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Chapter 18
Military and Humanitarian Actors
KarstenFriis,1
Introduction
‘It was easier under the Taliban’ – these words come from the head of a leading Western
humanitarian NGO in Afghanistan, complaining how the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) constantly undermined their work and their security. She claimed that things
had been calmer prior the Western intervention and that the security situation worsened as
more soldiers were deployed.2 Such outbursts, while possibly inflated, reflect the frustration
often felt by humanitarians in encounters with the military.
The armed forces, it is often held, undermine the core humanitarian values of independence,
impartiality and neutrality and politicize aid by doing humanitarian tasks in an attempt to win
‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. As a result humanitarian actors are put at risk as
well (Fast 2010; Collinson and Elhawary 2012). The military and the humanitarians should be
kept strictly apart and not interact, it is argued. The military, for its part, has been less
restrictive about interaction but tends to view the humanitarian NGO community with some
suspicion.
1 Thanks to Alex Beadle, Marit Glad, Mads Harlem, John Karlsrud, Stian Kjeksrud, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud
and the editors for advice and comments. A particular thanks to Susan Høivik for assistance on linguistics and
style.
2 See ‘- Lettere under Taliban’ (‘- Easier under the Taliban’), ABC News Norway, 28 December 2009,, .
Available HTTP: < http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/091228/lettere-under-taliban> (accessed 5 June 2013).
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How to understand the nature and intensity of the tensions between the military and the
humanitarians? Are they a result of the nature and roles of the two sets of actors, or of the
operational context? Some have highlighted the internal cultural and national differences
between these strange bedfellows (Winslow 2005, Ruffa and Vennesson, forthcoming) – they
may have little in common except being foreign interveners in the same territory.
Humanitarians may see the military as composed of hierarchically rigid, right-wing, gung-ho
men who seek quick fixes and lack cultural competence. The military, on the other hand, may
regard humanitarians as naïve, idealistic peaceniks, operating in a chaotic myriad of loosely
connected NGOs, with scant real impact.
While such prejudices probably explain some of the challenges, they cannot explain why such
conflicts seem to be increasing. Both the military and the humanitarians have proliferated in
numbers, missions and tasks (Berdal and Economides 2007; Barnett 2011), perhaps making
overlap and clashes more or less unavoidable. But this cannot help us to understand why these
clashes differ in intensity from intervention to intervention, place to place. One argument
offered is that more volatile the security situation, the more strained the relationship tends to
be (IASC 2008: 9). This makes sense, but is rather simplistic and does not take all variations
into account.
This chapter seeks to bring some clarity by offering a systematic account of the relationship
between the military and humanitarians. Taking different kinds of military missions as a
starting point, we can systematically compare military/humanitarian relationships from case to
case. Such an approach might not explain the different kinds of challenges, but it should
contextualize them, helping us to frame the discussion better. Importantly, the chapter deals
solely with the relationship between humanitarians and official, foreign intervening militaries.
The relationship between national armed forces and humanitarians is not addressed, nor that
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between militia groups and humanitarians. Further, the chapter focuses on the armed forces’
relations with humanitarian actors, not development agencies, political activists,
intergovernmental organizations, governmental agencies or other civilians operating in the
field.
Background
The boom in both humanitarian relief efforts and international peace and stabilization
operations in the 1990s marks the beginning of today’s military–humanitarian relationships.
The 1990s witnessed a significant broadening of the security sector, where war and violence
were regarded as being associated with poverty and weak states (Slim 1995, Duffield 2007).
In this period the humanitarian and military relationship remained relatively positive as they
were regarded as supporting the same ends, perhaps best illustrated during the Kosovo crisis
when the humanitarians let NATO take charge of the refugee camps without much protest
(Barnett 2011: 189). This changed after the 9/11 2001 attacks on the United States, with the
subsequent ‘war on terror’ and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Western military
forces’ approach in these operations became more explicitly political, aimed at regime change
and counter-terrorism. Unsurprisingly, this led to the more strained relationship with the
humanitarians as illustrated above. As troops are leaving both Iraq and Afghanistan many
observers consider the era of larger state-building military interventions to be over (Luján
2013) and with it perhaps also some of these contentions. At the same time though, the UN
continues to run a record-high number of peacekeeping missions. In some cases, such as in
the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and in Mali the peacekeepers are
confronting relatively strong armed resistance. The potential for new conflicts with
humanitarians is therefore present. We therefore still need to be able to grasp the nature of the
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conflicts. Let us begin by briefly revisiting the legal foundations, international humanitarian
law, and ask if the Geneva Conventions can guide us on this.
Legal foundations
The responsibilities of armed forces towards civilians and non-combatants were first specified
in international law in the Geneva Convention of 1864. Further clarification came with the
Fourth Convention of 1949 (‘The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War’), and the additional 1977 Protocols (‘Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts’ and ‘Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts’).
The relationship between the warring parties and humanitarian actors is addressed many
places in the Conventions, as in Article 70 of the First Convention:
If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict,
other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies […], relief
actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any
adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties
concerned in such relief actions.
Similar formulations are found in the Fourth Protocol, Articles 10, 23, 55 and 59.3
The Geneva Conventions underline the responsibility of the warring parties in ensuring that
the basic needs of the civilian population are provided for; they also state that humanitarian
actors require the consent of the warring parties to engage. Certain provisions regulate the
foundations for such consent, but it is not crystal-clear on what grounds humanitarian aid
3 The Geneva Conventions are available on the ICRC website. Available HTTP: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-
and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp> (accessed 18 June 2013).
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agencies may legitimately be granted or refused access. This need for consent has provoked
contention between militaries and humanitarians, and the principle of consent is sometimes
overlooked by humanitarian actors when they call for respect of the humanitarian space.
Moreover, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Geneva Conventions apply only in
cases of armed conflict. In many military operations today there may be a volatile security
situation but not armed conflict as such. Defining something as an armed conflict involves a
subjective assessment, but the involvement of armed forces is one indicator, as is the level of
organization of the belligerents and their political versus for instance criminal ambitions. The
alternative legal framework to regulate the armed forces’ behaviour is the International
Human Rights Law (IHRL). In contrast to the IHL, the IHRL applies to peacetime. However,
by applying IHRL the military operations would be guided according to international law
enforcement principles, which may not always be suited for military operations. For instance,
in an armed conflict regulated by IHL, a certain level of collateral damage may be tolerable in
offensive operations, something which is unacceptable in peacetime when IHRL applies.4
Furthermore, the IHRL does not address the military-humanitarian relationship. In practice, it
appears that troops tend to refer to IHL as their guidance – even if not always applicable – as
that is what they are trained for and are familiar with (Larsen 2012).
In short, international law appears to be insufficient if we wish to understand all the various
shapes and forms the relationship between military and humanitarians may take. An
4 See Siobhán Wills ‘The law applicable to peacekeepers deployed in situations where there is no armed conflict’,
EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law. Available HTTP: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
law-applicable-to-peacekeepers-deployed-in-situations-where-there-is-no-armed-conflict/> (accessed 15 May
2013).
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alternative approach is to analyse the relationship according to the nature of the intervention.
To this end, the next section offers a taxonomy of various forms of military operations or
tasks.
Taxonomy
The taxonomy of international military–humanitarian relationships presented below and in
Table 1 attempts to simplify complex relationships into ideal-type categories. It takes various
forms of military operations or tasks as the starting point, showing how the challenges as
regards humanitarians differ from case to case. Note that these are ideal types: most missions
incorporate a range of the categories below or evolve through several of them.
Logistical Support
The military logistical apparatus has increasingly been called upon to assist humanitarian
relief operations. Military organizations usually have unique assets at their disposal, regarding
transport in particular. In such operations, the armed forces do not have any security role, and
are fully at the disposal of the humanitarians. Further, according to the ‘Guidelines on the Use
of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines’, foreign
military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable
civilian alternative.5
Even these operations have faced challenges. Firstly, the nation receiving aid may be reluctant
to welcome foreign military units – as in Sri Lanka, where the government accused India of
military support to the Tamil areas after an (according to India) humanitarian air-drop;6 in
5 The ‘Oslo Guidelines’ are available at HTTP <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-use-military-and-
civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief-oslo-guidelines> (accessed 10 June 2013).
6 See ‘The use of military in humanitarian relief’, Frederick C. Cuny, November 1989. Available HTTP:
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/laptop/humanrelief.html> (accessed 6 June 2013).
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Aceh, where foreign troops were accused of espionage;7 and when Myanmar refused aid from
US warships after Cyclone Nargis.8 Military units are often regarded with greater suspicion
and political bias than other actors. Secondly, the ‘last resort’ principle may be circumvented,
because states may wish to use military assets to legitimize their military presence in the
region. US efforts after the Indian Ocean tsunami have often been described in such terms
(Wheeler and Harmer 2006: 7), as have various contributions to Pakistan, Haiti and others
(Metcalfe et al. 2012: 15). Practical coordination represents a third challenge, as in cases
where the UN cluster system not is fully functional or where many national military forces
engage simultaneously. Overlap, miscommunication and ineffectiveness may result (Metcalfe
et al. 2012: 16-17).
Escort
Escort operations aim to offer protection to humanitarian agencies operating in an insecure
environment. In general, humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts, but in exceptional
circumstances this may be a necessary ‘last resort’ to enable humanitarian action. And here
the military does have a security mandate: to protect the aid workers. However, that mandate
is restricted to the protection of the agencies; the troops are not to pursue attackers or seek to
create general security in the area.
The most commonly referred standard for such operations are the ‘MCDA Guidelines’,9
which stress that the military is to be under civilian control and engage only on request from
7 See ‘Foreign aid as a Trojan horse for proselytising and espionage’, Asia News, 1 December 2005. Available
HTTP: <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=2321> (accessed 6 June 2013).
8 See ‘Burma refuses aid from U.S. warships for cyclone victims’, CBC News, 21 May 2008. Available HTTP: <
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2008/05/21/burma-us.html> (accessed 6 June 2013).
9 Available at HTTP: < http://www.coe-dmha.org/Media/Guidance/3MCDAGuidelines.pdf> (accessed 30 May
2013).
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the UN humanitarian coordinator. The humanitarian agencies decide where to go and what to
do at destinations. During convoy, however, the military commander is usually in charge, and
may halt an aid convoy if the situation is deemed too risky.
Such operations entail challenges. Firstly, nations offering military support tend to be
selective as to where they offer it, usually coinciding with a crisis in which they have political
or security stakes. Secondly, the fact that escort is needed normally indicates that the intrusion
may not be welcome, and that resistance is likely. The moment force is used, troops may
become entangled in a protracted conflict. Hence, even if an armed escort is initially
successful in providing aid, it may also pull the troops into continued clashes with armed
groups, as the USA experienced in Somalia in 1993. As a result also humanitarians may be
affected. Thirdly, there appears to be an increase in the use of armed escorts. This push comes
from within the UN system, from those responsible for the safety of UN staff, such as the
Department for Safety & Security. Humanitarian agencies outside the UN tend to be critical to
this development as they regard it as creating dependencies and causing unnecessary
militarization of humanitarian aid – which also impede on them.10
Traditional Peacekeeping
Traditional peacekeeping refers primarily to post-conflict ceasefire monitoring operations on
an inter-state border, like UNIFIL in Lebanon, but also along demarcation lines, like
UNFICYP in Cyprus. While the mandates may differ, the point is that role and responsibility
of the military are relatively limited.
The armed forces have a narrow security mandate in terms of monitoring, for example, a de-
militarized border zone. They may support and protect humanitarians operating in this zone,
but will not go beyond this area of operation. This is a static and defensive mandate, where
10 Interview with NGO worker, 2013.
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the military respond only when fired upon, for self-protection. Until the 1990s, troops rarely
had the weaponry necessary to enforce their mandate, and had to rely on the trust and support
of the (former) warring parties. This approach ended with the humiliation of the UN troops in
Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, and, notably, the hostage-taking of UN peacekeepers in
Sierra Leone in 2000. Today’s peacekeepers are better equipped, also where the mandates are
basically unchanged, as with UNIFIL II.
In these cases humanitarians and peacekeepers tend to operate side by side. They may
communicate and exchange information but have few overlapping tasks and responsibilities.
The major challenges have occurred when peacekeeper contingents have initiated Civil-
Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities of a humanitarian nature without coordinating with
humanitarians operating in the same area (Ruffa and Vennesson, forthcoming). Peacekeepers
have also sometimes been tasked by the Security Council to provide humanitarian assistance,
as during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon 1982–85. Generally though, there are relatively
few reports of friction between militaries and humanitarians in traditional peacekeeping.
Protection of Civilians (PoC)
After the UN failure to prevent the genocides in Srebrenica and in Rwanda in the 1990s,
peacekeepers and other intervening troops in conflict zones have been increasingly mandated
to protect civilians. Failure to protect civilians undermines not only the credibility of the
peacekeeping operation, but also the UN itself. For the last decade or so, basically all UN
peacekeeping operations have been given PoC tasks as part of their mandate, usually worded
as ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. Sometimes a protection
mandate may be the single task of the troops, such as MINURCAT and EUFOR in Chad in
2008. Their responsibility concerned solely refugees from neighbouring Darfur in Sudan, not
the population in Chad (Karlsrud and da Costa 2013 ).
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PoC is not conducted by peacekeepers alone. It is often described as a shared task between
military and humanitarian actors (Metcalfe 2012). The first set of challenges is therefore
related to coordination. There exists no authoritative definition of PoC in the UN or anywhere
else (Holt et al. 2009; Mühlen-Schulte 2013), but the definition commonly referred to by
civilian agencies reads: ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the
individual in accordance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law,
and refugee law’.11 This broad definition is not limited to physical protection, but may also
include a range of humanitarian efforts. For humanitarians PoC means looking beyond
people’s immediate material needs to wider questions of personal safety, dignity and integrity,
both in the short term and in the long term (Slim and Bonwick 2005). At the same time the
military has usually preferred to stick to the more narrow approach of physical protection. As
a result PoC have tended to be a number of parallel processes rather a coherent approach. PoC
has thereby suffered in terms of sustainability and efficacy (Holt et al. 2009).
In an attempt to remedy these shortcomings, the UN has more recently begun to expand the
peacekeepers’ understanding of PoC, by, for instance, organize it in three tiers: protection
through political process; providing protection from physical violence; and establishing a
protective environment.12 Despite such efforts, the UN is unlikely to ever achieve a unified
coherent definition or approach to PoC. Differing mandates, organizational interests and
agendas among UN organizations (DPKO, OCHA, UNHCR etc.) work against such
coherence (Stensland and Sending 2013). The UN will probably continue to leave it largely to
11 See HTTP: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/protection> (accessed 25 May 2013)
12 See ‘UN Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations’. HTTP: <http://www.peacekeeping.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/100129-
DPKO-DFS-POC-Operational-Concept.pdf.> (accessed 18 June 2013)
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each mission to develop a coherent approach to PoC, and as a minimum expect troops to
provide physical protection of civilians, as this concerns the legitimacy of the UN itself.
Even if PoC for the military should be limited to physical protection, the task remains
challenging. Firstly, the armed forces have struggled to implement PoC into an operational
concept in the absence of a doctrine.13 A military logic usually presupposes an end-state or a
defined objective – but when is ‘protection’ achieved? What is ‘enough’ protection? Such
uncertainties may cause tensions with humanitarians for instance if the troops are regarded as
withdrawing prematurely.14 Secondly, the moment physical force is applied to protect certain
groups of civilians, troops may become a target, or be seen as a party to the conflict. Those
subjected to the use of force may respond by attacking the troops or accusing them of bias –
with potential repercussions for other actors in the field, including humanitarians. Thirdly,
with limited resources it is challenging to prioritize varied protection efforts. Women and
children may have top priority, but then? If specific categories are selected, be it minorities,
tribes, ethnic groups, geographic areas, the troops may be seen as politically biased. The UN
cannot ‘protect everyone from everything’ (Holt et al. 2009: 12). Protection mandates may
thus fuel disproportionate expectations by civilians in need. Furthermore, troops may yield to
mounting demands of protection and end up spreading out thinly, offering unrealistic
13 Outside the UN, one attempt is the ‘Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide’, published by
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the United States Army War College. However, this
document is not incorporated in doctrine or official concepts. Available HTTP:
<http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/collaborative/collaborativereview.cfm?collaborativeID=13> (accessed
15 May 2013)
14 See e.g. ‘UN move to withdraw from Chad puts thousands at risk’, Amnesty International, 24 May 2010,
HTTP: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/un-move-withdraw-chad-puts-thousands-risk-2010-05-
24> (accessed 5 November 2013).
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perceptions of protection. Eventual failure to meet expectations may backfire on all actors
present in the field.
Even if these challenges are basically military, they directly affect humanitarian actors. This
may encourage enhanced coordination between militaries and humanitarians, if nothing else
to avoid doing more harm than good. However, given the diverging definitions and
approaches between the military, humanitarians and others, PoC will most likely continue to
be characterized as a series of parallel and partly overlapping activities.
Robust Peacekeeping / Stability Operations / Peace Support Operations
‘Robust peacekeeping’ is not an official UN term (Tardy 2011: 153), but it is meant to refer
to modern-day peacekeeping, with troops better equipped to protect themselves and to help
implement the mandate or peace accords. The Security Council generally authorizes
peacekeepers ‘to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political
process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national
authorities in maintaining law and order’ (United Nations 2008: 34). Similarly, regional
security organizations like NATO and the AU, as well as the United States, have developed
doctrines for such operations.15
In these operations the military are responsible for providing security and stability in a
defined area of responsibility. Usually this is a post-conflict environment where major combat
operations are over and a peace agreement is in place, but the situation remains volatile and
the peace fragile. The main task of the military is to provide security and stability and prevent
15 NATO (2001) Peace Support Operations AJP-3.4.1, Brussels: NATO, U.S.Army. (2009) The U.S. Army
Stability Operations Field Manual, FM 3-07, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. The African
Stanby Force’ Peace Support Operations Doctrine is available at HTTP: <http://acoc-
africa.org/restricted/Doctrine/Doctrine.php > (accessed 26 June 2013).
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the recurrence of violence. This means that the military are primarily defensively oriented, but
may take offensive initiatives to avert attacks, apprehend criminals or counter ‘spoilers’ to the
peace process (Stedman 2000). As noted, mandates usually include PoC tasks as well.
Because security is defined broadly (encompassing human security, children, minorities,
women, etc.), such missions are generally ‘multidimensional’ and political, and require close
collaboration with civilian agencies, including humanitarians. Refugee camp security,
patrolling, demobilization of child soldiers, de-mining and removal of unexploded ordinances
are some examples of the tasks of a robust peacekeeping operation that touch on humanitarian
tasks as well. In the UN context, various models of ‘integrated missions’ have emerged,
where civilian and military agencies work within a shared command structure of sorts.
Outside the UN, the term ‘comprehensive approach’ has been applied by NATO and the EU,
indicating lower expectations of cohesion than within the UN system, but nevertheless
recognizing that there are no purely military solutions in these situations (de Coning and Friis
2011).
Humanitarians have tended to distance themselves both from the UN integrated approach and
the various comprehensive approaches (Metcalfe et al. 2011, Glad 2011). They fear that that
they get politicized by being forced to collaborate with troops and political UN staff. This
restrictiveness of humanitarian actors has frustrated the militaries, who often cannot
implement their mandate or achieve their objectives without collaboration with the
humanitarians.
Countering armed groups
This category incorporates military operations aimed at countering armed non-state actors,
like insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, criminal organizations, warlords, tribal factions
etc. (Norwitz 2008). We can roughly subdivide this into two types: enemy-centric and
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population-centric operations. The first is generally associated with counter-terrorism,
counter-piracy and historical counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, the second with recent
COIN operations.
The enemy-centric approach aims at weakening the adversary directly, by military
engagement. It is based on the conventional military tenet that military victory paves the way
for later political solutions and peace (Kalyvas 2006). The unconventional nature of the
adversary will require unconventional responses, not least when the fight takes place
‘amongst the people’ (Smith 2007), but the aim is nonetheless to engage the enemy and
incapacitate him. For enemy-centric operations the Geneva Conventions usually applies,
although the legal status of the insurgents is sometimes debated.16 Controversies with
humanitarians have often arisen in cases involving disproportional use of force and high
levels of civilian casualties, something which is partly a condition of the nature of these
conflicts. Recently also the UN has begun conducting operations of this kind. The
‘intervention brigade’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo is described by the UN as its
‘first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to “neutralize
and disarm”’ rebels.17 Some commentators warn of the high risk of violent retaliation against
16 The Bush administration invented the term ‘unlawful combatants’ to cover al-Qaida and their Taliban
associates. But most legal commentaries seem to argue the USA and its allies are covered by the Geneva
Conventions in these operations. See De Cock C. (2011) ‘Counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. What
about the 'Jus ad Bellum' and the 'Jus in Bello': is the law still accurate?’, in: M.N. Schmitt, L. Arimatsu, T.
McCormack et al. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press.
17 UN Department of Public Information: ‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate
Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo,’ 28 March 2013. Available HTTP:
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm> (accessed 12 June 2013)
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civilians in such operations.18 That would make it even more challenging for humanitarians to
cooperate with the UN.
The population-centric COIN was launched when the enemy-centric approach did not seem to
be working in Iraq. Collateral damage and failure to protect civilians fuelled local resentment
towards the foreign troops. COIN is often summarized as ‘clear–hold–build’: clear an area of
adversaries, then hold the territory, and build up its security and governance structures. The
term ‘population-centric’ indicates that the real struggle concerns the allegiance of the
population in the ‘build’ phase. There can be no isolated military solution: victory is achieved
only when the government has won over the population by offering security and services
(Kilcullen 2009). A consequence of this broad approach is that the entire area of operations is
regarded as part of the political struggle that COIN represents, including humanitarian relief.
According to the US COIN doctrine: ‘There is no such thing as impartial humanitarian
assistance (…) in COIN. Whenever someone is helped, someone else is hurt, not least the
insurgents’ (U.S.Army/Marine Corps 2007: 300).
The problem is, of course, that most humanitarians would not consider themselves as being
‘in COIN’. They would argue that they may very well provide ‘impartial humanitarian
assistance’ as long as the troops keep distance to them. Humanitarians have protested when
soldiers have attempted to win local ‘hearts and minds’, not least when this is attempted
through ‘quick impact projects’ and other short-term efforts. This, it is argued, is not only
inefficient and unsustainable, but has interfered with other aid efforts; it has politicized aid by
not being impartial and needs-based, and has undermined the security of humanitarians by
18 Cathy Haenlein: The UN Intervention Brigade: A Force for Change in DR Congo? RUSI Analysis, 17 May
2013. Available HTTP: <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C519659DB40673/#.UbsMNNgcM24>
(accessed 13 June 2013)
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blurring the lines between the humanitarian and military actors (Cornish 2007). However, also
humanitarians have engaged in a range of projects that are political rather than humanitarian
in nature – like educational programming, livelihoods, economic development and agriculture
– thereby potentially undermining their own notion of impartiality and neutrality (Olson 2008,
Anderson 2004:42).
International Armed Conflict
Most armed forces today are still based on the concept of conventional warfare, defined in
IHL as International Armed Conflict. Basic doctrines, concepts, training and education are all
primarily preparations for inter-state conventional war. All the categories of military
operations discussed above are regarded as exceptions, or at least assignments additional to
the primary task of an army. In such wars the Geneva Conventions regulate the respective
responsibilities of the belligerents and the humanitarians, as discussed at the introduction of
this chapter. However, few such international state-to-state wars have taken place in last
decades. The Russia-Georgia war in 2008 is the most recent one, and before that the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 1990s also witnessed predominantly intra-state wars.19 There are
therefore not many examples of recent challenges related to humanitarian issues in inter-state
wars.
Granting access for humanitarian actors to conflict zones appears to be the primary challenge.
In both Georgia and Iraq humanitarians called for improved access to civilians.20 As discussed
19 For an overview, see Centre for Systemic Peace’ website Major Episodes of Political Violence
1946-2012: HTTP: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm> (accessed 7 November 2013).
20 See for instance: Georgia: UN continues to press for humanitarian access to victims, UN News Centre, 15
August 2008, HTTP: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27710#.UntTZyeMk0E> (accessed 7
November 2013), Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War, Medecins Sans Frontieres, 1
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above, although the Geneva Conventions grants access in principle, it does not stipulate
exactly on what grounds humanitarian access can be denied by the belligerents. In the case of
Iraq, US troops did not allow aid workers passage until they had declared areas as safe. As a
result humanitarians were at times as far as 300 miles behind the frontline.21
Another challenge has been the humanitarian responsibilities resting on the occupying power.
According to the IHL, it is obliged to provide the necessary humanitarian aid and secure the
basic human rights of the civilian population. Again the case of Iraq demonstrated that this
not always went smoothly, not least as the security vacuum was filled by looters and violent
gangs.22 When both the UN and ICRC were deliberately attacked by insurgents in Baghdad in
2003, the relationship between the American-led occupation and the humanitarian community
soured further. Humanitarians (and the UN) more or less explicitly blamed the US for failure
to protect them (Anderson 2004). In short, therefore, one can conclude that even in cases like
this when the Geneva Conventions apply, they are not sufficient in and of themselves to
resolve all humanitarian questions. There are practical challenges facing the military and the
humanitarian actors also in conventional international armed conflicts.
Conclusions
This taxonomy of military operations and the associated challenges with humanitarian issues
offers a framework for differentiating various types of conflicts and challenges that militaries
May 2004, HTTP <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=2050> (accessed 7
November 2013),
21 See Humanitarian aid to Iraq proves one of war's biggest obstacles, Christian Science Monitor, 28 March
2003, HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0328/p09s01-woiq.html>.
22 See Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying powers, Amnesty International, 15 April 2003, HTTP:
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/089/2003/en/7fc9a988-d6ff-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/mde140892003en.html>
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
18
and humanitarians are likely to face in the field. The military mandates differ significantly
from category to category, but we have seen that conflicts may occur in all operations, not
only in intense warfare. The challenges identified range from practical questions of
coordination and communication, to dealing with shared and overlapping tasks, to potential
escalation of the conflict. All the operations identified here are regulated by IHL, IHRL or
specific guidelines or doctrines, but it appears that these not have been sufficient to resolve all
the challenges.
The most serious difficulties appear when humanitarian actors feel themselves politicized, as
this is would undermine their core values of independence, impartiality and neutrality. Such
politicization is more likely to occur in the offensive military operations, in other words when
the troops are tasked to implement a peace agreement or to engage an adversary. Furthermore,
when the military task requires active engagement with civilian populations, such as in PoC
and in population-centric COIN, frictions with humanitarians tend to increase. However, it is
also worth noting that humanitarians sometimes politicize themselves when they fail to
recognize the political nature or implications of activities they engage in.
How then to deal with the challenges? Some hold that the best way to overcome them is for
militaries to disengage the humanitarians altogether, and focus instead on building coherence
with developmental actors less concerned with impartiality and neutrality (Egnell 2013). But
this is too generic. In principle any intervention, civilian or military, is political, or may be
regarded as such locally (Terry 2002). The degree of politicization is defined by what the
various actors do, not who they are. In some circumstances, basic humanitarian aid may be
considered political interference; elsewhere, local belligerents may welcome projects
traditionally regarded as political, like building schools.
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
19
As long as the potential political implications of the intervention are recognized and dealt
with locally, humanitarians may be in a good position to coordinate with military actors,
without becoming unwillingly politicized. The humanitarian principle of ‘do no harm’ may
also be applied in this context: do nothing that has negative political implications or prolong
the conflict. The military may also keep this principle in mind when engaging humanitarians
or the local civilian population.
Overlapping tasks, physical proximity and situational circumstances in the field will continue
to keep these strange bedfellows together. Generic models can never resolve the challenges
discussed in this chapter. Only through situational awareness, mutual respect, political
sensitivity and recognition of the nature of the intervention can some of them be resolved.
Fortunately, pragmatism in the field has often proven more efficacious than academic
discussions in national capitals.
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
20
Table 1. TAXONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY–HUMANITARIAN
RELATIONS
Type of
Military
Task
Military
Role
Security
Objecti
ve
Humanitar
ian Role
Guideline
s and
Doctrines
Challenges Examples
Logistical
Support
Logistical
support
Not
security
related
Lead Oslo
Guideline
s
Recipient
refuses aid
from
military;
political
desire to use
troops;
too many
actors
Pakistan
earthquake
s 2005,
2010;
tsunami
2004
Escort Provide
security
for
humanitari
an relief
Protecti
on of
agencies
Lead MCDA
Guideline
s;
Civil–
Military
Guideline
s &
Reference
for
Complex
Emergenc
ies
(CMGR)
Escort may
attract
resistance;
dependency
UNITAF
(Somalia);
MONUSC
O (DRC)
Traditiona
l
Peacekeepi
ng
Oversee
peace
accords,
demilitariz
ed zone,
ceasefires
Security
within
clearly
defined
paramet
er;
purely
defensiv
e force-
Coexist,
coordinate
MCDA
Guideline
s;
UN
Capstone
Humanitarian
CIMIC
initiatives
UNIFIL
(Lebanon);
UNPROFO
R (Bosnia-
Herzegovin
a);
UNFICYP
(Cyprus)
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
21
protectio
n ops.
Protection
of
Civilians
Protect
national
civilians
against
violence;
guarding,
patrolling
Secure
targeted
groups
of
civilians
Shared PoC
mandate,
cooperation
necessary
MCDA
Guideline
s;
UN
Capstone;
CMGR
Coordination;
difficult to
operationaliz
e militarily;
risk of
escalation;
false
expectations
MINURCA
T (Chad);
MONUSC
O (DRC);
UNMIS
(Sudan);
UNMISS
(South
Sudan)
Robust
Peacekeepi
ng (UN)/
Stability
operations
(US)/
Peace
Support
Operation
s (NATO)
Provide
general
security in
AO, assist
civilian
efforts,
implement
the peace
accords
Keep
security,
supress
spoilers
and
criminal
s.
Coordinate,
cooperate if
integrated
UN mission
MCDA
Guideline
s;
CMGR;
UN
Capstone;
FM 3-07
(US);
AJP-3.4.1
(PSO
NATO);
AJP-3.4.9
(CIMIC
NATO);
IHL
Humanitarian
resistance to
comprehensi
ve approach
and
integrated
missions
Most UN,
AU, EU
and NATO
operations
Counterin
g armed
groups
Direct
military
engageme
nt (enemy-
centric) or
indirect
(populatio
Defeat
insurgen
ts, (re-
)establis
h peace
and
security
Coexist,
compete,
potential
conflict
CMGR;
FM-3.24
(US);
AJP-3.4.4
(NATO);
IHL/Gene
Disproportio
nate use of
force;
politicization
of
humanitarian
efforts
Operation
Enduring
Freedom
(OEF);
MONUSC
O
‘interventio
n brigade’
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
22
n-centric) va
Conventio
ns
Protocol
II
(DRC);
ISAF
(Afghanista
n)
Internatio
nal Armed
Conflict
Defeat the
enemy
forces
Pave
way for
political
surrende
r and
peace
accords
Coexist IHL Denial of
humanitarian
access;
failure of
occupying
power to
provide
security
US
invasion of
Iraq 2003;
Georgia-
Russia war
2008
Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015
23
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