Military and Humanitarian Actors

Roger MacGinty and Jenny Peterson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Humanitarian Action, London: Routledge, 2015

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Chapter 18

Military and Humanitarian Actors

KarstenFriis,1

Introduction

‘It was easier under the Taliban’ – these words come from the head of a leading Western

humanitarian NGO in Afghanistan, complaining how the International Security Assistance

Force (ISAF) constantly undermined their work and their security. She claimed that things

had been calmer prior the Western intervention and that the security situation worsened as

more soldiers were deployed.2 Such outbursts, while possibly inflated, reflect the frustration

often felt by humanitarians in encounters with the military.

The armed forces, it is often held, undermine the core humanitarian values of independence,

impartiality and neutrality and politicize aid by doing humanitarian tasks in an attempt to win

‘hearts and minds’ of the local population. As a result humanitarian actors are put at risk as

well (Fast 2010; Collinson and Elhawary 2012). The military and the humanitarians should be

kept strictly apart and not interact, it is argued. The military, for its part, has been less

restrictive about interaction but tends to view the humanitarian NGO community with some

suspicion.

1 Thanks to Alex Beadle, Marit Glad, Mads Harlem, John Karlsrud, Stian Kjeksrud, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud

and the editors for advice and comments. A particular thanks to Susan Høivik for assistance on linguistics and

style.

2 See ‘- Lettere under Taliban’ (‘- Easier under the Taliban’), ABC News Norway, 28 December 2009,, .

Available HTTP: < http://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/091228/lettere-under-taliban> (accessed 5 June 2013).


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How to understand the nature and intensity of the tensions between the military and the

humanitarians? Are they a result of the nature and roles of the two sets of actors, or of the

operational context? Some have highlighted the internal cultural and national differences

between these strange bedfellows (Winslow 2005, Ruffa and Vennesson, forthcoming) – they

may have little in common except being foreign interveners in the same territory.

Humanitarians may see the military as composed of hierarchically rigid, right-wing, gung-ho

men who seek quick fixes and lack cultural competence. The military, on the other hand, may

regard humanitarians as naïve, idealistic peaceniks, operating in a chaotic myriad of loosely

connected NGOs, with scant real impact.

While such prejudices probably explain some of the challenges, they cannot explain why such

conflicts seem to be increasing. Both the military and the humanitarians have proliferated in

numbers, missions and tasks (Berdal and Economides 2007; Barnett 2011), perhaps making

overlap and clashes more or less unavoidable. But this cannot help us to understand why these

clashes differ in intensity from intervention to intervention, place to place. One argument

offered is that more volatile the security situation, the more strained the relationship tends to

be (IASC 2008: 9). This makes sense, but is rather simplistic and does not take all variations

into account.

This chapter seeks to bring some clarity by offering a systematic account of the relationship

between the military and humanitarians. Taking different kinds of military missions as a

starting point, we can systematically compare military/humanitarian relationships from case to

case. Such an approach might not explain the different kinds of challenges, but it should

contextualize them, helping us to frame the discussion better. Importantly, the chapter deals

solely with the relationship between humanitarians and official, foreign intervening militaries.

The relationship between national armed forces and humanitarians is not addressed, nor that


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between militia groups and humanitarians. Further, the chapter focuses on the armed forces’

relations with humanitarian actors, not development agencies, political activists,

intergovernmental organizations, governmental agencies or other civilians operating in the

field.

Background

The boom in both humanitarian relief efforts and international peace and stabilization

operations in the 1990s marks the beginning of today’s military–humanitarian relationships.

The 1990s witnessed a significant broadening of the security sector, where war and violence

were regarded as being associated with poverty and weak states (Slim 1995, Duffield 2007).

In this period the humanitarian and military relationship remained relatively positive as they

were regarded as supporting the same ends, perhaps best illustrated during the Kosovo crisis

when the humanitarians let NATO take charge of the refugee camps without much protest

(Barnett 2011: 189). This changed after the 9/11 2001 attacks on the United States, with the

subsequent ‘war on terror’ and the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Western military

forces’ approach in these operations became more explicitly political, aimed at regime change

and counter-terrorism. Unsurprisingly, this led to the more strained relationship with the

humanitarians as illustrated above. As troops are leaving both Iraq and Afghanistan many

observers consider the era of larger state-building military interventions to be over (Luján

2013) and with it perhaps also some of these contentions. At the same time though, the UN

continues to run a record-high number of peacekeeping missions. In some cases, such as in

the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and in Mali the peacekeepers are

confronting relatively strong armed resistance. The potential for new conflicts with

humanitarians is therefore present. We therefore still need to be able to grasp the nature of the


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conflicts. Let us begin by briefly revisiting the legal foundations, international humanitarian

law, and ask if the Geneva Conventions can guide us on this.

Legal foundations

The responsibilities of armed forces towards civilians and non-combatants were first specified

in international law in the Geneva Convention of 1864. Further clarification came with the

Fourth Convention of 1949 (‘The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War’), and the additional 1977 Protocols (‘Protection of Victims of

International Armed Conflicts’ and ‘Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed

Conflicts’).

The relationship between the warring parties and humanitarian actors is addressed many

places in the Conventions, as in Article 70 of the First Convention:

If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict,

other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies […], relief

actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any

adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties

concerned in such relief actions.

Similar formulations are found in the Fourth Protocol, Articles 10, 23, 55 and 59.3

The Geneva Conventions underline the responsibility of the warring parties in ensuring that

the basic needs of the civilian population are provided for; they also state that humanitarian

actors require the consent of the warring parties to engage. Certain provisions regulate the

foundations for such consent, but it is not crystal-clear on what grounds humanitarian aid

3 The Geneva Conventions are available on the ICRC website. Available HTTP: <http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-

and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp> (accessed 18 June 2013).


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agencies may legitimately be granted or refused access. This need for consent has provoked

contention between militaries and humanitarians, and the principle of consent is sometimes

overlooked by humanitarian actors when they call for respect of the humanitarian space.

Moreover, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Geneva Conventions apply only in

cases of armed conflict. In many military operations today there may be a volatile security

situation but not armed conflict as such. Defining something as an armed conflict involves a

subjective assessment, but the involvement of armed forces is one indicator, as is the level of

organization of the belligerents and their political versus for instance criminal ambitions. The

alternative legal framework to regulate the armed forces’ behaviour is the International

Human Rights Law (IHRL). In contrast to the IHL, the IHRL applies to peacetime. However,

by applying IHRL the military operations would be guided according to international law

enforcement principles, which may not always be suited for military operations. For instance,

in an armed conflict regulated by IHL, a certain level of collateral damage may be tolerable in

offensive operations, something which is unacceptable in peacetime when IHRL applies.4

Furthermore, the IHRL does not address the military-humanitarian relationship. In practice, it

appears that troops tend to refer to IHL as their guidance – even if not always applicable – as

that is what they are trained for and are familiar with (Larsen 2012).

In short, international law appears to be insufficient if we wish to understand all the various

shapes and forms the relationship between military and humanitarians may take. An

4 See Siobhán Wills ‘The law applicable to peacekeepers deployed in situations where there is no armed conflict’,

EJIL: Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law. Available HTTP: <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-

law-applicable-to-peacekeepers-deployed-in-situations-where-there-is-no-armed-conflict/> (accessed 15 May

2013).


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alternative approach is to analyse the relationship according to the nature of the intervention.

To this end, the next section offers a taxonomy of various forms of military operations or

tasks.

Taxonomy

The taxonomy of international military–humanitarian relationships presented below and in

Table 1 attempts to simplify complex relationships into ideal-type categories. It takes various

forms of military operations or tasks as the starting point, showing how the challenges as

regards humanitarians differ from case to case. Note that these are ideal types: most missions

incorporate a range of the categories below or evolve through several of them.

Logistical Support

The military logistical apparatus has increasingly been called upon to assist humanitarian

relief operations. Military organizations usually have unique assets at their disposal, regarding

transport in particular. In such operations, the armed forces do not have any security role, and

are fully at the disposal of the humanitarians. Further, according to the ‘Guidelines on the Use

of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines’, foreign

military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable

civilian alternative.5

Even these operations have faced challenges. Firstly, the nation receiving aid may be reluctant

to welcome foreign military units – as in Sri Lanka, where the government accused India of

military support to the Tamil areas after an (according to India) humanitarian air-drop;6 in

5 The ‘Oslo Guidelines’ are available at HTTP <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-use-military-and-

civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief-oslo-guidelines> (accessed 10 June 2013).

6 See ‘The use of military in humanitarian relief’, Frederick C. Cuny, November 1989. Available HTTP:

<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cuny/laptop/humanrelief.html> (accessed 6 June 2013).


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Aceh, where foreign troops were accused of espionage;7 and when Myanmar refused aid from

US warships after Cyclone Nargis.8 Military units are often regarded with greater suspicion

and political bias than other actors. Secondly, the ‘last resort’ principle may be circumvented,

because states may wish to use military assets to legitimize their military presence in the

region. US efforts after the Indian Ocean tsunami have often been described in such terms

(Wheeler and Harmer 2006: 7), as have various contributions to Pakistan, Haiti and others

(Metcalfe et al. 2012: 15). Practical coordination represents a third challenge, as in cases

where the UN cluster system not is fully functional or where many national military forces

engage simultaneously. Overlap, miscommunication and ineffectiveness may result (Metcalfe

et al. 2012: 16-17).

Escort

Escort operations aim to offer protection to humanitarian agencies operating in an insecure

environment. In general, humanitarian convoys do not use armed escorts, but in exceptional

circumstances this may be a necessary ‘last resort’ to enable humanitarian action. And here

the military does have a security mandate: to protect the aid workers. However, that mandate

is restricted to the protection of the agencies; the troops are not to pursue attackers or seek to

create general security in the area.

The most commonly referred standard for such operations are the ‘MCDA Guidelines’,9

which stress that the military is to be under civilian control and engage only on request from

7 See ‘Foreign aid as a Trojan horse for proselytising and espionage’, Asia News, 1 December 2005. Available

HTTP: <http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=2321> (accessed 6 June 2013).

8 See ‘Burma refuses aid from U.S. warships for cyclone victims’, CBC News, 21 May 2008. Available HTTP: <

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2008/05/21/burma-us.html> (accessed 6 June 2013).

9 Available at HTTP: < http://www.coe-dmha.org/Media/Guidance/3MCDAGuidelines.pdf> (accessed 30 May

2013).


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the UN humanitarian coordinator. The humanitarian agencies decide where to go and what to

do at destinations. During convoy, however, the military commander is usually in charge, and

may halt an aid convoy if the situation is deemed too risky.

Such operations entail challenges. Firstly, nations offering military support tend to be

selective as to where they offer it, usually coinciding with a crisis in which they have political

or security stakes. Secondly, the fact that escort is needed normally indicates that the intrusion

may not be welcome, and that resistance is likely. The moment force is used, troops may

become entangled in a protracted conflict. Hence, even if an armed escort is initially

successful in providing aid, it may also pull the troops into continued clashes with armed

groups, as the USA experienced in Somalia in 1993. As a result also humanitarians may be

affected. Thirdly, there appears to be an increase in the use of armed escorts. This push comes

from within the UN system, from those responsible for the safety of UN staff, such as the

Department for Safety & Security. Humanitarian agencies outside the UN tend to be critical to

this development as they regard it as creating dependencies and causing unnecessary

militarization of humanitarian aid – which also impede on them.10

Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping refers primarily to post-conflict ceasefire monitoring operations on

an inter-state border, like UNIFIL in Lebanon, but also along demarcation lines, like

UNFICYP in Cyprus. While the mandates may differ, the point is that role and responsibility

of the military are relatively limited.

The armed forces have a narrow security mandate in terms of monitoring, for example, a de-

militarized border zone. They may support and protect humanitarians operating in this zone,

but will not go beyond this area of operation. This is a static and defensive mandate, where

10 Interview with NGO worker, 2013.


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the military respond only when fired upon, for self-protection. Until the 1990s, troops rarely

had the weaponry necessary to enforce their mandate, and had to rely on the trust and support

of the (former) warring parties. This approach ended with the humiliation of the UN troops in

Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s, and, notably, the hostage-taking of UN peacekeepers in

Sierra Leone in 2000. Today’s peacekeepers are better equipped, also where the mandates are

basically unchanged, as with UNIFIL II.

In these cases humanitarians and peacekeepers tend to operate side by side. They may

communicate and exchange information but have few overlapping tasks and responsibilities.

The major challenges have occurred when peacekeeper contingents have initiated Civil-

Military Cooperation (CIMIC) activities of a humanitarian nature without coordinating with

humanitarians operating in the same area (Ruffa and Vennesson, forthcoming). Peacekeepers

have also sometimes been tasked by the Security Council to provide humanitarian assistance,

as during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon 1982–85. Generally though, there are relatively

few reports of friction between militaries and humanitarians in traditional peacekeeping.

Protection of Civilians (PoC)

After the UN failure to prevent the genocides in Srebrenica and in Rwanda in the 1990s,

peacekeepers and other intervening troops in conflict zones have been increasingly mandated

to protect civilians. Failure to protect civilians undermines not only the credibility of the

peacekeeping operation, but also the UN itself. For the last decade or so, basically all UN

peacekeeping operations have been given PoC tasks as part of their mandate, usually worded

as ‘protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’. Sometimes a protection

mandate may be the single task of the troops, such as MINURCAT and EUFOR in Chad in

2008. Their responsibility concerned solely refugees from neighbouring Darfur in Sudan, not

the population in Chad (Karlsrud and da Costa 2013 ).


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PoC is not conducted by peacekeepers alone. It is often described as a shared task between

military and humanitarian actors (Metcalfe 2012). The first set of challenges is therefore

related to coordination. There exists no authoritative definition of PoC in the UN or anywhere

else (Holt et al. 2009; Mühlen-Schulte 2013), but the definition commonly referred to by

civilian agencies reads: ‘all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the

individual in accordance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law,

and refugee law’.11 This broad definition is not limited to physical protection, but may also

include a range of humanitarian efforts. For humanitarians PoC means looking beyond

people’s immediate material needs to wider questions of personal safety, dignity and integrity,

both in the short term and in the long term (Slim and Bonwick 2005). At the same time the

military has usually preferred to stick to the more narrow approach of physical protection. As

a result PoC have tended to be a number of parallel processes rather a coherent approach. PoC

has thereby suffered in terms of sustainability and efficacy (Holt et al. 2009).

In an attempt to remedy these shortcomings, the UN has more recently begun to expand the

peacekeepers’ understanding of PoC, by, for instance, organize it in three tiers: protection

through political process; providing protection from physical violence; and establishing a

protective environment.12 Despite such efforts, the UN is unlikely to ever achieve a unified

coherent definition or approach to PoC. Differing mandates, organizational interests and

agendas among UN organizations (DPKO, OCHA, UNHCR etc.) work against such

coherence (Stensland and Sending 2013). The UN will probably continue to leave it largely to

11 See HTTP: <http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/policy/thematic-areas/protection> (accessed 25 May 2013)

12 See ‘UN Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations’. HTTP: <http://www.peacekeeping.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/100129-

DPKO-DFS-POC-Operational-Concept.pdf.> (accessed 18 June 2013)


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each mission to develop a coherent approach to PoC, and as a minimum expect troops to

provide physical protection of civilians, as this concerns the legitimacy of the UN itself.

Even if PoC for the military should be limited to physical protection, the task remains

challenging. Firstly, the armed forces have struggled to implement PoC into an operational

concept in the absence of a doctrine.13 A military logic usually presupposes an end-state or a

defined objective – but when is ‘protection’ achieved? What is ‘enough’ protection? Such

uncertainties may cause tensions with humanitarians for instance if the troops are regarded as

withdrawing prematurely.14 Secondly, the moment physical force is applied to protect certain

groups of civilians, troops may become a target, or be seen as a party to the conflict. Those

subjected to the use of force may respond by attacking the troops or accusing them of bias –

with potential repercussions for other actors in the field, including humanitarians. Thirdly,

with limited resources it is challenging to prioritize varied protection efforts. Women and

children may have top priority, but then? If specific categories are selected, be it minorities,

tribes, ethnic groups, geographic areas, the troops may be seen as politically biased. The UN

cannot ‘protect everyone from everything’ (Holt et al. 2009: 12). Protection mandates may

thus fuel disproportionate expectations by civilians in need. Furthermore, troops may yield to

mounting demands of protection and end up spreading out thinly, offering unrealistic

13 Outside the UN, one attempt is the ‘Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide’, published by

Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at the United States Army War College. However, this

document is not incorporated in doctrine or official concepts. Available HTTP:

<http://pksoi.army.mil/PKM/publications/collaborative/collaborativereview.cfm?collaborativeID=13> (accessed

15 May 2013)

14 See e.g. ‘UN move to withdraw from Chad puts thousands at risk’, Amnesty International, 24 May 2010,

HTTP: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/un-move-withdraw-chad-puts-thousands-risk-2010-05-

24> (accessed 5 November 2013).


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perceptions of protection. Eventual failure to meet expectations may backfire on all actors

present in the field.

Even if these challenges are basically military, they directly affect humanitarian actors. This

may encourage enhanced coordination between militaries and humanitarians, if nothing else

to avoid doing more harm than good. However, given the diverging definitions and

approaches between the military, humanitarians and others, PoC will most likely continue to

be characterized as a series of parallel and partly overlapping activities.

Robust Peacekeeping / Stability Operations / Peace Support Operations

‘Robust peacekeeping’ is not an official UN term (Tardy 2011: 153), but it is meant to refer

to modern-day peacekeeping, with troops better equipped to protect themselves and to help

implement the mandate or peace accords. The Security Council generally authorizes

peacekeepers ‘to “use all necessary means” to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political

process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national

authorities in maintaining law and order’ (United Nations 2008: 34). Similarly, regional

security organizations like NATO and the AU, as well as the United States, have developed

doctrines for such operations.15

In these operations the military are responsible for providing security and stability in a

defined area of responsibility. Usually this is a post-conflict environment where major combat

operations are over and a peace agreement is in place, but the situation remains volatile and

the peace fragile. The main task of the military is to provide security and stability and prevent

15 NATO (2001) Peace Support Operations AJP-3.4.1, Brussels: NATO, U.S.Army. (2009) The U.S. Army

Stability Operations Field Manual, FM 3-07, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press. The African

Stanby Force’ Peace Support Operations Doctrine is available at HTTP: <http://acoc-

africa.org/restricted/Doctrine/Doctrine.php > (accessed 26 June 2013).


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the recurrence of violence. This means that the military are primarily defensively oriented, but

may take offensive initiatives to avert attacks, apprehend criminals or counter ‘spoilers’ to the

peace process (Stedman 2000). As noted, mandates usually include PoC tasks as well.

Because security is defined broadly (encompassing human security, children, minorities,

women, etc.), such missions are generally ‘multidimensional’ and political, and require close

collaboration with civilian agencies, including humanitarians. Refugee camp security,

patrolling, demobilization of child soldiers, de-mining and removal of unexploded ordinances

are some examples of the tasks of a robust peacekeeping operation that touch on humanitarian

tasks as well. In the UN context, various models of ‘integrated missions’ have emerged,

where civilian and military agencies work within a shared command structure of sorts.

Outside the UN, the term ‘comprehensive approach’ has been applied by NATO and the EU,

indicating lower expectations of cohesion than within the UN system, but nevertheless

recognizing that there are no purely military solutions in these situations (de Coning and Friis

2011).

Humanitarians have tended to distance themselves both from the UN integrated approach and

the various comprehensive approaches (Metcalfe et al. 2011, Glad 2011). They fear that that

they get politicized by being forced to collaborate with troops and political UN staff. This

restrictiveness of humanitarian actors has frustrated the militaries, who often cannot

implement their mandate or achieve their objectives without collaboration with the

humanitarians.

Countering armed groups

This category incorporates military operations aimed at countering armed non-state actors,

like insurgents, terrorists, guerrillas, militias, criminal organizations, warlords, tribal factions

etc. (Norwitz 2008). We can roughly subdivide this into two types: enemy-centric and


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population-centric operations. The first is generally associated with counter-terrorism,

counter-piracy and historical counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, the second with recent

COIN operations.

The enemy-centric approach aims at weakening the adversary directly, by military

engagement. It is based on the conventional military tenet that military victory paves the way

for later political solutions and peace (Kalyvas 2006). The unconventional nature of the

adversary will require unconventional responses, not least when the fight takes place

‘amongst the people’ (Smith 2007), but the aim is nonetheless to engage the enemy and

incapacitate him. For enemy-centric operations the Geneva Conventions usually applies,

although the legal status of the insurgents is sometimes debated.16 Controversies with

humanitarians have often arisen in cases involving disproportional use of force and high

levels of civilian casualties, something which is partly a condition of the nature of these

conflicts. Recently also the UN has begun conducting operations of this kind. The

‘intervention brigade’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo is described by the UN as its

‘first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to “neutralize

and disarm”’ rebels.17 Some commentators warn of the high risk of violent retaliation against

16 The Bush administration invented the term ‘unlawful combatants’ to cover al-Qaida and their Taliban

associates. But most legal commentaries seem to argue the USA and its allies are covered by the Geneva

Conventions in these operations. See De Cock C. (2011) ‘Counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. What

about the 'Jus ad Bellum' and the 'Jus in Bello': is the law still accurate?’, in: M.N. Schmitt, L. Arimatsu, T.

McCormack et al. (eds) Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law - 2010. The Hague: T. M. C. Asser Press.

17 UN Department of Public Information: ‘Intervention Brigade’ Authorized as Security Council Grants Mandate

Renewal for United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo,’ 28 March 2013. Available HTTP:

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm> (accessed 12 June 2013)


15

civilians in such operations.18 That would make it even more challenging for humanitarians to

cooperate with the UN.

The population-centric COIN was launched when the enemy-centric approach did not seem to

be working in Iraq. Collateral damage and failure to protect civilians fuelled local resentment

towards the foreign troops. COIN is often summarized as ‘clear–hold–build’: clear an area of

adversaries, then hold the territory, and build up its security and governance structures. The

term ‘population-centric’ indicates that the real struggle concerns the allegiance of the

population in the ‘build’ phase. There can be no isolated military solution: victory is achieved

only when the government has won over the population by offering security and services

(Kilcullen 2009). A consequence of this broad approach is that the entire area of operations is

regarded as part of the political struggle that COIN represents, including humanitarian relief.

According to the US COIN doctrine: ‘There is no such thing as impartial humanitarian

assistance (…) in COIN. Whenever someone is helped, someone else is hurt, not least the

insurgents’ (U.S.Army/Marine Corps 2007: 300).

The problem is, of course, that most humanitarians would not consider themselves as being

‘in COIN’. They would argue that they may very well provide ‘impartial humanitarian

assistance’ as long as the troops keep distance to them. Humanitarians have protested when

soldiers have attempted to win local ‘hearts and minds’, not least when this is attempted

through ‘quick impact projects’ and other short-term efforts. This, it is argued, is not only

inefficient and unsustainable, but has interfered with other aid efforts; it has politicized aid by

not being impartial and needs-based, and has undermined the security of humanitarians by

18 Cathy Haenlein: The UN Intervention Brigade: A Force for Change in DR Congo? RUSI Analysis, 17 May

2013. Available HTTP: <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C519659DB40673/#.UbsMNNgcM24>

(accessed 13 June 2013)


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blurring the lines between the humanitarian and military actors (Cornish 2007). However, also

humanitarians have engaged in a range of projects that are political rather than humanitarian

in nature – like educational programming, livelihoods, economic development and agriculture

– thereby potentially undermining their own notion of impartiality and neutrality (Olson 2008,

Anderson 2004:42).

International Armed Conflict

Most armed forces today are still based on the concept of conventional warfare, defined in

IHL as International Armed Conflict. Basic doctrines, concepts, training and education are all

primarily preparations for inter-state conventional war. All the categories of military

operations discussed above are regarded as exceptions, or at least assignments additional to

the primary task of an army. In such wars the Geneva Conventions regulate the respective

responsibilities of the belligerents and the humanitarians, as discussed at the introduction of

this chapter. However, few such international state-to-state wars have taken place in last

decades. The Russia-Georgia war in 2008 is the most recent one, and before that the US-led

invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 1990s also witnessed predominantly intra-state wars.19 There are

therefore not many examples of recent challenges related to humanitarian issues in inter-state

wars.

Granting access for humanitarian actors to conflict zones appears to be the primary challenge.

In both Georgia and Iraq humanitarians called for improved access to civilians.20 As discussed

19 For an overview, see Centre for Systemic Peace’ website Major Episodes of Political Violence

1946-2012: HTTP: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/warlist.htm> (accessed 7 November 2013).

20 See for instance: Georgia: UN continues to press for humanitarian access to victims, UN News Centre, 15

August 2008, HTTP: <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=27710#.UntTZyeMk0E> (accessed 7

November 2013), Humanitarian Action Under Attack: Reflections on the Iraq War, Medecins Sans Frontieres, 1


17

above, although the Geneva Conventions grants access in principle, it does not stipulate

exactly on what grounds humanitarian access can be denied by the belligerents. In the case of

Iraq, US troops did not allow aid workers passage until they had declared areas as safe. As a

result humanitarians were at times as far as 300 miles behind the frontline.21

Another challenge has been the humanitarian responsibilities resting on the occupying power.

According to the IHL, it is obliged to provide the necessary humanitarian aid and secure the

basic human rights of the civilian population. Again the case of Iraq demonstrated that this

not always went smoothly, not least as the security vacuum was filled by looters and violent

gangs.22 When both the UN and ICRC were deliberately attacked by insurgents in Baghdad in

2003, the relationship between the American-led occupation and the humanitarian community

soured further. Humanitarians (and the UN) more or less explicitly blamed the US for failure

to protect them (Anderson 2004). In short, therefore, one can conclude that even in cases like

this when the Geneva Conventions apply, they are not sufficient in and of themselves to

resolve all humanitarian questions. There are practical challenges facing the military and the

humanitarian actors also in conventional international armed conflicts.

Conclusions

This taxonomy of military operations and the associated challenges with humanitarian issues

offers a framework for differentiating various types of conflicts and challenges that militaries

May 2004, HTTP <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=2050> (accessed 7

November 2013),

21 See Humanitarian aid to Iraq proves one of war's biggest obstacles, Christian Science Monitor, 28 March

2003, HTTP: <http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0328/p09s01-woiq.html>.

22 See Iraq: Responsibilities of the occupying powers, Amnesty International, 15 April 2003, HTTP:

<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE14/089/2003/en/7fc9a988-d6ff-11dd-b0cc-

1f0860013475/mde140892003en.html>


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and humanitarians are likely to face in the field. The military mandates differ significantly

from category to category, but we have seen that conflicts may occur in all operations, not

only in intense warfare. The challenges identified range from practical questions of

coordination and communication, to dealing with shared and overlapping tasks, to potential

escalation of the conflict. All the operations identified here are regulated by IHL, IHRL or

specific guidelines or doctrines, but it appears that these not have been sufficient to resolve all

the challenges.

The most serious difficulties appear when humanitarian actors feel themselves politicized, as

this is would undermine their core values of independence, impartiality and neutrality. Such

politicization is more likely to occur in the offensive military operations, in other words when

the troops are tasked to implement a peace agreement or to engage an adversary. Furthermore,

when the military task requires active engagement with civilian populations, such as in PoC

and in population-centric COIN, frictions with humanitarians tend to increase. However, it is

also worth noting that humanitarians sometimes politicize themselves when they fail to

recognize the political nature or implications of activities they engage in.

How then to deal with the challenges? Some hold that the best way to overcome them is for

militaries to disengage the humanitarians altogether, and focus instead on building coherence

with developmental actors less concerned with impartiality and neutrality (Egnell 2013). But

this is too generic. In principle any intervention, civilian or military, is political, or may be

regarded as such locally (Terry 2002). The degree of politicization is defined by what the

various actors do, not who they are. In some circumstances, basic humanitarian aid may be

considered political interference; elsewhere, local belligerents may welcome projects

traditionally regarded as political, like building schools.


19

As long as the potential political implications of the intervention are recognized and dealt

with locally, humanitarians may be in a good position to coordinate with military actors,

without becoming unwillingly politicized. The humanitarian principle of ‘do no harm’ may

also be applied in this context: do nothing that has negative political implications or prolong

the conflict. The military may also keep this principle in mind when engaging humanitarians

or the local civilian population.

Overlapping tasks, physical proximity and situational circumstances in the field will continue

to keep these strange bedfellows together. Generic models can never resolve the challenges

discussed in this chapter. Only through situational awareness, mutual respect, political

sensitivity and recognition of the nature of the intervention can some of them be resolved.

Fortunately, pragmatism in the field has often proven more efficacious than academic

discussions in national capitals.


20

Table 1. TAXONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY–HUMANITARIAN

RELATIONS

Type of

Military

Task

Military

Role

Security

Objecti

ve

Humanitar

ian Role

Guideline

s and

Doctrines

Challenges Examples

Logistical

Support

Logistical

support

Not

security

related

Lead Oslo

Guideline

s

Recipient

refuses aid

from

military;

political

desire to use

troops;

too many

actors

Pakistan

earthquake

s 2005,

2010;

tsunami

2004

Escort Provide

security

for

humanitari

an relief

Protecti

on of

agencies

Lead MCDA

Guideline

s;

Civil–

Military

Guideline

s &

Reference

for

Complex

Emergenc

ies

(CMGR)

Escort may

attract

resistance;

dependency

UNITAF

(Somalia);

MONUSC

O (DRC)

Traditiona

l

Peacekeepi

ng

Oversee

peace

accords,

demilitariz

ed zone,

ceasefires

Security

within

clearly

defined

paramet

er;

purely

defensiv

e force-

Coexist,

coordinate

MCDA

Guideline

s;

UN

Capstone

Humanitarian

CIMIC

initiatives

UNIFIL

(Lebanon);

UNPROFO

R (Bosnia-

Herzegovin

a);

UNFICYP

(Cyprus)


21

protectio

n ops.

Protection

of

Civilians

Protect

national

civilians

against

violence;

guarding,

patrolling

Secure

targeted

groups

of

civilians

Shared PoC

mandate,

cooperation

necessary

MCDA

Guideline

s;

UN

Capstone;

CMGR

Coordination;

difficult to

operationaliz

e militarily;

risk of

escalation;

false

expectations

MINURCA

T (Chad);

MONUSC

O (DRC);

UNMIS

(Sudan);

UNMISS

(South

Sudan)

Robust

Peacekeepi

ng (UN)/

Stability

operations

(US)/

Peace

Support

Operation

s (NATO)

Provide

general

security in

AO, assist

civilian

efforts,

implement

the peace

accords

Keep

security,

supress

spoilers

and

criminal

s.

Coordinate,

cooperate if

integrated

UN mission

MCDA

Guideline

s;

CMGR;

UN

Capstone;

FM 3-07

(US);

AJP-3.4.1

(PSO

NATO);

AJP-3.4.9

(CIMIC

NATO);

IHL

Humanitarian

resistance to

comprehensi

ve approach

and

integrated

missions

Most UN,

AU, EU

and NATO

operations

Counterin

g armed

groups

Direct

military

engageme

nt (enemy-

centric) or

indirect

(populatio

Defeat

insurgen

ts, (re-

)establis

h peace

and

security

Coexist,

compete,

potential

conflict

CMGR;

FM-3.24

(US);

AJP-3.4.4

(NATO);

IHL/Gene

Disproportio

nate use of

force;

politicization

of

humanitarian

efforts

Operation

Enduring

Freedom

(OEF);

MONUSC

O

‘interventio

n brigade’


22

n-centric) va

Conventio

ns

Protocol

II

(DRC);

ISAF

(Afghanista

n)

Internatio

nal Armed

Conflict

Defeat the

enemy

forces

Pave

way for

political

surrende

r and

peace

accords

Coexist IHL Denial of

humanitarian

access;

failure of

occupying

power to

provide

security

US

invasion of

Iraq 2003;

Georgia-

Russia war

2008


23

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Military and Humanitarian Actors

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