Volume 8 Issue 4 May 2002 Iraq after Saddam

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Current speculation over possible USmilitary intervention to overthrow IraqiPresident Saddam Hussein suggests that‘regime change’ in Baghdad is more likelyto be brought about in the near futureby external intervention than by internalconspiracy. It is worth considering,therefore, what might follow from suchaction. Much that may occur in the wakeof military action cannot be predicted.However, given the enormous problemsassociated with any attempt to ‘refound’Iraqi politics, it is clear that the occupyingpower would have to work through theexisting forces of Iraqi political society –some openly opposed to the currentregime, some closely allied to it and othersdeeply ambivalent.

Conquest and coup d’étatThe impression that the current regimein Baghdad can only be overthrown by aUS-led military invasion is a testimony tothe enduring weakness of those Iraqiforces opposed to Saddam’s government.The failed popular uprisings of 1991,the botched assassination attempts andmilitary conspiracies of the 1990s, and theparochial concerns of the Kurdish RegionalGovernment in northern Iraq have shownthe limits of domestic opposition. The keyquestion now is whether, in the event of afull-scale US invasion of Iraq, one couldexpect things to be much different.

There is some scope to believe that aninvasion would act as a catalyst for dis-affected officers in Iraq’s security forces toturn on Saddam’s regime. An organisedcoalition of senior officers is almostcertainly the only effective internal methodof ousting a regime so well entrenched. Theconspirators must be able both to strike atthe heart of power by killing Saddamhimself and as much of the leadership asthey can in a single blow. They must also

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Iraq after SaddamThe quagmire of political reconstruction

be sure of being able to mobilise sufficientmilitary force to discourage thoughts ofresistance by units commanded by Saddamloyalists. For this reason, successful action ismost likely to come from within the eliteforces of the Republican Guard or theSpecial Republican Guard.

Recruited mainly from the tribal group-ings of the Sunni Arab northwest andofficered in large part by men drawnfrom the clans of the al-Bu Nasir (Saddam’stribe) from the Tikrit region, theseformations are very much part of theregime they are expected to overthrow.Yet, they are riven by the factionalism,personal and clannish rivalries andjostling for advantage that has been socharacteristic of the regime’s patronagesystem. They are also aware that they arebetter placed than others to bring aboutchange. It is thus possible to imaginethat a US invasion, backed by theoverwhelming power at Washington’scommand and promising an outcome asdevastating for the Iraqi armed forces asthat which they endured in Kuwait,would lead senior officers to act.

They might be acting to prevent the useof weapons of mass destruction (WMD),as the regime would certainly be temptedto do if its survival were at stake.However, they would equally be acting toensure that they and their kind – officersand the networks of the Sunni Arab elite –would continue to have a decisive role inIraqi politics after Saddam’s fall. Suchaction would, therefore, be pre-emptive.It would be designed to underline thecoup leaders’ utility to occupying USforces, while preventing the dominance ofthose Iraqi groupings that successive USadministrations have courted for the pastfew years: the Kurds; some of the Shi’a;self-declared liberals, democrats andcommunists; and exiled military officerswith their own agendas and networks.

Whether such a last-minute revoltdoes take place, or whether US forcesoccupy Baghdad unaided by anysubstantial section of the Iraqi state orsociety, Washington would face similarproblems. In essence, these would boildown to the two related questions of howfar the US could go in reshaping orrefounding the Iraqi state and its politics;and on which existing Iraqi forces the UScould rely in seeking to implement itsproject. Actual outcomes will dependupon any number of factors that cannotnot sensibly be predicted at this point.However, it is worth considering thedilemmas that will face a US occupyingforce as it vacillates between two positionsbest characterised as ‘micro-management’and ‘laissez-faire’ respectively.

‘Micro-management’…‘Micro-management’ would entail asustained effort on the part of the US torefound Iraqi politics – not simply thepublic state institutions, but also thenetworks of power, patronage, andexpectations that lie behind and operatethrough those institutions. It would entailintroducing new values into Iraqi publiclife and backing these with powersufficient to ensure that they were seen towork by significant numbers of thepopulation at all levels.

Two immediate problems becomeapparent in such a scenario. First, there isthe absence of Iraqi allies with sufficientsocial clout and determination to carrysuch a project through. All of the presentIraqi opposition forces are ill-suited forthis role. The Kurdish Democratic Partyand the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan cancommand considerable numbers, but onlyin Kurdistan, where their rivalry andpolitical methods stand in stark contrastto their declarations in support of open

© The International Institute for Strategic StudiesVolume 8 Issue 4 May 2002 Iraq after Saddam

Iraq after Saddam page 2

government and democratic accountability.The Shi’i Islamist al-Da’wa party andthose grouped around Sayyid Bakr al-Hakim in the Supreme Council for IslamicRevolution in Iraq enjoy a certainfollowing within Iraq, but their advocacyof political leadership by clerics has in factalienated many among the majority Shi‘aof Iraq. The other smaller parties associatedwith the opposition, both within the IraqiNational Congress and outside it – leftists,constitutional monarchists, liberals andothers – have virtually no following and, ifthe behaviour of some of their leaders isanything to go by, maintain a weak attach-ment to the idea of accountability. Much ofthe declared opposition operates accordingto the rules of patronage, clientelism and,where necessary, intimidation.

Adherence to the rules of a distinctivelyIraqi political game by virtually all playersprovides the second major challenge to theUS. Abandonment of these rules couldlead to formidable resistance. This wouldcome not simply from the residual elitesof the state over which Saddam haspresided, but also from those who fearedthat a new order would turn their worldupside down. For some, the fear would bedomination by the majority Shi’a of Iraq.Ironically, for many of the most organisedamongst the Shi’a – the Islamist parties –the danger would be the introduction ofsecular politics in which they would havelittle say. For others, transparency, account-ability and the idea of truly public servicewould carry the threat that accumulatedprivileges would be stripped from themand their patrons.

Resistance would not necessarily beviolent – at least not initially. It is morelikely to take the form of subversion of the‘democratising project’, if that is what theUS would be seeking to create. This couldhappen in a number of ways. After decadesof oppression, opening up the politicalsphere in Iraq will lead to the settling ofold scores and a revival of sharplyopposing views of Iraq’s future. The risk ofopen conflict in such a heavily armedsociety will tend to privilege the role of thesecurity forces.

… could backfireThe US will train and arm security forcesto maintain social order, almost certainlybuilding on the existing overdevelopedstructures of the Iraqi state. This will tendto reinforce the informal networks thatalready bind many of these individuals toeach other, making them representativeof a certain sector of society – generally theSunni Arab northwesterners – and acertain authoritarian mentality. It will

underline, once again, the indispensablenature of the security forces in thegovernance of Iraq.

The corrosive effects of Iraq’s politicaleconomy on forms of democratic account-ability have also to be considered. Here,the role of Iraq’s oil income will bedecisive, as it constitutes the prize forthose competing for power, under USprotection or otherwise. It also reinforcesthe centralising, authoritarian aspects ofthe economy, as well as the developmentof forms of patronage, which grant tothose disbursing the oil revenuesenormous political power.

In the face of this reassertion of some ofthe characteristic features of Iraqi politicalsociety – clannishness, patron-clientelismand coercive intimidation – the US mayfind itself with allies in Baghdad that areno more than clients, dependent oncontinued support and transmitting USdirectives through the military andeconomic power bestowed conditionallyupon them. Ironically, the US would havebeen manoeuvred into playing a rolewhich was functionally not far removedfrom that of the present regime in Iraq: itwould be the patron, armed withoverwhelming coercive force and financialresources, which would be relying uponits subordinates to ‘deliver’ social orderin Iraq.

This would invite two kinds ofresponse. Domestically, there will be atemptation either to eliminate orintimidate the chief clients of the USoccupying power. Competition for thecentre’s favour would be no less fierce andruthless than it has always been, with rivalfactions – for the most part bearing littleresemblance to the organisations formedin exile or within Iraq to combat Saddamduring the past decades – jostling forposition and for a chance to exercisepower. Violence would be part of thegame, directed both at the clients of the USand at US targets to make a point.

Regionally, such a situation wouldinvite intervention by various neigh-bouring states. Some, such as Iran, wouldbe concerned about the very presenceof the US in Iraq. Others – such as Turkey,Saudi Arabia or Syria – would beconcerned about the influence exercisedby regional rivals or, in the case of Turkeyin particular, by developments inKurdistan. Proxy conflicts and thesponsorship of individuals and parties inthe Iraqi political game would be one wayof ensuring that their interests wereprotected and that the ambitions of theirregional rivals, or indeed of the US, werechecked. For Iraqis already weaklyattached to the idea of national politics, the

temptation to look for such sponsorshipwould be great, in part to counter theinfluence of the US and its clients. The‘spoiler’ role played by such proxyconflicts could be harmful to any idea ofreconstruction.

‘Laissez-faire’ thelikely courseIn such circumstances, it is more thanlikely that the US would find itself veeringtowards a ‘laissez-faire’ role in which itaccepted de facto the power structures ofIraqi political society, many of whichwould be recognisable from Iraq’s recentpast. Thus, the armed forces and securityservices (which can guarantee order)would be recognised. With this wouldcome recognition of much of the informalpolitics of Iraq – communal, tribal andethnic – which has exercised such powerover Iraqi society and which might be ableto find more open expression under therelaxed rules of a broadly tolerantoligarchy. Here a number of the politicalorganisations which have given expressionto such politics – Kurdish, Turcoman,Assyrian and Shi’i – would play prom-inent roles, competing with each other forcommunal representation, rather thanseeking to dominate the state.

As in previous eras, the state wouldbecome the arena for uneasy competitionbetween newly founded coalitionscombining both civilian interests andfactions operating within the armed forces.Proclaiming the ideals of Arab and Iraqinationalism, the struggle would be, asever, for control of the state and its massiveresources. How the competition developswill depend upon a number ofunknowable factors. However, theadvantage will tend to lie with those whocan command the military. Apart fromhaving the means of coercion in theirhands, they could also plausibly claim tobring a certain order to Iraq out of thepotentially fractious scrum of communalpolitics – a communal politics that couldlend itself to regional interference by Iranand Turkey in particular. They would alsohave the advantage that they too might beable to rely on social networks of solidarityparticular to the tribal identities so heavilyrepresented within the Iraqi securityforces. In sum, the prospect for fashioninga post-Saddam government that conformsbehaviourally and in terms of its valueswith Washington’s preferences is subject toenormous practical obstacles, many ofwhich have their roots in a distinctiveand entrenched Iraqi political culture.Remnants of Saddam’s regime wouldprobably live on after his fall.