Making Cooperation Work Informal Governance in the EU and Beyond (forthcoming with Cornell University Press, 2013)
Mareike Kleine European Institute London School of Economics
UNC Chapel Hill Center for European Studies
7 September 2012
The EU as an International Organization Background
Commonalities: - Organization of 27 states based on international treaties - No monopoly of violence, although strong legal system
Differences: - Far more ambitious objective (a genuine Internal Market) - Legislative process at its core constantly produces rules
EU is most successful international organization to date
The “Community Method” (conventional wisdom)
Commission
Council
European Parliament
Commission
Nat. Admin.
Agencies
Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
The Puzzle: Why Informal Governance?
AGENDA SETTING
VOTING
IMPLEMENTATION
The “Community Method” (reality)
Commission Council
European Parliament
European Council
COREPER Working Groups Comitology Expert groups
Presidency
Nat. Admin.
Agencies
European Council
Presidency
Commission
Pre-Setting Agenda Setting Decision-Making Implementation
Why Informal Governance? Central Argument
Informal Governance (IG) adds flexibility to sometimes overly rigid legal rules.
It serves to resolve potentially disruptive conflicts that cooperation may suddenly generate at the domestic level.
Formal and informal rules complement each other in order to sustain a level of cooperation that would otherwise be
impossible to sustain.
Structure of Talk
1 Theory
2 Empirical Strategy and Evidence
3 Informal Governance and the Eurocrisis
4 Positive and Normative Implications
Liberal Regime Theory The demand for added flexibility
Commitments create value by managing expectations.
But: Commitments are subject to shocks.
EU: Shocks to the domestic politics of collective action.
Demand for situational flexibility
Liberal Regime Theory The supply of added flexibility
Informal norm of discretion: states should collectively depart from rules to accommodate gov under pressure
Norm remains informal b/c it serves to resolve conflicts that are fundamentally political in nature.
Adjudicating government resolves tension between commitment and suspension of rules.
Formal and informal elements complement each other to achieve and sustain level of economic integration.
Liberal Regime Theory Testable Implications
1) Variation in practices of informal governance: Issue-specific: with propensity for shocks Over Time: simultaneously and constant
2) Institutions to cope with moral hazard: Adjudicatory authority of “biased” government Co-evolution of authority and informal governance
Making Cooperation Work Table of Content
Introduction and Theory
Informal Governance in the EC (1959-2009) Formal and Informal Governance Agenda Setting Voting Implementation
Coping with Moral Hazard Institutional Solutions to Moral Hazard The Council Presidency Agenda and Adjudication Case Studies
Conclusion and Extension
Evidence I Informal governance in the EC (1959-2009)
Evidence II Coping with Moral Hazard
Descriptive Inference: The Council Presidency systematically accompanies informal governance.
Multivariate Regression: Issues are dropped when Presidency faces incentives to collude with claimant.
Case Studies: Presidency is denied authority when it faces incentives to collude with claimant.
(cf. Kleine 2012, in Review of International Organizations)
Positive Implications EU and IOs
Int’l law and politics: IG complements formal rules by adding political flexibility to them.
Institutions and time: IG renders commitments adaptable to dynamic strategic context.
Autonomy: Informal governance ensures collective state control of supranational actors.
Normative Implications European Union
Input: IG makes EU more responsive, i.e. it includes the voice of those that are most affected by int’l cooperation and reduces salience of EU politics.
Procedure: IG increases makes legislative process opaque.
Output: Domestic distributive effects of EU are weaker than formal rules (and literature) suggests.
Implications for the Eurocrisis
IG (bailout, bond purchase) sustains formal commitment to Euro by adding political flexibility in times of crisis.
Informal governance ensures collective state control of supranational actors such as ECB.
IG has (so far) mitigated the domestic distributive impact of the Eurocrisis; yet
IG has made processes opaque and reduced accountability.