would have no basis or support; 3) since ordinary mental perce~.f1 tual consciousness cannot ap.prehend the fiv.e external objectJ~ fields when they are present, If past factors dId not exist, recol~ lection of those object-fields would be impossible; and 4) sint6r? thought and thought concomitants cannot know themsel\Tei;~ factors associated with them, or their co-present causes, these,: various factors can only be known when they are past byi:' subsequent moment of thought. 73 <il

The Abhidharmakosabhii$ya74 offers four reasons in suppbrfk of the existence of past and future factors, two of which concedL perceptual consciousness and its object-support: ,I) accordil1g!! to scripture, "there is the arising of perceptual consciousness in. dependence upon two,"75 that is, the sense organ and the objectS: support; and 2) according to argument, since perceptual COh-',

sciousness operates only when there is an existent object-field,· if past and future factors did not exist, perceptual consciousness of past and future factors would have a nonexistent object-sup:' port, and hence, would not arise."

The Nyiiyiinusiira and Abhidharmadipa, even though pat: terned closely on the Abhidharmakosabhii$ya, display a striking similarity to the Tattvasiddhisiistra in their treatment of the existence of past and future factors. The Tattvasiddhisiistra begins! its discussion with the following observations.76

There are people who claim that factors of the two time period~ [of past and future] exist, and [others who claim that they] do not exist. [Question:] For what reasons are they said to exist;fof what reasons are they said not to exist? [Response:] Those [who

A NONEXISTENT OB JEeT 47

state that they] exist, [claim that] ifo factor exists, thought is pro(iuced with regard to it. Since one is able to produce thought with regard to factors of the twotime periods [of past and future], one should acknowledge that they exist. [Question:] You should first state the characteristic [i.e., definition] of existence. [Response:] That range (gocara) upon which knowledge operates is referred to as the characteristic of existence. .

For Sanghabhadra77 also, establishing the existence of past ;\t~~d future factors first requires defining or stating the charac';!feristic of existence (sallakJa1Ja, sattvalakJa1Ja). Once this defining :f~haiacteristic of existence is understood, he claims, the existence f{qfpast and future factors will be universally accepted. Some ,ireachers, he notes, define the characteristic of existence as that W~hic:h has already been produced and has not yet passed away. ~F;Qr Sanghabhadra, this is simply to identify existence with the ~~tesent, and thereby to assume, a priori, that past and future :;Jtctors do not exist. Instead, Sanghabhadra offers the following i,~~efinition that will include factors of all three time periods: 78

;~RTo be an object-field that produces cognition (buddhi) is the :Ytiue characteristic of existence." Similarly, the Abhidharmadipa, 79

:i'defines the characteristic of existence (sattvalakJa1Ja) as "that of iC,{yhich the indicative mark (cihna) is considered by cognition," ?~iid explains it as follows: 80

An objective thing, whose own form is established by intrinsic nature, is said to exist as a real entity when one observes its defining characteristic determined by an observation of factors, which is free from mistaken aspects.

Thus, the Nyayanusara and the Abhidharmadipa, like the opponent in the TattvasiddhiSastra, define existence as that which ,Serves as the object of cognition.

, These texts, however, admit several categories of existence, 'and hence, several categories of possible objects of cognition. Sanghabhadra8! first broadly distinguishes between existence as a real entity (dravyasat), equated with absolute existence (paramarthasat) , and existence as a provisional entity (prajfiaptisat) ,

:equated with conventional existence (sar(l,vrtisat). Sanghabhadra subsumes within these two categories of existence a third category of relative existence (apekJa) recognized by some teachers,


including the author of the Abhidharmadfpa. 82

.. The firs~ category of r~al entit~es includes factors such;~(\ vIsIble matenal form or feelmg, whIch produce cognition wWi~~ out depending upon anything else. These real entities exi tvi1;, several modes (bhava): specifically, present existence as intrr·~) nature (svabhava) ~ogether wi~h ~ist~nctive activity (karitra), iillW1

past or future eXlstence as mtnnslC nature alone. Since th';'': . . . h h f . .IS mtrmslC nature, w et er past, present, or uture, can serve',,!,. the object-support for knowledge, past and future factors ~l~\ can be said to exist. 83;~~

The second category ~~ provisi~nal entities, such as apgt' or an army, produces cogmtlOn only In dependence upon ar~~f entity. ~~is dep:ndence is twofold: 1) di~ect dependence up()~ real entltles, as m the case of a pot, whICh dependsuponth~) fundamental material elements (mahabhuta) of which it is mad~\ and 2) dependence first upon other provisional entities, an:~ secondarily upon a real entity, as in the case of an army, whicH depends first upon its human members, and finally upon th~ ultimate factors of which humans are composed.,.

This Sarvastivadin definition of existence in terms of objeq~) that give rise to cognition has significant implications for the'. dispute concerning the possibility of a nonexistent object-sup: port of perceptual consciousness. Since an entity's status as ah' object-support condition for the arising of perceptual conscious? ness is the very criterion by which the existence of that entitY. is established, no such object-support can, by definition, be nonexistent. However, it is important to note that the object perceived may exist in different ways. As the Mahavibha$a makes, clear, all conditions must actually exist as real entities, and the' object-support, as one such condition, must also so exist. Nevertheless, provisionally designated entIties may also become the objective content of mental perceptual consciousness. Does this then imply that the object-support condition may exist only provisionally? The answer lies in the definition of provisional existence: all provisional entities depend primarily or secondarily upon a real entity. Thus provisional entities, exclusive of their actually existing bases, cannot serve as the object-support condition for the arising of perceptual consciousness. Instead,.

, the real entity upon which provisional entities depend serves as the object-support. 84


t?F':;Objects Whose Existence is Disputed

:'Since the Dar~tantikas deny that conditions must exist as ~1ilentities, they .reject thi~ Sarvastivadin de~inition of existence

;;,.:idconsider theIr use of It to prove the eXIstence of past and ~~fIltllre factors groundless. This Dar~tantika objection is pte:t~;"'Ilted in the Nyayanusara: 85 "This [definition] also does not yet ;Y~\stitute the true characteristic of actual existence because [we J ~~J@owthat nonexistent [obj.e~ts] ,~lso are able t~ serve as obje~ti~;fields that produce cogmtIOn. The Mahavzbha$a, Tattvasld~a6iSiistra, Nyayanusara, and Abhidharmadipa all provide examples i~6fobjects of cognition claimed to be nonexistent: 86 1) products :j~:b(sensory error, such as two moons, and products of mistaken '~~6gnitio?-, such as a circle mad~ from a whirling firebrand, a ~tpillar mistak~n f~r a hUI?an be~ng: or the concept of. self; 2) 'ii'objects perceived m certam medItative states; 3) dream Images; ::,:~)reflected images, echoes, illusions, and magical creations; 5) ~,~~pressions having a nonexistent object including: a) certain t:ilegations, such as nonexistence, or the prior nonexistence of ~fs9und, b) affirmative expressions referring to unattested and ~/eutatively impossible objects, such as the horn of a hare, and )~) logically contradictory objects such as the thirteenth sense :§phere (ayatana) , or the son of a barren woman; 6) past and Nture objects either cognized through inferential memory and

';;ilnticipation, respectively, or perceived directly. ';, The Sarvastivadins respond to these examples by indicating, :in each case, the existent object-field that supports perception, 'and hence, cognition. L;'.- ,

]'Sensory Error and Mistaken Cognition Sensory error,87 such as the visual distortions produced by

ophthalmic disorders, or the image of two moons, results from faulty sense organs and does not imply a nonexistent object-field. For example, a visual sense organ afflicted by ophthalmic disorders does grasp existent visual material form, albeit unclearly. This then results in mistaken cognition with regard to that existent object-field. In the case of the image of two moons, Sarighabhadra explains that the visual sense organ and that initial moment of visual perceptual consciousness depend upon


or see the single existent moon. However, the clarity of per f:'ii0 tion is influenced by the sense @rgan, which is a conditio ceB~ equal with the object-field in the arising of perceptual consc7c,'?,~

Th f h d . d 'r h· . OUs. ness. ere ore, t e etenorate state 01 t e vIsual sense or::' produces an unclear visual perceptual consciousness, whichg~~ sul.ts in the confus~d cognition of two moo~s. N ev~rt~eless,&g object-field, the smgle moon, actually eXIsts. ThIS IS eviddir because no such cognition of the moon, confused or otherwis";;~ arises where the moon is not found. e,

I~stances ?f mistaken cog?ition88 also ~o not. arise with6~I an eXIstent object-field. The CIrcular form m whIch a whirlin' firebrand appears, or the human form in which a pillar appeart do not, in themselves, exist as real entities (dravya). However the cognition that apprehends them does have an existent object; field: the individual points of light comprising the apparent circle, or the form of the pillar. Similarly, regarding the vie~ that the self exists in one's own body (satkayadr$ti) , 89 the existent object-field is the five appropriating aggregates (upadanal! kandha), which are then mistakenly cognized as self (atman), a~J as what belongs to self (atmiya). ··'1,

The Sarvastivadin explanation of these instances of sensor): error and mistaken cognition assumes that cognition mayh~; either correct, that is consistent with the object-field, or mist<i,ken, that is deviating from the true character of the object-field due to certain intervening conditions. However, whether corre~.t or mistaken, cognition only arises if supported by an existent object-field. The status of cognition as correct or mistakenis determined by whether or not that cognition apprehends the object-field through a correct or a mistaken aspect (ahara). For example, the conditioning influence of a visual sense organ afflicted with an ophthalmic disorder causes the visual object~ field to be grasped unclearly, and produces cognition (buddhi) characterized by a mistaken aspect (viParitakara). Similarly, cognition of a whirling firebrand has the mistaken aspect of circu~ larity, and cognition 6f the five appropriating aggregates ha.s the mistaken aspect of self and what belongs to self. 90 However, in none of these cases does the object-field itself, in its true nature, possess these mistaken aspects, nor is it nonexistent-gl; Instead, error resides in the aspect of cognition through which the object-field is apprehended.

A NONEXISTENT OBjECT 51

.I~ this Sarvastivadin account of mistaken cogmtIOn, the t~:;'>rtlaspect (akara), is used in a restricted sense as identical to ~~~tght (prajiiakara) , and not. in the general. sense in which all ~;~Rought and thought concomItants may ?e SaId to ha~e an aspect {t(Jakiira). ~houg~t and thought concomItants are. saId to "ha~e ~;""'aspect only In the general sense that the object-support IS

~prehended . t~rou~h thei~ 0:vn. activity.92 A~pect in the re~Wicted sense IS IdentIfied wIth Inslght because It represents the ~iiliscrirnination of the characteristics of the object-field in a par;U~1.ilar way as carried out by insight. 93 Insight characterized by t~'rnistaken aspect may be the result of faulty sense organs, iMfilernents, ignorance, or past action. However, this mistaken !~~pect is not associated with the initial moment of externally ;dlrected perceptual consciousness in which insight, though pres:i~Ilt, is not acute. Instead, it occurs only in the subsequent moijDent of mental perceptual consciousness in which there is dis.{criminative conceptual thought (abhinirupaty,avikalpa) , or dis:!trimination of the characteristics of the object-field.94

r2.Meditative Objects \:. The Sarvastivadins explain objects perceived in certain iweditative states also as resulting from the application of a spebfic aspect (akara) to an existent object-support. The meditative objects in question are those perceived in such states as mindfulp~ss with regard to breathing (anapanasmrti), meditation on the repulsive (asubhii) , the four immeasurables (apramaty,a), the eight Fberations. (vimok$a), the eight spheres of .mastery (abhibhvayatana) , and the ten spheres of totality (krtsnayatana).95 All of ~hese states occur as a result of attention through resolution (adhimuktimanashara),96 by which practitioners intentionally perceive the object in a certain way, or with certain aspects, in accord with their resolve. For example, in the ,sphere of totality with regard to the color blue (nilakrtsnayatana), perceptual consciousness is concentrated on the color blue, and perceives everything, everywhere, exclusively and totally as blue.97 These aspects (ahara) of totality and exclusiveness are the product of the practitioner's attention through resolution: that is to say, atten~ion is directed in accordance with the practitioner's intention to perceive the object-field, "blue," as total and exclusive. For


the Dar~tantikas, 98 this perceivedblueness does not actualIy.</.';·~.l~l. . l ' 1 f h d" . eXIst: beca~s: l_t ~esu ts sImp y ro~ t e me Itator.s resolution. 'l'ilz{;l

SarvastlVadms, however, as m the cas~ of mIstaken cognifl .. ~.:! .•.. ;. d·· . h h h h . . . IOn· . IstmgUls t e aspects t. at c aracte~I~e cognItIOn from thebb~l} Ject-field that supports It. The practItIOner produces cognit'~'i~

. h h . l' d I' h .. IOn •. , . WIt.t e aspects, to.ta lty an e~c uSlV~~ess,.t rough the powei%\' of. hIS own. resolutIOn, but thIS cognItlOn IS supported by ari!;! eXIstent obJect~support, a small patch of blue color. 99 .,"/j

,,<,: ',: i~)

3. Dream Images .. . .•• ;. The Dar~tantikas claim that dream images are nonexisten:Df

because the dreamer discovers when awakened that events ex.:;.: perienced in a dream did not actually occur. For example,0l"le'. eats and satisfies the senses when asleep and nevertheless wakes up hun!p"y and wea~.IOO The Mahavibha~a defines dreamingl~r~ as the SImple operatIOn of thought and thought concomitants:; with regard to an object-support during sleep. Since the fi"d; externally directed types of perceptual consciousness do not:' arise in a dream, these object-supports, whether external matet.?;·. ial form, or internal mental factors (dharma), are apprehende~:: only by mental perceptual consciousness. 102 For Sanghabhadra,: dreaming is the recollection of past object-fields that haveal-.. '· ready been experienced,103 but this recollection is influencedbyi:. the mind's sluggishness during sleep. For example, in the case;!. of dream images that have never been experienced as such, like~ the horn of a hare, the dreamer combines in one place separate;.; waking memories of a horn and a hare. However, the object-sup";' port for the dream image is not nonexistent; it is precisely those past factors that support the various parts of the recollection separately.

The dream images themselves result from several causes; whi.ch the Mahavibha~al04 summarizes as follows: 1) they are stimulated by other beings, for example, sages, spirits, gods, and so on; 2) they result from previous experiences, or habitual activity; 3) they presage a future event, that is to say, the dreamer first perceives the indicative mark of an auspicious or inauspicious future event in a dream; 105 4) they result from conceptual thought, specifically, discriminative consideration that occurs in the waking state when one is about to fall asleep; 5) they result


\:;,I-Itl"'),'

~\ibrrt illness, that is to say; due to a conflict _or imbal~nc~ among ~fuffundamental ma~enal elements (dhatu, mahabhuta): the Y[~rearner sees a dream Image that conforms to the predommant ~:il~I1lent. 106 .

~~f0 ri~~Reflected Im~ges~ E~hoes, Illusions ~nd Magical Cre~tion~ %0:',. For the Dar~tantikas, reflected Images, echoes, IllusIOns and f~g;gical creatio~s, .like t~e objects of sen.sory error or mist~ken gt"ognition, medItatIve obJ~cts, or dream Images, do not eXIst as i;:perceived and have .no eXIstent support. For the Sarvastiva.di~s, ~:liOwever, reflected Images, and so on, are themselves vaneties 0'bf existent material form. As the Mahiivibha5ii l07 explains, the fbar~rantikas claim that reflected images do not actually exist "because the object reflected does not itself enter the reflecting hhrface. Similarly, echoes do not actually exist because all sound "is momentary, and one moment of sound cannot travel to pro)aUCe a distant echo. The Mahavibha5ii responds that these re(fleeted images and echoes do indeed exist because they act as ~c:()nditions supporting the arising of perceptual consciousness, :and because they are grasped by the sense organs and, hence, bn be included within the twelve sense spheres (iiyatana), which

ttbe Buddha declared to ~xist. Even though the reflected image and echo are not themselves the original visual material form or sound, they still consist of material form derived from the Original object. Indeed, material form can result from a variety

.of causes and conditions: for example, liquid may be produced from moonlight on a moonstone (candrakiinta) , heat from cow dung or from sunlight on a sun-crystal (silryakiinta), and sound from hitting together the lips, teeth, tongue, and so on. These

. varieties of liquid, heat, and sound, though perhaps not produced in the conventional way, can be said to exist precisely because they exert the activity ofliquid, heat, or sound. Similarly, the material form of which a reflected image or echo is composed actually exists because it has the function of producing cognition.

Sanghabhadral08 also argues at length for the actual existence of reflected images and echoes as varieties of material form. The reflected image as such, like all composite entities, exists provisionally, but also like all provisionally existing entities, it has an actually existing basis. In the case of reflected


,',;:"{;!'

images and echoes, this basis is the fundamental materi l\'~:j ments (mahiibhuta) and derivative material form (bhautika).; ~l~.t varieti~s. of the. fundamental elemen.ts, which are generat~~t!~ the ongmal object, reach the reflectIng surface to produc ·tli··'Y~

. 1 fl d . 109 e .. e" matena re ecte Image. ':'ii*). In Sanghabhadra's argument for the existence of refie "~~

im~ges, several_p~ir:ts. are rais~d that in~ic~te t~e criteri~t~c'~t whIch the SarvastlVadms establIsh an entIty s eXIstence. Firs{i; Sanghabhadra llo notes that his opponents allow only cert·,~;.

. b' h fl d' b . am nonexistent 0 ~ects,.suc as re ecte Ima?es, to e.a~prehen~e~L;

by perceptual conSCIousness. However, SInce no dIstInctions ca,i/; be drawn among nonexistents, they should admit thatati'; nonexistent objects are apprehended. Further, distinctiori~ '1 •... 1. n the apprehension of an object as correct or incorrect, Which'" result from the clarity of the sense organ, the distance ofth~;;; object, and so on, are only possible with regard to an existeIl~l: entity. Second, Sanghabhadra criticizes Vasubandu'slll assertion!;. that the reflected image in no way exists, but is simply a particul{i; efficacy of a collocation of conditions such that one sees thJ;: reflection. Sanghabhadra asserts that a collocation (siimagrZ) do~~'~ not exist as a real entity (dravya) , and therefore cannot be said: to have its own particular efficacy. Further, he demands whY'~: Vasubandhu will not allow this collocation of conditions, thaI is, the original object and the reflecting surface, to produceii: separate~y existing reflected image. It is the nature of all sepa":: rately existing conditioned factors to arise from a given colloca7 tion of conditions; similarly, a reflected image that arises from i

such a collocation should be allowed to exist as a separate entity::'. Third, Sanghabhadral12 offers several reasons in support of the >,

existence of the reflected image: 1) most importantly, a reflected; image satisfies the criterion for existence, that is, it serves as the object-support condition for the arising of perceptual conscious-<, ness; 2) like all actually existing conditioned factors, a reflected· ' .. image is apprehended only when that reflection is present, and' the presence of the reflection is dependent upon the collocation of its requisite conditions; 3) the reflected image is the objeCtsupport of visual perceptual consciousness, which, as an exter':. nally directed type of perceptual consciousness, is without conceptual thought, and therefore, must be supported by an actually existing object-field; 4) like all material form, a reflected image


!fEf;:61e to obstruct the arising of other material form (i.e., another l~i~ected i~age) in the s~me place; and 5) a r~flected image, lilT" 'all eXIstent factors, IS produced from vanous separately Jll':e d' . :;;{:+'iting can ItlOns. e'l{lS . - d' f h h '11 . d ~\~:;The SarvastlVa 10S urt er argue t at 1 uSlOns (maya) an '%Jgica~ c:eations. (nirma1J,a), ~ike reflected .images ~nd echo~s, ~1\levanetles of eXIstent matenal form. MagIcal creatlOns conSIst ~J.Olaterial for~ ~manated by magically creative thoug~t .~itriz~1fa1Jacitta), w~lCh Itself resul:s from s~p~rnor~al power (abhz",nia',-)', developed 10 trance (dhyana).1l3 SImIlarly, 10 the case of ;In ' ;illiisions (maya),114 the source of the illusion exists as actual ma-:,t6rial form and results from techniques in illusion.

~~;~~ "

;~?Negations and Expressions Referring to a Nonexistent Object li:;~:~ Of all the examples raised by the Dar~tantikas to prove the ~F;ossibility of a ~onexistent objec~-suppo~t of percep.tual consciousness, negatlOns and expresslOns hav10g a nonexIstent obH~Ct-referent receive the greatest attention from both ;Sapghabhadra and the Abhidharmadipa. 115 Sanghabhadra focuses i;hi~.extensive treatment of the topic on an examination of the ihiture and force of negating expressions. First, he cites a '})~qtantika objection that the scriptural passage, 116 "one knows 'i~honexistence (asat) as nonexistent," indicates that knowledge ~hIay depend upon a nonexistent object-field. Sanghabhadra rei;*ponds: 117

What does this cognition take as its object-support? It is produced supported by a specification (abhidhana)118 that negates existence; it does not take nonexistence as the object-field by which it is supported. That is to say, the specifying expression that negates existence is precisely a particular specification that asserts nonexistence. As a result, when cognition is produced with regard to the expression specifying nonexistence, it forms the understanding of nonexistence. Therefore, this cognition is not produced supported by nonexistence. [Objection:] Isn't this specification that asserts nonexistence [itself] existent; how can cognition deny it as nonexistent? [Response:] Cognition is not produced denying the expression itself; it is only able to cognize [the object] specified by that [specification] as nonexistent. That is to say, cognition is produced supported by an object-field that

56 -JIABS VOL. 11 NO.1

negates existence, but it is not produced taking nonex:is' "'<f, its object-field. [Objection:] Whitis this object-field tha~e?C~a~ to negate e~isten~e? [Response:] It is ~he specif~cation(abhi~hd9J~ that has ansen WIth regard to nonexIstence. Smce this co"~),v is supported by the specification as its object-field reasgnr~?n: ..•

• . J " ' on d.'" mands that one should not claIm that thIS [cogmtlOn] is prod!~~;; supported by a nonexistent object-field. u~2~

For Sanghabhadra, these negating expressions are oft!); types: 119 1) those that have an existent specified Ob·.,t.· •. o ... :l.. . Ject, (abhidheya) , as in the case of expressIOns such as non-brahm~n~ (abrahmar}a) , or impermanence (anitya); and 2) those who~;:: specified object does not exist, as in the case of expressions s1l2~~ as nonexistence (asat), or absence (abhava). In the first case,thei

expressions non-brahman and impermanence implicitly refe?!' to an existent object: a k:;atriya and conditioned factors, respe2~: tively. The specifying expressions, non-brahman or imperma1:; nence, negate the particular quality, brahman or permanen~(?' within the existent- specified object. This first type of negatiiji expression produces knowledge in two stages: knowledge first': depends upon the specification, non-brahman or imperm'<l2 nence, and cognizes that the negated quality does not exi~tNi Next, it depends upon the specified object, the k:;atriya orcor( ditioned factors, and cognizes that the negated quality doesn6£;: exist within the specified object. In the second case, the expr~~1 sions nonexistence, absence, and so on, do not refer implicitly' to an existent specified object. The resulting knowledge proc' duced by these expressions depends only upon the specification itself; it is aware of the nonexistence of that which is negated in that particular context. 120

For Sanghabhadra, the existence of a specificatioll; (abhidhana) does not demand the corresponding existence of a: specified object (abhidheya).I2I As in this second type of negation, 1 the specifying expression, "nonexistence," itself exists and call serve as the object-support for the arising of cognition. However; the specification does not correspond to an existent specified, object; that is to say, there exists no specified object, "nonexistence," to which the specifying expression, "nonexistence," re~ fers. If all specifying expressions required existent specified objects, then such expressions as the horn of a hare, the thirteenth. sense sphere, and the son of a barren woman would also be,


'ired to have an existent specified object. 122 Such specifying ll'essions arise in accordance with one's own intentions as a

:~!';1'~t of both immediately preceding thought concomitants, ", e~~elY, volition (cetana) , and simultaneous thought concomit-

oS. The former acts as the causal arouser (hettlsamtltthiina), and !!ije'latter a~t as ar~)Users in that moment \tat~a1J,asamtltt~ana) .123

f~Siiicethe Immed~ate causes of the. speCIfyIng expressIOn are tJDie~e prior and .sImulta?eo~s arousIng .thought. concomit~nts, i/,;ia not the speCIfied object Itself, the object specified by a given !~Wptession need ?-ot exist. ~lthoug~ a spe~ifying expr~ssi?n can :tYf~dicate a nonexIstent specIfied object, thls does notJustIfy the .if~t~l1dusion that, in a similar fashion, cognition can be supported ~;M? nonexi~tent object-field .. U.n~ike the r~lation bet,:een .the tip~cified obJec~ .and the speCI~y~ngexpreSSl?~, the object-field ~;~cts as a condItion for the ansIng of cogmtIOn, and as such, ~jXiiust exist. ~:~tIn this explanation, Sanghabhadra implicitly responds to :f~~objection that nonexistent object-fields must themselves serve 1~~the support for perceptual consciousness because they serve ~~sthe object-referent in speech. As the Tattvasiddhisiistra ;l(tl~i~ns, 124 "there should be perceptual consciousness that dei;iP~nds upon the hom of a hare, and so on. If there were not, i1~bw would one be able to speak of them?" According to l'9a,tghabhadra's explanation, one can indeed speak of such *6onexistent objects, but the specifying expression does not de~'p~nd upon a nonexistent specified object, but rather upon prei~ding and simultaneous thought concomitants. Similarly, the ;~Qgnition of this nonexistent object depends only upon the exisltent specifying expression, and not upon any nonexistent :,f~pecified object. ~ji; The Abhidharmakosabhii~ya and Abhidharmadipa next raise :the case of the denial of putatively impossible or logically con'iradictory objects, as in statements such as "there is no thirteenth fsehse sphere," or "there is no son of a barren woman." Such' ~enials are to be explained in a way similar to Sanghabhadra's t~nalysis of the second type of negation, illustrated by expressions such as "nonexistence," or "absence." Just as in the affirmative statement, "thirteenth sense sphere" (tray odasayatana) , so in its

idenial, "there is no thirteenth sense sphere," the object-field for the arising of one's cognition of the expression is not a nonexis-

58 JIABS VOL. 11 NO.!.

tent object, "no thirteenth sense sphere," but rather is si ~<t~~ the speech event itself (vaguastuiiuitra).125 rnp~r;?

The AbhidharmadZpa,126 explains in more detail the pro"F .' d h b" h Cess. by whIch negatIOn occurs, an teo ~ect-support t at conditi'fA;

. f h . . f . 1 . Ons", the arismg 0 t e cogmtIOn 0 a partlcu ar negatIOn. A dei",'; . . h . () . nIaL:

cannot. negat; e~t er an ex~stent ~at ,or no~exlstent (asatYINi and of Itself. II thIS were possIble, a king S enemIes would beco<': nonexist:nt simply as a result of declaring t~em to be so, a~J' a nonexIstent should, through double negatIOn, become ex!:,! tent. Using the example of negating the horn of a hare th"~" , e. Abhidharmad'ipa concludes: 127 .. : •• 1:1

<"'!,I?f,~

Neither the horn o.f a bull: nor the ~o~n of a hare is nega~dJ: through that negative partICle. How IS It then? In dependentl upon the cognition of a relation between the hare and the element: of space, cognitions of a lack of relation between real entitl~S such as [that relation between] a bull and a horn, and so on, a{~: indicated [in case of the hare and the horn]. " .

Therefore, in denying the horn of a hare, one does not negaiJ~ either an existent (i.e., the horn of a bull), or a nonexistent (i.~:/ the horn of a hare). Instead, one merely denies the relation' between a bull and its horn perceived previously as it pertains' to a hare's head, in which only a relation with space is perceived:.

The Abhidharmakosabha$ya raises one final example oLa. negative expression: "there is the prior nonexistence of sound;~" Sanghabhadra 128 explains our cognition of this expressioni~ accordance with his treatment of the first type of negation. He. refers to a prior disagreement with Vasubandhu concerning the; meaning of the phrase, "there is the prior nonexistence Of sound; there is the subsequent nonexistence [of sound)" (asti sabdasya prag abhavo 'sti pascad abhava ity ucyate).129 Sanghabhadra' inquires whether the phrase, "there is the nonexistence," is used

. with regard to an absolutely nonexistent object, or with regard to an existent object in which something else is negated. Only the second option, Sanghabhadra claims, is possible. In tha.t case, the phrase, "there is the prior nonexistence of sound,': indicates that there is no sound within another existent entity. The cognition of this prior nonexistence of sound then depends upon that other existent entity in which sound is not found. Specifically, it is the substratum (adhi$thana) , or the assisting


Ittfi;'TT"\stances in which sound has not yet arisen that serves as '!ClfCU,» f h .. f h h "h . h i~i:object-sU'pport or t e cog~ltlOn 0 t e p. .ase, t ere IS t. e !;;'lF r nonexIstence of sound. Thus, cogmtlOn of the pnor r~~;?e}cistence of sound does indeed have an existent object~:;port, that is, the substratum or assisting circumstances that

~i';;iGksound. ;~~.::\SanghabhadraI30 also defends the explanation attributed to r~~Vaibha~ikas in the Abhid~armakosa?hii~ya, 131 that the percep~tii~lconsciousness of th.e pnor nonexlsten~ce. o~ s?und ~epends 71'pbn the future sound ItSelf. For the SarvastlVadms, thIS future ;f01.lrid does exist, and therefore may serve as the object-support (foT the arising of a cognition. It does not, however, exist in the :~allleway as the present. A present factor exists characterized ~lJy'both ir:trinsic nat,:re .an~ activity, whereas past and future ;;f~ctors eXIst only as mtnnslC nature. Therefore, even though ;thi~ future sound exists as intrinsic nature, it is not heard be"l:illse, as future, it does not exert its activity. This future sound ;'ffiay be cognized due' to its existence as intrinsic nature, but ~nsofar as it lacks activity, it is cognized as nonexistent. 132 "'\;;'f:;,,;~

j~\\i" :'{Cognition of Past and Future Factors .~l;'f For the Dar~tantikas, the most common experience of per~f~ptual consciousness without an existent object-field is that of iwemory of the past, and anticipation of the future. The Dar~tan:#kas claim that in these cases, the object-field does not exist ;'precisely because the past factors recollected and future factors ianticipated do not actually exist. Nevertheless, no one would :~eny that recollection or anticipation is possible. Therefore, the rl)ar~tantikas conclude one must admit that thought and thought concomitants can arise with a nonexistent object-support .

. , . For the Sarvastivadins, however, the mental perceptual con~ciousness of past or future factors, like the perceptual consciousness of present factors, must be supported by an existent ()bject-field. The Mahiivibhii~iil33 explains recollection as follows: )'through the power of habitual practice, sentient beings obtain lmowledge homogeneous with a certain factor, which enables Jhem to cognize [that factor when past] in the same way in which !,twas previously experienced." Vasumitra further suggests three ;causes that make recollection possible: 134 1) securely grasping


the characteristic of the objectpreviously experienced;. 2)'; present oCcurrence of a series homogeneous with that p " ... \;\ .....

. . . rello"" expenence; and 3) not losmg mmdfulness. Therefore on' '. }~; . , ceoil" appre~ends and duly notes an object, one can recollect ib~t~'~i later tIme when homogeneous knowledge, or knowledge S·;.'.'l'. ~~\.;.'

h ·' 1 . dk Id" Illliar to t .at prevIOUS yexpenence nowe ge IS stImulated by., •. · .. : .. "'·.·,;.',. . b "1 b' b" .prac-, tIce, ya SImI ar 0 ~ect-support, or y CIrcumstances condu',;!J

to recollection. This recollection then takes the original obS~~~; . b' .. ~ect; now past, as Its 0 ~ect-support..;.rl

The thought concomitant, mindfulness (smrti), which OCC/:}li

associ.ated ~ith all moments of th?ught, plays an instrume~lii, role m thIS process of recollectIOn. Whereas the Abhidha~~ makosabha~ya 135 defines mindfulness simply as the non-Io~~' (asa7{lPramo~a) of the object-support, Sanghabhadradefin~~' mindfulness as the cause of the notation (abhiZapana) and n9ri~' loss (asa7{lPramo~a) of the object-support. 136 The reasonfot: Sanghabhadra's inclusion of notation in the definition of mindl;' fulness becomes cl~ar in a subsequent argument withtW Dar~tantika master Srllata concerning the existence of mindf~l{ ness as a separate thought concomitant occurring in eachIIlo~ ment of thought. 137 Sanghabhadra asserts that notation occlig in each moment of perceptual consciousness whenever thought is aware of an object-field. 138 Therefore, the thought concomifr ant, mindfulness, functions with regard to present as welLas past factors. Indeed, as Sanghabhadra suggests, if there werg: no present mindfulness in the sense of noting the object-fiel~; the recollection of previously experienced objects would be iITl~; possible. Mindfulness as the noting of present factors becomes the cause of their non-loss; this notation, in turn, enables the arising of subsequent recollection, which takes that past objec~ as its object-support. 139 ... '.

The Mahavibha~iil40 uses several models to explain knowV edge of future factors. First, one can infer a future event on; the basis of the past and present. That is to say, one obseryes the causal relation between past and present factors and infers, that a given present factor will produce a certain future factor.' Or, one anticipates a future effect on the basis of one's observation of a certain present characteristic or indicative mar~ (phalacihna), which exists in the psycho-physical series as a con;-. ditioned factor dissociated from thought (cittaviprayukJ


1~j;~'m.skara):141 Finally, future .(or pa~t) factors may be perceived ;~r:;, dy as III the case of certam speCial types of knowledge, such :f~J;~ow1edge resulting from one's vow (pra1J,idh~·nana).142 As ;~~;.".'.ghabhadraI43 explains, there are two types of cognition of "san d· f Th fi· 'dl· . ltii~past an uture. e ITSt, unpure worl y cogllltlOn, can f6nly recollect objects that have alr~ady been experienc~~. Since ~e future .has not ~et been expenenced, worldly. ~ogllltlOn can fcc"ticipate It only dimly. The second, pure cogllltlOn, observes r~~thperfect clarity past and future objects that have never been [:;Y~perienced. In all these cases, however, the direct perception r1nd resulting cognition of past and future factors demands an i~kistent object-support. J.

;~(t<: , ~~d:~\ (,vi ." Conclusion

i;\~iThe Sarvastivadins counter all such examples of seemingly ;aonexistent objects of cognition by finding, in each case, some j~kistent to serve as the object-support. To summarize their arIglifilent, all perceptual cor:sciousness or kno",,:ledg.e arises only ':iI1ciependence upon an object-support, and thIS object-support, ,~~ a condition for the arising of that perceptual consciousness 'bi-knowledge, must actually exist. Since the cognition of such ;thirigs as illusions, dream images, past and future factors, and 's8 on, does occur, it also must have some existent object-support .as its condition. The Sarvastivadin explanation of these cases 'further implies that the object-support need not exist exactly in the manner in which it is cognized; hence, there may be a disparity between the content of cognition and the character of ,the object-field in itself. •. Two principles are central to this Sarvastivadin position: 1) fonditions or causes must actually exist, and therefore, the object-support condition (alambanapratyaya) , as one of two condi.Hons required for the arising of perceptual consciousness, must actually, in some manner, exist; and 2) the object-field may exist in a way other than that in which it is cognized, and therefore, ,cognition or insight may apprehend the object-support with an aspect (akara) that is not found in the object-field itself. The Dar~tantikas, however, dispute both these points. The TattvasiddhiSastra, Vasubandhu, and Srnata clearly suggest that 1) even


thouoO"h the obiect-support may, in some sense, be consl'd .·.·:t!;.:'.·j.:f! .•. ~ ... . ered'"

condition, it is not the generative cause for the arising of p;i~. tual consciousness, and 2) the object-support is the actuaelrc~N;:

" . COQ': tent of cognition. .)~,;~;

. Concerning the first point of disagreement, the Tattv;:~:i{~, dhisiistra l44 asserts that precisely because there is knowledge.as.;l,h~J.1

b· 1 .' WIt •.. out an 0 0ect-support, perceptua conSCIousness is not in e ;.;~y;; . . ' . very

case, produced by two causes and condItIOns. Vasubandhl'4~;: takes. ~ more conser:~tive position: while stil! admittinghl~i cor:dltlo.ns for th: ansmg of perceptual consClo~sness as pr€~i scnbed m the scnpture, he remterprets the functIOn of the5h!} ject-support condition. He distinguishes the object-suPPortc9i'}; dition (iilambanapratyaya) from ?enerative conditio~s (janaka.~~; ratya~a!, and dalms that t~e object, though. an object-suPPOrt; condItIOn, cannot be consIdered a generative condition. Foi' example, in the case of mental perceptual consciousness (md~it ovijiiiina), the generative cause is that prior moment of mirld" (manas) within the same mental series. The object of mental) perceptual consciousness (dharma) is not a generative cause,;b~t'. rather a mere object-support. Vasubandhu notes that ifth~;; object-support condition were also the generative cause,tll~ unconditioned factor, nirviir.ta, which cannot functionascj" generative cause, could not become the object-support ofpe~i; ceptual consciousness. 146 Since the object-support is not the generative cause, it need not exist. Therefore, Vasubandhu co~~. dudes that such nonexistent objects as past and future factors can still be .considered the object-support of perceptual con{

, 1""

sCIOusness.,'t!. The Dar~tzmtika master, SriJata, presents a similar view:I~7,:

Mental perceptual consciousness that depends upon past factors; and so on, is not without an object-support, [but] it doesn6i depend only upon an existent [object-support]. For what reasow is this so? [It is so because] mental perceptual consciousness that. is produced taking the five externally directed types of perceptual· consciousness as. its immediate contiguous condition (samanan,;: tarapratyaya) is able to experience the object-field apprehended by the prior [moment] of mind. Such mental perceptual con,.' sciousness takes this [previous moment of mind] as its cause;ife· object-support condition is the object of [that previous momenf; of] the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness.


[This previous moment of mind can be said to be its cause because] this [mental perceptual consciousness] is able to be produced only when preceded by that [moment of mind], and therefore "this [mental perceptual consciousness] exists or does not exist in accordance with whether that [moment of mind] exists or does not exist."148 However, this mental perceptual consciousness does not depend only on an existent [object-support] because at the time [of its arising] that object-field has already passed away. It is not without an object-support because this mental perceptualconsciousr:-ess exists o~ does not exist in. accordance with whether that [obJect-field] eXIsts or does not eXISt. Further, when one recollects an object-field long past, [the recollection] is produced in the present time taking the prior [moment of] perceptual consciousness of that object as its condition because this recollection falls into the same series [as the prior moment of perceptual consciousness] and is produced through a mediated sequence. Even though there are other conditions that give rise to recollecting perceptual consciousness, it is produced only in dependence upon that previous object.

'rhus for Srilata, a given moment of mental perceptual con;iciousness takes as its object-support that object apprehended ~by.the previous moment of perceptual consciousness. Though :~is previous object has passed away and hence, in SrHata's ::bpinion, is nonexistent, it can still be designated the object-sup;lJort condition because it satisfies the traditional formula defin~ng a conditioning relation: "wher; this exists, that exists," and i~9on. It is important to note that Srilata interprets this formula .\~ indicating a relation among successive conditions; he claims ~~at a condition cannot be simultaneous with its effect, but rather ;tlust precede it. In this case, the existence or nonexistence of 'present perceptual consciousness depends upon the prior exis;!tence or nonexistence of this object-field. However, the generative cause of a present moment of perceptual consciousness is .~ previous moment of perceptual consciousness within its own ~eries, and not the nonexistent object-support. i In another passage,149 Srllata clarifies the process by which present mental perceptual consciousness apprehends nonexistent past and future objects. Past and future objects are known through a mediated process of successive causation; that is to ~~y, one infers the nature of past or future objects after having apprehended the present. As Srllata states: 150


t?;f~ One is able to infer that a given:present effect is produced f~;!;~ a certain type of past cause, and this [past] cause in turn, r~m~

. d' h d' allSeS ' from a certaIn cause, an so on, Into t e, lstance past in '," ···s;,:.! . h [d h '] . aWay appropnate to eae case, an t us one attams [past ob";"

through inference just as one would present [objects].~e~t~l ;':~>:~~:~

This inferential knowledge of various past objects is produH:~; from causes tha~ are fou?d within .the series of knowledg~C~ti perceptual conSCIousness Itself. PrevIOus knowledge of a parti/: lar type functions in a :nediated causal process to produce Pf~~?' ent knowledge, and thIS present knowledge can be said tOt<ik}' the object-field of this particular previous knowledge as its oWR" object-support. Thus, the cause of present recollecting kno,vi} edge is a previous moment of knowledge within its own serie~B and not the content of the present recollection. However,b~~ cause the past object serves as the object-support for the pr~vi~ ous knowledge, it can, by extension, be considered the obje2t~ suppor~ also of the present recollection, even though it no longJ'( exists. Srilata explains knowledge of past objects not yet experi~ enced and future objects in the same way: one applies a proces; of inference based on the knowledge .of causes and effects theft one has already experienced.j;~

Sanghabhadra151 rejects Vasubandhu's distinctionbetwe~f{ the generative cause and the object-support condition, and his identification of the generative cause as a prior moment withir' the series of perceptual consciousness. In Sanghabhadra's opi~';/ ion, the scriptural passage stating that perceptual consciousness is produced in dependence upon two conditions, clearly indK cates that the basis (iiSraya) , and the objec~-support (iilambana) are equally generative causes in the production of perceptual consciousness. Since the object-support acts as a generative cause; in th~ production of perceptual consciousness, it must actually! exist.. ,

In his criticism of Sri"lata's model of the arising of mental perceptual consciousness in dependence upon past nonexistent object-supports, Sans-habhadra focuses upon three major; points. 152 First, since Srllata does not admit that the five exter

. nally directed types of perceptual consciousness and the object; support they apprehend are simultaneous, even these five types of perceptual consciousness. arise only when their object-fielq

A NONEXISTENT OBJECT 65 ~l';;'~~l'

~~~.¥' a~sed away. The following moment of mental percept~al ~~l~fciousness would then be t~o moments removed from its ~~;ect:field. Therefore, before Srilata discusses the k~owledge 'i,last and future ~actors ~y ~enta~ perceptual conSCIOusness, i~i~ust first explam how It IS pos~lble for the five ~xternally rti1t~cted types ,of perceptual con~c~o~sness to perceIve a past i,,,:cSn'existent object-field. Second, Snlata states that mental per~ptual conscious~ess. is not without an obje~t-~upport. Th~s, ~S~dghabhadra cl~lms, IS tanta~ount to an adm~sslOn of the ~~s(';;(!1l"ce of that object-support m some form. Srilata's pOSitIon ,te, . 1 h f tWbuld then be eqmva ent to t at 0 the Sarvastivadins: a past '[factor, though lacking activity, is not absolutely nonexistent like i0,{~ky flower, and yet it does not exist like the present, wl;ich is Itharacterized by both activity and intrinsic nature. Third, Srilata It~nnot meaningfully appeal to the traditional formula defining ;~6nditioning relations, "when this exists, that exists," and so on, {6~t,o a model of mediated successive causation because he does l,)",J

l/n6tallow the existence of past or future factors. According to ~Srilata's model, when the obJect-support exists, the perceptual t~~J1sciousness that apprehends it has not yet arisen, and when ~iliat perceptual consciousness arises, its object-support has al;"riaClY passed away. Similarly, in the case of mediated successive Y<:llusation within the series of perceptual consciousness, the prior ~~ausal moment of perceptual consciousness no longer exists !~hen its subsequent effect arises. By maintaining a causal relau6nbetween these successive moments, Sri:lata is, in effect, ad

~r,llitting that there can be a causal relation of depe:r;dence be:fween existents and nonexistents, which neither Srilata nor iSanghabhadra would accept. 153 Thus, Sanghabhadra concludes ~'that object-support conditions act as generative causes coequal :with the basis (asraya) in the production of cognition, and must, ;~therefore, in some sense, exist. (' The second major point of disagreement between the Sar(vastivadins and the Dar~tantikas concerns the relation between 'the content of cognition and the object-support. In all of the !examples of seemingly nonexistent objects of cognition cited "previously, the Dar~tantikas assume that the object-support is "the object as cognized, orthe content of cognition. For example, :inthe case of the cognition of two moons, the object-support is precisely the two moons; in the case of meditation on the spheres


of tot~lity, the obj.ect-support oEone's cognition of total"']""!, exclusIve blueness IS the total expanse of blue. This Dar t" "j~~~/

. . . ~ . antItGr~ assumptIOn that the object-support IS the content of co ·· .. W,~i· leads i~evitably to. their conclusio~that the object-supPo~f~ .• not eXIst because m these cases thIS content of cognition h;;.t;l?~ actually existing counterpart. The Sarvastivadins, howeve.a~,~~§ sume that one's cognition in mental perceptual conscioJ'.~~,:~~ may diverge fr?m the actual character of the existen~ ~bject~~~i~~ that serves as ItS support. In the case of the cogllltion of't'l'i,; moons, one's cognition is supported by the single existent m6,~~ and so on. {tJ;;i!

. T~is differe~ce' i~ assumpti.ans b~corr;es apparent in;(h~~' dIscussIOn of delIberatIve reflectIOn (vzmarsa) on the nature'~";! characteristics of a perceived object. As Vasubandhu states:Z;;~'l "When all cognition has an existent object-support, howw(n.i{d~ there ~e deliberative reflec:ion with rei?ard to that [?bject-su'p2i:'; port]? He ass~~es ~hat smce th~ obJect-suppor~ IS the V§ryJ! c:ontent of cogmtIO?, If all s~ch obJect-.supports eXIst, no Cogijjt~, tlon may be questIOned or Judged mIstaken. In other wor(!t\l deliberative reflection and doubt are possible only so long'~~l nonexistent objects are allowed; mistaken cognition wouldtheif: be cognition based on such a nonexistent object-support,>i.t'

For Sanghabhadra, such deliberative reflection or douDt:if} only possible with regard to an existent object. The possibility\, of investigating whether one's cognition of a particular obje~tC is accurate or mistaken (viparUa) does not demand that the ob~ ject-support be nonexistent. On the contrary, distinctions, suchi as that between accurate and mistaken cognition, are possibl~' only with regard to or among existents; existence and nonexis'':' tenee share no characteristic by which they may be compare4P Accordingly, it is only possible to distinguish accurate from mis~i: taken cognition when those cognitions have an existent objedsupport. Therefore, Sanghabhadra assumes that mistaken cognition is not the product of a nonexistent object-support, but, rather is a function of the accuracy of cognition. The fact·of mistaken cognition demands not only an existent object,but also the possibility that the object in itself and our cognition of it differ.

Vasubandhu explicitly asserts this identity of the objectsupport with the content of cognition in a discussion of th~


;. ~ of existence of objects of memory and anticipation. 155

,lleasked how past and future factors that do not exist can ~nnsidered object-supports for perceptual consciousness, <::~andhu responds that an object can be said to exist in the ner in which it becomes an object-support. That is to say,

tfactors are recollected as "having existed," and, therefore, ~~:,'!r'::be described as "having existed;" future factors are antici<, t~d as "coming to exist," and, therefore, may be described as

';ihi:ng to exist." Since objects are not recollected or anticipated ';xisting," one cannot claim that they "exist." Further, Vasu

*'bilJdhu not~s that .past factors are rec~llected as they e~isted J~~hen expenenced III the present; that IS to say, the partICular ~);;Il'aracteristics of a recollected object are not different from those :~~fthe object when it was experienced in the present. If, like !~aiesarvastivadins, one claimed that these past factors "exist," ~6rlewould be forced into the contradictory position that past ~~f~hors are present, because they are cognized with the charac~l~fistics of a presently experienced object. Since, for Vasuba!~~dhu, the object-support of cognition is the very content of ~Mgnition, the object-support of the recollection of a past object Jti~\:that object in its form as presently experienced. But, since ?these factors are not present when recollected, we must conclude fl •• '

i:tliatthe object-support has no existent counterpart. ~;'f~;'S~nghabhadra156 responds by sharply distinguishing the ~e~istent object-support from the cognition of that object;;S~pport. For example, when one perceives a pillar as a human ib~ing, the object-support, the pillar, does not exist as cognized, \:ihat is, as a human being. Likewise, in the case of past and Y" . ::Juture factors, though they are cognized as they were or will be ~~hen experienced in the present, they exist as past or future. :;Therefore, precisely because the object-support need not be :identical to the content of cognition, an existent object-support 1Jlaycondition the arising of an instance of mental perceptual f6nsciousness whose cognitive content has no existing counterpart. ;; Thus, underlying these specific controversies between the ,Sarvastivada and Dar~tantika schools on the existence or ,nonexistence of the object-support of perceptual consciousness 'are two fundamental points of disagreement: first, concerning ,the causal nature of the object-support, and second, concerning


~ ,» h c;.{~:\@'r~j'

the relation between the object-support and the Content (}>'I)j~~~ nition. The controversies precipitated by these disagreet~~~~ would provide the background for the; extensive episternoltr}~J!~~~ inquiri~s of the B~ddhist logici~ns. Specifically, their IateF~~ troverSles concernmg the locatIOn of the perceived ob"£ "i

. . I' h fd' . ~ec eXlstentla status, t e natur~ 0 lrect perceptIOn (pratyaksa)., nature of knowledge as havmg aspects (sakara), or as bei~'\i'~~

( . -k-) d h d'" gWlih·' out aspects nzra ara ,an t e con ItIOmng relations th'&~i;')~ h · h' 11 .. d . rougH· w lC perceptIOn occurs were a antlClpate In these earl'&il\.\!

cussions. Y. 8~,

ABBREVIATIONS ".',~, ,";-:~~!~i:~!

ADV Padmanabh S. Jaini, ed., Abhidharmadzpa with Vibha~aprabhavrtti TI·bit;(::i;,.~ ., earr Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Resea.::f.lj'~'

. 77 .ro . Institute, 19 )'".::? AKB P. Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakosabha~yam ofVasubandhu, Tibetan Sansk~\'

Works Series, Vol. 8, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Instit1ite~i 1967) (reprinted ed., 1975)...;; .. '.;

AKV Unrai Wogihara, ed., Sphutarthii Abhidharmakosavyakhya: The Wo~f(iij Yas6mitra, (Tokyo: The Publishing Association of the Abhii1h~r.:'

makosavyfikhya, 1932).;';:: A VB Abhidharmavibhii~asiistra, T28.1546. Tr. Buddhavarman. ..i.~ Fa-pao Chii-she-Iun-shu, T41.1822. ; 'I::: HTAKBA-p'i-ta-mo-chu-she-lun, T29.1558. By Vasubandhu; tr. HSiian-tsangO-;> PAKB A-p'i-ta-mo-chu-she-lun, T29.1559. By Vasubandhu, tr. Paramartha.L:; P'u-kuang Chu-she-lun-chi, T41.1821. 1:"

MA Madhyamagama, T1.26. Tr. Sanghadeva. '" MN Robert Chalmers, ed., The MaJjhima-Nikaya, 3 Vols., (London: The Patr

Text Society, Henry Frowde, 1896-1899) (reprinted ed., London: The Pali Text Society, Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960).'

MVB Mahiivibhii~a, T27.1545. Tr. Hsiian-tsang. NAS Nyayanusara, T29.1562. By Sanghabhadra, tr. Hsuan-tsang. SA Sarrtyuktagama, T2.99. Tr. GUlJ.abhadra. . SN The Sarrtyutta-Nikiiya, 5 Vols., (London: The Pali Text Society, Henty

Frowde, 1884-1898) (reprinted ed., London: The Pali Text Society,' Luzac and Company, Ltd., 1960).

T Junjiro Takakusu, Kaikyoku Watanabe, and Gemmyo Ono, eds., Taish~ shinshfl Daizokyo, (Tokyo, 1924-1932). . .

TS TattvasiddhiSiistra, T32.1646. By Harivarman, tr. Kumarajlva. VB Vibhii~asiistra, T28.1547. Tr. Sanghabhadra. VK Vijiianakiiya, T26.1539. Tr. Hsiian-tsang.


For discussions in early non-Buddhist texts see the Nyayasutra Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, and Heman-

. eds., Nyayadarsnam, 2 Vols., The Calcutta Sanskrit Series, (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing, 1936-44) (reprinted ed., Kyoto:

1982»; for perception and the time period of the object perceived Vol. 1, p. 523; for the composition of objects of perception see

Vol. 2, pp. 1043-1058; for the existential status of the object of , and false apprehension see 4.2.26-37, Vol. 2, pp. 1072-1089; for

to objects of questionable existential status including the whirling 3.2.58, Vol. 2, p. 897, eye disorders 4.2.13, Vol. 2, p. 1054, dream

4.2.34ff, Vol. 2, pp. 1083ff, a pillar seen as a human being 4.2.35 Vol. 2, p. 1087 .

. 2. Of particular interest to the topic of this paper is Dignaga's Alamba'Ci~;,hn'·l,K.l''''' See Susumu Yamaguchi (in collaboration with Henriette Meyer),

/J"'''~'''-' Examen de l'objet de la connaissance," Journal Asiatique, Vol. 214, pp. 1-65; Erich Frauwallner, "Dignaga's Alambanapari~a. Text, Uberund ErHiuterungen," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes,

930), pp. 174-194 (reprinted in Gerhard Oberhammer and Ernst (eds.), Erich Frauwallner Kleine Schriften (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner,

pp. 340-360). For the perception of an object and error (bhranti) in 's Prama'l}asamuccaya see Masaaki Hattori, Dignaga, On Perception, Har

V"~".~. Series, Vol. 47, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), (1.7 cd-8 ab), pp. 95-97 (notes #1.53-54), pp. 32-35 (II), pp. 116-120 #2.11-28). For the nature of the object of perception and the four

ttateglJm~s of pratya~abhasa in the Pratyak~apramar:ta section of Dharmakirti's ·'P~iJ.mimavar'[m:a see Yusho Miyasaka, ed., Prama'l}avarttikakarika, in Acta In

Vol. 2, (Narita: Naritasan shinshOji, 1971-72), Ch. 2, vss. 194-238, 72; Ch. 2, vss. 288-300, p. 80. For the commentary ofPrajnakaragupta

the Prama'l}avarttika see Rahula Sankrityayana (ed.), Prama'l}avartikabhashyam . of Prajfiakaragupta, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 1, . Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1953), Ch. 2, vss. 194-239,

279-303; Ch. 2, vss. 289-301, pp. 331-338. See also Hiromasa Tosaki, cBukkyo ninshikiron no kenkyu (jokan) , (Tokyo: Daito shuppansha, 1979), pp. "37-43); vss. 194-238, pp. 294-336; vss. 288-300, pp. 382-393. For a diseus,',sion of these four categories of pratya~abhasa in Jinendrabuddhi's commen"lary, Visalamalavati-nama-prama'l}asamuccayatika, on Dignaga's Prama'l}asa,'muccaya, see Kensho Hasuba, "Shoshukaku ni yoru Shuryoron no jigenryo kaishaku ni tsuite," in Indogaku Bukkyogaku ronso, Yamaguchi Hakushi kanreki kinen, (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1955), pp. 205-212. For the perceptual process in 'Santarak~ita's Tattvasa7[!graha and KamalasIla's Pafijika see S.D. Sastri Tattvasaf(lgraha, 2 Vols., (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968) Pratya~ala~a'l}apar'i~a Yo!. 1, pp. 448-493; Bahirarthapar'i~a Vol. 2, pp. 670-711; for error and illusion see Vol. 1, vss. 1311-1328, pp. 479-484; for the two requisite condi-,tions for perceptual consciousness and the possibility of perceptual conscious,ness without an object-support see Vol. 2 vs. 1787 a-b, pp. 614-616, and Vol. 2, vss. 1846-1848, pp. 630-631.


. . 3. There are a number ~f groups within th: Sarvastivada sChd i : tmgmshed by geographlCallocatIOn or textual and mstructionall' .?

. . meage dence of these groups can be found m the vanous Sarvastivad': quoted in th~ Vi~ha~a comment~ri_es, and in the doctri~al differen~:~~; early SarvastIvadm texts. See BaIYu Watanabe, Ubu Abzdatsuma ron nci' (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1954), pp. 111-155; Masao Shizutani, ShojoBuk{kenkyu, (Kyo~o: .H~akkaer:' 1?78), pp. 137-140; Giyu Nishi, "Uhu s~~ okeru hocchIkeI hI-hocchIkeI no shoshu no hakusetsu oyobi gakut6 Ii" , kyu," ShUkyo kenkyu (shin), Vol. 11, (1934-4), pp. 564-579, (1934-5) /:.7'/ 789. For doctrinal differ~nces among the tr~nsl~tions ofthe Vibha~a'co~~~ tary see Watanabe, op. CIt., pp. 253-494; Kosho Kawamura, Abidatsum~i,f;;t'1.~ no shiryoteki kenkyu, (Kyoto: Dohosha, 1974), pp. 53-206. For doctrinali!' ences among post-Vibha~a Sarvastivadin texts see .Kawamura, op.ci I 39-52; Taiken Kimura, Abidatsuma ron no kenkyu, Vol. 4, Kimura Taikenz 6 Vols., (Tokyo: Meiji shoin, 1937), pp. 271-324; Ryujo Yamada, Da&"oll seiritsuron josetsu, (Kyoto: Keirakuji shoten, 1959), pp. 11 0-124. •

4. In the case of the Sarvastivada and Dar~tantika-Sautrantika sSh«(:~ th~ ~er.m "school" doe~ not in?icate dist!nct dis~iplifo1ary lineages or mofi~~tm affIlIatIOn, but rather SImply dIfferences m doctrmal mterpretation, orinstt{;E~:: tional or textual lineage. See Shizutani, op. cit., p. 256. The history of!h~; Dar~tantikas and Sautrantikas are closely intertwined, with the DarHantiIt~~; as the probable predecessor of the Sautrantikas. See Shizutani, op. cit., p.l?6'1: pp. 140-147. Though the Vibha~a commentaries cite Sautrantika andDar~iaRY: tika views separately, references to the DarHantikas are far more num~rb~t:. See Yamada, op. cit., p. 84. The later literature, however, refers almostexc~~; sively to the Sautrantikas. Note Yasomitra: "The Dar~tantikas are a variet}'j):~. the Sautrantikas." diir~tiintikii(l, sautriintikaviSe~ii ity artha!;. AKV p. 40Q.l!;'; Therefore, the correct identification of early masters as Dar~tantikas orSaUE' trantikas, if such a distinction was justified in the early period, is exceedinglf; difficult. See Junsho Kato, "Ibushurinron no tsutaeru Kyoryobu ni tsuite," Daif?; Bukkyo kara mikkyo e, Katsumata Shunk yo Hakushi koki kinen ronshil, (TokY9:> Shunjusha, 1976), pp. 175-198' J

5. Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanacakra records the Sarvastivadinp~~~ sition that thought and thought concomitants must have an object-supp~R1 (iilambana). T49.2031 p. 16.b.21-22; T49.2032 p. 19.a.16; T49.2033p3 2l.b.27-28. It does not refer to a difference of opinion between the Sarvas;: tivada and Sautrantika schools on this issue. T49.2032 p. 17.b.2ff; T49.2032", p.19.c.llff; T49.2033 p.22.b.20ff. Compare the Kathavatthu. (Arnold C;;; Taylor, ed., Kathiivatthu, 2 Vols., Pali Text Society, Text series Nos. 48,49, (London: The Pali Text Society, 1894, 1897) (reprinted ed., 1979), 9.4-7 pp: 405-412.

6. The later Sarvastivadin tradition includes seven texts in their early. Abhidharma canon. Following the dating of Hajime Sakurabe (see Hajime Sakurabe, Kusharon no kenkyu, (Kyoto: Hozokan, 1971), pp. 41ff), to the earliest period belong the Sang'itiparyiiya by Mahakau~thila (Ch. Sariputra, tr. Hsiian.~ tsang, T26.1536~ and the Dharmaskandha by Sariputra (Ch. Maudgalyayan~,. tr. Hsiian-tsang, T26.1537). To the next period belong the Vijiiiinakiiyaby


itt'wan, (tr. Hsuan-tsang, T26.1539), the ~hiitl.l~iiya by PUrI).a (Ch. Va.. tr.Hsuan-tsang, T26.1540); and the PraJnaptlSiistra by Maudgalyayana

!~identified, tr. Dharmapala ?, T26.1538), followed by the Prakara1Japiida gU!Ilitra; (tr. GUI.1abhadra,.T26.15~_1, and H~uan-tsang T26.1542). The ecent of the seven texts IS the jnanaprasthana by Katyayaniputra, (tr.

Jadeva, T26.~543, and Hs~an-tsang, T26.1544). See AKV p. l1.26ff. ~rther discuSSlOns of the datmg of these texts see Watanabe, op. cit., pp. : Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien, II," Wiener Zeitschriftfur die 'Siid- und Ostasiem, Archiv fur Indische Philosophie, Bd. 8, (1964), pp. 59-99. ~.7. The three Chinese translations, listed in the order of translation, he Vibhii~iiSiistra (tr. Sanghabhadra ?, T28.1547), the Abhidhar

(''1rEZihhffi.iiSiistra (tr. Buddhavarman, T28.1546), and the Mahiivibhii~iiSiistra (tr. ~~4ari-tsang, T2?154~) .. Fo~ a summary of the controversy ~oncerning the i~;iting and doctnnal dlstmctlOns. among these three translatlOns see Kawa-~ilra~op. cit., pp. 53-206, espec~ally pp. 8?-8~, 118-120, 206. . ii~,,;;j: 8. P. Pradhan (ed.), Abhzdharmakosabh~yam of Vasubandhu, TIbetan ~S~~5kfit Works Series, Vol. 8, (Patna: Kashi Prasad J ayaswal Research Institute, !i1975), the Abhidharmakosabh~ya, by Vasubandhu (tr. Paramartha, T29.1559, I¥JdHsiian-tsang T29.1558), and U. Wogihara (ed.), SPhu(iirthii Abhi:~rinakosavyiikhYii: the Work ofYaiomitra, 2 Vols., (Tokyo: The Publishing As:Jqthition of Abhidharmakosavyakhya, 1932). The Nyiiyiinusiira by !s.inghabhadra (tr. Hsuan-tsang, T29.1562), and a partially extant commentary ~nthe Nyiiyiinusiira, the Shun-cheng-li-lun shu-wen-chi, by Yuan-yu (Dai Nippon $kuz6ky6, 1.83.3). Padmanabh S. Jaini (ed.), Abhidharmad'ipa with Vibh~ii

~~bhiivrtti, Tibeta~ Sanskrit Works Series, Vol. 4, (Patna: Kashi Prasad Jaya:$Wal Research Institute, 1977). \~r( 9. In the Nyiiyiinusiira, Dar~~antika views are most often represented illy the teacher, Sthavira. Later sources identify Sthavira as the Sautrantika ~~llster, Srilata. See P'u-kuang 9 p. 172.a.8-1O; Fa-pao 9 p. 604.a.5-6; K'ueichi, Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun shu-chi, T43.1830 4 p. 358.a.9ff. However, from numerlbus references in the Nyiiyiinusiira it is clear that Sanghabhadra considers ;Sthavira to be a Damantika. See NAS 3 p. 347.b.6-7; 11 p. 390.c.20ff; 14 p. 'i12.c.9ff; 18 p.442.a.25ff; 19 p. 445.c.3-4; 25 p.482.a.5ff, b.I-2, b.20ff, c.1-3. See also JunshO Kat6, "Kyoryobu Shurirata (ichi)," Bukkyogaku, VoL 1, (1976), cpp: 45-65. J unsho Kato, "Notes sur les deux maitres bouddhiques Kumaralata ·etSrilata," in Indianisme et Bouddhisme: Melanges offerts a Mgr Etienne Lamotte, ·Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 23, (Louvain-Ia-neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1980), pp. 197-213. k 10. For textual references to the dating of the TattvasiddhiSastra, and tei Harivarman as the author of the Tattvasiddhisiistra and as a student of the DarHantika-Sautrantika master, Kumaralata, see Kato, "Notes sur Ie deux martres," pp. 199-200. Paramartha identifies the TattvasiddhiSiistra as representing the Bahusrutiya school. See Chugan Chozen's Sanrongengi kennyitshu (1'70.23005 p. 460.c.8ff, especially c.21), which cites Paramartha~s autocommentary on his translation of Vasumitra's Samayabhedoparacanacakra (T49.2033), See Paul Demieville, "L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres Pararnartha," Melanges chinois et bouddiques, VoL 1, (1931-32), pp. 16ff. How-


ever, there are frequent points of doctrinal similarity between Darst- .);fti1~ Sautrantika positions and those of the Tattvasiddhisiistra. Chi-tsang i .a~hkil!?&1 lun hsuan-i (T45.1852 1 p. 3.b.16ff, especially b.24ff) cites variousn t.~ ~~1~ as to the school ~ffiliation of th.e Ta~tvasiddhisiistra and notes the s~!~iI~~~i; between DaqtantIka or SautrantIka views and those of the Tattvasiddh.,~~.~i See also Shoson Miyamoto, Dai:jo to ShOjo, (Tokyo: Yakumo Shoten, 194~~~~~~1 152-168. Though the exact date of the Tattvasiddhisiistra is not kn C PP;.} historical references agree that Harivarman precedes Vasubandhu. own'f~'~:'

11.. N? attention will be give~ t~ ~h~ later Bu~dhist .and non-Buddhlii~ cha~~ctenzatlOns of the early Sarvastl:adm and Dar~tantlka or Sautrant;~~ posItIons. For example, among Buddhist sources, see Mok~akaragupta's y,'i;l kabhii~ii, Embar Krshnamacharya, Tarkabh~ii of Mo~iikaragupta, Gaek'';a~TJ Orien_t~l S.erie~: No. 94, (Baroda: ?riental Institute: 1942), p. 34.27ff, p. 36.23~ 24; YUlchl KaJlyama, An Intraductwn ta BuddhISt Ph.zlasaphy, An Annotated Traist·? latzan of the Tarkabhii~ii of the M o~iikaragupta, M emOlres ofthe F acuIty of Lette "i Kyoto University, No. 10, (Kyoto: 1966), p. 62, note #148, pp. 139-140 t\ 144. See also Yiiichi Kajiyama, "Sonzai to chishiki: Bukkyo tetsugaku sh~t':: no ronso," Tetsugaku kenkyu, Vol. 43, (1966 #6), pp. 207-236, Vol. 43, (196;' #11),.pp .. 1-28; Gadjin Naga~, "Shoengyosomon no ichi mondai," in ChUga~J' to YUlShzhz, (Tokyo: Iwanaml shoten, 1978), pp. 373-388. Among noil; Buddhis~ sources, see Madhava's Sarvad~rsanasa'r[L?"aha, V.S. Abhyankar (ed.);:; Sarvadarsanasa'r[Lgraha, Government Onental Senes, Class A, No. 1 (Poona:~; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1924) (reprinted ed. 1978); for th~:) characterization of the Sautrantikas as maintaining biihyarthanumeya andth~:; Sarvastivadins as maintaining biihyarthapratya~a see 2.41-44, p. 19; for the~ Sautrantika theory of perception see 2.220-263 pp. 33-37, 2.268-371 p. 46j: See also Ensho Kanakura, "Gekyo no bunken ni mieru Kyoryobu setsti,",~ Indogaku Bukkyogaku ronso, Yamaguchi Hakushi kanreki kinen, (Kyoto: H6z6kan';1~ 1955), pp. 55-68; Yiiichi Kajiyama, "Setsuissaiubu no shiso 0 megutte," B~k=. kyogaku semina, Vol. 25, (1977), pp. 93-106.:~

12. See AKB 3.85 c p.176,12-13, 4.2 c p.193.2; MVB 3 p.12.b.4ff, 39' p.200.a.29ff, 76 p.393.c.14ff, 93 p.480.a.26-27; NAS 13 p.407.c.19ff, 14 p.409.b.2ff, 14 p.410.a.4ff, 15 p.417.b.29ff, 15 p.419.c.2ff, 15 p.421.b.22ff,i 18 p.437.c.3ff, 19 p.447.a.l0ff, 52 p.631.c.5ff, 52 p.633.b.27ff, 52 p.634.a.26.\£

13. See AKB 3.32 b p.146.4ff; NAS 6 p.365.a.27ff, 15 p.417c.12-": p.421.c.24, 18 p.440.a.23-24, 20 p.452.a.16ff, 22 p.467.a.22ff, 25, p.482.a.3ff.

14. SA 13 #306 p.87.c.26ff; SN 12.43 Dukkhasutta, 44 Lokasutta, 45., Natikasutta, Vol. 2, pp. 72-75. cakkhu'r[L ca paticca rupe ca uppajjati ca:' kkhuviiiiiiir;a'r[L. See also MA 54 #201 p. 767.a.24ff; MN 1.38 Mahiitar;hasankhayasutta Vol. 1, p. 259. For references in Abhidharma texts see San: gZtiparyaya T26.1536 15 p.429.a.15ff; Dharmaskandha T26.1~37 10 p's01.b.9ff, 10 p.502.c.20-21, 11 p.507.c.25; VK 3 p.545.b.24; Dhatukaya T26.1540 (shang)< p.615.c.4; Prakarar;apada T26.1542 2 p.699.a.4; MVB 16 p.79.b.20; AKB 5.25 b p.295.16; NAS 2 p.338.c.22, 51 p.627.c.17, 57 p.658.c.8.

15. MA 7 #30 p.467.a.3ff; MN 1.28 Mahiihatthipadopamasutta Vol. 1, p. 191.


1'6. MA 47 #181 p. 723.b.16ff, p. 723.c.14ff; MN 3.115 Bahudhatukayol. 3, pp. 62-63. ,17. A distinction between homogeneous (sabhaga) and partially '~eneous (tatsabhaga) sense organs and object-fields was developed in o~o distinguish those that have functioned, are functioning, or will func~n a rnorne'nt of perception (i.e., homogeneous), from those that do not nction, but are nevertheless of the same nature as those that do (i.e.,

~!,;: • Jly homogeneous), This category of the partially homogeneous includes !"'11arUa b' fi Id h . d . . ~~!fud5e sense organs or? ~ect- Ie s. t at ans~ an pass away WIthout performmg ;1,1,",'. particular functlOn of graspmg or bemg grasped, as well as those future "I theIr b' f' Id h '11 . h ,:j:!": e organs or 0 ~ect- Ie stat WI never anse. T e dharma dement, as the q?se,ns t-field of mental perceptual consciousness, is exclusively homogeneous

ce .it is considered unreasonable that a mental factor will never be ap~hended, or arises and passes away without being apprehended. AKB 1.39

~.p:ap.27.18ff; NAS 6 p.362.a.7ff; AKB 1.42 b p.30.5-7; NAS 6 p.364.a.26ff; '¥!M\TB 71 p.368.a.10ff, p.371.a.8ff. *i:i¥ 18. Perceptual consciousness (vijiiiina) is identified with thought (citta), :.~~gd mind (manas), and is then described as occurring simultaneously with ~;ih~tight concomitants (caitta), each of which carries out its own specific mental i0Jiullction. Thought and thought concomitants are said to be associated (sa'l'{!prafi;~u'hia) because they ~r~ equ~valent ~ith r~spect to basis. (asraya): object-suppo~t ~llJjlfrnbana), aspect (aMra), tlme penod (kala), and the smgular mstance of theIr i;~dCl:urrence (dravya). AKB 2.34 a-d p.61.22ff; AKV p.141.8.ff; NAS 11 )::,V394.c.14ff; MVB 16 p.80.b.25ff. For an enumeration of the 46 thought '~~~dncomitants with which thought may be associated according to the Sarva;ti~fivada school see AKB 2.23 p.54.3-2.33 p.61.19; NAS 10 p.384.a.8-11 ;~ip·.394.c.12 . iii;' 19. See MVB 13 p;61.c.7ff and AVB 8 p.51.b.24ff where four views !'*Y< j;\~6ncerning the proper locus of grasping the object-field are presented: 1) .;ipharmatrata claims that visual perceptual consciousness, and not the eye, sees :;~vlsible color-form; 2) Gho~aka claims that the insight (prajiia) associated with :;.·.~isual perceptual consciousness sees; 3) the Dar~tantikas claim that the com;"plete collocation (samagrz) of causes, including the sense organ, and so on, :;~sees; and 4) the Vatslputrlyas claim that only one eye sees in each successive ":(ll0ment. The MahavibhaJa replies that the sense organ, speCifically both eyes tfunctioning together, sees form. See also AKB 1.42 p.30.3-43 b p.31.25; ';.AKV p.80.10ff; NAS 6 p.364.a.23ff; and ADV p.31.1ff; MVB 95 p.489.b.28ff. tThe AbhidharmakosabhaJya (AKB 1.42 c-d p.31.12) identifies this Dar~tantika 'view as that of the Sautrantikas.

if';' ~.,;, 20. See AKB l.l6 a p.l1.6ff. vijiiiina'l'{! prativijiiaptil; ... viJaya'l'{! viJaya'l'{! ,'prativijiiaptir upalabdhir vijiianaskandha ity ucyate. AKV p.38.22ff; NAS 3 ;p.342.a.15ff. See also NAS 11 p.396.b.6ff, 25 p.484.b.17ff; MVB 72 p.371.b.22ff. Sanghabhadra (NAS 3.p.342.a.17ff; Samayaprad'ipika, T29.1563

:2p.783.b.26ff) clearly delimits the functioning of perceptual consciousness :to that of apprehending the generic characteristic of the object-field, thereby :distinguishing the activity of perceptual consciousness from that of its as'~ociated thought concomitants (caitta), which apprehend the specific charac)1;'


teristics of the object-field. See also NAS'il p.390.c.9-11, 11 P.395·f~ P'u-kuang 1 m~ p.26.a.3ff; Fa-pao 1 yii p.486.c.7ff; ADV #120 b P.78.·~ff;.j Kyokuga Saeki, Kanda abzdatsumakusharon, Vol. 1 (1886) (reprinted ed K 13.; '. Hozokan, 1978), p. 29. Hsiian-ts~ng in translating this section of the Abhidla~k~.:{! akofabhi¥ya, perhaps under the mfluence of the Nyayanusara, modifies " rm-~ labdhi" with "tsung" meaning grasps in general, or grasps the generic ch up~;.) teristic of the object-field. (HTAKB 1 p.4.a.21; contrast with PAKi~i!: p.164.c.2-3). /,y,~

21. NAS 11 p.395.a.28ff; NAS 3 p.342.a.18ff; VK 11 p.582.c.20ff F) the distinction between those thought concomitants associated with m' .or

I · dh . d 'hh ental' perceptua conSCiOusness an t ose aSSOCIate WIt t e other five type. ,::.;). . ~~ perceptual conSCiOusness see NAS 29 p.506.c.7ff; VK 6 p.559.b.27ff.:>:>

22. AKB 1.10 d p.7.18ff; AKV p.2!.29ff;. MVB 13 p.65.a.12ff;127' p.665.b.lff. As these passages suggest, thIS partIcular characteristic of ih)'> o~ject-field as a generic sen~e ~phere (ayatanasvala~a?a) ~s not to be confuseJ: wIth the common charactenstlc (samanyala~ar;.a), whlCh IS apprehendedoriI; by mental perceptual consciousness.:, ,,~l'

23. See NAS 28 p.501.b.24-25, 4 p.352.a.20-21. Sarighabhadra (NA~) 4 p.350.~.5-p.352.a.25) argues at length against the Dar~tantika-Sautrantika~ master, Srllata, who claims that the five externally directed types of perceptuarF consciousness depend upon object-fields that do not exist as real entites. Sriiata' claims that single atoms are not the object-support of perceptual consciousne~s·j b~cause they do not constitute the .content of perception. The five externallY\. dIrected types of perceptual conSCiOusness rely only upon composites (ho-~o).. of atoms, and these composites, as such, do not exist as real entities. Therefore,,:i the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness do notap~'~ prehend actually existing object-fields. Sarighabhadra responds by distin~· guishing ~he term "composite" (ho-ho, samagrz, sa'Y(tghiita, samnipata, sa7[!hata ?), used by Srllata, from aggregation (ho-chi, sa'Y(tcita ?), Sarighabhadra clairns, that atoms form an aggregation, not a composite, and this aggregation the'n' allows direct perception to occur. (See also NAS 32 p. 522.a.5-10.) The actuallY.' existing object-field that causes perception is still, however, the indiVidual. atom. (See NAS 4 p.352.a.18-19.) This composite (ho-ho), as proposed by Srllata, exists only provisionally, and hence is apprehended only by mental' perceptual consciousness. Sarighabhadra's attempt to salvage the Sarvastivadin,' theory that atoms in aggregation are the object-field of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness by distinguishing ho-ho from ho-chi constitutes an innovation not found in the Vibha~a commentaries. See MVB.) 13 p.63.c.22-25, 121 p.632.a.24-26; ADV #317 p.277.15ff. See also Sylvain' Levi, Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi (Vi7[liatika), Bibliotheque de l'ecole des hautes etudes, ,. VoL 245, (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion, 1925), vs. 11 p. 6-7; Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi, Vol. 1, (Paris: Librairie Orieri~: taliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), p. 44 (notes), p. 45, #1; Junsh6 Kato, "WajulQ wag6-Ubu to Kyobu no busshitsu no toraekata," Buzan kyagaku taikai kiyo,.

'Vol. 1 (not available to me). 24. For the simultaneity of the sense organ and object-field see AKB,

1.23 a p.15.24ff; AKV p.50.22ff; NAS 3 p.345.c.9ff. For the simultaneity of


'1 ':~,~',' ': ',: -

ik.~:h" .. obiect-field and perceptual consciousness see AKB 1.44 c p.34.3ff; NAS :;{~t e J 7 ~i;s .374.a.2lff, 8 p.3 4.b.9ff, 4 p.351.b.29ff. . :;):t'P, 25. AKB 1.29 c p.19.16ff; AKV p.59.4ff; NAS 4p.348.b.5ff. The obJect~;fr~ld (viJa~a~ is defined. as that with ~egard to :vhich a f~cto: carries out its N~ttivity (kantra); the object-support \alambana) IS that w~ICh IS apprehended .:tbthought and the thought concomItants. For a companson of the usage of ;;~eterxns artha, viJaya, gocara, and alambana in Abhidharma texts see Akira H;Birakawa, "Setsuissaiubu no ninshikiron," Bungakubu kiyo, Hokkaido daigaku, ;11VoL2, (1953), pp. 7-8; Kyodo Yamada, "AbidatsumaBukkyo niokeru ninshiki ~~:(OInondai," Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyu, Vol. 5, (1957-1), pp. 184--187. Unq;:~Ol"tunately, Hsuan-tsang does not always distinguish iilambana from viJaya in ithi~ translations, making the clarification of Sanghabhadra's understanding of €(t±hedistinction exceedingly difficult. ~Ff' 26. NAS 15 p.420.c.21-p.421.a.11; AKB 3.32 b p.145.15ff; MVB 16 ,;:p~79.b.20-:-~ 1. According to the Sarvastivadin system of six causes. (hetu) and :0/four condItIOnS (pratyaya), the co-present cause (sahabhuhetu), assoCIated cause ~;;isaf(!prayuktahetu), the efficient variety of the general cause (kiira1J.ahetu) , the ;~:bbject-support condition (iilambanapratyaya) , and the sovereign condition j:l;Zddhipatipratyaya) may be simultaneous with their effects. Though there is some \ijidifference of opinion (see MVB 16 p.79.a.28ff), generally, according to the ;~t~ystem of six causes, the sense organ and object-support are both designated ,:t:¢fficient general causes, while according to the system of four conditions, the ,I;bbject-support is the object-support condition and the sense organ is the !:~s6vereign condition. See MVB 20 p.104.a.4ff; NAS 15 p.417.a.15ff, 18 i::p.438.a.13ff, 20 p.449.c.16ff; TS 2 #17 p.251.a.20-23 . . :i. 27. NAS 8 p.374.c.2ff. Sanghabhadra (NAS 73 p.736.a.9ff) admits ,'t"three types of direct perception: 1) that through the sense organs (i-ken-hsieni/Ziang, indriyapratya~a ?), which grasps the five external object-fields through :J'the five sense organs; 2) that through experience (ling-na-hsien-liang, 0Ja'nubhavapratya~a ?), which is the present occurrence of thought and the :0Jhought concomitants of feelings, concepts, and so on; 3) that through cogni~ihion (chueh-hui-hsien-liang, buddhiPratya~a ?), which attains the particular and ::coxnmon characteristic appropriate to each factor. This third type of direct ,',;perception arises in dependence upon the first two. The first among these, 'iF direct perception through the sense organs, demands the simultaneity of the 7.:sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness. C~ 28. AKB 1.17 a-b p.11.2lff; NAS 3 p.342.b.1lff. This mental organ •..• also serves as the basis (iifraya) of each of the five externally directed types of

perceptual consciousness, which then have two bases: the past mental organ ',~and their respective present sense organ. See MVB 71 p.369.c.14ff; AKB 1.44

p.34.6ff; NAS 8 p.374.a.24ff. 29. NAS 7 p.366.c.4ff; MVB 71 p.369.c.27-29. 30. NAS 6 p.365.c.2ff. The mental organ, as the immediately preceding

>.moment of perceptual consciousness has as its object-support the object ap;:prehended in the preceding moment. o 31. AKB 3.30 c-d p.143.25ff; AKV p.305.19ff; NAS 29 p.506.c.3ff; '~Yiian-yii, Shun-cheng-li-lun shu-wen-chi, (Dai Nippon zokuzokyo, 1.83.3), 29


p.262.d.6ff; VK 6 p.55~.b.27ff. In these p~ss~ge~, contact associated.·~l~ mental perceptual conSCIOusness (manalJsaT!!SpaTsa) IS explained. This WIty';: contact with the object-support is called designation (adhivacana) bIUental" •.

ecau " names are the primary object-support of mental: perceptual conscious . se: l . . ness " because mental perceptual consCIousness operates on Its obiect th "or.;2

~ rough speech. . ,; 32. AKBi.33 a-d p.22.19ff; AKV p.64.22ff; NAS 4 p.350.b.5ff; MV~:;~

42 p.219.b.7ff; AVB 23 p.169.b.5. . "':, _ ~3._ ~AS 4 p.349.a.23-24, 4 p.350.b.llff; MVB 42 p.21~.a.2ff. See t~~2

Mahavzbh~a (MVB 42 p.219.b.7) where conceptual thought In its intri' i. ~atur~ (s~abhiivavikalpa) is ide~ti~ed. with both initial inquiry (vitarka) ~~~, InveStlgation (vzciira). For the dIstInctIOn between vztarka and viciira see NAS: 11 p.393.c.29ff. , .

34. MVB 72 p.374.b.5ff; NAS 4 p.349.a.2lff, 4 p.350.b.8; AKB l.3F a-b p.22.20-23; AKV p.64.29ff. •

35. NAS 4 p.350.b.17ff; MVB 42 p.219.b.l0ff. . 36. NAS 4 p.349.a.16ff. • 37. AKB 1.48 a p.36.2lff; NAS 8 p.377.a.lff; AKB 2.2 a-b p.39.7fk.

NAS 9 p.378.a.12ff; MVB 9 p.44.b.3ff. . 38. AKB 1.23 a p.15.25ff; AKV p.50.26ff; NAS 3 p.345.c.12; MVB 9

p.44.b.llff. . 39. It is important to note that this ability to apprehend all factors

restricted. Mental perceptual consciousness may not apprehend itself, thought.) concomitants that are associated with it, and those factors that are its co-present " causes (sahabhuhetu). These factors may only be apprehended by a subsequent:. moment of mental perceptual consciousness. See MVB 13 p.65.b.3ff,71' p.370.c.9ff; NAS 7 p.370.b.22. For these restrictions on knowledge seethe discussion of the process by which one knows all factors as non-self: MVB9 p.42.c.9ff; AKB 7.18 c-d p.404.22ff; AKV p.630.3lff; NAS 74 p.742.a.27ff..' TS 15 # 191 p.364.a.4ff.

40. NAS 4 p.350.c.20ff, 4 p.35l.a.23-29; MVB 21 p.l09.b.25. Sanghabhadra (NAS 58 p.666.a.7ff) identifies entities that exist conventionally (sarrtvrtisat) as composite entities (ha-ha). There are two such types of compo:, sites: 1) those like ajar that can be broken into finer pieces by another object with the result that the conventionally existing jar is destroyed, and 2) those like water that retain their original conventional nature even when divided, into smaller amounts; this kind of conventionally existing entity can, neverthe-', less, be analyzed by insight !prajiiii), which resolves it into its constituent factors., When these two types of composite entities are thus broken or analyzed, the cognition of their composite nature no longer arises. However, these composite entities are still said to exist conventionally because they have provisional existence as designated by worldly or conventional names. See AKB 6.4 a-d p.333.23ff; AKV p.524.8ff; P'u-kuang 22 p.337.b.13; Fa-pao 22 p.728.a.4. Louis de la Vallee Poussin, "Documents d'abhidharma: les deux, les quatre, les trois verites," Milangeschinais et bouddhiques, Vol. 5, (1936-1937), pp.169ff. "

4l. MVB 13 p.6l.c.l0-ll. The Mahiivibhi¥ii (MVB 13 p.6l.c.16ff)responds that this position is not reasonable. If, for example, in the case of


~~f ····1 p' erception, the collocation had the power of sight, it should see at all '"lSUa .. :1 'es, since there IS no tIme when these three are not assembled. The exact ~erent of this collocation as use~ in the Dar~tantika ~iew is unclear (perh~I?s, i~e sense organ, perceptual consclOu_sne~s, ~nd th~ ~bJ~ct-field, or all re~Ulsite ('llditions), but the purpose of the Dar~tantika pOSItIOn IS to refuse to deSIgnate ~~o isolated factor as having prominent causal capability in perception. See dlJ1

Ji;ijJv p.31.6ff. '" _ . .. ft.:> 42. NAS 7 p.367.b.24ff. The Abhzdharmakosaohayya attnbutes thIS theory !'iothe Sautrantikas (AKB 1.42 c-d p.31.12ff; AKV p.82.27ff). See also ADV ?W44p.33.7ff. , .J 43. See NAS 25 p.484.b.19ff where the Dar~tantika master, Srilata ::~~ects the Sa.rvastivadir:- thesis th~t perceptual. ~ons~ious.n~ss is d~fin~d accord!:iIlg to its umque fun~tIon of bel.ng aware (v7Janatz). HIS ~n~entlOn IS to d~ny :. that perceptual consCIousness eXIsts as an agent, or as a dIstmct factor havmg ;its own unique activity. . . 44. See NAS 26 p.486.c.18ff. '1 'i. 45. AKB p.4 73.25 ff. yat tarhi vijiianaT[l vijanati 'ti sutra uktaT[l kiT[l tatra ~:vijiiiina'f[! karoti I na kiT[lcit karoti I yatha tu karyaT[l kara1'}am anuvidMyata ity u.cyate i/siidrsyena 'tmalabhad akurvad api kiT[lcit / evaT[l vijiianam api vijanatf 'ty ucyate / :Sadrsyena 'tmalabhad akurvad api ki'f[!cit I kiT[l punar asya sMrsyam / tadakarata I ;.ata eva tad indriyad apy utpannaT[l viJaya'T{! vijanatf 'ty ucyate ne 'ndriya'T{! / athava (tatha 'tra 'Pi vijiianasa'T{!tiinasya vijiiane karar;..abhavad vijiianaT[l vijanatf 'ti vacanan :·iJirdo~a'f[! kara1'}e kartrsabdanirdesat. AKV p.712.3lff. See also P'u-kuang 30 !,p,448.b.19ff; Fa-pao 30 p.810.a.Iff. :;;,' 46. NAS 7 p.367.c.Iff. . 47. AKB 3.32 b p.145.5ff; AKV p.306.27ff. Vasubandhudoes notiden-

"tify this argument as that of the Dar~tantikas, but such identification is justified .. from references in the Nyayanusara. P'u-kuang (P'u-kuang 10 p. 176.c.4-6) ,and Fa-pao (Fa-pao 10 p.608.a.15-16) attribute this view to the Sautrantikas. •.... 48. NAS 10 p.385.b.15ff; AKB 3.32 p.145.20ff; AKV p.307.17ff. See ·.also NAS 10 p.386.b.16ff; 29 p.504.a.29ff. The context for the discussion of :;:this process model of perception is SrIlata's acceptance of only three thought .concomitants-feelings (vedana) , concepts (sa'T{!jiia) , and volition (cetana)',:rather than the ten thought concomitants (mahabhumikadharmah which are '. claimed by the Sarvastivadins to be associated with each moment of thought. See NAS 10 p.384.b.12ff.

49. The Mahavibha~a (MVB 197 p.984.a.I-3) accepts two types of col. location: 1) that among simultaneous factors; and 2) that among factors that act together to produce a single effect. In the case of the five externally directed types of perceptual consciousness, the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual consciousness function as a collocation in both ways. However, because mental perceptual consciousness, the mental organ, and the object

. field are not simultaneous, they function as a collocation only in the second way, that is as producing a single effect. See also AKB 3.30 b p.143.2ff. The Sarvastivadins claim that this second type of collocation holds only if the existence of past and future factors is accepted. Since the Dar~tantikas reject the existence of past and future factors, they cannot appeal to a collocation


of causes over time-the sense organ, object-field, and perceptual ."'}fJ;~ ness-in explaining the process of perception. See NAS 10 P.38~~cn~i~~~'j p.421.a.12ff. .. ";;~:~

50. AKB 2.34 b-d.r.62.3ff; NAS 11 ?394,c.2~ff;.MVB 16 P.80.c.1~;~~'~ 51. The Dar~~antIkas are characterized as reJectmg both the distirl)f~~l

between thought and thought concomitants, and the claim that various· 7.1?% functions arise simultaneously. See MVB 16 p. 79.c.7ff, 52 p.270.a.1ci-i~~;; p.463.a.20ff, 95 p.493.c.24ff; NAS 1~p.395.a.lff; Saeki, op. cit., Vol. 1 p.}f'; See also TS 5 #60 p. 274.c.19-67 p.2/8.b.4. For example, Buddhadeva (My': 2 p.8.c.!-9; 127 p .. 66.1.c.17ff; ADV #116 p.!?7ff) identifies the th()u~;~ con.co.rmtants .as varIetIes of thought,. ~nd provlslOnally recognizes threes!c!i':l varIetIes: feel:ngs, c.oncepts, and vohtlOn. Fo~ Buddhadeva as a Dar~~ahtik~J m~ste: s~e Shlz~~am, op. CIt., p. 140ff. Th:re !S, ~owever, s~me variety inth~:: Daqtantlka posItIon. For example, The Daq~antlka master SrIlata (AKB 3,32' p.145.20ff; AKV p.307.17ff; NAS 10 p.384.b.12ff) accepts the three-feelin"; concepts, and volition-as thought concomitants, but maintains that th~~ three do not occur simultaneously. See also AKB 3.32 p.146.14ff; A~V;' p.309.20ff; NAS 10 p.385.b.15ff, 11 p.390.c.20ff, 29 p.503.b.llff,29: p.504.a.29ff, 29 p.504.b.15ff. See also JunshO Kato, "Kyoryobu Shurlra.ia' (III)," Buzan kyogaku taikai kiyo, Vol. 6, (1978), pp. 109-135. J .t;

52. According to the Sarvastivadins and Dar~tantikas, two instances6f; thought (citta) or perceptual consciousness (vijiiiina) cannot occur simultane;; ously. See VK 1 p.531.b.6ff, passim. NAS 17 p.435.b.8ff, 19 p.443.b.9ff:;; p.447.a.22ff; MVB 10 p.47.b.l-p.50.a.19, 140 p.720.a.10ff. .,

53. NAS 8 p.374.b.12ff.; 54. NAS 10 p. 384.c.2ff, 15 p.420.c.18ff, 19 p.447.b.16ff. 55. NAS 15 p. 421.c.5ff. 56. NAS 8 p.374.c.2ff; ADV #77 c-d p.47.13ff. "For the DarHantikas,

nothing is directly perceived. This is due to the fact that the five groupsof perceptual consciousness have past object-fields; indeed, when the eye and visual material form are found, perceptual consciousness does not exist, and when perceptual consciousness exists, the eye and visual material form do not' exist. Further, this is due to the fact that the apprehension of their own object is impossible given the absence of the continuation [of the object] in the moment of perceptual consciousness." diir~tiintikasya hi sarvam apratya~am /

. paiiciiniir[! vijiiiinakiiyiiniim atZtav~ayatviid yadii khalu ca~urupe vidyete tadii vij'iiiic

nam asat / yadii vijiiiinar[! sac ca~urupe tadii 'sati vijiiiina~a7Jasthityabhiive sviirtho~ palabdhyanupapattes ca.

57. Siiriputriibhidharmasiistra T28.1548 9 p.590.a.7-8, p. 593.c.16-18. For the possibility of states of concentration without an existent object-field see also Siiriputriibhidharmafiistra T28.1548 28 p.701.c.l0, 30 p.717.a.29-b.2: Though there is some agreement that the Siiriputriibhidharmafiistra represents the view of the Dharmaguptaka school, the dating of the text is, as yet, disputed. See Andre Bareau, "Les origines du Siiriputriibhidharmasiistra," Le Musion 63 (1950 #1,2), pp. 69-95; Yamada, op.cit., pp. 79-80; Erich Frauwallner, "Abhidharma-Studien, IV (Fortsetzung)," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sildasiens, Archiv fur Indische Philosophie, Bd. 16, (1972), pp. 133-152; Kimura, op.


fjcil( .,140-160, especially pp. 155~160; Kogen Mizuno, "Sharikotsuabidonf~~PP. tsuite," Indogaku Bukkyogaku ronshil, Kanakura Hakushi koki kin en, (Kyoto: :';rou·nI 134 ~,"f')' :kuji shoten, 1966), pp. 109- . xtffra 58. VK 1 p.531.a.26ff. See also Sariputrabhidharmasastra T28.1548 9 fi&:~94.c.7ff. Louis de I~ Vallee Poussin, "La controverse du temps etdu pudgala :51': sle Vij'iianakiiya/' Etudes Asiatiques, publiees a I'occasion du vingt-cinquieme :3~~uiversaire de I'Ecole Fran~aise d'Extreme-Orient, (Paris: Publications de ::;~~ole Fran~aise d'Extr~me-.Oriefo1t, 1925): pp. 343-376. . j;~i,/ 59. For the possIble IdentIty of thIs Maudgalyayana as the acknowlYi~ged patriarch of the Dharmaguptaka school see Vasumitra's ~YSi!mayabhedoparacanacakra ~4~.2031 p.15.b.16-1!; T49.203.2 .p.18.a.29~f; l~tt49.2033 p.20.b.15-17; Balyu Watanabe, tr., Ab~datsumash~k~sh~nsokuron, m ~$okuyaku issaikyo, Indo senjutsubu, Bidonbu, Vol. 4, (Tokyo: Daito shuppansha, 11(1931), p. 12 note #22; Shizutani, op,cit., pp. 173-181. :'ii.i· 60. For the attribution of this view to the Dharmaguptaka school, see ~Sl1mayabhedoparacanacakra T49.2031 p.16.c.26-27; T49.2032 p.19.b.12-13; 'i[r49.2033 p.22.a.16-17. Compare the Mahavibha~a (MVB 76 p.393.a.18ff), ::'thich cites the following contested view: "Further, there are fools who, with Hegard to the intrinsic nature of [factors in] the th~ee time periods, deny as 't!~onexistent [those of the] past and future and mamtain that [those of the] Y:presentare unconditioned." See also MVB 13 p.65.b.26-27, 37 p.l90.a.lO-l1. :;,'i 61. VK 1 p.535.a.8ff. \::;,f 62. MVB 105 p.554.c.15-17, 136 p.704.a.7-9, 146 p.747.b.15-17, 195 "p.975.a.3-5, 197 p.983.a.23-25. AVB 55 p.393.b.1O-12. i:, 63. MVB 16 p.79.a.19-21, 55 p.283.a.22-24, 131 p.680.b.26-27, 136 i'p.702.b.13-15. See also AVB 30 p.218.c.14ff. 1',' 64. MVB 44 p.228.b.20ff. See also MVB 108 p.558.a.7ff. }; 65. MVB 8 p.36.a.16ff. See also Johannes Rahder, "La satkayadJ;"~~i ~g'apres Vibha~a, 8," Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, Vol. 1, (1931-1932), pp. ;227-239. ,. 66. MVB 75 p.390.c.34ff. See, also A VB 6 p.455.c.8ff.

67. MVB 37 p.193.b.2ff. 68. MVB 135 p.696.b.24ff, 44 p.228.b.22ff. 69. MVB 195 p.975.a.2ff. 70. MVB 9 p.42.a.20ff. 7l. See also the Mahaprajiiaparamitasastra T25.1509 26 p.255.a.15ff. A

text that does not include the need for an existent object-support among the reasons for the existence of past and future factors is the Samyuktiibhidharmahrdayasastra T28.1552 11 p.963.b.2ff. This reason is also omitted from the two most recent translations of the Vibha~a commentary (MVB 76 p.393.a. 9ff; AVB 40 p.293.c.18ff), butis found in the oldesttranslation (VB 7 p.464.b.26ff).

72. TS 2 #21 p.255.b.12ff. 73. See also TS 15 #191 p.364.a.7ff. 74. AKB 5.25 p.295.8ff; AKV p.468.28ff. 75. AKB 5.25 b p.295.16 dvayarrt pratztya vijiiiinasyo 'tpiida ity uktam. See

SN 35.93 Dutiyadvayasutta Vol. 4 p. 67; SA 8 #214 p.54.a.22ff. See also SN 12.43-45 Vol. 2 pp. 72-75; ADV #306 a-b p.269.2ff.

80 lIABS VOL. 11 NO.1

76. TS 2 #19 p.253.c.27ff. 77. NAS 50 p.621.c.I4ff. 78. NAS 50 p.621.c.~0-21. See. also N~S 17 p.430.a.l0_1I

p.450.c.24-25. For the necessIty of an object-field m the arisinO" of pr ._~ ... NAS 17 p.432.a.7ff. '" a;nase~;

79. ADV #304 a p.262.1. buddhyii yasye '10yate cihnarrt . . . .:>{ 80. ADV #304 p.262.3ff. yasya khalv arthavastunal; svabhiivasidd ,>:j

svarupasyii 'viparZtiikiirayii dharmopala10a'IJayii paricchinnarrt lak;;a'IJam upalafo/y~':~ tatsaddravyam zty ucyate .. See al~o ADV #305 c-d p.264.2. "Those [past'anle'i future factors] have eXIstence lrke present [factors] due to their nature asth<l .. range of thought and name." dh'iniimagocaratviic ca tat sattvarrt vaTtamiina'" C?, See also ADV #305 p.268.22-24. "That object whose particular and com Vat characteristic is determined by cognition having the aspect of that [obj~Of i and which is referred to ?y the group of names and gro~p of factors decla~~d by the Buddha, that eXIsts from the absolute standpomt." tadiikiirayii Mal" buddhyii yasyii 'rthasya svasiimiinyalak;;a'IJarrt paricchidyate yaf ca buddho~i ktaniimakiiyadharmakiiyiibhyiim abhidyotyate sa paramiirthato vidyate..}'

81. NAS 50 p.621.c.2lff. See also NAS 15 p.421.b.28ff, 19 p.447.c.23ff.~ Unlike e~istence, absolut.e nonexistence ~a~not be ~lassified according to types i' because It lacks any partICular charactenstic by whIch It can be distinguished," and thereby compared or contrasted. See NAS 17 p.431.c.8ff. .

82. The Abhidharmadzpa (ADV #304 p.262.2ff) adds two types of exis- .. tence to those mentioned by Sanghabhadra: 1) existence through both (dvaya,',' ubhayathii), referring to entities that can be understood as either real or provi-'; sional depending upon the context; for example, earth (Prthivi), when understood as one of the four fundamental elements (mahiibhuta), exists in an abso~ .. lute sense, and when understood as ordinary dirt, exists only in a conventionaL sense; 2) relative existence (sattviipek;;ii), which refers to such correlative stat~s . as father/son, teacher/student, or agent/action. The Mahiivibhii~ii (MVB' 9. p.42.a.24ff) includes three different classifications of types of existence. The first includes two types: 1) existence as a real entity (dravya) , such as the. aggregates (skandha) , or elements (dhiitu) , and 2) existence as a provisional entity (prajitapti) , such as male or female. The second classification includes· three types: I) relative existence (hsiang-tai, ape10ii ?), as when something exists relative to one thing and not relative to another; 2) existence as a composite (ho-ho, siimagrz ?) as when something exists in one place and not in another; and 3) existence in accord with temporal state (shihjen, avastha ?), as when something exists at one time and not at another. The third classification includes five types: I) nominal existence (niima) , such as hair on a tortoise, ,. the horn of a hare, and so on; 2) existence as a real entity (dravya) , such as .. all factors (dharma), each of which is defined by intrinsic nature; 3) existence as a provisional entity (prajitapti), such as a pot, cloth, a chariot, and so on; 4) existence as a composite (ho-ho, siimagrz ?), such as the personality (pudgala), which is a provisional designation based on a collocation of the aggregates; and 5) relative existence (hsiang-tai, apek;;ii ?), such as this and that shore, or long and short.

83. NAS 52 p.636.a.22-24.


84. See NAS 50 p.624.c.6ff. Sanghabhadra uses this point to suggest 'if":<' ast and future factors cannot be said to exist only provisionally. If this i?J1i~t ~he case, they would lack a real basis and could not produce cognition. ,t,vere 261 1 Off #;\if'ADV #303 p. . . )~.S~~f;85. NA.~ 50 p.622.a.16ff. See TS 2 #19 p.254.a.3ff: "Knowledge also i},l'.: ates with regard to a nonexistent range." See also ADV #305 p.268.27. ~~~at] if th_e;e. were ~ogn~t~~n even having a nonexistent object-support?" filiaJalambana p~ buddh~r ast~ t~ eet. ii';f. 86. TS 2 #19 p.254.a 4ff; NAS 50 p.622.a.19ff; ADV #306 c-d i1)271.3ff. In the Mahiivibhii~a and Nyayanusara, these examples are attributed .,7P;:ihe Dar~tantikas. I have grouped the various examples in similar categories {ti~i~larity of exposition. For discussion of these examples see Yukio Sakamoto, :.:Ubidatsuma no kenkyii, Sakamoto Yukio ronbunshii, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Daita shup;;'''ansha, 1981), pp. 135-156; Shingya Yoshimoto, Abidaruma shiso, (Kyoto: 1J;'~ozokan, 1982), pp. 146-156; Louis de la Vallee Poussin, "Documents Yicl;abhidharma: la controverse du temps," Milanges ehinois et bouddhiques, Vol. {(1936-1937), pp. 25-128. ji;,' 87. NAS 50 p.623.c.18ff. See TS 2 #19 p.254.b.8ff. ':~f'. 88. NAS 50 p.623.b.8ff. , 89. See also MVB 8 p.36.a.21~25; AKB 6.58 b p.374.26ff; AKV

~'p.587.18ff. For an extensive discussion of satkayadr~ti see MVB 49 p.255.a.21 ff; iAKB 5.7 p.281.19ff; NAS 47 p.605.c.29ff. J;~; 90. NAS 50 p.623.b.17ff. See also MVB 8 p.36.a.2lff. ;~l 91. NAS 50 p.623.b.19. See also NAS 4 p.351.b.19ff. iii':. 92. The meaning of the term akara and the sense in which all thought ::~nd thought concomitants are said to have ahara became a controversial issue ;i':forthe Sarvastivada and Dar~tantika-Sautrantika schools with significant im:~plications for later Buddhist epistemological theory. For the Sarvastivada-Vai;bhasikas and Sanghabhadra, ahara means the discriminative function of in!"~lgh·t. Thought and thought concomitants are also said to have an aspect "(sakara), but only by extension from association with insight, or in the sense <that they perform their own activity in apprehending the object-support. This ';interpretation stands in sharp contrast to Vasubandhu's concept of ahara as thought and thought concomitants taking shape or taking on an aspect con

;sistent with the type or character of the object-support. Contrast AKB 2.34 c-d p.62.6; AKV p.141.29ff; to NAS 11 p.394.c.25-26; Samayapradipika T29.1563 6 p.803.a.17-18; ADV #482 p.376.3-4. See also NAS 74 p.741.a.2lff; P'u-kuang 1 mo p.26.b.26ff, 4 p.83.b.26ff, 26 p.394.a.2lff; Fa-pao ~4 p.534.c.4ff, 26 p.770.b.2ff; Saeki, op. cit., Vol. 3, p.llOlff.

93. MVB 7 p.409.a.10-11; NAS 74 p.741.b.12ff. For the definition of iikara as insight see AKB 7.13 b p.401.18ff; NAS 74 p.741.a.19ff; ADV #482 c-d p.375.16ff.

94. MVB 126 p.658.b.27ff. For a discussion of the difference between error (luan-tao, vibhrama, bhranti ?) and mistaken views (tien-tao, viparyasa), and their relation to defilements and conceptual thought (vikalpa) see MVB 166 p.841.b.2ff; NAS 47 p.608.c.17ff. For a discussion of the relation between the production of defilements and conceptual thought see MVB 61 p.315.b.6ff.

82 ]IABS VOL. 11 NO.1

For a discussion of the character of insight when associated with me l'(i~ ceptual. consciousness as distinguished fr~m that associated with the fi~~~te1;t~: nally dIrected types of perceptual consclO~sne~ see MVB 95 P,490.c.4ff.t~~~,!~

95. AKB 6.9 p.337.8-6.13 p.341.6, NA", 59 p.671.a.1-60 p.674 ",k,1 AKB 8.29 pA52.4--S.36 pA5S.10: NAS 79 p.768.c.20-S0 p.774.c 5. ~~~4~,:',

_ . . . In VB s, Sl p.420.b.S-S5 ~A42.~.14. See also Kathavatt~u, op. Clt., 5.3 pp. 305":'30}'I;

96. For a dlscusslOn of adhlmuktlmanaskara as one of three ty ')~::i attention see AKB 2.72 d p.10S.1Iff; AKV p.246.32ff; NAS 20 P,454.PiiQ\f\ MVB S2 pA22.c.27. For the various meanings of the term "adhimuk~i" ff;,; Hajime Sakurabe "Sh6ge 'adhimukti' ni tsuite," in Bukkyo go no kenk"u (K S~~,~"

:J' yoto'''' Buneid6, 1975), pp. 34-39.'i;~ 97. MVB S5 p.440.b.1Iff, pA41.a.25ff. ,::~\ 98. NAS 50 p.622.a.19; TS 2 #19 p.254.a.4. . ~;~, ,,:_,.i,~~

. 99. NAS 50 p.6~3.b.~3ff. The Tatt~asiddhisiistra (TS 2 # 19 p.254.a.27f~f cItes ~noth.er explananon: smce t~e quahty or na~ure of the color blue exis't{' even m thmgs that are not perceIved as blue, thIS blue nature in all thin ,I; can serve as the object-field for the cognitionof total and exclusive blueness :g:"

100. MVB 37 p.193.bAff; TS 2 #19 p.254.a.7-S, p.254.c.25ff. '" 101. See MVB 37 p.193.b.23ff; AVB 2S p.145.c.11ff; NAS

p.623.c.9ff. 102. NAS 3 p.346.a.17ff. 103. NAS 50 p.623.c.13ff. The MahiivibhilJa (MVB 3S p.194.a.2Sff)

sents several opinions as to whether or not all dream images must be result of past experience. Though no explicit judgment is offered, Mahiivibhi4a clearly favors the opinion that all dream images result object-supports that have been experienced. See also NAS 3 p.346.a.17ff.

104. MVB 37 p.193.c.24ff. 105. The Mahiivibhi4a (MVB 37 p.194.b.27ff) explains that in the case

of oneiromancy, one knows future events in a dream through inference; one" infers that a certain event will occur in the future on the basis of an experienced i cause and effect relation between the past and present. " '

106. The causes for dreams offered by Sanghabhadra (NAS 50 i p.623.c.9ff) and the TattvasiddhiSiistra (TS 2 #19 p.254.b.13ff) are generally consistent with those in the Mahiivibhi4a with a few exceptions: both,' Sanghabhadra and the TattvasiddhiSiistra omit dream images based on future events, and the Tattvasiddhisastra adds past actions (karma) as a possible cause.

107. MVB 75 p.390.c.3ff. See also VB 6 pA55.c.Sff. , lOS. NAS 23 pA70.a.6-474.a.5; AKB 3.11 c-d p.120.20ff; AKV

p.267.29ff. In this section, an opponent offers the example of a reflected image to disprove the existence of the intermediate state (antarabhava) between death and rebirth. That is to say, just as there is an interruption between the reflected image and the original object, so there is an interruption between death and rebirth and no intermediate state is required. Vasubandhu claims that since the reflected image does not exist, it should not be compared to . the aggregates at rebirth. Sanghabhadra, on the other hand, argues strongly, in defense of the existence of the reflected image, and claims that there is a connection between the reflected image and the original object.


NAS 23 p.473.a.8ff. 110. NAS 23 p.4 71.b.12ff. 111. NAS 23 p.472.a.22; AKB 3.12 a p.121.5-6. ato na 'sty eva tat kiT[lcit gryiis tu sa tasyas tadrsal} prabkavo yat tatka darsanaT[l bhavati. See also AKV

~~i269.16ff. ' , "'112. NAS 23 p.472.b.23ff.

>;,:.113. MVB 135 p.696.b.24ff. For a discussion of the arising of magical lions from the supernormal power that actualizes the knowledge of objects duced by magical power (rddhiv~aye jiianasa~atkriya abh&'iia) see AKB 7.42

;: .. ii42L6ff; NAS 76 p.752.c.17ff. (especially AKB 7.44 d p.423.5-6; NAS 76 1~j~53.c.l5-17; AKB 7.48 p.425.5-7.53 p.429.3; NAS 76 p.754.b.29-76

.~·755.c.2). ;~):;:d1l4. NAS 50 p.623.b.27ff. lJ.~i>1l5. NAS 50 p.623.c.28ff; ADV #306 c-d p.271.lff. ,}"~i' ,~, '

l€l\;.; 116. NAS 50 p.622.a.24-25; AKB 5.27 c p.300.18-21; SA 26 #703

~~~189.a.22ff. ' ;'~"'j 117. NAS 50 p.623.c.29-p.624.a.8. ~;Si~1l8. Sanghabhadra clearly distinguishes the sound of speech, which is Yinaterial form, from name (nama), which is classified as an independent con;;aitioned factor dissociated from both thought and material form (cittaviprayuk;"?;;siJ'T[1Skara). The specification here would be synonomous with name. See NAS tll4pAI3.a.17ff; p.413.b.16ff; p.414.a.16ff; p.414.a.29ff; p.414,b.22ff; ':pA14.b.22ff. I#:¥?;' 119. NAS 50 p.624.a.8ff. i.;' " 120. Though Sanghabhadra does not identify these two types of nega;:tlims, they appear to correspond to the implicative or exclusionary negation ;Waryudasaprati~edha) and simple or prohibitive negation (prasajyaprat~edha), .;which were used extensively in Indian grammatical, ritualistic and philosophi;~altexts. See George Cardona, "Negations in Pal)inian Rules," Language, Vol. ",43,(1967-1), pp. 34-56; J.F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction: ::A Comparative Study," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. :,2~, (1962-1), pp. 52-71. For references in later Buddhist texts see Yuichi ::kajiyama, "Three Kinds of Affirmation and Two Kinds of Negation in Budi'ghist Philosophy," Wiener Zeitschrift filr die Kunde Sildasiens, Bd. 17, (1973), pp. p81-175. , 121. NAS 50 p. 624.a.lSff.

122. Sanghqbhadra here uses the argument that expressions can lack a specified object because otherwise there would be no worldly speech that lacks meaning, Sanghabhadra then cites another opinion that all expressions must

"have a specified object because these expressions are specifications. In the :',case of expressions such as "nonexistence" or "thirteenth sense sphere" the 'specified object would be the name or concept and not some objective "nonexistence" or "thirteenth sense sphere." See also AKB 5.27 c p.300.7ff; AKV p.475.1lff. The Makavibh~a (MVB 15 p. 72.c.2-5) similarly explains that all names are able to manifest meaning and that even names such as the "thirteenth sense sphere" manifest the concept, "thirteenth sense sphere."

123. The terms hetusamuttkana and tat~a'l'}asamutthana are used to explain


the immediate causes by which manifest verbal or corporeal action(vi'1<+f;{~ tirupa) arises. See AKE 4.10 p.203.13ff; AKV p.364.17ff; NAS 36 P.S47 '17ia/f;;; MVB 117 p.610.a.5ff." .a·~{f;il,

124. TS 15 #191 p.364.b.9-10',;.l:fti1 125. ADV #306 c-d p.271.16-17. "If one claimed that there is co.//i:~Y

ha:ing a nonexister:t.obj~ct-suppo:t due to th~ existence [of a cognitionf~~~9~~ object-field of cogmtlOn IS the demal of the thirteenth sense sphere [w "):~;<

. . , e would'<; reply] no, because It has been demonstrated by the Lord that this [cogn' "'Ai is merely based upon speech." trayodasiiyatanaprat~edhabuddhivisayiid as~~loNl1 asadiilambanii buddhir astf 'ti eet / na / Bhagavatai 'va viigvastumatram et::~~",i nirr;,ftatviit. In the Abhidharmakosabh[4ya, the Sarvastivada-Vaibha~ikas res ,/Ji; to a similar objection claiming that the name (niima), "thirteenth sense sp!?n"" serves as the object-supyort of one's ~ognition of ~he deni~l of the thirte:~~,f sense sphere. AK~ S.2/ c p.300.8-9 Then w~at IS th.e object-support of the'; perceptual conscIOusness of the statement, there IS no thirteenth sen'r! sphere?" That has only name as its object-support." atha trayodasam iiyatand~ nii 'stf 'ty asya vijiiiinasya kim iilambanam / etad eva niimiilambanam. See also AKV.< p.4 7 5 . 14ff. Since the Sarvastivadins claim that names exist as real entitiesE classified as factors dissociated from thought and material form, namesca~t serve as the existent object-support for the arising of cognition. .,

;·j;/:3' 126. ADV #306 c-d p.271.1-1S, p.272.3-1S.:> 127. ADV#306 c-d p.272.13-15. tasmiin naiio na gov~iir;,iidi~'YJii'pt;:

saSav~iir;,iidi(L prati~idhyate / ki'r{! tarhi / saSiikiiSadhiitusa'r{!bandhabuddhyapek:;e'YJa,'[( gov~iir;,iididravyiisa'r{!bandhabuddhayo 'vadyotyante. . .... ',';;

128. NAS 50 p.624.b.4ff. See also AKB 5.27 c p.300.9ff; AKV p.47S. 17ff,;; 129. NAS 17 p.431.b.12ff; AKB 2.55 d p.93.7ff. See also Louis de. la,

Vallee Poussin, "Documents d'abhidharma: textes relatifs au nirvaI,la et aUll: asarpskrtas en general, II" Bulletin de nieole Franqaise d'Extreme-Orient, Vo1.30,:; (1930), pp.277ff. In this section, Vasubandhu cites the Sautrantika opinion,. that the unconditioned factors (asa'r{!skrtadharma)-space (iikiiSa), cessatio,n,' through application (pratisa'r{!khyiinirodha), and cessation not through applica~' tion (apratisa'r{!khyiinirodha)-do not exist as real entities, but rather are mere' absences (abhiiva). (AKB 2.55 d p.92.4) Nevertheless, the Sautrantikas assert' that unconditioned "factors can be said to exist in the same way in which.it can be said that there is the prior or subsequent nonexistence of souncl: However, this mere statement that they exist does not mean that absences' (abhiiva) themselves exist as entities (bhiiva).

130. NAS 50 p.624.b.22ff. 131. AKB 5.27 d p.300.10ff. 132. Sanghabhadra distinguishes absolute nonexistence, like the horn

of a hare, from the nonexistence of that which has not yet been produced (i.e., a future factor), or has already passed away (i.e., a past factor). These. last two are nonexistent only in the sense that they lack activity. Even though they do exist as entities having intrinsic nature, they are recognized to be nonexistent in comparison to the present, which is characterized by both activity and intrinsic nature. NAS 15 p.419.c.5ff. '

133. MVB 12 p.55.c.29ff; AVE 6 p.42.b.16ff. For a discussion of how


;:*~~:;Il ction occurs without a personality (pudgala) or a continuous substratum !i~,c9M~ 11 p.55.a.I6-12 p.58.c.18. :1~~'~134. MVB 12 p.57.c.24-26. . i101,~, 135. AKB 2.2~ p.54.22-23. smrtzr iilambaniisaT(l.pramo~al},. ~here~s ~~;:irnartha's r:,'anslauon (PAKB 3 p.178.b.I4-15) corresponds to thIS defiDl:~~rofsmrti, Hsuan-tsang (HTAKB 4 p.19.a.20-21) in his translation adds ,tlOIl . ") . 'bl d . f fii¥"_chi(abhdapana, or notatIOn, POSSI y un er the mfluence 0

);fg~habhadra's explanation. Yasomitra (AKV p.127.32ff) comments: "MindMihess is that by.connection with whic~ the mind d~;s not forget the objectI;ii.::' 'p'" ort, and, as It were, notes that [object-support]. yadyogiid iilambanaT(l. na "sliP. . - 'bh'l - , - 'h ;;~anovismarah tac ca z apatz va sa smrtz .. F~!;:<H6. NAS 10 p.384.b.7-8. See also ADV #112 p.69.6-7 "Mindfulness jba~asits form the functioning of thought. It is the notation of the object of }iligught and has the characteristic of not losing action that has been, will be, G)'fis being performed." cittavyiipiirarupii smrtil}, / cittasyii 'rthiibhilapanii krtakarta)/;fakriyamii1Jakarmiintiivipramo~alak;a1Jii. Compare Abhidharmiivatiirasiistra '1(28)554 shang p.982.a.18-19: See also ADV #446 p.360.14-16. For defini;i~~ns of smrti in terms of abhilapana in the early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma ;}rhts see Dharmaskandha T26.1537 7 pA85.a.7; Dhiitukiiya T26.1540 (shang) i'K614.c.20ff; SarigftiParyiiya T26.1536 16 pA33.b.6ff, 17 pA37.a.13ff; Pra-'kl1rar;apiida T26.1541 2 p.699.c.17ff. . :1'1' 137. NAS 10 p.389.b.12ff. . );f':.;. 138. This statement is also significant because it indicates that for the 'siivastivadins, mindfulness as notation (abhilapana) operates not only in mo~ri;ents of mental perceptual consciousness, but also in all moments of the five ~e'~ternally directed types of perceptual consciousness. Howe"er, since mindful,(~~ss associated with the five externally directed types of perceptual conscious.pess is weak, it is not considered to be conceptual thought through recollection ;(a~usmara1Javikalpa). (NAS 4 p.350.b.17ff). This view is to be contrasted with ;thatof Yasomitra (AKV p.65.10-11) who claims that mindfulness does not operate as notation in moments of the five externally directed types of percep

i;t,llalconsciousness: "Because mindfulness associated with the five types of 'perceptual consciousness does not operate through the notation of the experi;enced object, it is not considered to be conceptual thought through recollec'(ion." paiicavijiiiinakiiyasaT(l.prayuktii tu nii 'nubhutiirthiibhil~a(read abhiliipa) pravrtte 'ti nii 'nusmara1Javikalpa itf '~yate.

. 139. See P'u-kuang4 p.74.b.2lff; Fa-pao 4 p.527.c.13ff. 140. MVB 11 p.5l.b.14ff. Here theMahiivibhii~ii examines the problem

.of how the Buddha knows the sequence in which future factors arise, since they, as yet, lack sequence and are disordered. (vyiikula). Compare MVB 179 p.897.b.24ff; AKB 2.62 a-b p.98.29ff; AKV p.233.30ff; NAS 19 pA44.b.9ff; P'u-kuang 7 p.135.a.8ff. " 14l. Though the particular cittaviprayuktasaT(l.Skiira is not identified in ,this passage in the Mahiivbhii~ii, it can only refer to possession (priipti). For frriipti described as cihna see Yasomitra (AKV p.148.22-23) who quotes Sanghabhadra (NAS 12 p.397.bA-6): "Possession is the indicative mark of the knowledge that 'this belongs to that,' and is the cause of the non-disappear-


ance of factors that have been obtained." idam asye 'ti jiiiinacihna ' dhadharmiivipraniiSakiira'I'Ja'T{l ca priiptir ity iiciiryasarighabhadrah. 'Y[l,frr

142. MVB 178 p.895.a.26-179 p.898.a.12. See also MVB 76 P.395 AVB 40 p.295.c.lff; VB 7 p.466.a.14-15; ~KB. 7.37 a-b PA17.19fib.2 ,,;tiiij p.651.2~ff; NAS 75 p.750.b.18. For the vanous mterpretations of th~~~l} pra'I'Jz~h1J~iina see MVB 178 p.896.a.13ff. Two of the Buddha's powers~:(~ also. s~gn~~cant here: t~e power of the knowledge of previous birthstates;~~] vanzvasaJniinabal~), whIch knows p~st factors, an~ the power of the knowl~~~~i' of death and rebIrth (cyutyupapatt1Jniinabala), whIch knows future facto ." qg~w:i; Mahiivibh~ii (MVB 100 p.517 .a.3ff) discusses the complex issue of the r\~~~;,l

" I h ' se POW", ers, contrastmg them wIth the supernorma power t at actualizes the kn'J.:~ e~~e o~ _t~e recollection of previous birthstates (pu:vaniviisiinusmrtijiiiinasltsl;5~~ karabh1J~a) and the su~err:?_rma~ p~w~r_that_~ctuahzes the knowledge ofde'~t~~ and r~blrth (cyutyupapadaJnanasa~atkarabh1Jna). See also AKB 7.29 c pA12.4fM)\ NAS 15 p.746.a.18ff; AKB 7.42 p.421.6ff; NAS p.752.c.17ff. ',,:,\i

143. NAS 51 p.628.b.8ff.t:;,j~ 144. TS 15 # 191 p.364.a.13ff.\~11,;'~ 145. AKB 5.27 c p.299.20ff; AKV p.474.9ff; NAS 51 p.627.c.19ff.t9;~'~ 146. For a discussion of whether or not unconditioned factoi;':;:

(asa'T[iSkrtadharma) may serve as causes, and if so, as what type of causese~~ AKB 2.55 d p.91.18ff; AKV p.218.18ff; NAS 17 p.429.a.3ff. ,j;:ft

147. NAS 19 p.447.b.29-p.447.c.9. 'y~;~:~~ 148. For various interpretations of the general definition of causal rei~~~:1

tion-"when this exists, that exists; from the production of this, that is produ~_~": ed" (asmin sati: 'dam bhavati asyo 'tpiidiid idam utpadyate)-see AKB 3.28a.b\~: p.138.28ff; NAS 15 p.419.a.7ff, 25 p.482.a.ff: AKV p.297.9ff. For Stilata's';: interpretation of the nature of this causal relation see NAS 15 p.419.a.7f{'i;i

149. NAS 51 p.628.c.3ff.,~; 150. NAS 51 p.628.c.6-8. "1

151. NAS 51 p.628.a.4ff. See also Fa-pao 7 p.578.b.2ff.'ft 152. NAS 19 p.447.c.9ff; 51 p.628.c.27ff.,' 153. Sanghabhadra (NAS 19 p.448.a.8ff) also ~riticizes SrIlara's theory,::;

of the secondary or subsidiary element (sui-chieh = anudhiitu ?, or chiu-sui-chieh.J = purviinudhiitu ?), which SrI!;ita uses to account for all types of causal relations:" Sanghabhadra identifies this secondary element with the seeds (b'ija) proposed by Vasubandhu. Since both the secondary element and seeds function causally:. only through a successive relation within the psycho-physical series, their " proper operation requires the existence of past and future factors. Since neither SrIlata nor Vasubandhu admits the existence of past and future factors, their models are, in Sanghabhadra's opinion, untenable. See NAS '18 p.440.b.3ff.

154. AKB 5.27 c p.300.16-17 . ... sarvabuddMnii'T{l sadiilambanatve kuta 'sya vimarsa~ syiit... NAS 50 p.622.c.13ff. Yasomitra (AKV p.4 76.7-10) glosses vim~ arsa with investigation (viciira), or doubt, (sa'T{ldeha). He comments: "When there are existent and nonexistent object-supports of cognition, this deliberac. tive reflection is possible; not otherwise." sadasadiilambane tu buddhZniim ayar{! vimarsa~ sambhavati nii 'nyathii.

A NONEXISTENT OBJECT

:155. AKB 5.27 c p.299.24ff; AKV p.474.15ff; NAS 51 p.628.a.27ff. 156. NAS51 p.628.b.llff.

87

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~~aglCal_ Up~ya ~n t~e ~f{ifnalakzrtln'lrdesa-sutra :X;'{z1;"("';"

~QJEdward Hamlin "',,,)." ,

The Vimalak'irtinirdeia-sutra (VNS) has long been admired ~f6r its felicitous blend of literary and philosophical qualities. Its tstrong and ambitious narrative-as well as its delight in the ~~agical--can only remind us at times of the jatakas and avadanas, :iwhere the abstractions of Buddhist metaphysics are made ap~i>roachable for a lay audience through engaging moral fables. o/,In the VNS we find very few of the scholia which distend and i,break the narrative tension of other large sutras; the action keeps %~oving, building momentum toward a final and climactic en;~~6unter between the Buddha and the householder from Vaisali:. ;;qur dramatic expectations are skillfully lifted, and, in the end, ;!;\Vell satisfied. ~~' Yet the VNS is not a "novel" or an "epic" in any sense we !!Would recognize: just as the moral-phantasmagorical works of ;;~Swift, a Blake, or a Dante elude any single genre, so one c~nnot do justice to the VNS by analyzing it purely as a tale. ~rmplicit in what follows is my view that the VNS is a Buddhist ,work sui generis which merits and demands its own critical ap,proach. For this text more than for most, the success of a doc!trinal argument is hinged on the success of a poetics, and vice ~ersa. The plot line is far more than just an armature for a scholastic discourse; it both vivifies and takes its direction from jhe issues being debated by Vimalaklrti and his guests. Because it so admirably merges the visionary with the conceptual, the

:,aesthetic with the scholastic, the VNS stands as perhaps the 'purest example of philosophical drama the surviving Mahayana jmaterials provide. f-;'

89


I. Salvific Magic

This essay focuses on an especially sensitive point ofc ··.{:~.i1 . - Ont ',,' bet:-veen Mahay.ana phi~osop~y and Buddhist literary s~~l; bolIsm.: the maglc~l mampulatIO~ of. the pheno:r:nenal world bif an enlIghtened bemg. The VNS IS sImply burstmg with m';~l\ tricks, usually justified (when justified at all) as instance:~~.' b dh' ." kill' ,,- k 'I A . of . o ~sattvlc S m means, ?r upaya- aus~ ya. ccording t~ th~~ doctnne of upiiya, an enlIghtened bemg-a bUddha or)';; bodhisattva-possesses a special ability and prerogative tou~.~ what~ver. teac~~ng method is best suited to th~ character Jd,~; karmIC dISposItIOn of the student. For a bookish student ia'~; upayic approach might involve a doctrinal sermon or a schol~stiIJ:f debate; for a merchant, a parable involving gold pieces; for'~;;\ superstitious man, a magic spectacle intended to dazzleaniil beguile. Upiiya takes as many forms as the many dispositions ii sentient beings, and only the superior)nsight of the enlightened: being would seem to guarantee its appropriateness to the situ) ation at hand.j:»

Even in the Pali literature, the Buddha can sometimesb~'; found resorting to magic tricks as a teaching device; but only; in the Mahayana does the practice seem to have a true efflorev: cence, becoming in certain respects a literary setpiece. It seemi' plausible that the VNS enjoyed an early and important role in' this vogue, for magic is central to its texture as a work of imag: ination. It is certain that the VNS's colorful imagery inspired a" host of poetic and visual artworks, from the poetry of Po Chi.i~i to the sculptures of Lung-men and the large stele now housed at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. . .•.. ,

At the same time, the VNS is a deeply philosophical text-yet what role can magic possibly play in a sober Madhyamaka dialec~ tic? Certainly, the liberal use of illusion as a plot catalyst raises. a host of difficult philosophical questions. But perhaps this is exactly its function. When we witness one of the Buddha's fabu~ , lous displays of legerdemain we are prompted to ask: What is the nature of the phenomenal world such that it can be magically manipulated in this way? And what is the moral stance of the being who does so? How can we be sure of his good intentions?

By examining several instances of upayic magic I hope to show how the VNS's two primary rhetorics, the visual and the

VIMALAKiRTINIRDESA 91

~a;tursive/ work in tandem to address these questions. In par~i;{r1ar I will examine the tension between the Buddha and f~{rrtal~kirti as rival magicians-for it is .here, in the magical rl'butest between a ra~her otherworldly hlerophant and an ex~t~tnel~ worldly ~odhlsattva, that the m?ral and philosophical rt?lhIlenslOns of upaya come most sharply lUto focus. We wIll see, 156, that the VNS's careful exploration of upaya is really some!f~ing of a Trojan Horse concealing a much larger question: ~th'at of the true status, both moral and ontological, of the {M~hayana bodhisattva.

§~~i" >;:(~

fir The UPayic Magician

i::t I have suggested that the VNS is eminently concerned with 'the notion of "skill in means" (Skt. upaya-kausalya, Tib. thabs la '!fnkhas pa). The entire second chapter of the Tibetan text is dedicated to the topic, and the first concludes with a dramatic 'demonstration of upaya in action as the Buddha transforms the ~ciniverse into a panorama of jewels (Th 18).2 The chapters on :the humiliation of the sriivakas and bodhisattvas are essentially 'illustrations of Vimalakirti's upayic mastery, and as the text tmoves toward its dramatic denouement we witness ever more ~rTesting examples of his power to conjure. :';i At the outset, the VNS appears to exhibit a certain structural 'similarity to the SaddharmapurJ(larika, which also debates upaya (in its second chapter while furnishing examples of upaya at work. j~rit the similarity between these two important Mahayana texts .is only superficial: with a closer look we can discern a basic 'disagreement over the proper agency of upaya. This disagreement has wide implications, not only for the emergent Mahayana doctrine of upaya , but also for the early Mahayana view of the bodhisattva. While both texts ultimately use the upaya issue as a means of drawing ontological and ethical distinctions between buddhas and bodhisattvas, they proceed in very different ways and reach quite different conclusions.

In the Saddharmapu17darika or Lotus Siitra, the Buddha has recourse to the upaya doctrine in explaining how a buddha can communicate the inscrutable nature of reality to a non-buddha. 3

A sharp distinction is drawn between the understanding of a

92

buddha and that of a bodhisattva: in a dialogue between bUddh"f~~1 c.o~muni~ati.an of m.etaphysical truths takes place Withou(>~ tlflCe, while m the dlalogue of a buddha an. d a bodhisattv· .... ···h·. '1 £ . d '. at e on:~er m~st employ upaya m emons~ratmg his insights. Th~j

bodh2Sattva s lesser WIsdom places a barner between him and En! metaphysical enlightenment, and all of a buddha's efforts Y directed toward its removal. The episten::ololgical gap betwe~~ a buddha and a sravaka, or a mere prthagjana, of course, is ev wider, and the buddha must adjust his upaya accordingly, moldi eB it to the disposition of his listener. This flexibility allows fo~g wide range of upayic acts, including, as the famous parable6t the burning house illustrates, a type of deception.4 Farfrorrt condoning unethical behavior, however, the Saddharmapur}{la_ r'ika recognizes that the supreme wisdom of a buddha allows him' to act in ways which, for a non-buddha, might be moq.lly dubi~ ous.5 The buddha's special status as an enlightened being removes his behavior from the formulaic rubric of the Vinaya and place~ it in a realm of upayic compassion. "And it is precisely because a buddha stands outside of "the burning house of the tripl~ world" that he has a responsibility to employ his upaya to Sp(lr~ others. He alone is capable of fully discerning the true nature of reality, including the inward karmic dispositions of being~ trapped in the vagaries of rebirth. . ... , .•...•.

So argues the Saddharmapun,gar'ika. By contrast, the upiiyd chapter of the VNS opens by extolling Vimalakirti's long service to the past buddhas and his dedication to the bodhisattva caust in the present time (Th 20). It is understood, and will later be stated explicitly (Th 43), that he is a bodhisattva living as a layma!l for the sake of saving sentient beings. Ye.t like a buddha, Vim-. alakirti is said to have "assimilated an understanding of skill in means" (thabs mkhas pa rtogs par khong du chud pa,' Osh 155). The remainder of the text will systematically outline Vimalaklrti's upaya, even going so far as to establish parallels with the·· Buddha's own acts of upaya.

Evidently, then, the VNS does not accept the Saddhar~. mapuryjar'ika's limitation of upaya to the buddhas: here even a bodhisattva may practice upaya, and in doing so he does not. appear to raise the moral question addressed by the parable of the burning house. This observation raises a trio of questions which orient us for the present study: (1) What is the ontological


~;;; tuS "of magical upaya as it is presented in the VNS? (2) What :i;:fits rnoral_ status, if any? And (3) Are there differences in the Jla,gical upaya of a bodhzsattva and that of a buddha? ,j11

~~C . 51ir The Magical Parasol ;,:[:i:;

{{ As with so many Mahayana sutras, the VNS opens with a ~'tpecial spectacle which elev~tes the.plot s.ituation.to a supramun(~tla,ne status and sets the phIlosophICal dIalogue 111 gear. A huge :;£ssernbly of disciples and bodhisattvas has gathered in Amrapali ,;iohear the Buddha. From the crowd appears a group ofLicchavi Nouths, led by the Bodhisattva Ratnakara and bearing jewelled i'parasols as offerings for the Buddha. When the last parasol is iIaid at the Buddha's feet, the offerings are miraculously transfformed into a single giant parasol which appears to cover the "rriany universes (Osh 147-8). The particular features of all the '!;'~orlds seem to be reflected on the underside of the apparitional ;.parasol, complete with the buddhasof the ten directions preach~;ing in their respective domains. This cosmic vision astonishes ithe multitude and prompts Ratnakara to kneel and address a ilaudatory hymn to the Buddha (Th 13-15). i. What is the ontological nature of this incident? The text's ,'choice of language provides a number of interesting clues. As for the transformation itself, we are told that it is "by the power of the Buddha" (sangs rgyas kyi mthus; Osh 147)-by his anubhiiva-that the giant parasol "appears to cover" (khebs par snang ngo; Osh 148) the many universes. The use of the Tibetan verb snang ba ("to appear"), which Thurman's translation ignores, is significant here, for it points to the linked doctrines of illusion and emptiness which figure importantly in later parts of the text. The magical demonstration reveals the entire galaxy,

. and most especially, as Ratnakara sings, the fields of the sugatas or buddhas. It is a sort of beatific vision, a glimpse of the beyond not unlike that which Beatrice grants Dante; yet it is manifestly derivative, being only a magically-induced reflection, a secondorder appearance.

The distinction between the cosmos itself and its mirror image might seem trivial in light of the tremendous grandeur of what is being shown, but it is important to keep in mind the

94 JIABS VOL. lINO. 1

special symbolism of such imagery in the Mahayana. The th';};i . fl' d '11 d bl . ~erne of vIsual re ectlOns an 1 usory ou· es IS a potent on .;)/

Mahayana rhetoric; it almost always functions as a didacti/i{H go.ry for the empty nature of reality.6 Though the text In ak~0 ..

1· . l' I h' 1 a es no exp lClt onto oglCa statement at t IS ear y stage, by introd';j ing the theme of the magical mirror it begins to lay .&~\ groundwork for a rhetoric of emptiness to appear in full f1ow~ 1 er ater on. · •... 1

The incident of the parasols has an equally subtle functi;; . h' h d' f h' . on; WIt m t e ramatlC structure 0 t e text: It establishes ale

axis in the narrative's geography, a point d'appui against whiCh the other side of the plot's action-that centered on Vimalaklrti'~! sickroom~will now steadily begin to pull. Seated amid his ret:. inue in Amrapall, the Buddha uses his power (anubhava) toi project the entire universe over his head, thereby renderini himself its spatial and symbolic epicenter. This is none othef than the axis mundi motif as articulated by Eliade and others'1 but in our text it serves to throw the scene at Amrapali iIlt~ high relief, placing the assembly in a privileged position froni· which all cosmic events and destinies (gati) may be witnessed.il';

Yet almost immediately the action will leave this high ground and develop a second dramatic axis at Vimalaklrti's house. Just as the VNS allows a bodhisattva the power of magic~l upaya, so, in dramatic terms, does it allow his presence and actions to parallel and in some ways compete with those of the; Buddha. This peculiar tension between buddha and bodhisattva hints, perhaps, at the historical ascendancy of the bodhisattva as; an alternative model of perfection-and perhaps, too, at a slow struggle to accomodate both buddhic and bodhisattvic paradigms into Buddhist dogma without subtracting from the prestige of either. The geographical distance separating buddha from bodhisattva in the early chapters of the text-a distance which seems more and more treacherous as the disciples tell their stories and thus embellish our picture ofVimalaklrti-may mirror a very real ambivalence about the precise relationship between a buddha and a bodhisattva, a need to show that these two enlightened beings are in some ways similar but in other ways quite distinct. To test such a supposition we must take our cues from the plotting of the text, for it is here that the symbolic geography so carefully established at the outset is put through

VIAfALAKiRTINIRDESA 95

~Ji(,-t _ -rj~:paces.

~~',: .

:W.Enthronement of the Dharma-king .' .

. iN' The spectacle of the giant parasol is followed immediately ()15~:"::Ratnakara's laudatory hymn (Th 13-15). The young Lic~':~avi's verses intensify the emphasis on the Buddha as cosmic ~6cUS while preparing the way for a direct comparison with ~~trilalaklrti. :;,¥;i:i; .The Buddha emerges from Ratnakara's hymn as the i~~~theosis, of an Il1,dian riij~r$i: pure, virtuous, rich in goo~ \tleeds, he IS an ascetIC followmg the path of peace (dge sbyon zhz ?:b~;i lam brten; Osh 148). Yet at the same time he is a bull of elrien, a leader, a Dharma-king, a Lord of Dharma (Th 13). ZEpllowing the early Buddhist paradigm, he teaches the law of ta~pendent co-origination in order to liberate beings. Doctrine :fNerses 4, 7, 8) interweaves with sacred or hagiographical history ~i~5, 6) to apotheosize the Buddha and elaborate his special marks ~:(lak$a'IJa) (9, 10, 11). Besides elevating the Buddha to a position 0:oL supreme respect, Ratnakara's paean serves as a brief !~Maliayana catechism, deftly laying out the philosophical stance ~i>fthe text and validating it by fusing it with a portrait of the ~IBuddha, The Buddha is a teacher of the doctrine and a sacred }!ong, poised at the center of all destinies (gati) and able, through .his special powers, to appear individually to each disciple. As ':we will see, this homology with kingship will ultimately help to "distinguish the Buddha from Vimalakirti even as it raises the ':i:ritical issue of kingly power and legitimacy. , Having established the sacred identity of the vision's creator,

'the text goes on to ponder its cosmological significance. Ratnakara, on behalf of his Licchavi cohorts, asks the/Buddha to explain the purification of the buddha-fields (buddhak$etra) (Th 15), as he has already (in verse 2) identified the vision as revealing "the superb and radiant fields of the Sugatas" (Th 13).

But what exactly is meant by "purification" here? The Buddha's discussion details the ways in which a bodhisattva, by the merits of his own practice, draws karmically-ripened beings

,into his buddha-field when he attains enlightenment. A ,bodhisattva perfects his generosity, and thereby causes generous

96 JIABS VOL. 11 NO, 1

beings to be reborn in his field; he perfects his morality •• \'~;2~ II ' b ' d h' DI ' , alJ.d. mora y vlrt~ous emgs ar~ rawn to l~, tlmately, throu;~~

a causal cham of several lmks, the punty of the buddha-fi1cii. becomes a reflection of the purity of the bodhisattva's own rri~££; (Th 18). Since t~ebodhisattva has become a ~u~dha, this purif'~! cannot be anythmg less than absolute. Why IS It, then, thatth'~ "sup.erb and radiant fiel?s ofthe Sugatas" m~terialize underth~~: magIC parasol replete Wlt~ all the pur~ and l~p~r.e features6l1 the natural cosmos? How IS such a kaleIdoscopIC VISIOn reflectiy'!i of the Buddha's inner state of puritY?.1~i;i

. Sariputra finds himself wondering these very things.BSPf:'.' cifically, he questions whether the apparent impurity of thfi: magically revealed buddha-field is somehow a reflex of the implll'J;: ity of the Buddha's mind when he was still a mere bodhisattvd/ (Th 18). And here we encounter the text's first real ontologic~l;; argument concerning the nature of both upayically-controllec(; reality and the cosmos as it appears in everyday life. Ler.i.W1 examine it closely. ,.i;n

The Buddha addresses Sariputra's doubt by explainingl~~"t. appearance of the buddha-field in terms of the perceiver's mentaLJ state: "Sariputra, the buddha-field of the Tathagata is pure, bllr,lj you do not see it" (Th 18). In explaining the vision this way;;]; the Buddha implies a twofold reality: the first aspect ofth~.~ ~eal-its genetic or creative aspect-is pure because the buddhqi:; at the center of the buddha-field is pure. But the second aspectL~\; its apparent or phenomenological aspect-conforms to the dis.~!l position of the mind which perceives it. As the Buddha putsiti; "What do you think, Sariputra? Is it because the sun andtlj~\ moon are impure that those blind from birth do not see theII1?':;l. (Th 18). . .i/~~);

Thus, in ontological terms, the appearance of the cosll1,o~': tells an ordinary man nothing about its intrinsic nature. Thi~; radical statement is only emphasized, of course, by the facttha~.! the vision under discussion is a spectacle magically displayedQY\~;2

. the Buddha's upayic powers. But in what sense is this th.e~:.; upaya? The Buddha's upayic emanations seem to be truncate~., I;>y the narrowness of Sariputra's mind. As Brahma Sikhina~:I~;g monishes him, "Lord Sariputra, because there are highsan~~ lows in your mind, in reflecting on the Buddha-knowledge yO~!,;'l are convinced that it is not wholly pure" (btsun pa shi'i ri 'ibH~~;

'~;[

, \,]';~~~-: ; .. :~,,' i"i!;::

( .. ~~J~


1,:i~':~~:;j ,-,; - . ;;KtS la rnthon dman yod cing sangs rgyas kyi ye shes La bsam pa yongs Jf&rn~ dag par nges so;. Osh 154). Has t~e Bu~~ha's u~aya failed for Sariputr~? Or, ~tlll more provocatively, IS It I?osslble that a '~pectacle whic~ enlIghtens one sort of man can sImultaneously ~confuse and mIslead another? . ;~;;i

~~irhe Jewelled Cosmos ~'::'g->~/

i~'j~( The miracle of the parasols almost immediately undergoes ~'J1.lrther mutation which seems to remove any doubt as to the ~J.lddha's complete control over it. With a tou~h of his t~e to l~eground the Buddha transforms the cosmos mto a matnx of ~~wels, wherein each beholder perceives himself to be seated on ~jewelled throne (Th 18-19). The text intimates that this transifiguration applies not (only?) to the cosmos reflected in the giant !parasol, but also to the cosmos in its everyday form. If this is illiecase, the Buddha has shifted his ontological demonstration :Iiom the domain of the overtly magical apparition (the giant ~~rasol-mirror) to that of the "natural" world. This is an ambi,Mus step, for it dramatically equates the common phenomenal :,~()rldwith the illusion built of maya. tee. Such a step is consistent, of course, with the philosophical :~t'lllceof the text: when the Buddha later "blunts" (brtuL ba) his ~apidary vision, eighty-four thousand beings who had been "deW:.()ted to the grandeur of the buddha-field" suddenly see that "all \things are by nature but magical creations" (Th 19). As is often :.t4ecase with Mahayana pericopes of magical upaya,9 it is not so much the vision itself but its withdrawal which precipitates an [~piphany in the beholder. Here the visual rhetoric of the text~ ;tbemirrored duplicate cosmos, the successive transfigurations :~fillusion and ~'real"-clrives home a specific doctrinal point, ;~nd with such force that each witness to the spectacle has a '.(eligious awakening. As we would expect, these awakenings vary ~ith the karmic disposition of the being who is awakened: while !the sravakas, for example, extract a lesson in impermanence trom the incident, the bhi/0us are released from their asravas. :~uch later, in the eleventh chapter, the Buddha will further ~~tend this principle of dispositionaLity by asserting that each ,~ddha-field emphasizes a particular type of disposition and thus tF· ~:::::::"

98 JIABS VOL. I 1 NO.1

a particular brand,of upaya (Th 86).;.,;~ But what of Sariputra's concern about the pUrity rl"'1:

buddha:field? The Buddha answered his disciple by statinO .• ·.·.ht. r:.: .. · ....... . . S- . ,. I" d . d h' h d g t at It was anputra sown Imlte mm w lC cause various "h'Ii:s and lows" to infest the original vision of the cosmos. ThrJg 4ij his magical upaya the Buddha now makes it possible for Sarip ll~~;: to see the field as pure ~as .symbolized by the jewelled arr~trj~): Yet what has changed-Sanputra, the cosmos, or the illusi \\

The ontological question is confounded further by a ref.~:~!! ous one: If the Buddha is indeed the creator of his own bUdd~~! field, why would he choose, as a compassionate being, tOfil&"Y with impurities? Or, in thaumaturgic ter~s, if the BUddhaht~; the power to transform the cosmos by hIS upaya, why doesh' transform it toward greater impurity?<;1;.,

This is, in essence, a Buddhist wording of the problemdf theodicy, or the explanation of the profane's perdurance,ih default ofthe sacred's power. 10 As Wendy O'Flaherty has showl} the problem of impure creation found its classical Hindu SOhl~:! tion in Vedic and Pural)ic myths, where negative aspects ofth!~! universe are created from the more baneful parts of Brahm~s'; own body. II For Sariputra, however, the cosmos is homologizeg"; with the sacred being's mind, not his body; Sariputra's moment} of doubt reflects a psychologization of the Vedic "dismembere(i~ god" concept, and as such poses a new series of dogmatic dileIll~l mas. A mapping of the variegated, sacred/profane cosmos: against the Buddha's presumably pure mind could hardlyber!.

supported in Sariputra's naive, devotional view. . ·S(;. The specific vocabulary of the 'Jewelled cosmos" passag~';

reveals a curious stance toward these ontological and religions;2 questions. Rather than speaking of the Buddha "creating" tht series of apparitions, the text prefers to say that he simply! "shows" them (stan). Is the Buddha the actual creator ofhif' buddha-field, or merely its presiding genius? There is evidence.' in the text to support both positions; side-by-side with the con( sistent use of stan to imply a mere manipulation of what already' exists, we find a curious passage in which the Buddha speC\ks, of a bodhisattva "making" (bya ba,' Osh 151) a buddha-field to.! ripen beings. But the use of stan in adverbial phrases ("showas\ X") is common and consistent enough to suggest that the text is generally more comfortable in describing the mode of an .


;)~; ran"ce than in assessing its ontological value. Rhetorically, if~tVNS uses stan in a r~lat~vely conven:io~al fa.s~ion; ontol?g.fa11y its use seems to mdicate a certam mdeCIslOn regardmg Ie' f _. ·D h h h ,\ . statuS o· upaylC magIc. oes t e text mean to say t at t e ~1on of the jewelled cosmos is a revelation of the "true" nature r¥the buddha-field-and thus of the ,Buddha's mental state? ~k The Buddha puts it this way: "Sariputra, the buddha-field i;~i;~lways like this; but for the sake of ripening lower beings, the I~~thagata shows it as contaminated by many faults" (Osh 154). 'ithe notion of "like this" is conveyed in Tibetan by 'di 'dra, $rqbably refle~ting a ~~nsk:it tad iva or a similar con~truction~a $llrase whose ImpreCIslOn m the source languages IS much lIke fits imprecision in English. We have no clue as to whether the i:~lation of the jewelled vision to the buddha-field is one of simile, Groimesis, metaphor, or identity. In short, even in this pivotal ;~assage the ontological status of the upayic vision is left open ~t(jquestion. 07:" We also detect here a subtle shift in the Buddha's rhetoric: ~hereas at first he insisted to Sariplftra that the impurities in :ihe cosmic vision were the result of Sariputra's own deficiency, ;;Howhe suggests that these impurities are his own upayic crea::tion. Yet these two positions are not necessarily contradictory. ;ltis, after all, the translation of ordinary reality through the first c'~ision and then the second which enlightens Sariputra-the ~three stages taken together form a soteriological unity, and thus ~r~l credibly under the rubric of upaya. While the text sidesteps ;~ny firm ontological analysis of the various levels of visions, :~hen, it clearly exposes the two key aspects of the upayic process: i~rst, the importance of the beholder's karmic disposition; and :;second, the process of progressive insight as steered by an en;lightened being. The incessant use of visual language (ston, ~~nang) roots the Buddha's upayic magic firmly in the ;phenomenological realm; though upayic conjurings may pro;yide their beholders with a realization of ontological emptiness, ',~eir own ontological status remains indefinite. As the case of 'i~ariputra demonstrates, it is the magical-upayic process, as rep~resented in the three stages of the jewelled cosmos vision, which 1rhatters most-for it is only by considering a juxtaposition of ;~isions that the disciple is able to see ontological questions in a ,new light. No single vision provides the necessary point and


,}fl,'i)W~

counterpoint for this characteristically Mahayanist awakeni~":i~i By the same token, the problem of the Buddha's own rno9:1\

. h' 1 .. Dh ki . ental' punty--or IS egltlmacy as a arm a- ng, to VOIce the oh·';\i, implications-is deftly skirted by an invocation of skill in rn Vi~'1~;\, . By transforming the variegated cosmos int~ a jewelled exp~~~:'X the B.uddha shows. not t~e. tru~ _n~ture of hiS own ~ind, butili,sj, emptm~ss of. t~e Impuntl~s Sa.npu~ra observes m the worlcf";; These impunties have their ongm m upaya, as the rnetarnoii?, phosis of upaya proves. .;,5{,'

With this established, the theodical pro?lerrr. is also rernov~J~~ the Buddha causes the buddha-field to mamfest Impurities soler); in order to lead lower beings to liberation. With the great~J; possible economy, then, the VNS is able to transmute a challeng6; to the Buddha's legitimacy and good intentions into a vivid proof of his compassion. By the close of the first chapter the~ text has apotheosized the Buddha as a supreme manipulatorbr phenomenological realities, a compassionate magician Whose' intentions are always salvational and consonant with th~!: Dharma. But what of Vimalakirti, that magician of equally irn::; pressive powers? 0":)

":","~):'i

. ;',: :,:::;,,:~j:b "/'

" ',:x~~~',' ·f:-

VI. Illness as Metaphor

With the introduction of the Bodhisattva Vimalakirti in the' VNS's second chapter, a second dramatic epicenter beginst6. emerge, one which presents a rhetorical counterpoint to the Buddha's actions and words. Having elevated the Dharma-king to a stature of religious supremacy and established his seataF Amrapal1 as the center of the cosmic array, the text shifts quicklY to Vimalakirti's house within the city of Vaisali, outlining the. Bodhisattva's character through an elegiac recitation of his quaP. ities and attainments. From the start. he is described through contrasts, oppositions which have the effect of casting his life" as a continuous play between illusion and reality: he wears layman's clothes, yet lives as a sramar;a; he has a wife, a son and harem, yet practices purity; he appears to be surrounded by~ retinue, yet practices solitude; he appears to eat, yetis nourishe~. by the virtues of his meditation (Osh 155-6). Once again, then~ we have a rhetoric of appearance: the spiritual being appear~

VIMALAKlRTINIRDESA 101

~S'dO one thing while actually doing its opposite. Nor is there ~%ydoubt as to ~h~ re~son f~:_t~is duplicity. We ~re to.ld expli~itly that Vimalakirtl lIves III Valsah for the sake of npemng sentient beings throl)gh hi~ upaya (Osh 155). If he go~s to games and t!ambling houses, It IS for the sake of convertmg garners and farnb1ers; if he ~oes into broth~ls it i~ for the sake of ill~~inating tbe evils of deSire (Th 21). HIS actIOns are not capnCIous but are, on the contrary, carefully crafted as salvific strategies. :f'D We have here an upaya which, while grounded in the manip~iation of ~llusi~n, .also inve~ts itself in worldly life. The Buddha ~inploys hls upaya m essentially two modes, the spectacular and the verbal-homilitic; this is appropriate to his dual role as a cosmic or semi-docetic saint, on the one hand, and a teacher of iDen on the other. By contrast, Vimalakirti, as a bodhisattva, kmploys his upaya initially through his worldly actions, preferHng to teach by example. This aspect of his spiritual praxis is the main theme of our introduction to him as a protagonist, 'lIrid by its position in the_ text stands in sharp contrast to the :[potheosized Buddha at Amrapali. ~. Immediately, however, the relationship between the 'Buddha and Vimalakirti is complicated. We learn that Vimhlaklrti, through his "skillin liberative technique," "shows" (bstan ~ston) himself "as if' (lta bur) ill (Osh 157). This illusion-the ~rst hint of what will soon emerge as a formidable power of illusion-has the effect of drawing visitors to his house to inquire 'after his health. Their visits give the malingering Bodhisattva ;~perfect pretext for a discourse on the emptiness and imperma'~ence of the human body (Th 22-3). To undermine the human :trust in the body's reality (satkayadr~ti) Vimalakirti characterizes ;it as prone to disease, ownerless, inert, selfless, lifeless, unreal, .yoid, insensate, filthy and false; in a series of similes he likens itto a mirage, a machine, an illusion, a dream, a reflection, an ~cho, a cloud, and an old welL This didactic interlude, besides opening the text to a common universe of Mahayana imagery concerning emptiness, 12 deepens its preoccupation with illusion.

In clear contrast with the action of the first chapter, in which the Buddha displays both verbal and magical upaya in grand ~tyle, Vimalakirti's first exercises of upaya are quite modest and only subtly magical. They serve in all cases merely to set up or introduce a doctrinal discourse, and no claim is made for their

--------- -----------------

102 jIABSVOL.llNO.l

own power to enlighten. Whereas the beholders of the p.,<l;;t;~ d . 1 . 1 b h . h b arasolt an Jewemrrac es are roug t to eplp any y the mer~\'J'~

of the. visual specta~les, thos: :vho ex~erience Vimalakirt~'ssh1~~;1 sory sIckness conceIve the spmt of enlIghtenment only fro .. ~ii.},;;

b 1 d ' h' h h ". k" d l' III tIle'l ver a Iscourse wh lC .c t ~ SlC man e Ivedrs. ~~e illness is}[it~~: an elegant metap or lor Impermanence an Splfltual SI'ckn"Jii",,;ti ess"} ~mt its r~ligious meaning comes out ~n~y ur:d~r the invalid;~:.~ mteq~retlve ~ecture. Moreover,.though It IS upaYlc~lly COnjured,'!;" there IS nothmg outwardly magICal about the Bodhlsattva'sind;\}I~ position; far from being a bold celestial spectacle of the BUddli~~~;tl type, it is only a homely affliction. The contrast of upayic rno/~:'); though it will seem to vanish as the text moves forward, und~tl}i scores an important tension between the buddhic and}:} bodhisattvic paradigms of the VNS. As we will see, this tensioJ:;: drives the story forward, not only dramatically, but philosophi{{ cally as well. ".:<.;;

"!~',:il

, ;~~f~ VII. The Gadfly of Vaisiil'i

'Cc/,

:,:):J,<:':'c:!

?2Ct)::/~

The two long chapters following that in which VimalakIJ~r~ is introduced are dedicated to an exploration of his verbal, and~ chiefly non-magical, upiiya. As the disciples and then the1 bodhisattvas in the Buddha's retinue relate their tales of hUInili~:~ ation at Vimalakirti's hand we begin to get a clear picture,.of~ the gentleman from Vaisali: as something of a curmudgeon,~}~ relentless debunker who makes it his business to confront pio~~} Buddhists and challenge their conduct. In this respect V{j malakirti must sometimes remind us of Socrates, who loiters aU the fringes of Athenian society to unmask hypocrites and attac(: the cant of the Sophists, One by one the Buddha's followers) beg to be released from their assignment to call on the invalid;' and as their stories unfold and interweave, the figure of Vi< malakirti grows to larger and larger dimensions, challenging.; that of the Buddha himself. Moreover, the very length of the.,' "reluctance" chapters (twenty-nine folios in the Peking edition): builds an element of suspense into the sidra, pointing ever mor,e" strongly to the absent Vimalakirti in his sickroom within in the, city. By withholding him from us the text intensifies his mystique}: and effectively builds anticipation toward a confrontation with~;


t"~\hafa later point. ~~t~<This dramatic technique reinforces the general tension be~~)~~n buddha and bodhisattva which we have been highlighting. <lW h d· . 1 f ~,;r~~fact that t. e ISCIP es ~e use a request of the Bu~dha-:-who l~"YMter all, thelr Dharma-kmg-cannot but create a dIrect rIvalry " 'een him and the Vimalakirti they dread. The implication oj

anecdotes is that even a mere bodhisattva's power can be such that ddha's wishes must be lift unanswered-a profound implication

?;jJideed, especially as the reluctant disciples must refuse the ~~~ddha dir~ct~y to his face: ~11,~(As the dISCIples temponze, of course, they repeat fragments ~~f.Vimalakirti's challenges and sermons, thereby illustrating the i';i&tiety of his upayic devices. Yet for the most part, the incidents i:lia've nothing particularly magical about them; the Bodhisattva's ~~ilpaya is of the dialectical or homilit~c var~ety, confined. to ,:ell*chosen words and retorts. 13 The mam pomt of the sectIOn IS to ~¢fY:.stallize Vimalaklrti's way o~ life: h.is attitude as. he moves kHlrough the lay world, and to bmld him mto a compellIng charac~;r~j with a formidable personal mythos. ~~!We must assume further, though, that the passages are ~eant to describe Vimalakirti in soteriological or hagiographical ~ihms. If he is not an overt hypocrite-if he practices what he ~'~reaches-his admonitions provide us with a clue to his own ~level of attainment and place within the Buddhist spiritual $ierarchy. Can we assume otherwise when he advises Sariputra ~t~."absorb yourself in contemplation in such a way that you lmimifest all ordinary behavior without forsaking cessation" or fito"manifest the nature of an ordinary person without abandonfririgyour cultivated spiritual nature" (Th 24)? These admonitions ,lJ,

ij:~ovetail perfectly with the initial descriptions of Vimalakirti in !~~he second chapter. In remonstrating with Mahama~Jldgalyayana, in fact, the roving Bodhisattva gives us a succinct ~picture of his own present activities: "You should be adept in .,~~gard to the spiritual faculties of living beings ... you should ;~teach the Dharma in order that the continuity of the Three 1Jewels may never be interrupted" (Th 26). He flourishes his . ability to intuit "the spiritual faculties of all beings" in the pres;~nce of Puma, causing some young monks to recall their prior i;llves and recognize their hodhic natures (Th 28-9); PUfl).a con',fludes that Vimalaklrti surely must be something more than a


sravaka, for the psychic feat he has just witnessed is onf' \"h;:""B~ traditionally belongs only to a tathagata. This comparis;n'l.c4<f;~

. ~he T~thagata is ech~ed boldly. by Upali, ,;ho warns his corn;~~~;;!' lOllS: Do not entertam the notIon that he IS a mere household'!~ Why? With the exception of the Tathagata himself there is no disc' efti~t ~r bodhisat~v~ capable o.f cOI?petir;,g with his ~l09.uence Or ri~ii~;~ ~mg the bnlha~ce oEhiS wIsdom (Th 31,. ItalIcs ~ine). AIld.[; mdeed, the senes of tales we hear about Vlmalaklrtl's litigio;':' encounters with the disciples would seem to confirm Upal~~'J assessment.· '.' .. ,} .

I noted above that the upayic mode for the sravaka chapte; is almost exclusively verbal. But as we move throughth~ bodhisattva chapter we begin to notice the intrusion of small magical motives, minor upayic spectacles which prepare th~: ~~ound f~r the comin~ confronta~ion ofyi~alaklr.t~ a~d Maii.j~_:;)' SrI, The fmal two pencopes of VimalakIrti s humIlIatIOn of th~! bodhisattvas-those involving J agatirpdhara and Sudatta-offe,{,i pointed parallels to two of the Buddha's powerful feats, leaving:;) no doubt that the man from Vaisall is in some sense a rival of';; the Blessed One. In the J agatirpdhara incident, Vimalakirtiisc~i; able to unveil a magic trick of Mara's, exposing the BUddha;s', old foe and leaving him hoist with his own petard. Not oni{'~ does the Bodhisattva unmask "Indra" as the evil tempter, but '. he takes the opportunity to convert the twelve thousand maidens': with whom Mara had meant to compromise Jagatlrpdhara (Th', 37-8). This is certainly a symbolic homology of the Buddha's; famous defeat of Mara during the night under the tree of en-" lightenment; it implies that Vimalakirti shares with the Buddha: an. ability to identify the personification' of the adharma andO l

uproot it.;. To complete the homology and thread it once more into,'

the present-time storyline, Vimalak"irti is described by Sudatta .... as having performed a magic trick very much like the Buddha's conversion of the parasols in the first chapter. The miracle .• ,'. reveals a universe called MarIci and shows a pearl necklace; transformed into a pearl-inlaid pavilion (Th 41). Though the ( specifics are different from those of the parasol miracle, the .... formal structure of the spectacle is much the same: like the: parasols, the pearl necklace is a devotional gift; like the cosmic:, canopy, another universe is displayed magically; and as with

VIMALAKlRTINIRDESA 105

~f,tH~l1lerger of the ~any parasols i~to a s~ngle giant one., . the ;li;!lnaIllent of pearls IS transformed mto a smgle large pavIllOn. l~~~hedrama~ic implication of the incident is that Vimalak'irti's ~~29srnic-maglcal Pdohwers, when employed, are comparable to ~~ose of the Bud a. ~hough a l?ere bodhisa~tva, _h~ can, like ~~;llie Buddha, freely mampulate realIty to serve hIS upaylC ends.

~21i~),. !::,t~:~~;:':,:--:~ ,-

~~V1IJ. Emptiness and Upaya ;t/',;)

';~0'; With Mafijusri's call on the invalid Vimalakirti, the two foci ~3fthe narrative finally begin to converge. Mafijusrl, the only ~i':podhisattva bold enough to take on Vimalaklrti, does not hesitate ';;tqengage him in a lively philosophical conversation. The topic ~'i;~Illptiness; the entry point, Vimalakirti's illusory illness. Once ~~~gain the Bodhisattva exploits his metaphor to the fullest, argu;';i#g that his illness is merely a reflection of the more basic illi:i1iess-the spiritual cupidity-of sentient beings. Here at last he ;;~xplicitly calls himself a bodhisattva, and admits that his affliction ;;;1s'£1 device of maya. These clarifications, following rapidly upon k(~he another (Th 42-3), point inevitably to the central doctrine Y~()fSiinyata. But they also provide an opportunity for Vimalakirti ~lolink emptiness with the bodhisattva path, the path of compasJ;sionate upaya. Specifically, emptiness acts as a corrective to "sen~i.fimental compassion" or a "compassion of attachment" (phan iyon'du Zta bar . .. snying rje; Osh 183; Th 46). In this sense, }:emptiness guides the bodhisattva, allowing him to be compassion~~te and energetic in his dealings with others without clinging ;!'t() these relations. r'; In this discourse we see a new relationship between upaya f~ind sunyata. In previous instances of upayic magic, the alterna.<tion of "natural" phenomenal appearances and plainly spectaculiar appearances functioned to reveal ordinary phenomenal re;;ality as essentially empty, analogous to the coruured images or ~rareflection in a mirror. Now, however, Vimalakirti argues that lthe understanding of emptiness can guide upaya itself, maintain,jng its appropriateness in a philosophical sense. Because the bodhisattva regards all beings as empty, there is no danger that he will become attached to them in the course of discharging

,:his upayic duties. True compassion purifies the bodhisattva to


the point where his voluntary incarnation resembles the liberation, or nirvary,a (Th 46); cloying compassion, on the hand, sends him through a cycle of reincarnations fired karma which h~s spurious atta.chments acc~mulate. UPaya, not only mampulates and dIsplays emptmess, as it were--'~u~',>+" takes its cues from emptiness and is circumscribed by it. ' ness acts as a moral force for the bodhisattva as he moves the world on his mission of liberation, protecting him backsliding and helping to keep his vision pure.

IX. The Magical Thrones

With this key point established, Vimalaklrti is freed to LAr.r.,;,

cise his magic to its fullest extent. The Bodhisattva's now grounded both morally and metaphysically; it remains to distinguish it from that of a buddha. As the head-on between Vimalaklrti and the Buddha draws closer, the VNS explore Vimalaklrti's bodhisattvic magic with closer integrating it with the bodhisattvic paradigm laid out in "reluctance" chapters. The most important locus for this nation is a miracle. performed in the middle chapters: the portation of the lion thrones into the Bodhisattva's

Sariputra, the hapless Pierrot of the sidra literature, himself the butt of several gentle drolleries once he malaklrti's house. One of these serves as the trigger of the spectacle: looking about him, the practical-minded wonders where the crowd of visitors will all find seats. alaklrti reads his mind and teases him, "Reverend did you come here for the sake of the Dharma? Or did come here for the sake of a chair?" (Th 50). The two engage in a brief exchange which interprets the question chairs as one of attachment to the physical body. In the however, Vimalaklrti honors Sariputra's wish by LL~L""lHL transporting 32,000 thrones from another universe room. The miracle exhibits a number of "impossible" the thrones, which are of large dimensions, arrange in the house without any crowding; the house enlarges accommodate them; the city is not obscured by the


~{y{th 51':"'2). The more advanced bodhisattvas transform their phys~~ci::t bodies so as to mount the lofty thrones; Vimalakirti gives It~l~lesser. bod~isattvas ~ special teaching which enables :hem to fibYf~\low SUlt. ~mally, Wlt~ ~ respectful bow to the Tathagata of !f~th~oth~r umvers~, the sravakas to? are a~l~, to seat then:selves. ,,';! this IS accomplIshed through Vlmalahrtl s legerdemam, and

~surrounding world is left just as it was before. Sariputra revels in this achievement, prompting the

,i, clhisattva to dilate upon the nature of his powers over phe\r~~ornenal reality. One who has attained the "inconceivable liber~;iHon" (acintyavimoksa) has the ability to alter the appearance of ~~~gpate and time at will; he can put Mount Sumeru, the largest li:;§frnountains, into a mustard seed, or make the passing of a 1~n'o/eek seem like the passing of an aeon (Th 52-3). ~~i~l' Critically, however, the efficacy of these miracles depends :t~~dpon the karmic receptivity of those who are meant to experil;1~rce them. Thus, even the most ambitious upayic magic is sub~i(j~ct.to the dis~ositi~n. of ~ts b~~olde:. 'Yhile the text .s~&gests ;t;\~arlier that thIS upaylC dlSpositlOnahty IS the responsIbIlIty of i¥r~e!magician himself, the present passage implies that disposi}r,.Honality is rooted in the karmic matrix of the world aroundf0:~pecifically, in the subtle interplay between the magician'S power ~~~iQmanipulate maya and the karmic context of the beholder. tiiX~' Such a necessity begins, in fact, with the very notion of the Jfft~iraculous: miracles appear as miracles only to those who are ~';'~estined to be disciplined by miracles" (Th 52). Not only is the ~j+I~~rticular setting and form of the apparition a function of the ~!~,R.~holder's karmic disposition; its very existence, its lj!'phenomenological possibility, depends on the presence of a re~;;:}eptive mind. The present passage suggests, then, that upayic ~;~&ispositionality is more than merely a positive quality added to !E~miracle by its creator: it is a root condition without which the J;tlIJiracle cannot come to be. The dogmatic implication of this ?:/principle is that the miracle of an enlightened being cannot t;~pring from anything other than upaya. Gratuitous magic-the ~sosmic sport or lila of the classic Indian gods-is not the magic :;·Ipfa buddha, nor that ofa bodhisattva. Magic has a purpose, and U.:this purpose is rigidly governed by the force of the karmic situ;~(~ation in which it is unfurled. 14

k'~~~1:', ~;i;~,;;::\< , Ff:':-

108 JIABS VOL. 11 NO, 1

X. The Goddess

, The deservedly famous chapter on the dialogue bet<~,;,;:I~ Sariputra and the Goddess contains,' besides their notew w.~~,~.;:;.

d d b f ' 1 d h' h OllllY"" pas, e eu~, a ~um er 0 mter u es w IC press forwardke'<t{l phllo_sophICal Issues, Foremost am?ng these ~ssues iSth~;t; Mahayana paradox of empty compaSSIOn: If abodhzsattva regd<i~j all liv~ng beings ~s essentially empty: how ~n? why shoUl~rh~";'l exerCIse compaSSIOn toward them? VImalakIrtl's answer is t<\!:<,

d h ' b dh' h Id 11 h' erSe~.' an to t e pomt: a 0 lsattva s ou reca IS own realizatio>:'.:i~ knowing his own emptiness, and help others to attain real~zati rl\~ while knowing theirs, In short, the bodhisattva's empathy fort~n,;.; p~enomenological world o~ il!~sory beings allows h~m-compei~ff hIm-to tran~cen? a lazy m!uhsm an~ com~ to theIr aid, Empt~~v or not, suffenng IS an experzenced reahty whICh can be mitigated ~! with proper insight and application, .. !/.;::,:

This r~ply" by :-eturning t? the p,heno~e.nological paradig~')~ and acceptmg ItS lIved value If not ItS vendI cal value, dovetails;.,' perfectly with the metaphysical position the text has adopted',~ toward upayic ~iracles: by e,mphasizing t.he cognitive immediacy.;~; of both suffenng and magIC, the VNS IS able to propound.a:J rigorous philosophy of emptiness without falling into pessimisni'\ or passive nihilism. Here, too, we find the basis for the text's·:·.~ moral view of upiiya: the bodhisattva's magical means are not: arbitrary, though they may be founded on emptiness; on the contrary, the karmic matrix which underpins the' phenomenological world guarantees that they will never turn, pernicious. Because the dispositionality of upiiya is in some sense beyond the magician's control, arising as it 'does from the karma of the beholder, magic is always experienced in such a way.as to serve the soteriological interests of the experiencer.

We might say, then, that upiiya finds its justification on the ontic plane. 15 Importantly, however, it succeeds soteriologically by shifting its beneficiary from an ontic and conventional view of reality into an ontological mode: that is, it makes him aware of the essence of his ontic experience, which is only emptiness, This play between ontic and ontological, besides allowing us to grasp the rhetorical structure of the text, provides the basic paradigm of the Mahayana Buddhist epiphany. After each in; stance of magicalmiiyii, some or all of the witnesses have a

VIAfALAKiRTINIRDESA 109

~;; went of awakening in which they see, in a pregnant sense, ~g:9 underlying structure of reality. Magic creates a disruption, t~hinkle, in the us~all~ unbr?ken continuity of ontic awareness, ~>(d it is through thIS dIsruptIOn that the nature of the phenom~~;U world is disclosed as emptiness. , ii~~i.The episode of the Goddess and Sariputra attacks one of 1lli~ wost b~sic types of ont~c immer,sion o.r blind.ness: the satkiil;;;1]d,f$ti, or VIew of the ~hyslcal body s realIty. As m ~he S.addhar~~pU1J,~arfka, a .dram~tlC sex change ~eveals the ar.t)l~r~ru~ess of 'the body's mamfestatIOn; and also as m the Lotus, It IS Sanputra rr~ho triggers the spectacle. 16 By the Goddess's magical power ,J6yin gyi brlab pa; Osh 1 99) ~e, is made to appear (snang) as the ~.poddess herself (lha mo de cz dra ba; Osh 19~). The Goddess's 'prankish conjuring is intended as a reply to Sariputra's inquiry ~as to why she does not transform herself (bsgyur) out of her ;.~feIIlale state;, when the miracle has taken effect she taunts him, i:IReverend Sariputra, what prevents you from transforming ~yourself from.rour female sta~e?" (Th 62).. . . ~~> The ensumg exchange brmgs the rhetonc of lllusIOn back :"t6center stage, arguing that one's physical appearance is mere f#yiya (Th 62). Philosophically, Sariputra and the Goddess conMude that something unmade cannot be changed-and that all {things, like Sariputra's female form, are neither made nor changed. This conclusion is foreshadowed in the very opening

;Sieps of their dialogue, as the God~ess explicitly introduces the i:theme of magical maya: "Reverend Sariputra, if a magician were ~:to incarnate a woman by magic, would you ask her, 'What preiyents you from transforming yourself out of your female state?'" '(Th 61). The word for "magician'" here is sgyu ma mkhan-liter;klly, "maya-adept." That Sariputra is himself subject to the vagaries of illusion, even in his physical being, is a break in his qntic continuum which he can hardly ignore. The philosophical 'thread of the scene is emptiness; rhetorically, it serves to create .a transition from the still dominantly verbal upaya of the middle .chapters to the ambitious visual upaya to come. Whereas the 'miracle of the transported thrones focused attention on the role of the individual's karma in governing magic upaya, Sariputra's transformation radically undercuts any tendency to identify this individual karma with the physical body. Scene by scene; a clear ;theory of upaya emerges, preparing the way for the magical


finale of the closing chapters.

XI. Two Emptinesses

. Chapte:-s Eight and Nine, coming in the wake of Sariptiti~\y~~ mterlude wIth the Goddess, further pursue the lesson of c=rn'f';:J1P~ tiness she has given him. In contrast to the disciple Sariputr,e~;i~ som~what plodding ques~ions: Chapter Eight gives .us a mo~i~:~ bodhzsattva whose behavIOr IS a perfect expreSSIOn oflii~!:i: metaphysical understanding:'··:?:

Of the true bodhisattvas, The mother is the transcendence of wisdom,

The father is the skill in liberative technique; The Leaders are born of such parents. (Th 67)

While dilating upon. the bodhisattva's :profound ~nderstandIif¥i~~ of the nature of realIty, the verses whIch compnse the bodyof:I'; the chapter also stress his worldliness, his self-chosen embedde?:(~~ ness in the sarp.saric order. The bodhisattva metamorphoses hirri~~; self into a hell-being, an animal, a courtesan, a head of state,";[i;%

':,~,?>,.-",<}; holy man-whatever guise will serve him in developing liViN(l:ip beings. His upaya expresses itself in a willingness to assumeall;~';; shapes, to melt into a series of magical masks, to utterly aban~9*d;~ his personal identity. In this sense it becomes, of course,~#ly object lesson in nairatmya, or the unfoundedness of beliefj~t1~ self. The bodhisattva is emptiness in action. Though always pre,s:-i~rj~ ent in times of need, though always energetic in easing the,;':j suffering of those around him, the true bodhisattva is intangibl~/~;, empty-and this ineffable quality is, perhaps, his deepe~p~ metaphysical teaching: ':I,,!;

They manifest birth voluntarily, Yet they are not born, nor do they originate.

They shine in all the fields of the Buddhas, Just like the rising sun. (Th 68)

. 'J~~ Chapter Eight, then, establishes both the bodhisattva cat~stiS

and its metaphysical emptiness. In Chapter Nine, the rheto~~,c;J;1 of emptiness receives a more abstract dialectical treatment,';

("->' ',/i\~

VIAIALAKlRTINIRDESA 111

~;~;tedly shifting from an ontic account of the bodhisattva's path t"pOIO . 1 d b h h" h Dh d ~,/;lian ontologlCa e ate over ow e enters t e arma- oor ~7~pon-duality" (Th 73). While Chapter Eight clearly demon~~\ktes the emptiness of the person, Chapter Nine concerns itself ?:,stL . f Th· . fhd . ~!0'iththe emptmess 0 concepts. ese two wmgs 0 t e octnne f:~~feInptiness-which shadow the text's dichotomy of visual and ;v:g'ihal upaya-lay the groundwork for the meeting of the ~~%4dha ~nd Vimal~k~~t~. Vimalaklrti'~ famous.silence, far from l~tttIninatmg all possIbIhtIes for verbal dIscourse m favor of purely i5fihive upaya, actually unites these two emptinesses: part of verbal j~pciya, after all, is knowing whe~ silence, or ~ buddha'~ inscrutable ,lisirtiIe, can be eloquent. The skillful alternatIOn of dIscourse and liaction is precisely what defines Vimalakirti's bodhisattva practice. ~4,'i.~~;-'

?J1-~?:4;""

lfi'jtrA Meeting of Magics :~ji(:~{:!,~":;:'i jit~f The final three chapters of the VNS witness a long-awaited ~;:'~~eting between the Bodhisattva Vimalakirti-empty though ~!h$emay be-and the Buddha. Here at last we find a dramatic f~t~6Iution of the tension which has been rigorously maintained jj~?etween the text's two chief spiritual figures: as the invalid trans~~Pbrts himself ane!. his visitors (by magic, of course) to the ~?B~ddha's seat at Amrapall, we begin to see the intent of the ~l~~refully established homology between the two characters. Two ~p~radigms of sainthood are at play here, and the figure of Vimi[;lJ-!akirti, by a subtle refraction, illuminates for us an important ~\lhdecision or historical motion in the Mahayana concept of bud;r~,qhahood. The interplay of the two saints, while plainly meant ;'lovalorize the bodhisattva as a character model, also reveals some~i~ing significant about the Buddha's changing status. it;; Chapters Ten and Eleven, those leading up to the final Ji~Ilcounter, serve to revive the theme of upaya, fitting it into the ;fosmological scheme with a chain of references to the multitude !~()fworld systems and their respective ways of life. Vimalakirti's ~irb.agical power is so vast that he "sends magical incarnations to r:~ll the buddha-fields of the ten directions, and all these incarna~;H~ns accomplish the buddha-work for all the living beings in all :~~hose buddha-fields" (Th 80); but by incarnating voluntarily in ,:::;the lowly Saha world, full of the "wild and uncivilized," the 'Jr'·

112 JIABS VOL. I 1 NO.1

bodhisatt~a has the precious opportunity to p~actice theten1!~~~ tues whlCh_ befit only such a ble~k rung of eXistence (Th 82~l~~ In the Saha worl~ the Buddha fmds unadorned verbal tea~hi~~'~ to be the most sUItable mode of upaya, for the most part S'~~7i identifying wh~t should be done and what sho~ldn't (Th 82~~,~\!~~

~he Bo?hlsattva,. too, .finds great salvatlo?-al power in th~~: pr.actlCe of simple ethICal vlrtu.es of a .non-magl:al character:i~i thIS passage, a m.ore conventIOnal View of upaya balances:th~;i, magICal upaya WhiCh permeates the rest of the text; it serve:'!

. d h h h .. f s to. remm us, per ~ps, t . at t e ,:,anetles 0 upa~a are as manYa~l1 the buddha-fields ~n ,:,hICh bodhzsattvas act upaYICally. Once agciiriii we have a steady mSIstence on what I have called the dispositio~; ality of skill in means: the karmic context of its exercise dete~~'; mines the specific character of upaya, guaranteeing its liberativ " efficacy. Ie

Despite the Buddha's stated rel~ance. on verbal teachinf.'· however, the present text abounds In mIracles. Why? As .we: have seen, the various miraculous happenings which movet~e) narrative forward serve primarily to catalyze or provoke a verb~l'l response: a question, a dharma-lecture, a dialogue. It is 1l6t'J~ that, as the saying has it, "miracles quickly convert the commori, ..

. man" (asu prthagjanasya rddhiravarjanakarZ)18; rather, it is acas~'~ of miracles provoking the beholder into metaphysical curioslty~~;. The interplay of visual and verbal rhetorics is most pronounced. when Vimalakirti at last betakes himself and his company to the: Buddha-and it is here, too, that the subtle differences betwee~': Vimalak'irti's magical upaya and that of the Buddha become most apparent. J"l,:

Chapter Eleven begins with a small but portentous miracle: " the Buddha's surroundings at Amrapali: begin, of their o~ll accord, to expand, while the assembled disciples begin to tak~ 1 on a golden hue (Th 84). The Buddha interprets these signs as an indication that Vimalaklrti is coming to visit, but the text{ leaves the source of the miracle unnamed. Is the omen the resulL! of Vimalaklrti's magic, the Buddha's, or neither? We are riot informed. But Vimalaklrti soon confirms the Buddha's surmise by magically transporting himself and his company to the gar~. den. Upon his arrival the Bodhisattva makes the customary gestures of reverence to the Tathagata, prostrating himself be-. fore the Dharma-king and assuming an uncharacteristic and


~l~~'fe~t silence. The vastness of his own upayic powers does eprevent him from rendering proper homage to il miglior

iJ. >this setpiece is followed by a brief dialogue between 'uda, the Buddha and Vimalaklrti concerning the ambrosial

~'ifi~a which th~ bodhisattvas have taken f~r lunch ~nd which now !.',.".'.'.·.',p·.··.sfrom theIr pores to perfume the aIr. Doctnnally, the core see ., h "fi f h' ~i¥Hhe diSCUSSIOn IS t e slgm lCance 0 t IS amrta as a metaphor ~dfthe upayic te~ching of.Dha~ma: like a ~ispositional t~aching, i:1l1enectar stays m the dnnker s body untIl he has attamed the I;;i:'~lization appropriate to his spiritual stage (Th 85). For beings ~~h6 have not yet formulated the thought of enlightenment, the 2~iritta will be digested only when they do so; for those who have ~~~~ady conceived the bodhicitta, the nectar will persist until they ,i~~iIize k$anti~and so on. f:~',WJt remains for the Buddha to expand Vimalaklrti's explana~ifon to describe the general principle of dispositionality through;(~{ltall the buddha-fields, as well as the unity of all buddhas despite iiQeir outward difference (Th 86-7). This discourse prompts the !~isiting bodhisattvas from the ambrosial buddha-field to ask the ~~'Jddha for a final teaching to take home with them. In what jJfollows, the Buddha brings together the ontic and the ontological 1.~treams of the text, arguing that, ontically, the bodhisattva must ['plunge into the world of compounded things ('dus byas; Osh ~,g24), while ontologically he must not rest in the uncompounded ';['dus ma byas la mi gnas; Osh 225). This double mandate throws ',!rIto high relief the career of the bodhisattva as an engaged being, ~9he who comprehends the ultimate nature of things yet [f~aselessly applies himself to salvational work in the world. The ,entiretext, in fact, when considered from the rhetorical perspeci)~ve, has exemplified this position, skirting a full-blown ontology 'iufavor of a persistent concern with praxis. Though the VNS ;iscertainly not without its philosophical interludes, in compari~on with other Mahayana works of its time it is rather uniquely

::cohcerned with playing out the actual practices of the .bodhisattva's life, deferring many scholastic problems which might blur its pragmatic vision. Needless to say, this vision is ,largely one of upaya . ...• ' ." . It is in the final chapter of the VNS that the career of the ybodhisattva-and his soteriological value-are given their ulti-


mate vindication. The Bodhisattva Vifualakirti stands be£3'it~1 Blessed One, surrounded by a multitude of admiring di~~~;r~~il As if in challenge, the Buddha asks: "Noble son, Whe~P"~~:;~ wou!d .~ee the Ta~ha~ata, h~w ~o you vi~~ hi~?" (Th 91). ~~~;~ alakIrtl s answer IS hIghly sIgmficant-it IS, m fact, the k,.~0·:~ his own dramatic and philosophical function within the teeY Z9\rJ . Accor~ing to the Saint fr~m Vais~li:, the T~thagata is n~iHJ;~ mg but an mterplay of OpposItes, an mexpressIbl: being who~~r; natur~ eludes human concepts: h.e does not dwell m~he prese6t~j;; n?r anse fro~ the past, nor p~ss mto the future;. he I~ identified;~ wIth the realIty of form, yet IS not form; he abIdes m ultima.tc~ reality (de bzhin nyid; Osh 227), yet between it and him there:,1'i\ no connection (Th 91). Not devoid of characteristics, he isn~~.1;~ possessed of them either; he is neither name nor sign; he Js':s neither good not evil. On the whole, he is simply inexplicabl~cl; (don du 'ang brjod pa ma lags pa; Osh 228). No verbal teachiIlg,~ can express him (Th 92)'/i':

The Buddha as painted here is ineffable; even a bodhisatt~~\){ as advanced a Vimalakirti can barely grapple with his state'~r:.; being. As we will see presently, this view of the Buddha-n?i~ so far removed, perhaps, from the docetic view of Christ;,~i: creates the need for a more manageable character model,;'!,;' personification of enlightenment whose (apparent) realityis~7. manifest and approachable. The final miracle of the VNS act~':J to establish the Bodhisattva as the man for the job: juxtapos~d) between the buddhic order and the samsaric, the bodhisattva acts .• as a religious interpreter, a sort of ~issing link who makd enlightenment comprehensible to those in the lower worlds.

Moreover, this pivotal role for Vimalakirti explains much" about the construction of the text itself: in particular, it helps to account for the subtle and tireless parallelism which is maintained between Vimalakirti and the Buddha, on the one hand,' and Vimalakirti and the common householder on the other.

The Buddha himself plainly realizes this important function .' of the Bodhisattva, for he overtly countermands Vimalakirti in order to emphasize bodhisattvic embeddedness in the sarp.saric order. Sariputra asks Vimalakirti where he might have died in. order to reincarnate in the lowly Saha world. In reply, and', perhaps with a bit of dry wit at Sariputra's effrontery, Vimalakirti. promptly deconstructs the question, arguing that since all things<


IJ~{;~ssentially magical creations, he cannot have been rein car;fLi d (Th 92-3). Surprisingly, though, the Buddh~ raises his "nate V· 1 1- ., d . S . :~:f';/e to sidestep Ima a nrtl s non-answer an gIve anputra a ,~pIC I . I 1 V· 1 k- . h . f h iIDrect, non-~nto ogICa . rep. y: Ima a lrtl, . ~ says, IS. rom t e ~~hirati Ulllverse, whICh IS under the spintual gUIdance of

f~!4°bhy~. . _.,. . J;4~,;~;Desplte VimalakIrtl s dlssemblmg, then, the Blessed One t;jgcat~s him sq,uarely ~ithin th~_ c?smol~gical spectrum, ~nswer~"g Sariputra s questlon on Sanputra s own level. ThIS leads %~inalakIrti to relent and offer a more ontically comprehensible ;J~~planation ~f his own_ reb.irth, admitting that he has i?- fact ;"teincarnated m the Saha umverse, whether he and the umverse ~~t~ mere maya or not (Th 93). i,~~~: The assembly then wishes to see the Abhirati universe. The ~Buddha, reading the thoughts of the disciples, orders Vim~~akIrti to reveal it: or, in more interpretive terms, the Dharma~~Ilg commands his proxy to perform some magic for the good iOLthe multitude. Vimalakirti executes the miracle as ordered, ;}iuid the company is rightly astounded. This accomplished, a 'i41ghly significant exchange occurs between Sariputra and the (Buddha, the final dialogue of the text proper: the Buddha asks ;:~ariputra if he has seen the conjured universe, whereupon ';Sariputra extolls Vimalakirti in terms which make the rtodhisattva's religious function clear at last: ':t"

I saw it, Lord! May all living beings come to live in a buddha-field as splendid as that! May all living beings come to have miraculous powers just like those of the noble Licchavi Vimalaklrti!

We have gained great benefit from having seen a holy man such as he. We have gained a great benefit from having heard such teaching of the Dharma, whether the Tathagata himself still actually exists or whether he has already attained ultimate liberation. (Th 95)

Sariputra's speech reveals a certain metaphysical doubt with regard to the Buddha: though standing before him, and indeed being addressed by him, the ordinary disciple is simply uncertain whether what he sees as the Buddha is real or merely a trick of magic. Vimalakirti, however, despite his own Madhyamaka rhetoric to the contrary, is real enough-or seems so-to have


a profoundly Hberative effect upoll his beholder..<~:!.' Here, I believe, we have the essential division betweel;\;\l~

Buddha a~d Vimalakjr~i as religi?us. teachers. The BUddhJe~\;; portrayed In the VNS IS a cosmIC fI'gure, well on his w .. \~~\~\ docetic apotheosis; Vimalakirti, as his proxy in the marketar\;~\\l:

d · h h h Id . f h ld pace,.! an In t e ouse 0 ,IS a man 0 t e wor ,empowered'li~

magic but indefa~igably engaged in .the external affairs ofc8~1\~ mon men. We mIght even wonder, In fact, whether Vimalakr:,l himself is a creation of the Buddha's, an upayic vision magicaif~ conjured in order to infiltrate the everyday world. But thisia~\ ical possibility aside, the Buddha's use of Vimalakirti-hisr~~; spectful praise for him, his insistence on his worldly embeddt~:l\ ness, his deferral to Vimalakirti's magic in the final scene--':'is; plainly upayic in the wider sense. The Buddha seems to realizJr~ t~at. Vimalakirti is a more approachable figure for the avera.gei" dISCIple, a character model one can actually hope to emulaie.Zj In this sense, Vimalakirti secures the worldly foundation()f; religious life while the Buddha himself is raised to a more aha: more docetic or metaphysical status. ,,~

);~}

Conclusion .

The VNS presents us with two of the most compellings characters in the early Mahayana literature, each drawn witH; remarkable finesse and considerable philosophical rigor. Byt playing them against one another through mechanisms of plot. and rhetoric, it maintains a sharp tension between them, highlighting certain parallelisms which unite' them while acknowl edging their profound differences. The Buddha is no long~r the humble teacher of the Pali texts; he is rapidly becoming~> supramundane, divinized figure, whose earthly presence is built on the shaky edifice of maya. Against this apothetic upwarc! pressure the VNS installs the Bodhisattva as anchor, establishing; him resolutely in the sar:p.saric world as a constant exemplar of the dharmic teaching. Vimalakjrti stands at the critical point of juncture between a 'cosmic order and a conventional one, acting as a living embodiment of Nagarjuna's two truths, ultimate and relative. His life, though immediately accessible to a layman of Vaisali, constantly intimates the greater ontological order, like}


~;~ipalifnpsest slowly wearing away to reveal an older metaphysical

(c1 tf1.lth. . ~i:{. The chief rhetorical mode of the VNS is, of course, verbal. 1it~Jt alongside t?e vari?us~ialo~ue~, an~ runr:ing all thr~ugh r!ih~rn like a' phIlos0.r:>hIcal lliummatl~n, IS a VIsual rhetOriC ~f ~}~qual force, ~ rhet?~IC of spectacle. LIk.e an~ ~ype ?f upaya, thIS i~cit;g.ual rhetOriC exhIbIts a finely-tuned dlSposltlOnahty, conform:~i~gitself to the contours of its karmic environ~e~t an~ ~ppe~r;i'lhg differently to e~ch beholder. Mor~ove:, thIS diSposltlOnahty ;~igeerns to be a functlOn of the pedagogICal sItuation or encounter r~itstlf, not merely a skill the upayic teacher has learned. In this 'ii~rid other ways, the miracles of the text display a structure and %ecessity of their own, hinting that maya, even as illusion, must :~iinidue course have a certain logic. :it;. Philosophically, however, this possibility is never addressed. ::iinptiness becomes a way of describing the mode of appearance, 'J'Aot its ontological status. And this emphasis on modality is per;Jectly consonant with the upayic methods of the bodhisattva, for f$hilosophical constructs cannot, we are told, capture reality. r';6' The VNS is eminently a teaching in motion, a text which ;*~hfolds as much through its plot events as through the dialogues ~i6f its protagonists. To grasp its philosophical orientation corF;ectly it is essential to give due weight to the narrative and i(~esthetic structures which underrun it. And it is this quality-an f~Itistic quality, to put it most simply-which sets the Vimalakir;'tinirdesa in a class of its own, making it one of the most enjoyable 'Mahayana texts to read and reflect upon. To the very extent ',.that it can draw us in with its beauty and humanity, its own :upayic power stands undiminished by time.

NOTES

1. In the use of these terms I mean to suggest that the predominantly yisual materials of the text-particularly, of course, the moments of magical upaya-are governed by a logic of persuasion much as are the verbal dialogues. This position is inevitable if one accepts the upayic intentionality of the spectacle-a hardly radical position in light of the fact that each major spectacle is followed by a report of religious epiphanies experienced by its beholders.

In referring to the "discursive" rhetoric of the text, I mean the text's 'verbal elements taken in the widest sense: philosophical discourses, laudatory


verses, tales, and even the Goddess's playful jibes at Sariputra. ",';\1 2 The VMS does not survive in Sanskrit; it is generally Delt th ;eG.'.' . '. .. at th~;

canomcal TIbetan verSIOn gIVes the most coherent and fluent reading a ?\'r the surviving editions. In what follow .. s I have adopted two systems for idellI~fyng'f . I r I h R Th ' I 'd ntl -,i mg textua relerences. n cases were. urman s UC! translationr, ';i~ Holy Teaching of Vimalakirti, seems to me to capture the sense of the Tib3e;;i'

I I "11 . . h r (Th ) . h etan: '\ accurate y, WI CIte passages m t e lorm xx ,WIt xx representin: :"ii;'; page number from his translation. In cases where I disagree with Thurmg}"'i; read~ng or wis~ t~ highlight a grammatical point, I will ~ive either the Tibe~J} text m romamzatIOn followed by a page reference to ]Isshu Oshika's critiI,I; edition (see Bibliography), or simply an Oshika reference with no text. Re£cay~ ences to other canonical and secondary works are given in endnotes. cr,,"

3. L. Hurvitz, tr. Scripture of the Lotus Blossom of the Fine Dharma (New" i York: 1976) 22-25 et passim. "

4. Ibid., 58-83." 5. Ibid., 60-61. 6. For a more detailed discussion of visual illusion in Mahayana SiltT~

see my paper, "Discourse in the Larikavatara-sutra,"Journal ofIndianPhilosoPhy~ (11: 1983), section one. For a representative Hindu parallel of the "doubled; cosmos" motif, see W. O'Flaherty, Dreams, Illusion and Other Realilies (Chicago:i~ 1984) 103-109. . .... , ... '

7. Cf. Eliade, Myths, Dreams, and Mysteries (New York: 1960) 60. Eliaae', stressed throughout his work the connection between the axis mundi concept':,' and the myth of paradise, a resonance which is perhaps not out of place in;' the present text. ... '.

8. The text tells us that Sariputra's skepticism regarding the purity ()f; the magically-revealed buddha-field arises "by the power (anubhiiva) of the' Buddha" (sang rgyas kyi mthus; Osh 153). This is the exact phrase used earlie{ to account for the creation of the spectacle in the first place. It cannot be' determined from the text whether the repetition of this phrase is meant to imply that the Buddha, in a new act of magical manipulation, has put the, thought into Sariputra's mind, or whether the reference simply points back;' ward to the initial creation of the spectacle. Thurman opts for the former reading; but if an act of overt thought-control is suggested here it is difficult' to explain why the Buddha must then read Sariputra's thought telepathically

'(yongs su rtog pa thugs kyis mkhyen; Osh 153). ' 9. Compare the vanishing Buddha in the RavaI)a chapter of the Larikii-"

vatara-sutra; cf. my 1983 paper, op. cit., pp. 270-275, for an analysis. 10. See O'Flaherty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley:

1976) 1-3. 11. Ibid., 139-140. 12. Hamlin, op. cit., 277-8. 13. The reluctance stories effectively convey Vimalaklrti's ability to ad

just his upaya to the disposition of his auditor. Thus, his challenges to the, sravakas are geared to vinayic issues, right views and conduct in sarpsaric lik, By contrast, his lectures to the bodhisattvas chiefly concern nirvaI)ic ideas~ ' •. Verbally, then, Vimalaklrti's upaya reflects the same "dispositionality" we found

vnwALARiRTINIRDESA 119

f1;JJ:~:,';'\" " l:?;i'the Buddha s magIC. !~~< Thurman's and Lamotte's endnotes to these vignettes detail the subtle f.\i;.,.: .•. ·· •. • .• ·ys .. in which the sermons and challenges are adjusted to legendary attributes ·.wa . ldh h'b ~;;)'f.the characters mvo ve : t us, to c oose ut one example, the well-known ~rscdic Mahakasyapa is att~c~ed by Vimalaklrti explicitly on th~ grounds of p:th{worthless~ess of austentles 5~h 26-:, .116). [Yet, see followmg note.] !j~;;.; 14. But If the power ofupaYlc magIc IS regulated in some sense by karma, t,fhat is its actual origin? The close of Chapter Six gives a surprising answer, \;~beit a partial one. ':imalaklrti asserts that all the Maras and beggars who ii(''ccost abodhlSattva are m fact other bodhzsattvas who, wearing an upayic disguise, .!:~oIIle to test the resolve of their peers. Their power is said to arise from their ~~{errible austerities" (Th 55). Common people (phal po ehe) never have the ~ibility (or authority; mthu) to trouble a bodhisattva. :.: This seems a rather strange passage for a Mahayana text devoted to k:~xioning the career of a worldly bodhisattva. It resonates deeply, however, with (the timeless Indian image of the ascetic, the tapasvin whose austerities heat R~pIndra's throne when ~hey become too great. As King Du~yanta in Kalidasa's 1~A.bhijiianaSakuntala puts It,

};"

Ascetics devoted to peace possess a fiery hidden power, like smooth crystal sunstones that reflect the sun's scorching rays.

[B.S. Miller, tr. Theater of Memory: The Plays of Kiilidiisa (New York: 1984) 105]

t;Viinalakirti is no forest-dwelling yogi, but we should remember that he is, in ;;ih~ literal sense, chaste. The bodhisattva's austerities not only grant him the fpbwer to manipulate maya but also protect him from the corruptive force of !{.tlie multitude-a statement with which apologists for many religions might ('concur. At this formative stage of the Mahayana, then, we see that insight r~lone is not felt to be a sufficient explanation for the bodhisattva's extraordinary ::~ttainments; there still lingers the idea of the hermit who buys his attainments ~jvith a pound of flesh, even if the rigors of such a course are only sketched lin passing. '" 15. The ontic (ontisch) / ontological (ontologisch) distinction is borrowed ;berefrom Heidegger. In general terms, the ontic is that which pertains to the ilived phenomenal world as lived; it implicitly assumes the experiential immedilacy of entities encountered "in the world." The ontological, on the other hand, ,pertains to any attempt to articulate the conditions for the possibility of this 'Jnl,nediacy of being-namely, the essential structure of the "rea!." For 'lI1adhyamaka metaphysics, of course, the key ontological truth is emptiness. fo 'say, "I see a miracle!" is to make an ontic statement; to say "Miracles are founded on emptiness" is to invoke the ontological. Ontic awareness-Heideg. ger's "everydayness" (Alltiiglichkeit)-assumes without question the reality of .~xperienced things: this is the error (bhranta) of the common man, according itO Buddhism. For Heidegger, the philosopher describes a circular movement.

120 JIABSVOLII NO.1

from this naIve awareness to a theoretic~l awareness or ontology, the .<;::'~41 . h . Th b dh' d . f h VNS . h" n back'" agam to t e ontlc. e 0 lsattva octnne 0 t e ,wIt Its lilsistence ";::~

the bodhisattva's return to the world, makes a similar circular movem ,on.k though rather than founding its ontology on the doctrine of Being (S .en)t::,;;

em as'~'" Heidegger does, its reposes itself on emptiness (Sunyatii.). '>!:;

For a discussion of the ontic and the ontological, see John Macqu "~'~ij and Edward Robinson, tr. Being and Time (Harper and Row, 1962) pp. ;~~,} + ff. 5~;:

,~'A.t

16. Hurvitz, op. cit., 200-l. 17. Thurman's "concealing his miraculous powers" is absent from

Tibetan recension at my disposal (Osh 218). 18. This stock aside occurs in several texts. See, for example,

adiinasatakam (Suprabha story, 4.4) and Divyiivadiina (133.9 and 192.8).

Selected Bibliography

The Vimalak'irtinirdeia-sutra

Xylograph and critical editions: 1. Tibetan Xylograph text Suzuki, T., ed., The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking Edition (Tokyo and Kyoto: 1957)Y:

bKah-hGyur, mDo sNa Tshogs VIII(34): 74-101. Tibetan title: 'Phags-pa/, dri-ma med-par grags-pas bstan-pa zhes bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo. [Tibetan ',.' •• : translation of Ch.os-nyid Tshul-khrims.] "

2. Chinese texts Takakusu, J., and Watanabe, K., et. al., ed" Taisho Issaikyo (Tokyo: 1924-35). '

Texts: T. 474, T. 475, T. 476. [Chinese translations of Kumar,ylva, Hsuan-tsang, Chih Ch'ien.] ,

3. Critical editions and romanized texts' Bailey, H.W., ed., Khotanese Buddhist Texts (Cambridge: 1951; rev. 1981) pp.'

104-/113. [Khotanese fragments mentioning Vimalaklrti.] Kara, G. Le sutra de Vimalak'irti en Mongol: texts de Ergilu-a Rincin: Manuscript

de Leningrad (Monumenta linguae mongolicae collecta, no. 9) (Budapest: ,: 1982). [Romanization of a Mongol VNS manuscript.] ,

Osshika, J., ed., "The Tibetan Text of Vimalak'irtinirdeia." Acta Indologica I (1970) pp. 137-240. [Romanization of Tibetan text.]

Prasadika, Bhik~u, and Joshi, L. M., Bhotzya saT(lskara1'}a, saT(lSkrta udviira eva1/! hindz anuviida (English title: Vimalakzrtinirdeia-sutra: Tibetan Version, Sanskrit Restoration and Hindi Translation) (Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica, vol. V) (Sarnath: 1981). [Critically edited, typeset Tibetan text, Sanskrit restoration, Hindi translation].

Modern translations:

Boin, S., trans. The Teaching ofVimalakirti (Vimalak'irti-nirdesa): From the French

VIAfALARJRTINIRDESA 121

Translation (of Lamotte), with Introduction and Notes (Sacred Books of the ~f( Buddhists, vol. 32) (London: 1976). [English rendering of Lamotte's ;,:' French translation (below); certain material has been omitted.] ;;;i~cher, J., and Tazeko, Y., Das Sutra Vimatak'irti (Das Sutra tiber die Erlosung) t. (Tokyo: '1944; rev. 1969). [Cerman translation from Kumaraji:va's t: Chinese.] ::jclzurni, H., "The Vimalak'irti-sutra," serialized in Eastern Buddhist III-IV. [En:'~:; glish translation from the Chinese.] ;:£arnotte, Et.,.L'Enseignemen~de Vimalak'irti (Louvain: 1962). [French translation ;.. from TIbetan and Chmese.] :tuk, c. (Lu Kuan Yu), The Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra (Wei Mo Chieh So Shuo :, Ching), (Clear Light Series) (Berkeley and London: 1972). [English trans-"'" lation of Kumarajlva's Chinese.] iThurrnan, R.A.F., The Holy Teaching of Vimalak'irti: A Mahayana Scripture (Ini, stitute for the Advanced Study of World Religions series) (University J. Park and London: 1976). [English translation from the Tibetan.]

:,,"","/j

Critical apparatus:

,j{itarnura, S., "Variant Narrative Texts of the Vimalak'irti-nirdesa sutra, " Journal • of Indian and Buddhist Studies 24:2 (1976). bshika, j., "Appendices to the Tibetan Translation of the Vimalak'irtinirdesa .... (Acta Indologica I): 1. Concordance of the Four Translations; II. Cor.':. rigenda," Acta Indologica III (1975). Oshika, J., "An Index to the Tibetan Translation of the Vimalak'irtinirdeia," ,. Acta Indologica III (1975). Weller, F., "Bemerkungen zum Sogdischen Vimalak'irtinirdeia-siltra," Asia Major

X (1935).

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_:;"I~i:,:;:;j

~i3hddhist Sanskrit In the I\}{alacakra Tan tra

"WJohn Newman

Vajrayana Buddhist texts were composed in at least three :ifndian languages: Sanskrit, Apabhrarpsa, and an East Indian ;dia1ect usually referred to as "Old Bengali." By far the greatest [p~rt of Vajrayana .literature was .w~itten in San~~rit, the lingu~ fra~ca of. pan-IndIC. culture. Thls IS not surpnsmg-th~ VaJ~rayana, like Buddhism as a whole, developed among dIverse "Uhguistic communities, and it is only to be expected that Indian ;:¥~jrayana Buddhists used the common language of educated ldlscourse to communicate their ideas. ii' The Sanskrit of the Vajrayana literature, however, is not fthe Sanskrit of Pa1).ini. According to M. Winternitz: "The ~S~nskrit in which the [Buddhist] Tantras are written, is, as a !'Hlle, just as barbarous as their contents" (Winternitz 1933 :40 1). 'Tp.e question remains as to the exact nature of this linguistic :;i'parbarism"-is it due simply to incompetence on the part of ;Yajrayana Buddhist authors, or does some other factor, such 'as Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, come into play here?l ", Perhaps the earliest Western comment on the Sanskrit of faVajrayana text is L. de la Vallee Poussin's description of the :~anguage ofNagarjuna'sPancakrama: "11 est ... redige en sanscrit, ;#ans une langue riche de termes techniques et de particularites '~rammaticales ou prosodiques, mais qui, du point de vue phonetique, est correcte et n'exige pas les vastes connaissances ~tla surete de main que suppose l'edition du Lotus ou celle du lvIahavastu" (de la Vallee Poussin 1896:VII). In other words, ~the Sanskrit of the Pancakrama does not always follow pa1).inian '!,lorms, but it is not what we today would call Buddhist Hybrid ,~anskrit, or Buddhist Arsa. 2

123

124 JIABS VOL: 11 NO.1

So~e scholars reject the i?fluence of BuddhistHh~f;~jl Sansknt on the language of VaJrayana texts. D.L. Snell Y~&'r d 'b' h S k' f h H . 7' groVer. escn mg t e ans nt 0 t e evaJra .Lantra, says: "The li'{r,: guage need not be graced by the term Buddhist Sanskritt~~:~ just. bad Sanskrit" (Snellgrove 19?9:xi). C.S. George, aite~)~~ metICulous study of the firs~ portIOn of the Carj,{;lamaharo$aiiil! Tantra, appears to concur wIth. Snellgr~ve: "The language6B1 the [C~r;r;lamahiiro~atJ:a Tant:aJ. . . IS Sansknt. Alth?ugh the voc~ti:J ulary IS ofter: techmcal, thIS seems har~ly su~fiClent groundstb~ confuse the Issue of language by descnbmg It as 'Buddhist It'.) brid Sanskrit' or even 'Buddhist Sanskrit.' The subject mat/1~ is Buddhist, but the language is Sanskrit, close indeed toth~j Sanskrit of the Epics" (George 1974:14)",f

Other scholars, on the contrary, discern a relationshipbt' tween the Sanskrit of the Vajrayana literature and BUddhist': Hybrid Sanskrit. B. Bhattacharya says: "The Sadhanamala, J()t' all intents and purposes, is written in Sanskrit, but the Sanskrit used here is far from what we usually understand by the w()r~:' It is the Sanskrit of the Buddhists,-similar to t,hat employea' in the Mahiivastu Avadiina, theLalitavistara, the Si~iisamuccayd,:! the Kiirar;r;lavyuha, the Saddharma-Pur;r;larika, and similar works"] (Bhattacharya 1925:viii). T. Skorupski, commenting on the lari0; guage of the SarvadurgatipariSodhana Tantra, says: "The text9f this Tantra, like many other works of this kind, has many', peculiarities of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. To a Sanskrit schol~f who is not acquainted with this kind of literary work and whtJ has no sympathy for Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit many grammaC ical endings will appear simply as wrong" (Skorupski 1983: 118).'

Most pertinent to the present essay is H. Hoffmann's de: . scription of the Sanskrit of the Paramiidibuddha-the Kalacakra " mulatantra: "[The Kalacakra mulatantra] is not only written ill Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit but in a very corrupt barbariail Sanskrit of a semi-Indian region in the far north-west",. (Hoffmann 1973: 136). A characterization such as this, however, must be evaluated in light of what the Kalacakra tradition itself has to say about the question of "correct" language.3

. In what follows we edit and translate the Sanskrit and Tibe· tan of a yassage from the Vimalaprabhii, the great commentary on the Sri Kiilacakra (the Kalacakra laghutantra). This passage describes the language of the Paramiidibuddha, the Sri Kalacakra,.

BUDDHIST SANSKRIT 125

g Vimalaprabhii and, by extension, the entire early Kalacakra ~i't:rature.4 The Sanskrit text of this passage was first published ;,ieventy years ago,s but Western scholars have not given it the :;&'ttention it deserves.6 a,

te~arp ca susabdavadinarp susabdagrahavinasayarthasara1).atam asritya kvacid vrtte 'pasabda1:;/ kvacid vrtte yatibhanga1:;/ kvacid avibhaktikarp padam/ kvacid var1).asvaralopal)7/ kvacid vrtte dlrgho hrasva1:; hrasvo 'piS dirghal)/ kvacit pancamyarthe saptaml caturthyarthe ~a~thl/ kutracit parasmaipadini9 dhatav atmanepadam atmanepadini. parasmaipadam/ kvacid ekavacane bahuvacanarp bahuvacana ekavacanam/ purplinge napurpsakalingarplo napurpsake purplingam/ kvacit talavyasakare dantyamurdhanyau ll/ kvacin murdhanye dantyatalavyaull/ kvacid dantye talavyamurdhanyau/ evam anye 'py anusartavyas tantradesakopadeseneti 12/ tatha mulatantre bhagavan aha/

sucandra sarvabuddhanarp deyarp nitye~tavastukam/ si~yebhis ca guru1).arp ca bharyaduhitrputrakam//(l) gandho bhavati medinyarp toye ruparp raso 'nale/ vayau sparso 'k~are sabda dharmadhaturl3 mahanabhe//(2) gandhadhu padidi pe bhi1:; khana panadivasasai1:;/ pujayitva sada mudrarpl4 guror dadati satsuta1:;//(3)

ity evam adayo .'nye 'py apasabdal5 yoginavagantavya agamapathadl6 iti/ evarp tikayam api susabdabhimananasayal7 likhitavyarp mayarthasara1).atamlS asrityeti/ atha yena yena prakare1).a kulavidyasu sabdabhimanak~ayo bhavatp9 tena tena prakare1).arthasara1).atam asritya buddhanarp bodhisattvanarp dharmaddana ddabha~antare1).a20 sabdasastrabha~antare1).a

mok~artham/

Vimalaprabhii 1.321

"In order to destroy the attachment to correct language of those (brahman sages22 who) advocated correct language, (Kalki Yasas) relied on the meaning. 23 In some verses (of the Sri Kiilacakra) there are ungrammatical words. In some


verses the caesuras are lacking. Some have words without case endings, In some, letters and vowels are elided (BHSG 2.3,2.17,2.72,2.84 ff., 2.90, 3.106, 3.122, 3.118). In SOIDe verses long vowels are short, and short vowels are long (BHSG 1.10, 3.1-46). In some the locative case is used for the ablative case (BHSG 7.82), and the genitive case is Used for the dative case (BHSG 7.63; Whitney 294b, 297a' Holtzmann 297). In some a middle voice is attributed to ~ root that possesses an active voice, and an active voice is attributed to one that possesses a middle voice (BHSG 37.22 ff. & 37.10 ff.; Whitney 529a, 774; Holtzmann 530, 774). In some the pluralnumber is used for the singular number and the singular number is used for the plural numbe; (BHSG l.10, l.101, 25.4). The neuter gender is used for the masculine gender,and the masculine gender is used for the neuter (BHSG l.10, 6.1; cf. Boltzmann 263). In some the dental (sa) and the cerebral (5a) are used for the palatal letter sa; in some the dental and the palatal are used for the cerebral; in some the palatal and the cerebral are used for the dental (BBSG 2.56 ff.; Boltzmann 63). There are also other such things that must be understood in conformity with the instructions of the tantra teacher. Likewise, the Bhagavan (Buddha) said in the basic tantra (the Paramadibuddha) :

Sucandra, disciples should constantly offer desired thingswives, daughters, and beloved sons-to all the~Buddhas and gurus.//(l) Odor arises from earth, form from water, taste from fire, tactility from wind, sound from the unchanging, the sphere of phenomena from the great sky'//(2) Constantly worshipping the mudrii with perfumes, incense, lamps, and so forth, and food, drink, clothing, and so forth, the noble son gives her to the guru.//(3)

A yogi should understand ungrammatical words like these, and others too, by reading the sacred texts. Likewise, I (Kalki PUl)<;larika) must write the (Vimalaprabha) commentary relying on the meaning, in order to destroy conceit in correct language. Thus, Buddhas and bodhisattvas teach the Dharma for the sake ofliberation-relying on the meaning, they use the different vernaculars and the different


la"nguages of the grammatical treatises, whichever eliminate conceit in family, learning, and correct language."

It should be noted that I have translated the Sanskrit of tiWispassage ~n .accordance ~ith the Tibetan translation. An exti{€ption to thIS IS the verses CIted from the mulatantra, where the t;1jbetan faithfully reproduces the grammatical solecisms of the t~~~skrit. 24

\f~> As Bu ston points out, the genitives sarvabuddhiinam in verse" ~1:t'l,guru1J,am in lc, and gurol:t in 3d must all be glossed as datives f!;t~u ston 1~~4:61y~-6). In ~c the first ca is .syntactically redun,j~ant, and sz~yebhzl; IS a VedlC form of the mstrumental plural "'£orthe a-stems (BHSG 8.110; Whitney 329d). ;~,.All the locatives in the second verse-medinyam, toye, anale, '~{iIld so forth-are to be taken as ablatives (Bu ston 1324:61114-;~grln 2c sabda is lacking a case ending. :.f,".. In 3a & b adi should properly come at the end of the comi,.~()unds. In 3a -dzpebhil; is, again, a Vedic form of the instrumen~talplural for the a-stems. In 3b-vasasail;, vasas, neuter, is treated ~~s,an a-stem (BHSG 16.26; Whitney 1315). In 3d the plural 'Ha,aati should properly be dadati, singular (BHSG 28.11). 'i.~;It is important to note that the langu_age described above ilsnot Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (Buddhist Ar~a). AsF. Edgerton :~~plains, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit "is a blend of Middle Indic iWith Sanskrit, but its basis, or substratum, is Middle Indic; the f~anskrit features are secondarily and superficially laid on" ((Edgerton 1956:134). Edgerton stresses that Buddhist Hybrid 3$anskrit "originally was, or was based on, an ancient, pre-ChrisAtian, Middle Indic vernacular. That is, it is not, and never was, '$anskrit" (Edgerton 1954:2). In particular, "[BHS] vocabulary 'isto a very large extent not Sanskrit, but Middle Indic" (ibid); '.and "[Middle Indic words] stamp the language of the [BHS] ;w6rks containing them as based upon another dialect than §anskrit" (BHSG 1.37). "Even the latest Buddhist Hybrid ;Sanskrit texts still retain numerous words, lexical items, which 'show their vernacular origin" (Edgerton 1956: 134). "."... The language of the Kalacakra literature, on the other hand, )s Sanskrit. As the passages cited in this essay exemplify, it is ~ot based on a Middle Indic dialect; it contains very few Middle !Indic words. 25 ff;


The grammatical "rules" gl'ven in the Vimalaprabha c:;: deed be applied to the language depicted by Edgerton :~~-:; Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar, but many of these feat IS:

are also common to the Sanskrit of the Mahabharata, the Puraures; and the Hindu tantras (cf. Goudriaan 1981 :27-28). Moreo1J.as,: t~ese.g~ammatical irregularities are ~ot the o~tcome of a nat~;ri ImgUlstlc dev~lopmen: from an e~rher Pra~nt-they appear to have been deliberately mtroduced mto the Kalacakra literatur

Early Buddhist traditions record that the Buddha ~.: thorized his followers to recite the buddhavacanam in their in:_ vidual dialects in order to convert the unconverted (cf. BHst l.6-1.13; Edgerton 1954:5-6; 1956:130-133). In the same} spirit, concern for the meaning rather than the words of the·· Dharma is often exhibited in the early Kalacakra literature. F~r example, in the Paramadibuddha the Buddha says:

yena yena prakareI)a sattvanarp paripacanam/ tena tena prakareI)a kuryad dharmasya ddanam//(5)

yogi sabdapasabdena dharmarp. grhI)ati yatnatab/ desasabdena labde 'rthe sastrasabdena tatra kim//(6)26

.. One should teach the Dharma in whatever fashion completely matures sentient beings.//(5) . ..

A yogi zealously grasps the Dharma through grammatical and ungrammatical words. When one gets the meaning from the local words, what is the use of technical terms?//(6)

Likewise, the verse introduction to the Vimalaprabha says:

sabdasabdaviciraI)a na mahati sarvajiiamargarthinam nanadesakubha~ayapi mahatarp marge pravrttib sada/

sattvanam adhimukticittavasatab sarvajiiabha~a para any a vyakaraI)e surahiracita sabdadivadarthinam//(37)

apasabdad artham api yogi grhI)ati desabha~atab/ toye payo nivi~tarp pibanti harps as tad uddhrtya//(38)

paramarthatattvavi~aye na vyaiijanasaraI)ata27 sada mahata28/

desasarpjiiabhir arthe jiiate kirp sastrasabdena//(39)

jiianarp tad eva na bhavati udite yasyapasabdasabdab29 syub/ sarvajiiasya na bha~a ya sa pradesiki jagati//(40Yo


Those intent on the path to omniscience do not greatly discriminate between grammatical and ungrammatical words. They always enter the path of the great ones, even through the lowly languages of various countries. The Omniscient One's language is Other,3! in accordance with the dispositions of sentient beings. Quite different is the language of those intent on arguing about the words and so forth the gods and nagas arranged in the grammars.//(37)

A yogi grasps the meaning even from vernaculars and ungrammatical words. Swans draw out and drink the milk mixed in the water.//(38)

In the realm of ultimate reality great ones never rely on the letters. What is the use of technical terms when one understands the meaning through the local expressions?//(39)

That which grammatical and ungrammatical words can express is not gnosis. That which is parochial to the world is not the language of the Omniscient One'//(40)

. PUl)Q.arika, the author of the Vimalaprabhii, tells us that his 'father Yasas introduced "ungrammatical words" and so forth ·in the text of the Sri Kalacakra "in order to destroy the attach'ment to correct language of those (brahman sages) who advo~ated correct language." Likewise, the irregular Sanskrit of the ;Vimalaprabhii is intended to "destroy conceit in correct language." Excessive esteem for Sanskrit appears to have had a 'deleterious effect on some members of the Buddhist community 'during PUl).qarika's time:

anena pradesikasarpskrtaikavacanena buddh032 pi pradesiko bhavati sarvasattvarutasvabhavinya sarvajfiabha~aya vinal iha aryavi~aye sabdavadinan tirthikanarp pal)c;iitanam abhimanarp dr~tva balamatlnarp bauddhanam abhiprayab/ yatha brahmahariharadayab sarpskrtavaktaro brahmal)avai~l)a

vasaivadlnam iHadevatab tatha.smakarp ya i~radevata buddhabodhisattvab sarpskrtavaktaro bhavantitil iha na ca te anena praddikasarpskrtaikavacanena sarvasattvarutair dharmaddakab sarpgHikaraka . bhavanti buddhabodhisattvab sarvajfiabha~aya

vinal ato devajatipratibaddha praddika bha~a33 buddhabodhisattvanarp na syad iti nanasattvarutadharmadesakatvat/34

"If he did not use the omniscient language that has the


nature of the utterances of all sentient beings, if he used<~ this parochial Sanskrit speech, then the Buddha would be only chial as well. Here in the land of the Aryans,35 foolish BUddPha:o~

, lsts see the arrogance of the scholarly heterodox proponents of· >,~ rect language, and corne to believe: 'Just as the chosen dei./or,\

. ' . uesof the brahmans, Val;iI).aVaS, Salvas, ~nd so forth-Brahma, Rari,' Hara, and so forth-speak Sansknt, so too our chosen deities' the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, speak Sanskrit.' But here th·.\ , ese ,. Buddhas and bodhisattvas do not use the utterances of all sentient. beings to teach and redact36 the Dharma solely by means afth'\ parochial Sanskrit speech, without using the omniscient laA~,. guage. Therefore, Buddhas and bodhisattvas do not use a para chiallanguage that is ~ntangled with birth as a ~od, because they' teach the Dharma usmg the utterances of vanous sentient beings."

We are not dealing with simple bad Sanskrit in the Kalacakra; literature because the irregular grammar employed in the sri Kalacakra and the Vimalaprabha is not the result of incompeten~e,: The authors of these texts, Yasas and PUl)<;iarlka, demonstrate •. considerable knowledge of the full range of brahmanicallearrr_' ing, including grammar, prosody, and poetics. They compos~ correct, even elegant, Sanskrit when they so desire. Moreover,> in the Vimalaprabha PUl)<;iarika sometimes even points out the' irregular forms appearing in the Sri Kalacakra, and explains>· how they deviate from standard usage. For exam:ele: ...•. , \, (l) Comment on the declension of kalayoge in Sri Kiilacakra I.26d: kalayoga iti pancamyarthe saptami (Vimalaprabha (S) B 31 bi3; .. ' U 77.19); the locative is used for the ablative. (2) Comment on the declension of jnanadhatau in Sri Kiilacakra II.24a: iha sarire apanavayur jnanadhator bhavati atrapi paft~

camyarthe saptamz (Vimalaprabha (S) B 57bl7; U 168.26); the loca-' tive is used for ablative. . (3) Comment on the number of $atsandhil; in Sri Kiilacakra II.25d: $atsandhir iti bahuvacane ekavacanarrt (Vimalaprabhii (S).8. 58a/2; U 169.12-13); the singular is used for the plural. .. ,:. (4) Comment on mahi in Sri Kalacakra II.25d: mahiti hrasvo bhilparyayal; (Vimalaprabha (S) B 58a/3; 169.14); short vowel fof long. . •.•. :. (5) Comment on antrameghal; in Sri Kalacakra n.34b: antrameghii 'ntra ity avibhaktikarrt padarrt antra1J,i megha bhavantiti (Vimalaprabhii


~(S)B 60a/l; U 174.27-28); a.ntra is lacki~g ~ _cas~ ending. (6) Comment on the declensIOn of karrJe m Srz Kalacakra II. 79c: ~fw,rn.e ity agamapathat pancamyarthe saptami (Vimalaprabha (S) B ~75b/2; U 213.11); the locativ: is used for the ablative . • ,;. The fact that the Sansknt of the early Kalacakra literature ?f~ strewn with irregular grammatical forms presents special prob}l~rns for the editor and translator. If these forms were used "consistently, it would be simple enough to learn to recognize .,Iand understand them. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The clqegular forms appear in verses and prose passages that are ;otherwise written in standard Sanskrit,37 and sometimes an ir~regular form is disguised in such a way that it can be interpreted :meaningfully, but wrongly, as though it were standard usage. ;' An example of this is kalac chunye$u in Sri Kalacakra 1.43., ;lwhich the Tibetans consistently translate as dus kyis stong pa rnams ;las. Kalat as an ablative of instrumental use is not extraordinary, • but the locative sunye$u as an ablative would be extremely problematic if we did not have the Tibetan translation (cf. Holtzmann

:,301). ; Another example is PUl).Q.arlka's usage of the words vivarta

(,and sar(l,varta in his comment on Sri Kalacakra 1.4. These terms ;usually mean "evolution" and "devolution," respectively (cf. ~Abhidharmakosa 3.90), but the Vimalaprabha exactly inverts their 'meaning: lokadhatutpado nirodho veditavyal; samvarto vivartakalas ,ceti; 'jig rten gyi khams 'byung ba dang 'gag pa chags pa dang 'jig pa'i dus kyang rig par bya'o (Vimalaprabha (S) B 22a/6; U 54.18-19; (T) 425/4). On first glance the Tibetans seem to have blundered

'in translating sar(l,varta as chags pa and vivarta as 'jig pa, but this idiosyncratic usage is confirmed by PUl).Q.arika's use of sar(l,varta in apposition to utpada and utpatti: atal; samvartad utpadakalavasat Sunye$v iti; des na chags pa ni 'byung ba'i dus kyi dbang gis stong pa rnams las shes pa (Vimalaprabha (S) B 22a/6; U 54.19; (T) 425/4); and kalayogat prajatar(l, samvartotpattikalavasat; dus kyi sbyor ba dag

. las rab tu skyes shes pa chags pa skye ba'i dus kyi dbang gis (Vimala-prabha (S) B 28a/1; U 68.12; (T) 45717 [comment on Sri Kalacakra I.11d]).

The linguistic peculiarity of the Kalacakra literature once again underscores our dependence on Tibetan translations and Indian and Tibetan commentaries for correct editing and translation of the Vajrayana literature in Sanskrit. Without their aid

132 ]IABSVOL. ll-NO. 1

we would be at a loss to establish the Sanskrit texts, not to sp 'k"; . h' . 38 ea of understandmg t elr meamng. '''''-.

The language of the early K~laca~ra literature is not Bud. dhist Hybrid Sanskrit (Buddhist Ar~a), nor is it simply substa. dard Sanskrit. It is Sanskrit into which various types of nonsta n. dard forms have been intentionally introduced. Most of then irregularities are common to Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit and la~e classical Sanskrit. While some of these solecisms have e pedagogic purpose, for the most part they are designed to coul~ teract pedantic arrogance. How far these findings can be applied to other Vajrayana texts will be an important subject for future research. '

APPENDIX: Rare Vocabulary from the Kiilacakra Literature I

Although the Kalacakra literature contains negligible Middle Indicvocab_ ulary, it does present a number of Sanskrit words that are either rare or unattested elsewhere. (Here we are not concerned with technical terminology; which is notorious for being poorly represented in current dictionaries.) Unless' otherwise noted, the following words are not found (with these meanings, at least) in the lexicons of Bohtlingk and Roth, Bohtlingk, Schmidt, Monier" Williams, Apte, or Edgerton.

(1) ekalolZbhuta m. (Tib. gcig tu 'dres par gyur pal "become blended into one": e~ii1!l niriivarar;,atii samarasatvam ekalolZbhutatva1!l fun yam ity ucyate; 'di mams sgrib pa dang bral ba nyid dang ro mnyam pa nyid dang gcigtu 'dres par gyur pa nyid la stong pa zhes brjod do (Vimalaprabhii (S) B 19a12; U 47.22-23; (T) 407/3-4). "Their quality of being free from obscuration, of having a single taste,of being blended into one, is called 'void'." (The things "blended" here are various aggregates, elements, faculties, and so forth that are components in the Kalacakra abhidharma.) -loli- appears to be derived from Vlur,l or Vlul; cf. lolita. Schmidt lists ekalolzbhiiva in the sense of "Begehren" [desire] (Schmidt 125,318). (2) kalka m. (Tib. rigs) "clan": atal}, kalasaguhya-prajiiiijiiiiniibhi{ekatal}, sarvavarr;,iiniim ekakalko bhavatil sa kalko 'syastiti kalkZl tasya gotra1!l kalkZgotraT(! vajrakuliibhi{ekatal}, sakalamantrir;,iim iti nztiirthal},; bum pa dang gsang ba dang shes rab ye shes kyi dbang bskur ba 'di las rigs thams cad rigs gcig tu 'gyur rol rigs de 'di la yod pa'i phyir rigs ldan nol de'i rigs ni rigs ldan gyi rigs te sngags pa mtha' dag rdo rje'i rigs kyis dbang bskur ba'i phyir ro zhes bya ba nges pa'i don tal (Vimalaprabhfi (S) B 8b/3-4; U 22.8-10; (T) 345/2-3). "The vase, secret, and wisdom-gnosis initiations make all the castes into a single clan. Because he possesses that, clan, he is Kalki. The definitive meaning of this is: 'His lineage is the lineage


Kalkl because all mantra adepts are initiated into the vajra family.''' Simi-

'lady, Srz Ka:acakr:: I.l~8ab: " :X< . so 'yar(L srzmanJuvayra!; suravaranamzto vaJragotrer;a kalkZ

. dattva vajrabh~ekar(L sakalamunikulany ekakalkar(L kar~yat/ ';'lIe (i.e., Manjusri Yasas) will be Sri Manjuvajra, saluted by the best of gods, ;I{alkl by means of the vajra lineage. Having given them the vajra initiation, ::he will make all the families of sages into a single clan." .,The usual meanings of kalka-"dregs", '~filth", "feces", "sin", and s6 forth-are clearly inapplicable here. This usage of kalka is uniquE to the Kalacakra literature (cf. Newman 1985:64 & n. 4; 1987a:94). F6rdiscussion of other ;etymolo.gies of ka~ka and kalki/-in ~,ee: Schra~e~ (193,:)' . ' (3) pratzsena f. (Tlb. pra phab pa) prognostIC Image : pratyak:;a!; svaClttapratz

'bhiisO yogina1[t gagane pratibhi¥ate kumarikaya adarsadau pratisenavad iti; gzhon nu ina mams kyis me long la sogs pa la pra phab pa bzhin du mal 'byor pa mams kyi rang gi sems kyi 'od gsal mngon sum du nam mkha' la snang ba (Vimalaprabha (S) B 16b/6; U 42.23-24; (T) 394/3-4). "Like a maiden's prognostic image in a Ihirror and so forth, the clear light of the yogis' own minds appears manifest 1n the sky." The "sky" here refers to the void. (N ote: I take kumarikaya!; ;is a genitive singular against the Tibetan ins~ru~e.ntal plural) Vimalaprab~a L1.35ab (U 4.21-22) notes that mahamudra IS SimIlar to the eight prognostic .images (a~taprasenopama). In his Paramarthasar(Lgraha-nama-sekoddeSatzka Naro refers to the Pratisenavataratantra on the eight kinds of prognostication: 'pratisimavataratantre kila darpar;akharjgarigu~thaprad"iPacandra-suryodakakur;rjanetre~v avast~u (read: ~tasu) pratisenavatara ukta!; (Carelli 1941 :49.6-7). "Indeed,

ithe Pratisenavataratantra speaks of the manifestation of prognostic images in the.eight: mirror, sword, thumb, lamp, moon, sun, water well, and eye." Pratisena appears to be a Sanskritized form of (Prakrit?) prasena (m. or n.), '"na (f.): "eine Art Gauklerei" [a kind of conjuring] (Bi:ihtlingk 176.2). Edgerton, following Bi:ihtlingk, lists prasena with a query, and also cites Mahavyutpatti #4268: prasenam; gsal snang (BHSD 389.1). Edgerton translates gsal snang as "bright light, or bright clear," but it is most likely the old orthography for dag 'snang, "a mystic vision." It is interesting to note that prasenam appears in the Mahiivyutpatti in the section on tantric terminology (Mahavyutpatti #4234-

:;4387). :(4) lz (Tib. Ii) "Khotan": bora lZ ca cfnadidesesu . . . sambhalavi~ayantar(L; bod dang Ii dang rgya nag la sogspa'i yul mams suo . . shambha la'i yul la thug pa'i bar du (Vimalaprabha (S) B 40al2; U 10l.8; (T) 521/4). "In the countries of Tibet, !{hotan, and China and so forth ... through to the land of Sambhala ... " The context here is a discussion of the duration of daylight in various regions north of India. This passage of the Vimalaprabha is the source for the only other known occurance of lZ in Sanskrit, Abhayakaragupta's Kalacakravatara: bhota l"i ca c'inadideSe~u sambhalavi;;ayantar(L (Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G.4732 f.6b/5). L'i is an example of a very rare phenomenon, a Tibetan loanword in Sanskrit.


NOTES

1. For previous study of the language of Sanskrit Vajrayana texts' Bhattacharya (1925:viii-x); Snellgrove (1959:viii-xi); George (1974:14-~W, Tsuda (1974:6-27); Skorupski (1983:117-118).<'

2. D.S. Ruegg notes: "Ar,1'a is indeed in several respects a more con j !

nient (and a less linguistically questionable) term than Buddhist HybridSans;~'~' to designate the basically Middle Indo-Aryan language of much of the Can "}t., and could therefore be used instead by modern scholars, at least for cert ~[j stages of BHS" (Ruegg 1986:597). Weadd the qualification "Buddhist"~~ distinguish this language from the J aina and brahmanical ar}a-s (cf. Winternit~ 1933:430; Goudriaan 1981:27). ..,

3. As we will see, the Kalacakra literature is not written in BUddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, and its language is not simply "very corrupt" or "barbarian;" Sanskrit. Hoffmann has not presented any evidence to support his view that the Kalacakra originated in "a semi-Indian region in the far north-west." The' Vimalaprabha, in any case, was by its own account written in India (see note 35). The earliest historically identified proponent of the Kalacakra, AtiSa's guru Pil).<;io, was born in Java (Newman 1985:71-75; I987b:96-106).

4. For discussion of this literature see: Newman (1985:52-54, 58, 63-65, 73; I987a; 1987b). I believe all of these texts were composed in India, during the first few decades of the 11 th century. . ,

5. By H.P. Shastri (1917:78-79), under the heading "The Buddhi~t did not care for Correct Sanskrit." f\

6. Indian scholars have noted its significance: B. Bhattacharyyr (1924:iv) quotes Shastri's Catalogue. P.e. Bagchi (1934:v) cites the Catalogue, and offers an English rendering and an interpretation (cf. Goudriaan 1981:27, n. 130). B. Banerjee gives a brief synopsis of this passage in English (Ban':;: dyopadhyaya 1952:73), and alludes to it in the introduction to his recel1S edition of the Sri: Kalacakra (Banerjee 1985 :xxii). J. U padh yaya refers to it in the introduction to his recent edition of the first two patalas of the Sri: Kiilacakra ". and the Vimalaprabhii (Vimalaprabha (S) U xv, xxiv).

Tibetan scholars were well aware of the grammatical anomalies of early Kalacakra literature. See: Bu ston (1324:610-612); mKhas grilb< ( 1434:444-448).

7. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: -svarolopal;. 8. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: krasval; hrasvapi. 9. Vimalaprabhii (S) D: paraspai-.

10. Vimalaprabhii (S) D: napu7[lSakarrt. 11. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: danta-. 12. Vimalaprabhii (S) D: -desakeneti. 13. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: -dhiitum. 14. Vimalaprabhii (S) D: mahiimudrarrt. 15. Vimalaprabha (S) N: iidayo py apaSabdiis tadanye pi. 16. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: agarigama- (emendation deletes -riga-). 17. Vimalaprabha (S) D: suiabdiibhimanarrt nasa. 18. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: -sar;,atarrt (emendation adds -ra-).


19. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: bhavaci. 20. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: de~a- (emended to desa-).

921. Vimalaprabhii (S) N 21b/4-22a/4; D 17bll-9; cf. U 29.21-30.6. I have "o;tandardizedthe sandhi, the orthography with respect to use of the avagraha ih;tid doubling of consonants after -T-, and h~ve supplied the darp;ias. Unfortui~nately, the leaf containing this passage is missing from Vimalaprabhii (S) B, by ;far the best of the three MSS available to me. The Tibetan for the passage t1~uoted reads:

Vimalaprabha (T) 36115-36217: /sgra bzang po smra ba de dag mams kyi sgra bzang po la zhen pa spang ba'i slad du don la rton pa nyid la brten tel tshigs su bead pa kha eig tu zur ehag gi sgra dang/ tshigs su bead pa kha eig tu geod mtshams nyams pa dang/ kha eig tu mam dbye med. i..a'i tshig dang/ kha eig tu dbyangs dang gsal byed [better: yig 'bTU dang dbyangs] phyis pa dang/ tshigs bead kha eig tu ring po la thung ngu dang thung ngu la ring po dang! kha eig tu lnga pa'i don la bdun pa dang/ bzhi pa'i don la drug pa dang/ kha cig tu gzhan gyi tshig can gyi byings la bdag nyid kyi tshig dang! bdag nyid kyi tshig can la gzhan gyi tshig dang/ kha eig tu gcig gi tshig la mang po'i tshig dang/ mang po'i tshig la geig gi tshig dang/ kha eig tu pho'i rtags la rna ning gi rtags dang rna ning gi rtags la pho'i rtags dang/ kha eig tu rkan las byung ba sha yig la so dang spyi bo las byung ba dang! kha eig tu spyi bo las byung ba la so dang rkan las byung ba dang/ kha eig tu so las byung ba la rkan dang spyi bo las byung ba ste/ de Ita bu gzhan yang rgyud ston pa po'i man ngag gi rjes su 'brang bar bya'o/ de bzhin du rtsa ba'i rgyud las beom ldan 'das kyis/

Izla bzang sangs rgyas thams cad dang/ Ibla rna rnams kyi slob rna yis/ /ehung rna bu mo bu sdug dang/ /rtag tu 'dod pa'i dngos po dbul/(l) /dri ni sa la 'byung ba ste/ jehu la gzugs dang me la ro/ /rlung reg 'gyur ba med la sgral /nam mkha' ehe la ehos kyi dbyings/(2) /dri dang spos sogs mar me dang/ Ibza' dang btung sogs gos rnams kyis/ Irtag tu phyag rgya mehod byas tel /dam pa'i bu yis bla ma'i dbul/(3)

Izhes gsungs te de Ita bu la sogs pa'i sgra zur ehaggzhan yang mal 'byor pas lung bklags pa las rtogs par bya'o/ de bzhin du 'gre! bshad las kyang sgra bzang po'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal nyams par bya ba'i slad du bdag gis don la rton pa nyid la brten te bri bar bya ste/ mam pa gang dang gang gis rigs dang rigs pa [read: rig pa] dang sgra bzang po'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal zad par 'gyur ba'i mam pa de dang des don la rton pa nyid la brten te yul gyi skad gzhan dang sgra'i bstan beos kyi skad gzhan gyis sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' mams thar pa'i don du ehos ston to/

22. The "brahman sages" referred to here are the thirty-five million brahman sages of Sambhala. The story told in the Vimalaprabhii of how Kalki: Yasas converted them to the Vajrayfma is translated in Newman (1985:59-63; 1987b:304-314). The passage on grammar edited and translated here im-


mediately follows the conversion story, and makes up the end of the thO uddesa of the first pata1a of the Vimalaprabhii. lrd

23. This refers to the first of the four pratisara?,}as; d. Mahavyutpat'; #1545-1549. ' t~

24. Vimalaprabhii (T) usua,lly translates the Sanskrit according to the, meaning rather than the words: It does not attempt to reproduce grammatic I irregularities, but provides the sense. In this instance, however, it "mecha .~ cally" reproduces the irregular grammar because the irregular grammar its~~t is part of the meaning.'

25. In editing a passage of the Kalacakra mulatantra, Hoffmann create~ "Middle lndic" out of correct Sanskrit forms metri causa (Hoffmann 1973: 13i n. 3 & 7). This is difficult to justify given the fact that the verses of th~ Paramadibuddha are often hypercatalectic or catalectic: cf. verses lIa, 13c, 15b in Reigle (1986:5-6, 9).

26. Sanskrit after Reigle (1986:5); cf. Vimalaprabhii (S) U 24.27-30. Thes~) verses are part of a twenty-one and one-half verse quotation from the Paramadibuddha that appears towards the middle of the third udde.§a of the Vimalaprabhii. Vimalaprabhii (T) 35117-35212:

Imam pa gang dang gang dag gisl Isems can rnams ni yongs smin byed! Imam pa de dang de dag gisl Ichos ni bstan par bya ba yin/(5) Isgra dang sgra nyams dag gi [read: gisJ chosl Imal 'byor pa ni 'bad pas'dzinl Iyul gyi sgra yis don myed pal Ide la bstan bcos sgra yis ci/(6)

27, Vimalaprabhii(S) D: -sara?'}atii . . 28. Vimalaprabhii (S) N: mahatiirrt. 29. Vimalaprabhii (S) D: -sabda{t sabdii{t. 30. Vimalaprabhii (S) N 3a/6-3b/2; D 3al2-5; d. U 5.3-12; leaf missing

in B. These are verses 37-40 of the first uddesa of the Vimalaprabhii.Verse 37 is flawless sardulavikr'irjita; 38-40 are iiryii. Pur:H;iarlka employs a wide variety of metres in the Vimalaprabhii, and his Sri Paramiirthasevii is composed of various kinds of tri~tubh. Vimalaprabhii (T) 307 /5~308/2:

Ikun mkhyen lam don gnyer ba rnams la sgra dang sgra min mam dpyad chen po medl

Isna tshogs yul skad ngan pa yis kyang chen po mams kyi lam la rtag tu Jugl

Isems can mams kyi mas pa'i sems kyi dbang gis thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsung gzhan lal

Ilung stan dag la [better: brda sprod dag laJlha klus bkod pa'i' sgra sags rtsod pa don gnyer mams kyi gzhan/(37)

Iyul gyi skad dang zur chag sgra las kyangl Imal 'byor ldan pas don ni 'dzin byed del Ichu la '0 rna nges par zhugs pa del In gang pas rab tu phyung nas 'thung bar byed/(38)

BUDDHIST SANSKRIT

Idon dam de nyid yul la rtag tu nil /chen po mams dag tshig la rton pa mini Iyul gyi mi [read: ming] mams kyis ni don shes Ia/ Ibstan bcos sgra dag gis ni ci zhig bya/(39) Igang zhig ZUT chag sgra dang sgrar gyur pasl Ibrjod pa· de nyid ye shes rna yin zhingl Igang zhig 'gro ba dag la nyi tshe bal Ide ni thams cad mkhyen pa'i gsung rna yin/(40)

137

31. Here "Other" refers to the transcendent aspect of the Kalacakra . triad: eva7[L sarvatra vajrayogo bahye adhyatmani pare yoginii 'vagantavya iti; de h.zhin du rdo rje rnal 'byor yang phyi dang nang dang gzhan thams cad la rnal 'byor pasrtogs par bya'o (Vimalaprabhii (S) B 17ai7-17b/l; cf. U 44.10-11; (T) 398/2-3). ~'A yogi should realize the vajrayoga everywhere in the Outer, Inner, and Other." .

32. Vimalaprabhii (S) B: sarvabuddho (emendation deletes sarva). 33. Vimalaprabhii (S) B: omit bhii~ii (emendation adds). 34. Vimalaprabhii (S) B 13ai7-13b/l; cf. U 34.11-18. MS B spells sattva

as satva, and I have supplied the darpjas, but otherwise I have retained its orthography in this and all other quotations from it. Vimalaprabhii (T) 372/6-373/4:

Isems can thams cad kyi skad kyi rang bzhin can thams cad mkhyen pa'i skad med par legs par sbyar ba'i skad nyi tshe ba gcig pu 'di yis yin na sangs rgyas kyang nyi tshe bar 'gyur TOI 'phags pa'i yul 'dir sgra smra ba po mu stegs pa mkhas pa'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal dang Idan pa mams [sic!] mthong nasi ji !tar bram ze dang khyab Jug pa dang zhi ba pa la sogs pa mams kyi 'dod pa'i Iha tshangs pa dang khyab Jug dang drag po la sogs pa mams legs par sbyar ba smra ba po yin pa de bzhin du bdag cag gi 'dod pa'i lha sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' mams legs par sbyar ba smra ba po yin no zhes pa nil sangs rgyas pa byis pa'i blo can mams kyi bsam pa stel 'dir sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' de dag thams cad mkhyen pa'i skad med par legs par sbyar ba'i skad nyi tshe ba [add: gcig bu] 'di yis rna yin te sems can thams cad kyi skad kyis chos ston par byed pa po dang yang dag par sdud par byed pa po yin nol de'i phyir sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' mams ni Iha'i skye ba dang 'brei ba'i [add: skad] nyi tshe bas rna yin te sems can sna tshogs kyi skad kyis chos ston pa po yin pa'i phyirl

35. This is one of several instances in the Vimalaprabhii in which PUJ.l.<.iarIka writes "here in the land of the Aryans/' demonstrating that this text was written in India. (Elsewhere in the Vimalaprabhii "the land of the Aryans" is dearly defined as India [cf. Newman 1985:61; 1987b:309-310].)

36. sa7[Lgitikiiraka; yang dag par sdud par byed pa po. The use of this term to indicate the "redactor" of a text is not quite clear at BHSD 548, s.v. sa7[Lgiti (3). It is often used in this sense in the Vimalaprabhii: e.g., King Sucandra, an emanation of VajrapaJ.l.i, redacted the Paramiidibuddha, and KalkI Yasas, an emanation of MaiijusrI, condensed the Paramiidibuddha and redacted it in the form of the Sri Kiilacakra (Newman 1985:54,63; 1987a:93-94).

37. Likewise Skorupski: "It must be said that one does get frustrated by


the fact that the correc~ gra~matic~l forms. are used si~e ~y side with the hybrid forms. It is practically Impossible to discern the prinCIple of using h correct grammatical forms instead of the hybrid ones or vice versa" (Skoru t J 1983: 118). The s~me can be said about the .ear!? Kal~cakra li~::ature, altho~;h, again, I do not thmk we are confronted with hybrid forms m the strict sense of forms that developed directly from Prakrit. ...

38. I agree completely with Snellgrove'S remark that we must be conte'~ with "a text that accords with the required sense as it may be ascertained front the Tibetan translation and the several commentaries" (Snellgrove 1959:x~ cf. Tsuda (1974:6-16).

REFERENCES

Apte: Vaman Shivaram Apte, The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary: Revised & Enlarged Edition (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company reprint [1957 ed.] ., 1986). ,.

Bagchi (1934): Prabodh Chandra Bagchi (ed.), Kaulafiiananir1Jaya and Some. Minor Texts of the School of Matsyendranatha (Calcutta: Metropolitan Print~\ ing & Publishing House, 1934) [Calcutta Sanskrit Series no. 3]. .

Bandyopadhyaya (1952): Biswanath Bandyopadhyaya [Biswanath BaneIjee],: "A Note on the Kalacakratantra and Its Commentary"Journal of the Asiatic Society: Letters 18 (1952) pp. 71-76.

Banerjee (1985): Biswanath Banerjee (ed.), A Critical Edition of Sri Kalacakratantra-raja (Collated with the Tibetan version) (Calcutta: The Asiatic Soc. ciety, 1985) [Bibliotheca Indica Series no. 311].

Bhattacharyya (1924): Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, The Indian Buddhist Iconography (London: Oxford University Press, 1924).

Bhattacharya (1925): Benoytosh Bhattacharya (ed.), Sadhanamala vol. 1 (Baroda: Oriental Institute reprint, 1968) [Gaekwad's Oriental Series " no. 26].

BHSG/BHSD: Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass reprint, 1972) vol. 1: Grammar, vol. 2: Dictionary.

Bohtlingk: Otto Bohtlingk, Sanskrit-Worterbuch in kurzerer Fassung (Graz: Akademische Druck-U. Verlagsanstalt reprint, 1959).

Bohtlingk and Roth: Otto Bohtlingk and Rudolph Roth, Sanskrit-Worterbuch (St. Petersburg/Leipzig: Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1855 ff.).

Bu ston (1324): Bu ston Rin chen grub, dPal dus kyi 'khor lo'i bshad thabs sgra rig mkhas pa'i rgyan ces bya ba; Lokesh Chandra (ed.), The Collected Works of Bu-ston: Part 4 (NGA) (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965) pp. 599-614 [Sata-pitaka Series vol. 44].

Carelli (1941): Mario E. Carelli (ed.), Sekoddesatika of Na¢apada (Niiropii) (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1941) [Gaekwad's Oriental Series no. 90].

de la Vallee Poussin (1896): L. de la Vallee Poussin (ed.), Etudes et textes


tantriques: Paiicakrama (Gand: H. Engelcke, 1896) [Recueil de travaux publies par la Faculte de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Universite de Gand, 16me fascicule].

Edgerton (1954): Franklin Edgerto?, Buddh.ist H?brid Sanskrit Language and 1,: Literature .(Banaras: Banaras Hmdu Umverslty, 1954). :tdgerton (1956): Franklin Edgerton, "The Buddha and Language" Indian •... Historical Quarterly 32 (1956) pp. 129-135. (George (1974): Christopher S. George (ed. and trans.), The Car}lj,dmahiiro~arj,a

. Tantra: A Critical Edition and English Translation, Chapters I-VIII (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1974) [American Oriental Series

'It vol. 56]. Gdudriaan (1981): Teun Goudriaan and Sanjukta Gupta, Hindu Tantric and . Siikta Literature (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981) [A History of In-" dian Literature 2.2]. Hoffmann (1973): Helmut Hoffmann, "Buddha's Preaching of the Kalacakra

Tantra at the Stupa of Dhanyakataka" German Scholars on India vol. 1 . (Varanasi: The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1973) pp. 136-140. Boltzmann: Adolf Holtzmann, Grammatisches aus derll Mahabharata (Hil-

;; desheim/New York: Georg Olms Verlag reprint [1884 ed.], 1981) . . mKhas grub (1434): mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang, rGyud thams cad kyi

rgyal po beam ldan 'das dpal dus kyi 'khor lo mchog gi dang po'i sangs rgyas kyi rtsa ba'i rgyud las phyung ba bsdus ba'i rgyud kyi 'grel chen rtsa ba'i rgyud kyi rjes su 'jug pa stong phrag bcu gnyis pa dri ma med pa'i 'ad kyi rgya cher bshad pa de kho na nyid snang bar byed pa zhes bya ba; Yab sras gsung 'bum: mKhas grub KHA (Dharamsala: Tibetan Cultural Printing Press [Shes rig bar khang],1983).

Mahiivyutpatti: Ryozaburo Sakaki et al (ed.), Mahiivyutpatti (Tokyo: Suzuki Re-search Foundation, 1970).

Monier-Williams: Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary . (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass reprint [1899 ed.], 1981). Newman (1985): John Newman, "A Brief History of the Kalachakra"; Geshe

Lhundub Sopa (ed.), The Wheel of Time: The Kalachakra in Context (Madison, WI: Deer Park Books, 1985) pp. 51-90.

Newman (l987a): John Newman, "The Paramiidibuddha' (the Kalacakra mulatantra) and Its Relation to the Early Kalacakra Literature" IndoIranian Journal 30 (1987) pp. 93-102.

Newman (1987b): John Ronald Newman, The Outer Wheel of Time: Vajrayiina Buddhist Cosmology in the Kiilacakra Tantra (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1987) [U niversity of Wisconsin - Madison Ph.D. thesis).

Reigle (1986): David Reigle, "The Lost Kalacakra Mula Tantra on the Kings of Sambhala" [Kiilacakra Research Publications no. 1] (Talent, OR: Eastern School, 1986).

Ruegg (1986): D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Review of Georg von Simson, Sanskrit-Worterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden 3" Journal of the American Oriental Society 106 (1986) pp. 596-597.

Schmidt: Richard Schmidt, Nachtrage zum Sanskrit-Worterbuch in kurzerer Fas-


sung von Otto Bohtlingk (Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1928). Schrader (1937): F. Otto Schrader, "The Name Kalki(n)" The Adyar Libra.'

Bulletin 1 (1937) pp. 17-25. ry Shastri (1917): Hara Prasad Shastri, A Descriptive· Catalogue of Sanscrit Ma

scripts in the Government Collection Under the Care of the Asiatic Societ nu-,. Bengal vol. 1, Buddhist Manuscripts (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Ben~:~ 1917). . ...... .

Skorupski (1983): Tadeusz Skorupski (ed. and trans.), The Sarvadur a-v tiparifodhana Tantra (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983). go'

Snellgrove (1959): D.L. Snellgrove (ed. and trans.), The Hevajra Tantra Part. 2 (London: Oxford University Press reprint, 1980) [London Oriental Series vol. 6].

Sri Kalacakra: text as given in Vimalaprabhii (S) U. Tsuda (1974): Shinichi Tsuda (ed. and trans.), The Samvarodaya Tantra: Selected

Chapters (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1974). Vimalaprabhii (S) B: Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G.l 0766; palm leaf; old

Bengali script; dated 39th regnal year of Harivarman of Bengal (11th-12th cent.); described in Shastri (1917:79-82).

Vimalaprabhii (S) D: The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions film-strip no. MBB-1971-24-25; paper; devanagari; (Stony Brook, NY: The Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, 1971).

Vimalaprabhii (S) N: Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G.4727; palm leaf; old Newarl script; description and extracts in Shastri (1917:73-79). . ............. .

Vimalaprabhii (S) U: J agannatha U padhyaya (ed.), Vimalaprabhiitikii of Kalki Sri. f,

PU1Jr}arika on Sri Laghukalacakratantraraja by Sri ManjuSriya.fa vol. 1 (Sar- ..•.• nath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1986) [Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series no. 9].

Vimalaprabhii (T): Lokesh Chandra (ed.), The Collected Works of Bu-ston: Parti (KA) (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965) pp. 301-603 [Sata-pitaka Series vol. 41].

Whitney: William Dwight Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar (Camht:idge: Harvard University Press reprint of the 2nd [1889] edition, 1967). .

Winternitz (1933): Maurice Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature vo1.2 (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint Corporation reprint, 1977). .

,Two New Fragments of Buddhist Sanskrit 'Manuscripts from Central Asia

By Richard Salomon and Collett Cox

1. Introduction

The two manuscript fragments presented below were reported in Huang 1983, p. 51 and illustrated there in plates ;XXXVI and XXXVII. They are said there to have been found at the site at Ruoqiang (Charkhlik, a), southeast of the Tarim Basin in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. Paleographically these fragments resemble most closely Sander's Gupta alphabet type A,f (Sander 1968, Tafeln 9-20), dating from the 3rd-4th centuries A.D.; 'note for example the forms of a and sa in fragment 2, and ka, without a curved tail at the bottom, in both fragments. The script of no. 1 may be slightly later that that of no. 2, and in some respects resembles Sander's Gupta B,h (4th-5th centuries A.D.), for instance in the shape of a and sa. Both fragments may thus be dated around the 4th century A.D.; possibly a little earlier in the case of no. 2, a little later in no. 1.

Both fragments are clearly written and reasonably accurate, though there are some scribal errors such as omission of vowel signs and visarga, deletion of one element of a consonant conjunct, confusion of dentals and retroflexes, etc. All of these are more or less obvious and typical of central Asian Sanksrit manuscripts, and have been emended in square brackets with as-

. terisks.

141

142 JIABS VOL 11 NO.1

II. Fragment of a Stotra Text

Fig. 1: Fragment of a stotm

Fragment no. 1 (Fig. 1) consists of a single leaf of a paper manuscript, measuring 10 X 2.5·cm. It is mostly intact except for the left edge and a portion broken away at the upper right (recto), so that a few akJaras at the beginning of each line and in the last quarter of the first and last verses are missing. (Missing akJaras are indicated by X; portions of missing akJaras by-. Where possible, conjectural restorations of the missing portions are indicated in the translation.) There are five lines of writing on each side, each line corresponding to a single verse in anU$tubh (sloka) meter, with a space in the middle between hemistichs. The verses, lOin all, are not numbered.

Recto 1) X-ac(i)nt(ya?)dhhutagul)e tvayi kalyal)acetasi /

vikkriyarp naspadarh lebhe yatha dh(i?)XX-mmat(a) / 2) XXX-eHate kascit tvayy asadhu tam eva tu /

krpayasedhikatararp matevatmajam aturam / 3) XXXkhanapek~ldarp svadubkaik:aturarp jagat /

tvarp svadub.khany anadrtya paradub.khaturab. sada /

SANSKRIT FRAGMENTS

4) XXXya dubkhani svapral).ativyayair <"pi / ya te pritir abhut sadho sa te~am api na t[*a]vat /

5) XXXXX(l)okoyarp. na tatha p10yate yatha / krpapesalasarp.tanab pioyase tvarp. parartibhib /

Verso 1) XXXXX(bh)uc chatrau putre vanugraha(nt)aram /

krpavi~tamater ak~l).ob savyadak~il).ayor iva / 2) XXXXr vahen murdhna muner padarajarp.sy api /

karul).anika~odgari yasya te sarvvace~titarp. / 3) XX-b khedyamanopi cchidyamanopi casakrt /

143

nayasid vikkriyarp. dhira grahakkranta ivoourat [sic; read -rat]/ 4) XXXvyasanavarte karul).a satvavatsala /

na tatyaja k~al).am api tvarp. dharman iva dharm(m)ata / 5) XXnityanubaddharp. ca tvarp. do~a ak~amadayab /

notsehire samave~turp. taXXXXXXX /

~Translation

Recto 1) In you, with your holy mind and inconceivably (?; [*

a]c(i)nt)ya)) wondrous virtues, perturbation (read vikkriya fot vikkriyarrt?) found no place, like ...

2) [*Even if] someone does ([yadyapi *cehfate) ill to you, you pity him all the more, as a mother does her sick child.

3) This world has no care for the sorrows'[*of others] ([* paradu/:t]khiinape~i) and is afflicted by its own; you disregard. your own sorrows and are always afflicted by those of others.

4) The joy which you (felt), Holy One, in [*dispelling] the sorrows [*of others] ([*Pare~am vyaslya du/:tkhiini] even at the cost of your own life; even they (the others) did not (feel) so great (a joy).

5) This world is not pained [*by its own afflictions] ([*svartibhir eva] laka 'yam) as much as you, with your tenderly compassionate heart are pained by the afflictions of others.

Verso 1) [*For you] whose mind is filled with compassion, there was

no ([*na te kimcid a](bh)uc chatrau) difference in the kindness (shown) to an enemy or to a son, any more than to your left or right eye.

2) ... would carryon the head even the footdust of the Sage, of


you whose every action bespeaks [? udgariJ the touchsto ..... ~ ...... . ~of~ compaSSIOn. .;

3) Even when tormented and cut to pieces again and a ;. . gaIn

[*your body?] ([*tvaddehajlJ?) dId not undergo perturbaf', [vikkriyanzJ, 0 Steadfast One, like the moon when obscu~~~ by an eclipse. • ......

4) In the whirlpool of evil [*of samsara] ([*samsarajvyasaniivart)! (your) compassion, tender to (all) beings, never once aba~~ doned you, any more than the nature of things could abandon the things themselves."

5) Faults such as impatience could not affect you, who were . and always dedicated. . . . .

Although we have not succeeded in identifying the text with any previously published stotra, it closely resembles in both style' and content several other Sanskrit poems of this class, such as the Vany,iirhavarrj,a and Satapancasatka or AdhyardhaSataka attributed to Matrceta, which have been published from manuscript fragments found in central Asia (see Schlingloff 1955 and 1968; Shackleton Bailey 1951). The following instances are characteristic:

With R2cd, krpayasedhikataranz matevatmajam aturam and V4bc, karur}a satvavatsalal I na tatyaja k;ar}am api, compare verse lOcd of the Rahulastava (Schlingloff 1955 p. 90), karur}a tva na tatyaja mata sutam ivaurasam. With R3ab, [*paradul;}khiinapek;'idanz svadul;kaikiituranz jagat, compare Rahulastava 6ab (Schlingloff 1955 p. 89), parathe niravek!;asya janasyatmanzbharer iha. With R4, [*pare$am vyasjya du/:tkhiini svaprar}ativyayair api I ya te· pr'itir abhut sadho sa te$am api na t[*ajvat, compare Satapaiicasatka 17 (Shackleton Bailey 1951 p. 46), pararthe tyajata/:t prar}an ya pr'itir abhavat taval I na sa na$topalabdhe$u prar}i$u prar}inanz bhavet II. With Vlab, [*na te kimcid a}(bh)uc chatrau putre vanugrahantaram, compare Munayastava 7ab (Schlingloff 1955 p. 86), vadhakapatyayor yasya manas tulyanz pravartate. With V3b, cchidyamanopi casakrt, compare Satapaiicasatka ISb (Shackleton Bailey 1951 p. 47), cchidyamanasya te 'sakrt. With V5a, .. . nityanubaddhanz ca tvanz, cf. Satapaiicasatka 22c (Shackleton Bailey 1951 p. 50), na te nityanubaddhasya.

Further parallels could be cited, but these examples should suE-

SANSKRIT FRAGMENTS 145

j;'6ce to demonstrate the cl?se. similarity of the new fragment to ;:the known stotras. In partICular, the closest resemblances seem 5io be .with the anonymous Riihulastava and with Mat:rceta's !;;Satapancasatka (especially the Hetustava portion, verses 10-26). ~rhe fragment is thus almost certainly from a stotra, previously ;:llhdiscovered as far as we have been able to determine, of the ~school of Mat:rceta; whether by Mat:rceta himself or by an imJitator we cannot say for sure, although if the latter it is a good 'tirnitation of the master's style.

,flIl. Fragment of an Abhidharma Text

Fig. 2: Fragment of an Abhidharma Text

Fragment no. 2 (Fig. 2), part of an Abhidharma text, is on palm leaf and measures 8.7 by 1.3 em., with three lines on each side. It is complete except for a break at the upper left (of the recto), with four or five ak;;aras missing from the beginning of line R1 = V3. In the left margin of the recto is a numerical sign, apparently 40, indicating the number of the folio.

Recto 1). X X X X rta(?)vatIti kecit tavad ahul,1 dvividharp kusalarp


sasravarp. canasravarp ca tatra ya[t*] 2). sasravarp tad upadayatlti athava dvividharp kusalamm [. :

dh' hi' . SlC] upa lp a arp vlsarpyoga- , 3). phalarp ca tatropadhiphalarp upa[da*]nakam iti atroc ..•.

h . -k h h - yate ne a vlpa a etu. pan-

Verso 1). k:;;yate upapattihetur iha parlk~yate sa ca [a*]kusalab atrah~

yady upapattihetur akusa- .' ..... 2). lasyana [~e~d -lab. syan na~ kakid _r~panlpyadhatur up::

apadyeta Itl tad dhl tatra kusalam astltl •.•.. 3). -o-e X X -astiti uktarp hi bhagavata viviktab kame~v iti at~

rocyate na vayarp .

Translation

Recto 1) .... Now, some say, "The virtuous is twofold, with contamina_

tion and without contamination. Of those, that which.:.: 2). is with contamination furthers attachment." Or, "The virtu:\'

ous is twofold, resulting in a substratum, and resulting 3). in disconnection. Of these, the one resulting in a substratum

is the basis of attachment." To this it is said, "It is not the cause of maturation that'is being examined here;

Verso 1). it is the cause of rebirth that is being examined here; and

that is [un]virtuous." To this one [might] say, "If the cause of rebirth were unvirtuous, .

2). no realm of form nor formless realm would arise at all; for that is virtuous there,

3). " .is ... For the Lord has said, 'One is free from desires.'" To this it is said, "We do not. ...

Both the style and content of this fragment suggest thatit \. is from a Buddhist Abhidharma commentarial treatise. Though efforts to locate the passage in any extant Sanskrit text or fragment, or any Chinese translation were unsuccessful, there is a marked similarity in style to two fragments discovered at Kucha, .... which were published by E. Waldschmidt. (Waldschmidt 1965 #15, #18, pp. 9-12) All three fragments are written in the form


rof a dialogue in which the views of the proponent are indicated :by the phrase atrocyate, an~ those of the opponent(s) ~y kecid ~hu~, atraha, etc. Both partles employ argument and scnptural ':Citations as authorities in support of their positions. Further, all :three fragments treat a relatively sophisticated point of doctrinal 'controversy. The dialogical expository style and complexity of doctrinal investigations suggest an Abhidharma text ofthe middle or later period, that is, contemporaneous with or following ;the initial compilation of the Vibha5a compendia (c. 2nd century ~AD.) (Lamotte 1958 p. 648; see Kimura 1937 pp. 207ff).

•. . Although neither the specific topic under discussion in this ;fragment nor the sectarian affiliation of either party is explicitly :identified, the following doctrinal issues suggest that the topic is probably karma, or possibly citta, and at least one statement .bythe opponent (V. 1-3) is fully consistent with Kashmiri Sar.vastivada-Vaibha~ika doctrinal positions: ... '!.(,' > •

:1). Rl The two categories of contaminated, sasrava, and uncon;laminated, anasrava, are used to classify all dharmas in an early !;Abhidharma text, the Sariputrabhidharmasa,stra (SAS 1 p. ,527.b.23ff), and become common in Abhidharma texts from tthe middle period on. (PP 5 p. 711.b.9; JP T.26.1544 2 p. 926.a.llff; MVB 76 p. 391.c.2lff, VB 7 p. 463.a.19ff; AVB 40 p~ 293.b.8ff; MVB 95 p. 490.a.26, AVB 47 p. 360.b.22) The classification of virtuous dharmas according to these two categories is also frequent. (MVB 67 p. 346.a.28, A VB 35 p. 258.a.24ff)

2). R2 The second classification of "the virtuous" according to the two categories of that having substratum as its effect (upadhiphala) and that having disconnection as its effect (visarrtyogaphala) does not appear in any extant Abhidharma text. It is, in part, clarified by a passage from the Jnanaprasthiinasastra OP T.26.1543 7 p. 851.b.19ff; T.26.1544 12 p. 979.b.23ff; MVB 123 p. 640.b.24ff) describing the effects of sasrava and anasravakarma. Here, karma as a whole, including both sasrava and

anasrava, is said to have three possible effects: 1) the effect of uniform outflow (ni5yandaphala) and 2) the effect of maturation (vipakaphala), which are themselves sasrava and are produced by sasravakarma, and 3) the effect of disconnection


(visar(iyogaphala), which is anasrava and may be produced b' . either sasrava or anasravakarma. Dharmasrl's Abhidharmahrd . Y (T.28.1550 1 p. 815.a.7ff) and yp~s~I?-ta's Abh~dharmah~~: (T.28.1551 2 p. 843.b.5ff) contam simllar descnptions of the threefold effects of karma, but the later Sar(iyuktabhidharma_ hrdayasastra (T.28.1552 3 p. 897.b.3ff), after presenting the theory of the threefold effect, adds the two effects_th purwakaraphala and the adhipatiphala-which all together cons/ tute the set of five effects characteristic of Kashmiri Sarvastivad~_ Va~bh~~ika theory. The two, _~ecensions ,?f the jnanapra_ sthanasastra, and both Dharmasn sand Upasanta's Abhidharma_ hrdaya present a theory of three possible effects that predates or rivals the theory of five effects typical of the later Sarvastivada~' Vaibha~ika position (MVB 21 p. 108.c.3ff, 121 p. 629.c.4ff).

The "effect of disconnection" mentioned in these passages and in this fragment dearly correspond. However, the identity of the "effect resulting in substratum" (upadhiphala) mentioned' in the fragment with the "effect of uniform outflow" (ni$yandaphala) and the "effect of maturation" (vipakaphala) is uncertain. Virtually the only occurrence of the term upadhi in the Abhidharma texts is in the terms sopadhise~anirva1'}a, "nirvar;,a with a remainder of upadhi," and nirupadhise~anirva1'}a, "nirvar;,a without a remainder of up ad hi." (MVB 32 p. 167. 14ff, AVB17 p. 126.a.8ff. See also Schmithausen 1969 pp. 79-81 #2.) The character yib , can be used t6 translate upadhi, (YBS 50 p. 576.c.27ff) and yiguoC , as in the Jnanaprasthiina T.26.1543 (tr. Sarighadeva), the Abhidharmahrdaya T.28.1550 (tr. Sarighadeva), T.28.1551 (tr. Narendrayasas), and the Sar(iyuktabhidharmahrdaya T.28.1552 (tr. Sarighavarman), could then conceivably be the equivalent of upadhiphala. However, we find Sarighadeva in the jnanaprasthiina (T.26.1543 17 p.851.b.20) usingyiguo to translate a term for which Xuanzang's translation (T.26.1544 12 p.979.b.25) dearly suggests ni~yandaPhala. Similarly, Buddhavarman in the Abhidharmavibhii~a T.28.1546 (AVB 10 p. 74.c.27) uses the term yiguo, where Xuanzang (MVB 18 p. 90.c.1) has dearly translated ni~yandaPhala.) The term upadhi appears frequently in Pali suttas and Chinese translations of the agamas: 1) as that which provides the basis for suffering (MN #26 vol. 1 p. 162, MA 56 #204 p. 776.a.12), or as one link in a succession of factors that give rise to suffering, old age, and death (SN vol. 2


;108, SA 12 #291 p. 82.b.lOff(upadhitransliterated); Norman ~p. 334-336); 2) as that from which one becomes free in attain~:ing nirua~a (MN. #16 vol. 1 p. 454, MA 50 #192 p. 74?a.8ff, [~tc.), and 3) as Juxtaposed to attachment, upadiina as 1ll upadkyupadanavinibaddho . .. (Tripathi 1962 pp. 45,168; Pali: upa'Jupadana . .. SN vol. 2 p. 17,. ~A 12 #3~! 'p' 8~.c.22ff).

One reference to upadhz 1ll the MaJJhzmanzkaya (MN # 11 7 :vol. 3 p. 72) describing right views (sammaditthi) parallels its use :in this fragment: a contaminated right view (sammaditthi sasavii) connected with meritorious action (puiiiiabhagiya) has its result

!In upadhi (upadhivepakka), whereas an uncontaminated noble right view (sammaditthi ariya anasavii) is the member of the noble

!path (magg~nga). Upadhi, .as the basis for attach~ent, is associated ;with suffenng and functIOns as a component III the causal proc'ess leading to birth and death. In this sense, upadhi and visar(l,yoga, . or disconnection, represent mutually exclusive categories. However, no passage was found that clearly juxtaposes upadhiphala

>and visar(l,yogaphala.

3). R3-Vl No explicit reference to the pair, upapattihetu and ;vipakahetu, or to these two as causes producing upadhi was found in any Abhidharma text. However, the canonical use of upadhi indicates that it is clearly associated with the process of rebirth. Further, in an explanation of the meaning of upadhi in the terms, sopadhisesanirva~a and nirupadhisesanirva~a, the Mahavibhasa (MVB 32 p. 168.a.lff, AVB 17 p. 126.a.28-29) distinguishes between the upadhi of defilements (kleSa) and the upadhi

. of rebirth (upapatti). Although the term vipakahetu, appears frequently in Abhidharma causal systems of all periods, upapattihetu ,has a much more constricted use. Upapattihetu appears paired with abhinirvrttihetu, the cause of proceeding; the former refers to the cause of specific rebirth states, and the latter, to the cause that leads to rebirth in general. (AKB 6.3 p. 333.5ff; YBS 5 p. 301.c.7ff, YB Bhattacharya p. 108). (For the pair abhinirvrttisarrtyojana and upapattisar(l,yojana and their relation to the intermediate state and the future rebirth state according to Sarvastivada-Vaibha~ika theory see AKB 3.41 p. 153.16ff.) Sanghabhadra in the Nyayanusara (NAS 49 p. 618.a.13ff) lists abhinirvrttihetu and upapattihetu with vipakahetu in a group of three causes: abhinirvrttihetu is the cause of not abandoning, or

150 JIABS VOL. 1) NO.1

not surpassing realms and stages; upapattihetu is the cause tl . makes one be reborn; and vipakahetu is the cause that rna~at

?ne recei~e the maturatio? ?f ef~ects after one is ~eborn. Accoral mg to Sanghabhadra, abhznzrvrttzhetu and upapattzhetu differ from' vipakahetu in. that they are. causes for the process of rebirth. Though logIcally one might assume that Sanghabhadr' t~reefold d.ivision of causes into abhinir:rttihetu, upapattihetu a~~ vzpakahetu IS a refinement of an earlIer twofold division int ., upapattihetu and vipakahetu attested in this fragment, no textu~ basis for this hypothesis has been found.

4). Vl-2 Given the objection of the opponent in Vl-2, "ifth~ cause of rebirth were unvirtuous," the proponent's staternent in VI, sa ca kuialal;, should probably be emended to read so, cakusalal;, "and that is un-virtuous." With this emendation, the proponent suggests that the cause of rebirth under discussion. is unvirtuous. The opponent's subsequent objection (Vl-3) provides an important clue concerning both the function of the prior distinction between upapattihetu and vipakahetu, and the: opponent's identity. The opponent's first point-if this cause' of rebirth were unvirtuous, the realm of form and the formleSs realm would not arise-implies that this cause of rebirth,if unvirtuous, would produce an unvirtuous effect. In other words, the cause of rebirth functions through a causal relation of simi~ larity producing an effect similar to it, as opposed to the cause of maturation, which functions through a relation of difference (MVB 19 p. 98.b.5ff). An unvirtuous cause of rebirth must then •• produce an unvirtuous effect. This unvirtuous effect could nOt occur within the realm of form or the formless realm because; the opponent states, "that is virtuous there." This statement is consistent with the Kashmiri Sarvastivada-Vaibha~ika position that unvirtuous dharmas are not found in the two upper realms' of the realm of form and the formless realm, and therefore, whatever defilements (klesa) are found there are indeterminate (avyakrta) (MVB 3 p. 14.b.8ff, 38 p. 196.b.12ff, 50 p. 259.c.9ff, 141 p. 724.c.3ff, 144 p. 741.b.4ff; AKV p. 392.32-33). This position opposes the Dar~tantika and Mahasanghika view that. all defilements are unvirtuous (MVB 38 p. 196.a.15ff, 50 p. 259.c.9; Masuda 1925 p. 27), and therefore, by implication, that defilements of the realm of form and the formless realm must.


!;~So be unvirtuous . . r Though the opponent seems to represent the Kashmiri Sar~vastivada-Vaibha~ika perspective, the identification of the pro:~'ponen~ as ~ Dar~tantika an~ the frag.ment as part of a Dar~ta~tika :Jastra IS hIghly problematIc. DespIte Sanghabhadra's ObVIOUS :rdiance on a written text in his frequent references to the views ;:of the Dar~tantika master Sthavira (Srllata), no fragment of an :Hndependent Dar~tantika siistra has yet been found. Instead, the ,'proponent could well represent the view of another branch of tthe Sarvastivada. Or, this fragment could represent a section 'embedded in a larger text quoting the views of an opponent .'who presents his position in a dialogue in which he is the proponent. In that case, the proponent and opponent of the frag.ment and the larger text would be reversed .

.••. 5). V3 The opponent concludes his reasons for the impossibility (.of rebirth in the realm of form or the formless realm with a :'scriptural citation in V3: "one is free from desires (vivikta/:t ikiime~u)." Though brief, this citation echoes the common for:mulaic description of the process by which one passes from the realm of desire through the four trance states in the realm of form: "one traverses, attaining the first trance state ...... that is free of desires, free of evil and unvirtuous dharmas." ( .. . viv-ktarrt kiimair vviviktarrt piipakair akusalair dharmmai/:t . . . prathamarrt dhyiinam upasarrtpadya viharati. Dietz 1984 p. 62; DS 12 p. 512.c.23ff. See also DN #2 vol. 1 p. 73; MN #13 vol. 1 p. 89, MA 25 #99 p. 586.a.18ff; MVB 80 p. 415.a.23ff, AVB 41 p. 311.b.7ff, VB 10 p. 488.a.2ft). One would normally expect vivikta to be construed with the instrumental, as we find in this canonical passage, reflecting the common idiom of the instrumental with verbs of separation (von Hiniiber 1968 § .149 p: 162; UV 30.28c-d p. 399 kamebhir vipramukto ... ). However, in this fragment, the locative, kiime~u, is probably not an anomaly

. but rather is due either to a confusion of the locative for the .instrumental (Edgerton 1953 §.7.30 p. 44, §.7.81 p. 47), or reflects another verbal idiom witli kiime~u in the locative. (Sen 1953 p. 410; UV 2.9c p. 114 kiime~u tv apratibaddhacitta . .. ; UV 18.15c p.245 atrptam eva kiime~u . .. ). Since this scriptural passage states that in attaining the first trance state in the realm of form, there

152 JIABS VOL) 1 NO.1

is freedom not only from desires, but also from unvirtu '. 'd .c h OUs dharmas, it would provl e support lor t e opponent's suggesti

that there is nothing unvirtuous in the ~ealm of form or t~n formless realm. Remarkably, we find this very scriptural refer~ ence used by Sanghabhadra in the Nyayanusara (NAS 49" 617.a.24ff) in an argument with the Dar~tantika master Sthavi~' (Sri:!ata) in a context identical to that of this fragment: thatisa

Sanghabhadra attempts to refute Sthavira's suggestion that sine' all defilements are unvirtuous, there are unvirtuous dharmas i~ the realm of form. However, the same caution noted at the end of the previous section concerning the attribution of this fragment to the Dar~tantika must be repeated here.

REFERENCES

AKB-Pradhan, P., ed., 1975. Abhidharmakosabhf4yamofVasubandhu, (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. 8.) Patna.

AVB-Abhidharmavibhf4iiSiistra. T.28.1546. Dietz-Dietz, S. 1984. Fragmente des Dharmaskandha. (Abhandlungen der

Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gi:ittingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr.142.) Gi:ittingen.

DN-Rhys Davids, T.W. and J. E. Carpenter, eds., 1890. The Digha Nikaya, Vol. 1 London. .

DS-Dharmaskandha. T.26.1537. Edgerton-Edgerton, F., 1953. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary.

(Vol. 1, Grammar). New Haven. von Hiniiber-Hiniiber, O. von, 1968. Studien zur Kasussyntax des Pali, besonders

des Vinaya-Pitaka. Miinchen. Huang-Huang Wenbid . 1983. Xinjiang kaogufajue baogao (1957-8ye. (An Ar

chaeological Tour of Xinjiang (1957-8)). Beijing. JP-Jiianaprasthana. T.26.1544. (Abhidharmf4taskandhasiistra. T.26.1543.) Kimura-Kimura, T., 1937. Abidatsumaron no kenkyu. Kimura Taiken zensM,

Vol. 4. Tokyo. Lamotte, E., 1958. Histoire du bouddhisme Indien. (Bibliotheque du Museon,

Vol. 43). Louvain. MA-Madhyamagama. T.1.26. Masuda-Masuda, J., 1925. "Origins and Doctrines of Early Buddhist

Schools." Asia Major. 2:1-78. MN---,-Chalmers, R., ed., 1896-99. The Majjhima Nikaya, 3 Vols. London. MVB-Mahiivibhii~iiSiistra. T.27.1545. NAS-Nyayanusara. T.29.1562. Norman-Norman, K.R., 1970. "Middle Indo-Aryan Studies VIII." Journal

of the Oriental Institute, Baroda. 20:329-336.


~(fP_praiwra'f}apiidasiistra T.26.1542. :'\SA_Sarrz,yuktiigama. T.2.99.... ., "Sander-Sander, L., 1968. Palaographzsches zu den Sanskrzthandschriften der Ber-<" liner Turfansammlung. (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in it,· Deutschland, Supplementband 8.) Wiesbaden. J§AS_Siiriputriibhidharmafiistra. T.28.1548. :"Schlingloff (1955 )-Schlingloff, D., 1955. Buddhistische Stotras aus ostturkistanis-, ' chen Sanskrittexten (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften iu Berlin.

iF Institut fUr Orientforschung, Veroffentlichung Nr.22). Berlin. 'sihlingloff (l968)-Schlingloff, D. 1968. Die Buddhastotras des Miitrceta. Fak-

similewiedergabe der HandschriJten. (Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Klasse fUr Sprachen, Literatur and Kunst, 1968, Nr.2). Berlin.

iSchmithausen-Schmithausen, L., 1969. Der Nirvii'f}a-Abschnitt in der ViniS, cayasarrz,graha'f}t der YogiiciirabhilmiJ;,. (Veroffentlichungen der Kommission

fUr Sprachen und Kulturen Siid- und Ostasiens, 8. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 264, Band 2.) Wien.

,Sen-Sen, S., 1953. ,"Historical Syntax of Middle Indo-Aryan." Indian Linguis-, tics. 13 (in Vol. 3, reprint ed. of Vois. 1-15):355-412. "Shackleton Bailey-Shackleton Bailey, D.R., 1951: The Satapaiicasatka oj "" Miitrceta. Cambridge. SN-Feer, M. L., ed., 1884-98. The Sarrz,yutta Nikiiya oJthe Sutta Pitaka. 5 Vois.

,',' London. T.-Takakusu,]., et al. eds., 1924-32. TaishO shinshil Daizokyo. Tokyo.

: TripathI-TripathI, C. 1962. FiinJundzwanzig Siltras des Nidiinasarrz,yukta. (Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Institut fUr Orientforschung, Veroffentlichung Nr.56. Sanskrittexte aus den Turfan-funden, 8.) Berlin. '

"UV-Bernhard, F., 1965. Udiinavarga, Band 1. (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gottingen. Philologisch-Historische Klasse, Dritte Folge, Nr.54.) Gottingen.

VB-Vibh~asiistra. T.28.1547. Waldschmidt-Waldschmidt, E., 1965. Sanskrithandschriften aus den TurfanJun

den, Teil 1. (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Band 9,1.) Wiesbaden.

VB-Bhattacharya, V., 1957. The Yogiiciirabhilmi oj .Aciirya ASa1iga, Part 1. Calcutta.

YBS-Yogiiciirabhilmisiistra. T.30.1579.

Chinese terms

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;~SOIlle Reflections on R. S. Y. Chi's Buddhist 1tJ:;()rrnal Logic ... k,~ \' .'

~J3y Tom J. F. Tillemans f/"

It has been almost twenty years since Richard Chi published ~hisBuddhist Formal Logic, I a work which attempted virtually every',thing at once: it was filled with various interpretations of the 'ihistory of Buddhist thought, particularly that of Dignaga as ~found in the short synopsis of valid and fallacious reasons known )~as the Hetucakra; at the same time it sought to present a ;:,philosophical analysis and evaluation of Dignaga's thought by /abundantly using the techniques of Anglo-American analytic ;'philosophy and formal logic. The book, in spite of its forbidding ~·appearance, is certainly worth the necessary effort on the part ;.of an open-minded reader; no doubt it has its share of question:able interpretations, as we shall see below, but Chi's approach and his portrayal of Dignaga's thought are still of relevance for

:the growing number of philosophers who recognize the importance and interest of understanding non-western systems of logic and epistemology.

Two recent events make it fitting to once again examine .Chi's contribution: one is the sad news of Prof. Chi's death, and the other is the fortunate fact that his book has been reprinted in India by Motilal Banarsidass. Given that the book was written many years ago, it is, of course, inevitable that the perspective of a present-day writer on these issues will exhibit important differences from that of Chi. Nevertheless, I think that it is of interest to take stock of some of the positive and negative sides of Chi's book and, in so doing, address some aspects of the problem as to how one might approach the subject of "Buddhist

• formal logic." It should be clear by now that formal logic can be profitably

155

156 JIABS VOL. 1 rNO. 1.

used i~ elucidating the thought of early logicians, ?e they WesterJ or ASIan; w.ehave. a number of e~ample~ of ~hIS now and Chi ?as the m~nt of.bemg one ~f the ~lOneersm usm~ this approach; m BuddhIst lOgIC. The ObVIOUS pitfall, ?owever, IS basing enor:; mous fo~mal superstructu~es on ve~y mcomplete or shaky un~: derstandmgs of the BuddhIst texts: If one does not have a realI' clear picture of the philosphical notions which' one is seekiriX to translate, or if those notions themselves are fuzzy, the resu~ of using formal techniques will be, to say the least, unilluminating. '.

1. The Trairupya

. ~ good example o~ a rat~er fruitless, pre~ature use oflogic IS ChI s treatment of Dignaga s theory of the tnply characterized reason (trairupya). (Here, let me refer to two articles published by S. Katsura: "On Trairupya Formulae" and "Dignaga 011

Trairupya."2) On pp. 40 et seqq. we find Chi's section 126, "In-. terpretation of the Trairupya," where the author bases his opinion.' on what Dignaga's theory was all about on a passage from Hsuantsang's Chinese translation of the Nyayapravesa (NP), a work which was itself most likely written by Sar'lkarasvamin. Aside from the obvious incongruity of grounding an interpretation of the fine details of Dignaga's thought on a text which is not actually by him, and is at any rate far and away less important than the Prama1J,asamuccaya, Chi bases his whole understanding on the Chinese translation of NP, when in fact we have the Sanskrit original and the Tibetan: Here is what Chi says on p. 41:'

The above way of interpretation is not merely my personal specu-. lation. The Chinese translation, although usually very poor, is accurate enough in the rendering of the Trairupya. The word piena which means "pervade" or "pervasive" is used in the first and the third clauses; while the word tingb which means "necessary" is used in the second clause. According to the Chinese rendering, the Trairupya [as found in Hsuan-tsang's trans. ofNP] should be translated as follows:

The pervasive presence of the hetu in the subject; The necessary presence of the hetu in some similar instances; The pervasive absence of the hetu from dissimilar instances.

BUDDHIST FORMAL LOGIC 157

Now let me reproduce the Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan "ts of the NP passage in question and confront Chi's rendition

~th some of Katsura's results concerning "only" (eva) i~ the NP: , -rl -.J-: - ...j-Q 1- 1tt 1-1- - )'Ifl: - E- -:;:

thinese: 1.£1 II'l :::- 'l'D.. floJ <;j E.7 .::-. f,F) ~.<l:..J '/" C', IA. r-;:) 0 ,-'-'1 -t:. l.,'t- ,'<'1 0 - ~ tJ<-~~: I~ 'l~ t I~~ or] :iL 11'l 'r.:t. I ~ /~1(1 ~ ~,,' ',:i:..

~Sanskrit: hetus trirupab, I ki1'(t punas trairupyam I pak.$adhar.matva1'(t "~~pak$e sattva1'(t vipakJe casattvam iti/3

'Tibetan: gtan tshigs ni tshul gsum mo II tshul gsum po de yang gang ;~he na I phygos kyi chos nyid dang I mthun pa'i phyogs nyid la yod ;par nges pa dang I mi thun pa'i phyogs la med pa nyid du nges pa ;yang ngo II (Peking bstan 'gyur ce 180b5-6),

i'i' The first thing to be noticed, following Katsura, is that the :Sanskrit does not have "only" (eva), whereas the Tibetan, in the second and third clauses, has nyid, which here has the sense of

:'eva rather than the abstract tva or tao As for the Chinese, pienc 'hnd tinl do not correspond to anything in the Sanskrit, but are .rather Hsuan-tsang's additions, just as nyid was added by the 1:Tibetan translator. Now, Chi understood ting in a rather normal 'Chinese way4 as meaning "necessary." He explains on p. 42 that :iing you hsinge means:

"assured presence," "not failing to be present" or "bare presence" and includes two possible cases, namely: the pervasive presence and the partial presence (sapakJavyapaka andsapakJaikadesavrtti).

" There is, however, every reason to believe that here the character ting is being used, perhaps infelicitously, to convey

'the sense of "only" (eva = nyid): in other words Hsuan-tsang also made the same "addition" which the Tibetan translator

,made. The point then is not (as Chi would have it) that the ,second clause simply asserts that some, 'but not all, instances of the reason are in the set of similar instances. Rather, the clause asserts that all instances of the reason are in that set. 5 This equivalence, ting = eva, while fairly rare, is attested in A .

. Hirakawa's Index to the Abhidharmakosabha~ya, but more signific-antly, we find that both pien and ting are used to render eva in other trairupya formulae in Hsuan-tsang's translation of NP, formulae where eva actually does occur in the Sanskrit. 6

No doubt, if we want to translate the NP passages strictly on the basis of what the Chinese says, the result will be ambigu-


ous. But if we bear in mind. that ting and pien are. be,ing Usedto render eva, then the meanmg of the passage wIll oe that th . hetuis only present in the subject, it is present in only the simile instances and it is only absent (i.e., entirely absent) in the dissirti lar instances. If this does not look different from Dharmaklrti~< formulation in the Nyayabindu, so be it: it seems that both Hsuan~ tsang and the Tibetan translator of NP may very well have hatf a Dharmakirti-style formulation of the trairupya with eva in mind when they made their "additions." Anyway, leaving aside Np we now have fairly good evidence that Dignaga in th~ PramatJ,asamuccayavrf;ti did use eva in the second characteristiC' viz., the anvayavyapti, when commenting on tattulye sadbhiiv()' and moreover, that he may have accepted the equivalence of the second and third (i.e., the vyatirekavyapti) characteristics.'

Chi seems to have based his stance largely on an articIe()f K. Potter, "Dignaga and the development ofIndian logic", which he reproduced in his book and which distinguished three phas~s of the development of the trairupya. Given the results whichwe have now, I doubt that these phases can be accepted as Potter described them. So, in sum, I will not present the superstructure of formulae (see pp. 42-43) which Chi based on his or Potter's interpretation, for I think it is sufficient to say that the Buddhological problem of what Dignaga, or even Hsiian-tsang, held with regard to eva was a much more thorny one than Chi or Potter made it out to be, and until that problem is clearer in our minds, much of Chi's formal treatment of the trairupya and his philosophical comparisons with John Stuart Mill are really beside the point.

II. Is the Hetucakra extensional?

On p. xix Chi writes:

The Hetucakra was intended to be an extensional study of various kinds of major premises about whether they can yield valid syllogisms.

By "extensionality of logical formulae" we mean that any two equivalent formulae may, in contexts in a given theory, be


freplaced by on~ another. Th.us, for example, if the .sentences P trid Q are eqmvalent, then It can be shown that, III formulae ;20111Posed only of sentential connectives and quantifiers, Q can ~Be substituted for P in any given sentence and the truth-value Ebf that sentence will remain unchanged. If, however, we have :;itheory which uses epistemic statements such as "X knows that .t .. " or modal statements such as "Necessarily ... ," then there (will be many statements which are not extensional, but rather, ~~~'intensional." The sentence

:;, (P == Q) --_. (X knows that P == X knows that Q)8

"';

,is false, and thus sentences containing "X know that. .. " are said to be "intensional" rather than "extensional."9

~' .. , Now, one of the key problems in deciding to what degree hhe Hetucakra is extensional is how to interpret the ?asadhiirar;,anaikantikahetu, viz., "the reason which is uncertain ,because it is [too] exclusive," where, according to Dignaga, the 'jreason is supposed to be absent from both the similar instances .;(sapak$a) and the dissimilar instances (vipak5a).10 The usual in'terpretation, which Chi also presents and which I have elsewhere ::termed "the orthodox scenario," is that a reason such as "audibility" (sravar;,atva) , which is co-extensive with the dharmin,

' .. "sound," is literally excluded from both the sapak5a and the ;vipak$a. The sapak5a here would be all things which are imper'manent, except for the dharmin, sound. So, audibility cannot occur ln the set of sapak5a for proving sound's impermanence, for such a sapak5a simply does not exist: it would have had to be

;something which was audible a~d was not a sound.1i And a <fortiori, "audibility" does not occur in the dissimilar instances '(vipaksa) either, for there is nothing which is audible and which ;is also permanent. 12

. This version of the asadharar;,ahetu is not silly or wrong, but it is worth our while to see that it is not the only version: far

.. from it. Indeed, I have argued that there was a controversy in Tibetan Buddhism over this question, with the Sa skya pas main

' .• taining something like the orthodox scenario, while the dGe .Jugs pa maintained a different position, basing themselves on ; definitions of sapak5a and vipak5a such as those found in Ratna. karasanti's Antarvyaptisamarthana. But it is, of course, not particu-

160 JIABS VOL. 11 NO. Y

larly I?ersuasive to just. cit~ later logicians in <:rder to answer the questIon as to what Dlgnaga thought; what IS much more Con~ vincing is that Dharmaklrti, in Pramar;,avarttika IV's long discus .. sion of the asadharar;,ahetu, d~es not s~ppo~t .the orthodo~ scenario, but rather comes up wIth a verSIOn (sImIlar to thedG lugs) which wotll~ int:rpret .this f~llacy as .b~ing essentially I problem of an epistemlC and mtensIOnallogic m that it involves contexts such as "X knows that ... ". I leave it up to the reader to judge whether DharmakIrti was an accurate exponent of Dignaga's thought on this matter. 13

Karikas 207-259 of the pararthanumana chapter of Pramar;,avarttika form part of a larger section loosely treatingof Dignaga's Hetucakra, and specifically concern the refutationo[ the Naiyayika's argument that living bodies have selves (atma~) because they have breath and other animal functions (pra1J,tidi).14 Although Dharmakirti does not discuss the sound-(im)perrna_ nent-audibility example very much, he does explicitly state in karika 218 that the asadharar;,anaikantikahetu, "breath, etc.,"js completely similar logically to the example found in the Hetucakra. 15 Here are some of the key verses along with extracts from commentaries.

Context: In k. 205 and 206, Dharmakirti has been putting forth the recurrent theme that the certainty of the reason's being excluded from the dissimilar instances depends upon there being a necessary connection (avinabhava) between it and th¢' property to be proven. Such a connection will guarantee the pervasion (vyapti), i.e., the concomitances in similarity (anvaya) and in difference (vyatireka). Thus, given such a connection, the reason would be excluded from the dissimilar instances, butifl the case of the asadhara1J,ahetu, such a connection cannot be established; hence there is no such exclusion.

Devendrabuddhi's introduction to k. 207: [Objection:] If in this .. way the Master [Dignaga] did not exclude (ldog pa ma yin na) the' special case [i.e., the aSiidhiira1J,ahetu] [from the dissimilar in-. stances], then why is it said that it is excluded from the similar and dissimilar instances?16 k. 207: [Reply:] It is just from the point of view of merely not observing [the reason among the dissimilar instances] thath~ spoke of it being excluded. Therefore [i.e., since the vyatirekai~ uncertain when it is due to merely not observing the reason],


[the Master said that the reason] is uncertain. Otherwise [if there were the certainty that it is excluded from the dissimilar intances], [the reason] would be demonstrative (gamaka).17 k. 220: By saying that [the sadhana] is excluded just from the contrary· of what is to be proven [viz., the dissimilar instances], it is asserted [by implication] that it is present in what is to be proven [viz., in the similar instances]. Therefore, it was said that by means of one [viz., the vyatireka or the anvaya], both will be demonstrated by implication. 18

The point of k. 207, then, is that Dharmakirti wants to interpret "absence in the vipak$a" metaphorically: it does not mean that breath, etc., are in fact completely absent from what >does not have a self, but rather that the debaters do not observe that breath, etc., occurs in things which have no self. But, although the debater might not see something, that does not necessarily mean that it is not there. In that sense, the debater does not ascertain absence, for indeed, as k. 220 makes clear, if breath, etc., were really absent in the dissimilar instances, then the vyatirekavyapti would hold; hence, the anvaya would hold

'too, and the reason would be valid! So in brief, "exclusion" or "absence" is to be interpreted

metaphorically as meaning "non-observation." And precisely because non-observation is not probative, the essential point of

·.the asadhilra1J,ahetu, according to Dharmakirti's interpretation of, Dignaga, is that the debaters do not know or ascertain vyapti, be it the reason's absence in vipak$a or its presence in sapak$a.

Finally, consider the following important passage from Dharmakirti's Svavrtti to Prama1J,avarttika I (Svarthilnumana) k. 28, along with KarI:lakagomin's TiM.19 (I have underlined the Svavrtti passages):

katharrt tarhy asadharar;atvac chravar;atvarrt nityanityayor nastfty ucyata ity aha I kevalarrt tu ityadi I nityanitye~u sravar;,atvasya bhiivaniscayabhiivat I sravar;,atvarrt nityiinityayor nastity ucyate I. Now then, how is it that audibility is said to be absent in both permanent and impermanent [things] because it is an exclusive [attribute]? [Dharmaklrti] answers: But it is just. .. etc. [It is just] because audibility is not ascertained as being in either permanent or impermanent [things] that audibility is said to be absent from what is permanent or impermanent.


Our conclusion must be that, at least following Dharmaklrf the Hetucakra cannot be treated extensionally, but will invol 1,.

epistemic, intensional statements. 20 Ve

III. Quantification and semantics

A number of years ago the Dutch logician, E.W. Beth sketched out a set of questions which a study of a non-Wester~. logic should approach if it is to be of use to a modern philosopher of 10gic. 21 Some of his more general questions (e.g., "Does the. language of the culture in question give suitable means of expression for formal logical reasoning?") have, I think, been more or less satisfactorily answered by now with regard to Buddhist logic, but others, in particular those which concern the basic structures of Buddhist logic, such as quantification, negation, implication, intensionality/extensionality and semantic theory> are still to a surprising degree unresolved. Whenever one at~ tempts to explain such structures, one would do well to bearin mind Beth's caution that "one should be prepared for the pos" sibility that the treatment of formal logical problems is combined or mingled with considerations of another, for example, epistemological, psychological or grammatical nature."22

Now let us, by way of an example, look at quantification ill Buddhist logic. It seems to me that one of the recurring problems in using formal logic to handle pervasion (vyapti) and such notions is that we often disregard the peculiar semantic theories of the Buddhists, and then we simply go ahead and use first order predicate calculus (with some modifications here and' there) plus a semantics which is more or less as we might find it in an elementary logic textbook. Of course, there can be a certain utility in deliberately over-simplifying things. But I would argue that a satisfactory theory of basic formal structures in Buddhist logic must take into account Buddhist metaphysiCs and especially the semantic theory of anyapoha ("exclusion of what is other").

Let us first look at what Chi did with quantification. We find an account of Dignaga's three "operators," pervasive pre-· sence (vyapaka) , absence (avrtti) and partial presence' (ekadesavrtti) , where Chi uses standard first order predicate caI7 ..


culus quantifiers (Ex) Fx (Read: "There is an x, such that x has f) and (x) Fx (Read: "For all x, x has F). He then argues (cf. pp. )o{iv and xxv) that Dignaga's version of pervasion between F arid G was:........., (Ex) (Fx &-, Gx) plus the additional premiss (Ex) (Fx & ?X!: I pr~sum~ that what ~h~ means b~ sayin~ that pervasion IS a conjUnctIOn of two dIstmct premIsses," IS that the ekample constitutes a premiss, viz., that there are instances of :Fand G. At any rate, if these quantifiers are taken normally (as ,in an elementary logic textbook), they should range over a do.main composed only of actually existent things. And that leads ~to difficulties in the case of Buddhist logic: (a) pervasion (and hence quantification) is not restricted to existent things, but also concerns inexistent but possible items, such as the rabbit's horn,23 .and even inconsistent, impossible items, such as the barren woman's son; (b) even in the Hetucakra itself, we find examples, such as space (iikiisa), which from the point of view of Buddhist

.metaphysics do not really exist. 24 , A fairly good solution to the conundrum is that of A. Mac;Dermott, who uses R. Routley's R*.2s We can introduce a univer~sal quantifier, (1TX) P, ranging over all possible items, be they ~xistent or inexistent. We can then define another quantifier as follows:

Thus "(1TX) Fx" should be read as "For all possible items, x, x has F". Read "(~x)" as "for some x," i.e., as a quantifier which does not imply that the value of the variable exists. Pervasion

,then would become:

('Trx) (Fx- Gx) & (2:x) (Fx & Gx), i.e., ,(2:x) (Fx & -,Gx) & (2:x) (Fx & Gx) .

. (The second conjunct would show the premiss that F and G must not be uninstantiated.)

This approach does, however, have the distinct disadvantage that it cannot easily handle inconsistent items, a point which

,seems to have given MacDermott herself some qualms.26 The problem is symptomatic of the fact that the semantics which she used bears little resemblance to the Buddhists' own semantics


as developed in the theory of apoha. (In fact, even Routley h' self had some misgivings about the domain of an interpretat~rnofR* being composed in part Qfinexistent items, and he sho\lo~ a preference for a substitutional interpretation, where the ae

main wo~ld c?nsi~t of nam~s.) I~?uld suggest another approa~ to~uan~lficatlo~ III BuddhIst lOgIC, an app~oach which, in spite OElts pnma faCIe strangeness, has the ment of staying close t the Buddhist's own semantic theories. 0

. We know that for Dignagaand Dharmaklrti words do not directly refer to particulars (svalak;a1Ja); instead, what is spoken about is always a mentally created fiction, a samanyalak;a1Ja or universal characteristic, which consists in the exclusion of all

. that is other than the ~ntended object. This fiction has a type of mind-dependent existence (we could say "subsistence"), or in Buddhist terminology, it is said to be "conventionally existent~'

_ (sar{Lvrtisat); it is, however, only indirectly connected with what is ultimately real, i.e., svalak;a1Ja; in sum, it is a type of proxy over which our thoughts .and words range. The details of this connection between proxies and svalak;a1Ja is beyond the scope of this paper, but suffice to say that the proxy, largely because one confuses it with the svalak;a1Ja leads us to understand and act on various svalak;a1Ja in the world. (Dharmakirti, in Prama1Javarttika III, k. 57, illustrates the process by an example of a person who mistakes the light emitted by a jewel through a keyhole for the jewel itself; such a person will nonetheless know where the jewel is, and will eventually obtain it.) Equally, there can be "proxies," such as that of the rabbit's horn or that of the barren woman's son, which have no corresponding svalak;a1Ja. The upshot is that the Buddhist adopts what B.K. Matilal has termed a "pan-fictional" approach: .

The Buddhist, in fact, would like to put all the objects over which our thoughts and other psychological activities may range at the

. same level; and this will include not only (a) things which do exist now (i.e., which are assumed to be existent by the common people or by the realist) but also (b) things which do not exist now (i.e., past and future things), (c) things which cannot exist (viz., the rabbit's horn) and also (d) things of which it would be a logical contradiction to say that they exist (viz., the son of a barren woman).27


To return to the problem of quantifiers and their interpretation, the essential idea is to let them range over a domain composed entirely of proxies, i.e., samanyalaksa'f}a. We could use the quanti.fiers (1TX) and (2:x) and let them range over domains of proxies, which all exist at least conventionally. While the barren woman's son is contradictory, his samanyalaksa'f}a proxy is not, and gives us no special problems. We also introduce a function which assigns svalaksa'f}a to some of these proxies. This function will often assign the same svalaksaTJa to several different samiinyalaksaTJa proxies; the samanyalaksaTJa denoted by the words !'impermanence" and "producthood" (krtakatva) , for example, are connected with the same svalaksaTJa.

An interpretation I will consist of the ordered quadruple [D, D',j, g], where D is a non-empty set of samanyalaksaTJa, D' is a possibly empty set of svalaksaTJa,f is a function assigning elements of D to individual variables and constants, and sets of n~tuples in D to n-ary predicates. g is a function assigning .svala10a1Ja in D' to proxies in D. Truth and satisfaction could proceed more or less normally, except that in the case of an atomic formula such as Fa (interpreted as "a is impermanent"), the formula would be true when the proxy, a, which is not itself impermanent, is conventionally or commonly thought to be impermanent. (In the case of the barren woman's son we should probably have to say that his proxy is not even conventionally thought to be a son.) I do not wish to pretend that this is philosophically wholly satisfying as a theory of truth-at any rate it would need an accompanying account of what conventional truth is for Buddhist logicians. 28 Suffice to say that this line of approach to quantification and its semantics in Buddhist logic is also faithful with regard to the philosophical stance of .Dignaga and Dharmakirti's thought.

IV. Final Remarks

It seems to me obvious that we cannot reasonably attempt a philosophical analysis of Buddhist logic as extensive and technical as that of Chi's study on the Hetucakra until we are much more familiar with the main Indian and Tibetan texts and have a clearer idea of the doctrines about which we wish to


philosophize. Now, Chi acknowledged~that his work Was ju .......... ~ . beginning-that should be stressed. However, the next /t~

1 h k . II . lIne .. someone tack es t e Hetuca ra we espeCla y need to hay ••..•...•.... clear~r u_nd~rstanding of. the P~ama1J,aviniscay~ and ~h~'i Prar:"a1J,avarttz~a, ?oth of wh.ICh haveImp~rtant sectIOns onthii' subject. The Hidlgenous TIbetan rtags rzgs texts, which of tiC

have a section on the Hetucakra and provide useful definitioell

of the variou~ sorts of valid and fallacious r~asons, are also die value here. Fmally, there are many other TIbetan works, such', as dGe 'dun grub pa's Tshad ma rigs pa'i rgyan and rGyal tshab'~ rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed and N gag dbang bstan dar's commerr~. tary on the Hetucakra, which have long and valuable sectionsori the problems at stake and merit serious study. .'

NOTES

1. R.S.Y. Chi, Buddhist Formal Logic, Part I, A study ofDigniiga's Hetucak;~: and K'uei-chi's Great Commentary on the Nyiiyapravesa. Dr. B.C. Law Trust Fund,: Volume I, first published by the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britian, 1969::, Reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1984. There are no differences be~i:: tween the two printings, except that the errata indicated in the first editidIil have been corrected in the reprint. Let me specify that in what follows, I have,",. for typographical reasons, changed Chi's symbolic notation in certain places., Specifically, co~unction will be represented by "&" (read: ... and ... ), disjunc~< tion by "v" (read: ... or. .. ), material implication by" -" (read: if. .. theri)); negation by "-," (read: ... not. .. ) and equivalence by"""" (read: .. .if and.:. only if. .. ). . ....... .

2. "On Trairupya Formulae," in Buddhism and Its Relation to OtherR~li~. gions: Essays in Honour of Dr. Shozen Kumoi on His Seventieth Birthday, Kydtoi. 1986, pp. 161-172. "Dignaga on Trairupya, " Journal of Indian and Buddhi§t' Studies (IndogakuBukkyogakuKenkyu), XXXII, 1, December, 1983, pp. 544-538: <

3. See p. 1 of The Nyiiyapravesa, Sanskrit Text with Commentaries, ed. A.B,; Dhruva, Gaekwad's Oriental Series 38, Baroda, 1968. .,

4. Cf. modern Chinese yi tinl. 5. For the use of eva / "only" at stake in the trairupya see Y. KajiyaIIla, .•.•

"Three kinds of affirmation and two kinds of negation in Buddhisr: philosophy," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 17, 1973, pp. 161-175,.,.: See also the corrections of B.S. Gillon and R.P. Hayes, "The role of the particlf eva in (logical) quantification in Sanskrit," WZKS 26, 1982, pp. 195-203.· ••

6. See Katsura (1986) op. cit. p. 162. To take one of Katsura's example~:., NP, p. 1, 13-14: tatra krtakatvaf[t prayatniintariyakatvaf[t vii pa10adharmal;, sapa~a;


;:i-sti vipa4e niisty eva I. Taish6 p. lib:

eva ttt '7 PJf ~Ip ·Ii ~ jjJ ~ '11 .j! ! t yt ;li J I~ \:Jb ~ ~ 'Ii

7. See Katsura (1983) op. cit. 8. For an explanation of the symbols used, see n. 1. 9. See A. Grzegorczyk, An Outline of Mathematical Logic. (Dordrecht: D.

;:'Reidel Publishing Co., 1974) pp. 222-224. I have discussed the role of these :intensional epistemic statements in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist logic in my !:~'Identity and referential opacity in Tibetan Buddhist apoha theory," in B.K. ·;M~ti.lal and R.D. Evans (eds.) Buddhist Logic and Epistemology. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986), pp. 207-277.

i 10. In another article I have argued against taking Buddhist inferences"for-oneself (sviirthanumiina) and inferences-for-others (pariithanumiina) as ::.being some sort of syllogism; I will not go into the details here. See my article "i';Sur Ie pariirthanumiina en logique bouddhique," Asiatische Studien I Etudes ;.J,siatiques 38, 2, 1984, pp. 73-99. : 11. See my paper, "On sapaf0a, " forthcoming in Acta Orientalia Hungarica, "Proceedings of the Csoma de Karas Symposium held in Visegrid in Sept. ;:1984. On p. 363 of his article, "On the theory of intrinsic determination of ::universal concomitance in Buddhist Logic," Journal of Indian and Buddhist F~tudies, 7, 1, pp. 364-360, Y. Kajiyama gives the "orthodox scenario":

If the reason belongs exclusively to the minor term, as in the case of audibility which is supposed to prove momentariness of sound (minor term), no homologous cases [i.e. sapa~aJ which are audible and momentary are available.

12. In fact, the Hetucakra discusses the reason "audibility" in the context 'of proving that sound is permanent. We frequently find both sorts of proof, , viz., of sound's impermanence or sound's permanence. See Kajiyama op. cit. "p. 363, and T. Stcherbatsky:Buddhist Logic. Leningrad 1930, vol 2, p. 208, n.

1. Indeed, logically the problem is the same. If we are proving that sound is permanent, then there will be no vipaf0a, i.e., impermanent things other than

,.sound, which will also be audible. Note that Chi (p. 17) definesvipak,5a as z . ( hz), i.e., the set of all things which do not have the property to be proven. 'If he wants to make his account of the asiidhiira7Jahetu work, he would have to specify vipaf0a as z ( fz & hz), i.e., the set of things which are not the

>pa~a, and which do not have the property to be proven. Cf. n. 33 on p. 135 :pf M. Tachikawa, "A Sixth-century manual of Indian logic," Journal of Indian >Philosophy 1, 1971, pp. 111-145: "Both the sapakJa and the vipaf0a must be

different from the paf0a. Therefore the mark is present neither in the sapaf0a nor in the vipaf0a." If we kept Chi's definition,z (-,hz) , then we would be

• (forced to say that "audibility" does occur amongst the things, like sound, which ;"are not permanent, and hence that it does occur in the vipaf0a when one is ; proving that sound is permanent!


13. The question turns largely, I would think, on Dharmaklrf' ,,' ;'~ . ..' (" . d"" I S add!" tIOn" of the word nges pa = msczta ascertame ) m hIS renditi .-

Prama'f}aviniscaya II) of Dig nag a's formulation of the trairupya inPraman on (cf.;:.' h h Th" k . E S . .asamuc. caya's Svart anumana c apter. IS IS ta en up m· . temkellner's "Re "{

'. . h "£ h . . F h ifi fi G T" marks' on msatagra a'f}a, iort commg m estsc n t or . uccz. ThIs term i ", explicitly present in Dignaga's formulation but the sense, judging from ~ hnot."

f P - . dd' t er passages 0 ram~'f}asamuccaya, . seems to ~ar~ant, Its a . Ition. Surprisin r?' enough, when ChI (d. p. 30) cItes the Nyayabmdu s verSIOn of the trair- g r he. omits t.~is word, which makes.for a big change: I think it is fair to sayU~~iJ nzsata I nzscaya makes an extensIOnal treatment of the trmrupya incom r ')

d d · . pete. an Istortmg..;, 14. Cf VaiSe~ikasutra 3.2.4 Uddyotakara maintained that the reasou' ..... .

was one where only the contraposition held (kevalavyatirekin). iHg 15. srava'f}atvena tat tulyar[! pra'f}adi vyabhicaratal},., 16 .. Prama'f}ava;ttikapaiijika, (sDe dge edition, reproduced in sDe dge Tib~-.

tan Tnpztaka, bsTan gyur Tshad ma, Tokyo, 1981ff), 310a3: gal te 'di ltarslob dpon gyis khyad par ldog pa ma yin na I ji ltar mthun pa'i phyogs dang mi mthun: pa'i phyogs las de ldog pa yin no zhes bshad ce na I.' ..

17. adr~timatram adaya kevalar[! vyatirekita I ukta 'naikantikas tasmad anyatha gamako bhavet II.

My additions in pada c and d have been made on the basis of Manorathanan_ din's Prama'f}avarttikavrtti (ed. R. Sari.knyayana, Patna 1938-40): tasyiidar~i sanamatre'f}a vyatirekaniscayad anaikantika acarye'f}oktal}, I anyatha viPa~ad vya~. tirekaniScaye gamako hetur bhavet I. Note, however, that with regard to padaa' and b, this latter commentator strangely glosses sapa~ad vyatirekitokta, whereas following Devendrabuddhi's line of thought,.as well as the general thread 6f the argumentation, viPa~ad vyatirekitokta would seem more logical. I hav~ essentially followed Devendrabuddhi here. Cf Paiijika 31 Oa4: gang gi phyir mi. mthun pa'i phyogs la de mthong ba med pa tsam gyis ldog pa yin la I de'i phyir nama.~ nges pa yin no II.

18. asadhyad eva viccheda iti sadhye 'stitocyate I arthapattya 'ta evoktam ekena dvayadarsanam I

For additions, see Manorathanandin ad. k. 220. 19. P. 84in ed. R. Sari.kl;tyayana, reprinted in Kyoto: Rinsen Books, 1982. 20. A few remarks on the subject of sapa~a. Chi, and indeed most other

modern writers on Buddhist logic, have defined sapa~a as those items, with' the exception of the dharmin, which have the property to be proved. It is important to stress that this view on sapa~a would involve serious problems of a formal nature: in particular, the equivalence between anvaya and vyatireka does not hold. Chi seems to have recognized this fact (cf p. xxxvii). Specifically, he argued that a formula such as (x) (fx - gx) & (x) (hfx & gx) - hx) . --(x) (fx - hx) is "completely wrong", but he then used this as an argument to scrap any equivalence between the dnvaya and vyatireka and to try to show that Dignaga perhaps had some sort of way out of John Stuart Mill's charge that the syllogism committed a petitio principii. This last bit is, to say the least, rather far-fetched.

Now, given our previous discussion concerning Dignaga's trairupya, we


p, ha~e to recognize that anvaya and vyatireka were taken to be equivalent may . f D' - H h h h . . . ~~lready at the tIme 0 Igna?"a.. owever, w et er t .at IS so or not, It IS id~finitely cl?ar t~at DharmakIrtI held them to be eqUIvalent. But then a~ ;'bsurdity anses: If we must exclude the dharmzn from sapa~a, DharmakirtI k~;ould have been making a gross logical blunder in claiming this equivalence. i:~ote that J.F. Staal, in an ar~icle, "C~ntraposition in Indi~n Logic" (~n E. ~Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tar~kI ed., L0f5l.c, ':'1ethodol?gy and Phtloso~hy ofS~zence. i stanford , 1962), obscured thIngs by claImIng that In DharmakirtI's verSIon of lithe trairiipya in the Nyiiyabindu, the anvayavyiipti and the vyatirekavyiipti are in 'hd equivalent, i.e., the latter is the contraposition of the former. Staal used T. Bailperin's restricted variables (see "A Theory of Restricted Quantification

h&I1,"]ournal of Symbolic Logic, 22,1. 1957: pp. 19-35 and 22, 2,1957: pp. ~Jl~129) where the expression ax F(x) denotes any of the values of x such i;that x has F. He also introduced a relation A(y,x) meaning that y occurs in a 'locus x, h means the hetu, p means the pa~a and s means the siidhya. He then 'defined sapa~a and viPa~a as:

., (1) ax h(x = p) & A(s,x)) and ,: (2) ax-,A(s,x) ;:'respectively. The result is that the anvaya condition becomes: ? (3) (x) (A(h,x)-(x = sapa~a»)' i.e., .' (4) (y) (A(h,y) -(y = ax h(x = p) & A(s'x»», i.e., '. (5) (y) (A(h,y)-h(y = p) & A(s,y»). i''vyatireka becomes: ~,;" (6) (ax-,A(s,x»-,A(h, ax--,A(s,x)), i.e., ; (7) (x) hA(s,x)_ ,A(h,x)) ~ However, contrary to what Staal maintains, (6) is not the contraposition of (4): (4) and ;:'(6) are not equivalent. The formula,

(8) (y) (A(h,y)_ (y =ax h(x = p) & A(s,x»» == (ax-,A(s,x» -,A(h, ax ':~A(s,x» is false. This becomes clear when we eliminate the restricted variables as in

(5) and (7) . . (9) (y) (A(h,y)_ (--,(y = p) & A(s,y») == (x) (,A(s,x)_ -,A(h,x» is dearly

. false. The problem arises precisely because of the presence of the formula ", (y = p )."

What is perhaps worse, following this interpretation of sapa~a in Dhar. rnakirti's trairiipya, the anvayavyiipti would in most cases be a false statement. .~:Intuitively speaking, the anvaya would state that everything which has the : hetu-property is a member of the set of things which have the siidhya and are not the dharmin. That's usually false: the dharmin can certainly have the hetit-

• property. So leaving aside Dignaga, we would have to say that the logicians ~ho followed him continually made howlers of the most abysmal sort-and .~urely here we are violating the fundamental hermeneutical principle that

.' one should always seek an interpretation which presupposes that the author ,was intelligent and had a consistent position in mind. Now, I would readily ; grant that the term sapa~a is vague, but it seems that to "recuperate" Dhar"rnakirti's (and probably Dignaga's) statements, the sapa~a at stake in the !Jrairiipya theory cannot exclude the dharmin. This is more or less the conclusion ,that the Tibetan dGe lugs pa scholastics reached when they formulated two . sorts of sapa~a: sapa~a proper (mthun phyogs) and sapa~a taken etymologically


(sgra bshad du 'jug pa'i mthun phyogs). It is -only in the latter type that h dharmin is excluded. See my article, "On sapa~a." Note that followin \l Tibetans' idea of sapa~a (proper), it would come down to everything !h~ (!

has the property to be proved (siidhya), and viPa~a (proper) Would be thi(:h things which do not have this property (asiidhya). Not only would this aO~d all the logical problems which plague us, but it is noteworthy that Dharmavk~I.

. Irq in k. 220, for examp.le, (see above) uses the~e very ~erms siidhya and asiidhd' and Manorathanandm and Devendrabuddhl (cf. Pan;zkii 312b6-7) gloss th ~,

ks d 'ks .. em as sapa .a an mpa.a respecuvely.,.;: 21. Se~ pp. 131-133 of his Aspects of Modem Logic. Dordrecht: D. Reidel

Publishing, 1970.; 22. op. cit. p. 132., 23. ~or ex~mple, Budd.hists fro~ Dh~rmaklr~i (cf. his Viidanyaya)tci'7

Ratnaklru argue m the followmg way: All thmgs which do not produce their effects successively or simultaneously are incapable of casual efficacity, likea rabbit's horn. What is not momentary does not produce its effect successively or simultaneously. Therefore what is not momentary is incapable of casual efficacity and hence does not exist." See p. 60 in K. Mimaki, La Rifutation bouddhique de la permanence des chases (sthirasiddhid0a1Ja) et la preuve de la momen_' taneite des chases (~a1Jabharigasiddhi), Paris, 1976. The pervasion here between "not producing effects successively or simultaneously" (F) and "being incapable of casual efficacity" (G) cannot follow Chi's model, for the point is that there does not exist anything whatsoever which has F or G.}

24. It could very well be argued that not all cases of pervasion for Dig'-; nagean logicians must be accompanied by examples. In particular, Dignaga and his followers also used consequences (prasariga), which behave quite dif_i ferently from the valid and fallacious reasons which are the concern of the Hetucakra: they do have pervasions between their terms, but it is not usual to give any examples at all. To take an illustrative case, Dharmaklrti in" Pramii1Javiirttika IV, k. 12 (cf. also Pramii1Javiniscaya III) explains Dignaga's; use of consequences by taking the prasariga that a Naiyayika universal (siimanya) would have to be many different things because it is present in a multitude of particulars. There is not discussion of an example at all in the commentaries, nor in the Pramii'lJ,aviniScaya. Note however that Manoratbanandin in commenting on k. 12's parakalpitail,! prasarigo dvayasar{lbandhiid ekiibhiive 'nyahiinay~ glosses dvayasar{lbandha as vyiipyav'yiipakabhava, which is essentially the ter~\ Chi is seeking to explain in Dignaga. See my article, "Pramii'lJ,aviirttika IV (1)" in the Weiner Zeitschriftfur die Kunde Sudasiens 30,1986, pp.143-162. Mano~ rathanandin and the other commentators make it clear that the pervasion of the consequence is logically equivalent to the pervasion in the consequence's contraposition (prasarigaviparyaya), which yields a valid reason. But it is onlf with regard to this contraposed form that one would need to present art example.

25. See A. MacDermott, An Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of 'Exists'. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969. R. RoutIey, "Some things do not exist," Notre,'; Dame journal of Formal Logic 7, 3, 1966, pp. 251-276. ','

26. See notes 24 and 29 in MacDermott op. cit. Routley himself had


.. . me suggestions as to how to handle a thoroughly Meinongian logic with ~oconsistent items, but I doubt that it is worth our while to enter into the In M'" "AP Ii tails. For an attempt at a emonglan semantIcs, see T. Parsons, . ro-:ie~omenon to Meinongian semantics," Journal of Philosophy, 61, 1, 1974, pp.

;561:--579. . 27. p. 103 in B. K. Matilal, "Reference and existence in Nyaya and

Buddhist logic," Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970, pp. 83-110. • 28. See S. Katsura, "Dharmakirti's theory of truth," Journal of Indian

Philosophy 12, 1984, pp. 215-235.

Chinese terms

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II. REVIEWS

Divine Revelation in Pali Buddhism, by Peter Masefield. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986. xx,187 pages.

Peter Masefield applies his broad knowledge of the Theravada canon and commentaries to two distinct purposes in this book: first, to clarify a number of difficult or neglected concepts in Pali, and second, to present a theory about the development of Buddhism. Unfortunately, the combination of purposes detracts from the overall contribution of Masefield's labors, mainly because a weak historical thesis seems to restrict the scope of the word studies which in themselves are serious and valuable.

Masefield begins by saying that, "the sad fact is that much of the basic terminology and symbolism of the Nikayas is still in need of detailed investigation" (p. xv). There is no denying this, and it is to Masefield's credit that he attempts to rectify what many of us deplore. He is most successful in the first chapter, "The Spiritual Division of the Buddhist World," in which he considers the distinctions between the ariyasiivaka and the puthujjana. Masefield has collected a number of passages which suggest that the puthuJj"ana was indeed considered as apart from the Buddhist path (prthak; see the PTS dictionary, s.v. puthuJj"ana, which says this meaning of separateness "is not felt at all in the Pali word"), and, according to his conclusions, eternally so. Masefield's discussion is quite thought-provoking, but it is regrettable that he does not consider those passages which speak of the kalyii1Ja puthuJj"ana (e.g., inPatisambhidiimagga and the Dlgha commentary) which seem to suggest the opposite.

Chapters Two and Three also make contributions to our understanding of Theravadin systematic thought, but they are more grab-bags of suggestion than sustained arguments. Chapter Two, "The Path," begins with the question of how "right view" can be the beginning of the eightfold path, and continues with considerations of the organization of the path according to the threefold division of slla, samiidhi, panna, the idea of Dhamma as sound, and the concept parato ghosa. Chapter Three, "The Goal," takes up different schemata of the fruits of the path. Masefield, arguing that these fruits are actually discontinuous goals, questions whether they could be attained after the parinibbiina of the Buddha and his great disciples.

173


Masefield's answer is negative, and his sweeping conclusions are presented in a short (18 pages) fourth chapter in which his "historical" thesis finally becomes explicit. For Masefield, Buddhism was a short-lived esoteric movement. The "true Dhamma" lasted only "a mere seventy years," and thus the subsequent Buddhist tradition is merely the misguided product of puthuyjana monks who, by definition, were unaware of this cataclysmic fact (pp. 162, 163).

This might work as "theological" argument, even if a very nihilistic one. As history, however, this is very poor stuff. Indeed the requirements of good historiography are not Masefield'~ strong suit. He is inconsistent in his appeals to textual history, justifying his selection of texts on the grounds that they "may, for reasons of style, be said to form a literary unit" (p. xvii), while also invoking the idea that these same texts have suffered a later redaction which distorted their original message (p. 46). Masefield organizes his investigation with elastic categories like "the Nikaya period" and "the Abhidhamma period" which he never specifies temporally. He has a disconcerting tendency to make debatable links, such as his identification of Mi-Ia-ras-pa as "the Tibetan counterpart of Ailgulimala" (p. 92). There are problems of historical fact, such as his blunt statement that the Vimuttimagga is a non-Theravadin text. And it is quite surprising that the translator of commentaries attributed to Dhammapala could simply state that this author wrote in the late fifth century, ignoring the discussions about his date and works which have appeared in the scholarly literature.

Masefield seems to have a low opinion of his co-workers in the field of Buddhist studies (e.g., p. 54). This in itself is innocuous, but I can't help wondering whether this opinion has led Masefield to ignore generally the contributions of other scholars. While there are profuse references to Pali literature, there are remarkably few to secondary literature. In a book that seeks to overturn much of scholarly opinion (especially the conventional idea that the early Buddhist movement had a strong exoteric orientation), more detailed reaction to individual arguments would seem to be required. Moreover, Masefield is misleading about his use of his colleagues' labors. He quotes verbatim existing translations without acknowledgement (e.g., pp. 71, 73, 130, 153). This may not be uncommon these days, but it becomes a disservice because Masefield is often critical of individual translators by name.

In his preface, Masefield seems to step back from his histor-

REVIEWS 175

i~al thesis: "My next reading of the Nikayas will probably cause me to rethink some of the claims made in the present work but if ... enough has been said to stir others into realization of the need fQr a re-examination of the Buddhism portrayed in the Nikayas, my efforts will have been rewarded" (p. xx.). I expect that few students of Buddhism will want to adopt the general claims of Masefield's book, but if my own experience is at all representative, it will indeed send many back to the texts for a fresh reading.

Charles Hallisey

Studies in Buddhist Art of South Asia, edited by A.K. Narain (New Delhi: Kanak Publications, 1985), 139 pp., 54 figs., US $50.00

Studies in Buddhist Art of South Asia publishes seven papers presented at an international conference on Buddhism held at the University of Wisconsin in 1976. The essays are arranged chronologically by topic, with the first three dealing with the origin of the Buddha image and the remaining four with diverse subjects. The three essays on the early Buddha image are, I think, particularly suggestive and deserve careful reading by scholars interested in early Buddhist doctrine and art.

The first of the early Buddha-image essays, by the volume's editor A.K. Narain, proposes that the earliest anthropomorphic Buddha images occur on a coin-type of the Saka king Maues who reigned ca. 95-75 B.C.E. in the area of the Swat Valley and Kashmir. Narain argues that the cross-legged figure on Maues' coins, although long considered but mostly rejected by scholars as a Buddha image, should be reconsidered as indeed the Buddha. He suggests that the ideological underpinnings for the creation of the anthropomorphic image came from the Sarvastivada school of "Hlnayana" Buddhism and its philosophy of "realism." Narain feels the Sarvastivadins associated themselves with the Sakas as patrons in a mutually advantageous political and economic alliance that allowed for the creation of the Buddha image. The period from the appearance of the Maues coin-type to the numerous examples of anthropomorphic images during the reign of the Kw;;aI).a king Kaniska some 200 years later is, according to Narain, one of experimentation. Extant Buddha images of the period are few, however, and mostly on coins,


except for those on the Bimaran reliquary (which Narain accepts as dating to the period of Azes II, ca. 30 B.C.E., due to four of his coins found inside).

Most of Narain's evidence is not new, but he argues that it has not been fairly analyzed and spends considerable time review_ ing past arguments. As with the other two writers on the early image, Narain assumes that the reader has considerable familiarity with the now extensive and increasingly complicated Buddha_ image bibliography.

Such familiarity is particularly helpful in understanding Joe Cribb's essay on the origin of the Buddha image as revealed by images on the coins of King Kani~ka. Unlike the images on the coins discussed by Narain, whose identification as the Buddha is controversial, the Buddha images on Kani~ka's coins are clearly labeled as such. Cribb argues that on all the coins there are only three different basic image types and three inscriptions, two that identify the Buddha Sakyamuni and one the Buddha Maitreya. That Maitrep on the coins is dressed in princely clothes and is labeled a Buddha points out that the later distinction between a buddha and bodhisattva was not made in Kani~ka's time.

Cribb's coin evidence is helpful, and he proposes to use it to comment on a vast array of theological and art historical issues, such as the chronology of Gandharan sculpture and the early artistic relationship between Marhura arid Gandhara. His basic methodological assumptions are that the coin images were modeled on existing sculpture; that unlike the sculptural models, however, the coins are securely dated by inscription to Kani~ka's reign; and that; therefore, the coin images can be used to identify sculptures of Kani~ka's reign. Unfortunately, to properly judge Cribb's essay would require a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, as, I think, there are serious problems with. many of his ideas and conclusions. His key assumption, for example, that the coin images were modeled on sculpture gets off to a shaky start when he repeatedly shows that there are, in fact, very few likely sculptural models and none that fit the coin images precisely. Rather than come to the logical conclusion that the coin images are not modeled on sculpture, but are independent creations that share with sculpture certain underlying characteristics, Cribb is forced to find his sculptural models scattered fro.m Gandhara to Mathura (although the mints are all in Gandhara), each exhibiting only this or that characteristic. The arguments made in this essay are not well served by either the awkward writing style or the unfortunate typographical errors for the figure numbers.

REVIEWS 177

(Readers are advised to read Cribb's previously published ;;trticles where much of the same material is presented: "Kani~ka's Buddha Coins-The Official Iconography of Sakyamuni & Maitreya,"Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3.2 [1980]:79-88, and "The origin of the Buddha image-the numismatic evidence," in South Asian Archaeology 1981 [Cambridge, 1984]:231-244).

The third article, on the origin of the Buddha image, written by John Huntington, is an interesting attempt to judge, based primarily on analyses of literary references, how early the anthropomorphic Buddha image was invented. We have seen that Narain places it at ca. 100 B.C.E. in Kashmir or Swat; Cribb concludes that there is little evidence for images before Kani~ka's reign and locates their emergence at Mathura; Huntington, on the other hand, argues that there is a probability that images were made during Buddha's own lifetime (5th c. B.C.E.), most likely in Magadha. He suggests that it was not the monks but the laymen who prompted the first making of images, and their motivation was to enable themselves to gain merit by viewing the Buddha (buddhadarsanapur;ya). While one may question certain of Huntington's propositions in this long essay, the cumulative evidence he presents does strongly argue for the existence of Buddha images long before their extant examples (in stone) in the 1st c. C.E. The question has always been: where is the earlier archaeological evidence? Huntington tentatively presents a possible Maurya-period piece (ca. 3rd B.C.E.), a small stone relief image, which would be the earliest example thus far known; but one must wonder why there are no examples in the extensive Buddhist sculptural remains of the 2nd and 1st centuries B. C.E.

The fourth article in the book is a straightforward analysis of an iconographic formula popular in Gandharan art, the Buddha flanked by two weapon-holding attendants in narrative scenes. Its author, Joan Raducha, points out that identification of the guardians is, however, anything but straightforward. She shows that textual references do not explain or identify the attendants. Rather, she relies on reconstructing the religious context for attendant and protective deities in Gandharan sculpture and in popular beliefs, concluding that the attendants are most likely VajrapaI).i and Pafichika. Raducha reminds us of how few of the often very prominent subsidiary figures we can identify in Indian sculpture, as they are creations of concepts and beliefs not necessarily recorded directly in texts.

The fifth article also deals with iconography. Janice Leoshko


presents a number of PaJa style reliefs of the Bodhisattva Amoghapasa, a multi-armed form of Avalokitesvara. She finds that Amoghapasa was popular primarily in the area of Gaya and only during the 9th and early 10th centuries: She stresses that, although it is not usually done, the possibility of such geograph_ ical and chronological specificity should be considered when dealing with iconographical questions .

. The sixth article is by Walter Spink, on the internal chronol_ ogy of Cave 7 at Ajanta. Spink argues that Cave 7, and primarily its major Buddha image, was the result of two separate artistic campaigns, one that lasted from ca. 462-468 and the second from ca. 477-479. As with Spink's previous work on Ajanta, one stands in awe of the careful sifting of evidence that allows the reconstruction of events that appear to explain what we see. Spink is attempting to give, in far greater detail than is usually possible in Indian art due to the lack of historical documentation, a detailed explanation of the chronology of the making of the monument. In many ways, he is suggesting what was in the minds of the cave's makers, what their decisions were, and how these decisions resulted in what we see. When one recalls that Spink is working with almost no hard historical data, his results are amazing.

Is he correct? The explanations are, to my mind, too plausible, too helpful, to be "incorrect." They may be reconstructions, with some pieces out of place, but most of the edifice must be original and it enables us to understand the art in an unusually direct and personal fashion.

The final article, by Martha Carter, is on the colossal Buddha images at Bamiyan in Afghanistan. She makes the interesting suggestion, based on the Chinese pilgrim Hsiian-tsang's comments on his visit to Bamiyan in 632, that only the smaller (the 127 foot) of the present two colossal rock-cut Buddha images existed at the time of his visit. HSiian-tsang does mention two colossal images, but one he describes as made of metal andjoined together in parts. This description has puzzled scholars (who assumed he had mistaken stone for metal), but Carter proposes to accept it at face value-that there was a now lost metal image. Since HSiian-tsang estimates its height at 100 feet, this would be a very large metal image indeed. Carter suggests that the larger rock-cut image (the 175 foot) was not carved until the end of the 7th or beginning of the 8th century.

Most scholars today accept that the two extant monumental stone relief Buddhas at Bamiyan are not as early as was thought

REVIEWS 179

just a decade or so ago, when they were often dated 2nd/3rd c. for the smaller and 4th/5th c. for the larger. That they both were made after 600 C.E. has been shown, for example, by the work of Deborah Klimburg-Salter and Zemaryalai Tarzi. Carter's suggestion, ,however, that one of the colossi Hsuan-tsang mentions is metal is difficult to judge. Although she points to examples of monumental bronzes from both Western and Asian antiquity, a 100-foot standing Buddha in metal appears to me an interesting but unlikely possibility. As with the other six essays, however, Carter's article is an important contribution that will be of interest to all students of Buddhist art and religion.

Robert L. Brown

Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism. Edited by Peter N. Gregory. Studies in East Asian Buddhism no. 4. The Kuroda Institute for the Study of Buddhism and Human Values. Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1987. 266 pp.

Since the publication of Studies in Ch'an and Hua-yen in 1983, the first volume in the Studies in East Asian Buddhism series edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory, a number of significant contributions to our understanding of East Asian Buddhism have appeared in this excellent series. The present book, which is a collection of six lengthy articles on different aspects of meditation in Chinese Buddhism, is the most recent. Despite the fact that meditation in one of its many forms has always been at the heart of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, surprisingly little has been written on this topic from a scholarly point of view. For this reason the present collection is a very welcome contribution towards a deepening of our understanding of the contemplative aspects of Chinese Buddhism.

The book opens with a long, very interesting and perceptive introduction by Peter N. Gregory, the editor. Recapitulating the views of previous and current authorities on Zen/Ch'an Buddhism, he points out the need for revising many of our fixed opinions on Chinese Buddhism meditation, which hitherto has tended to be identified solely with Ch'an Buddhism. Gregory presents his views with detailed consideration of the hermeneutics of the various traditions of meditation within Chinese Buddhism, i.e., the methods of meditation seen in relation to their underlying


doctrinal structures, "and thus gIves us a complex, but at the same time useful methodological framework with which to approach and understand the issue under discussion.

The first paper, "Meditation in Fa-hsiang Buddhism" by Alan Sponberg, is devoted to a hitherto little studied subject (at least among Western scholars), namely meditation as practiced in the Fa-hsiang tradition, which originated with Hsuan-tsang. The author has chosen to present his topic through a discussion of two methods of meditation, both of which were designated by the polyvalent term kuan. The first use of this term relates to the practice of visualization, here highlighted by an example of Maitreya visualization found in Hui-li's Ta Tang Ta Tzu-en Ssu San-ts'ang Fa-shih chilan. In its second usage kuan appears as a method of "discernment" or "insight," such as is found in the traditional prajnaparamita literature, but of course based on the dharmalak:;a1}a perspective. Sponberg gives considerable space to a general discussion of the importance of defining the meaning of "meditation." In his concern for clarification of terminology the author suggests that the Sanskrit term bhavana would be a better designation for meditation than the more limited dhyana, since it includes any practice productive of nirva1}a. While much of Sponberg's argument on the issue of dhyana is certainly valid and raises important questions, I think that he might have devoted a separate paper to a discussion of this important topic. By so doing, he would have been able to treat a wider range of Fa-hsiang practices in the present paper, one obvious drawback of which is precisely its narrow focus on only two aspects of Fa-hsiang meditation. This limitation is unfortunate when we consider the copiousness of the existing sources. What is lacking in particular is a discussion of the important Tantric practices in Hsuan-tsang's tradition, practices which the author at least ought to have mentioned when formulating his broad definition of meditation as bhavana.

N ext follows a very interesting and detailed paper by Daniel B. Stevenson, "The Four Kinds of Samadhi in Early T'ien-t'ai Buddhism." Using very wide-ranging source material, the author gives an in-depth presentation and discussion of the structure of early T'ien-t'ai ritual and contemplative practices. Relying mostly on the writings of Chih-i (548-597), Stevenson shows how the meaning of chih-kuan, the central type ofT'ien-t'ai meditation, covers a wide range of practices, including rituals of repentance as well as buddhanusmrti, Lotus Samadhi and i-hsing san-mei, the so-called "one practice samadhi." The influence of Tantric Bud-

REVIEWS 181

dhism is also noted. The author treats a large complex corpus of texts expertly and succeeds in showing how structured and multi-faceted the meditation practices of the early Tien-t'ai tradition were, A minor point of criticism concerns a certain lack of clarity in the way in-which Chih-i's master Hui-ssu (515-577) is presented when the author discusses the origin and structure of the early Tien-t'ai practices. An acknowledgment of Paul Magnin's La Vie et l'Oeuvre de Huisi (515-577): Les Origines de la Secte Bouddhique Chinoise du Tiantai, Publications de l'Ecole Franc;aise d'Extreme-Orient, vol. 116 (Paris: Ecole Franc;aise d'ExtremeOrient, 1979) would have been appropriate in this respect.

Bernard Faure's "The Concept of One-Practice Samadhi in Early Ch'an" sets out to discuss the main methods of meditation on so-called Northern Ch'an Buddhism, i.e. the tradition popularized by Shen-hsiu (605?-706) and his successor P'u-chi (652-739). As Stevenson shows, I-hsing san-mei constituted an important part of the higher practices in the Tien-t'ai regimen and had a fixed meaning as a special type of practice. In the Ch'an trad'ition one-practice samadhi took on a more general meaning, and was redefined as a designation for a number of practices such as shou-i (maintaining an unwavering concentration), kuan-hsin/kan-hsin (contemplating the mind), and even nienfo (Buddha invocation). Faure's paper demonstrates a versatile and sure grasp of a large range of sources as well as of the general history of the contemplative traditions in Chinese Buddhism.' This allows him to establish a plausible as well as clear presentation of the topic under discussion. However, when he discusses the respective practices of Northern and Southern Ch'an, I am rather reluctant to accept his view that the traditional distinction between gradual and sudden enlightenment is invalid. Clearly the practices of meditation advocated by Shen-hsiu and the earlier patriarchs of the East Mountain/Northern School were gradual, if not in theory, then at least in practice. This can be seen in Tao-hsin's entry in Leng-ch'ieh shih-tzu chi, in Hung-jen's Hsiu-hsin yao lun and in Shen-hsiu's Kuan-hsin lun, all of which speak of preparation and a gradual entry into samadhi in their respective sections dealing with the actual practice(s) of meditation.

In his paper "Ch'ang-lu Tsung-tse's Tso-ch'an I and the 'Secret' of Zen Meditation" Carl Bielefeldt discusses what he calls "the earliest and in some ways most influential" (pp. 130) manual of Ch'an medita,tion and presents a very fine translation of the work. The text in question is the Tso-ch'an I by the Yiln-men monk Tsung-tse (d.u.), a relatively short treatise on meditation


mo~t comn:onl~ encountered as a part of the Ch'an-yuan ch'ing_ kuez, complIed In 1103. I feel, however, that the author in his conscientious effort at contextualizing the Tso-,ch'an 1 in relation to earlier Tien-t'ai manuals of meditation (such as the Mo-ho chih-kuan and especially the T'ien-t'ai hsiao chih-kuan) , may, to some extent, have looked in the wrong place. It is true that Tsung-tse mentions Chih-i and his Chih-kuan in the manual, but this indirect reference is solely concerned with how to check demonic disturbances while meditating, and does not refer to the actual practice of chih-kuan. In fact, Bielefeldt himself correctly concludes that the Tso-ch'an 1 does not have much in common with the much larger Tien-t'ai texts on meditation. Furthermore, the doctrinal differences between the Ch'an schools of the late Tang/Five Dynasties Period-with the exception of the Fayen School-and the revived T'ien-t'ai School of early Northern Sung are fairly obvious and would have made a direct link there problematic. For these reasons the author might have looked in other directions for material with which to illuminate the possible origin(s) of the manual as well as other similar Ch'an texts of a later date. Personally I would have tried to relate the Tso-ch'an 1 to references to meditation in material from the Yun-men School (since Tsung-tse belonged to that school), and also to information to be found in the other lineages. A close scrutiny of the Tun-huang Ch'an mss. is most likely to yield significant information in this regard. Slightly later meditation manuals and related texts such as the Tso-ch'an 1 by Fo-hsin Pen-ts'ai (d.u.) and the Tso-:ch'an ming by Fo-yen Ch'ing-yuan (1067-1120), both of the Lin-chi School, would also serve as useful points of reference.

David W. Chappell follows next with his "From Dispute to Dual Cultivation: Pure Land Response to Ch'an Critics." This paper examines two late T'ang Pure Land masters' response to, and counter-attack on, general Ch'an criticism of the relevance of their practice. The highlights of this paper are Chappell's very interesting examples of the Pure Land master H ui-jih's (680-748) anti-Ch'an polemics which are seen in relation to the criticism directed by the Ch'an master Ling-yu against the excesses of many Ch'an adherents. Likewise Chappell's discussion of the Pure Land dialectics of Fei-hsi (d.u.) serves as a useful point of departure for understanding the later dual cultivation of Ch'an and Pure Land practices. For unknown reasons the author has chosen not to mention the importance of Ch'an and Pure Land practices in the Fa-yen School, a syncretism which is perhaps the

REVIEWS 183

. most outstanding example of dual cultivation in Chinese Buddhism. I am also hesitant to accept Chappell's view of the average pure Land Buddhist's attitude to practice. He asserts that "at a fundamental level they were aware that all was empty and there was nothing to attain" (pp. 189). Although such an argument was put forth by Tan-Iuan from the point of the two levels of meaning, i.e., as a philosophical view, such an understanding-if employed in practice-would simply prevent the desire for rebirth in Sukhavati, the very goal of the Pure Land devotees. In order to go to the Pure Land for rebirth one must believe in it! Another minor point on which I disagree with the author concerns his insistence that "the Southern SchoQI of Ch'an emerged . partially by defining itself over against various Pure Land prac~ tices" (pp. 174). Southern Ch'an emerged-I believe-as a general reaction to intellectualism and relative practices current in Tang Buddhism as a whole. (This includes the practices employed by various lineages within the Ch'an tradition itself).

The final paper of the volume is Rob~rt E.. Buswell's "Chinul's System of Chinese Meditative Techniques in Korean Son Buddhism." In this paper, which may serve as a supplement to the author's momumental work, The Korean Approach to Zen: The Collected Works of Chinul, the focus is on the teachings and methods of meditation propounded by Chinul (1158-1210), the reviver of Korean Son Buddhism during the middle of the Koryb Dynasty (936..;..1392). Buswell presents five aspects of Chinul's thought on practice, including Amit'a invocation. However, Chinul's Son developed in two basic stages. In the early stage it shows strong influem:e from the Plaiform Scripture (Liu-tsu fa-pao t'an ching) attributed to Hui-neng. The teachings which developed around the combined practice of samiidhi. and prajiiii especially left a significant impact on Chinul during his formative years. The later and more mature stage is that based on Ta-hui Tsung-kao's k'an-hua or hua-t'ou practice, i.e., the type of meditation which employs kung-an. Buswell's impressive knowledge of the Korean sources is readily apparent in his demonstrations of how these Chinese Ch'an techniques influenced and shaped Chinul's Son in the two basic stages.

Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism is a collection of informative and highly interesting papers written by some of the best American scholars in the field of East Asian Buddhist studies. The volume is significant because most of the information it presents is new or presented in a new light, and one of the book's most marked characteristics is the inner coherence and structure

which connects the individual papers. This places meditation in a central position in the history of Chinese Buddhism and thus gives t~e reade~ ~ ~rm und~rstandin.g of its importance: My only real pomt of cntICIsm of thIS otherwIse excellent collectlOn is the limitation of topics treated. If the book is intended to present the more important traditions of meditation in Chinese Buddhism, then I would have liked to see articles on meditation in the Nan-Pei Chao period (preferably on meditation literature), one on Chen-yen (Tantric) Buddhism in the Tang, one on the influence of Tibetan practices after the Yuan, and one on Ch'an practice in the Ming. Such papers would have given the present compilation more perspective as well as a deeper historical dimension. However, the book is an important contribution to our understanding of the role of meditation in Chinese Buddhism and can be warmly recommended.

Henrik H. Sorensen

CONTRIB UTORS

IDr, c. Bielefeldt rofpt. of Religion ~tanford University rS~ford, CA 94305 (;." '

'1.R.L. Brown

I'"""',!,,~,e,p,, t. of Art, Design & Art History 300 Dickson Art Center

!lirtiversity of California, [!,lir,,' '''','';',',L', ,os Angeles ~~Rr'· Ilks Angeles, CA 90024 IM~;;, ~!)r.C. Cox !Dept. of Asian Languages &

IWLiterature DO-21 IUniversity of Washington

I~~ttle, WA 98195

fiir. C. Hallisey l'Pepartment of Theology ~L()yola University ~~,c" i~5~5 North Sheridan Road

t~rcago, IL 60626 .

!1tt.. Hamlin f~509 North Racine #3E rChicago, IL 60657 fIb'

185

Dr. J. Newman Dept. of South Asian Studies 1244 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706

Dr. R. Saloman Department of Asian Languages

and Literature DO-21 University of Washington Seattle, WA 98195

H.H. Sorensen 0stasiatiske Institui, Ki<lbenhavns Universitets Kejsergade 2' 1155 Ki<lbenhavn K Danmark

Dr. T.J.F. Tillemans 25, rue Winke1ried 2300 La Chaux-de-Fonds Switzerland

Both the Editors and Association would like to thank Indiana Univep sity and Fairfield University for their financial support in the production of the Journal.

The Editors wish to thank Mr. Kevin Atkins for his invaluable help· in the preparation of this issue.

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1988 ISSN: 0193-600X

Indexed in Religion Index One: Periodicals, American Theological Library Association, Chicago, available online through BRS (Biblio~ graphic Retrieval Services), Latham, New York, and DIALOG Information Services, Palo Alto, California.

Composition by Publications Division, Grote Deutsch & Co., Madison, WI 53704. Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.