Edinburgh Research Explorer No visible means of legal support Citation for published version: Ghaleigh, NS 2018, No visible means of legal support: China’s CCS regime. in I Havercroft, R Macrory & R Stewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues. 2nd edn, Hart Publishing. Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: Carbon Capture and Storage General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 03. Oct. 2020
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Edinburgh Research Explorer
No visible means of legal support
Citation for published version:Ghaleigh, NS 2018, No visible means of legal support: China’s CCS regime. in I Havercroft, R Macrory & RStewart (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues. 2nd edn, HartPublishing.
Link:Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:Peer reviewed version
Published In:Carbon Capture and Storage
General rightsCopyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise andabide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policyThe University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorercontent complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright pleasecontact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately andinvestigate your claim.
a) BasicsoftheChineseLegalSystemAlthoughChina’slegalsystemfallsintothefamilyof‘socialistlaw’inDavid’sclassicaltaxonomy,therearereasonstodoubtthatthisisahelpfulfinding.14AsMatteinotes,thisisaclassificationthatisbothEuro-Americancentric,andfailstoaccountforthesuccessoftheChinesepoliticalsystemandtheinfluenceoflegalsinology.15Amorecompellingapproachhearguesisonewhichtakesintoaccountandseekstounearth‘hiddenlaw’,“thehiddenassumptionsofdifferentlegalsystems.”16Inordertobetterarriveatthisdeeperview,Matteiproposeshisown,nowfamous,classificationofgloballegalsystems.Ratherthanrelyingonformalcategoriesoflegalsystems(i.e.commonlaw,civillaw,socialistlaw…),Mattei’scategorizationrevolvesaround“threepatternsofsocialincentives(orsocialconstraints)whichareatplayinalllegalsystemssimultaneously.”17Thecategoriesofsocialincentivesaretheruleofprofessionallaw,theruleofpoliticallaw,andtheruleoftraditionallaw.Whatvariesamongthelegalsystemsoftheworldisthe“quantity,acceptability,andmostimportantly,hegemony”ofthesepatternsofsocialincentives.Theapplicationofthisapproachhastheadvantageofbothbeingnon-Western-centric,andalsodynamic,respondingtodevelopmentsastheyoccur.Therewillofcoursebecircumstancesinwhichthedistinctionsbetweenapproaches,i.e.theruleofpolitical
b) EnvironmentalLawMaking,andEnforcementInFebruary1978theChineseConstitutionwasamendedtoprovideanexplicitrequirementofenvironmentalprotection–thecurrentArticle2638–andshortlythereafterestablishedanideologicalbasisfortheStatetofulfilitsconstitutionalenvironmentalobligations.39ThedevelopmentofmodernChineseenvironmentallawscommencedinSeptember1979withtheintroductionoftheEnvironmentalProtectionLawofthePeople’sRepublicofChina.40Legislativedevelopmenthasbeenrapidthereafter,andaccordingtoWangtheEnvironmentalProtectionLawtookprecedenceoverotherareasoflaw,suchaseconomicconstruction.41Thisispartlyduetotheincreasinglyseriousenvironmentalproblemsthatthenationhadfacedsincethelate1950s,whichwereexacerbatedduringtheCulturalRevolution.42InthisformativeperiodoftheRepublic,economicgrowthwasprioritisedoverenvironmentalprotection,whichwereinturnmarginalised.43AnawarenessonthepartoftheleadershipofthepublicharmcausedbyindustrialisationintheWestandJapanwasalsoacontributoryfactorintheformulationofthenewregime.44Inthesameperiod,theLeadingGroupofEnvironmentalProtectionintheStateCouncil(LGEPSC)preparedpolicyinstructionsforcadres45providingthatthe“eliminationofpollutionandprotectionoftheenvironmentwereapartofbuildingsocialismandrealisingthefourmodernisationsenactedbyDengXiaoping.”46AsMcElweedemonstrateshowever,theeffectofmyriadmergersandadministrativereformsoftheLGEPSC,includingrenamingastheEnvironmentalProtectionBureauandsubsequentlytheStateEnvironmentalProtectionAdministration(SEPA),servedweakeneditandprovedtobeasetbackforenvironmentalprotection.47Since2008however,SEPAwasrenamedtheMinistryofEnvironmentalProtection,andits
c) TheTurntotheClimateAlthoughChinaratifiedtheUNFCCCfromthefirst,andhasbeenengagedinitsnegotiationseversince,domesticclimatechangeactiondidnotimmediatelyfollow.Inthedecadeorsofrom1992,China’sprimarypolicygoalwasitsdevelopmentstrategyandannualeconomicgrowthof10%.Totheextentthatenvironmentalconcernswerearticulatedinmajorpolicyprocesses,theyweremanifestedintheformofsustainabledevelopmentplanning.Asearlyas1994China’sAgenda21:WhitePaperonChina’sPopulation,EnvironmentandDevelopmentinthe21stCenturyexplicitlystatedthewishtocontrolGHGemissionsforpurposesofclimate
a) PolicyandPilotsGiventhescaleandindustrialprofileoftheChineseeconomy,especiallyitsrelianceoncoal-firedpowergeneration,CCSisChinaismutuallysupportiveofChinesedecarbonisation,aswellasglobaleffortsatwidescaleCCSdeployment.China’senergysystemaloneaccountsfornearlyhalfoftheworld’s1,950GWofexistingcoal-firedpowerplants78andtheroleofCCSincontributingtoChina’ssuiteofclimatepolicies,andenablingthem,hasbeenpublicallyrecognised.Intheforewordtoaimportant2015reportbytheAsianDevelopmentBank,theDeputyDirectorGeneraloftheNDRC’sDepartmentofClimateChangediscussedtheurgentneed“toexpand[CCS]deploymentatarapidscaletomeetpriorityemissionreductiontargetsintheshort,mediumandlong-term.”79InChina,aselsewhere,CCSdeploymentisaconditionprecedenttothelowestcostdeploymentofotherclimatechangepolicies.Forexample,intheIEA’sRoadmaps,thecostofmeetingthe450ppmtargetincreasesbyc.40%withoutCCS,owingtotheabsenceofalternativestofossilfuelpowerinindustrysectorssuchasironandsteel,cement,chemicalsetc.80InrecognitionoftheimperativeofwidespreadCCSdeployment,ChinahasinvestedconsiderablepolicyenergyinthedevelopmentofitsCCSknowledgebase.AsQinnotes,Chinahasforanumberofyearsengagedinresearchprojects,policystudiesandroadmaps,pilots,anddemonstrationprojectsonaspectsoftheCCSchain,includingtheworld'slargestcaptureprojectforcoal-firedpowerplants.81DetailedstudieshoweverhavefoundthattheCCSregulatoryframeworkinChinatobeunfitforpurpose,evenwhentakingintoaccountthescopeforadaptationofexistinglaws.82AlthoughsomeaspectsoftheregulationoftheCCSchainholdoutsomehope(prinicipallythoserelatedtoindustrialactivities),othersprovidelessscopeforbuildingupon,primarilythoserelatedtogeologicalstorage.83
b) TheAdequacyofAmendingExtantRegimesSeligsohnetaldohoweversurveytheexistinglegalandinstitutionalarrangementsinavarietyofCCS-relevantareassuchasenvironmentalstandards,geologicalstorage,regulatoryoversight,andhealthandsafety.Thepurposeistoexplorethescopefordrawinguponthesevariousbodiesoflaw,andattachingCCS-specificprovisionstothem,intheabsenceofadedicatedCCSregimeontheEUmodel.Inmanyrespects,thisisapromisingexercise,notingforexamplethat“ChinaalreadyhasrobustregulationsforplantconstructionandairpollutionthatwillimpactallCScaptureplantsandformpartoftheCCS-specificregulations…underthecurrentLawonPreventionandControlofAirPollution.”84OtherareashoweverareconsideredinmoreneutraltermsandthegenericlimitationsofChineseenvironmentallawarediscussion.Inadditiontotheshortcomingsdiscussedherein,awiderangeofregulatorygapsareexplored,themostpressingofwhicharecapture,transportation,andgeologicalstorage.Totakethefirstofthese,thewaterconsumptionaspectsofcapturearenotaddressedintheexistinglegislation.ForawaterstressedsocietysuchasChina,itisvitalthereforethattheimpactofCCSplantsonlocalwatersuppliesisadequatelyapprovedandmonitored.Whilsttransportationregulationshouldbeabletodrawoncognateschemesforoil,gas,andchemical,newCO2puritystandardswillberequiredaswellasstandardsforpipelinematerials.Regardinggeologicalstorage,owingtothedifferencesinstoringCO2ascomparedwiththeexistingstorageregimes(forradioactivepollution,chemicals,hazardousmaterialsetc)abespokeCCSstorageregimewouldberequired.Therearethoughampleregimesforemulationinthisrespect.Gibbsthoughhassubjectedthispreciseissuetoexactingscrutiny,anddevelopedcriteriatoexaminetheeffectiveenforcementofundergroundstorageofCO2.85Thefourcriteriaare:
c) StateOwnedEnterprisesOnefurtherchallengeofCCSinChinatoucheduponbySeligsohnandothers,butdeservingofgreaterattention,isthatposedbyChina’sStateOwnedEnterprises(SOEs).103Giventheneedforlargeinvestmentsandfamiliaritywiththeoperationsofthepowersector,itisacertaintythatmanyoftheleadingindustrialactorsinvolvedinCCSinChinawillbeSOEs–theChinesegridcompaniesareownedbythestateandpowergenerationisdominatedbystate-ownedenterprises.104Indeed,severalSOEshaveconsideringlargescaledemonstrationprojects,105andkeysaspectsofCCSinfrastructure,suchastheCO2pipelinenetworkcouldbeorganizedasafullystate-ownedenterprise.106Moreover,SOEshaveanumberofstructuraladvantagessuchasbeing“betterplacedtomanagerisksthansmaller,independentoperators,andarethereforeexpectedtobeinvolvedinamajorityofthedemonstrationprojects”.10799ibid33.100ibid.101ibid.102ibid2,14-15,30.103Foranearlytreatmentoftheissues,seeRichardMacrory,‘AirPollutionandtheRegulationofEuropeanStateEnterprises:AComparativeLegalModel’inWilliamElliottButler(ed),YearbookonSocialistLegalSystems(TransnationalJurisPublicationsInc1989).104MunSHo,ZhongminWangandZichaoYu,China’sPowerGenerationDispatch(ResourcesfortheFuture2017)12-13.105AsianDevelopmentBank(n78)8.106ibid19.107ibid45.
a) LegalCodes,HostilitytoTheargumentabove,thatthereisanabsenceofhardlawinChinaregulatingclimatechange,muchlessCCS,fitsintoabroadnarrativeabouttheroleoflawinChinesesociety.Atthehighestlevelofgenerality,thissitswellwiththeclaimsthatthereisatraditionalChinesehostilitytolegalcodesandlaw.DullwrylyrecountsthesixthcenturyB.C.storyofDengXi,amanwhosoughttoestablishasystemoflawfulaccountabilityforrulers,onlytobeexecutedforhistroubles.SaysDull,“whenlookingfortherootcausesofmodernChina’slowopinionoflawyers,thestoryofDengXishouldbeexaminedforthesourceofadeepprejudice,notagainstlaws,butagainstpubliclawsthatcouldtakeonalifeoftheirownandbeusedtochallengetheauthorityofofficialpoliciesandvalues.”119Suchapproaches,emphasizingadeepseatedhostilitytolawinChinaarealsotobefoundinthewritingsofcontemporaryhumanrightsscholars,andthoseworkinginrelatedfieldssuchascriminallawandprocedure.Recountingappallinglitaniesofhumanrightsabuses–abduction,unauthoriseddetention,'blackjails',forcedabortionsandsterilizations,intimidationofactivistsandfamiliesofactivists,interferencewithlawyers,'re-educationthroughlabour'andsoon–theconclusionisthatsuchviolationsofbasicrightsaresufferedbymillionsofChineseonanannualbasis.AsCohenpointsout,alltheseareplainviolationsoftheChineseConstitution,but“atpresentthegovernmentoffersnoeffectivemeansofenforcingconstitutionalprotections.”[xii]120Noristhismerelyamatterofadministrativeomission,theStateisactivelycomplicitinsuchviolations:“thepolicehavemasteredtherangeoflawlessblackarts,andtheprocuracyandthecourtshavetoooftenprovedaccommodating.”[ix]121ForWesternlawyers,thepositionoftheCourtsiscentral.Writinginthecontextofthecriminallaw,Cohennotesthat“thecourts...haveoftenhaddifficultyfairlyapplying[thelaw].Partyinterference,corruption,localprotectionismandsocialnetworkshaveallledtodistortedapplicationsofthelaw.”
b) AdministrativeMeasures,andtheRuleofLawThepreferenceforadministrativefiatinplaceofordinarylawisevidentinthecaseofChineseclimatelaw.Thisisnottocriticizeeitheritsscopeoreffectiveness.TheargumentcaneasilybemadethatChineseclimateactionisatleastaspowerful,asextensiveasothermorerulebasedregimes.However,paceWang,theissueislessoneofbruteeffectiveness,thannormative.Thekeyshortcomingofnon-legislativerulemakingisroutinelyidentifiedasoneofepistemicaccessible.Therulesgoverningapolityshouldpromulgatedaspublicknowledgesothatthedemoscanscrutinise,criticise,internalizeandplanforit,and“useitasaframeworkfortheirplansandexpectationsandforsettlingtheirdisputeswithothers.”126Rulesshouldbemadeinpublicandnotinobscurebureaucraticcontexts.Additionally,theinstitutionsofstate,includingthecourts,“shouldbeavailabletoordinarypeopletoupholdtheirrights,settletheirdisputes,andprotectthemagainstabusesofpublicandprivatepower.”127Rulesshouldbeclearanddeterminate,suchthatofficialinterpretationsdonotleavecitizenssubjecttoofficialwhims.Attheheartofthislatterpointistheneedofjudicialindependence,executiveaccountability,theabsenceofcorruption,andsoon.ViewingChineseenvironmentalandclimateregulationinthelightoftheruleoflaw,itisnotasurprisingtoconcludethatitisaninadequateregime.AtthehighestlevelofabstractionthedifficultiesofChinatocoherewiththestricturesofthisprinciplearewelldocumented.128Indeed,whensubjectedtothevariousfactorsandcriteriaoftheWorldJusticeProjectChinaperformsremarkablypoorlyforajurisdictionofits
c) EnforcementThe“airpocalypses”ofextremeairpollutioneventssufferedbyChinaarenowannualevents,makingcleartoglobalaudiencesthattheenvironmentofChinahasnotbeenfundamentallyimprovedbyitscorpusofenvironmentallawandpolicy.131Thecausesofthisineffectivenessarenumerous132–competencestomakeandimplementenvironmentalpoliciesarebroadlydispersedamongministriesandagenciescreatinginconsistentapproacheswhichhampercompliance.133PivotalinstrumentssuchastheEnvironmentalProtectionLawhavenotbeenamendedsince1989meaningthatmanyofitsprovisionsareoutdatedandsimplistic.Thecoretaskofaffectingentities’behaviourwillnotbeachieved,forexample,whenthebenefitsofnon-compliancearegreaterthanthecostofpenalties.134Asdiscussedabove,lawhasnotalwaysbeenthevehiclebywhichpublicbehaviourhasbeenmodelledinChina,andtheconceptoftheruleoflawhasneverbeenfullyacceptedbytheChinesestate.135Intheplaceoflaw,otherconsideration,oftenpoliticalorideologicalhavemediatedtheapplicationoflaw,136aparticularinstanceofwhicharetheinformalguanxinetworks.137Inaninstanceofdraftingstraightforwardlyantitheticaltotheruleoflaw,Chineselawsareoftendraftedata