Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism
Introduction
In recent years there has been a surge of interest in the
philosophy of language over the merits, limits and future
perspectives of various approaches to the problem of meaning and
communication that focus on the role of linguistic context.
However, a noticeable problem that has been pivotal in motivating
some developments of this trend has been so far under-explored.
The problem in a nutshell is: what’s the nature of disagreement?
Given that linguistic disagreement data has been recently advanced
as one of the main motivations for some of these contextual
approaches in relation to the so-called phenomenon of “faultless
disagreement” (more on this phenomenon later), the intellectual
pressure to answer this question has accordingly increased.
The aim of this paper is to show that a very natural and
intuitive notion of disagreement cannot but lead to criticizing
these proposals as positive philosophical explanations of
faultless disagreement (more on this notion later). “So much the
worse for the ‘natural and intuitive view’ of disagreement” some
would say; “so much the worse for these approaches” others would
say. As often happens in philosophy, one person’s modus tollens is
another person’s modus ponens. Though we are in this case more
sympathetic with the modus ponens reaction, we are content to shed
light on the difference between different philosophical projects
that, we think, in the current debate on faultless disagreement
have not been properly kept distinct. We also wish to establish
the conditional conclusion that if the natural and intuitive view
of disagreement is correct, then mainstream approaches to semantic
content (i.e. contextualist and relativist approaches) that make
use of the notion of context cannot offer a positive philosophical
explanation of faultless disagreement and are ultimately committed
to a revisionary approach with respect to semantics tout court.
In §1 we introduce two distinctions (normative vs empirical
and revisonary vs descriptive) that are useful for characterizing
a philosophical project. These distinctions give rise to four
different possible projects on the problem of faultless
disagreement. In §2 we lay out a basic and intuitive view of
doxastic disagreement and we show why this view poses a problem to
any basic form of contextualism and relativism for any descriptive
approach to faultless disagreement. We then argue (§3) that a
revisionary approach to faultless disagreement is a natural option
by means of a semantic blindness hypothesis, but that such an
approach sits badly with the methodology usually adopted by
supporters of these semantic outlooks.
§1 Normative vs empirical and revisonary vs descriptive
philosophical projects
§1.1 Two distinctions: normative/empirical and descriptive/revisionary
So, before moving on, let’s make clear which projects we are
targeting. We do not want to criticize contextualist or relativist
proposals because they are inadequate qua empirical semantic
theories; on this fact we want to remain neutral – though we will
raise some doubts on this. Our aim is different: we want to
criticize these proposals as philosophical explanations of certain types
of disagreement, namely those disagreements that have been called
“faultless disagreements” (Kölbel 2003). So, before entering the
details of our critique, it is necessary to provide an elucidation
of what we take a “philosophical explanation” to be.
We can distinguish two different projects: one that aims to
investigate the normative connections that underlie our use of
language; and another one that means to discover general principles
which can be employed to account for some linguistic data. Contemporary
empirical semantics clearly falls into the second category: the
aim is to explain some linguistic data by means of a compositional
formal semantics together with pragmatic principles that connect
the formal apparatus to our linguistic activity. Take for example
the case of taste discourse (which will be our leading example).
Philosophers of language and linguists have pointed out that we
have linguistic data like:
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
A moment reflection on the scenario depicted by this example
suffices to realize that these disputes have the appearance of
faultless disagreement: when it comes to disputes of inclination
it seems that it is possible that both opinions are in good
standing and subjects aren’t at fault. The business of empirical
semantics is to explain why exchanges of this type are felicitous
by means of the resources of formal semantics and pragmatics. Now,
how is this connected to the former project of investigating the
normative connections that underlie our use of language? Of
course, the whole point is to clarify the phrase “investigating
the normative connections”. It is not the purpose of this paper to
hold that there is a univocal reading of that phrase; rather, we
want to advance our own interpretation that we believe is firmly
entrenched in the philosophical tradition. When it comes to
disagreement, we inquire into the nature of disagreement in a
given area of discourse because we want to understand how we
deploy our concepts in these disputes and whether this deployment
is rational: whether the engagement in the dispute is characterized
by a stance that is justified by the relevant information. This
latter question involves a normative dimension that is absent in
the empirical semantic project. Like the empirical semantic
project also the “normative project” pays attention to the
linguistic use because to do so is a useful strategy to get a grip
on how we deploy our concepts. However, the normative project, as
opposed to the empirical project, aims at explaining why we
disagree in a certain way and what the justification of our attitudes
is.1
Given this understanding of the normative project, there is no
principled reason why the two projects should be in opposition or
mutually exclusive. An inquiry into the semantics of an area of
discourse aimed at making sense of the linguistic data for
disagreement could provide valuable, if not decisive, insights
into the normative question of the nature and rational basis of
disagreement. Moreover if we believe in a close relationship
between linguistic questions and normative questions – i.e. if we1 Wright (2012) adopts a similar distinction.
believe (as for example Dummett thought) that an explanation of
the meaning of expressions in a given area of discourse can solve
some traditional philosophical questions related to that area –
then the connection between the empirical project and the
normative one is not only possible, but actually to be expected.
One aim of this paper is to show that current contextualist and
relativist semantics aren’t of help when the purpose of inquiry is
that of providing a normative explanation of disagreement. This
conclusion is of course consistent with drawing different morals:
either further work has to be done for linking these empirical
projects to the normative project, or the project of linking the
empirical with the normative is in fact doomed to fail, or else,
current contextualist and relativist empirical semantics have to
be rejected as solutions to the philosophical problem of faultless
disagreement.
A final distinction. The empirical/normative opposition is
orthogonal to another opposition that is the
descriptive/revisionary. A philosophical project is descriptive when
it delivers just a description of a targeted area of investigation
that matches with our ordinary representation of it.
Alternatively, a philosophical project is revisionary when it
delivers a description of the area of investigation that does not
match with our ordinary representation of it.2
With respect to the problem of faultless disagreement, a
descriptive project must deliver a description of the relevant
area of discourse where disputes are taken at face value as real
and rationally sustainable and not to be imputed to error or
ignorance or other deficiencies on subjects’ part. By contrast, a
revisionary project on the problem of faultless disagreement calls
for a revision of some traits of the relevant area of discourse;
disputes are approached with the intent of resolving or, in
effect, dissolving them.
§1.2 Four projects
From the previous distinctions it follows that both empirical and
normative projects could either be descriptive or revisionary.
There are, in the history of philosophy, plenty of instances of
2 Dummett (1976: 66) has famously argued, for example, that part of our
inferential practice must be revised: some classically valid inferential
principles (double negation elimination, excluded middle and classical reductio)
cannot be redeemed on a semantics grounded on the central aspects of our use,
aspects that are constitutive of the meaning of logical expressions. According
to Dummett, these principles cannot be justified if we assume a molecular theory
of meaning, which rests on a connection between meaning and knowledge of
meaning. Hence, our acceptance of these principles can be subject to legitimate
philosophical criticism.
these type of projects. To illustrate how an empirical project
could be revisionary just think of how epistemic contextualists3
such as DeRose (2012) have advanced the semantic blindness
hypothesis: according to some epistemic contextualist we, qua
ordinary speakers, feel that the skeptical argument based on
closure4 poses a threat to knowledge because we are blind to the
fact that its conclusion does not contradict our ordinary claims
to knowledge. Semantics advanced by these epistemic contextualists
are thus revisionary because they impute an error to ordinary
speakers.
As an instance of normative revisionism take for example
Richard Rorty’s discussion of progress (Rorty 1979, esp. Ch. 7).
Rorty holds that our ordinary idea of progress with respect to,
for example, ethical questions, is just a retrospective projection
of our categories. Although he wouldn’t endorse the claim that
such a projection is erroneous, he thinks there is no fact of the
3 For a minimal definition of the contextualist position see infra §2.1.
4 A skeptical argument based on closure runs as follows:
P1. I don’t know that that I’m not a bodiless brain in a vat (BIV), being
stimulated to have just those experiences I would be having if I weren’t a
BIV.
P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, being stimulated to have just those experiences I
would be having if I weren’t a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.
C. So, I don’t know that I have hands.
matter that could sanction the superiority of our perspective over
any other one, contrary to what we usually think about political
or ethical progress.5
As for the descriptive empirical project, most present-day
relativist semantics are a luminous examples of such kind of
project: they intend to deliver a description of the truth-
conditions that underlie our actual linguistic use. So, for
example, Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane
(forthcoming) are examples of descriptive empirical projects for
the semantics of English expressions for epistemic modality.
Finally, the descriptive normative case. We understand this
category simply as the traditional philosophical task of saying
what we ought to think with respect to a certain philosophical
notion. Take for example the notion of knowledge: a descriptive
normative project lays down the principles that are constitutive
of knowledge and claims that these principles are the ones we
ought rationally to deem as correct and abide by.
Our focus will be on philosophical projects on faultless
disagreement, namely those disputes of inclination (in ethics,
aesthetics or taste discourse for example) where it appears that
“when two thinkers disagree on a non-objective matter of opinion
5 We have analyzed the problem of ethical progress in connection with
contemporary relativist proposals in Coliva&Moruzzi 2012.
it is possible that neither of them has made a mistake or is at
fault” (Kölbel 2003: 53). In such cases we have linguistic data
like (Omelettes) together with, after reflection, the appearance
of faultless disagreement. Faced with these, obviously different
kinds of data, one can pursue four different projects6:
P1) Empirical revisionary project: to revise the appearance of
faultless disagreement, by appealing only to further
linguistic data and hypotheses;7
P2) Empirical descriptive project : to maintain that the
appearance of faultless disagreement is correct, by appealing
only to further linguistic data and hypotheses;8
P3) Normative revisionary project : by appealing to conceptual
reflections, to revise the appearance of faultless
disagreement, and to deem the dispute as not rationally
sustainable;9
6 Each project is relativized to an area of discourse.
7 Cappelen (2008) is a clear example of revisionary empirical project: by
appealing to the semantic blindness hypothesis the author holds that the
appearance of faultless disagreement is an illusion.
8 Kölbel (2007) illustrates how truth-relativism or a sophisticated form of
contextualism can be seen as cases of descriptive projects.
9 Rovane (2012) exemplifies a conceptual revisionary project: by claiming
that there is no coherent account of faultless disagreement, she argues that we
P4) Normative descriptive project : by appealing to conceptual
reflections, to maintain that the appearance of faultless
disagreement is correct and that the dispute is rationally
sustainable.10
Normative projects could be undertaken with the help of empirical
ones, so P1 and P3, and P2 and P4 aren’t respectively mutually
exclusive; while P1 and P2, and P3 and P4 are.
So let’s go back to the accounts mentioned before that focus on
the role of linguistic context. Some philosophers have advanced
these accounts as ways to explain the phenomenon of faultless
disagreement. The question we want to address is: which one of the
four projects mentioned before can these accounts successfully
pursue? To answer this question we will lay down in the next
section (§2) what we take to be the constitutive conditions for
having a disagreement and, after introducing the barebones of
these accounts, we will present an argument that threatens the
should rationally give up the idea that in disputes of inclination opposite
views are incompatible..
10 Wright (2006) can be read as case of normative descriptive project: by
appealing to the notion of super-assertibility, Wright tries to offer an anti-
realist framework that can accommodate the idea that a dispute can be faultless
and rationally sustainable.
possibility for these accounts to successfully engage in a
descriptive project regarding faultless disagreement. In section
3, we also cast doubt on the idea that these accounts can provide
a satisfactory revisionary explanation of faultless disagreement,
consistent with their underlying methodology.
§2 Basic disagreement and the lost disagreement problem
In this section we formulate a simple and intuitive view on
disagreement (§2.1) and present two basic forms of semantic
theories that make use of the notion of context: one where the
context plays a content-determining role (which we label “basic
contextualism”, see infra §2.2); and one where the context plays a
circumstance-determining role (which we label “basic relativism”,
see infra §2.3). We then formulate a problem (the “lost disagreement
problem”) for both positions. We will then consider some possible
replies to the problem in the following section.
§2.1 Basic disagreement
Though we do not want to provide a full analysis of the notion of
disagreement, we submit that a genuine disagreement must meet two
conditions. Two subjects disagree only if:
Basic Disagreement
i) (Incompatibility condition) they accept incompatible contents,11 i.e.
their truth-values are mutually exclusive12, and
ii) (Aboutness condition) the acceptance of these contents concern
the same circumstances, i.e. they are meant to be true at the
same circumstances.
The Incompatibility condition and the Aboutness condition
constitute together what we call “Basic disagreement”. Basic
disagreement is, in our opinion, a necessary feature of every
genuine semantic disagreement. Our formulation of the lost
disagreement problem depends on the acceptance of Basic
disagreement. We know that Basic disagreement has been challenged
(MacFarlane 2007; MacFarlane ms, ch.6; Lopez De Sa 2008; Sundell
2011; Marques forthcoming-a). However, we submit that Basic
disagreement is a fundamental feature of a genuine conflict of
opinions. Following Baker (forthcoming) we can distinguish three
disagreement-based strategies for arguing against relativism and
contextualism: i) a strategy starting from loaded principles (i.e.
11 The relevant attitude here is full belief – we leave aside cases of
degrees of belief.
12 We limit ourselves to acceptance and denial of the same content, though
matters can get complicated when a different content is accepted and
rejected.
principles that are neutral towards the theories on the market);
ii) a strategy based on minimal principles that should supposedly
be acceptable for any theory; iii) a strategy challenging the very
possibility that any other candidate relativist principle
regarding disagreement can adequately fulfill the required role
and underwrite the correct verdicts in paradigm cases of faultless
disagreement. Whereas Baker follows strategy (ii) – the one with
the minimalist notion of disagreement - we follow strategy (i).
Our challenge to contextualism can be thus methodologically
represented as follows: contextualist and relativist approaches
cannot successfully pursue a descriptive project on faultless
disagreement by appealing to an intuitive and simple view of
disagreement (Basic disagreement).13
13 Baker (forthcoming) formulates a dilemma for strategy (i): either it is a
problem for accounting disagreement in itself for relativism and
contextualism or these theories can provide an alternative notion of
disagreement. Hence he argues that any challenge to contextualism and
relativism based on strategy (i) is dialectically ineffective since either
presupposes a notion of disagreement unfriendly to these theories or it leads
to a more general problem for these theories that is conceptually antecedent
to the problem of accounting for some linguistic data. Our response is simple
and straightforward: we employ strategy (i) because we do think that
contextualism and relativism do have a general problem for accounting of
disagreement. Moreover in Coliva&Moruzzi ms we argue that it is not
One final remark: we are assuming a notion of disagreement that is
doxastic. That is to say, the conflict that Basic disagreement
captures is analyzed in terms of an incompatibility between belief
attitudes. In contrast to this assumption, some recent literature
(Dreier 2009; Huevenes 2011, forthcoming; Marques forthcoming-a)
suggests that it might be promising to account for the appearance
of disagreement (at least in some cases) by means of a non-
doxastic notion, for example in terms of preference instead of
belief. Let us then state a few points on these proposals. First,
none of these proposals articulates precisely what non-doxastic
disagreement would amount to. So, until a clear characterization
is given, it is difficult to assess the interest of a non-doxastic
account of faultless disagreement. Second, the main motivation for
these proposals is that it seems difficult for relativism and
contextualism to stabilize a doxastic notion of disagreement.
However, it is dialectically ad hoc to argue that it follows that
we must replace a doxastic notion with a non-doxastic one. For our
orthodox notion of Basic disagreement is intuitive and simple
whereas no clear non-doxastic account is available as yet. Until
we lack a decently articulated proposal regarding non-doxastic
dialectically ineffective to use our loaded Basic disagreement principle
since we argue against alternative construals of disagreement that might be
sympathetic to relativism and contextualism.
disagreement, it is much more plausible to infer that relativism
and contextualism fail to account for the notion of disagreement.
Finally, a doxastic notion of disagreement fits more naturally
areas of discourse that are taken to be truth-apt; for, if
discourse is truth-apt, it is plausible to assume that utterances
express propositions (whether classical or non-classical) with
truth-conditions and thus that the correct attitude underscored by
these utterances is one pointing to the truth of the proposition
expressed, namely the attitude of belief.14
So, if one’s proposed account of disputes of inclination
doesn’t meet requirements (i) and (ii) of Basic disagreement, it
incurs in what we will call the “Lost disagreement problem”.
Obviously such a problem is a powerful challenge to all
descriptive projects mentioned so far. For, trivially, if they
can’t solve it, they won’t be able to fulfill their advertised
task – that is to say, the task of respecting the appearance of
faultless disagreement.
§2.2 Basic contextualism
Call “basic contextualism for E” the view according to which the14 Of course, this latter point is ineffective against those who have sympathy
for expressivist analyses of the relevant area of discourse (e.g. Dreier
2009). Yet, we are concerned with contextualists and relativists who take it
for granted that the targeted area of discourse is truth-apt.
semantic content of the expression E is sensitive to the context
of use.15 Basic indexical contextualism seems the right semantic
theory for certain uses of some expressions, consider for example:
(Italian)
Mario: I am Italian
Nicholas: I am not Italian
It is clear that in these cases the semantic content of “I” is the
speaker of the context.16 Kaplan (1989) has famously taught us how
to treat these cases.
Moreover there are cases of expressions belonging to areas of
discourse of taste, aesthetics and ethics where such an analysis
has been considered as a live option. As we have mentioned in the
former section, the pressure for this position is to account for
faultless disagreement. Let’s go back to our example:
15 We use the expression “basic” because the position can be enriched with
other principles. The position is equivalent to what is also known, following
MacFarlane (2009), as “indexical contextualism”. We consider more complex
variants of contextualism in Coliva-Moruzzi ms.
16 The rule needs some qualifications that are not relevant for the present
discussion – see Predelli (1998).
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
Basic contextualism analyses “better” as indexed to the some
contextual parameter of the context of use. A natural candidate is
the standard of taste of the speaker. A well-known problem for
this proposal is that it seems unable to account for the feeling
of disagreement since the latter exchange is interpreted as
equivalent in content to:
(Omelettes-contextualist)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better w.r.t. my standards than
sausages.
Angela: No. Sausages are better w.r.t. my standards than
omelettes!
The propositions expressed in (Omelettes-contextualist) explain
the appearance of faultlessness since, presumably, the idea is
that in normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly
relatively to his/her own standards.17 However, the problem with
17 This assumption is by no means obvious. It could be held that the
appearance of faultless disagreement is systemically connected to an opacity
(Omelettes-contextualist) is that Nicholas and Angela seem to talk
past each other since they are expressing two different
comparative properties that give rise to compatible propositions:
Nicholas is expressing the property “being better w.r.t. Nicholas’
standards” whereas Angela is expressing the property “being better
w.r.t. Angela’s standards”. Basic contextualism thus faces the
Lost disagreement problem, because it cannot account for (i) the
Incompatibility condition of Basic disagreement.18
The Lost disagreement problem for contextualism has been
invoked by relativist semanticists as the master argument against
contextualism (Kölbel 2004, MacFarlane 2007, Lasershon 2005,
Stephenson 2007).
§2.3 Basic relativism
Call “basic relativism for E” the view according to which the
condition with respect to the question of which standards are salient in the
context. However, contextualists seem to assume that even in the presence of an
appearance of faultless disagreement the salient standards are always
transparent to the speaker.
18 The problem is not avoided if we switch from individualistic to
communitarian basic contextualism: if both propositions expressed by the
speakers involve the same standard (i.e. the standard of the conversation) then
the incompatibility condition is met but faultlessness is lost.
extension (but not the semantic content19) of the expression E is
sensitive to the context – where the context can be the context of
use of the expression or also the context from which an utterance
is assessed (context of assessment). In other words, the context
plays the role of determining the circumstances of evaluation for
determining the extension of the expression. The distinctive
feature of basic relativism is that it ascribes to the context a
circumstance-determining role, whereas basic contextualism
ascribes to the context a content-determining role. According to
basic relativism an utterance can express a proposition that can
correctly receive different assessments. Another way of expressing
the same thought is to say that the extension of the truth-
19 Basic semantic relativism constitutes, so to say, the semantic barebones
of two theories: non-indexical contextualism and truth relativism (see
MacFarlane 2005 for the distinction - content relativism is here left out of
the picture). Whereas MacFarlane’s taxonomy is based on the opposition between
context of use sensitivity and context of assessment sensitivity, our taxonomy
is orthogonal to that opposition since it is based on the alternative between
context dependence without preservation of content and context dependence with
preservation of content. We use the label “basic” not because the position is
itself entrenched in the literature, but because it provides the barebones of
theories that are well entrenched in the literature. One prominent way to put
some flesh on these barebones is MacFarlane's (2005) truth-relativism that we
discuss in Coliva&Moruzzi ms.
property is relative to contexts.
It has been argued that basic relativism can provide the basis
for formulating the right semantic theory for certain uses of some
linguistic expressions. Consider for example:
(Italian debt)
Mario: Italian debt is under control
Angela: Italian debt is not under control.
Temporalists, such as Prior (1957, 2003) and Kaplan (1989), have
argued that the content semantically expressed in the utterances
of (Italian debt) does not include reference to times. To
exemplify: if Mario utters on September 9 2013 at 10am “Italian
debt is under control” he expresses the proposition that Italian
debt is under control, and not the proposition that Italian debt
is under control at 10am of September 9 2013 – or so the
temporalists argue.
In particular, there are cases of expressions belonging to
areas of discourse of taste, aesthetics and ethics where such an
analysis has been considered an open option to account for
faultless disagreement. Let’s go back to our example:
(Omelettes)
Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages
Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!
Like basic contextualism, basic relativism holds that “better” has
to be relativized to some contextual parameter of the context of
utterance or of assessment (e.g. the taste standard of the
speaker); but whereas the basic contextualist relativization
involves a change of semantic content, basic relativism predicts a
change in extension without a change in semantic content. The
advantage of this analysis is that it explains that appearance of
disagreement by attributing to speakers the expression of
incompatible propositional contents (condition (i) of Basic
disagreement). The appearance of faultlessness is also accounted
for because, like in the contextualist case, the idea is that in
normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly relatively to
his/her own standards.
However, the basic relativist proposal suffers from a problem
analogous to the one underlined for basic contextualism. According
to basic relativism, in (Omelettes) the exchange has to be
interpreted as equivalent to:
(Omelettes-relativist)Nicholas [using his standards as part of
the circumstances]: Omelettes are better than sausages.
Angela [using her standards as part of the circumstances]: No.
Sausages are better than omelettes!
Basic relativism analyses “better” as pointing to the
circumstances that include the judge’s standards. In (Omelettes-
relativist) Nicholas and Angela are taking different circumstances
as relevant for evaluating the (common) propositional content
involved in the dispute and the assertion made. This latter fact
prevents the satisfaction of condition (ii) (the Aboutness
condition) of Basic disagreement (cf. Francén 2010). To see the
point, take the following example:
Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and
June, her counterpart in another possible world. Jane asserts
that Mars has two moons, and June denies this very
proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way. Jane’s
assertion concerns our world, while June’s concerns hers. If
June lives in a world where Mars has three moons, her denial
may be just as correct as Jane’s assertion. (MacFarlane 2007:
23)
Just as there is no disagreement between two speakers in two
different worlds accepting and rejecting the same proposition,
disagreement is lost also in the (Omelettes-relativist) scenario.20
§3 Semantic Blindness
At this point both basic contextualism and basic relativism could
invoke the semantic blindness hypothesis: speakers ignore the real
workings of the semantics of their utterances and therefore take
themselves to disagree even if they are, as a matter of fact, just
talking past each other. In fact both basic contextualism and
basic relativism predict that one of the conditions of Basic
Disagreement is not satisfied in the Omelettes scenario: according
20 It may seem ironic that we mention MacFarlane for supporting our lost
disagreement objection, since it implies that MacFarlane would then be
portrayed as arguing against his own view. Of course, MacFarlane does not
argue against his own view nor do we intend to suggest this. Rather, his
example is meant to show that an appropriate account of disagreement must not
appeal only to the propositional contents of the speech acts but must be
connected to the notion of context. Or so he argues. We discuss his proposal
in Coliva&Moruzzi ms. We quoted MacFarlane because we think he has underlined
an intuitive difficulty that any relativist treatment faces in relation to
the notion of basic disagreement. Of course the relativist can revise the
notion of basic disagreement, but then it becomes controversial whether the
new relativistic notion of disagreement is acceptable.
to basic contextualism speakers express contents whose truth-
values are not mutually exclusive, whereas basic relativism holds
that speakers' acceptances of the content express concern
different circumstances. It thus then follows that in such a
scenario any expression of disagreement is at fault since at least
one necessary condition for the existence of a disagreement is not
satisfied. The semantic blindness hypothesis explains this mistake
in the linguistic performance (e.g. Angela's utterance of “No” to
express her rejection of what Nicholas has asserted) by positing a
misunderstanding of what has been actually expressed in the
linguistic exchange (basic contextualism) or of what circumstances
are relevant for assessing the correctness of the assertions
(basic relativism).
Notice that such a move is compatible only with the empirical
revisionary project. In fact the descriptive projects (normative
and empirical) are ruled out because they presuppose that the
theory does not contradict speakers' representation of the
relevant area of discourse; normative revisionism is ruled out too
because the semantic blindness hypothesis is used to explain a
pattern of use of linguistic expressions, whereas a normative
revisionist project aims to criticize this pattern as not
rationally sustainable. The semantic blindness hypothesis entails
that disputes on taste are in fact mistaken: were the speakers
aware of the workings of the semantics for their utterances, they
would stop arguing and the dispute would no longer be rationally
sustainable since they would realize that they are just mistaken
in thinking of disagreeing with each other.
Notice also the methodologically problematic consequence of
turning to an empirical revisionary project. For if we opt for
this move, it becomes dubious that we can trust those semantic
intuitions that are usually appealed to in order to motivate
contextualism and relativism. So either these theories can be
independently motivated (for example by arguing in favor of the
metaphysics underwritten by contextualist semantics), or the
semantic blindness hypothesis cuts the ground underneath the very
philosophical positions it is meant to be a defense of (cf. Baker
2012: 112-15).21 It might be replied that the data supporting
contextualism and relativism come from a set of intuitions that is
distinct from the set for which semantic blindness is invoked.
Contextualism, for example, has been typically motivated by
intuitions about the variability of truth-values of utterances
across different contexts (see Cappelen&Lepore 2005:17-38). The
contextualist might then argue that this set of intuitions
21 In fact Cappelen (2008) argues that semantics should not be based on
intuitions about content because they are unreliable.
provides evidence for a contextualist semantics for, say, taste
vocabulary independently of the disagreement data. As for the
intuitions about disagreement the contextualist might then hold
that these are so hopelessly muddled to prevent ordinary speakers
from understanding properly the correct semantics for these
expressions. To this objection we have two replies. First, the
semanticist who defends these theories should explain why
intuitions about disagreement are confused: do ordinary speakers
have a cognitive shortcoming when they employ the concept of
disagreement? Or is the concept of disagreement itself ambiguous
or, perhaps, even incoherent? More has to be said to motivate the
confusion hypothesis. Second, though it is a common practice for
linguists to hold similar semantic blindness hypothesis,
contextualists and relativists have nonetheless the burden of
proof of showing that the unreliability of intuitions about
disagreement does not cast doubt on the reliability of the other
set of intuitions that are supposed to independently motivate the
theory (such as intuitions about the variability in truth-value of
utterances in the case of contextualism).
However, the crucial question is another one: granting the
semantic blindness hypothesis, is a revisionary explanation of the
disputes a palatable solution to the problem of faultless
disagreement? The price to pay (assuming the notion of Basic
disagreement), to account for the appearance of faultlessness, is
to explain away the appearance of disagreement. Contextualists and
relativists could, of course, reject Basic disagreement by
claiming that the appearance of disagreement could be explained by
some kind of disagreement other than Basic disagreement (see supra
fn 16). It then becomes an open question which one is more worthy.
However, if we grant Basic disagreement there is no longer any
clear advantage in an approach that focuses on the role of context
since the advertised advantage of vindicating a genuine sense of
faultless disagreement would be lost.
§4 Conclusions
The upshot is then that both contextualism and relativism in their
basic forms cannot redeem as genuine the many disputes we
continuously face in a subjective domain such as taste discourse
since these theories are committed to a revisionary stance. We
want to be clear, though, that our conclusion is not meant to be
an unconditional and unqualified rejection of contextualism and
relativism. These theories might be supported by considerations that
are different from the phenomenon of faultless disagreement.
Rather, the conclusion of our argument is conditional and
qualified: if we accept Basic disagreement, then both (basic)
contextualism and (basic) relativism can’t make sense of it and
hence they should end up being revisionary with respect to the
appearance of faultless disagreement. This conclusion justifies a
thesis of explanatory limitation for (basic) contextualism and
(basic) relativism: unless further work is done in the
contextualist and relativist field, these theories do not seem to
be able to pursue a descriptive project with respect to faultless
disagreement.
We started this paper by delineating the possible
philosophical projects that can be pursed in relation to the
problem of faultless disagreement. We can now draw some
conclusions with respect to contextualism and relativism (in their
basic forms). The (basic) contextualist and the (basic) relativist
have then two options for clarifying what philosophical project
there are engaged in: either they chose to pursue an empirical
revisionary project or a normative revisionary one. If the former,
we have argued that they have a methodological problem. In fact if
(basic) contextualism and (basic) relativism have problems in
making sense of disagreement (at least in relation to the
phenomenon of faultless disagreement), this outcome would sit
badly with their usual methodological stance, which consists in
taking semantic intuitions at face value. We thus think that
contextualists and relativists can either argue that the
unreliability of disagreement intuitions does not cast doubt on
the intuitions that can independently support their theories, or
their revisionary stance over faultless disagreement threatens the
very reliability of the data that should provide empirical support
for their very theories. If, on the other hand, (basic)
contextualists and (basic) relativists opt for a normative
revisionary project, they are committed to the view that disputes
in subjective areas of discourse are not rationally sustainable.
As a consequence, speakers should give up the idea that in
disputes of inclination opposite views are incompatible and they
should stop arguing.22 The empirical and normative revisionary
project could also be conjoined: empirical semantics could then be
used, along the lines of the Dummettian project, to call for a
revision of a trait of our subjective discourse that concerns our
mode of reasoning and disputing. This is a line of research that
could be interestingly pursued but that is, so far, alien to
current debates on contextualism and relativism.
To sum up, we think that there is a challenge to be met by
(basic) contextualists and (basic) relativists who are prone to be
22 This view fits Rovane (2012) stance towards disputes on morality. However
it is not clear what background semantic theory Rovane would accept (though her
view seems very much in line with some sort of subvaluationism).
engaged in a descriptive project on faultless disagreement, but
that there also new prospects for those theorists who are
persuaded to move to a revisionary project on faultless
disagreement.
The prospect for the converted revisionists are, if the
converted subscribe to an empirical credo, to clarify the role that
disagreement intuitions have with respect the evidential basis for
their theory and, if they subscribe to a normative credo, to assess
the consequences for reasoning and rationality in the targeted
subjective domains.
The challenge for the obstinate descripitivists is the
following. Either a different notion of disagreement is canvassed
– perhaps one merely non-doxastic in character, related to the
different attitudes and commitments that people judging P and not-
P from different contexts of evaluation would have –; or else,
pending further work for contextualists and relativists on the
rationality of the targeted disputes and on the status of the
semantic intuitions taken to provide an evidential basis for these
theories, the prospects for a contextualist or a relativist
descriptive account of faultless disagreement look bleak. An
inquiry into a different notion of disagreement would, no doubt,
be reasonable, but Basic disagreement too is definitely a
legitimate notion. With respect to that, the relativist and the
contextualist (at least when engaged in a descriptive project)
seem to have very little credible to say.23
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