Basic disagreement, basic contextualism and basic relativism

Basic Disagreement, Basic Contextualism and Basic Relativism

Introduction

In recent years there has been a surge of interest in the

philosophy of language over the merits, limits and future

perspectives of various approaches to the problem of meaning and

communication that focus on the role of linguistic context.

However, a noticeable problem that has been pivotal in motivating

some developments of this trend has been so far under-explored.

The problem in a nutshell is: what’s the nature of disagreement?

Given that linguistic disagreement data has been recently advanced

as one of the main motivations for some of these contextual

approaches in relation to the so-called phenomenon of “faultless

disagreement” (more on this phenomenon later), the intellectual

pressure to answer this question has accordingly increased.

The aim of this paper is to show that a very natural and

intuitive notion of disagreement cannot but lead to criticizing

these proposals as positive philosophical explanations of

faultless disagreement (more on this notion later). “So much the

worse for the ‘natural and intuitive view’ of disagreement” some

would say; “so much the worse for these approaches” others would

say. As often happens in philosophy, one person’s modus tollens is

another person’s modus ponens. Though we are in this case more

sympathetic with the modus ponens reaction, we are content to shed

light on the difference between different philosophical projects

that, we think, in the current debate on faultless disagreement

have not been properly kept distinct. We also wish to establish

the conditional conclusion that if the natural and intuitive view

of disagreement is correct, then mainstream approaches to semantic

content (i.e. contextualist and relativist approaches) that make

use of the notion of context cannot offer a positive philosophical

explanation of faultless disagreement and are ultimately committed

to a revisionary approach with respect to semantics tout court.

In §1 we introduce two distinctions (normative vs empirical

and revisonary vs descriptive) that are useful for characterizing

a philosophical project. These distinctions give rise to four

different possible projects on the problem of faultless

disagreement. In §2 we lay out a basic and intuitive view of

doxastic disagreement and we show why this view poses a problem to

any basic form of contextualism and relativism for any descriptive

approach to faultless disagreement. We then argue (§3) that a

revisionary approach to faultless disagreement is a natural option

by means of a semantic blindness hypothesis, but that such an

approach sits badly with the methodology usually adopted by

supporters of these semantic outlooks.

§1 Normative vs empirical and revisonary vs descriptive

philosophical projects

§1.1 Two distinctions: normative/empirical and descriptive/revisionary

So, before moving on, let’s make clear which projects we are

targeting. We do not want to criticize contextualist or relativist

proposals because they are inadequate qua empirical semantic

theories; on this fact we want to remain neutral – though we will

raise some doubts on this. Our aim is different: we want to

criticize these proposals as philosophical explanations of certain types

of disagreement, namely those disagreements that have been called

“faultless disagreements” (Kölbel 2003). So, before entering the

details of our critique, it is necessary to provide an elucidation

of what we take a “philosophical explanation” to be.

We can distinguish two different projects: one that aims to

investigate the normative connections that underlie our use of

language; and another one that means to discover general principles

which can be employed to account for some linguistic data. Contemporary

empirical semantics clearly falls into the second category: the

aim is to explain some linguistic data by means of a compositional

formal semantics together with pragmatic principles that connect

the formal apparatus to our linguistic activity. Take for example

the case of taste discourse (which will be our leading example).

Philosophers of language and linguists have pointed out that we

have linguistic data like:

(Omelettes)

Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.

Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!

A moment reflection on the scenario depicted by this example

suffices to realize that these disputes have the appearance of

faultless disagreement: when it comes to disputes of inclination

it seems that it is possible that both opinions are in good

standing and subjects aren’t at fault. The business of empirical

semantics is to explain why exchanges of this type are felicitous

by means of the resources of formal semantics and pragmatics. Now,

how is this connected to the former project of investigating the

normative connections that underlie our use of language? Of

course, the whole point is to clarify the phrase “investigating

the normative connections”. It is not the purpose of this paper to

hold that there is a univocal reading of that phrase; rather, we

want to advance our own interpretation that we believe is firmly

entrenched in the philosophical tradition. When it comes to

disagreement, we inquire into the nature of disagreement in a

given area of discourse because we want to understand how we

deploy our concepts in these disputes and whether this deployment

is rational: whether the engagement in the dispute is characterized

by a stance that is justified by the relevant information. This

latter question involves a normative dimension that is absent in

the empirical semantic project. Like the empirical semantic

project also the “normative project” pays attention to the

linguistic use because to do so is a useful strategy to get a grip

on how we deploy our concepts. However, the normative project, as

opposed to the empirical project, aims at explaining why we

disagree in a certain way and what the justification of our attitudes

is.1

Given this understanding of the normative project, there is no

principled reason why the two projects should be in opposition or

mutually exclusive. An inquiry into the semantics of an area of

discourse aimed at making sense of the linguistic data for

disagreement could provide valuable, if not decisive, insights

into the normative question of the nature and rational basis of

disagreement. Moreover if we believe in a close relationship

between linguistic questions and normative questions – i.e. if we1 Wright (2012) adopts a similar distinction.

believe (as for example Dummett thought) that an explanation of

the meaning of expressions in a given area of discourse can solve

some traditional philosophical questions related to that area –

then the connection between the empirical project and the

normative one is not only possible, but actually to be expected.

One aim of this paper is to show that current contextualist and

relativist semantics aren’t of help when the purpose of inquiry is

that of providing a normative explanation of disagreement. This

conclusion is of course consistent with drawing different morals:

either further work has to be done for linking these empirical

projects to the normative project, or the project of linking the

empirical with the normative is in fact doomed to fail, or else,

current contextualist and relativist empirical semantics have to

be rejected as solutions to the philosophical problem of faultless

disagreement.

A final distinction. The empirical/normative opposition is

orthogonal to another opposition that is the

descriptive/revisionary. A philosophical project is descriptive when

it delivers just a description of a targeted area of investigation

that matches with our ordinary representation of it.

Alternatively, a philosophical project is revisionary when it

delivers a description of the area of investigation that does not

match with our ordinary representation of it.2

With respect to the problem of faultless disagreement, a

descriptive project must deliver a description of the relevant

area of discourse where disputes are taken at face value as real

and rationally sustainable and not to be imputed to error or

ignorance or other deficiencies on subjects’ part. By contrast, a

revisionary project on the problem of faultless disagreement calls

for a revision of some traits of the relevant area of discourse;

disputes are approached with the intent of resolving or, in

effect, dissolving them.

§1.2 Four projects

From the previous distinctions it follows that both empirical and

normative projects could either be descriptive or revisionary.

There are, in the history of philosophy, plenty of instances of

2 Dummett (1976: 66) has famously argued, for example, that part of our

inferential practice must be revised: some classically valid inferential

principles (double negation elimination, excluded middle and classical reductio)

cannot be redeemed on a semantics grounded on the central aspects of our use,

aspects that are constitutive of the meaning of logical expressions. According

to Dummett, these principles cannot be justified if we assume a molecular theory

of meaning, which rests on a connection between meaning and knowledge of

meaning. Hence, our acceptance of these principles can be subject to legitimate

philosophical criticism.

these type of projects. To illustrate how an empirical project

could be revisionary just think of how epistemic contextualists3

such as DeRose (2012) have advanced the semantic blindness

hypothesis: according to some epistemic contextualist we, qua

ordinary speakers, feel that the skeptical argument based on

closure4 poses a threat to knowledge because we are blind to the

fact that its conclusion does not contradict our ordinary claims

to knowledge. Semantics advanced by these epistemic contextualists

are thus revisionary because they impute an error to ordinary

speakers.

As an instance of normative revisionism take for example

Richard Rorty’s discussion of progress (Rorty 1979, esp. Ch. 7).

Rorty holds that our ordinary idea of progress with respect to,

for example, ethical questions, is just a retrospective projection

of our categories. Although he wouldn’t endorse the claim that

such a projection is erroneous, he thinks there is no fact of the

3 For a minimal definition of the contextualist position see infra §2.1.

4 A skeptical argument based on closure runs as follows:

P1. I don’t know that that I’m not a bodiless brain in a vat (BIV), being

stimulated to have just those experiences I would be having if I weren’t a

BIV.

P2. If I don’t know that I’m not a BIV, being stimulated to have just those experiences I

would be having if I weren’t a BIV, then I don’t know that I have hands.

C. So, I don’t know that I have hands.

matter that could sanction the superiority of our perspective over

any other one, contrary to what we usually think about political

or ethical progress.5

As for the descriptive empirical project, most present-day

relativist semantics are a luminous examples of such kind of

project: they intend to deliver a description of the truth-

conditions that underlie our actual linguistic use. So, for

example, Egan, Hawthorne & Weatherson (2005) and MacFarlane

(forthcoming) are examples of descriptive empirical projects for

the semantics of English expressions for epistemic modality.

Finally, the descriptive normative case. We understand this

category simply as the traditional philosophical task of saying

what we ought to think with respect to a certain philosophical

notion. Take for example the notion of knowledge: a descriptive

normative project lays down the principles that are constitutive

of knowledge and claims that these principles are the ones we

ought rationally to deem as correct and abide by.

Our focus will be on philosophical projects on faultless

disagreement, namely those disputes of inclination (in ethics,

aesthetics or taste discourse for example) where it appears that

“when two thinkers disagree on a non-objective matter of opinion

5 We have analyzed the problem of ethical progress in connection with

contemporary relativist proposals in Coliva&Moruzzi 2012.

it is possible that neither of them has made a mistake or is at

fault” (Kölbel 2003: 53). In such cases we have linguistic data

like (Omelettes) together with, after reflection, the appearance

of faultless disagreement. Faced with these, obviously different

kinds of data, one can pursue four different projects6:

P1) Empirical revisionary project: to revise the appearance of

faultless disagreement, by appealing only to further

linguistic data and hypotheses;7

P2) Empirical descriptive project : to maintain that the

appearance of faultless disagreement is correct, by appealing

only to further linguistic data and hypotheses;8

P3) Normative revisionary project : by appealing to conceptual

reflections, to revise the appearance of faultless

disagreement, and to deem the dispute as not rationally

sustainable;9

6 Each project is relativized to an area of discourse.

7 Cappelen (2008) is a clear example of revisionary empirical project: by

appealing to the semantic blindness hypothesis the author holds that the

appearance of faultless disagreement is an illusion.

8 Kölbel (2007) illustrates how truth-relativism or a sophisticated form of

contextualism can be seen as cases of descriptive projects.

9 Rovane (2012) exemplifies a conceptual revisionary project: by claiming

that there is no coherent account of faultless disagreement, she argues that we

P4) Normative descriptive project : by appealing to conceptual

reflections, to maintain that the appearance of faultless

disagreement is correct and that the dispute is rationally

sustainable.10

Normative projects could be undertaken with the help of empirical

ones, so P1 and P3, and P2 and P4 aren’t respectively mutually

exclusive; while P1 and P2, and P3 and P4 are.

So let’s go back to the accounts mentioned before that focus on

the role of linguistic context. Some philosophers have advanced

these accounts as ways to explain the phenomenon of faultless

disagreement. The question we want to address is: which one of the

four projects mentioned before can these accounts successfully

pursue? To answer this question we will lay down in the next

section (§2) what we take to be the constitutive conditions for

having a disagreement and, after introducing the barebones of

these accounts, we will present an argument that threatens the

should rationally give up the idea that in disputes of inclination opposite

views are incompatible..

10 Wright (2006) can be read as case of normative descriptive project: by

appealing to the notion of super-assertibility, Wright tries to offer an anti-

realist framework that can accommodate the idea that a dispute can be faultless

and rationally sustainable.

possibility for these accounts to successfully engage in a

descriptive project regarding faultless disagreement. In section

3, we also cast doubt on the idea that these accounts can provide

a satisfactory revisionary explanation of faultless disagreement,

consistent with their underlying methodology.

§2 Basic disagreement and the lost disagreement problem

In this section we formulate a simple and intuitive view on

disagreement (§2.1) and present two basic forms of semantic

theories that make use of the notion of context: one where the

context plays a content-determining role (which we label “basic

contextualism”, see infra §2.2); and one where the context plays a

circumstance-determining role (which we label “basic relativism”,

see infra §2.3). We then formulate a problem (the “lost disagreement

problem”) for both positions. We will then consider some possible

replies to the problem in the following section.

§2.1 Basic disagreement

Though we do not want to provide a full analysis of the notion of

disagreement, we submit that a genuine disagreement must meet two

conditions. Two subjects disagree only if:

Basic Disagreement

i) (Incompatibility condition) they accept incompatible contents,11 i.e.

their truth-values are mutually exclusive12, and

ii) (Aboutness condition) the acceptance of these contents concern

the same circumstances, i.e. they are meant to be true at the

same circumstances.

The Incompatibility condition and the Aboutness condition

constitute together what we call “Basic disagreement”. Basic

disagreement is, in our opinion, a necessary feature of every

genuine semantic disagreement. Our formulation of the lost

disagreement problem depends on the acceptance of Basic

disagreement. We know that Basic disagreement has been challenged

(MacFarlane 2007; MacFarlane ms, ch.6; Lopez De Sa 2008; Sundell

2011; Marques forthcoming-a). However, we submit that Basic

disagreement is a fundamental feature of a genuine conflict of

opinions. Following Baker (forthcoming) we can distinguish three

disagreement-based strategies for arguing against relativism and

contextualism: i) a strategy starting from loaded principles (i.e.

11 The relevant attitude here is full belief – we leave aside cases of

degrees of belief.

12 We limit ourselves to acceptance and denial of the same content, though

matters can get complicated when a different content is accepted and

rejected.

principles that are neutral towards the theories on the market);

ii) a strategy based on minimal principles that should supposedly

be acceptable for any theory; iii) a strategy challenging the very

possibility that any other candidate relativist principle

regarding disagreement can adequately fulfill the required role

and underwrite the correct verdicts in paradigm cases of faultless

disagreement. Whereas Baker follows strategy (ii) – the one with

the minimalist notion of disagreement - we follow strategy (i).

Our challenge to contextualism can be thus methodologically

represented as follows: contextualist and relativist approaches

cannot successfully pursue a descriptive project on faultless

disagreement by appealing to an intuitive and simple view of

disagreement (Basic disagreement).13

13 Baker (forthcoming) formulates a dilemma for strategy (i): either it is a

problem for accounting disagreement in itself for relativism and

contextualism or these theories can provide an alternative notion of

disagreement. Hence he argues that any challenge to contextualism and

relativism based on strategy (i) is dialectically ineffective since either

presupposes a notion of disagreement unfriendly to these theories or it leads

to a more general problem for these theories that is conceptually antecedent

to the problem of accounting for some linguistic data. Our response is simple

and straightforward: we employ strategy (i) because we do think that

contextualism and relativism do have a general problem for accounting of

disagreement. Moreover in Coliva&Moruzzi ms we argue that it is not

One final remark: we are assuming a notion of disagreement that is

doxastic. That is to say, the conflict that Basic disagreement

captures is analyzed in terms of an incompatibility between belief

attitudes. In contrast to this assumption, some recent literature

(Dreier 2009; Huevenes 2011, forthcoming; Marques forthcoming-a)

suggests that it might be promising to account for the appearance

of disagreement (at least in some cases) by means of a non-

doxastic notion, for example in terms of preference instead of

belief. Let us then state a few points on these proposals. First,

none of these proposals articulates precisely what non-doxastic

disagreement would amount to. So, until a clear characterization

is given, it is difficult to assess the interest of a non-doxastic

account of faultless disagreement. Second, the main motivation for

these proposals is that it seems difficult for relativism and

contextualism to stabilize a doxastic notion of disagreement.

However, it is dialectically ad hoc to argue that it follows that

we must replace a doxastic notion with a non-doxastic one. For our

orthodox notion of Basic disagreement is intuitive and simple

whereas no clear non-doxastic account is available as yet. Until

we lack a decently articulated proposal regarding non-doxastic

dialectically ineffective to use our loaded Basic disagreement principle

since we argue against alternative construals of disagreement that might be

sympathetic to relativism and contextualism.

disagreement, it is much more plausible to infer that relativism

and contextualism fail to account for the notion of disagreement.

Finally, a doxastic notion of disagreement fits more naturally

areas of discourse that are taken to be truth-apt; for, if

discourse is truth-apt, it is plausible to assume that utterances

express propositions (whether classical or non-classical) with

truth-conditions and thus that the correct attitude underscored by

these utterances is one pointing to the truth of the proposition

expressed, namely the attitude of belief.14

So, if one’s proposed account of disputes of inclination

doesn’t meet requirements (i) and (ii) of Basic disagreement, it

incurs in what we will call the “Lost disagreement problem”.

Obviously such a problem is a powerful challenge to all

descriptive projects mentioned so far. For, trivially, if they

can’t solve it, they won’t be able to fulfill their advertised

task – that is to say, the task of respecting the appearance of

faultless disagreement.

§2.2 Basic contextualism

Call “basic contextualism for E” the view according to which the14 Of course, this latter point is ineffective against those who have sympathy

for expressivist analyses of the relevant area of discourse (e.g. Dreier

2009). Yet, we are concerned with contextualists and relativists who take it

for granted that the targeted area of discourse is truth-apt.

semantic content of the expression E is sensitive to the context

of use.15 Basic indexical contextualism seems the right semantic

theory for certain uses of some expressions, consider for example:

(Italian)

Mario: I am Italian

Nicholas: I am not Italian

It is clear that in these cases the semantic content of “I” is the

speaker of the context.16 Kaplan (1989) has famously taught us how

to treat these cases.

Moreover there are cases of expressions belonging to areas of

discourse of taste, aesthetics and ethics where such an analysis

has been considered as a live option. As we have mentioned in the

former section, the pressure for this position is to account for

faultless disagreement. Let’s go back to our example:

15 We use the expression “basic” because the position can be enriched with

other principles. The position is equivalent to what is also known, following

MacFarlane (2009), as “indexical contextualism”. We consider more complex

variants of contextualism in Coliva-Moruzzi ms.

16 The rule needs some qualifications that are not relevant for the present

discussion – see Predelli (1998).

(Omelettes)

Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages.

Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!

Basic contextualism analyses “better” as indexed to the some

contextual parameter of the context of use. A natural candidate is

the standard of taste of the speaker. A well-known problem for

this proposal is that it seems unable to account for the feeling

of disagreement since the latter exchange is interpreted as

equivalent in content to:

(Omelettes-contextualist)

Nicholas: Omelettes are better w.r.t. my standards than

sausages.

Angela: No. Sausages are better w.r.t. my standards than

omelettes!

The propositions expressed in (Omelettes-contextualist) explain

the appearance of faultlessness since, presumably, the idea is

that in normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly

relatively to his/her own standards.17 However, the problem with

17 This assumption is by no means obvious. It could be held that the

appearance of faultless disagreement is systemically connected to an opacity

(Omelettes-contextualist) is that Nicholas and Angela seem to talk

past each other since they are expressing two different

comparative properties that give rise to compatible propositions:

Nicholas is expressing the property “being better w.r.t. Nicholas’

standards” whereas Angela is expressing the property “being better

w.r.t. Angela’s standards”. Basic contextualism thus faces the

Lost disagreement problem, because it cannot account for (i) the

Incompatibility condition of Basic disagreement.18

The Lost disagreement problem for contextualism has been

invoked by relativist semanticists as the master argument against

contextualism (Kölbel 2004, MacFarlane 2007, Lasershon 2005,

Stephenson 2007).

§2.3 Basic relativism

Call “basic relativism for E” the view according to which the

condition with respect to the question of which standards are salient in the

context. However, contextualists seem to assume that even in the presence of an

appearance of faultless disagreement the salient standards are always

transparent to the speaker.

18 The problem is not avoided if we switch from individualistic to

communitarian basic contextualism: if both propositions expressed by the

speakers involve the same standard (i.e. the standard of the conversation) then

the incompatibility condition is met but faultlessness is lost.

extension (but not the semantic content19) of the expression E is

sensitive to the context – where the context can be the context of

use of the expression or also the context from which an utterance

is assessed (context of assessment). In other words, the context

plays the role of determining the circumstances of evaluation for

determining the extension of the expression. The distinctive

feature of basic relativism is that it ascribes to the context a

circumstance-determining role, whereas basic contextualism

ascribes to the context a content-determining role. According to

basic relativism an utterance can express a proposition that can

correctly receive different assessments. Another way of expressing

the same thought is to say that the extension of the truth-

19 Basic semantic relativism constitutes, so to say, the semantic barebones

of two theories: non-indexical contextualism and truth relativism (see

MacFarlane 2005 for the distinction - content relativism is here left out of

the picture). Whereas MacFarlane’s taxonomy is based on the opposition between

context of use sensitivity and context of assessment sensitivity, our taxonomy

is orthogonal to that opposition since it is based on the alternative between

context dependence without preservation of content and context dependence with

preservation of content. We use the label “basic” not because the position is

itself entrenched in the literature, but because it provides the barebones of

theories that are well entrenched in the literature. One prominent way to put

some flesh on these barebones is MacFarlane's (2005) truth-relativism that we

discuss in Coliva&Moruzzi ms.

property is relative to contexts.

It has been argued that basic relativism can provide the basis

for formulating the right semantic theory for certain uses of some

linguistic expressions. Consider for example:

(Italian debt)

Mario: Italian debt is under control

Angela: Italian debt is not under control.

Temporalists, such as Prior (1957, 2003) and Kaplan (1989), have

argued that the content semantically expressed in the utterances

of (Italian debt) does not include reference to times. To

exemplify: if Mario utters on September 9 2013 at 10am “Italian

debt is under control” he expresses the proposition that Italian

debt is under control, and not the proposition that Italian debt

is under control at 10am of September 9 2013 – or so the

temporalists argue.

In particular, there are cases of expressions belonging to

areas of discourse of taste, aesthetics and ethics where such an

analysis has been considered an open option to account for

faultless disagreement. Let’s go back to our example:

(Omelettes)

Nicholas: Omelettes are better than sausages

Angela: No. Sausages are better than omelettes!

Like basic contextualism, basic relativism holds that “better” has

to be relativized to some contextual parameter of the context of

utterance or of assessment (e.g. the taste standard of the

speaker); but whereas the basic contextualist relativization

involves a change of semantic content, basic relativism predicts a

change in extension without a change in semantic content. The

advantage of this analysis is that it explains that appearance of

disagreement by attributing to speakers the expression of

incompatible propositional contents (condition (i) of Basic

disagreement). The appearance of faultlessness is also accounted

for because, like in the contextualist case, the idea is that in

normal circumstances each speaker judges correctly relatively to

his/her own standards.

However, the basic relativist proposal suffers from a problem

analogous to the one underlined for basic contextualism. According

to basic relativism, in (Omelettes) the exchange has to be

interpreted as equivalent to:

(Omelettes-relativist)Nicholas [using his standards as part of

the circumstances]: Omelettes are better than sausages.

Angela [using her standards as part of the circumstances]: No.

Sausages are better than omelettes!

Basic relativism analyses “better” as pointing to the

circumstances that include the judge’s standards. In (Omelettes-

relativist) Nicholas and Angela are taking different circumstances

as relevant for evaluating the (common) propositional content

involved in the dispute and the assertion made. This latter fact

prevents the satisfaction of condition (ii) (the Aboutness

condition) of Basic disagreement (cf. Francén 2010). To see the

point, take the following example:

Consider Jane (who inhabits this world, the actual world) and

June, her counterpart in another possible world. Jane asserts

that Mars has two moons, and June denies this very

proposition. Do they disagree? Not in any real way. Jane’s

assertion concerns our world, while June’s concerns hers. If

June lives in a world where Mars has three moons, her denial

may be just as correct as Jane’s assertion. (MacFarlane 2007:

23)

Just as there is no disagreement between two speakers in two

different worlds accepting and rejecting the same proposition,

disagreement is lost also in the (Omelettes-relativist) scenario.20

§3 Semantic Blindness

At this point both basic contextualism and basic relativism could

invoke the semantic blindness hypothesis: speakers ignore the real

workings of the semantics of their utterances and therefore take

themselves to disagree even if they are, as a matter of fact, just

talking past each other. In fact both basic contextualism and

basic relativism predict that one of the conditions of Basic

Disagreement is not satisfied in the Omelettes scenario: according

20 It may seem ironic that we mention MacFarlane for supporting our lost

disagreement objection, since it implies that MacFarlane would then be

portrayed as arguing against his own view. Of course, MacFarlane does not

argue against his own view nor do we intend to suggest this. Rather, his

example is meant to show that an appropriate account of disagreement must not

appeal only to the propositional contents of the speech acts but must be

connected to the notion of context. Or so he argues. We discuss his proposal

in Coliva&Moruzzi ms. We quoted MacFarlane because we think he has underlined

an intuitive difficulty that any relativist treatment faces in relation to

the notion of basic disagreement. Of course the relativist can revise the

notion of basic disagreement, but then it becomes controversial whether the

new relativistic notion of disagreement is acceptable.

to basic contextualism speakers express contents whose truth-

values are not mutually exclusive, whereas basic relativism holds

that speakers' acceptances of the content express concern

different circumstances. It thus then follows that in such a

scenario any expression of disagreement is at fault since at least

one necessary condition for the existence of a disagreement is not

satisfied. The semantic blindness hypothesis explains this mistake

in the linguistic performance (e.g. Angela's utterance of “No” to

express her rejection of what Nicholas has asserted) by positing a

misunderstanding of what has been actually expressed in the

linguistic exchange (basic contextualism) or of what circumstances

are relevant for assessing the correctness of the assertions

(basic relativism).

Notice that such a move is compatible only with the empirical

revisionary project. In fact the descriptive projects (normative

and empirical) are ruled out because they presuppose that the

theory does not contradict speakers' representation of the

relevant area of discourse; normative revisionism is ruled out too

because the semantic blindness hypothesis is used to explain a

pattern of use of linguistic expressions, whereas a normative

revisionist project aims to criticize this pattern as not

rationally sustainable. The semantic blindness hypothesis entails

that disputes on taste are in fact mistaken: were the speakers

aware of the workings of the semantics for their utterances, they

would stop arguing and the dispute would no longer be rationally

sustainable since they would realize that they are just mistaken

in thinking of disagreeing with each other.

Notice also the methodologically problematic consequence of

turning to an empirical revisionary project. For if we opt for

this move, it becomes dubious that we can trust those semantic

intuitions that are usually appealed to in order to motivate

contextualism and relativism. So either these theories can be

independently motivated (for example by arguing in favor of the

metaphysics underwritten by contextualist semantics), or the

semantic blindness hypothesis cuts the ground underneath the very

philosophical positions it is meant to be a defense of (cf. Baker

2012: 112-15).21 It might be replied that the data supporting

contextualism and relativism come from a set of intuitions that is

distinct from the set for which semantic blindness is invoked.

Contextualism, for example, has been typically motivated by

intuitions about the variability of truth-values of utterances

across different contexts (see Cappelen&Lepore 2005:17-38). The

contextualist might then argue that this set of intuitions

21 In fact Cappelen (2008) argues that semantics should not be based on

intuitions about content because they are unreliable.

provides evidence for a contextualist semantics for, say, taste

vocabulary independently of the disagreement data. As for the

intuitions about disagreement the contextualist might then hold

that these are so hopelessly muddled to prevent ordinary speakers

from understanding properly the correct semantics for these

expressions. To this objection we have two replies. First, the

semanticist who defends these theories should explain why

intuitions about disagreement are confused: do ordinary speakers

have a cognitive shortcoming when they employ the concept of

disagreement? Or is the concept of disagreement itself ambiguous

or, perhaps, even incoherent? More has to be said to motivate the

confusion hypothesis. Second, though it is a common practice for

linguists to hold similar semantic blindness hypothesis,

contextualists and relativists have nonetheless the burden of

proof of showing that the unreliability of intuitions about

disagreement does not cast doubt on the reliability of the other

set of intuitions that are supposed to independently motivate the

theory (such as intuitions about the variability in truth-value of

utterances in the case of contextualism).

However, the crucial question is another one: granting the

semantic blindness hypothesis, is a revisionary explanation of the

disputes a palatable solution to the problem of faultless

disagreement? The price to pay (assuming the notion of Basic

disagreement), to account for the appearance of faultlessness, is

to explain away the appearance of disagreement. Contextualists and

relativists could, of course, reject Basic disagreement by

claiming that the appearance of disagreement could be explained by

some kind of disagreement other than Basic disagreement (see supra

fn 16). It then becomes an open question which one is more worthy.

However, if we grant Basic disagreement there is no longer any

clear advantage in an approach that focuses on the role of context

since the advertised advantage of vindicating a genuine sense of

faultless disagreement would be lost.

§4 Conclusions

The upshot is then that both contextualism and relativism in their

basic forms cannot redeem as genuine the many disputes we

continuously face in a subjective domain such as taste discourse

since these theories are committed to a revisionary stance. We

want to be clear, though, that our conclusion is not meant to be

an unconditional and unqualified rejection of contextualism and

relativism. These theories might be supported by considerations that

are different from the phenomenon of faultless disagreement.

Rather, the conclusion of our argument is conditional and

qualified: if we accept Basic disagreement, then both (basic)

contextualism and (basic) relativism can’t make sense of it and

hence they should end up being revisionary with respect to the

appearance of faultless disagreement. This conclusion justifies a

thesis of explanatory limitation for (basic) contextualism and

(basic) relativism: unless further work is done in the

contextualist and relativist field, these theories do not seem to

be able to pursue a descriptive project with respect to faultless

disagreement.

We started this paper by delineating the possible

philosophical projects that can be pursed in relation to the

problem of faultless disagreement. We can now draw some

conclusions with respect to contextualism and relativism (in their

basic forms). The (basic) contextualist and the (basic) relativist

have then two options for clarifying what philosophical project

there are engaged in: either they chose to pursue an empirical

revisionary project or a normative revisionary one. If the former,

we have argued that they have a methodological problem. In fact if

(basic) contextualism and (basic) relativism have problems in

making sense of disagreement (at least in relation to the

phenomenon of faultless disagreement), this outcome would sit

badly with their usual methodological stance, which consists in

taking semantic intuitions at face value. We thus think that

contextualists and relativists can either argue that the

unreliability of disagreement intuitions does not cast doubt on

the intuitions that can independently support their theories, or

their revisionary stance over faultless disagreement threatens the

very reliability of the data that should provide empirical support

for their very theories. If, on the other hand, (basic)

contextualists and (basic) relativists opt for a normative

revisionary project, they are committed to the view that disputes

in subjective areas of discourse are not rationally sustainable.

As a consequence, speakers should give up the idea that in

disputes of inclination opposite views are incompatible and they

should stop arguing.22 The empirical and normative revisionary

project could also be conjoined: empirical semantics could then be

used, along the lines of the Dummettian project, to call for a

revision of a trait of our subjective discourse that concerns our

mode of reasoning and disputing. This is a line of research that

could be interestingly pursued but that is, so far, alien to

current debates on contextualism and relativism.

To sum up, we think that there is a challenge to be met by

(basic) contextualists and (basic) relativists who are prone to be

22 This view fits Rovane (2012) stance towards disputes on morality. However

it is not clear what background semantic theory Rovane would accept (though her

view seems very much in line with some sort of subvaluationism).

engaged in a descriptive project on faultless disagreement, but

that there also new prospects for those theorists who are

persuaded to move to a revisionary project on faultless

disagreement.

The prospect for the converted revisionists are, if the

converted subscribe to an empirical credo, to clarify the role that

disagreement intuitions have with respect the evidential basis for

their theory and, if they subscribe to a normative credo, to assess

the consequences for reasoning and rationality in the targeted

subjective domains.

The challenge for the obstinate descripitivists is the

following. Either a different notion of disagreement is canvassed

– perhaps one merely non-doxastic in character, related to the

different attitudes and commitments that people judging P and not-

P from different contexts of evaluation would have –; or else,

pending further work for contextualists and relativists on the

rationality of the targeted disputes and on the status of the

semantic intuitions taken to provide an evidential basis for these

theories, the prospects for a contextualist or a relativist

descriptive account of faultless disagreement look bleak. An

inquiry into a different notion of disagreement would, no doubt,

be reasonable, but Basic disagreement too is definitely a

legitimate notion. With respect to that, the relativist and the

contextualist (at least when engaged in a descriptive project)

seem to have very little credible to say.23

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