Flew - Supposing and Imagining

8/19/2019 Flew - Supposing and Imagining

1/10

Royal Institute of Philosophy and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Philosophy.

http://www.jstor.org

Royal nstitute of Philosophy

Images, Supposing, and Imagining

Author(s): Annis FlewSource: Philosophy, Vol. 28, No. 106 (Jul., 1953), pp. 246-254Published by: on behalf ofCambridge University Press Royal Institute of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3748100Accessed: 24-11-2015 00:33 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content

in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 136.142.187.228 on Tue, 24 Nov 2015 00:33:54 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=riphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3748100http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3748100http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=riphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/


2/10

IMAGES, SUPPOSING,

AND

IMAGINING

ANNIS

FLEW,

B.A.

[I

should

like

to

acknowledge my gratitude

to A.

G. N.

Flew forhis

frequent

discus-

sions

on

the

subject

of

this

paper

and for

hislcriticisms

f

the

paper

tself;

he is

largely

responsible

for

any

merits

t

may have.]

IN this

paper

I shall

do

three

hings.

irstly,

shall

distinguish

between

hree enses

f

"imagine":

ne n which

the

ontext

makes

clear

that)

the word s

used

to

report

he

occurrence

f

mental

imagery; secondin which"imagined" s used as substantially

equivalent

o

"thought";

nd

a

third

n

which

imagine"

s used as

substantiallyquivalent

o

"suppose."

(And

I shall

argue

that

in

neither

f the two atter

enses

does

imagining

ecessarily

nvolve

imagery.)

econdly,

shall

discuss

Hume's

thesis

bout

magination:

both

because,

lthough

his s set out

as a

plausible

but mistaken)

generalization

bout

psychology,

t

nevertheless

eems

to me

that

Hume

dealt

with a central

philosophicalproblem

concerning

imagination-the

elation

f

descriptions

o

imagery-in way

that

is

suggestive

nd

fruitful;

nd-the main reason for

mentioning

Hume-because

a

study

of

the

relation

etween

magining

when

this

s

imaging)

nd

imaginingwhen

his s

supposing)

will

help

us to

reinterpret

is thesis

from

mistaken ne

about

psychology

into

correct

ne about

ogic

nd

anguage.

Thirdly,

shall

give

the

central

rguments

nd

the

conclusion

f

the

chapter

n

Imagination

in The

Concept

f

Mind,

and comment n them.

Although

yle

is

correct

n

saying

hat

magining-or

t

least

magining

supposing)-

is in some ense-a sensewe shalltry o elucidate-a sophisticated

process,

nd

requires

hat

we

shouldhave earnt

nd

not

forgotten

language;yet

want

o show hat he

rguments

y

which e

reaches

this

conclusion

re

unsatisfactory.hough

omprehensive,

hey

re

crude;

nd

on

the

way

he

manages

o

conceal he

case

of

magining

(imaging).

And

thus

he is

precluded

rom

pplying

is

conclusion

that

magination

s

a

sophisticated rocess

o the

problems

f

the

description

f

mental

magery.

ut,

as I will

show,

his s

precisely

wherewe

should

pply

the

conclusion.

(I) In anydiscussionf magination,ttentionends ocentre n

mental

magery.

his

s

unfortunate.

or

though

may

lways

have

a

mental

mage

f

my

father

umping

five-barred

ate,

o

imagine

something

t

is

not

necessary

o

have

an

image.

"Imagine

what

would

happen

f

your

father

umped

he

gate

at

his

age":

I

require

no

mental

icture

o

makeme

reply

No,

certainly

e

mustn't

o

t";

though

may

s

a

matter ffacthave

had)

an

image.

This

command

("Imagine

whatwould

happen

f

..")

resembles

ne

"Just

uppose

246


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/10

IMAGES,

SUPPOSING,

AND

IMAGINING

he were

to do

it"

or

even "Think

of

what

would

happen

f

..."

In certain

uses

"suppose"

and

"imagine"

are

interchangeable.

Furthermore,goodmanymetaphorsboutpicturingndpictures

are in

fact

used without

ntailing

hat

anyone

has an

image.

can

try

o

put

someone

n

the

picture

bout the American

onstitution,

without

necessarily

being

concerned

o

induce

imagery

n

his

unimaginative

mind.

(And

this in

spite

of

the fact that

mental

or

physical

ictures

may help

one

to

teach or

learn

a

subject.

The

main

difference

etween

he two

kinds

of

picture

here

being

that

mental nes

are of ess

use

for

he

purpose

han

physical

nes:

it

is

easy

to

present

he

pupil

with

chart,

nd

say

"this

s

how the

U.S. Constitutionorks";but onehas todescribe mental

icture,

and make

oneself

nderstood,

efore

ne can

even

begin

o

use it in

communication.

recisely

ecause

mental

pictures

re

private

to

one,

whereas

hysical ictures

re

public

to

all.)

Again,

can

say

that

I

had

a

different

icture

f

rock-climbing

efore

began

to

climb:

but

this

may

only

mean that didn'tknow t

rained ll

the

time;

t

does

not

necessarily

nvolve

my

ever

having

had

a

mental

image

of

rope

work

n

Clogwyn

urArddhu.

So far have dealtwith twosenses of "imagine":one,that n

which

to

imagine"

means

"to

have

a mental

picture"-which

call

the

"imaging"

ense

for

xample,

I'm

imagining

hat

t will

look ike

when t is

erected").'

The

other,

hat

n which

imagine

"

means he ame

s

"suppose

p"--which

shall all

the

"propositional

entertainment"

ense,

nd

where

he verb s

usually

n

the

mpera-

tive

(for

xample:

"Imagine

what would have

happened

f

we had

not

had

the

Spitfire").

here

emains

he

third ense f

to

imagine,"

where

f

say

(usually

n

a

past

tense)

I

imagined

"

this

mplies

that amnow tleast doubtful hether isthecase,orknow hat t

is

not

the

case.

(For example:

I

imagined

hat

hey

were

elying

n

some

secret

guarantees.")

shall call

this

the

"(perhaps

mistaken)

thinking"

ense.

These

three

senses

are

radically

different,

nd

demand

individual

attention.

f

we assume

that

"imaging"

is

equivalent

o

"propositional

ntertainment"

e

get

at

the

beginning

to where

rofessor

yle

takes

us

at the

end;

that

s,

we

find

we

have

joined

him n

an

efforto

hush

up

the

scandal of

the

occurrence

f

mental

magery.

t

may

be

possible

o

produceyet

further

enses

f

"imagine,"

nd would ertainlye

possible

furthero subdivide he

senses

we

already

have: but for the

purposes

of

this

paper

it

is

sufficient

o

distinguish

hesethree

major

senses;

noting

n

passing

that

the

sense

of

the

formations

imagination"

nd

"imaginative"

is

not

uniquely

erived rom

imagine"

n

any

one of

these

enses.

I

The context

does

not

by

any

means

invariably

make

it clear

and

certain

whether

or

not

"imagine"

is

being

used

in

this

sense;

which

entails the

occurrence

f

magery.

247




4/10

PHILOSOPHY

(2)

Now

for

Hume.

n

the

first

lace

he

ignored

he

possibility

f

our

maginingsupposing)

nything

ithout n

accompanying

mage.

(And, or hatmatter, e also ignoredhepossibilityfour magining

[perhaps

mistakenly hinking]

nything

without

magery.)

n the

second

lace,

he

held that

we could

not

imagine

nything

hat

we

had

not

previously experienced wholly

or

in

part;

".

.. All

simple

ideas

and

impressions

esemble

ach

other;

nd as the

complex

re

formed rom

hem,

we

may

affirm

n

general,

hat

these

wo

pecies

of

perception

re

exactly

orrespondent"T.H.N.,

Everyman,

ol.

i,

p.

13,

para.

3).

The

exception

o thisrule

ay

in

the

case of

the man

who could

magine

shade

of blue

that

he

had

never

met

before,

whenpresented ith colour ard nwhich his hadewasmissing

from

he

scale;

but

"the

nstance

s

so

particular

nd

singular,

hat

it

is

scarce

worth

ur

observing,

nd

does

not merit

hat,

for

t

alone,

we should

lter

ur

general

maxim"

T.H.N.,

Everyman,

ol.

,

p.

15,

para.

2).

Hume

presents

is

argument

hat

images

are

the

product

f

experience

s a

very

safe

empirical eneralization.

e

says

(T.H.N.,

Everyman,

vol.

i,

p.

14,

last

para.),

". .

.

whenever,

by

any

accident,

he

facultieswhich

give

rise

to

any impressions

areobstructedn their perations,s when ne sbornblind rdeaf,

not

only

he

mpressions

re

ost,

but

also

their

orrespondent

deas,

so

that

there

never

ppear

n

the mind

he

east

trace of

either

f

them."

Now

there's

no reason to

suppose

that

he

(or

anyone

lse

at that

ime)

had

done

thorough

esearchn this

point.I

But

the

fact

that

Hume s so certain hat

a blind

man could

have no

idea

of

red,

suggests

hat

forhim hewholematter

s not

imply

ne

of

empirical

research;

nd

though

here

s no

passage

where

e

says

that

t

would

be

logically

mpossible

or

blind

manto

describe

is

visual

magery

ina publicvisual anguagewhich ehimselfnderstood; etthis s,

I

think,

legitimate

einterpretation

o

give

to the

passage

have

quoted.

Though

do not

say

that this s

what

Hume

really

meant.

Hume,

being

a

competent rose

writer nd an

honest

man,

really

meant

what

he

actually aid-except

whenhe

was

being

ronical.)

The

last

passage

quoted

from

Hume at least

suggests

he

following

analysis:

since we

learn

colour

words

by

having

coloured

hings

pointed

ut

to

us,

a man bornblindcould

not

have

learnt

o

apply

colour

words.

f he

claims o have red

mages,

we then

reply youcan'tknowwhat 'red' means." Imaginethatsuch a man

gained

sight;

on

looking

t

a

scarlet

pillar-box

e

comments

you

know,

all these

years

I have

been

having

mages

of

just

that

colour."

Now

thiswould

be

a

very

remarkable

act;

and

we

might

e

very

sceptical

bout

t.

In

the

present

tate

of

neurophysiology

he

only

evidence

hat

can

be

produced

o

prove

t

is

the

man's

testimony

1

William

James quotes

a man who had

done

such

research.

Principles

of

Psychology,

vol. ii,

p.

44.

248




5/10

IMAGES,

SUPPOSING,

AND

IMAGINING

after

e

has

got

ight,

nd earnt o

recognize

ed

n

the

normal

way;

and even f we

were

eady

o admit

accepting

is

testimony

r/and

neurophysiologicalvidence) hat,when lind,hehadhadimages f

the

colour

he

now

rightly)

alls

red,

yet

there s no reasonfor

s to

say

that he

knewwhat

the word red" meant

when

he

was blind-

for

hen

he

had

not

earnt he

word;

t

was

pure

oincidence e

used

it

right. Knowing"

when

you get

the

answer

ight y

a

flukes not

knowing.

There s

throughout

ore to Hume's thesis

than

an

unproven

statementn

psychology,

n

assertion

f

psychologicalncapacity;

and

this s most

clearly

een

f we

substitute

orwhat

with

Hume

was always) a case of imagining imaging) nother ase-one of

imagining

propositional

ntertainment).Imagine

uch-and-such-

that Britain

had

a

closed

economy."

here

s no

suggestion

ere

of

a

mental

mage,

for

whateverwould

a

mental

mage

of a

closed

economy

e like? I

need

not have "taken

a

photograph"

f the

whole,

r

part,

of

the

beast

at

any

time;

how

ndeed ould have

done? Nor is there

ny

reason

forus to

generalize

bout

the

psy-

chology

f he

peaker,

is

ability

r

nability

o form

mages.

et

we

can (logically) nlymake n utteranceftheformSupposep" and

understand

t ourselvesf

we

already

know how

to use

language

correctly. imilarly,

hough

may

have

images

which I

can't

describe,

hese

re,

ike

all

images, ecessarily rivate; ifthey

were

not

they

would

be not

mental

mages

but

physical bjects).

f I

am

to

describe

mental

mages

correctly,nderstanding

hat

am

saying

and

not

just

perhaps

be

right

or

intelligible

y

a

fluke)

I

mustbe

able

to

talk

about them

n

public

anguage.

And to

have

learnt

the

language

entails

(in Ryle's

words)

"some

perceiving."

So Hume's nsistencehatbeforewe couldhave a particularmage

(idea)

we must

necessarily

ave had

particular

xperiences

impres-

sions)

an be

reinterpreted

nto thesis

hat o

describe

ny

private)

image

with

understanding

e

musthave

learnt

nd not

forgotten

(public)

essons

n the use

of

the words n which

we are to

describe

that

mage.

Hume's

assumption

hat

we

cannot

have

images

without corre-

sponding

xperience

s attractive

ecause,

hough magery

may

well

be "like

nothing

n

earth,"

like

nothing

've

met

before,"

everthe-

lesswe all somehow o think

by

a sortof ntuition f

empiricism)

that

his annot

eally

e

so,

that

omehow

his

magery

s

a

kaleido-

scopic

onfusion

f

whatwe

have seen nd heard

efore.

he

difficulty

hereoften s

describing

situationwhich

seemto have no suitable

words

to

describe: nd

this s

a real

difficulty.

ut

we

must not

mistake ts

mplications.

or whilewe

may

have

mages

which,

with

our

presentvocabulary,

re

indescribable,

nd

while

this would

certainly

end,

f

anything,

o

disprove

Hume's

psychological

hesis

249




6/10

PHILOSOPHY

about

the

necessary riority

f

impressions

o

their

orresponding

ideas:

the

contrary

act

that n

some

particular

ase

we

can

find

words odescriben image idea)doesnotnecessarily rove hatwe

have

ever

"experienced"

n

original

which

orresponds

o it

(have

ever

had

a

correspondingmpression);

or

yet

that

we

must

have

had

impressions

orresponding

o all

the

parts

f

that

mage

idea).

It

onlyproves

hat

we must

have

had whatever

mpressions

t

was

essential

o

have had

in order o learn

the

meanings

f

the

words

used n

our

description.

To

demonstrate

he

difficulty

hat often ies in

finding

words:

in

experiments

ithmescal

he

subject

who

has taken he

drug

has

veryvivid imagery, hichhe maybe able to locatein space-

e.g.

"between

me and

the

wall"-but

whichtends

to

be

unlike

anything

een

before. n

one

experimentI

n

extended

ocabulary

was

agreed

n beforehand:

y

using

collection

f

reproductions

f

paintings

y

very

different

rtists

e.g. Goya,

Turner,

Van

Gogh,

etc.)

as reference

oints

a

new

set of

public

analogies

was

made

available

both

o

the

ubjects

nd the

xperimenters.

learly

we

may

be

able

to

describe

ur

images

more

or

less

completely;

Hume's

manwith he colour ard couldhave done so pretty ffectivelynd

in

precisely

he

way

n which

Hume has in

fact

ontrived

o

explain

to us

the

case

he had in

mind.

The

character n

Wells

who

(most

improbably)

aw

a new colour nd

called

t

"wing-colour"

ailed

o

make

himself

ully

nderstood.

e

made

himself

artially

nder-

stood

by

saying

t

was a new

colour

and

not

a

new

sound);

yet

he

could

point

o

no

specimens.

manwhohad

(or

has)

a new

ensation

peculiar

ohimself

ould

have

(or

has)

even

greater

ifficulties,

or

with

ensation

uality

s all and thatex

hypothesi

e

cannot

ndicate

in anyone lse.

Before

going

on to

Ryle

on

Imagination,

want

to

make

one

further

oint.

This

is to

underline he

fallacy

f

treating

hypo-

thetical

apacity

o

imagine

omething

s a

proof

hat the

descrip-

tion

given

o whatever

t is thatwe

do

in

fact

ee in

our

mind's

ye,

makes

sense.

Consider

chlick,

who in the

article

Meaning

and

Verification"

Feigl

and

Sellars,

Readings

n

Philosophical

nalysis,

p.

159)

says

"I can

easily magine,

.g.,

witnessing

he

funeral f

my

own

body

and

continuing

o

exist

without

body,

for

nothing

s

easier han o describe worldwhich iffersromurordinary orld

only

n

the

complete

bsence f all

data

which

would all

parts

of

my

own

body.

We must onclude

hat

mmortality

..

is

an

empiri-

cal

hypothesis,

ecause

t

possesses

ogical

verifiability.

t

could

be

verified

y

following

he

prescription

Wait

until

you

die " But

the

fact

that

can

imagine

image)

omething

hich

am

inclined o

I

Now

going

on

in

Aberdeen: not

yet

published.

Philosophers,

sychiatrists

and

psychologists

re

co-operating.

250




7/10

IMAGES,

SUPPOSING,

AND

IMAGINING

describe

s

"witnessingmy

own

funeral" oesn't

n

any

way

eveu

tend

to

prove

that

immortality

s

an

empirical

ypothesis,

f

the

descriptions not a proper nd possible ne. AnduntilSchlick an

prove

that

the

description

I am

witnessingmy

own

funeral"

s

proper

nd

possible with

no

sniggering

nverted

ommas

ound

my

own funeral" s

therewere

when

Harry

Lime

reported

hathe

had

just

witnessed

his own

funeral")

t s

useless

or

im o

try

o nduce

images

n

an

attempt

o

prove

hatthe

expression

I

can see

myself

witnessing y

ownfuneral" as sense.

A

picture

mental

r

physical:

the

only

elevant

ifferences

that

heformers

private

nd

so

of

ess

use)

may

help

someone

o

understand

sentence

which

describes

thatpicture,ndmayevenhelphim osee that suggestedescrip-

tion

of

t makes

ense.

But

no

picture

an

provide

n

argument

hat

a

doubtfully

ignificantuggested

escription

f

itself

oes

indeed

make

sense.

And that

s what

s

at

stake here.

Surely

chlick

has

confused

Imagining-knowing

what

it would

be

like to be

at

Schlick's

uneral"

with

Imagining-knowing

hat t

wouldbe

like

for chlick o be at

Schlick's uneral."

he

former

s

straightforward,

while he

atter

s

perhaps

self-contradictory

upposition.)I

(3) And so to Professor yle,who nhischapter n Imagination

in

The

Concept

f

Mind mentions

ume

n two contexts:

irstly

o

say

that he

"notoriously

hought

here

xist both

mpressions

nd

ideas

. .

. and

looked

in

vain for a clear

boundary

between the

two

sorts

of

perceptions"

p.

249);

and

secondly

o

say

that

he

"put

forward causal

theory

hat one could not

have

a

particular

idea'

without

aving

previously

ad the

corresponding

ensation,

ome-

what

as

having

n

angular

bruise nvolves

having

been

previously

struck

y

an

angular

bject" p.271).

This

s

all;

and after

what

've

said it's notsurprisinghat should hinkt unduly ngraciouso

Hume. But for he

moment will

eave himout

of t.

Ryle

comes

to

deal

with

magination

ot

from

he

battle

about

the status

of

minds;

he

is,

then,

rimarily

oncerned

o

prove

that

images

re not

physical henomena

nd so that

they

re

nothing

t

all. He claims

that

the

smile

a

child

magines

n

her

doll's

lips

is

not

n

fact

on its

ips;

nor

can

it

be

unattached

ike

the

grin

which

survived

he

vanishing

f the Cheshire at-so

it

is

nowhere

nd

nothing.

We are

told,

n

a

paralysing

roadside,

hat such a

smile

is not a

physicalphenomenon

or a

non-physical

henomenon;

though

ictured

t

is

not a

picture,

or s it

a

real

phantasm.

There

is

not a

real life

outside,

hadowily

mimicked

y

some

bloodless

likenesses

nside;

here

re

ustthings

nd

events,

nd

people

ancying

themselves

itnessing

hings

nd events

hat

hey

re not

witnessing"

(p.

249).

have

moved t

speed;

but we now

know

Ryle

claims

hat

I

This

paragraph

s drawn

from

forthcoming

aper

on "Is

disembodied

existenceconceivable?"

by

A.

G.

N. Flew.

251




8/10

PHILOSOPHY

there are no such

things

s

images

which

s

simply

false);

and

that to

imagine

ne

sees or hears

omething

s to

fancy

r

suppose

that one sees or hears it. (Which s perfectlyrue n one sense

of

"imagine":

my

[perhaps mistakenly]

hinking

ense.)

There

follows he

first ttackon

Hume;

if

mages

re

to

be

distinguished

from ensations s less

lively,

this must mean either

that

they

are

less

intense,

r that

they

are less vivid and

lifelike han sen-

sations.

Ryle

makes

two

points

n

reply: (i)

a sensation

annot

be

lifelike,

ny

more

than a

real

child

as

opposed

to

a doll

can

be

life-like;

while

2)

an

imagined

noise

is

neithermore

nor

less

intense han

a

real

one-it isn't a

noise at all. His

first

oint

s

sound and well taken.But the second is quite mistaken:for t

is

perfectly

ossible

o

confuse eal and fancied

oises;

and we fre-

quently

o

ust

this

"Was

that he

bell,

rdid

imagine

t

?"). Ryle's

last

negative

ontribution

s to

showthat the

ordinary

se of "to

imagine

doesn't escribe

single,

entral

ctivity;

ow bsurd t

would

be to doubt

whether novelistwas

imaginative,

n

the

ground

hat

one didn'tknow

what

was

n his

mind's

ye

when

he

wrote.

There

s

no

faculty

f

magination,

ccupying

tself

ingle-mindedly

n fancied

viewings nd hearings.On

the

contrary,seeing' things s one

exercise f

magination,rowling

omewhatike a

bear is

another;

smelling hings

n

the

mind'snose

is an

uncommon ct of

fancy,

malingering

very

ommon

ne,

nd so forth"

p. 158).

"The

search

after he unit s

the

delusion"

A.

B.

Johnson).

he

positive art

of

Ryle's argument egins

with n

analysis

f the

sophisticatedpera-

tionof

pretending-sophisticated

n the

sense hat t

is an

operation

which

equires

hat

we

know

whatthe

original

was like.

To

imagine

that

one

sees

x

is

logically quivalent

o

fancying

ne

sees

x,

and

fancyings a specialcase ofpretending;ere s theslipperylide.

So

imagining

s

a

special

case of

pretending

nd

is

therefore

sophisticated

rocess,

oo;

we cannot

make clear

what we were

imagining

nless

we

know

he

anguage

n

which

o

express

urselves.

"Seeing Helvellyn

n one's

mind's

eye

does not entail what

seeing

Helvellyn

nd

seeing

napshots

f

Helvellyn

ntail,

the

having

of

visual

sensations.

t

does involve he

thought

f

having

view

of

Helvellyn

nd

it

is therefore

more

sophisticated peration

han

that

of

having

a view of

Helvellyn.

t

is one

utilization,

mong

others, f theknowledgefhowHelvellyn hould ook, or, n one

sense

ofthe

verb,

t

is

thinking

ow

Helvellyn

hould ook"

(p.

270).

And

(p. 272)

"we

learn how

things

ook and sound

chiefly

nd

originally

y

seeing

nd

hearing

hem.

magining, eing

one

among

manyways

of

utilizing

nowledge,equires

hat

the

relevant now-

ledge

should

have been

got

and

not

ost. We

no moreneed

a

para-

mechanical

heory

f

how to accountforour imited

bility

o

see

things

n our

mind's

ye

than

we

need t to account or ur imited

252




9/10

IMAGES,

SUPPOSING,

AND IMAGINING

ability

o

translate rench nto

English.

All that s

required

s to see

that

earning

erceptual

essons

ntails

ome

perceiving,

hat

apply-

ingthose essonsentailshaving earned hem, nd that magining

is one

way

of

applying

hose essons."

We

seem

to

have

got

back to

where

we

were

fter

einterpreting

Hume;

but

Ryle's

conclusions

too

narrow

o

be at

all

satisfactory,

and the

arguments

hat

get

him

here,

hough

stoundinglyompre-

hensive,

re

simply

ncorrect.he

most

mportant

oints

o

be

made

in

reply

re-Firstly,

o

conduct he discussion

n

terms

f

real

and

non-existent

bjects

from he

start

s to stack

the

cards

n

Ryle's

favour

efore he

game

begins.

nsteadwe

should

nsist

hat

people

do, nfact,havementalmages.Thenthethunderousttack-is an

image

a

physical

r

non-physical

henomenon,

picture

r a real

phantasm?-simply

asses

us

by. People

do

have

images;

and so

why

not talk

about

mages?

Secondly,

e

should

esist

he

bullying

about the

ocation f

an

image.Ryle

makes

psychological

istake

when he

says

the

imaginary

mile s

not

(and

we

suppose

never

would

e)

on

the

doll's

face.

When

maging

s

nvolved,

hy

houldn't

it

be? To

say

that t

is,

does not

nvolve

reating

he

mage

mile

as

unattached,

smile

without face to

smile

t,

like

that

of the

Cheshire at.We can

say

that t s

(apparently)

ocated n thedoll's

face

(or

anywhere

lse;

in

mid-air orthat

matter);

ut

it's not

a

smiling

ace

but

an

image

f

a

smiling

ace-so

only

he

person

who

has it can

see

(have)

it. The

subjects

n the

mescal

experiments

could

place

their

mages

even

when

they

couldn't

describe

hem;

and

I

can

say

that

see

a

red

patch

between he

door

nd the desk.

(And

ncidentally

his

s

one

of

the

very

few

occasions

when

t is

correct o

say

"I

see-or

better,

can

see-a

red

patch").

Thirdly

having nsisted hatpeople n facthave imageswe can then gree,

with

Ryle,

that there

s no

nuclear

rocess

o

imagining.

ourthly,

we

can

add

that,

though

he

situation

must

remain

onfused

ntil

at

least

our hree

major

enses f

"imagine"

re

distinguished,

till

t

is

clearly

wrong

o

pretend

hat

magery

oes

not

occur;

ust

because

we realize

that

its

occurrence

s,

for

purposes

f

communication,

idle

and

supererogatory.

erhaps

Ryle's

extreme,

mistaken,

iew

has

been

dopted

n

reaction o

Hume

and

otherswho

madeout

that

imagery

as

essential

o

significant

ommunication;

orwhen

Ryle

is not concerned-ashe is in the chapter n Imaginationn The

Concept

f

Mind-to

show

that

mages

re

(at

least

in some

ways)

superfluous

nd

idle,

he

does not

adopt

this ruthless

ttitude

ut

admits

that

imagery

oes occur. On

page

27

of

The

Concept

f

Mind

he

says

"Much of

our

ordinary hinking

s

conducted

n

internal

monologue

r

silent

oliloquy, sually

accompanied

y

an

internal

inematograph

how

of

visual

imagery."

That

he should

make his

later

strictures

n

spite

of

his

earlier dmission

f

the

253




10/10

PHILOSOPHY

obvious

s,

think,

vidence

n

favour

f his

uggestion.

erhaps

he

paradox

of

thedenialof

the

occurrence

f

magery

s in

part

t least

a misleadingnd unfortunateonsequence f hissystematicse of

the

material

modeof

peech.

Compare,

or

xample,

whatMr.

Heath

says

about his denial

of

volitions n

"The

appeal

to

ordinary

an-

guage"

(Philosophical

Quarterly,

anuary 952,

p.

4).

To

conclude:

n

this

paper

I have

tried

firstly

o

distinguish

between

hree

enses

f

"imagine"-which

have calledthe

maging,

propositional

ntertainment,

nd

(perhapsmistaken)

hinking

enses.

Secondly,

have

used

this

distinctionetween

magining

in

the

ense

of

imaging)

nd

imaginingin

the sense of

propositional

ntertain-

ment) norder o treatHume'sthesis bout magination;nd show

that

thiscan be

reinterpreted

rom ne about the

physical

apacity

or

incapacity

f

people

to

have

images,

o one that

t is

logically

necessary

o

learn

a

public

language

beforeone can describe

private

mage. Whether

e

can

usually

escribe

mages atisfactorily

is

another

matter;

ut the

problem

ere

s to

findwords

n

which

o

do

so,

and

be

intelligible.)

have also

shownhow

irrelevanthe

question

f

capacity

o

have

mages

s;

whenwe are

concerned

ith

whether r not a putativedescriptionfwhat s imaginedmakes

sense.

Here

gave

the Schlick

xample.)

Finally,

gave

the

main

points

from

Ryle's

treatment

f

Imagination.

said that

it

was

mistakeno

try

o

suppress

he

ase

of

maging,

nd

suggested

arious

reasons

whyRyle

should

have

wanted

o do

this;

one

of

them

might

be

the

fact-which

hope

this

paper

has served o

bring

ut-that

images

re

superfluous,

nd as

it

were

dle,

n

communication.

254

This content downloaded from 136 142 187 228 on Tue 24 Nov 2015 00:33:54 UTC

Flew - Supposing and Imagining

Documents