Texas Motion to Dismiss

7/28/2019 Texas Motion to Dismiss

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

SHANNON PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,

Defendants.

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MEXICAN AMERICAN

LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(MALC),

Plaintiffs,

v.


Defendants.____________________________________

TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING

TASK FORCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.SA-11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR

[Lead case]

CIVIL ACTION NO.

SA-11-CA-361-OLG-JES-XR

[Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )

Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 768 Filed 06/28/13 Page 1 of 17


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MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )

JOHN T. MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.


Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )

EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Defendants Rick Perry, in his official capacity as Governor, John Steen, in his

official capacity as Secretary of State, and the State of Texas (collectively

Defendants) hereby move to dismiss all claims in this case for lack of subject



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matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). In

support of their motion, Defendants respectfully submit the following memorandum

of points and authorities.

INTRODUCTION

This is a redistricting case to prevent the implementation of electoral

districts enacted by the Texas Legislature in 2011. The Legislature has enacted

bills that repeal the 2011 plans and establish new plans for 2014 and future

elections. The Governor has signed those bills into law. As a result, the vacated

2011 plans can never be used to conduct any election. Because those plans will

never be implemented, they pose no threat of injury to the plaintiffs. It follows that

any order regarding the 2011 plans can provide no effectual relief. As far as the

defunct 2011 plans are concerned, there is no relief to grant. This case no longer

presents a live case or controversy. The Court therefore lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. The only thing left to do is dismiss.

FACTS

The plaintiffs in these consolidated cases seek declaratory and injunctive

relief to prevent Defendants from implementing bills enacted by the 82nd Texas

Legislature in 2011 to establish electoral districts for the Texas House of

Representatives (Plan H283) and the United States House of Representatives (Plan

C185).1 The pleadings invoke a variety of statutory and constitutional provisions,

1See, e.g., Plaintiff MALCs Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 50) 21 (The redistricting legislation

for the Texas House districts, H.B. 150, was signed by the Governor on June 17, 2011. The

redistricting legislation for the United States House of Representatives, S.B. 4, was passed by the

Texas Legislature on or about June 15, 2011.); Quesada Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint (Doc.



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but the plaintiffs challenge to Plans H283 and C185 rests primarily on Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution.2 On September 29, 2011, the Court entered an

injunction against implementation of Plans H283 and C185 because the plans had

not been precleared under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.3

The parties stipulated that the Courts order would be effective as a permanent

injunction, subject to being lifted by order of the Court as appropriate.4

On June 25, 2013, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in

Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12-96, 2013 WL 3184629 (U.S. June 25,

2013), reversing679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), holding that the coverage formula in

Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional and can no longer be used

as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance. Id. at *18. On June 27,

2013, the Supreme Court vacated the D.C. District Courts judgment denying

preclearance of the 2011 legislatively enacted redistricting plans and remanded the

case for further consideration in light ofShelby County. SeeTexas v. United States,

No. 12-496, 2013 WL 3213539, *1 (U.S. June 27, 2013).

On June 23, 2013, the Legislature passed new redistricting bills for the

United States House of Representatives and the Texas House of Representatives.5

In addition to enacting Plans C235 and H358, the newly enacted redistricting bills

105) 2 (Plaintiffs file this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Defendants

from using the States Plan [Plan C185] in any future elections.). 2See, e.g., Order (Doc. 285) at 516 (enumerating the claims asserted by plaintiffs).3See Order Enjoining the Implementation of Voting Changes (Doc. 380) at 4.4Id. at 5.5See Tex. S.B. 3,83d Leg., 1st C.S. (enacting Plan H358); Tex. S.B. 4,83d Leg., 1st C.S. (enacting

Plan C235).



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repealed the 2011 plans challenged in this case.6 On June 26, 2013, the Governor

signed the newly enacted redistricting bills into law. See Exhibit A ((June 26, 2013

Letter from Office of the Governor to Texas Secretary of State).

LEGAL STANDARD

Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts to adjudicate only actual

cases or controversies. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990).

This means litigants must suffer, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable

to the defendants actions, and that the federal court must be able to grant effectual

relief. See id. This case-or-controversy requirement must be satisfied at every

stage of judicial proceedings. Id. If it is not, the federal court lacks the power to

adjudicate the case and must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. E.g.,

Home Builders Assn of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.

1998).

Plaintiffs generally bear the burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction, see Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001),

including their own standing to sue, see Cobb v. Central States, 461 F.3d 632, 635

(5th Cir. 2006). When a party asserts that its own conduct has eliminated any live

case or controversy, however, it bears a heavy burden to show that the change in

circumstances makes it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could

not reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.

6See Tex. S.B. 3, art. III, 3,83d Leg., 1st C.S. (Chapter 1271 (H.B. 150), Acts of the 82nd

Legislature, Regular Session, 2011 (Article 195a-12, Vernon s Texas Civil Statutes), is repealed.);

Tex. S.B. 4 3,83d Leg., 1st C.S. (Chapter 1 (Senate Bill No. 4), Acts of the 82nd Legislature, 1st

Called Session, 2011 (Article 197j, Vernon s Texas Civil Statutes), is repealed.).



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Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Governmental entities, however, are

accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants, not self-

interested private parties. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325

(5th Cir. 2009), affd, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011).

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

As a result of the Legislatures enactment of new redistricting plans and its

repeal of the redistricting plans enacted in 2011 by the 82nd Legislature, the claims

asserted against the 2011 redistricting plans no longer present a live case or

controversy. Because the 2011 plans have been repealed, the State cannot

implement themno election is scheduled for the Texas House, the Texas Senate,

or the U.S. House of Representatives between now and the effective date of the new

plans. Nor is there any realistic threat that the State will reinstate the 2011 plans

through future legislation. Indeed, the Legislature has enacted starkly different

maps to be used in elections for the rest of the decade. As a result, the plaintiffs

alleged injury from the 2011 plans no longer exists, and this Court cannot provide

any effectual relief with respect to their claims against the 2011 plans. The case is

moot, and the Court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

The Constitution confines the judicial power to actual cases or controversies.

See U.S. Const. art. III 2. The Supreme Court has explained that the triad of

injury in fact, causation, and redressability constitutes the core of Article III's case-

or-controversy requirement. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83, 10304 (1998) (footnote omitted). To invoke the jurisdiction of a federal



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court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury

traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990); see also Iron

Arrow Honor Socy v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (per curiam) (To satisfy the

Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some

actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.). When a

lawsuit no longer presents a live controversy, the court loses subject matter

jurisdiction and can proceed no further:

Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.

Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,

the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact

and dismissing the cause.

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506,

514 (1868)).

Because this case no longer presents a live case or controversy the plaintiffs

claims against the 2011 redistricting plans are moot. [A]n actual controversy must

be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.

Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997). A case is moot

when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable

interest in the outcome. City of Erie v. Paps A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000)

(quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).

The issues presented by the plaintiffs challenge to the 2011 plans are no

longer live because the plans have no prospect of enforcement. A suit challenging

the validity of a statute generally becomes moot when the statute is repealed. In



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that event, the challenge to the statute no longer presents a live controversy, and

the case must be dismissed:

If the challenged statute no longer exists, there ordinarily can be no

real controversy as to its continuing validity, and an order enjoining itsenforcement would be meaningless. In such circumstances, it is well

settled that the case should be dismissed as moot.

Ne. Florida Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville,

Fla., 508 U.S. 656, 670 (1993); see also McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir.

2004) (Suits regarding the constitutionality of statutes become moot once the

statute is repealed.).

Similarly, the demise of the 2011 redistricting plans eliminates the plaintiffs

concrete stake in the outcome of the case because they face no realistic threat of

injury from Plans C185 or H283. To maintain a live case or controversy:

[t]he parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome

of the lawsuit. . . . . This means that, throughout the litigation, the

plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury

traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorablejudicial decision.

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 47778). For

this reason, the doctrine of mootness is often characterized as the doctrine of

standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the

commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence

(mootness).7 E.g.,Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22; cf.Lujan v.

7 This shorthand description of mootness doctrine, first expressed in Monaghan, Constitutional

Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973), is not comprehensive in the

sense that it does not reflect certain exceptions to mootness, seeFriends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw

Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000), none of which vest the Court with jurisdiction in

this case.



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Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that Article III standing

requires the plaintiff to identify a concrete and imminent invasion of a legally

protected interest that is neither conjectural nor hypothetical); Ashwander v.

Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)

(The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who

fails to show that he is injured by its operation.). Because the claims asserted by

all plaintiffs are directed at legislation that has now been repealed and replaced,

Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they are likely to be harmed by the challenged

redistricting plans. Plaintiffs inability to identify any threat of injury deprives

them of a concrete stake in the outcome of this case, rendering the case moot and

divesting this Court of subject matter jurisdiction.8

The fact that the Texas Constitution postpones the effective date of the newly

enacted redistricting bills9 does not save this case from mootness for at least two

reasons. First, the repeal is automatic. No further action is necessary before the

new redistricting plans take effect and the old redistricting plans are repealed. The

effective date will come, and the 2011 redistricting mapsthe maps at issue in this

casewill cease to exist. Second, there are no election dates for the Texas House,

8 Plaintiffs claims for attorneys fees are insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy

where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 480 (citingDiamond v.Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 7071 (1986)). [A] determination of mootness neither precludes nor is

precluded by an award of attorneys fees. The attorneys fees question turns instead on a wholly

independent consideration: whether plaintiff is a prevailing party. Murphy v. Fort Worth Ind. Sch.

Dist., 334 F.3d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (quoting Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 120 (5th

Cir.1980)).9See TEX.CONST. art. III, 39 (No law passed by the Legislature, except the general appropriation

act, shall take effect or go into force until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which

it was enacted, unless the Legislature shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to

each House, otherwise direct . . . .).



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the Texas Senate, or the U.S. House of Representatives between now and the

effective date of the newly enacted redistricting plans.

It follows that this Court can no longer provide any effectual relief with

respect to claims against the 2011 redistricting plans. The case or controversy

requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution prohibits federal courts

from considering questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case

before them. C&H Nationwide, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Texas NA, 208 F.3d 490, 493

(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971)).A case no

longer presents a live case or controversy, and thus becomes moot, when it is

impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.

Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013).

The constitutionally delayed effective date of the 2013 redistricting bills

cannot sustain an Article III case or controversy because it does not change the fact

that the 2011 plans will never be implemented.10

The fact that the challenged

statutes have been repealed provides an absolute assurance that the conduct sought

to be enjoinedimplementation of Plans C185 and H283will not occur.

To be sure, a party urging mootness based on voluntary cessation of the

challenged conduct bears a heavy burden to demonstrate that it is absolutely

clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to

10 Even if the effective date of SB 3 and SB 4 somehow preserved an Article III case or controversy,

the case is still moot, and dismissal is required, because the Court cannot provide any relief on the

claims asserted. See, e.g., First Indiana Federal Savings Bank v. F.D.I.C., 964 F.2d 503, 507 (5th

Cir. 1992) (Even if First Indianas claims constitute a case or controversy under Article III of the

Constitution, those claims should be dismissed for prudential reasons because there is no practical

purpose in requiring their adjudication on the merits. Irrespective of the abstract validity of any of

First Indianas claims against Old United, there are no set of circumstances under which First

Indiana can recover any money or property as a result of those claims.) (footnotes omitted).



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occur. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. But a governmental entitys

conclusive abandonment of the challenged policy is sufficient to demonstrate that

the threat of injury has abated, even when the change in policy is not accomplished

by a statutory repeal or amendment. See, e.g., Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (holding

that the TDCJ directors affidavit explaining a revision to the policy in question was

sufficient to establish that the plaintiff would no longer be subject to the challenged

restrictions on attendance at religious services); Coalition of Airline Pilots Assn v.

F.A.A., 370 F.3d 1184, (D.C. Cir. 2004) ([T]he agencies commitment to draft new

regulations that will provide additional administrative review proceduresa

commitment made both to this court and in the formal entry in the TSA rulemaking

docketsprovides sufficient assurance that the agencies will never return to [the]

allegedly unlawful procedures.). Government entities are entitled to a

presumption of good faith when a change in policy eliminates the case or

controversy. See Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325 (Without evidence to the contrary, we

assume that formally announced changes to official governmental policy are not

mere litigation posturing.).

The Legislatures formal repeal of the statutes at issue in this case

demonstrates beyond any doubt that the State will not reanimate the challenged

redistricting plans. With no prospect that the 2011 plans will be used to conduct

elections, any order enjoining their use or declaring them unlawful would serve no

purpose, as it would not change the plaintiffs position. Because ruling on the

validity of the repealed 2011 plans can provide no relief to the parties, any such



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ruling would constitute an advisory opinion, which the federal courts lack power to

issue. E.g., Prieser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) ([A] federal court has

neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot

affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. (quoting North Carolina v.

Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971))).

This case no longer presents a live controversy because the Legislature has

repealed the redistricting plans challenged by the plaintiffs. The statutes that

created Plans C185 and H283 will not take effect. Those plans will not be used to

conduct any election. Any order to prevent their implementation would be an

advisory opinion. This Court lacks jurisdiction. The case should be dismissed as

moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the case should be dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Dated: June 28, 2013 Respectfully submitted.

GREG ABBOTT

Attorney General of Texas

DANIEL T. HODGE

First Assistant Attorney General

/s/ David C. MattaxDAVID C. MATTAX

Texas Bar No. 13201600

Deputy Attorney General

for Defense Litigation

J. REED CLAY, JR.

Special Assistant and Senior Counsel



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to the Attorney General

PATRICK K. SWEETEN

Chief, Special Litigation Division

ANGELA COLMENEROAssistant Attorney General

MATTHEW H. FREDERICK

Assistant Solicitor General

P.O. Box 12548, Capitol Station

Austin, TX 78711-2548

(512) 463-0150

(512) 936-0545 (fax)

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF

TEXAS, RICK PERRY, AND JOHN

STEEN



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this filing was sent on June 28,

2013, via the Courts electronic notification system and/or email to the following

counsel of record:

DAVID RICHARDS

Richards, Rodriguez & Skeith LLP

816 Congress Avenue, Suite 1200

Austin, TX 78701

512-476-0005

davidr@rrsfirm.com

RICHARD E. GRAY, III

Gray & Becker, P.C.

900 West Avenue, Suite 300

Austin, TX 78701

512-482-0061/512-482-0924 (facsimile)

Rick.gray@graybecker.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

PEREZ, DUTTON, TAMEZ, HALL,

ORTIZ, SALINAS, DEBOSE, and

RODRIGUEZ

JOSE GARZA

Law Office of Jose Garza7414 Robin Rest Dr.

San Antonio, Texas 78209

210-392-2856

garzpalm@aol.com

MARK W. KIEHNE

mkiehne@lawdcm.com

RICARDO G. CEDILLO

rcedillo@lawdcm.com

Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza

McCombs Plaza755 Mulberry Ave., Ste. 500

San Antonio, TX 78212

210-822-6666/210-822-1151 (facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN

AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS

GERALD H. GOLDSTEIN

ggandh@aol.com

DONALD H. FLANARY, III

donflanary@hotmail.com

Goldstein, Goldstein and Hilley

310 S. St. Marys Street

San Antonio, TX 78205-4605

210-226-1463/210-226-8367 (facsimile)

PAUL M. SMITH, MICHAEL B.

DESANCTIS, JESSICA RING

AMUNSON

Jenner & Block LLP

1099 New York Ave., NW

Washington, D.C. 20001

202-639-6000

J. GERALD HEBERT

191 Somervelle Street, # 405

Alexandria, VA 22304

703-628-4673hebert@voterlaw.com

JESSE GAINES

P.O. Box 50093

Fort Worth, TX 76105

817-714-9988

gainesjesse@ymail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS

QUESADA, MUNOZ, VEASEY,

HAMILTON, KING and JENKINS



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NINA PERALES

nperales@maldef.org

MARISA BONO

mbono@maldef.org

Mexican American Legal Defense

and Education Fund110 Broadway, Suite 300


210-224-5476/210-224-5382 (facsimile)

MARK ANTHONY SANCHEZ

masanchez@gws-law.com

ROBERT W. WILSON

rwwilson@gws-law.com

Gale, Wilson & Sanchez, PLLC

115 East Travis Street, Ste. 1900


210-222-8899/210-222-9526 (facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS LATINO

REDISTRICTING TASK FORCE,

CARDENAS, JIMENEZ, MENENDEZ,

TOMACITA AND JOSE OLIVARES,

ALEJANDRO AND REBECCA ORTIZ

JOHN T. MORRIS

5703 Caldicote St.

Humble, TX 77346281-852-6388

JOHN T. MORRIS, PRO SE

MAX RENEA HICKS

Law Office of Max Renea Hicks

101 West Sixth Street Suite 504

Austin, TX 78701

512-480-8231/512/480-9105 (facsimile)

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS CITYOF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX

SERNA, BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY

F. LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE

ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE

RODRIGUEZ, MILTON GERARD

WASHINGTON, and SANDRA SERNA

LUIS ROBERTO VERA, JR.

Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. &

Associates

1325 Riverview Towers

San Antonio, Texas 78205-2260

210-225-3300irvlaw@sbcglobal.net

GEORGE JOSEPH KORBEL

Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc.

1111 North Main


210-212-3600

korbellaw@hotmail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-

PLAINTIFF LEAGUE OF UNITED

LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS

ROLANDO L. RIOS

Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios

115 E Travis Street, Suite 1645


210-222-2102

rrios@rolandorioslaw.com

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR-

PLAINTIFF HENRY CUELLAR

GARY L. BLEDSOE

Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe

316 W. 12th Street, Ste. 307

Austin, TX 78701

512-322-9992/512-322-0840 (facsimile)

garybledsoe@sbcglobal.net

ATTORNEY FOR INTERVENOR-

PLAINTIFFS TEXAS STATE

CONFERENCE OF NAACPBRANCHES, TEXAS LEGISLATIVE

BLACK CAUCUS, EDDIE BERNICE

JOHNSON, SHEILA JACKSON-

LEE, ALEXANDER GREEN,

HOWARD JEFFERSON, BILL

LAWSON, and JUANITA WALLACE



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STEPHEN E. MCCONNICO

smcconnico@scottdoug.com

SAM JOHNSON

sjohnson@scottdoug.com

S. ABRAHAM KUCZAJ, III

akuczaj@scottdoug.comScott, Douglass & McConnico

One American Center

600 Congress Ave., 15th Floor

Austin, TX 78701

512-495-6300/512-474-0731 (facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS CITY

OF AUSTIN, TRAVIS COUNTY, ALEX

SERNA, BALAKUMAR PANDIAN,

BEATRICE SALOMA, BETTY F.

LOPEZ, CONSTABLE BRUCE

ELFANT, DAVID GONZALEZ, EDDIE

RODRIGUEZ, ELIZA ALVARADO,

JOSEY MARTINEZ, JUANITA

VALDEZ-COX, LIONOR SOROLA-

POHLMAN, MILTON GERARD

WASHINGTON, NINA JO BAKER, and

SANDRA SERNA

CHAD W. DUNN

chad@brazilanddunn.comK. SCOTT BRAZIL

scott@brazilanddunn.com

Brazil & Dunn

4201 FM 1960 West, Suite 530

Houston, TX 77068

281-580-6310/281-580-6362 (facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR INTERVENOR-

DEFENDANTS TEXAS DEMOCRATIC

PARTY and BOYD RICHIE

VICTOR L. GOODE

Asst. Gen. Counsel, NAACP

4805 Mt. Hope Drive

Baltimore, MD 21215-5120

410-580-5120/410-358-9359 (facsimile)

vgoode@naacpnet.org

ATTORNEY FOR TEXAS STATE

CONFERENCE OF NAACP

BRANCHES

ROBERT NOTZON

Law Office of Robert S. Notzon

1507 Nueces Street

Austin, TX 78701

512-474-7563/512-474-9489 (facsimile)

robert@notzonlaw.com

ALLISON JEAN RIGGS

ANITA SUE EARLS

Southern Coalition for Social Justice

1415 West Highway 54, Ste. 101

Durham, NC 27707

919-323-3380/919-323-3942 (facsimile)

anita@southerncoalition.org

ATTORNEYS FOR TEXAS STATE

CONFERENCE OF NAACPBRANCHES, EARLS, LAWSON,

WALLACE, and JEFFERSON

DONNA GARCIA DAVIDSON

PO Box 12131

Austin, TX 78711

512-775-7625/877-200-6001 (facsimile)

donna@dgdlawfirm.com

FRANK M. REILLY

Potts & Reilly, L.L.P.

P.O. Box 4037Horseshoe Bay, TX 78657

512-469-7474/512-469-7480 (facsimile)

reilly@pottsreilly.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

STEVE MUNISTERI



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Via Email

JOAQUIN G. AVILA

P.O. Box 33687

Seattle, WA 98133

206-724-3731/206-398-4261 (facsimile)jgavotingrights@gmail.com

ATTORNEYS FOR MEXICAN

AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS

KAREN M. KENNARD

2803 Clearview Drive

Austin, TX 78703

(512) 974-2177/512-974-2894 (facsimile)

karen.kennard@ci.austin.tx.us

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

CITY OF AUSTIN

DAVID ESCAMILLA

Travis County Asst. Attorney

P.O. Box 1748

Austin, TX 78767

(512) 854-9416

david.escamilla@co.travis.tx.us

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

TRAVIS COUNTY

/s/ David C. Mattax

DAVID C. MATTAX



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Case 5:11-cv-00360-OLG-JES-XR Document 768-1 Filed 06/28/13 Page 1 of 6


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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

SAN ANTONIO DIVISION

SHANNON PEREZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.


Defendants.

____________________________________

MEXICAN AMERICAN

LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(MALC),

Plaintiffs,

v.


Defendants.____________________________________

TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING

TASK FORCE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY,

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.5:11-CV-360-OLG-JES-XR

[Lead case]

CIVIL ACTION NO.

5:11-CV-361-OLG-JES-XR

[Consolidated case]

CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )



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MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )

JOHN T. MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.


Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

____________________________________ )

EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

RICK PERRY, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

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CIVIL ACTION NO.


[Consolidated case]

ORDER

Now before the Court is Defendants Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction. After considering the motion, the Court is of the opinion that,

for the reasons stated therein, it should be GRANTED.



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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

Defendants Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is hereby

GRANTED.

SIGNED on this _______ day of ____________, 2013.

_________________________________

JERRY E. SMITH

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

_________________________________

ORLANDO L. GARCIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

_________________________________

XAVIER RODRIGUEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


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