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No visible means of legal support
Citation for published version:Ghaleigh, NS 2018, No visible means of legal support: China’s CCS regime. in I Havercroft, R Macrory & RStewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues. 2nd edn, HartPublishing.
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Download date: 03. Oct. 2020
NoVisibleMeansofLegalSupport:China’sCCSRegime*
1. Introduction:WitherLaw?....................................................................................12. EnvironmentalLawinChina..................................................................................3a) BasicsoftheChineseLegalSystem...................................................................3
b) EnvironmentalLawMaking,andEnforcement.................................................6
c) TheTurntotheClimate....................................................................................8
3. CCSandChina......................................................................................................11a) PolicyandPilots..............................................................................................11
b) TheAdequacyofAmendingExtantRegimes..................................................12
c) StateOwnedEnterprises.................................................................................14
4. TheProblemofLawandtheEnvironmentinChina............................................16a) LegalCodes,Hostilityto..................................................................................16
b) AdministrativeMeasures,andtheRuleofLaw..............................................17
c) Enforcement....................................................................................................18
d) Corruption.......................................................................................................21
5. Conclusion...........................................................................................................22
*Sincerethanksareowedtotheeditors,andespeciallyMsSonjaKarikumpuforhersuperbresearchassistance.
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1. Introduction:WitherLaw?Inthespaceofafewshortyears,thePeople’sRepublicofChinahastransformeditselffromvillaintohero,theworld’sleadinghopeforavoidinganthropogenicclimacticdisaster.Notwithstandingitspositionastheworld’sleadingemitter–itsemissionsbeingroughlydoublethatofthesecondplacedUSA1–China’sembraceoftheParisAgreement,reaffirmedinthelightofTrumpPresidency;2itspilotemissionstradingschemes;andavastrenewablespushhaveplaceditinapositionofgreatglobalmoment.AgainstthebackdropofEuropeanUnionperipheralityandtroublingsignalsfromthepost-ObamaUSA,thereisagreatburdenonChinatodemonstrateleadershipinclimateaction.Seeninthislight,carboncaptureandstorageservesasaparticularinstanceofthegeneralphenomenonofChinaasatthecentreofclimatechangedebates.China’senergysystemaloneaccountsfornearlyhalfoftheworld’sexistingcoal-firedpowerplants,anditsfirstNDCplansforitsemissionstopeakonlyaround2030,wellpastthedatebywhich1.5Cdegreewarmingwillhavebeenreached.Notwithstandingthisframing,theawe-inspiringnumbersofChina’sclimatechallengecanbecastinanoptimisticlight.RetrofittingCCStotheChinesecoalpowerassetswillcontributetothereversalofthe“‘lock-in’ofemissions”,aswellaseasingthedomesticeconomicandsocialcostsofprematureclosureofthefleet.3Fromawiderperspective,ifChinaweretodeployCCS,evenifslowlyatfirst,suchisitsscaleandnetworkedsystemofgovernancethatmorerapiddiffusioncouldpushCCSpastthresholdsofcost,technology,socialacceptance,governanceetc,withtheeffectthatatippingpointisreached.4Assuch,thescaleofChina’sclimatechangechallengescontainswithinitthepossibilitytotransformthedemonstrationanddeploymentofCCSglobally.Whatthoughistheroleoflawinthisprocess?China’sextantCCSregulatoryregimeisprofoundlyunderdeveloped.5Assuch,thischapterplacesthatregime,suchasitis,inthecontextofdomesticenvironmentallawbutalsolargerdebatesaboutunderstandingthenatureoflawinlegalsystemswhich,unlikethoseintheWest,do
1Asof2015,China’semissions(10,357MtCO2)werenearlydoubleoftheUnitedStates(5,414MtCO2),thesecondlargestemitterintheworld,andover¼oftheglobaltotal(36,262MtCO2).SeeTABoden,GMarland,andRJAndres,‘Global,Regional,andNationalFossil-FuelCO2Emissions:CarbonDioxideInformationAnalysisCenter(CDIAC),OakRidgeNationalLaboratory’,accessedviatheTyndallCentre’sGlobalCarbonAtlas,at<http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/>(accessed4January2017).2PilitaClark,‘ChinaPledgestoUpholdParisClimateCommitments’FinancialTimes(29March2017).3OECD/IEA,20YearsofCarbonCaptureandStorage:AcceleratingFutureDeployment(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment2016).4Seegenerally,GeoffreyHealandHowardKunreuther,‘TippingClimateNegotiations’inRobertWHahnandAlistairUlph(eds),ClimateChangeandCommonSense:EssaysinHonourofTomSchelling(OUPOxford2012).5XuZhaofengandothers,‘GuidelinesforSafeandEffectiveCarbonCaptureandStorageinChina’(2011)4EnergyProcedia5966.
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notgiveprimacytotheprofessionalizationoflaw.Itwillbearguedthatnotwithstandingmajoreffortsoflegalreform(i.e.consistencyoflaw,rights-basednormativity,restructuringofthelegalsystem)6China’sclimategovernance,legalnormsandinstitutionscontributeandsafeguardonlypartiallytheproperfutureofChineseCCS.Moreover,suchisthecharacteroftheChineselegalsystem,anyroleitdoesplaybearslittleresemblancewithgovernanceregimesinotherjurisdictions.Fromthefirst,itshouldbenotedthatChinacurrentlacksacomprehensivelegalregimeforclimateaction.Surveysundertakenbynon-lawyerssuchastheGlobalClimateLegislationStudymakeclearthatthereisnocomprehensiveclimatechangelawinChina.7Thisisdespitethepledgemadein2010forsuchalegalregime,andtheoptimisticthoughtthat“passageofthelawisexpectedin2015or2016”8–thewaitisongoing.ThereisofcoursenodenyingthatsuccessivebureaucraticedictsfromChina’s11thFive-YearPlan(2006)onwardshavepromisedeconomy-widereductionsincarbonintensity,whichhavebeenfollowedupbypoliciesandmeasurestomeetsaidtargets.ThepowerfulNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC–theleadingeconomicplanningunitofcentralgovernment,dubbedthe‘LittleStateCouncil’)hasdevelopedaNationalPlantoAddressClimateChange(2014-2020),andcarbonpricingschemesandmeasuresforenergydemandandsupplyabound.9Allsuchpolicies,measures,andschemeshavebeenformalizedintoChina’sNDCundertheParisAgreement.10Whatmanyoftheseanalysesfailtodohoweveristofocusonthelegalnatureoftheinstrumentsinquestion.Forexample,theGLOBEstudylistsunder“China:legislativeportfolio”genuinelegalmeasuressuchastheRenewableEnergyAct(2006)andEnergyConservationLaw(1997),alongwiththe12thFive-YearPlanfortheDevelopmentofNationalEconomyandSociety(2011).WhereasChinadoesindeedhaveasubstantialbodyofenvironmentallawproperlyso-called(discussedatXXbelow),theregulationofclimateactionisdominatedby‘Plans’,‘Strategies’,andothermeasuresofquestionablelegalprovenance.ThisdeficiencyextendstotheregulationofCCS.ChinalacksbothadedicatedCCSregulatoryregime(ontheEUmodel)andthenecessaryarrayofCCS-orientedprovisionsboltedontoexistingschemesforenvironmentalprotection,geologicalstorageetc,asseeninoilandgaslegislationinAustraliaandCanada.11The6ChrisThornhill,ASociologyofTransnationalConstitutions:SocialFoundationsofthePost-NationalLegalStructure(CambridgeUniversityPress2016)PAGE?.7MNachmanyandothers,‘ClimateChangeLegislationinChina’,The2015GLOBEClimateLegislationStudy:AReviewofClimateChangeLegislationin99Countries(GLOBEInternationalandtheGranthamResearchInstitute,LondonSchoolofEconomics2015)2.8ibid.9Forsurveysofgeneralclimatechangemeasures,seegenerallyXiWangandothers,‘ResearchandScholarshiponClimateChangeLawinDevelopingCountries’inDanielAFarberandMarjanPeeters(eds),EncyclopediaofEnvironmentalLaw:ClimateChangeLaw,vol1(EdwardElgarPublishingLtd2016);AlexLWang,‘ClimateChangePolicyandLawinChina’inKevinRGray,CinnamonPCarlarneandRichardTarasofsky(eds),TheOxfordHandbookofInternationalClimateChangeLaw(OxfordUniversityPress2016).10http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/Home.aspx11DeborahSeligsohnandothers,‘CCSinChina:TowardanEnvironmental,Health,andSafetyRegulatoryFramework’[2010]WRIIssueBrief6-7.SeefurtherthechaptersbyGibbs(Australia)andKrupa(Canada)inthisvolume.
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consequenceofthelegallacunaeinwhichCCSfindsitselfinChinaaretwo-fold.Firstly,theenvironmentalregulationofCCSfallsbackontothegeneralenvironmentallawgoverningenvironmentalprotection,EIAs,airpollutionandsoon.Thisisinitselfhardlyproblematic.OtherCCSregimes,includingtheEU’s,makelinkagestoexistingenvironmentallawssuchasenvironmentalassessmentandenvironmentalliability.12CCSisafterallonetypeofindustrialproject,whichwillfallwithinanextantlegalstructuresrelatingtoenvironmentalprotection,hazardoussubstances,planningandpermitting,andprojectapprovaletc.InthecaseofChinahowever,itisquestionablewhetherthegeneralenvironmentallawiscapableofbearingthisburdenefficaciously.Secondly,andrelatedly,asothershavenoted,“CCSprojectsinvolvelargeinvestmentsandinitiallywillmostlikelyoriginatefromthestate-ownedsectoroftheeconomy.”13TheconflictsofinterestthatexistintheregulationChineseStateOwnedEnterprises(SOEs)giveampledoubtsastotheeffectivenessofthismodeofgovernance,notleastwhenthelimitationsofenforcementandothergovernanceconsiderationsaretakenintoaccount.
2. EnvironmentalLawinChina
a) BasicsoftheChineseLegalSystemAlthoughChina’slegalsystemfallsintothefamilyof‘socialistlaw’inDavid’sclassicaltaxonomy,therearereasonstodoubtthatthisisahelpfulfinding.14AsMatteinotes,thisisaclassificationthatisbothEuro-Americancentric,andfailstoaccountforthesuccessoftheChinesepoliticalsystemandtheinfluenceoflegalsinology.15Amorecompellingapproachhearguesisonewhichtakesintoaccountandseekstounearth‘hiddenlaw’,“thehiddenassumptionsofdifferentlegalsystems.”16Inordertobetterarriveatthisdeeperview,Matteiproposeshisown,nowfamous,classificationofgloballegalsystems.Ratherthanrelyingonformalcategoriesoflegalsystems(i.e.commonlaw,civillaw,socialistlaw…),Mattei’scategorizationrevolvesaround“threepatternsofsocialincentives(orsocialconstraints)whichareatplayinalllegalsystemssimultaneously.”17Thecategoriesofsocialincentivesaretheruleofprofessionallaw,theruleofpoliticallaw,andtheruleoftraditionallaw.Whatvariesamongthelegalsystemsoftheworldisthe“quantity,acceptability,andmostimportantly,hegemony”ofthesepatternsofsocialincentives.Theapplicationofthisapproachhastheadvantageofbothbeingnon-Western-centric,andalsodynamic,respondingtodevelopmentsastheyoccur.Therewillofcoursebecircumstancesinwhichthedistinctionsbetweenapproaches,i.e.theruleofpolitical
12SeefurtherthechapterbyVelcovaontheEUDirectiveinthisvolume13ibid.CitingAl-Juaied,M.andWitmore,A.,‘RealisticCostsforCarbonCapture’(BelferCenterHarvard,2009).14RDavidandCJauffretSpinosi,LesGrandsSystemesdeDroitContemporains(10thedn,1992).15UgoMattei,‘ThreePatternsofLaw:TaxonomyandChangeintheWorld’sLegalSystem’(1997)45TheAmericanJournalofComparativeLaw5,10.16ibid,13,citingSacco.17ibid,16.
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lawandtheruleoftraditionallaw,willbedifficulttoparse,butthisisnomorethanaproperrecognitionofthecomplexitiesofthetask.Inanyevent,Mattei’sconclusionisthatChina’shegenomiclegalapproachistraditional,albeitwithnotable“characteristicsoftheruleofpoliticallaw.”[43]18Forcontext,thisistobecontrastedwithJapanwhichalthoughalsoclassifiedaspredominantlytraditional,hasprofessionallawasitssecondarypatternofsocialincentives.ItshouldbenotedthatMattei’sclassificationisnotonethatisroutinelyadoptedbyscholarsworkingonChina.AleadingUStextbookonChineselawmakesthewhollyEurocentricpointthat“China’slegalsystemislargelyacivillawsystem.”19Thisisofcoursearecognitionthat,likeJapan’s,itisasystemthathasdrawnveryheavilyontheGermanlegalsystemwhichhasbeengrafted,farfromunproblematically,ontoConfuciansystemsofthestate,authorityandvalue.20Nonetheless,manyoftheabstractfeaturesidentifiedbyMattei–oftheinterplaybetweentraditional,politics,andprofessionalization–arevividlypresentintheactuallawmakingprocessesofthePRC.China’slaw-makingprocessisgovernedbytheConstitution(1954)andtheLegislationLaw(2000).21Althoughlaw-makingmustrespectconceptssuchas‘thesocialistroad’,democraticdictatorshipbythepeople,Marxism,Leninism,andthoughtsofMaoZedongamongother,theConstitutionvestsallthepoliticalpowerinthenationalgovernment.22ThehighestlegislativeorganofthePeople’sRepublicofChinaistheNationalPeople’sCongress(NPC),anditsStandingCommitteeadoptsnationalenvironmentallaws.TheStateCouncilisChina’shighest‘executive’and‘stateadministration’body,andoverseesalltheministriesandcommissions.23ItsfunctionsincludepromulgatingtheregulationsnecessarytoimplementnationallawspassedbytheNPCoritsStandingCommittee.TheStateCouncilisformallysubordinatetotheNPCbutinrealityoperatesrelativelyindependentlyfromit,andcancreateabottleneckforlawswaitingforimplementingregulations.24Critically,itisconstitutionallytaskedtodrawupChina’sFiveYearPlanswhichisdraftedbytheNationalDevelopmentandReformCommission(NDRC),25althoughits“broadthemesandgoals…aredevelopedbythe
18ibid.19DanielCKChow,TheLegalSystemofthePeople’sRepublicofChina(3rdedn,WestAcademicPublishing2015).20PRLuney,‘TraditionsandForeignInfluences:SystemsofLawinChinaandJapan’(1989)52LawandContemporaryProblems129.21CharlesMcElwee,EnvironmentalLawinChina:MitigatingRiskandEnsuringCompliance(OxfordUniversityPress2011)44.Seerespectively,http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2825.htmandhttp://english1.english.gov.cn/laws/2005-08/20/content_29724.htm.22Articles9,22and26oftheConstitution.23McElwee(n13)41.24McElwee(n13)78n4.25TheNDRCis“China’smostimportanteconomicplanningbody”,andisalsoinchargeofChina’sresponsetoclimatechange,isChina’sDesignatedNationalAuthorityundertheKyotoProtocol,andplayedamajorroleindraftingChina’sclimatechange“whitepaper”releasedin2008-ibid.92-4.
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CommunistPartyofChina(CPC)CentralCommittee.”26TheroleoftheFiveYearPlans(FYP)isessentialtonote.ThesearethepivotalpolicydocumentsinChina,declaringandsettingtheChina’seconomypolicies,objectives,andlongtermdirection.Whereitisdeemednecessaryandappropriate,thePlansaresupplementedbyNPClegislation,andministerialpolicy.27Asregardsenvironmentallawmakingspecifically,theNPChasanumberofspecialcommittees,oneofwhichistheEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesProtectionCommittee(ENRPC).28Similarly,theStateCouncilhassub-unitswithcross-ministerialtasks,suchastheLegislativeAffairsOfficethatalsohasanEnvironmentalProtectionDepartment.29AsenvironmentalprotectiondoesnotfallwithinexclusivecompetenceofeithertheNPCoritsStandingCommittee,itcanbelegislatedbytheNPCandtheStateCouncilanditsministries.30Forthosewhoview‘law’throughthelensofwesternconceptionsoftheruleoflaw(aroughapproximationforMattei’sruleofprofessionallaw),theChineseapproachbearsonlyaslightresemblancetoasystemofgenerallyapplicablerulesappliedimpartially,andenforceableviaindependentcourts.31EssentialtonoteistheroleoftheCommunistPartyofChina(CPC).AlthoughitformallyderivesnopowerfromtheConstitution,andhasonlyalimitedroleinthelaw-makingprocess,32itisthedefactohighestpowerinthecountry.ItsNationalPartyCongressischargedwithformulatingthebasicorientationoftheParty,andthePolitburoofitsCentralCommitteedeterminesallkeypolicydecisionsandappointments.33Furthermore,theThirdPlenumoftheCentralCommitteeusuallyintroducesthenewPartyleadership’sbroadeconomicandpoliticalreforms.34Aseparateissuearisesfromthedispersaloflegislativeauthority.35The“linesofauthority”areoftenunclear,withinconsequentuncertaintiesoverwhethergivenentitiesareactwithintheirvires.36
Peerenboomdescribesthelegislativeprocessesaslackingintransparency,butalsowithahighdegreeofinconsistencybetweenlowerandsuperiorlegislation,aswellasproblemssurroundingthepublicationandaccessibilityoflaws.3726ibid.72.27Chow(n18).28McElwee(n20)35-6.29ibid42.30ibid45.31Seegenerally,JeremyWaldron,‘TheRuleofLaw’inEdwardNZalta(ed),TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Fall2016,MetaphysicsResearchLab,StanfordUniversity2016).32RPPeerenboom,China’sLongMarchtowardRuleofLaw(CambridgeUniversityPress2002)240.33ColinMackerras,DonaldHughMcMillenandAndrewWatson,DictionaryofthePoliticsofthePeople’sRepublicofChina(Routledge1998)66-8.34“IntroductiontoChina’sPlenarySessionsandtheCPCCentralCommittee”ChinaBriefing(November11,2013)http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/11/11/introduction-to-chinas-plenary-sessions-and-the-cpc-central-committee.html35Peerenboom(n31)240.36ibid.241.37ibid.245.
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b) EnvironmentalLawMaking,andEnforcementInFebruary1978theChineseConstitutionwasamendedtoprovideanexplicitrequirementofenvironmentalprotection–thecurrentArticle2638–andshortlythereafterestablishedanideologicalbasisfortheStatetofulfilitsconstitutionalenvironmentalobligations.39ThedevelopmentofmodernChineseenvironmentallawscommencedinSeptember1979withtheintroductionoftheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.40Legislativedevelopmenthasbeenrapidthereafter,andaccordingtoWangtheEnvironmentalProtectionLawtookprecedenceoverotherareasoflaw,suchaseconomicconstruction.41Thisispartlyduetotheincreasinglyseriousenvironmentalproblemsthatthenationhadfacedsincethelate1950s,whichwereexacerbatedduringtheCulturalRevolution.42InthisformativeperiodoftheRepublic,economicgrowthwasprioritisedoverenvironmentalprotection,whichwereinturnmarginalised.43AnawarenessonthepartoftheleadershipofthepublicharmcausedbyindustrialisationintheWestandJapanwasalsoacontributoryfactorintheformulationofthenewregime.44Inthesameperiod,theLeadingGroupofEnvironmentalProtectionintheStateCouncil(LGEPSC)preparedpolicyinstructionsforcadres45providingthatthe“eliminationofpollutionandprotectionoftheenvironmentwereapartofbuildingsocialismandrealisingthefourmodernisationsenactedbyDengXiaoping.”46AsMcElweedemonstrateshowever,theeffectofmyriadmergersandadministrativereformsoftheLGEPSC,includingrenamingastheEnvironmentalProtectionBureauandsubsequentlytheStateEnvironmentalProtectionAdministration(SEPA),servedweakeneditandprovedtobeasetbackforenvironmentalprotection.47Since2008however,SEPAwasrenamedtheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtection,andits
38“Thestateprotectsandimprovesthelivingenvironmentandtheecologicalenvironment,andpreventsandcontrolspollutionandotherpublichazards.Thestateorganizesandencouragesafforestationandtheprotectionofforests.”Seegenerally,CanfaWang,‘TheRapidDevelopmentofEnvironmentalProtectionLaw’inDingjianCaiandChenguangWang(eds),China’sjourneytowardtheruleoflaw:legalreform,1978-2008(Brill2010)498;McElwee(n20)24.39Wang(n37)499.40Asamended,http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383917.htm.Formallyimplementedin1989.41Wang(n37)496.42ibid.43PitmanBPotter,China’sLegalSystem(PolityPress2013)40-41,155.44Wang(n37)497-8.45Roughlyequivalenttoacivilservice–seeADoakBarnett,Cadres,Bureaucracy,andPoliticalPowerinCommunistChina(ColumbiaUniversityPress1967).46McElwee(n20)25.47ibid25-8.
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ministerhasgainedmembershipoftheStateCouncil.Asacorollaryitsstatushasbeenelevatedtothehighestlevelofnationaladministrative.48TheEnvironmentalProtectionLawservesasaframeworklaw,providingprinciples,establishinganadministrativesystemforprotectionandalegalbasisforthedevelopmentofvariousenvironmentalprotectioninstitutions,andprovidingthesystemforimplementationofenvironmentalmanagement.49Thelatterincludestherequirementthatenvironmentalprotectioneffortsaretobeimplementedduringthedesign,constructionandoperationofindustrialfacilities.Alongwithenvironmentalimpactassessmentandemissionfees,thisservesasthebasisofenvironmentalmanagementsystemsinChina.50Underthisframework,theNPChaspromulgatednineenvironmentalprotectionlaws,andtheStateCouncilenactedoverfiftyadministrativeregulations.51Inaddition,oversixhundredrulesandregulationshavebeenissuedbythedepartmentsoftheStateCouncil,andothersubordinatecongressesandgovernmentstoimplementthesaidlawsandadministrativeregulations.52Inthecognateareaofenergylaw,socriticalforCCS,theChinesegovernmenthasbeenregulatingforbroadenvironmentalendsfordecades.Asearlyas1980,thegovernmentestablishedmulti-levelledbureaucraticroles,includingwithinstate-ownedenterprisesspecificallyforthepurposeofenergyconservation.Notablythough,asnotedbyWang,thiswasachievednotthroughpositivelawbutwasrather“directgovernmentinterventionbymeansofadministrativeplanandorder.”53Noristhisahistoricalanomaly–theEnergyConservationLaw(2007)54isjudgedtobe“mostlyapolicydeclarationandpolicyframeworkwithweakoperativenature[with]fewpunitivemeasurestodealwithviolations[and]governmentalauthoritieshavingtoomuchdiscretionintheirfunctionsofmacro-regulatoryandadministrativesupervision.”55Furthermore,asWangpatientlydemonstrates,such“defectsanddeficiencies”[p398]areendemicinfieldsbeyondenergyconservationlaw.TheRenewableEnergyLaw2005displaysmanysuchcharacteristics.Afternotingthewidespreadroleofcivilsocietyorganisationsinformulatingandenforcingenvironmentallaw,andofcitizens’rightsofinformationandparticipation,itisnotedthatalthoughArticle9oftheRenewableEnergyLawrequiresthatopinionsbesoughtfrominteraliathegeneralpublic,“theprovisionisnotoperationalbutadeclarationofpolicy.”[p394]Althoughotherstakealesscriticalstanceon
48ibid29.49Wang(n37)500-1.50ibid.51ChenxiaShi,‘Directors’DutiesandLiabilitiesinChina :EnforcementDifficultiesinProtectingInvestorsandOtherCorporateStakeholders’,PoliticaldeterminantsofcorporategovernanceinChina(Routledge2012)182.52ibid.53Wang(n37)385.54http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383579.htm55WangMingyuan,‘China’sPlightinMovingTowardsaLow-CarbonFuture:AnalysisfromthePerspectiveofEnergyLaw’inDonaldNZillmanandothers(eds),Beyondthecarboneconomy:energylawintransition(OxfordUniversityPress2008)385-6.
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environmentally-relatedpublicengagementinChina,56furtherexamplesoftheshortcomingsofChineseenvironmentallawabound.AdetailedanalysisoftheshortcomingsofChineseenforcementofenvironmentalregulations,withafocusontheinstitutionalframeworkbywhichregulationsareenforced,comesfromAndrews-Speed.Hiscloselyobservedworkonthecloselyrelatedfieldsofenergypolicyandregulation(specifically,theregulationoftownshipandvillagecoalmines),identifiestwobasicinstitutionalchallenges,“theever-changingstructureofgovernment[and]theopaque,heterogeneousandambiguousnatureofgovernmentfunctionsinChina.”57Thereis,heobserves,ahierarchicallyorganizedsetofenvironmentalagencies,bureausandofficesrangingfromcentralgovernmenttotownship,aswellasasignificantoverlappingofresponsibilities.58Theconsequent“inadequateimplementationanddirectobstruction”arepredictable,andaresupplementedby“thesheernumberofverticalreportinglines[and]theoverlaporduplicationofrolesamongstdifferentagencies.”59Theconclusionthattheregulatorysystemhasbeen“largelyineffective[and]characterizedbyanever-growingweightoflawsandregulationsandahighlycomplicatedadministrativestructure”bodesillforthebroadercharacterofenergyandenvironmentalregulationasthe“higherlevelsofgovernmentarepreventedfromachievingtheirpolicygoalsbypolicymodification,inadequateimplementationanddirectobstructionatintermediateandlowerlevelsofgovernment.”60InAndrew-Speed’sestimation,notonlyaresuchoutcomestypicalofChineseregulatorysystems,but“intheenergyandnaturalresourcessectorsthenegativeimpactofsuchadministrationisparticularlypronounced.”61
c) TheTurntotheClimateAlthoughChinaratifiedtheUNFCCCfromthefirst,andhasbeenengagedinitsnegotiationseversince,domesticclimatechangeactiondidnotimmediatelyfollow.Inthedecadeorsofrom1992,China’sprimarypolicygoalwasitsdevelopmentstrategyandannualeconomicgrowthof10%.Totheextentthatenvironmentalconcernswerearticulatedinmajorpolicyprocesses,theyweremanifestedintheformofsustainabledevelopmentplanning.Asearlyas1994China’sAgenda21:WhitePaperonChina’sPopulation,EnvironmentandDevelopmentinthe21stCenturyexplicitlystatedthewishtocontrolGHGemissionsforpurposesofclimate
56QiuyanZhao,‘China’sEmergingRegulatoryFrameworkforSafeandEffectiveCCS,2011-15’inIanHavercroft,RichardMacroryandRichardBStewart(eds),CarbonCaptureandStorage:EmergingLegalandRegulatoryIssues(HartPublishing2011)229.57CPAndrews-Speed,EnergyPolicyandRegulationinthePeople’sRepublicofChina(KluwerLawInternational2004)197.58ibid198.59ibid200.60ibid200–201.61ibid201.
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changeavoidance,62intermsthatcombinedthetenoroftheUNFCCC,andpost-Riounderstandingsofsustainabledevelopment.Similarly,the10thFYP(2001-2005)givesgreatfocustosustainabledevelopment,includingrelatedobjectivesto,interalia,increaseforestcover,improveenergyefficiency,expandrenewableenergy.FromreadingChinesescholarsitseemstobethecasethatthepolicycommitmentsinAgenda21andotherpolicydocumentsoftheerawerenottranslatedintolaw,muchlesscompliedwithinspirit.63However,fromtheEleventhFiveYearPlan(2006-2011)onwards,anewshifttowardstheenvironmentandclimateconcernsbecameclear.Variousexplanationscanbeoffered–theentryintoforceoftheKyotoProtocolandtheeconomicopportunityofferedbytheCleanDevelopmentMechanism,increasinginternationalpressureforactionasChina’semissionsmatchedthoseoftheUSA,aswellastheco-benefitsfortheclimateassociatedwiththedomesticpriorityofactiononairpollutioninChina’scities.ThepolicymomentumthatthesePlanshavegivenclimateactioninChinahasbeenconsiderable,rangingoverfieldsasdiverseasenergyefficiency,adaptation,thebuiltenvironment,forestmanagement,andtoolsfromcarbontariffstotradingschemes.64WhiletheclimateaspectsoftheFYParecloselyconnectedwithairpollutioncontrolpolicies65containedinthe11thFiveYearPlan(2006-2010)66andthe12thFiveYearPlan(2011-2015),67thePlanscertainlyhavehadbroaderenvironmentalambitions.AsNanotes,the11thFYPwasbasedonthe‘ScientificDevelopmentConcept’,promotedbythenPresidentHuJintaoastheguidingsocioeconomicideologyoftheCommunistPartyofChina.68Atthecoreofconceptwasthegoalof“environmentallyfriendlyandenergy-efficientgrowth”,69fromwhichfollowedthePlan’spolicyofreducingunitGDPintensityby20%by2010comparedwith2005,anda10%reductioninpollutedsubstances.Notwithstandingthesegoals,suchwasthe‘success’ofChina’senergy-intensiveindustriesthatcoalconsumptionactuallyincreasedinthisperiod.70The13thFYPisayetmoreambitiousscheme,withyet
62China’sAgenda21(1994),ch18(31-35),citedinJiangXiaoyi,‘ClimateChangeandEnergyLaw’inTianbaoQin(ed),ResearchhandbookofChineseenvironmentallaw(EdwardElgarPublishing2015).63InadditiontoJiang,seeMingyuan(n54).XiWangandothers,‘ResearchandScholarshiponClimateChangeLawinDevelopingCountries’inDanielAFarberandMarjanPeeters(eds),EncyclopediaofEnvironmentalLaw:ClimateChangeLaw,vol1(EdwardElgarPublishingLtd2016),NaSungin,‘TowardsSustainableDevelopmentinDevelopingCountries:AchievementsandProblemsofaCleanDevelopmentMechanism’inHidenoriNiizawaandToruMorotomi(eds),GoverningLow-carbonDevelopmentandtheEconomy(UnitedNationsUniversityPress2014),amongstmany.64WangWeiguangandGuoguangZheng(eds),China’sClimateChangePolicies(Routledge2012).65Seegenerally,ChrisPNielsenandMunSHo(eds),ClearerSkiesOverChina:ReconcilingAirQuality,Climate,andEconomicGoals(MITPress2013).66http://www.gov.cn/english/special/115y_index.htmaccessedon21December2016–focusingonsulphurcontrolpoliciesandacarbontax.67http://english.gov.cn/12thFiveYearPlan/accessedon21December2016–advancingcarbonpricingschemesandinparticularthepilotingofcarbontradingschemes.68Sungin(n62)73.69ibid.70ibid.
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deepercarbonandenergyintensitytargetsaimedatmeetingitsParisAgreementpledgetoreducecarbonintensity60to65percentby2030.71Itshouldalsobenotedthatnotwithstandingahistoricallyuneasyrelationshipwithinternationallaw,72Chinahasengagedpositivelywiththeclimateregime.ThisisespeciallytrueoftheUNFCCCnegotiationssincetheCopenhagenCOP(2009)whichmarkedaneweraofBASICleadershipwithChina’sthenpremierWenJiabaoandotherleadingdevelopingcountriesacceptingthepossibilityofquantifiedemissionreductions,inexchangefordevelopedcountriesfulfillingtheirenvironmentalcommitments.73ArguablytheTrumpPresidencywilldeepenthisprocessofengagement.Indeed,ithasbeenarguedthatthe‘America-first’approachoftheTrumpadministrationmeansthat,“Chinahasanevengreaterstakeininvestingininternationalregimes,aswellasmoreroomforleadership.ItisinstructivethatBeijing’simmediatereactiontoTrump’selectionwastocallforreaffirmationofcommitmenttotheParisclimatechangedeal.”74AstothelegalsubstanceofChina’scurrentclimateregime,arevealingaccountisprovidedbyWang.75Itsetsoutthevarioustargetsforenergyintensity,afforestation,pollutionreductionetclaiddowninsuccessiveFiveYearPlans,thewiderangeofpoliciestoadjustChina’sindustrialstructure,improveitsenergyefficiencyandsoon,aswellasbetterknowninitiativessuchasthecarbontradingpilotschemes.Whatisnotablehoweveraboutthisdiscussionistheadmissionthat“theproliferationofdiscreetenergyandclimate-relatedplans,policies,andprojects….hasnotreliedonlegislativeauthorization.Asubstantialprogramhasemergedthroughthestateplanningprocessandrelatedtargetandpolicydocuments.”76Notmerelyisthereno‘climatechangelaw’onthemodelunderstoodinmanyotherjurisdictions,thebodyofinstrumentsunderstoodastheChineseclimateregimeexistswithoutanyvisiblemeansoflegalsupport.OdderisWang’sinsouciance:“Itisunclearwhatfunctionlegislationandtheirchosenallocationsofauthoritywouldservethatisnotalreadyservedbystateplanning…”77–amattertowhichwewillreturnbelow.
71Seehttp://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf72Seegenerally,AnnEKent,BeyondCompliance:China,InternationalOrganizations,andGlobalSecurity(StanfordUniversityPress2007).73LavanyaRajamani,‘TheMakingandUnmakingoftheCopenhagenAccord’(2010)59International&ComparativeLawQuarterly824.74KerryBrown(ed),TheCriticalTransition:China’sPrioritiesfor2021(ChathamHouse2017)51.SeealsoClark(n2).75Wang(n9).76ibid651.77ibid.
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3. CCSandChina
a) PolicyandPilotsGiventhescaleandindustrialprofileoftheChineseeconomy,especiallyitsrelianceoncoal-firedpowergeneration,CCSisChinaismutuallysupportiveofChinesedecarbonisation,aswellasglobaleffortsatwidescaleCCSdeployment.China’senergysystemaloneaccountsfornearlyhalfoftheworld’s1,950GWofexistingcoal-firedpowerplants78andtheroleofCCSincontributingtoChina’ssuiteofclimatepolicies,andenablingthem,hasbeenpublicallyrecognised.Intheforewordtoaimportant2015reportbytheAsianDevelopmentBank,theDeputyDirectorGeneraloftheNDRC’sDepartmentofClimateChangediscussedtheurgentneed“toexpand[CCS]deploymentatarapidscaletomeetpriorityemissionreductiontargetsintheshort,mediumandlong-term.”79InChina,aselsewhere,CCSdeploymentisaconditionprecedenttothelowestcostdeploymentofotherclimatechangepolicies.Forexample,intheIEA’sRoadmaps,thecostofmeetingthe450ppmtargetincreasesbyc.40%withoutCCS,owingtotheabsenceofalternativestofossilfuelpowerinindustrysectorssuchasironandsteel,cement,chemicalsetc.80InrecognitionoftheimperativeofwidespreadCCSdeployment,ChinahasinvestedconsiderablepolicyenergyinthedevelopmentofitsCCSknowledgebase.AsQinnotes,Chinahasforanumberofyearsengagedinresearchprojects,policystudiesandroadmaps,pilots,anddemonstrationprojectsonaspectsoftheCCSchain,includingtheworld'slargestcaptureprojectforcoal-firedpowerplants.81DetailedstudieshoweverhavefoundthattheCCSregulatoryframeworkinChinatobeunfitforpurpose,evenwhentakingintoaccountthescopeforadaptationofexistinglaws.82AlthoughsomeaspectsoftheregulationoftheCCSchainholdoutsomehope(prinicipallythoserelatedtoindustrialactivities),othersprovidelessscopeforbuildingupon,primarilythoserelatedtogeologicalstorage.83
78OECD/IEA(n3).79AsianDevelopmentBank,RoadmapforCarbonCaptureandStorageDemonstrationandDeploymentinthePeople’sRepublicofChina(AsianDevelopmentBank2015)<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/175347/roadmap-ccs-prc.pdf>.80Fortheroleofeachoftheotherenergytechnologiesnecessarytoachievethe2050target,see<www.iea.org/roadmaps>.81TianbaoQin,‘RegulationofCarbonCaptureandStorageinChina:LessonsfromtheEUCCSDirective’inMichaelZHou,HepingXieandPatrickWere(eds),CleanEnergySystemsintheSubsurface:Production,StorageandConversion(SpringerBerlinHeidelberg2013)-atTable7andattendanttext.SeealsoSeligsohnandothers(n11)Box2.82Seligsohnandothers(n11).83ibid3,6-9.
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b) TheAdequacyofAmendingExtantRegimesSeligsohnetaldohoweversurveytheexistinglegalandinstitutionalarrangementsinavarietyofCCS-relevantareassuchasenvironmentalstandards,geologicalstorage,regulatoryoversight,andhealthandsafety.Thepurposeistoexplorethescopefordrawinguponthesevariousbodiesoflaw,andattachingCCS-specificprovisionstothem,intheabsenceofadedicatedCCSregimeontheEUmodel.Inmanyrespects,thisisapromisingexercise,notingforexamplethat“ChinaalreadyhasrobustregulationsforplantconstructionandairpollutionthatwillimpactallCScaptureplantsandformpartoftheCCS-specificregulations…underthecurrentLawonPreventionandControlofAirPollution.”84OtherareashoweverareconsideredinmoreneutraltermsandthegenericlimitationsofChineseenvironmentallawarediscussion.Inadditiontotheshortcomingsdiscussedherein,awiderangeofregulatorygapsareexplored,themostpressingofwhicharecapture,transportation,andgeologicalstorage.Totakethefirstofthese,thewaterconsumptionaspectsofcapturearenotaddressedintheexistinglegislation.ForawaterstressedsocietysuchasChina,itisvitalthereforethattheimpactofCCSplantsonlocalwatersuppliesisadequatelyapprovedandmonitored.Whilsttransportationregulationshouldbeabletodrawoncognateschemesforoil,gas,andchemical,newCO2puritystandardswillberequiredaswellasstandardsforpipelinematerials.Regardinggeologicalstorage,owingtothedifferencesinstoringCO2ascomparedwiththeexistingstorageregimes(forradioactivepollution,chemicals,hazardousmaterialsetc)abespokeCCSstorageregimewouldberequired.Therearethoughampleregimesforemulationinthisrespect.Gibbsthoughhassubjectedthispreciseissuetoexactingscrutiny,anddevelopedcriteriatoexaminetheeffectiveenforcementofundergroundstorageofCO2.85Thefourcriteriaare:
1) comprehensiveobligationsaddressingtherisks2) comprehensivemonitoringandverification(M&V)requirements3) enforcementmechanisms,and4) clearallocationofrolesandresponsibilitiesforenforcement.
GibbsassessesthegeologicalstorageofCO2infivejurisdictions,includingChina’sonshoreregime.Eachlegalandregulatoryregimeisscoredagainsteachofthefourcriteria,andareasofpotentialimprovementrecommended.8684ibid7.85MKGibbs,‘EffectiveEnforcementofUndergroundStorageofCarbonDioxide’(HWLEbsworthLawyers2016).86ibid7-8.
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Gibbs’scores(1)at2/9forChina,87withGibbsagreeingwithSeligsohnetalthatwhilecurrentlawscouldbeadaptedfordemonstrationprojects,largerscaleprojectswouldneedspecificCCSlaws,particularlyinrespectofthelackoftechnicalandmanagementstandards,efficientpoliciesforinformationdisclosureandpublicengagement,andfinancialbarriersandlackofefficienteconomicincentivisingpoliciestocoverthecommercialitygap.88GibbsidentifiesgapsintheapplicationoftheChineseEIAprocesstoCCSprojects,andthefactthatCO2isnotadesignatedpollutantforlicensingpurposes.89Accordingly,whiletheEnvironmentalProtectionLawmakespollutersliableforthefailuretocontrolpollution,notclassifyingCO2asapollutantmakesitunclearwhethersuchrulescouldbeenforcedasregardsCCS.90ByCriterion(2),Chinasimilarlyperformsweakly–3/9,principallyduetotheabsenceoftechnicalandmanagementstandardsapplicabletoCCS.91InasimilarfashiontoSeligsohn,itisnotedthatwhilstotherenvironmentalregimesmaypotentiallyapplytoclosureandlong-termmonitoring,therearecurrentlynorequirementsapplicabletoCCS.92Criterion(3)alsoscores3/9,withGibbsnotingtheinadequacyoffinancialpenaltiesforpollutingwhichleadstostrategicnon-complianceasitisfrequentlycheapertopolluteandpayafinethanabate.Furthermore,withpatchyenforcement,pollutionisoftenundertakencostlessly,thatis,withoutthepaymentofsanctions.93ItisofcourserecognisedthattheChineselegalsystemhasavailableawidevarietyofadministrativeenforcementtoolsforenvironmentalmatters,fromtheissuingofwarnings,andterminatinglicences,tofines,propertyseizuresandmandatoryshutdowns.Criminalsanctionsarealsoavailable.94However,andaswillbediscussedatgreaterlengthinthesectionbelow,theeffectivenessofenvironmentalenforcementsuffersfromwidespreadlocalprotectionism,notleastsinceenforcementauthoritiesareoftenmajorshareholdersofpollutingenterprises,whichcreatespowerfulconflictsofinterest.95Finally,environmentallawsoftenlackclearobligations,havingthecharactermoreofpolicystatementsoridealsthanbindingnorms.96ManyoftheseshortcomingshavebeenrecognisedbytheState.Gibbscitesthe2016acknowledgmentbytheEnvironmentalProtectionMinisterofissueswithlocalprotectionismandinterference.97Oneresponsetotheseproblemsthatisnotedwithapprovalistheintroductionofeconomicincentives,rewardinglocalgovernmentofficialsandenterpriseswhomeetenvironmentaltargets,andfiningandcriticisingthosewhofailtoachievetheirtargets.9887ibid30.88ibid.89ibid.90ibid31-2.91ibid31.92ibid.93ibid.94ibid.95ibid32.96ibid.97ibid.98ibid.
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Criterion(4)–theclearallocationofrolesandresponsibilitiesforenforcement–isscored1/3.99Asisnotedelsewhereherein,thewiderangeofpossiblyapplicablelawsisreflectedinthatavarietyofgovernmentbodieswouldbeinvolvedintheenforcementactivities,withuncertaintyastorolesandresponsibilities,aproblemthathascausedissueswiththeenforcementofenvironmentallawinthepast.100Additionally,problemsofresourcingarenotuncommon.TheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtectionisreportedtohavelimitedresources,frequentlyleavingenforcementtolocalEnvironmentProtectionBureaus.However,thesebodiesthemselvesarealsounderstaffed,lackedauthority,andareinevitablyatriskofregulatorycapture.101Again,theselimitationshavebeenacknowledgedbytheMinisterforEnvironmentalProtection.InthelightoftheaboveitisnotsurprisingthatChinaperformspoorlyincomparisonwithotherAsia-Pacificnations.102Itsscoreof9outof27indicatesthatsignificantreformoftheregimeisrequiredforChineseCCSenforcementtobeeffective.Bycomparison,theAustralianOffshoreRegimescored25/27,theJapaneseandMalaysianOffshoreRegimesrespectively17/27,and12/27.
c) StateOwnedEnterprisesOnefurtherchallengeofCCSinChinatoucheduponbySeligsohnandothers,butdeservingofgreaterattention,isthatposedbyChina’sStateOwnedEnterprises(SOEs).103Giventheneedforlargeinvestmentsandfamiliaritywiththeoperationsofthepowersector,itisacertaintythatmanyoftheleadingindustrialactorsinvolvedinCCSinChinawillbeSOEs–theChinesegridcompaniesareownedbythestateandpowergenerationisdominatedbystate-ownedenterprises.104Indeed,severalSOEshaveconsideringlargescaledemonstrationprojects,105andkeysaspectsofCCSinfrastructure,suchastheCO2pipelinenetworkcouldbeorganizedasafullystate-ownedenterprise.106Moreover,SOEshaveanumberofstructuraladvantagessuchasbeing“betterplacedtomanagerisksthansmaller,independentoperators,andarethereforeexpectedtobeinvolvedinamajorityofthedemonstrationprojects”.10799ibid33.100ibid.101ibid.102ibid2,14-15,30.103Foranearlytreatmentoftheissues,seeRichardMacrory,‘AirPollutionandtheRegulationofEuropeanStateEnterprises:AComparativeLegalModel’inWilliamElliottButler(ed),YearbookonSocialistLegalSystems(TransnationalJurisPublicationsInc1989).104MunSHo,ZhongminWangandZichaoYu,China’sPowerGenerationDispatch(ResourcesfortheFuture2017)12-13.105AsianDevelopmentBank(n78)8.106ibid19.107ibid45.
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SOEsarebutoneofthecontradictionswithintheChinesestate.Article15oftheConstitutiondescribesitsmodeofeconomicsystemasa“socialistmarketeconomy”–atermunexplained.OneofthewaysinwhichChinamanagesthetensionbetweenthesefactsandnormsisviaSOEs,meansofprotectinglargepartsoftheindustrialsectorfromcompetition,whilesimultaneouslypromotingmarketliberalization.108InevitablytherelationshipbetweentheChinesestateandSOEsisacomplexone,mediatedthroughSASAC,109acommissionoftheStateCouncilfunctioningasasupervisoryauthorityandaholdingcompany.110SASACistheultimateshareholderof100-120corecompaniesandhundredsofdownstreamsubsidiariescontrolledthroughpyramidstructures.SOEsmanagedbySASACincludePetroChina,Shenhua,andtheStateGrid.Itscontrolmaybedirectorindirect,anditisnotunusualforSOEstohavecloselinkstolocalgovernments.111SASACisoneofthegroupsthatneededtoapproveinvestmentdecisionsforSOEs,includingCCSprojects.112TheChinesestatealsohassignificantcontrolovertheexecutivesofSOEs.TheCommunistPartyandSASACshareanarrangementtoappointandrotateleadingpersonnelinthespheresofbusiness,governmentandParty.113Suchrotationisparticularlycommonamongtheseniorexecutivesofdifferentbusinessgroupsinthesamesector.114Statealsohascontrolinmanagerialincentives,suchascompensation.115Moreover,successandpromotioninbusinessbringsaccompanyingrewardsintheareaofpolitics,andviceversa.116Forinstance,numberofpositionsinelitegovernmentandpartybodiesarereservedforleadersofSOEs.117OfparticularsignificanceforpresentcircumstancesisthattheChinesestatehaslesscontroloverSOEsthanmaybesupposed.Indeed,MilhauptandZhengconcludethatChinesestatecapitalismcanbebetterexplainedbycaptureofthestatethanbyownershipofenterprise.Large,successfulfirmsexhibitanumberofcommoncharacteristics:marketdominance,receiptofstatesubsidies,proximitytostatepower,andexecutionofthestate’spolicyobjectives.InstancesofSOEcaptureofthestateareabound,withthestricturesoflawroutinelybeingeasedwheretheexigenciesofasituationsorequire.LinandMilhauptgivetheexampleofSASACencouragingSOEstocollaborateinoverseasprojectssoasto
108ChristopherAMcNally(ed),China’sEmergentPoliticalEconomy:CapitalismintheDragon’sLair(1edition,Routledge2007)3-17.109State-OwnedAssetSupervisionandAdministrationCommissionoftheStateCouncil,http://en.sasac.gov.cn/110CurtisJMilhauptandWentongZheng,‘BeyondOwnership:StateCapitalismandtheChineseFirm’(2015)103GeorgetownLawJournal665;Li-WenLinandCurtisJMilhaupt,‘WeArethe(National)Champions:UnderstandingtheMechanismsofStateCapitalisminChina’(2013)65StanfordLawReview697.111LinandMilhaupt(n108)725,734.112Seligsohnandothers(n11)20.113MilhauptandZheng(n108)677;LinandMilhaupt(n108)707,737,741.114MilhauptandZheng(n108)677;LinandMilhaupt,740115ibid.680116LinandMilhaupt(n108)707117ibid.726-727
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increaseglobalcompetitiveness.WhilstsuchactivitiesundoubtedlyraisedantitrustconcernsundertheChineseAntitrustLaw,“SASAC-supervisedenterpriseshavebeenvirtuallyexemptfromantitrustenforcement”.118ConcernsofthisnatureinevitablyraisethequestionofwhethertheintimaterelationsbetweenSOEsandtheStateconstituteacorruptionproblem–discussedbelow.
4. TheProblemofLawandtheEnvironmentinChina
a) LegalCodes,HostilitytoTheargumentabove,thatthereisanabsenceofhardlawinChinaregulatingclimatechange,muchlessCCS,fitsintoabroadnarrativeabouttheroleoflawinChinesesociety.Atthehighestlevelofgenerality,thissitswellwiththeclaimsthatthereisatraditionalChinesehostilitytolegalcodesandlaw.DullwrylyrecountsthesixthcenturyB.C.storyofDengXi,amanwhosoughttoestablishasystemoflawfulaccountabilityforrulers,onlytobeexecutedforhistroubles.SaysDull,“whenlookingfortherootcausesofmodernChina’slowopinionoflawyers,thestoryofDengXishouldbeexaminedforthesourceofadeepprejudice,notagainstlaws,butagainstpubliclawsthatcouldtakeonalifeoftheirownandbeusedtochallengetheauthorityofofficialpoliciesandvalues.”119Suchapproaches,emphasizingadeepseatedhostilitytolawinChinaarealsotobefoundinthewritingsofcontemporaryhumanrightsscholars,andthoseworkinginrelatedfieldssuchascriminallawandprocedure.Recountingappallinglitaniesofhumanrightsabuses–abduction,unauthoriseddetention,'blackjails',forcedabortionsandsterilizations,intimidationofactivistsandfamiliesofactivists,interferencewithlawyers,'re-educationthroughlabour'andsoon–theconclusionisthatsuchviolationsofbasicrightsaresufferedbymillionsofChineseonanannualbasis.AsCohenpointsout,alltheseareplainviolationsoftheChineseConstitution,but“atpresentthegovernmentoffersnoeffectivemeansofenforcingconstitutionalprotections.”[xii]120Noristhismerelyamatterofadministrativeomission,theStateisactivelycomplicitinsuchviolations:“thepolicehavemasteredtherangeoflawlessblackarts,andtheprocuracyandthecourtshavetoooftenprovedaccommodating.”[ix]121ForWesternlawyers,thepositionoftheCourtsiscentral.Writinginthecontextofthecriminallaw,Cohennotesthat“thecourts...haveoftenhaddifficultyfairlyapplying[thelaw].Partyinterference,corruption,localprotectionismandsocialnetworkshaveallledtodistortedapplicationsofthelaw.”
118ibid723.SeefurtherthediscussionregardingthepositionofSASACundertheLawonState-OwnedAssetsofEnterprises,at736.119JackDull,‘TheDeepRootsofResistancetoLawCodesandLawyersinChina’inKarenTurner-Gottschang,JamesVFeinermanandRKentGuy(eds),ThelimitsoftheruleoflawinChina(UniversityofWashingtonPress2000)328–9.Emphasisadded.120JeromeACohen,‘Foreword:LawlessnessinChina’inXuYouyuandHuaZe(eds),Intheshadowoftherisingdragon:storiesofrepressioninthenewChina(PalgraveMacmillan2013).121ibid.
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[x]122Indeed,atthetimeofwriting,ZhouQiang,PresidentoftheSupremePeople’sCourt,denouncedtheideaofjudicialindependence,urginghighercourtofficialsto“bareyourswordstowardsfalsewesternidealslikejudicialindependence.”123MatteistressesthedangersofslippingintostereotypedviewsofChineselaw,that“traditionalculturedisparagedlaw,thatChineselawwasdevoidofconceptsofrights,andthatthedominationoflawbypoliticalconsiderationswasandstillisviewedaslegitimateintheConfuciantradition.”[37]124Instead,thealternativeapproachistoseektounderstandthe“differentstructuralnatureoflawin[China]”[37]125,withakeyhintbeingprovidedbywhichpatternoflawcomesoutsecondinthecompetition–inthecaseofChina,likelytobepoliticallaw.
b) AdministrativeMeasures,andtheRuleofLawThepreferenceforadministrativefiatinplaceofordinarylawisevidentinthecaseofChineseclimatelaw.Thisisnottocriticizeeitheritsscopeoreffectiveness.TheargumentcaneasilybemadethatChineseclimateactionisatleastaspowerful,asextensiveasothermorerulebasedregimes.However,paceWang,theissueislessoneofbruteeffectiveness,thannormative.Thekeyshortcomingofnon-legislativerulemakingisroutinelyidentifiedasoneofepistemicaccessible.Therulesgoverningapolityshouldpromulgatedaspublicknowledgesothatthedemoscanscrutinise,criticise,internalizeandplanforit,and“useitasaframeworkfortheirplansandexpectationsandforsettlingtheirdisputeswithothers.”126Rulesshouldbemadeinpublicandnotinobscurebureaucraticcontexts.Additionally,theinstitutionsofstate,includingthecourts,“shouldbeavailabletoordinarypeopletoupholdtheirrights,settletheirdisputes,andprotectthemagainstabusesofpublicandprivatepower.”127Rulesshouldbeclearanddeterminate,suchthatofficialinterpretationsdonotleavecitizenssubjecttoofficialwhims.Attheheartofthislatterpointistheneedofjudicialindependence,executiveaccountability,theabsenceofcorruption,andsoon.ViewingChineseenvironmentalandclimateregulationinthelightoftheruleoflaw,itisnotasurprisingtoconcludethatitisaninadequateregime.AtthehighestlevelofabstractionthedifficultiesofChinatocoherewiththestricturesofthisprinciplearewelldocumented.128Indeed,whensubjectedtothevariousfactorsandcriteriaoftheWorldJusticeProjectChinaperformsremarkablypoorlyforajurisdictionofits
122ibid.123LucyHornby,‘China’sTopJudgeDenouncesJudicialIndependence’FinancialTimes(17January2017).124Mattei(n14).125ibid.126Waldron(n30).127ibid.128Forindicativesurveys,seeDingjianCaiandChen’guangWang(eds),China’sJourneytowardtheRuleofLaw:LegalReform,1978-2008(Brill2010);KarenTurner-Gottschang,JamesVFeinermanandRKentGuy(eds),TheLimitsoftheRuleofLawinChina(UniversityofWashingtonPress2000).
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wealthandsophistication–80thoutof113surveyedstatesoverall,sandwichedbetweenBurkinaFasoandZambia.Whilstperformingwellinfieldssuchasorderandsecurity,andciviljustice,itsconstraintsongovernmentpowers,regulatoryenforcement,andfundamentalrightsprotectionarenegligible.129Suchasysteminwhichtheruleofpoliticsdominatessodecisivelyoverthatoflawisdeeplyinimicaltotheidealsoftheruleoflaw.ScholarssuchasTamanahahavetermedthistherulebylaw.130Whereasthetraditionalunderstoodruleoflawelevateslawfrompolitics,suchthatitstandsinapositionofequidistancefromallpeopleandinstitutions,therulebylawisdeployslawasnothingmorethanainstrumentofpoliticalwill.Lawinthissenseisunidirectionalinthatitisatoolbywhichthestatecanexercisedominionoveritscitizenswithoutiteverbeingabletoexercisesimilarcontroloverthestate.Theenforcementofenvironmentallawgenerally,andinrespectoftheSOEswhichwilloperatesodecisivelyinthecontextofCCS,demonstratepreciselythis.
c) EnforcementThe“airpocalypses”ofextremeairpollutioneventssufferedbyChinaarenowannualevents,makingcleartoglobalaudiencesthattheenvironmentofChinahasnotbeenfundamentallyimprovedbyitscorpusofenvironmentallawandpolicy.131Thecausesofthisineffectivenessarenumerous132–competencestomakeandimplementenvironmentalpoliciesarebroadlydispersedamongministriesandagenciescreatinginconsistentapproacheswhichhampercompliance.133PivotalinstrumentssuchastheEnvironmentalProtectionLawhavenotbeenamendedsince1989meaningthatmanyofitsprovisionsareoutdatedandsimplistic.Thecoretaskofaffectingentities’behaviourwillnotbeachieved,forexample,whenthebenefitsofnon-compliancearegreaterthanthecostofpenalties.134Asdiscussedabove,lawhasnotalwaysbeenthevehiclebywhichpublicbehaviourhasbeenmodelledinChina,andtheconceptoftheruleoflawhasneverbeenfullyacceptedbytheChinesestate.135Intheplaceoflaw,otherconsideration,oftenpoliticalorideologicalhavemediatedtheapplicationoflaw,136aparticularinstanceofwhicharetheinformalguanxinetworks.137Inaninstanceofdraftingstraightforwardlyantitheticaltotheruleoflaw,Chineselawsareoftendraftedata
129JCBotero,MAgrastandAPonce,WorldJusticeProject-RuleofLawIndex2016(TheWorldJusticeProject2016).130BrianZTamanaha,OntheRuleofLaw:History,Politics,Theory(CambridgeUniversityPress2004)3.131Wang(n36)350.132ibid.352;McElwee(n19)3;Shi(n49)182.133McElwee(n19)9.134Shi(n49)183.135Wang(n36)532-3;PitmanB.Potter,TheChineseLegalSystem:GlobalizationandLocalLegalCulture(Routledge2001)7.136McElwee(n19)4-5.137ibid8;PitmanB.Potter(n94)7,30.
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highlevelofgeneralitywhichprovidestheinterpretivespaceforcorruptivepractices.138Inparticular,localauthoritieshavesufficientflexibilityintheinterpretationandimplementationoflegislationwhichunderminescertaintyoflaw.139Itisbytheuseofguanxiratherthantransactionalbriberythatdecisionmakingisinfluenced,asystemwhichweakensenvironmentallaw,legalauthority,andtheprestigeofthejudiciary.140Economicdevelopmentisoftenconsideredtobeofhigherimportancewhenitconflictswithenvironmentallawsandregulations.141Bothnationalandlocalgovernmentshavetheirowneconomicdevelopmentgoalsandneedsinmind,androutinelyusepressuretoobstructenforcement.142Whenenvironmentalobligationsaretobeenforcedlocally,authoritiesmaybediscouragedfromenforcingtheminthebeliefthatthesamemaynotoccurincompetingjurisdictions,therebyputtingtheirlocalindustriesatacompetitivedisadvantage.143Inthisway,thegeographicfragmentationofenvironmentalresponsibilitycombinedwitheconomicconsiderationscandiscourageauthoritiesfromenforcingtherulesandinsteaddefaultingtolocalprotectionism.144Institutionally,environmentalenforcementagenciesfacedifficultiestoundertaketheirdutiesduetotheirbureaucraticconnectionswithenvironmentalprotectiondepartmentsoflocalgovernments,whosestaffandresourcesarecontrolledbythelocalseatofthePeople’sGovernment.145Primaryresponsibilityforenvironmentalprotectioniswiththelocalauthorities,anddespitereportingobligationsthereareopportunitiestonotfollowtheenvironmentallaws.146ThelocalPeople’sGovernmentmayprioritiseeconomicdevelopmentoverenvironmentalprotection,andinsomecases,theenvironmentalprotectiondepartmentsmayevenbecomeaccomplicesinillegalconstructionprojects.147Refusingtofollowtherequestsofthegovernmentandinsistingonenforcingthelawmayleadtodismissaloftheenvironmentalofficials.148Moregenerally,routineproblemsofresourcingarise–environmentalprotectiondepartmentshavelimitedresourcestoenforcethelaw;149
andtheyhavedifficultiestodiscoverpollutersintheirjurisdictioninatimelymanner,andchallengesincollectingsufficientevidencetopresentincourtdueto
138McElwee(n19)8;Peerenboom(n30)251.139Peerenboom(n31).140Wang(n36)533;McElwee(n19)6.141McElwee(n20)6;Potter(n42)159.142Wang(n37)533.143McElwee(n20)7.144Shi(n50)184;McElwee(n20)7;.ZhenminWangandKaiTu,‘ChineseConstitutionalDynamics:ADecennialReview’inAlbertHYChen(ed),ConstitutionalisminAsiaintheEarlyTwenty-FirstCentury(CambridgeUniversityPress2014)137.145Wang(n37)533-4.146McElwee(n20)5-6.147Wang(n37)534.148ibid.149ibid;McElwee(n20).
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lackofappropriateequipmenttomonitoractivities.150Whereillegalconstructionprojectsaresupportedbygovernmentagenciesandlocalgovernmentsbehindthescenes,itisextremelydifficultforenvironmentalofficestoenforcethelaw.151Asregardsestablishingliability,thereareproblemsbothsubstantiveandprocedural.Companylawprovidesanotinconsiderableloopholeinthatwhilepollutingcompaniescanfacecivilliabilityforharmingtheenvironment,thereisliabilityfordirectors.152Asregardsenforcementmechanisms,GibbsnotesthatChina’sTortLiabilityLawprovidesenforcementavenuesforindividuals.153IfthereislossordamagethatCCScauses,theselawscanprovideforremedies.154Againstthat,thereisaswatheofChineseenvironmentallawliteraturethatrunsintheoppositedirection.Environmentalpublicinterestlitigationhasstruggledtomakeprogress.155Thereasonsincludethetraditionofhavingcitizens,legalpersonsorothergroupswhoaredirectstakeholdersasplaintiffs,andthisbeingresistanttochange.Also,thereissomeconcernthatthesystemwouldappeartounderminethegovernmentduetoexpandingdemocraticvalues.156Thelegislationondefendingenvironmentalrightsisdescribedasweak,lackingimportantproceduralelements,suchasrulesonresponsibilitytoprovideevidence,determinationofcausationandonthescopeofdamages.157Thelawshaveunderdevelopedareas,whichhascausedmanydisputestolanguishwithoutaresolution,andsometoenduptoviolentclashesoverpollution.158Pollutingindustriesaresometimesprotectedbylocalgovernments,meaningthatimpartialjudgmentsarehardtoobtain.159Oftendefenceofenvironmentalrightsisalsomorechallengingduetothequalityofthejudgesinthejudicialsystem,includingtheirlackeducationandsystematictraininginenvironmentallaw,andsufficientknowledgeabouthowtohandlepollutioncases.Theindependenceofjudgesisdisruptedbycentralandlocalgovernmentinvolvementthroughpersonalrelations,andappointmentandfundingpowers.160Inthisway,environmentalrightssufferfromanegativeimpactcausedbyjudgesrelyingoncivilcaseswheretheylackspecificknowledgeonhowtoapproachviolationsofenvironmentalrights.Recentlyestablishedlocalspecialenvironmentalcourtshavebeenestablishedtotackletheissuesresultingfromlackofspecial
150Wang(n37)534.151ibid545.152Shi(n50)182-3.153Gibbs(n84)32.154ibid.155Wang(n37)537-538.Foramorepositiveassessment,seeJamesThorntonofClientEarth,2015UKELAGarnerLecture“CanweCatch-Up?HowtheUKisfallingbehindonEnvironmentalLaw”.Copyonfilewiththeauthor.156ibid.157ibid538-539.158ibid.159ibid539-540.160Shi(n50)171;PitmanB.Potter(n133)32;Wang(n37)541;WangandTu(n142)136-7.
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knowledge,andthemethodhasshownsuccess.161Thatsaid,thelackofspecialisedknowledgeonenvironmentallawconcernsnotonlyjudgesbutalsobureaucrats.162
d) CorruptionCorruptionasregardsChineseSOEsis“widespread,andaccompaniedbyinstitutionalisedandpervasivecronyism.”163PresidentXiJinpinghasrunananti-corruptioncampaignfrom2012onwards,164butcorruptionremainsendemic,andtherehavebeenstrugglestocarryoutfundamentalreforms.165ThefactorsenablingcorruptionwithinSOEsincludethe“complexityoftheSOEoperation,decentralisationofmanagerialpowerallowingdirectcontroloverdistributionofresources,andtheabilitytomakedecisionsgeneratingcorruptbenefits.Rampantcorruptionisfurtherenabledbyweaksupervisionsystemsandopportunitiesforcorruptioncreatedbothbythesystemandtheuseoflegitimatemanagingpower.”166ForthepurposesofCCS,thesemechanismstoextractrentsfromgovernmentsriskunderminingkeyaspectsofCCS.WhilstSOEsmayalignwiththeinterests,goals,andprioritiesofthepoliticalleadershipbydevelopingCCSprojects,theymayberelativelyindifferenttoaspectsofprojectintegritywhichtheleadershiparesimilarlyindifferentto.Poorsiteselection,monitoring,CO2purity,oranynumberofothersystemicdefectsmaywellgoundetectedandeventacitlysupportedinanenvironmentinwhichfirmsobtainspecialadvantagesthroughcorruptaccesstogovernment,andwherethereisdeepconvergenceofinterestsbetweenmanagerialelitesintheparty-stateandbusiness.167
161Wang(n37)541.162McElwee(n20)5.163MilhauptandZheng(n107)691,citingtheHeritageFoundation’s2013IndexofEconomicFreedom.SeealsoWenhaoCheng,‘AnEmpiricalStudyofCorruptionwithinChina’sState-OwnedEnterprises’(2004)4.SpecialIssueon:CorruptioninChina,ChinaReview55.164MilhauptandZheng(n107)682.165HeritageFoundation,2017IndexofEconomicFreedom,Asia-Pacific,China,127.166Cheng(n116)78-9.167MilhauptandZheng(n107)688,716.
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5. ConclusionIntheconcludingchaptertothisvolumetheeditorsobservethatoneoflaw’skeyfunctionsistoprovidethemeanstoresolveconflictinginterests,toarticulate,“theframeworkforreconcilingthecomplexissuesandrelationshipsinvolved[ingreenhousegasreductions].Thisreinforcestheimportanceofdevelopingeffectivelegalandregulatorystructures.”Ifoneagreesthatlawisazoneofinstitutionalisedcontestationbetweencompetingsocietalinterests,theforegoingseverelyquestionswhetherthisisauniversaltruth,oroneparticulartocertainlegalsystems.Certainly,thecasecannotbeeasilymadethatChineselawmediateseffectivelybetweenthevariousstakeholderspotentiallyimplicatedinaCCSproject.Thatcaseisyethardertosustaininrelationsbetweenaggrievedindividuals,andtheStateanditsproxies.OnewaytounderstandthiswouldbetoarguethatthereisinChinasimplyanabsenceoflawtoutcourt.OnemightdrawuponGibbsandherfindingthat,havingmeasuredtheChineseCCSregimeagainstherfourcriteria,thereisaneedforapermittingregimetobeestablished,relevantstandardstobedeveloped,includingmonitoringandverificationstandards,forexistingenforcementmechanismstobeadaptedornewmechanismsdevelopedforCCS,fortherolesandresponsibilitiesoftherelevantauthoritiestobeclarified,andforattitudestowardenforcementandcompliancetobechangedtoensureeffectiveoperationofCCSinChina.168Allthisisundoubtedlycorrect,but‘mere’rulemakingwouldnotaddresstheprobleminalegalsysteminwhichtraditionandpoliticsplayassignificantastheydoinChina.AsMatteinotes,“oneshouldnotconfusetheruleoftraditionallawwiththeabsenceoflaworevenwiththeabsenceofformallegalinstitutions.Intheruleoftraditionallawformallegalinstitutionsdoexist,buttheirworkingruleisdifferentfromwhatweareusedtoinWesternsocieties.”169Thedeficitinthissenseisthennottheabsenceoflaw,buttheperceivedshortcomingsofthemodeoflaw.Inonesense,thestoryofChina’sclimateregime,anditsCCSregime,isoneoftheabundanceofbureaucraticagreements,plans,andschemesthathaveadegreeofeffectivenessthatmoreconventionally‘legal’regimesmightenvy.SuchistheinterlockingwebofrelationsthattheChineseState,SOEs,andlocalgovernmentshavebetweenoneanother,thatthe‘absence’oflawcanbe(andoftenintheliteratureis),easedoutofsight.Thishoweveristodoaninjusticetotheweightofthedistinctionbetweentheruleoflaw,andtherulebylaw.Thelatter’selevationofpoliticsabovelawservestoallowthestatecanexerciseuncontestedmightoveritscitizens.ForthepurposesofenforcingenvironmentallawinChina,andinparticularrespectoftheSOEswhichwilloperatesodecisivelyinthecontextofCCS,thereislittleprospectofaCCSregimewhichbothenablesitswidespreaddeploymentandprotectsthebroaderinterestsoftheenvironmentandcitizens.
168Gibbs(n84)33-4.169Mattei(n15)39.
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AuthorBiographyNavrajSinghGhaleighisSeniorLecturerinClimateLawattheUniversityofEdinburghwhereheistheHeadofthePublicLawSubjectArea,andDirectoroftwoLLMprogrammes:LLMinGlobalEnvironmentandClimateChange,andLLMinLawandChinese.Hehaspublishedwidelyonthenatureofclimatelawanditsinter-andinfra-disciplinarynature.HiscurrentresearchinterestsrelatetoclimatelawinEastAsia,andtheoperationofclimateconstitutionalisminthelightoftheParisAgreement.
