Case No:
Filed with: .I
Date of document:
Party filing:
Original language:
Type of doc~ment:
Filed by:
The Prosecutor
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'!.l!L 4.-WI ~ U .. SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR I fBANO"
TRIBUNAL SP£CIAL POUR LE LIRA"
BEFORE THE PRE-1RIAL JUDGE Special Tribunal for Lebanon
STL-11-01I11PTJ
Pre-Trial Judge
10 June 2011
The Prosecutor
English
CONFIDENTIAL AND EX PARTE
THE PROSECUTOR v.
MUSTAF A AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,
HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI & ASSAD HAS SAN SABRA
INDICTMENT
Distribution to:
The Registrar D.A. Bellemare, MSM, QC Mr. Herman von Hebel
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I. Preamble
I. The Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, pursuant to the authority
stipulated in Articles I and II of the Statute for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
charges under Articles 2 and 3 o( the Statute, and thereby under the Lebanese
Criminal Code l and the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the
penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle,2:
a. MUST AF A AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL AYY ASH, HUSSEIN
HASSAN ONEISSI, and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA, each and together with:
Count I - Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act; and
b. MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL AYY ASH, each and
together with:
Count 2 - Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device;
Count 3 - Intentional Homicide (ef Rafik HARIRI) witb premeditation by
using explosive materials;
Count 4 - Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in addition to the Intentional
Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive
materials;
Count 5 - Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the
Intentional Homicide ofRafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using
explosive materials; and
I As translated from Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 2 As translated /Tom Arabic into English by the Languages Services Section of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
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c. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASS AD HASSAN SABRA, each and
together with:
Count 6 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act
by means of an explosive device;
Count 7- Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of
Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials;
Count 8 - Being an Accomplice to tbe felony oflntentional Homicide (of 21
persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARlRI with
premeditation by using explosive materials; and
Count 9 - Being an Accomplice to the felony of Attempted Intentional
Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of
Rafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials.
2. The Indictment contains the Prosecutor's allegations concerning the 14 February 2005
attack that killed Rafik HARIRI and 21 others and that resulted in injury to 231
others. As is the case in all criminal proceedings, the Accused are presumed innocent
until proven guilty in a court of law.
3. The case against the Accused is built in large part on circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, which works logically by inference and deduction, is often
more reliable than direct evidence, which can suffer from first-hand memory loss or
eye-witness distortion. It is a recognised legal principle that circumstantial evidence
has similar weight and probative value as direct evidence and that circumstantial
evidence can be stronger than direct evidence.
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11. The Accused
4. Pursuant to Rule 68(D) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, the name and particulars of the Accused persons on this
indictment are as follows:
a. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE3 (BADREDDINE) (also known as
'Mustafa Youssef BADREDDINE', 'Sami ISSA' and 'Elias Fouad SAAB')
was born on 6 April 1961 in AI-Ghobeiry, Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of
Amine BADREDDINE (father) and Fatima JEZEfNI (mother). His precise
address is not known, though he has been associated with: the property of Khalil
AI-Raii, Abdallah AI-Haij Street, AI-Ghobeiry, in South Beirut; and the AI-Jinan
Building, AI-Odaimi Street, Haret Hreik, in Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon.
His Lebanese civil registration number is 34I1AI-Ghobeiry. BADREDDINE,
under the alias 'Elias Fouad SAAB', was convicted in Kuwait for a series of
terrorist acts there on 12 December 1983, where inter alia suicide bombers drove
trucks loaded with explosives into the French and US embassies. He was
sentenced to death but he escaped from prison when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
b. SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH4 (A YY ASH) was born on 10 November 1963 in
Harouf, Lebanon. He is the son of Jamil Dakhil A YY ASH (father) and Mahasen
[ssa SALAMEH (mother). He has resided inter alia at: AI-Jamous Street, Tabajah
building, Hadath, in South Beirut; and at the A YY ASH family compound in
Harouf, Nabatiyeh in South Lebanon. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese
civil registration is 197/Harouf, his Haij passport number is 059386, and his social
security number is 63/690790.
c. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSIs (ONEISSI) (also known as 'Hussein Hassan
ISSA') was born on 11 February 1974 in Beirut, Lebanon. He is the son of Has san
ONEISSI (also known as 'Hassan ISSA') (father) and Fatima DARWISH
(mother). He has resided in the Ahmad Abbas Building, at AI-Jamous St, near the
] fnArabic~.AI~\~ 4 fn Arabic ~~ ~~ s In Arabic~ u-c.»- . the birth name 'ISSA' having been changed to 'ONEISSI' by judicial declaration on 12 January 2004.
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Lycee des Arts, in Hadath, South Beirut. He is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese
civil registration is 7/Shahour.
d. ASSAD HASSAN SABRA 6 (SABRA) was born on 15 October 1976 in Beirut,
Lebanon. He is the son of Hassan Tahan SABRA (father) and Leila SALEH
(mother). He has resided at apartment 2, 4111 floor, Building 28, Rue 58, in Hadath
3, South Beirut, also described as St. Therese Street, Hadath, in South Beirut. He
is a citizen of Lebanon. His Lebanese civil registration is 1339/Zqaq AI-Blat.
5. The four Accused participated in a conspiracy with others aimed at committing a
terrorist act to assassinate Rafik HARlRJ and their respective roles may be
summarised as follows: BADREDDINE served as the overall controller of the
operation; A YY ASH coordinated the assassination team, which was responsible for
the physical perpetration of the attack; ONEISSI and SABRA had the task of
preparing the false claim of responsibility, which served to identify the wrong people
to investigate, in order to shield the conspirators from justice. As participants in the
conspiracy, all four Accused played important roles in the attack on 14 February 2005
and therefore all four bear criminal responsibility for the results of the attack.
6 In Arabic, 1.Jf'"'I u- .a...l
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Ill. A Concise Statement of the Facts
6. The Prosecutor submits, pursuant to Rule 68(0) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that the following facts have been
ascertained during the ongoing investigation.
A. OVERVIEW
7. On 14 February 2005, at 12:55 on Rue Minet el Hos'n in Beirut, Rafik HARIRI, the
former Prime Minister of Lebanon, was assassinated as a result of a terrorist act in
which a suicide bomber detonated a large quantity of high explosives concealed in a
Mitsubishi Canter van. In addition to killing HARIRI, the explosion killed 21 other
persons (listed in Schedule A) and injured 231 persons (listed in Schedule B).
8. Shortly after the explosion, AI-Jazeera news network in Beirut received a video with a
letter attached on which a man named Ahmad ABU ADASS (ABU ADASS) falsely
claimed to be the suicide bomber on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist group called
. Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'. The video was later broadcast on television.
B. RAFIK "ARIRI
9. Rafik Baha'eddine AL-HARIRI (HARIRI) was born on I November 1944 in the city
of Sidon, Lebanon. HARIRl served as Prime Minister of Lebanon in five
governments from 31 October 1992 to 4 December 1998, and from 26 October
2000 until his resignation on,26 October 2004.
10. From 20 October 2004 until his assassination, HARIRI was a Member of Parliament
and a prominent political figure in Lebanon. Upon resigning as Prime Minister in
2004, he started preparing for parliamentary elections to be held in June 2005.
11. In the morning of 14 February 2005, HA RI RI departed his residence at Quraitem
Palace, in West Beirut, to attend a session of Parliament, located at Place de l'EtoiJe,
Beirut.
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12. Shortly before 11 :00, HARIRI arrived at Parliament where he met with many
Members of Parliament, including his sister, MP Bahia HARJRJ, and MP Marwan
HAMADEH.
13. Shortly before 12:00, HARIRJ left Parliament to go to Cafe Place de l'Etoile, located
nearby where he stayed for approximately 45 minutes.
14. At about 12:45, HARIRl left the Cafe and asked his security detail to prepare the
convoy to go back to his residence for a lunch appointment.
15. At about 12:49, HA RI RI entered his armoured vehicle accompanied by MP Bassel
FULEIHAN and the convoy then departed the Place de l'Etoile. His security detail
had planned to drive back to Quraitem Palace along the coastal road.
16. Approximately 2 minutes ahead of the convoy, the Mitsubishi Canter van slowly
moved towards its final position on Rue Minet el Hos'n. As the convoy passed, the
suicide bomber detonated the explosives.
C. THE COMMUNICATIONS ANALYSIS
17. The evidence gathered throughout the investigation, including witness statements,
documentary evidence and Call Data Records (COR) for mobile phones in Lebanon
has led to the identification of some of the persons responsible for the attack on
HARlRI.
18. Call Data Records contain information such as incoming and outgoing phone
numbers, the date and time of a call, its duration, call type (whether voice or text
message), and the approximate location of mobile phones by reference to the cell
towers which carried a call.
1. MOBILE PHONE NETWORKS
19. Analysis of the COR has revealed the presence of a number of interconnected mobile
phone networks involved in the assassination of HARJRI. Each network consisted of
a group of phones, usually registered under false names, which had a high frequency
of contact with each other.
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20. There are two types of networks, which can be described either as:
a. 'covert networks' where members only call each other; or
b. 'open networks' where members sometimes call others outside the group.
21. The investigation identified five covert and open networks which have been colour-
coded as follows:
a. Red Network: a covert network used by the assassination team and consisting of
_hones (of which.ere particularly active) operational from 4 January 2005, "
Red Network Number
Sbort-Dame
until it ceased all activity 2 minutes before the attack on 14 February 2005. The
Red Network phones are listed below with their short-names:
b. Green Network: a group of. phones that formed a covert network from 13
October 2004 until it ceased all activity on 14 February 2005 about one hour
before the attack. Two of the Green Network phones were used to control and
coordinate the attack. The.Green Network phones were once part of a group of
.phones. Th~reen Network phones are listed below with their short-names:
Green Network Number
Short-name
c. Blue Phones: an open network consisting of.phones operational between
September 2004 and September 2005. Blue Phones were used by the
assassination team inter alia for preparation of the attack and for surveillance of
HARlRI.
d. Yellow Phones: an open network consisting of lip hones activated between 1999
and 2003 and operational until 7 January 2005. Yellow Phones were over time
mostly replaced by Blue Phone use.
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e. Purple Phones: an open network consisting of.a:onventionally used phones
activated before 2003 and operational until 15 or 16 February 2005. Purple
Phones were used to coordinate the false claim of responsibility.
22. Some users of the network phones carried and used multiple phones on the different
networks.
a. The analysis of COR shows many instances where a Red Network phone was
active at the same location, on the same date, and within the same timeframe as
other phones, including a Green Network phone and Blue Phones. It is
reasonable to conclude from these instances that one person is using mUltiple
phones together when over a significant period, the patterns of use for each phone
never deviate in an inexplicable manner, the phones are recorded by cell-towers as
being together over extensive geographical areas, and the phones do not contact
each other. This is called 'CO-LOCATION'.
b. For example,. Blue Phones co-located with. Red Network phones as
follows:
Blue Pbones
Blue Pbones short name Co-located Red Network
23. In addition, analysis of COR shows co-location between network phones and persona)
mobile phones (PMP).
a. A PMP is a phone used for day-to-day matters, including contact with family,
friends and legitimate business associates. In general, a PMP is therefore used to
make calls to people who do not behave in a covert manner and whose identity is
more easily traced.
b. By identifying and then investigating persons who have been in contact with a
PMP, the user of that PMP can be identified.
c. Identifying the user of a phone is called ' ATTRIBUTION'.
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24. Once network phones, subscribed under false names, are shown to be co-locating with
PMPs, then through attribution of a PMP, a person can ultimately be identified by co
location to be the user of a network phone.
2. THE RED NETWORK IS THE ASSASSINATION TEAM
25. The users of the Red Network,.,f whom were in the possession of a co-located
Blue phone, made up the assassination team that killed HARIRI. The _member
assassination team was led by AYYASH and the other.members of that team are
unidentified at present. The assassination team conducted surveillance and physically
carried out the attack. This can be reasonably concluded from the following:
a. The Red Network was covert in nature and functioned in an organised and
disciplined manner because:
i. Red Network users exclusively called each other;
11. AU"Red Network phones were activated in the Tripoli area within
30 minutes of each other on 4 January 2005 which shows that its activation
was coordinated;
Ill. The Red Network phones were all registered under false names; and
IV. Credit was added on all ofthe Red Network phones together in the Tripoli
area within 45 minutes of each other on 2 February 2005 which shows that
the addition of credit was coordinated.
b. The location and concomitant movement of Red Network phones and Blue
PhoDes shows surveillance on HARIRI on at least 15 days before l4 February
2005. Between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, the concomitant
movement of the Red Network phones and co-locating Blue Phones, as
evidenced by the timing and location of calls, often coincided with:
I. the movements ofHARIRl; and
ii. locations relating to HARJRJ, such as his residence at Quraitem Palace in
Beirut or at his villa in Faqra.
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c. The co-located Blue Phones show association with the purchase of the Mitsubishi
Canter van which occurred in Tripoli on 25 January 2005.
d. It may be reasonably concluded that the activity of the Red Network phones on
14 February 2005 shows the execution of the attack on HARIRI because:
i. _fthe Red Network phones were active in Beirut;
ii. The movements of the Red Network phones reflect HARJRI's
movements, starting from the vicinity of his residence at Quraitem palace
in the morning, later moving to the vicinity of Parliament, and then to the
vicinity of the St. Georges Hotel where the attack took place;
iii. The final 33 calls made by the Red Network phones between 11 :00 and
12:53 were mostly in the vicinity of Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel;
iv. At 12:50 the user of a Red Network phone located in the vicinity of
Parliament called the user of a Red Network phone located in the vicinity
of the St. Georges Hotel at the same time as HARIRI left the area of
Parliament in his vehicle convoy which coincides with the Mitsubishi
Canter van moving into its final position for detonation.
e. All Red Network phones ceased use 2 minutes prior to the attack, by which time
the Mitsubishi Canter van had reached its final position. The phones were never
used again.
f. From paragraphs 25(a)-(e) above, it is reasonable to conclude that phone use in
the Red Network is inconsistent with innocent or coincidental communications
and shows instead a coordinated use of these phones to carry out the assassination.
Moreover, it is reasonable to conclude that the movement of the Mitsubishi Canter
van within 2 minutes of the arrival of the convoy cannot be coincidental and must
be the result ofa coordination, demonstrable in the Red Network usage, between
people observing the convoy and the person driving the van.
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3. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED
26. Communications analysis, including co-location, witness statements and documentary
evidence, identified Mustafa Amine BADREDDINE, Salim Jamil A YY ASH,
Hussein Hassan ONEISSI and Assad Hassan SABRA, amongst others as yet
unidentified, as having different roles in the killing of HARlRI and others by a
terrorist act.
27. The Accused used various phones before, during and after the attack.
28. A YY ASH used, over time, at least 8 phones, including a phone in each of the Red
Network, Green Network, Blue Phones and Yellow Phones, and four PMPs.
a. His Red Network phone was
b. His Green Network phone
c. His Blue Phone was
d. His Yellow Phone was and
e. His 4 PMPs were:
i.
ii.
Hi. and
IV.
29. BADREDDINE used, over time, at least 8 phones, including one Green Network
phone and 7 PMPs.
a. His Green Network phone was and
b. His PMPs were:
i.
11.
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iii.
iv.
v.
vi. and
vii.
c. Analysis initially attributed some of the PMPs in paragraph 29(b) to a man named
'Sami ISSA'. Further communications analysis and investigation into 'Sami
ISSA' revealed that this was a false identity being used by BADREDDINE. It
can be reasonably concluded that the background of BADREDDINE as a man
experienced in committing terrorist acts corroborates that 'Sami ISSA' is his alias.
30. ONEISSI used at least one phone, being a Purple Phone, -31. SABRA used at least one phone, being a Purple Phone, namely -32. By analysing their phone use, the respective role of each Accused in the attack
became clear:
a. BADREDDINE on Green.communicated covertly with AYYASH on Green
"and through these calls exercised control over the preparation and execution
of the attack carried out by AYYASH and the other members of the assassination
team.
b. AYY ASH, on both Red. and Blue. coordinated the assassination team
through their respective Red Network phones and Blue Phones.
c. ONEISSI on Purple. and SABRA on Purple. communicated with an
unidentified person who used the to
report on the progress of the false claim of responsibility. During this period,
A YY ASH on PMP. was also in communication with Purple. It is
reasonable to conclude that A YY ASH was monitoring the false claim preparation.
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d. The following section, detailing the Chronology of the Attack, provides greater
detail on the role of each of the Accused. A pictorial representation of these
relationships appears below:
The Control (Green Network)
The Assassination Team (Red Network with co-locating Blue Phones)
The False Claim Team (Purple Network)
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D. CHRONOLOGY OF THE ATTACK
1. Preparations
33. The investigation -uncovered evidence that AYYASH and other members of the
assassination team observed Rafik HARIRI on a number of days prior to the attack.
By comparing the movements of Rafik HARlR1 and the concomitant movement of
the Blue Phones and Red Network phones, it is reasonable to conclude that these
periods of observation were preparatory steps for the assassination. In short, these
parallel movements of HARlRI and the Blue Phones and Red Network phones
cannot be explained as mere coincidence.
34. On at least 20 days between 11 November 2004 and 14 February 2005, AYVASH
and other members of the assassination team, communicating on their Blue Phones
and Red Network phones, carried out acts in preparation for the attack including
observation and surveillance, in order to learn the routes and movements of his
convoy and the position of HARIRI's vehicle within it. Surveillance occurred on at
least 15 days and in particular on 11 November 2004, 1, 7, 14, 20, 28 and 31 January
2005, and 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, I I and 12 February 2005. By doing so, AYVASH and the
assassi~ation team determined the most suitable day, location and method for the
attack, which they then executed on 14 February 2005.
35. As part of the assassination preparations, between 22 December 2004 and 17 January
2005, ONEISSI and SABRA were responsible for locating a suitable stranger who
would be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack
against HARIRl. With ONEISSI falsely calling himself 'Mohammed', the person
they chose was ABU ADASS, a 22-year old Palestinian man, found at the Arab
University Mosque of Beirut, also known as 'the AI-Houry Mosque'.
a. The activity of ONEISSI and SABRA is illustrated inter alia by the fact that their
Purple Phones, Purpl~ and Purpl~ registered against the cell-tower
covering the mosque on 11 days, being on 22, 29, 30, and 31 December 2004 and
I, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 17 January 2005. ONEISSI and SABRA would later deliver
the video for broadcast, accompanied by a letter in Arabic, after the assassination.
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b. ONEISSI and SABRA have a history of contact with the unidentified person on
Purple. In particular, SABRA ~as been in contact 213 times with Purple.
between 7 January 2003 and 14 February 2005, and ONEISSI 195 times with
Purple. between 25 June 2003 and 26 January 2005. This pattern of phone
usage shows both compartmentalisation and that Purple" served as the
intermediary between AYY ASH and ONEISSI and SA BRA.
c. Between 4 December 2003 and 6 February 2005, the unidentified person on
Purple. was in contact 32 times with AYYASH on PMP. PMP. and
PMP. and in particular 7 times on PMP. between 23 January 2005 and 6
February 2005.
36. Between 1 January 2005 and 14 February 2005, often during activity by the
assassination team, BADREDDlNE on Green. was in contact 59 times with
A YY ASH on Green.
37. On 4 January 2005, the"Red Network phones were activated in the Tripoli area
over a period of approximately 30 minutes._Blue Phone and.Yellow Phones
were in the vicinity at the time of activation.
38. On 11 January 2005, AYYASH visited the area of AI-Beddaoui in Tripoli where
vehicle showrooms are located including the one from which the Mitsubishi Canter
van would be purchased on 25 January 2005. From the same area, AYY ASH, on
Green. contacted BADREDDINE twice on Green.
39. On 16 January 2005, at about 07:00, ABU ADASS left his home to meet with
ONEISSI calling himself 'Mohammed'. ABU ADASS has been missing since that
day.
40.
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41. On 20 January 2005, HARIRl was scheduled to attend the Grand Mosque of Beirut in
the morning but instead attended the Imam AIi Mosque for Eid prayers. All active
Red Network phones operated for less than one hour in the areas surrounding
Quraitem Palace and the Grand Mosque. A YY ASH, on Red. participated in the
observations on that day.
42. On 25 January 2005,. relevant Blue Phones were active, including Blue.
belonging to A YV ASH who made 16 calls. In particular:
a. Between 14:41 and 14:59, AYVASH on Blue_in Beirut was in contact 3 times
with a member of the assassination team on Blue.who was in the Tripoli area.
b. At 15:10, AYYASH on Green.called BADREDDINE on Green_for 81
seconds.
c. Between 15:30 and 16:00, the member of the assassination team on Blue.
with another unidentified person, both giving false names, purchased for $11250
in cash a Mitsubishi Canter van with engine block number 4033-J01926 from a
vehicle showroom in the AI-Beddaoui area of Tripoli. The assassination team later
used the vehicle to carry the explosives in the attack.
d. At 15:37, the member of the assassination team on Blue_during the purchase
negotiations called A YY ASH on Blue.for 8 I seconds.
e. It is a reasonable conclusion from these calls that BADREDDlNE authorised the
purchase of the Mitsubishi Canter van through A YV ASH, and AYY ASH then
coordinated it.
43. On 28 January 2005, HARIRI stayed at Quraitem Palace throughout the day. The
assassination team, using the Red Network phones, including A YV ASH on Red.
operated for more than six hours around Quraitem Palace and HARlRl's residence in
Faqra.
44. On 31 January 2005, HARlRI was at Quraitem Palace before going to the Higher
Shiite Council, later returning to the Palace. The assassination team, using the Red
Network phones, were actiye for less than three hours covering the period before,
during and after HARIRI's movements. They were located around Quraitem Palace
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and the Higher Shiite Council when HARIRI was present. In both areas and in the
same timeframe, A YY ASH used Red. Blue_and Green. In particular, on
Green~ he was in communication I1 times between 10:49 and 12:07 with
BADREDDINE on Green.
45. On 2 February 2005, the credit of the~ed Network phones was topped up in
Tripoli over a 45 minute period. In the same vicinity, within 10 minutes of the top-up,
one member of the assassination team, on Blue. called another member of the
assassination team on Blue" Later, while travelling back to Beirut, the same
member of the assassination team, on Blue. was in communication 3 times with
A YY ASH in Beirut on Blue_
46. On 3 February 2005, HARIRl had a meeting close to his residence before going to the
St. Georges Yacht Club for lunch and later returning to Quraitem Palace._Red
Network phones were active for more than 4 hours and some co-locating Blue
Phones for 10nger._Red Network phones were active around· Quraitem Palace,
and.Red Network phones (with.Blue Phones) around the St. Georges Yacht Club
at the same time that HARJRI was having lunch there. In particular:
a. AYY ASH, on Red" was around the St. Georges Yacht Club and in regular
contact with other members of the assassination team.
b. Between 13:56 and 15:44, AYYASH had contact four times on Green.with
BADREDDINE on Green"
c. By around 15:44, A YY ASH and BADREDDINE were in the same area, in close
proximity to HARIRI and to the location that would be used for the attack on 14 , February 2005.
47. On 8 February 2005, HARlRJ's movements and those of the assassination team are
similar to their respective movements on 14 February 2005, being the day of the
attack. HARIRI was at Quraitem Palace in the morning before attending Parliament
and afterwards returning to the Palace at around 13:45.~ed Network phones and
their co-located Blue Phones were mainly active around Quraitem Palace, Parliament
and the routes normally used by HARIRI to travel between both locations. In
particular:
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a. AYY ASH was active on Re~ Blu~ Gree~ and on his PMP _and
PM~, at relevant locations, in particular around Parliament and where the
attack would take place on 14 February 2005.
b. At 13:40 and 15:05, AYVASH on Gree"'was twice in communication with
BADREDDINE on Gree.-.
2. The Attack
48. On 14 February 2005, the assassination team consisting of A YY ASH and. others
positioned themselves in locations where they were able to track and observe
HARIRI's convoy from his residence at Quraitem Palace in Beirut to Parliament and
thereafter, travelling back to his residence, into the area of the St. Georges Hotel.
T~ey kept in frequent contact with each other on their Red Network phones and their
co-located Blue Phones. In particular, there were 33 calls within the Red Network
between 11 :00 and 12:53. Significant calls included:
a. At 11 :58, A YY ASH, on Gree~ while positioned close to the area of the St.
Georges Hotel, contacted BADREDDINE on Gree..- for 14 seconds. The
Green Network phones were never used again. It is reasonable to conclude from
this last Green Network call that BADREDDlNE issued the final authorisation
for the attack.
b. At 12:50:34, as HARJRI was leaving Parliament to drive home, Re~ located
near Parliament, called for 5 seconds to Re«tlllocated near the St. Georges
Hotel and near the Mitsubishi Canter van. Immediately after, at 12:50:55, Red
_then called A YV ASH on Re~ for 10 seconds who was located between
Parliament and the St. Georges Hotel. At around this time, from a location close to
AYY ASH, the van began moving towards the St. Georges Hotel. It is reasonable
to conclude from these calls that the assassination team member on Re~
informed AY,Y ASH and another member on Re<llll of HARIRI's departure
from Parliament so that the van could move into its final position for attack.
c. At 12:53, the last ever call within the Red Network took place, from Re~in
the area of Parliament to R~ nearby. By that time, all members of the
assassination team had been informed ofHARlRJ's final movements.
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49. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:52, closed-circuit TV footage shows the Mitsubishi
Canter van move slowly towards the st. Georges Hotel.
50. On 14 February 2005, at about 12:55, a male suicide bomber detonated a large
quantity of high explosives concealed in the cargo area of the Mitsubishi Canter van
with engine block number 4033-J01926, killing HARIRI as his convoy of six
vehicles on Rue Minet el Hos'n passed the St. Georges Hotel.
51. The explosion took place on a busy public street and was enormous and terrifying.
Forensic examination has established the quantity of explosives was approximately
2500 kilogrammes of TNT (trinitrotoluene) equivalent. In addition to HARIRJ, 8
members of his convoy and 13 members of the public were killed. Not including the
suicide bomber, the explosion killed a total of 22 persons. Due to the size of the
explosion, the attack attempted to kill a further 231 persons who were injured, and
also caused partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings.
52. Fragments of the suicide bomber were recovered at the scene and forensic
examination has established both that the remains were: (a) of a male, and (b) not of
ABU ADASS. The identity of the suicide bomber remains unknown.
3. Delivery of the Video
53. Starting about 75 minutes after the attack, ONEISSI and SABRA made a total of 4
calls to the offices of the Reuters and AI-Jazeera news networks in Beirut. All 4
phone calls were made using the same prepaid Telecard 6162569 from 4 different
public payphones:
a. At about 14: 11, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, claimed to Reuters
that a fictional fundamentalist group called' Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'
executed the attack.
b. At about 14: 19, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, uttered into the phone
to AI-Jazeera a claim of responsibility from 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria',
a report of which was broadcast shortly after.
c. At about 15:27, SABRA called AI-Jazeera and gave information on where to find
a videocassette which had been placed in a tree at the ESCW A Square near the
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AI-Jazeera offices at Shakir Ouayeh building, Beirut. ONEISSI was watching the
location to confirm receipt by AI-Jazeera of the videocassette. On the video, ABU
ADASS claimed responsibility for the attack, that it was in support of'Mujahidin'
in Saudi Arabia, and that further attacks would follow. Attached to the
videocassette was a letter in Arabic which stated in/er alia that ABU ADASS was
the suicide bomber.
d. At about 17:04, ONEISSI or SABRA, both acting together, demanded with
menace that Al-Jazeera broadcast the video, which was done shortly after.
54. On 14 February 2005, ONEISSI and SABRA delivered the ABU ADASS
videocassette while using their Purple Phones close to the public payphones which
they used to call Reuters and AI Jazeera and close to the tree in which ,the
videocassette was hidden.
55. On 14 February 2005, between about 14:03 and 17:24, before, between and after
these 4 public payphones calls to the news networks, SABRA on Purple.was in
contact with the unidentified person on Purple.on 7 occasions.
56. On 15 February 2005, Purple. ceased being used.
57. On 16 February 2005, ONEISSI's Purple_and SABRA's Purple~ceased
being used.
E. THE CRIMINAL AGREEMENT
1. The Conspiracy
58. The facts as outlined above show that a conspiracy had come into existence by
sometime between at least 11 November 2004 and 16 January 2005. In the
conspiracy, BADREDDINE, AVYASH, ONEISSI and SABRA, together with
others as yet unidentified, including the assassination team and the person on Purple
_ agreed to commit a terrorist act by means of an explosive device in order to
assassinate HARIRl.
a. The conspiracy began sometime between at least 11 November 2004 and 16
January 2005, and was executed on 14 February 2005. This is ~cause:
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i. On I1 November 2004 two unidentified conspirators, using Blue Phones,
carried out the first detected surveillance ofHARlRI; and
ii. By 16 January 2005 the Red Network had been established and ABU
ADASS was missing; while
iii. The conspiracy was then executed on 14 Febmary 2005 with the attack on
HARIRl.
b. BADREDDINE, as the controller, AYY ASH, as the assassination team
coordinator, and the other members of the assassination team were early members
of the conspiracy.
c. ONEISSI and SABRA together with the unidentified person on Purple~
joined the conspiracy at the latest by between 22 December 2004 and 16 January
2005 with the task of preparing the false claim of responsibility. This timeframe
starts on 22 December 2004 because inter alia the Purple Phones of ONEISSI
and SA BRA were then active around the Arab University Mosque of Beirut
where ABU ADASS prayed. In the conspiracy, they agreed to act as accomplices
performing supporting tasks for the assassination, namely:
i. to seek a suitable individual, later identified as ABU ADASS, who would
be used to make a false claim of responsibility, on a video, for the attack
against HARIRl; and,
ii. to deliver the video, with a letter attached, for broadcast after the
assassination.
59. All four Accused are supporters of Hezbollah, which is a political and military
organisation in Lebanon.
a. In the past, the military wing of Hezbollah has been implicated in terrorist acts.
Persons trained by the military wing have the capability to carry out a terrorist
attack, whether or not on its behalf.
b. BADREDDINE and A YY ASH are related to each other through marriage and
together to a certain Imad MUGHNIY AH: they are brothers-in-law. Imad
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MUGNIYAH was a founding member of Hezbollah a~d in charge of its milit~
wing from 1983 until he was killed in Damascus on 12 February 2008. He was
wanted internationally for terrorist offences.
c. Based on their experience, training and affiliation with Hezbollah, therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that BADREDDINE and A YY ASH had the capability to
undertake the 14 February 2005 attack.
60. All who concluded or joined the criminal agreement were perpetrators of the
conspiracy against state security. BADREDDINE, AYYASH, and the assassination
team, were perpetrators of the substantive offences of committing a terrorist act,
intentional homicide of HARJRI, and of 21 others, and attempted intentional
homicide of 231 others. ONEISSI, SABRA, and the unidentified person on Purple
.were accomplices to the above substantive offences by preparing and delivering
the false claim of responsibility.
61. It is reasonable to conclude that the aim of the conspiracy, to which all conspirators
knowingly agreed, was to commit a terrorist act by detonating a large quantity of
explosives in a public place, in order to kill HARIRl.
, 62. The conspirators had two additional goals, namely:
a. To create a false claim of responsibility on behalf of a fictional fundamentalist
group named 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria', to identify the wrong people to
investigate, and so shield the conspirators from justice; and
b. By doing so, to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack.
2. Blaming Others
63. Phone use shows that the conspirators, including A YY ASH and other members of the
assassination team, as well as the false claim team, were centred in South Beirut.
64. To create a false trail away from Beirut, the conspirators chose Tripoli for certain
traceable acts, such as:
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a. On 4 January 2005, the.Red Network phones were first activated, including the
number used by A YY ASH, traceably in Tripoli.
b.
c. On 25 January 2005, the device employed to carry the explosives for the terrorist
act, namely the Mitsubishi Canter van, was traceably purchased in Tripoli.
d. On 2 February 2005, the credit of each of the~ed Network phones was
traceably topped up in Tripoli.
65. The conspirators expected that the false trail, together with the false claim of
responsibility by ABU ADASS, would cause the authorities to investigate others in
Tripoli, and so shield the conspirators from justice by shifting attention away from
Beirut.
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IV. The Counts
66. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 68(0) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the Prosecutor charges the Accused persons with the
following counts:
COUNT ONE
Statement of Offence
67. Conspiracy aimed at committing a Terrorist Act,
a. pursuant to Articles 188,212,213, 270, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,
and
b. Articles 6 and 7 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the
penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and
c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
68. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE, SALIM JAMIL AYYASH, HUSSEIN
HASSAN ONEISSI, and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,
a. between at least the eleventh day of November 2004 and the sixteenth day of
January 2005,
b. together with others unidentified,
c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared
intent,
d. concluded or joined an agreement, aimed at committing a terrorist act intended to
cause a state of terror by a predetermined means liable to create a public danger,
e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place
of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARJRI,
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f. which intentionally with premeditation should,
g. or they foresaw and accepted the risk would,
h. kill and attempt to kill others in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, and cause
the partial destruction of buildings,
I. all of which they agreed as two additional goals of the said conspiracy
i. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield
themselves from justice, and
ii. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack,
j. and in so doing thereby. together they committed a conspiracy against state
security.
COUNT TWO
Statement of Offence
69. Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an explosive device,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 212, 213, and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code, and
b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for
sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and
c. Article 3( I)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
70. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,
a. on the fourteenth day of February 2005,
b. together with others unidentified,
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c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared
intent,
d. committed a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to
create a public danger,
e. namely by the assassination by means of a large explosive device in a public place
of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,
f. thereby bringing about the detonation at 12:55 on the fourteenth day of February
2005 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut, Lebanon, being a public street, of
approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT equivalent,
g. and, it being an aggravating circumstance that, in so doing,
i. resu Iting in the deaths of Rafik HARIRI and 21 other persons, and
ii. in the partial destruction of the St. Georges Hotel and nearby buildings,
h. while also attempting to kill 231 other persons.
COUNT THREE
Statement of Offence
7l. Intentional Homicide (of Raftk HARlRl) with premeditation by using explosive
materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 212, 213, 547 and 549(1) and (7), of the Lebanese
Criminal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
72. MUSTAFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMll.. A YY ASH,
a. on the fourteenth day of February 2005,
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b. together with others unidentified,
c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators with shared
intent,
d. committed the intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRl,
e. in the aggravating circumstance of
I. premeditation, and
ii. by bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,
Lebanon, of explosive materials of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of
TNT equivalent.
COUNT FOUR
Statement of Offence
73. Intentional Homicide (of21 persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide ofRafik
HARIRl) with premeditation by using explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,212,213,547 and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese
Crim inal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
74. MUSTAFA AMlNE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,
a. on the fourteenth day of February 2005,
b. (or subsequently as a result of injuries sustained on the fourteenth day of February
2005),
c. together with others unidentified,
d. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,
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e. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared
intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime
Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,
f. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of
the general public in the vicinity,
g. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within
the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,
h. by then bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,
Lebanon, being a public street, of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT
equivalent,
i. thereby with shared intent,
j. and in the aggravating circumstance of
i. premeditation, and
ii. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,
k. committed the intentional homicide, as named alphabetically in Schedule A,
I. of eight members ofthe said convoy, namely:
L Yahya Mustafa AL-ARAB,
2. Omar Ahmad AL-MASRI,
3. Mazen Adnan AL-ZAHABI,
4. Mohammed Saadeddine DARWISH,
5. Bassel Farid FULElHAN (who died on 18 April 2005 as a result of
injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),
6. Mohammed Riyadh Hussein GHALA YEENI,
7. Talal Nabih NASSER, and
8. Ziad Mohammed TARRAF;
m. and of thirteen members of the general public, namely:
1. Joseph Emile AOUN,
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2. Zahi Halim ABU RJEIL Y (who died on 15 February 2005 as a result
of injuries sustained on 14 February 2005),
3. Mahmoud Saleh AL-HAMAD AL-MOHAMMED,
4. Mahmoud Saleh AL-KHALAF,
5. Sobhi Mohammed AL-KHODR,
6. Rima Mohammed Raif BAZZI,
7. Abdo Tawfik BOU FARAH,
8. Yamama Kamel DAMEN,
9. Abd AI-Hamid Mohammed GHALA YEENI,
10. Rawad Hussein Suleiman HAIDAR,
11. Farhan Ahmad ISSA,
12. AlaaHassan OSFOUR, and
13. Haitham Khaled OTHMAN (who died on 15 February 2005 as a result
of injuries sustained on 14 February 2005).
COUNT FIVE
Statement of Offence
75. Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231 persons in addition to the Intentional
Homicide ofRafik HARIRI) with premeditation by using explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 200, 212, 213, 547, and 549(1) and (7) of the
Lebanese Criminal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
76. MUST AFA AMINE BADREDDINE and SALIM JAMIL A YY ASH,
a. on the fourteenth day of February 2005,
b. together with others unidentified,
c. each bearing individual criminal responsibility as co-perpetrators,
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d. by using a large quantity of explosive materials in a public place with shared
intent and premeditation to commit the intentional homicide of former Prime
Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI, within his motor convoy,
e. in addition, either intending to kill members of the said convoy and members of
the general public in the vicinity,
f. or by reason of foreseeing and accepting the risk that deaths would occur within
the said motor convoy and among the general public in the vicinity,
g. by then bringing about the detonation at 12:55 at Rue Minet el Hos'n, Beirut,
Lebanon, of approximately 2500 kilogrammes of TNT equivalent,
h. thereby, with shared intent,
i. and in the aggravating circumstance of
i. premeditation, and
ii. by bringing about the said detonation of explosive materials,
j. in so causing injury in the explosion to persons from the said convoy and general
public, attempted to commit the intentional homicide of 231 other persons, as
named alphabetically in Schedule B.
COUNT SIX
Statement of Offence
77. Being an Accomplice to the felony of Committing a Terrorist Act by means of an
explosive device,
a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5), and 314 of the Lebanese Criminal Code,
and
b. Article 6 of the Lebanese Law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing the penalties for
sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle', and
c. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statut~ of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. ?
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Particulars of Offence
78. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,
a. between not later than the sixteenth day of January 2005 and the fourteenth day of
February 2005,
b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of
February 2005 then did,
c. commit a terrorist act intended to cause a state of terror by a means liable to create
a public danger, namely by means of a large explosive device in a public place;
d. which the co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:
I. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield
themselves from justice; and
11. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack;
e. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit
the said terrorist act,
f. together with shared intent,
I. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an
accomplice to the terrorist act, and
ii. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
g. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory
to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice,
which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group so as to add
to the state ofterror, as follows:
J. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old
Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create a false
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claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence on
behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jlhad in Greater Syria '; and
11. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then
ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of
responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon
immediately after the said offence.
COUNT SEVEN
Statement of Offence
79. Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of Rafik HARIRI)
witb premeditation by using explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188,219(4) and (5),547, and 549(1) and (7) of the Lebanese
Criminal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
80. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,
a. between not later than the sixteenth day of January 2005 and the fourteenth day of
February 2005,
b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of
February 2005 then did,
c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide
of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARlRI;
d. which the co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:
i. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield
themselves from justice; and
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11. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack;
e. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to commit
the said intentional homicide of Rafik HARIRI,
f. together with shared intent,
i. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an
accomplice to the intentional homicide of Rafik HARlRI, and
11. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
g. agreed with the co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts preparatory
to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice,
which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group so as to add
to the state of terror, as follows:
i. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old
Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create a false
claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence on
behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and
ii. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then
ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of
responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon
immediately after the said offence.
COUNT EIGHT
Statement of Offence
81. Being an Accomplice to tbe felony of Intentional Homicide (of 21 persons in
addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARlRI) with premeditation by using
explosive materials,
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a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189, 219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the
Lebanese Criminal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute ofthe Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
82. HUSSEIN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASS AD HASSAN SABRA,
a. between not later than the sixteenth day of January 2005 and the fourteenth day of
February 2005,
b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of
February 2005 then did,
c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide
of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRl,
d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they
intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would kill others in the
vicinity of the explosion,
e. and who thereby committed the intentional homicide of21 others,
f. which the said co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:
i. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield
themselves from justice; and
ii. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack;
g. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to kill
others in addition to killing Rafik HARJRI,
h. together with shared intent,
I. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an
accomplice to the intentional homicide of21 others, and
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ii. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
i. agreed with· the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts
preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves
from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group
so as to add to the state of terror, as follows:
i. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old
Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create a false
claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence on
behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria'; and
ii. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then
ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of
responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon
immediately after the said offence.
COUNT NINE
Statement of Offence
83. Being an AccompJice to the felony of Attempted Intentional Homicide (of 231
persons in addition to the Intentional Homicide of Rafik HARIRI) with
premeditation by using explosive materials,
a. pursuant to Articles 188, 189,200,219(4) and (5), 547 and 549(1) and (7) of the
Lebanese Criminal Code, and
b. Article 3(1)(a) of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
Particulars of Offence
84. HUSSElN HASSAN ONEISSI and ASSAD HASSAN SABRA,
a. between not later than the sixteenth day of January 2005 and the fourteenth day of
February 2005,
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b. knowing that others as co-perpetrators intended to, and on the fourteenth day of
February 2005 then did,
c. commit with premeditation by using explosive materials the intentional homicide
of the former Prime Minister, and leading political figure, Rafik HARIRI,
d. which in addition, as shown by the large quantity of explosive materials used, they
intended, or foresaw and accepted the risk, that this act would attempt to kill
others in the vicinity of the explosion,
e. and who thereby committed the attempted intentional homicide of231 others,
f. which the said co-perpetrators agreed as two additional goals:
i. to blame falsely on others in a fictional fundamentalist group so to shield
themselves from justice; and
ii. to add to the state of terror, by raising in the mind of the population
insecurity and fear of further indiscriminate public attack;
g. ONEISSI and SABRA, knowing the intent of the said co-perpetrators to attempt
to kill others in addition to killing Rafik HARIRI,
h. together with shared intent,
i. each bearing individual criminal responsibility and participating as an
accomplice to the attempted intentional homicide of231 others, and
ii. each aiding and abetting the co-perpetrators of the felony,
i. agreed with the said co-perpetrators to perform, and then performed, acts
preparatory to the offence, and acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves
from justice, which would falsely blame others in a fictional fundamentalist group
so as to add to the state of terror, as follows:
i. as preparatory to the offence, by identifying and then using a 22-year old
Palestinian man named Ahmad ABU ADASS in order to create a false
claim of responsibility from him on video for the forthcoming offence on
behalf of a group called 'Victory and Jihad in Greater Syria '; and
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11. as acts to shield the co-perpetrators and themselves from justice, by then
ensuring the video, with the attached letter, of the false claim of
responsibility would be broadcast on the television in Lebanon
immediately after the said offence.
[Redacted] Original signed
D.A. Bellemare, MSM QC The Prosecutor
This 10th day ofJune 2011, Leidschendam, The Netherlands
9384
Word Count
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Schedule A
Below is an alphabetical list of 21 other persons intentionally or foreseeably killed as a direct
consequence of the public explosion on 14 February 2005 intended to kill the fonner Prime
Minister Rafik HARJRI, and who Counts 4 and 8 plead were each and collectively subject to
intentional homicide with premeditation.
In addition to Rafik HARIRI, eight members of Rafik HARIRI's motor convoy were
killed, (following in alphabetical order):
died 14 February 2005,
cause of death - burns due to an explosion.
2. Omar Ahmad R.1"'iVUIsn
died 14 February 2005, cause of death - (not provided on death
certificate ).
3.
cause of death - bums to more than 90% of the body due to an explosion.
4. Mohammed Saadeddine Darwisb,
cause of death - heart attack due to explosion of 14 February 2005 and bums to entire
body.
5. Bassel Farid Fuleihan,
6.
Mr. Fuleihan was a Member of Parliament who was travelling with
Mr. HARlRl. He initially survived the explosion but received third degree burns to
96% of his body. He was flown to Paris for emergency treatment. He remained in
hospital in a coma for 60 days before he died on 18 April 2005.
died 14 February
2005, cause of death - burns due to an explosion.
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9.
7. Talal Nabih Nasser,
died 14 February 2005, cause of death - bums
due to an explosion.
8. Ziad Mohammed Tarraf,
2005, cause of death - bums due to an explosion.
In addition, thirteen public bystanders were also killed (following in alphabetical
order):
2005, cause of death - crushed and disfigured in explosion.
cause of death - blockage of the respiratory tract as a result of the heavy accumulation
of debris due to an explosion in the St. Georges area.
11. Mahmoud Saleh AI-Hamad AI-Mohammed,
_ died 14 February 2005, cause of death - explosion leading to death.
12. Mahmoud Saleh AI-Khalaf,
February 2005, cause of death - explosion leading to death.
13. Sobhi Mohammed AJ-Khodr,
14. Rima Mohammed Raif Bazzi,
2005, cause of death - multiple injuries caused by the St. George's explosion.
15. Abdo Tawflk Bou Farah,
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February 2005, cause of death - explosion of the brain as a result of shattering of the
skull due to a bomb explosion.
16. Yamama Kamel DarneD,
cause of death - burns due to an explosion.
17. Abd AI-Hamid Mohammed GhalayeeDi,
2005, cause of death - injuries due to an explosion.
18. Rawad Hussein Suleiman Haidar,
cause of death - cardiac and respiratory arrest due to an explosion.
19. Farhan Ahmad 18sa,
20. Alaa Hassan Osfour,
cause of death - burns due to an explosion.
21. Haitham Khaled OthmaD,
2005, cause of death - [illegible] ... explosion.
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Schedule B
Below is an alphabetical list of 231 persons7 intentionally or foreseeably injured as a direct
consequence of the public explosion intended to kill the former Prime Minister Rafik
HARlRI and who Counts 5 and 9 plead were each and collectively subject to attempted
intentional homicide with premeditation.
1 This figure and the listed names are subject to change. as further evidence is gathered.
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