8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
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Royal nstitute of Philosophy
Images, Supposing, and Imagining
Author(s): Annis FlewSource: Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 106 (Jul., 1953), pp. 246-254Published by: on behalf ofCambridge University Press Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748100Accessed: 24-11-2015 00:33 UTC
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
2/10
IMAGES, SUPPOSING,
AND
IMAGINING
ANNIS
FLEW,
B.A.
[I
should
like
to
acknowledge my gratitude
to A.
G. N.
Flew forhis
frequent
discus-
sions
on
the
subject
of
this
paper
and for
hislcriticisms
f
the
paper
tself;
he is
largely
responsible
for
any
merits
t
may have.]
IN this
paper
I shall
do
three
hings.
irstly,
shall
distinguish
between
hree enses
f
"imagine":
ne n which
the
ontext
makes
clear
that)
the word s
used
to
report
he
occurrence
f
mental
imagery; secondin which"imagined" s used as substantially
equivalent
o
"thought";
nd
a
third
n
which
imagine"
s used as
substantiallyquivalent
o
"suppose."
(And
I shall
argue
that
in
neither
f the two atter
enses
does
imagining
ecessarily
nvolve
imagery.)
econdly,
shall
discuss
Hume's
thesis
bout
magination:
both
because,
lthough
his s set out
as a
plausible
but mistaken)
generalization
bout
psychology,
t
nevertheless
eems
to me
that
Hume
dealt
with a central
philosophicalproblem
concerning
imagination-the
elation
f
descriptions
o
imagery-in way
that
is
suggestive
nd
fruitful;
nd-the main reason for
mentioning
Hume-because
a
study
of
the
relation
etween
magining
when
this
s
imaging)
nd
imaginingwhen
his s
supposing)
will
help
us to
reinterpret
is thesis
from
mistaken ne
about
psychology
into
correct
ne about
ogic
nd
anguage.
Thirdly,
shall
give
the
central
rguments
nd
the
conclusion
f
the
chapter
n
Imagination
in The
Concept
f
Mind,
and comment n them.
Although
yle
is
correct
n
saying
hat
magining-or
t
least
magining
supposing)-
is in some ense-a sensewe shalltry o elucidate-a sophisticated
process,
nd
requires
hat
we
shouldhave earnt
nd
not
forgotten
language;yet
want
o show hat he
rguments
y
which e
reaches
this
conclusion
re
unsatisfactory.hough
omprehensive,
hey
re
crude;
nd
on
the
way
he
manages
o
conceal he
case
of
magining
(imaging).
And
thus
he is
precluded
rom
pplying
is
conclusion
that
magination
s
a
sophisticated rocess
o the
problems
f
the
description
f
mental
magery.
ut,
as I will
show,
his s
precisely
wherewe
should
pply
the
conclusion.
(I) In anydiscussionf magination,ttentionends ocentre n
mental
magery.
his
s
unfortunate.
or
though
may
lways
have
a
mental
mage
f
my
father
umping
five-barred
ate,
o
imagine
something
t
is
not
necessary
o
have
an
image.
"Imagine
what
would
happen
f
your
father
umped
he
gate
at
his
age":
I
require
no
mental
icture
o
makeme
reply
No,
certainly
e
mustn't
o
t";
though
may
s
a
matter ffacthave
had)
an
image.
This
command
("Imagine
whatwould
happen
f
..")
resembles
ne
"Just
uppose
246
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
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IMAGES,
SUPPOSING,
AND
IMAGINING
he were
to do
it"
or
even "Think
of
what
would
happen
f
..."
In certain
uses
"suppose"
and
"imagine"
are
interchangeable.
Furthermore,goodmanymetaphorsboutpicturingndpictures
are in
fact
used without
ntailing
hat
anyone
has an
image.
can
try
o
put
someone
n
the
picture
bout the American
onstitution,
without
necessarily
being
concerned
o
induce
imagery
n
his
unimaginative
mind.
(And
this in
spite
of
the fact that
mental
or
physical
ictures
may help
one
to
teach or
learn
a
subject.
The
main
difference
etween
he two
kinds
of
picture
here
being
that
mental nes
are of ess
use
for
he
purpose
han
physical
nes:
it
is
easy
to
present
he
pupil
with
chart,
nd
say
"this
s
how the
U.S. Constitutionorks";but onehas todescribe mental
icture,
and make
oneself
nderstood,
efore
ne can
even
begin
o
use it in
communication.
recisely
ecause
mental
pictures
re
private
to
one,
whereas
hysical ictures
re
public
to
all.)
Again,
can
say
that
I
had
a
different
icture
f
rock-climbing
efore
began
to
climb:
but
this
may
only
mean that didn'tknow t
rained ll
the
time;
t
does
not
necessarily
nvolve
my
ever
having
had
a
mental
image
of
rope
work
n
Clogwyn
urArddhu.
So far have dealtwith twosenses of "imagine":one,that n
which
to
imagine"
means
"to
have
a mental
picture"-which
call
the
"imaging"
ense
for
xample,
I'm
imagining
hat
t will
look ike
when t is
erected").'
The
other,
hat
n which
imagine
"
means he ame
s
"suppose
p"--which
shall all
the
"propositional
entertainment"
ense,
nd
where
he verb s
usually
n
the
mpera-
tive
(for
xample:
"Imagine
what would have
happened
f
we had
not
had
the
Spitfire").
here
emains
he
third ense f
to
imagine,"
where
f
say
(usually
n
a
past
tense)
I
imagined
"
this
mplies
that amnow tleast doubtful hether isthecase,orknow hat t
is
not
the
case.
(For example:
I
imagined
hat
hey
were
elying
n
some
secret
guarantees.")
shall call
this
the
"(perhaps
mistaken)
thinking"
ense.
These
three
senses
are
radically
different,
nd
demand
individual
attention.
f
we assume
that
"imaging"
is
equivalent
o
"propositional
ntertainment"
e
get
at
the
beginning
to where
rofessor
yle
takes
us
at the
end;
that
s,
we
find
we
have
joined
him n
an
efforto
hush
up
the
scandal of
the
occurrence
f
mental
magery.
t
may
be
possible
o
produceyet
further
enses
f
"imagine,"
nd would ertainlye
possible
furthero subdivide he
senses
we
already
have: but for the
purposes
of
this
paper
it
is
sufficient
o
distinguish
hesethree
major
senses;
noting
n
passing
that
the
sense
of
the
formations
imagination"
nd
"imaginative"
is
not
uniquely
erived rom
imagine"
n
any
one of
these
enses.
I
The context
does
not
by
any
means
invariably
make
it clear
and
certain
whether
or
not
"imagine"
is
being
used
in
this
sense;
which
entails the
occurrence
f
magery.
247
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
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PHILOSOPHY
(2)
Now
for
Hume.
n
the
first
lace
he
ignored
he
possibility
f
our
maginingsupposing)
nything
ithout n
accompanying
mage.
(And, or hatmatter, e also ignoredhepossibilityfour magining
[perhaps
mistakenly hinking]
nything
without
magery.)
n the
second
lace,
he
held that
we could
not
imagine
nything
hat
we
had
not
previously experienced wholly
or
in
part;
".
.. All
simple
ideas
and
impressions
esemble
ach
other;
nd as the
complex
re
formed rom
hem,
we
may
affirm
n
general,
hat
these
wo
pecies
of
perception
re
exactly
orrespondent"T.H.N.,
Everyman,
ol.
i,
p.
13,
para.
3).
The
exception
o thisrule
ay
in
the
case of
the man
who could
magine
shade
of blue
that
he
had
never
met
before,
whenpresented ith colour ard nwhich his hadewasmissing
from
he
scale;
but
"the
nstance
s
so
particular
nd
singular,
hat
it
is
scarce
worth
ur
observing,
nd
does
not merit
hat,
for
t
alone,
we should
lter
ur
general
maxim"
T.H.N.,
Everyman,
ol.
,
p.
15,
para.
2).
Hume
presents
is
argument
hat
images
are
the
product
f
experience
s a
very
safe
empirical eneralization.
e
says
(T.H.N.,
Everyman,
vol.
i,
p.
14,
last
para.),
". .
.
whenever,
by
any
accident,
he
facultieswhich
give
rise
to
any impressions
areobstructedn their perations,s when ne sbornblind rdeaf,
not
only
he
mpressions
re
ost,
but
also
their
orrespondent
deas,
so
that
there
never
ppear
n
the mind
he
east
trace of
either
f
them."
Now
there's
no reason to
suppose
that
he
(or
anyone
lse
at that
ime)
had
done
thorough
esearchn this
point.I
But
the
fact
that
Hume s so certain hat
a blind
man could
have no
idea
of
red,
suggests
hat
forhim hewholematter
s not
imply
ne
of
empirical
research;
nd
though
here
s no
passage
where
e
says
that
t
would
be
logically
mpossible
or
blind
manto
describe
is
visual
magery
ina publicvisual anguagewhich ehimselfnderstood; etthis s,
I
think,
legitimate
einterpretation
o
give
to the
passage
have
quoted.
Though
do not
say
that this s
what
Hume
really
meant.
Hume,
being
a
competent rose
writer nd an
honest
man,
really
meant
what
he
actually aid-except
whenhe
was
being
ronical.)
The
last
passage
quoted
from
Hume at least
suggests
he
following
analysis:
since we
learn
colour
words
by
having
coloured
hings
pointed
ut
to
us,
a man bornblindcould
not
have
learnt
o
apply
colour
words.
f he
claims o have red
mages,
we then
reply youcan'tknowwhat 'red' means." Imaginethatsuch a man
gained
sight;
on
looking
t
a
scarlet
pillar-box
e
comments
you
know,
all these
years
I have
been
having
mages
of
just
that
colour."
Now
thiswould
be
a
very
remarkable
act;
and
we
might
e
very
sceptical
bout
t.
In
the
present
tate
of
neurophysiology
he
only
evidence
hat
can
be
produced
o
prove
t
is
the
man's
testimony
1
William
James quotes
a man who had
done
such
research.
Principles
of
Psychology,
vol. ii,
p.
44.
248
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
5/10
IMAGES,
SUPPOSING,
AND
IMAGINING
after
e
has
got
ight,
nd earnt o
recognize
ed
n
the
normal
way;
and even f we
were
eady
o admit
accepting
is
testimony
r/and
neurophysiologicalvidence) hat,when lind,hehadhadimages f
the
colour
he
now
rightly)
alls
red,
yet
there s no reasonfor
s to
say
that he
knewwhat
the word red" meant
when
he
was blind-
for
hen
he
had
not
earnt he
word;
t
was
pure
oincidence e
used
it
right. Knowing"
when
you get
the
answer
ight y
a
flukes not
knowing.
There s
throughout
ore to Hume's thesis
than
an
unproven
statementn
psychology,
n
assertion
f
psychologicalncapacity;
and
this s most
clearly
een
f we
substitute
orwhat
with
Hume
was always) a case of imagining imaging) nother ase-one of
imagining
propositional
ntertainment).Imagine
uch-and-such-
that Britain
had
a
closed
economy."
here
s no
suggestion
ere
of
a
mental
mage,
for
whateverwould
a
mental
mage
of a
closed
economy
e like? I
need
not have "taken
a
photograph"
f the
whole,
r
part,
of
the
beast
at
any
time;
how
ndeed ould have
done? Nor is there
ny
reason
forus to
generalize
bout
the
psy-
chology
f he
peaker,
is
ability
r
nability
o form
mages.
et
we
can (logically) nlymake n utteranceftheformSupposep" and
understand
t ourselvesf
we
already
know how
to use
language
correctly. imilarly,
hough
may
have
images
which I
can't
describe,
hese
re,
ike
all
images, ecessarily rivate; ifthey
were
not
they
would
be not
mental
mages
but
physical bjects).
f I
am
to
describe
mental
mages
correctly,nderstanding
hat
am
saying
and
not
just
perhaps
be
right
or
intelligible
y
a
fluke)
I
mustbe
able
to
talk
about them
n
public
anguage.
And to
have
learnt
the
language
entails
(in Ryle's
words)
"some
perceiving."
So Hume's nsistencehatbeforewe couldhave a particularmage
(idea)
we must
necessarily
ave had
particular
xperiences
impres-
sions)
an be
reinterpreted
nto thesis
hat o
describe
ny
private)
image
with
understanding
e
musthave
learnt
nd not
forgotten
(public)
essons
n the use
of
the words n which
we are to
describe
that
mage.
Hume's
assumption
hat
we
cannot
have
images
without corre-
sponding
xperience
s attractive
ecause,
hough magery
may
well
be "like
nothing
n
earth,"
like
nothing
've
met
before,"
everthe-
lesswe all somehow o think
by
a sortof ntuition f
empiricism)
that
his annot
eally
e
so,
that
omehow
his
magery
s
a
kaleido-
scopic
onfusion
f
whatwe
have seen nd heard
efore.
he
difficulty
hereoften s
describing
situationwhich
seemto have no suitable
words
to
describe: nd
this s
a real
difficulty.
ut
we
must not
mistake ts
mplications.
or whilewe
may
have
mages
which,
with
our
presentvocabulary,
re
indescribable,
nd
while
this would
certainly
end,
f
anything,
o
disprove
Hume's
psychological
hesis
249
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PHILOSOPHY
about
the
necessary riority
f
impressions
o
their
orresponding
ideas:
the
contrary
act
that n
some
particular
ase
we
can
find
words odescriben image idea)doesnotnecessarily rove hatwe
have
ever
"experienced"
n
original
which
orresponds
o it
(have
ever
had
a
correspondingmpression);
or
yet
that
we
must
have
had
impressions
orresponding
o all
the
parts
f
that
mage
idea).
It
onlyproves
hat
we must
have
had whatever
mpressions
t
was
essential
o
have had
in order o learn
the
meanings
f
the
words
used n
our
description.
To
demonstrate
he
difficulty
hat often ies in
finding
words:
in
experiments
ithmescal
he
subject
who
has taken he
drug
has
veryvivid imagery, hichhe maybe able to locatein space-
e.g.
"between
me and
the
wall"-but
whichtends
to
be
unlike
anything
een
before. n
one
experimentI
n
extended
ocabulary
was
agreed
n beforehand:
y
using
collection
f
reproductions
f
paintings
y
very
different
rtists
e.g. Goya,
Turner,
Van
Gogh,
etc.)
as reference
oints
a
new
set of
public
analogies
was
made
available
both
o
the
ubjects
nd the
xperimenters.
learly
we
may
be
able
to
describe
ur
images
more
or
less
completely;
Hume's
manwith he colour ard couldhave done so pretty ffectivelynd
in
precisely
he
way
n which
Hume has in
fact
ontrived
o
explain
to us
the
case
he had in
mind.
The
character n
Wells
who
(most
improbably)
aw
a new colour nd
called
t
"wing-colour"
ailed
o
make
himself
ully
nderstood.
e
made
himself
artially
nder-
stood
by
saying
t
was a new
colour
and
not
a
new
sound);
yet
he
could
point
o
no
specimens.
manwhohad
(or
has)
a new
ensation
peculiar
ohimself
ould
have
(or
has)
even
greater
ifficulties,
or
with
ensation
uality
s all and thatex
hypothesi
e
cannot
ndicate
in anyone lse.
Before
going
on to
Ryle
on
Imagination,
want
to
make
one
further
oint.
This
is to
underline he
fallacy
f
treating
hypo-
thetical
apacity
o
imagine
omething
s a
proof
hat the
descrip-
tion
given
o whatever
t is thatwe
do
in
fact
ee in
our
mind's
ye,
makes
sense.
Consider
chlick,
who in the
article
Meaning
and
Verification"
Feigl
and
Sellars,
Readings
n
Philosophical
nalysis,
p.
159)
says
"I can
easily magine,
.g.,
witnessing
he
funeral f
my
own
body
and
continuing
o
exist
without
body,
for
nothing
s
easier han o describe worldwhich iffersromurordinary orld
only
n
the
complete
bsence f all
data
which
would all
parts
of
my
own
body.
We must onclude
hat
mmortality
..
is
an
empiri-
cal
hypothesis,
ecause
t
possesses
ogical
verifiability.
t
could
be
verified
y
following
he
prescription
Wait
until
you
die " But
the
fact
that
can
imagine
image)
omething
hich
am
inclined o
I
Now
going
on
in
Aberdeen: not
yet
published.
Philosophers,
sychiatrists
and
psychologists
re
co-operating.
250
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
7/10
IMAGES,
SUPPOSING,
AND
IMAGINING
describe
s
"witnessingmy
own
funeral" oesn't
n
any
way
eveu
tend
to
prove
that
immortality
s
an
empirical
ypothesis,
f
the
descriptions not a proper nd possible ne. AnduntilSchlick an
prove
that
the
description
I am
witnessingmy
own
funeral"
s
proper
nd
possible with
no
sniggering
nverted
ommas
ound
my
own funeral" s
therewere
when
Harry
Lime
reported
hathe
had
just
witnessed
his own
funeral")
t s
useless
or
im o
try
o nduce
images
n
an
attempt
o
prove
hatthe
expression
I
can see
myself
witnessing y
ownfuneral" as sense.
A
picture
mental
r
physical:
the
only
elevant
ifferences
that
heformers
private
nd
so
of
ess
use)
may
help
someone
o
understand
sentence
which
describes
thatpicture,ndmayevenhelphim osee that suggestedescrip-
tion
of
t makes
ense.
But
no
picture
an
provide
n
argument
hat
a
doubtfully
ignificantuggested
escription
f
itself
oes
indeed
make
sense.
And that
s what
s
at
stake here.
Surely
chlick
has
confused
Imagining-knowing
what
it would
be
like to be
at
Schlick's
uneral"
with
Imagining-knowing
hat t
wouldbe
like
for chlick o be at
Schlick's uneral."
he
former
s
straightforward,
while he
atter
s
perhaps
self-contradictory
upposition.)I
(3) And so to Professor yle,who nhischapter n Imagination
in
The
Concept
f
Mind mentions
ume
n two contexts:
irstly
o
say
that he
"notoriously
hought
here
xist both
mpressions
nd
ideas
. .
. and
looked
in
vain for a clear
boundary
between the
two
sorts
of
perceptions"
p.
249);
and
secondly
o
say
that
he
"put
forward causal
theory
hat one could not
have
a
particular
idea'
without
aving
previously
ad the
corresponding
ensation,
ome-
what
as
having
n
angular
bruise nvolves
having
been
previously
struck
y
an
angular
bject" p.271).
This
s
all;
and after
what
've
said it's notsurprisinghat should hinkt unduly ngraciouso
Hume. But for he
moment will
eave himout
of t.
Ryle
comes
to
deal
with
magination
ot
from
he
battle
about
the status
of
minds;
he
is,
then,
rimarily
oncerned
o
prove
that
images
re not
physical henomena
nd so that
they
re
nothing
t
all. He claims
that
the
smile
a
child
magines
n
her
doll's
lips
is
not
n
fact
on its
ips;
nor
can
it
be
unattached
ike
the
grin
which
survived
he
vanishing
f the Cheshire at-so
it
is
nowhere
nd
nothing.
We are
told,
n
a
paralysing
roadside,
hat such a
smile
is not a
physicalphenomenon
or a
non-physical
henomenon;
though
ictured
t
is
not a
picture,
or s it
a
real
phantasm.
There
is
not a
real life
outside,
hadowily
mimicked
y
some
bloodless
likenesses
nside;
here
re
ustthings
nd
events,
nd
people
ancying
themselves
itnessing
hings
nd events
hat
hey
re not
witnessing"
(p.
249).
have
moved t
speed;
but we now
know
Ryle
claims
hat
I
This
paragraph
s drawn
from
forthcoming
aper
on "Is
disembodied
existenceconceivable?"
by
A.
G.
N. Flew.
251
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
8/10
PHILOSOPHY
there are no such
things
s
images
which
s
simply
false);
and
that to
imagine
ne
sees or hears
omething
s to
fancy
r
suppose
that one sees or hears it. (Which s perfectlyrue n one sense
of
"imagine":
my
[perhaps mistakenly]
hinking
ense.)
There
follows he
first ttackon
Hume;
if
mages
re
to
be
distinguished
from ensations s less
lively,
this must mean either
that
they
are
less
intense,
r that
they
are less vivid and
lifelike han sen-
sations.
Ryle
makes
two
points
n
reply: (i)
a sensation
annot
be
lifelike,
ny
more
than a
real
child
as
opposed
to
a doll
can
be
life-like;
while
2)
an
imagined
noise
is
neithermore
nor
less
intense han
a
real
one-it isn't a
noise at all. His
first
oint
s
sound and well taken.But the second is quite mistaken:for t
is
perfectly
ossible
o
confuse eal and fancied
oises;
and we fre-
quently
o
ust
this
"Was
that he
bell,
rdid
imagine
t
?"). Ryle's
last
negative
ontribution
s to
showthat the
ordinary
se of "to
imagine
doesn't escribe
single,
entral
ctivity;
ow bsurd t
would
be to doubt
whether novelistwas
imaginative,
n
the
ground
hat
one didn'tknow
what
was
n his
mind's
ye
when
he
wrote.
There
s
no
faculty
f
magination,
ccupying
tself
ingle-mindedly
n fancied
viewings nd hearings.On
the
contrary,seeing' things s one
exercise f
magination,rowling
omewhatike a
bear is
another;
smelling hings
n
the
mind'snose
is an
uncommon ct of
fancy,
malingering
very
ommon
ne,
nd so forth"
p. 158).
"The
search
after he unit s
the
delusion"
A.
B.
Johnson).
he
positive art
of
Ryle's argument egins
with n
analysis
f the
sophisticatedpera-
tionof
pretending-sophisticated
n the
sense hat t
is an
operation
which
equires
hat
we
know
whatthe
original
was like.
To
imagine
that
one
sees
x
is
logically quivalent
o
fancying
ne
sees
x,
and
fancyings a specialcase ofpretending;ere s theslipperylide.
So
imagining
s
a
special
case of
pretending
nd
is
therefore
sophisticated
rocess,
oo;
we cannot
make clear
what we were
imagining
nless
we
know
he
anguage
n
which
o
express
urselves.
"Seeing Helvellyn
n one's
mind's
eye
does not entail what
seeing
Helvellyn
nd
seeing
napshots
f
Helvellyn
ntail,
the
having
of
visual
sensations.
t
does involve he
thought
f
having
view
of
Helvellyn
nd
it
is therefore
more
sophisticated peration
han
that
of
having
a view of
Helvellyn.
t
is one
utilization,
mong
others, f theknowledgefhowHelvellyn hould ook, or, n one
sense
ofthe
verb,
t
is
thinking
ow
Helvellyn
hould ook"
(p.
270).
And
(p. 272)
"we
learn how
things
ook and sound
chiefly
nd
originally
y
seeing
nd
hearing
hem.
magining, eing
one
among
manyways
of
utilizing
nowledge,equires
hat
the
relevant now-
ledge
should
have been
got
and
not
ost. We
no moreneed
a
para-
mechanical
heory
f
how to accountforour imited
bility
o
see
things
n our
mind's
ye
than
we
need t to account or ur imited
252
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
9/10
IMAGES,
SUPPOSING,
AND IMAGINING
ability
o
translate rench nto
English.
All that s
required
s to see
that
earning
erceptual
essons
ntails
ome
perceiving,
hat
apply-
ingthose essonsentailshaving earned hem, nd that magining
is one
way
of
applying
hose essons."
We
seem
to
have
got
back to
where
we
were
fter
einterpreting
Hume;
but
Ryle's
conclusions
too
narrow
o
be at
all
satisfactory,
and the
arguments
hat
get
him
here,
hough
stoundinglyompre-
hensive,
re
simply
ncorrect.he
most
mportant
oints
o
be
made
in
reply
re-Firstly,
o
conduct he discussion
n
terms
f
real
and
non-existent
bjects
from he
start
s to stack
the
cards
n
Ryle's
favour
efore he
game
begins.
nsteadwe
should
nsist
hat
people
do, nfact,havementalmages.Thenthethunderousttack-is an
image
a
physical
r
non-physical
henomenon,
picture
r a real
phantasm?-simply
asses
us
by. People
do
have
images;
and so
why
not talk
about
mages?
Secondly,
e
should
esist
he
bullying
about the
ocation f
an
image.Ryle
makes
psychological
istake
when he
says
the
imaginary
mile s
not
(and
we
suppose
never
would
e)
on
the
doll's
face.
When
maging
s
nvolved,
hy
houldn't
it
be? To
say
that t
is,
does not
nvolve
reating
he
mage
mile
as
unattached,
smile
without face to
smile
t,
like
that
of the
Cheshire at.We can
say
that t s
(apparently)
ocated n thedoll's
face
(or
anywhere
lse;
in
mid-air orthat
matter);
ut
it's not
a
smiling
ace
but
an
image
f
a
smiling
ace-so
only
he
person
who
has it can
see
(have)
it. The
subjects
n the
mescal
experiments
could
place
their
mages
even
when
they
couldn't
describe
hem;
and
I
can
say
that
see
a
red
patch
between he
door
nd the desk.
(And
ncidentally
his
s
one
of
the
very
few
occasions
when
t is
correct o
say
"I
see-or
better,
can
see-a
red
patch").
Thirdly
having nsisted hatpeople n facthave imageswe can then gree,
with
Ryle,
that there
s no
nuclear
rocess
o
imagining.
ourthly,
we
can
add
that,
though
he
situation
must
remain
onfused
ntil
at
least
our hree
major
enses f
"imagine"
re
distinguished,
till
t
is
clearly
wrong
o
pretend
hat
magery
oes
not
occur;
ust
because
we realize
that
its
occurrence
s,
for
purposes
f
communication,
idle
and
supererogatory.
erhaps
Ryle's
extreme,
mistaken,
iew
has
been
dopted
n
reaction o
Hume
and
otherswho
madeout
that
imagery
as
essential
o
significant
ommunication;
orwhen
Ryle
is not concerned-ashe is in the chapter n Imaginationn The
Concept
f
Mind-to
show
that
mages
re
(at
least
in some
ways)
superfluous
nd
idle,
he
does not
adopt
this ruthless
ttitude
ut
admits
that
imagery
oes occur. On
page
27
of
The
Concept
f
Mind
he
says
"Much of
our
ordinary hinking
s
conducted
n
internal
monologue
r
silent
oliloquy, sually
accompanied
y
an
internal
inematograph
how
of
visual
imagery."
That
he should
make his
later
strictures
n
spite
of
his
earlier dmission
f
the
253
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8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining
10/10
PHILOSOPHY
obvious
s,
think,
vidence
n
favour
f his
uggestion.
erhaps
he
paradox
of
thedenialof
the
occurrence
f
magery
s in
part
t least
a misleadingnd unfortunateonsequence f hissystematicse of
the
material
modeof
peech.
Compare,
or
xample,
whatMr.
Heath
says
about his denial
of
volitions n
"The
appeal
to
ordinary
an-
guage"
(Philosophical
Quarterly,
anuary 952,
p.
4).
To
conclude:
n
this
paper
I have
tried
firstly
o
distinguish
between
hree
enses
f
"imagine"-which
have calledthe
maging,
propositional
ntertainment,
nd
(perhapsmistaken)
hinking
enses.
Secondly,
have
used
this
distinctionetween
magining
in
the
ense
of
imaging)
nd
imaginingin
the sense of
propositional
ntertain-
ment) norder o treatHume'sthesis bout magination;nd show
that
thiscan be
reinterpreted
rom ne about the
physical
apacity
or
incapacity
f
people
to
have
images,
o one that
t is
logically
necessary
o
learn
a
public
language
beforeone can describe
private
mage. Whether
e
can
usually
escribe
mages atisfactorily
is
another
matter;
ut the
problem
ere
s to
findwords
n
which
o
do
so,
and
be
intelligible.)
have also
shownhow
irrelevanthe
question
f
capacity
o
have
mages
s;
whenwe are
concerned
ith
whether r not a putativedescriptionfwhat s imaginedmakes
sense.
Here
gave
the Schlick
xample.)
Finally,
gave
the
main
points
from
Ryle's
treatment
f
Imagination.
said that
it
was
mistakeno
try
o
suppress
he
ase
of
maging,
nd
suggested
arious
reasons
whyRyle
should
have
wanted
o do
this;
one
of
them
might
be
the
fact-which
hope
this
paper
has served o
bring
ut-that
images
re
superfluous,
nd as
it
were
dle,
n
communication.
254
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