International tobacco companies
David Simpson
Director, International Agency on Tobacco and Health
Visiting Professor, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine
Honorary Fellow, Clinical Trial Service Unit, Oxford
Editor, News Analysis, Tobacco Control journal
World’s smokers
1.2
1.64
0123456789
billions
1999 2025
SmokersPopulation
From the US Bureau of the Census and World Bank, Curbing the epidemic: Governments and the economics of tobacco control, 1999.
Smoking prevalence: men
4248
25
45
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
1999 2025
Industrialisedcountries
Developingcountries
WHO data
Smoking prevalence: women
24
7
20 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
1999 2025
Industrialisedcountries
Developingcountries
WHO data
World tobacco deaths
4.2
10
0123456789
10
millions
2001 2030
WHO World Health Report 1999 ..
Cumulative tobacco deaths
116
430
140
20
140
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2000-2024 2025-2049
Avoidable if adult smokinghalved by 2020
Avoidable if uptake halvedby 2020
Remaining tobacco deaths
millionsper annum
WHO World Health Report 1999.
Tobacco addiction is a communicated disease:
The vector? Big tobacco
Trans-national tobacco companies’ sales (1990)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60US$ billions
TNC sales &developing countries’ gross domestic product (GDP)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60US$ billions
Philip Morris
BAT
Japan Tobacco
Peru
Bangladesh
Kenya
Senegal
Sri LankaGhana
Hungary
BAT(highest paid director)
£0
£500,000
£1,000,000
£1,500,000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
IATH BAT director
IATH(total income)
&
Annual earnings:
The international tobacco industry
Philip Morris – PM (holding company now known as ‘Altria’)
British American Tobacco – BAT (includes Rothmans)
Japan Tobacco International – JTI (still state-controlled; former JT + non-US business of RJR Reynolds)
Marlboro, Chesterfield,Philip Morris
State Express 555, Lucky Strike, Benson & Hedges, Rothmans
Mild Seven, Salem
also: Altadis (France/Spain, formerly SEITA & Tabacalera);
Imperial (UK), incl. Reemtsma (Germany) ; ITC India (part-BAT);
Monopolies, e.g. Tekel (Turkey), Sampoerna (Indonesia), etc
A brief tobacco industry history of the tobacco epidemic
1940s +50s
1960s + 70s
1980s
1990s
2000-2003
- scientific evidence forces health-related scientific research
- development of government health policy; - industry scientists lose power to marketing executives
- expand international activities; - use toxic reduction health policy as hostage to preserve advertising
- litigation increases; - Minnesota case releases millions of papers; - health advocacy increases
- ‘We’ve changed!’ programmes, e.g. BAT’s ‘Social reports’; - FCTC process puts tobacco on health agenda worldwide; - continue to expand markets as fast as possible
Two unique aspects of the tobacco industry:
The product: highly addictive
very dangerous, at any level of consumption; largest cause of disease, disability & premature death
The people: self-selected group, not concerned by scientific evidence of diseases caused by tobacco
One simple truth about the tobacco industry:
The companies will always fight every effective health policy measure
Senegal
Cape Times, South Africa, Oct 1993
Trinidad, 1998
Uganda, Tanzania & Kenya, Dec 2001
- “We don’t want kids to smoke”
- global ad code (self-regulation…)
- “Let us back into the scientific community”
- community aid programmes
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:
“We don’t want kids to smoke”
Industry ‘Youth Prevention’ programmes:
- public relations strategy: improve image
- ‘proactive’ - industry avoids ad bans
- programme says little on dangers of tobacco
- programmes shown to be ineffective*
- “adult activity” - may encourage kids to smoke *
* DiFranza J & McAfee T. The Tobacco Institute: Helping youth to say ‘yes’ to tobacco.• J Fam Prac 1992,34(6)
“The youth program... support[s] the [Tobacco] Institute’s objective of discouraging unfair... federal, state and local restrictions on cigarette advertising,
by...”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
• “Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure - not advertising - is the cause of youth smoking.
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
• “Reinforcing the belief that peer pressure - not advertising - is the cause of youth smoking.
• “Seizing the political center and forcing the antismokers to an extreme…”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple:
“1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple:
“1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.
“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple:
“1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.
“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.”
“3. Work with and through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the ‘problem’.”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
“The strategy is fairly simple:
“1. Heavily promote industry opposition to youth smoking.
“2. Align industry with broader, more sophisticated view of the problem - that is, parental inability to offset peer pressure.”
“3. Work with and through credible child welfare professionals and educators to tackle the ‘problem’.”
“4. Bait anti-tobacco forces to criticise industry efforts.”
US Tob. Inst. 1/1991
Industry youth programmes:
Uzbekistan
Industry youth programmes:
Middle East
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:
‘global advertising code’ (self-regulation)
“We have analyzed the 9-page agreement and believe that the multinationals' strategy is proactive and is a way to improve their image.”
- Herzog B, Credit Suisse , investors’ briefing.
Oct ‘01
Tobacco industry global advertising code
- a Wall Street analyst’s view:
Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:
“Let us back into science”
- make health policy dependent on tobacco
- split the scientific community
- tie up research resources on non-tobacco topics
- corporate ‘blackmail’ against legislation
‘Tobacco industry ‘We’ve changed’ strategy:“Let us back into science”
“We all decided not to accept the tobacco company [money] in the end & now trying to find alternate source of funding …
“Some time I feel isolated in Pakistan when I give my strong feelings against the tobacco..”
IATH Contact, Karachi, Nov ‘01
Tobacco industry’s ‘science’ programmes
- a note from Pakistan:
Botswana
Senegal, May 1998
Philippines, 1995
Pakistan, May 2000
246
87
105
142 144
123131
175
222
188
241
70
5869
80 8697 97
104 108 109 113112
47
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Contacts Countries
IATH’s Contacts / Countries
1991
2002
International Agency on Tobacco and Health (IATH)
Contacts’ e-mail & web access, Nov 2001
no network accessemail accessemail + web
by Contact (n = 240)
no emailemail/+
by Country (n = 112)
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