Trends in Terrorism and the Architecture of TRIA
Peter Chalk
Associate Political Scientist
June 20, 2005
National Symposium on Terrorism Risk Insurance
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GWOT Has Decisively Limited Environmental and Strategic Context al-Qaeda Operates In
• Al-Qaeda remains principal focus of concern about imported terrorist threats to the United States
• Attacks on Taliban in Afghanistan have led to loss of al-Qaeda safe haven
– Scattering core of leadership to locales in Middle East and throughout Central, South, Southeast Asia
• Unremitting campaign has led to capture/elimination of many al-Qaeda’s critical field commanders and functionaries
• Focus on staunching international flow of money has denuded group’s ability to plan and execute large-scale, complex attacks
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In Fact, GWOT Successes Have Led al-Qaeda to Reconfigure Itself
Late-1990s: Monolithic Structure
Now: “Movement of Movements”
• Centrally controlled organization
• Strategic assaults executed by inner core of jihadist activists
• Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric organization
• Tactically oriented strikes done by affiliated cells (individuals) and when opportunity arises
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Based on Changes, We Postulate Foural-Qaeda Trends for the Future
Now: “Movement of Movements”
• Nebulous, segmented, and polycentric organization
• Tactically oriented strikes done by affiliated cells (individuals) and when opportunity arises
1. Continuing interest in hard targets but increased focus on soft, civilian-centric venues
2. Ongoing emphasis on economic attacks
3. Continued reliance on suicide strikes
4. Desire to use CBRN weapons but little abilityto execute large-scale conventional attacks
Future Trends
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1. Continuing Interest in Hard Targets but Growing Focus on Soft Venues (1)
• Focus on hard targets underscores credentials as meaningful force
• Ongoing presence of Egyptian Islamic Jihad helps al-Qaeda
• Numerous attacks on hard targets since 9/11 shows importance to al-Qaeda
– American-led Coalition headquarters in Baghdad (2003)
– UN compound in Baghdad (2003)
– Central office of Saudi General Security Service (2004)
UN Compound in Baghdad, Before and After
Aftermath of Attack on SGSS
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1. Continuing Interest in Hard Targets but Growing Focus on Soft Venues (2)
• Have largely unimpeded access and large concentrations of people
– Yielding significant body count
• Provide greater scope for locally based cells and supporters
– Yielding useful “force multiplier” that puts al-Qaeda in all places at all times
• Dramatic rise in post-9/11 period
– Nightclubs (Bali, 2002)
– Synagogues (Djerba Tunisia, 2002)
– Hotels (Marriott in Jakarta, 2003)
– Public transport (Madrid, 2004)
Attack on Bali Nightclub (2002)
Madrid Train Attack (2004)
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2. Ongoing Emphasis on Economic Attacks
• For Bin Laden, 9/11 exposed U.S. as “paper tiger” on verge of financial ruin and total collapse
• Attacks underscored vulnerability of highly complex critical infrastructure
• Has focused on venues liable to generate disruptive commercial effects
– Oil installations
– Banks
– Shipping
• Al-Qaeda would like to pursue its economic war against the United States on American soil
Attack on MV Limburg off Yemen
(2002)
Attack on HSBC Bankin Istanbul
(2003)
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3. Continued Reliance on Suicide Strikes
• Suicide attacks across Europe, Asia, and Middle East have killed over 900 since 9/11
– Nightclubs, restaurants, hotels, housing compounds
• No attacks since in U.S.
– Difficult to get operatives into U.S.
– Hard to (externally) indoctrinate/ motivating cadres in place
– Perhaps not part of image wants to convey in U.S. context
• But U.S. well-suited to attacks
– Lots of venues, lack of law enforcement expertise, highly risk-averse nature of society
Damage to Hotel in Casablanca (2003)
Damage to House in Riyadh (2003)
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4. Desire for CBRN Attacks but Little Ability toExecute Large-Scale Conventional Attacks
• Al-Qaeda has active interest in large-scale CBRN attacks
– In 1998 Bin Laden asserted that acquiring CBRN for mass killing is religious duty for all Muslims
– Documents and discs recovered in Afghanistan underscore focus on mass casualties
– Explored possibility of obtaining CBRN from Russia, Czech Republic and North Korea
• But no evidence Al-Qaeda gotten CBRN for mass casualty attacks
• Most likely scenarios are radiological releases and low-tech biological attacks
“Dirty Bomb” Suspect, Joseph
Padilla (2002)
Videotapes Describing
Training on How to Release
Cyanide Gas into Buildings (2002)
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The Anti-Globalism (AG) Movement HasTaken on a More Coherent Worldview
• Opposes concentrations of state and corporate power
• Challenges the intrinsic qualities of capitalism
• Forcefully rejects argument that trans-border trade, investment, technology, info flow enhance human condition
• Rank and file activists generally have not engaged in direct violence against the state
Cancun (2003)
Genoa (2001)
Seattle (2000)
London, May Day (2002)
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Real Threat of AG Movement Lies in ImpactIt’s Having on Three Homegrown Groups
Anarchists
Environmental Extremists
Far Right
AG Movement
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What Threat Does Anarchism Pose?
• Radicals increasingly prepared to attack symbols of state order
• Animated by AG assertion that international trade/commerce is mask to hide/covertly advance U.S. global economic, cultural, and political power
• Major danger of AG-inspired anarchism is radicalization of fringe elements toward terrorist designs
– Already occurred in Italy
• In U.S., anarchists have potential to influence more civilian-centric violence
Black Bloc in Sacramento (2003)
Black Bloc in D.C. (2003)
Black Bloc in Chicago(2000)
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What Threat Does the Far Right Pose?
• Right-wing/xenophobic militias have emerged, championing combo of revolutionary, racist, anti-Semitic doctrines
• AG movement has sharpened and galvanized imperatives
– Dislike of increased state power and belief that increasing internationalism favors Jewish capitalists
• Adoption of AG rhetoric may reflect convergence with parts of far left
– Already occurring in France and Germany
• Far right has demonstrated penchant for catastrophic violence
– Bombing of Murrah building
Neo-Nazi “Taxpayers Against Terrorism” Rally, Washington (2002)
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What Threat Do Environmental Extremists Pose?
Car dealership, West Covina,
California (2003)
• Environmental extremism largely reflected in guise of ELF– In 2004, FBI designated “eco-
terrorism” as number one militant threat from inside own borders
• ELF attacks have caused an estimated $35–$45 million in property damage
• Scale and focus of attacks likely to expand due to growing nexus with AG movement– Focus now is directly on
globalization and its negative impact on the environment
– Multinational corporations seen at heart of “unrestrained” capitalism increasingly targeted for action
ArsonFire in
Maryland(2004)
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Questions and Answers
• What is the evolving threat from transnational terrorism?
• What are the implications for terrorism insurance?
• What is the evolving threat from domestic terrorism
• What are the implications for terrorism insurance?
• Attacks on al-Qaeda have led it to reconfigure itself, suggesting four trends for future threat
Questions
• Trends expose weaknesses in terrorism insurance market
• Spreading anti-globalism movement is having impact on three homegrown entities
• Increasing homegrown threat against private-sector targets reveals large gap in terrorism insurance
Answers
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Assaults Perpetrated by a Purely DomesticEntity Are Not Covered by TRIA
• TRIA defines certified actions as those “carried out by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign source person or foreign interest”
• Many insurers are making domestic terrorism insurance available
– Most insureds who purchase TRIA have purchased it
– But take-up rates will be lower than for TRIA-covered attacks
– Catastrophic domestic attack carries with it elevated risk of insolvency for insurers involved
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Assaults Perpetrated by a Purely DomesticEntity Are Not Covered by TRIA
• TRIA defines certified actions as those “carried out by an individual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign source person or foreign interest”
• Many insurers are making domestic terrorism insurance available
– Most insureds who purchase TRIA have purchased it
– But take-up rates will be lower than for TRIA-covered attacks
– Catastrophic domestic attack carries with it elevated risk of insolvency for insurers involved
Represents big gap in current system for managing/mitigating financial risk of terrorist attack in U.S.
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Practical Application of Distinction BetweenDomestic/International Attack Is Difficult
• Al-Qaeda routinely relies on affiliates to carry out assaults—especially citizens/established residents of targeted country
• If U.S. national carries out bombing on U.S. soil, would this be domestic or international terrorist act?
– If an American inspired but not trained, financed or advised by jihadist cause commits an attack, is it covered by TRIA?
• Perpetrators of 2001 anthrax attacks were never identified and thus not possible to certify attacks
– If they occurred today and were large enough to trigger TRIA, they could lead to insolvency for some insurance companies . . . if not certified
• Such confusion will not help recovery from attack