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TheEvol ut i on
of
t he
Cr ui se M s s i l e
by
KENNETH
P
WERRELL
Ai r Uni versi t y
(AU)
Ai r
Uni vers i t y Press
Maxwel l Ai r
ForceBase,
Al abama
September 1985
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Li braryof Congress Catalogi ng
i n
Publ i cati onData
Wer r el l , Kenneth
P
The
Evol uti on
of
the Crui seMs s i l e
September 1985
I ncl udes bi bl i ogr aphi es and i ndex
1 Crui seMssi l es-H story I i r Uni versi ty US T i t l e
UG 3 2
C7W47
1985
358
.174 0973
85-8131
Fi rs t Pr i nt i ng 1985
SecondPri nti ng
1998
D sclai mer
Opi n ons, concl usi ons, andrecommendat i ons
expressedor i mpl i edw t hi n aresol el y
those
of the
edi t ors and
do
not necessari l yrepresent
thevi ews of
Ai r
Uni ver si t y,
the
Uni ted
States
i r
Force
the
Department of
Defense,
or
any
other
US
government
agency Ceared
f or
publ i c
rel ease
di str i buti on
unl i mted
For
sal e
by the
Superi ntendent of Documents
USGovernment
Pr i nt i ng
Of f i ce
Wshi ngtonDC20402
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t z
c nezi eani
a l i o ka TE
j zzvzJ
j zvi ny at wdl i zzvE wi t f i t f i E
ez ui s z
mi l l i z
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CONTENTS
Chapt er
Page
DSCL IMER
FOREWORD
i x
THE
UTHOR
xi
CKNOWEDGMENTS
x i i i
I
I NTRODUCTION
1
Not es
6
THE
E RLY
YE RS
7
For ei gn
Ef forts 8
The
Navy- Sper r y Fl yi ng
omb 8
The
Army- Ket t er i ng
ug
12
For ei gn Devel opment s
17
The
Army- Sper r y
Exper i ment s 21
USNavyEf forts
23
TheKet t er i ng- General Mot or s A 1
26
X QAi rcraf t
s Aer i al Torpedoes
3
PHRODTE
The
Aer i al
Torpedo
I n
Act i on
32
Not es
36
WORLD
W R
41
TheGermn
V l
41
The
Ameri can V- 1 J B- 2
62
The
Nor t hr op
J B- I / J B-10
68
Not es
71
I V
POSTW R
DEVELOPMENTS
79
Post war Adj ust ment
81
Ai r
Mat er i el
Commnd
NSHEE
81
Nort hr opSnar k 82
North Ameri can
Navaho
97
TheMar t i n Matador
108
Navy Pr ogr ams
113
Regul us
I
Ri gel , Regul us
I I
Tri ton
113
TheCrossbow
120
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Chapter
Page
The
Hound
Dog
121
TheBuckDuck 123
The Bul l Goose
124
The
Quai l
125
Not es
129
V
USCRUSEMSSI LES
REVI TALIZED
135
Advanci ng
Technol ogy
135
Remot el y Pi l oted Vehi cl es
RPVs
142
SCAD
SCAM
S UD
144
1970s
146
Harpoon 150
ST WSand
S M
oSL M
151
The
Navy Ef fort Gener al
Dynamcs Wns
t heSL Mont r act 154
L M 156
Not es
165
VI
1977TOTHE
PRESENT
171
Cr ui se
M ssi l es
and
SALT
172
TheB 1
176
L Mel ect i on
178
Cr ui se M ssi l e Car r i er
187
Rati onal e
f or
Mul t i pl e
Cr ui se
M ssi l e Var i ants
189
SL M
192
GL M
201
MR SM
205
L M
C ASALM
T M
208
Fi nal Words
211
Not es
214
VI I
CONCLUSION
223
APPENDX
Speci f i cat i ons
of Vari ous Cr ui se
M ssi l es
235
APPENDX
B Di scussi on of Ai r War Col l ege
Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey
237
APPENDXC Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey Ai r power Resear ch
n s t i t u t e Ai r
War
Col l ege
241
APPENDX
D
Cr ui se M s s i l e Sur vey Cr oss
Tabul at i on
249
V
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Page
APPENDX
E
Snark
Fl i ght
Record
253
APPENDX
F X 1
Launchi ngs
6
APPENDX
Navaho
Launchi ngs
63
APPENDX
Tomahawk
Launchi ngs
65
APPENDX
Boei ngAGM8 Aand
AGM8 B
Fl i ght Test s
7
INDEX
273
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FOR WOR
The penchant of t he Amer i can ml i t ar y t o be on t he l eadi ng edge of
t echnol ogy
coul d destroy our
perspect i ve
of newweapon system and
d i s t o r t
our percept i ons of
t h e i r most e f f e c t i v e
use
i n mdemwar f ar e
o
s
wi t h crui se m s s i l e s
one
of
t echnol ogy s newes t and mos t sophi st i cat ed devel opment s r Werr el l s
book
pr ovi des t he perspect i ve and i n s i gh t
we woul d ot her wi se
l ack
Al t hough
c r u i s e m ss i l es
a r e amng
t he newest and mos t sophi st i cat ed weapons
f i e l d e d by t he Uni t ed t a t e s t hey possess a r i c h concept ual and t echnol ogi cal
he r i t a ge t s
i mpor t ant
t h a t
we
under st and t h i s heri t age as
we
consi der
depl oyment
and empl oy ment
opt i ons
t s al so i mpor t ant t h a t we understand t he
devel opment al
process i l l u s t r a t e d by t he hi s t or y of t he c r u i s e mss i l e
W t hout
t he perspect i ve
pr ovi ded by t h i s h i s t o r y
our percept i ons
of
t h e i r purpose and use
l ack
dept h and
i n s i g h t
Many
s i g n i f i c a n t event s have
i nt er vened bet ween
t he
compl et i on of r Werr el l s
manuscr i pt
i n
1982
and
t s
publ i cat i on
The
manuscr i pt
has not
been
updat ed
because rapi d devel opment s
mke
such updat i ng an endl ess task I n f a c t
t he
rapi d
pace of
cont i nued devel opment
serves t o r ei nf or ce t he need t o r e f l e c t on t he
devel opment
of these
system and
t o
pl ace t h e i r purpose
i n
perspect i ve
ON L
STEVENS
Col onel US F
Commnder
Cent er
f o r
Aerospace
Doct r i ne
Research and
Educat i on
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TH
UTHOR
r
Kennet h
P Wer r el l
conduct ed t h i s
study whi l e
ser vi ng
as a
v i s i t i n g prof essor
a t the
Ai r Uni ver si t y
Cent er f or
Aer ospace
Doctr i ne
Research and Educat i on
CADRE ,
Maxwel l Ai r Force Base
Al abama
A 1960 graduate
of the Uni t ed
t a t es Ai r Force Academy,
r Wer r el l hol ds the
M
and
PhDdegr ees f r om
Duke
Uni ver si ty
r
Wer r el l
s
Prof essor
of
Hi stor y
a t
Radf or d
Uni versi t y
Hi s
backgr ound
i ncl udes a Vi si t i ng
Associ ate
Prof essor as s i gnment a t Command and
Gener al
Staff
Col l ege
and Hi stori an assi gnment s
f or both
Oper at i ons Research
I nc and the
Wr
Depar tment
i s t o r i c al
Fund
A f r equent
parti ci pant
i n m l i t a r y h i s t o r y
wor kshops and conf er ences r Wer r el l
has
authored s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s and
papers
onml i t a r y h i s t o r y Amongthese s Ei ghth
i rForce
Bi bl i ogr aphy
MA/AH
Publ i shi ng
1981
r
Wer r el l was comm ss i oned
upon
graduati on
f r omthe Uni t ed t a t es Ai r Force
Academy
i n
1960
and r ecei ved hi s p i l o t wi ngs
i n 1961 Ass i gned t o
t he
56t h
Weat her
Reconnai ssance Squadron i n
Yokot a J apan f r om 1962
u n t i l
1965 Dr
Wer r el l served
r s t as
p i l o t
and
l a t e r
as
a i r c r a f t commander f or t he WB-50
He
r esi gned h i s
commssi on
wi th the r ank of
capt ai n i n 1965
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ACKNOWEDGMENTS
Many i ndi vi dual s and
or gani zat i ons
hel ped
make
t h i s book possi bl e
F i r s t
w sh
t o t hank those
a t my
home
i n s t i t u t i o n
Radf or d
Uni ver si t y,
who
encour aged
and
made poss i bl e
my
workw t h t he Ai r Uni ver s i t y t he oard of V i s i t o r s
D Donal d
~Dedmon, Presi dent ;
D
Davi d
Moor e,
Vi ce
Presi dent
f or
cademc Af f ai r s D
j
D St ump,
Dean
of
t he
School
of
Arts
and
Sci ences
and
D
K
Rober t s,
Chai r man of t he Depar t ment of Hi s t ory Speci al t hanks ar e due Prof B Hol l ey
t DukeU
and
CongressmanRi ckBoucher 9t h D st
Va
f or ass i s tance
and
suppor t
dur i ng t he cl ear ance pr ocess The Uni t ed St at es Ai r For ce, Li eut enant General
Char l es Cl evel and, f or mer Commander of t he Ai r
Uni ver si t y,
Maj or General
USAF Ret i r ed Davi d Gr ay,
f or mer Commandant
of
t he Ai r War
Col l ege,
and
Maj or General Paul Hodges, Commandant of t he Ai r War Col l ege, wer e unspari ng
i n t h e i r suppor t t hr oughout t h i s pr oj ect Col onel
Thomas
Fabyani c USAF
Ret i r ed
t he
f ounder
and
fas t di r ect or
of t he Ai r power Resear ch
I n s t i t u t e
ARI ,
and Col onel
Kennet h
Al nw ck,
h i s
successor,
deserve
much
of
t he
c r e di t
f or
hel pi ng
concei ve t he concept , encour age t he p r o j e c t and removemany of t he b a r r i e r s
encount er ed
Col onel
Donal d St evens ,
current
d i r e c t o r pr ovi ded
v i t a l
publ i cat i on
assi st ance Ot her s a t t he Ai r Uni ver s i t y who hel ped i n many i mpor t ant ways were
Li eut enant
Col onel s
Donal d Baucomand
J ohn Gui l mart i n USAF Ret i r ed
and
Dr
Davi d MacI saac Pr est on Br yant , J ohn
F
H
Schenk,
and Dorot hy
McCl uski e
l en t
very val uabl e
e d i t o r i a l
assi st ance Many
i ndi vi dual s
hel ped i n document
pr ocessi ng
J o Ann
Per due,
Edna Davi s,
Conni e
Smt h,
Mar ci a W l l i a m , and
J enni f er Warner For
l o g i s t i c a l
suppor t am
thankful
t o Capt Harbert J ones, Bet t y
Br own,
Mar i l yn Tyus,
and
Toni Whi t e
Gr aphi c
support,
of
excel l ent
q u a l i t y
came
f r omt he pen of Peggy
Gr eenl ee,
whi l e
J ohn West cot t
and
St ephen
Garst
of
Ai r
Uni ver s i t y Revi ewcreated t he softback cover
The
US F
Hi s t ory Programhel ped
i n a number of ways, f r om archi val
and p i c t o r i a l suppor t t o
much
appr eci at ed
advi ce and c r i t i c i sm
These
i ndi vi dual s i ncl ude Dr
Ri char d
Mor se, R
Car gi l l
H a l l
LynnGamma J udy
Endi cot t , Pres sl ey
B ckerst af f ,
and Mar gar et
CWorn
of t he
Al ber t F Simpson Hi st or i cal Resear ch
Cent er
D
Ri char d Hal l i on of Edwar ds
Ai r
Force Base
and J ohn
Bohn
of Of f ut t Ai r Force Base
The abl e assi st ance of
J u l i e
McAul ey
fromEgl i n Ai r
Force
ase l M senko,
Dr Cl ar ence G ger , and Mke
Levy f rom
Aer onaut i cal
Syst em
D v i s i o n
;
Rober t
Smth f r om
Ai r
Force Logi st i cs
Command
and Kl ar a
Foel l er f r om
Medi a
Resear ch
a t Nor t on Ai r
Force
Base
pr oved
i nval uabl e
The Ai r Uni vers i t y
Li br a r y pl ayed a key r o l e i n maki ng t h i s
book poss i bl e w t h speci al t hanks due Tomma
P a s t o r e t t
Rut h Gr i f f i n andKat hl een
Gol son
Col onel
Benj amn Ti l l man
and Maj or J ohn Gannon of t he 416t h
Bombardment Wng
Col onel
J oseph Rut t er , theL Mrogram
D r ect or, and t he
RDQsect i on
a t
t he Pent agon were as unspar i ng of t h e i r
t i me as
t hey
wer e hel pf ul
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and hospi t abl e Rear
Adm ral
Wal t er Locke
Col onel
Carey Dani el s and Mabl e
Lawry
of t he J oi nt
Crui se
M s s i l e s Proj ect
Of f i ce
l e nt
i nval uabl e
assi st ance E
Conrowand others a t R ND
Dean Sampson
and J
R
Utterstrom
of t he Boei ng
Aerospace Company
D
I r a
Chart of t he Nor t hrop Corporat i on Rose Mar i e
P h i l l i p s of t he
Sperry
Corporat i on J ohn
Bi ckers and
E J Rei l l y of t he
McDonnel l
Dougl as Ast ronaut i cs Company Davi d J o l i v e t t e r of
t he Wl l i ams I nt ernat i onal
Corporat i on
Ri chard Shear i n of t he
Vought
Corporat i on
D
Derek
Brui ns
of
Occi dent al Col l ege W l l i amKai ser of t he Cradl e of Avi at i on Museum
Ri char d
Schar chburg of
t he
Gener al
Mot or s
I n s t i t u t e Foundat i on Bob
Fi nl ey
and
Bruce
Greenberg
of t he Nat i onal Ar chi ves Phi l Edwards and Pet e Sut hard of t he
Nat i onal
Ai r
and
Space
Museum
Char l es
Wrman
of
t he
Ai r
Force
Museum
and
D
W l l i am
Armst r ong of
t he
Naval Ai r Syst ems Command
a l l pl ayed
v i t a l
rol es
i n
maki ng t h i s book
poss i bl e
The many i ndi vi dual s a t t he
Def ense
udi oVi sual
gencyhel ped obt ai n most of t he
i l l u s t r a t i o n s
whi l e
t he
Maxwel l
Ai r Force Base
Photo Lab
processed
them
Overseas
B. C. Kervel l of t he Royal
Aeronaut i cal
Est abl i shment Ai r Commodore A
Probert
Humphrey Wnn
and J
P.
McDonal d
at the Ai r Hi st ori cal Branch andE Hi nes of t he I mper i al War Museum
made t he r i t i s h
and
German s i d e of t he s tory poss i bl e
F i n a l l y must t hankmy
e n t i r e
f aml y especi al l y
mywi f e J eanne
who
endured
much
t o
make
t h i s
proj ect
possi bl e
K NN T PW RR LL
Seni or Research
Fel l ow
Ai r power
Research I n s t i t u t e
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CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION
The out come of war
i s determned by a compl ex combi nat i on of f a c t o r s t h a t
i ncl ude number s, p o l i t i c s ,
s t r a t e g y , t a c t i c s , t r a i n i n g ,
moral e,
l eadershi p,
organi zat i on, l o g i s t i c s , weapons,
and
l uck . As l i g h t super i or i ty i n most of these
c at e go r i e s , or a
great superi or i t y i n one,
can
account f or vi ct or y . Wthout
at t empt i ng
t o rank
order these
f a c t o r s , i t i s obvi ous t h a t
t he
country
possessi ng
b e t t e r weapons i ncreases
i t s chances of vi ctory .
Consequent l y,
t he
Uni t ed
S t a t e s must come t o gri ps w t h changi ng
t echnol ogy
i f
t he
country
i s t o r emai n
m l i t a r i l y strong A l eadi ng student of m l i t a r y
t echnol ogy
has put i t
t h i s
way
. . . newandmore
ef fect i ve
weapons
have general l y beenadoptedonl y
s l ow y i n
spi te of
thei r
obvi ous advantages
Si nce t he character of
contemorary
weapons i s such
that thei r pr oducti on
as
wel l
as thei r
use candi sl ocate
whole
economes, i t i s probabl y not toomuch t o suggest
that
t he
sur vi val of
enti re
cul t ur es mayhi ngeuponan ab i l i t y
t o
perf ect
super i or weapons
andexpl oi t them
f u l l y Sur vi val i t s e l f ,
then, appears
t o
depend
on speedi n both t he
devel opment and
t he
opti mum
ut i l i zat ion
of
weapons I
Gi ven
t h i s
premse,
t he
US
m l i t a r y
must
not
become
p a r t
of the
pr obl em
but
r a t h e r
must
make
the best use of t he count r y' s economc, s c i e n t i f i c ,
and
manufact ur i ng
resources
. The
s e r v i c es
must l ook t o
the f uture
.
I n 1945,
t he
t op
Amer i can
ai r man
wr ote t h a t :
Nati onal safety woul d
beendangered
by
anAi r Forcewhosedoctr i nes and t echni ques are
t i e d
sol el y on t he equ pment and
process
of
t he
moment
Present
equ pment
i s but astep i n progress,
andany Ai r Force
which
does
not
keep i t s doct r i nes
ahead
of i t s equi pment, andi t s vi s i on far i nto
t he future, canonl y del ude t he nat i on i nto a
f a l se
senseof
securi ty
2
Whi l e weapons
come
and
go
i n the
m l i t a r y ,
h i s t o r y
provi des
exampl es
of
c l a s s es
of
weapons
havi ng both
a
dramat i c
and a l a s t i n g
i mpact upon t he conduct of
war f ar e .
These
exampl es i nvol ve weapons
whi ch
wer e, a t t h e i r i ncept i on,
r evol ut i onary s i nc e they wer e not mer el y new but c l e a r l y super i or t o equi pment
al r eady
i n
use
on
t he
b a t t l e f i e l d
.
Because
they
domnated
war f ar e
they
wer e
c r uc i a l
t o b a t t l e f i e l d success ;
and
nat i ons possessi ng
and
usi ng such weapons
e f f e c t i v e l y
wer e,
more of ten t han n o t , vi ct or i ous . Exampl es
i ncl ude
t he
l ong bow gunpowder ,
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EVOLUTIONOF
THECRUSEMSSILE
i r o n - c l a d
st eamhi ps, tanks,
and
ai rpl anes
. These weapons not
onl y di spl aced
e x i s t i n g ar mament s, they a l s o
forced w descal e changes i n ml i ta ry t r a i ni ng,
organi zati on,
t a ct i c s,
s t r a t e g y ,
and
t hought
.
For
exampl e,
the ai rpl ane
has
come
to
domnate l and
and
sea war f ar e i n addi t i on to
i nt r oduci ng anewformof
war f ar e,
d i r e ct bombardment
of t he enemy' s
homel and
. A
number of t echnol ogi cal
devel opment s have
f undament al l y
changed t he course of
ai r power
dur i ng i t s short
h i s t o r y
.
Some of t he
more
s a l i e n t exampl es
are j e t engi nes, nucl ear warheads,
r ad i o , r adar , and
mssi les ( b a l l i s t i c
and c r u i s e
:
sur f ace- t o- sur f ace,
a i r - t o - a i r ,
a i r - t o -
gr ound, ands u r f a c e - t o - a i r ) .
A
c l as s
of
mss i l e
of par t i cul ar i n t e r e s t , now
ent eri ng
t he
US
i nventory, i s t he
c r ui s e
mss i l e . The purpose of t h i s
study
i s t o eval uat e t he crui se
m s s i l e agai nst
the
c r i t e r i a
suggested above, seeki ng
answer s
t o
two
basi c
quest i ons
:
I s
the curr ent
c r ui s e
mss i l e si mpl y anot her weapon i n t he nowf aml i ar
c l as s
of ae r i a l
muni t i ons?
Or does i t represent a potent i al l y r evol ut i onar y
c l as s
of weapons i n
i t s
own
r i g h t ?
These quest i ons, and t he. answer s t o them maywel l
have f ar - r eachi ng
i mpl i cat i ons,
f or i f the curr ent
ver si on
of t he cr ui se mssi l e r epr esent s not an
evol ut i onar y
devel opment but a quantum
eap
f or war d i n
weaponr y,
then US devel opment
and
empl oyment s t r a t e gi e s
r equi r e
s i g n i f i c a n t
adj ust ment .
I n a c t u a l i t y ,
t he
crui se m s s i l e , as
an
operat i onal
concept
and system
has been
around f or some t i me ;
and
very
earl y
on
i nspi r ed
r a t h e r
f ar - r eachi ng cla im . A
newspaper
account
i n
1915
c a l l e d
i t
:
A
devi ce
. .
.
l i k e l y
t o revol ut i oni ze
modern
war f ar e
.
'
Bef or e Worl dWar I was over , the
c r u i s e
m s s i l e ,
or
t he
ae r i a l
torpedo,
as
i t
was then c al l ed , was touted as t he gun
of t he futur e - 4
and
compar ed i n
i mpor t ance w th t he i nvent i on of gunpowder . ' Bi l l y M tchel l sawi t as :
A
weapon
of
t r emendous
val ue
and
t e r r i f i c force to
ai r power .
6
The
passi ng of years
has
not
dimmed ent husi asm f or t he devi ce, a newspaperman i n 1977 wr i t i ng t h a t : Except
f or
gunpowder and atomc bomb, no weapon
has
threatened agreater
e f f e c t
onwar
and
peace than t he
c r ui s e m s s i l e
. ' More t emper at e
comments
al so
emphasi ze
i t s
i mpor t ance .
The
advent of t he l ong- r ange hi ghl y accurat e crui se mssi les ,
one
hi gh
o f f i c i a l
t o l d
Congress,
i s
per haps
t he
most
s i gni f i c ant
weapon
devel opment
of t he decade .
8
Accor di ng
t o Lesl i e Gel b, a noted def ense a na l y s t : Thecrui se
m s s i l e coul d be an i nval uabl e addi t i on t o
our
s ec ur i t y or a
danger ous
compl i cat i on
.
9
I ndeed, there i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t
t he crui se
m s s i l e
t oday i s
i mpor t ant
t o the overal l
US def ense e f f o r t
.
At t h i s wr i t i ng ( J une
1983),
USdef ense pl anner s
are c a l l i n g f or a
l a r g e
buy of
c r ui s e m s s i l e s
i n
a var i ety
of f or ms :
3,000ALCMs ( Ai r - Launched
Crui se Mssi les ) , 3,994
SLCMs
( Sea- Launched
Crui se Mssi les ) , 560 GLCMs
( Gr ound- Launched Crui se Mssi les ) ,
and
per haps 3,000 t o 5, 000
MRASMs
( Medi um Range Ai r - t o- Sur f ace Mss i les )
w th
a
t o t a l
est i mat ed
pri ce tag of al most
$30 b i l l i o n . Thi s w l l i ngness byDODof f i c i a l s t o spend
l a r g e
sums
on var i ous
v er s i o ns of t he c r u i s e mss i l e i nd i c at e s t h a t DODbel i eves
t he
weapon i s
c r u ci a l
t o a
successf ul f u t u r e def ense
posture
. Such an i nvest ment of
conf i dence
and
d o l l a r s
mer i t s s er i ous at t ent i on byml i tary prof essi onal s
and
l ay persons al i ke
.
Cer tai nl y, t he
publ i c
needs
t o know
more about
t h i s weaponi n order t o
f o l l owi t s
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The
Boei ng
AGM86B,
ALCMAi r
Launched
Cr ui se
Mss i l e )
. (USN)
I NTRODUCTION
TheGeneral DynamcsBGM109, SLCM(SeaLaunchedCr ui se
Mss i l e ) (USN)
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EVOLUTION
OF
THE
CRUISE
MSSILE
The General
Dynamcs
BGM109, GLCM (Ground
Launched Cr ui se Mss i l e )
.
( General
Dynamcs)
progress, to understand i t s
i mpor t ance,
and
to bear
i t s c o s t s
. Thi s poi nt i s
f undament al
because
publ i c
knowl edge
represents
t he onl y
vi abl e
mechani smi n a
democr acy f or
generat i ng
suppor t f or def ense proj ect s .
For
i t s p a r t , t he
ml i ta ry
est abl i shment at a l l l evel s* needs t o
know
more about t he c r ui s e mssi l e f or even
more
f undament al
reasons . Those
operat i ng
i t w i l l
be
e f f e c t i v e onl y t o t he ext ent
t h a t
they
compr ehend
t he
weapon' s
c a p a b i l i t i e s
and
l i mtati ons
.
But
even
those
m l i t a r y members not d i r e c t l y
i nvol ved
w th the crui se m s s i l e
need
t o be wel l
i nf ormed t o
appr eci at e
i t s i mpor t ance
and
t o
know
why i t
r ecei ves
so
much
f undi ng
and
at t ent i on . At t he hi gher l e v e l s , pl anner s
and
deci si onmaker s need t o underst and
c r u i s e mssi les as much as possi bl e i n order t o
make
t he bes t deci si ons and pl ans .
Students of t he
c r ui s e
mss i l e shoul d
f ocus
on t he
bas i c
c har a ct e r i s t i c s of t he
weapon
Consequent l y,
t h i s study addresses these c har a c t e r i s t i c s as wel l
as
quest i ons deri ved
f r om
and i nher ent i n
t hem Such an appr oach can
put
t he
s t o r y
i n t o a moremeani ngf ul cont ext and suggest f ol l ow on
quest i ons and
hypotheses
f or
f u r t h e r
eval uat i on
.
A
revi ew of
t he
c r ui s e m s s i l e ' s
l ong
hi s t o r i c al
record
can
i l l umnate not
onl y
wher e
i t has been, but
suggest wher e
i t may be
goi ng
. Thi s
i s
admt t edl y
an ambi t i ous goal .
But
t o be more than j ust an
i nt er esti ng s t u d y ,
more than j ust h i s t o r y f or h i s t o r y ' s
sake,
t h i s study must r a i s e
and s a t i s f a c t o r i l y
answer a
number of
s p e c i f i c quest i ons
.
' See
AppendixH
or a survey of the
Ai rWar
Coll ege
class of 1982, i ncludi nga rough
test of
t he
knowedge l evel of
Ai r
Force
of f i ce rson
the crui se mssil e
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I NTRODUCTION
For i ns t a nc e,
what has changed and what has r emai ned const ant between t he
e a r l i e r
and current vers i ons
of
t he cr ui se mssi l e? What advantages and
di sadvantages
are
i nher ent
t o cr ui se mssi l es as a cl ass
of
weapons?
Why
wer e
c r ui s e m s s i l e s not
successf ul l y
i nt r oduced ona l arge
s c al e
i nto ml i tary i nventor i es
bef or e?
What
obst acl es
has
t he weapon
encount er ed?
Overal l ,
what
l essons can
be
gl eaned f r om t he hi s t o r i c al record of t he cr ui se mssi l e?
What
are the useful
par al l e l s ? F i na l l y ,
howi mpor t ant
i s the crui se mssi le? I s t he c r u i s e mss i l e j u s t
another weapon l i k e so
many o t h e r s ,
or does i t represent a r evol ut i onary
c l as s
of
weapon?
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EVOLUTIONOF
THECRUISE
MSSILE
NOTES
CHAPTER
1 .
I . B Hol l ey, J r . , I deas andWeapons (New
Haven,
Conn
:
Yal e Uni versi ty,
1953) ,
175 .
2
.
Henry H
Ar nol d
quoted i n
Ai r
Force Manual I - 1 , Funct i ons andBasi c Doctr i ne of t he Uni t ed
S t a t e s
Ai r
For ce, Febr uar y
1979,
4- 11
.
3
.
Aeri al Tor pedo i s
Gui ded
100
mles by
Gyr oscope,
NewYork Tr i bune ( 21 Oct ober 1915) , 1
4
.
El mer Sperry t o
Admr al
E ar l e , 25
Oct ober
1918,
quoted i n
Delmar S Fal uney,
The
Hi stor y of
P i l o t l e s s Ai rcraf t and
Gui ded Ms s i l e s ,
manuscr i pt ,
Naval H i s t o r i c a l Center,
c
.
1958,
112,
113
.
5
.
Geor ge
OSqui er t o Chi ef of
S t a f f ,
5 Oct ober 1918, Subj ect : An
Automat i c
Carr i er f or t he Si gnal
Corps (Liberty Eagl e) ,
; Bi on
J .
Ar nol d
t o t he
Secretary
of War, Secret Report onAutomat i c Car r i e r s ,
Fl yi ng
Bombs ( FB) , Aeri al Tor pedoes (AT) 31 J anuar y 1919, Exhi bi t F,
Ai r
Uni vers i ty Li brary F i l m
623
. 451 W253B
6 . W l l i amMtchel l ,
Lawr ence
Sperry and
the Aeri al Torpedo,
US .
Ai r
Servi ces ( J anuary
1926) ,
16
.
7
.
HowardS i l b e r , Omaha Wor l d- Heral d ( 17
Apr i l
1977) ,
11 .
8
.
Mal col m
R Curr i e
quoted i n J ohn
H
Dougl as,
A Technol ogy
Revol ut i on i n Weaponry,
Sci ence News
( 23
J u l y
1977) ,
60
9 . L e s l i e
HGel b, Nucl ear Bar gai ni ng
:
The Presi dent' s
Opt i ons, New
Yor k Ti mes Magaz i ne ( 27
J une
1982) ,
61
.
10 . Thepr i ce t ag
on
t he
GLCMs
i s
$3 . 7
b i l l i o n ,
on t he MRASM$3 t o $6
b i l l i o n , and
on t he SLCMs
$11
. 8 b i l l i o n
.
TheALCMbuy
of
4, 348
mssi les at $8. 5 b i l l i o n was cut t o
3, 000
mssi les and unspeci f i ed
cost
i n
February 1983
. Tomahawk
Numbers, Aerospace Dai l y
( 5 Apr i l 1982) ,
201
; Pentagon,
Announci ng
SARs, I ndi cat es
F- 15,
F- 16 Deri vat i ves,
Aer ospace Dai l y ( 23
March
1982) , 129,
130 ;
J CMPOSeeks
P ot e n t i a l
Compet i t i on f or
GLOM
TEL,
LCCs, Aer ospace
Dai l y
( 23
December
1981) ,
275
;
SARPr ogr ams
Summari zed
as
of
Sept ember 30, Aer ospace
Dai l y
( 18 November
1982) ,
101
;
Pent agon
Puts
Cr ui se M s si l e
Thr ough
Ext ensi ve
Revi ew
Aer ospace
Dai l y
( 20 May
1981) , 106
;
Davi d R G r i f f i t h s ,
Pr oposal
Se t onAi r- to- Sur f ace
Ms s i l e ,
Avi at i on Week
( 29
December
1980) , 24,
25 ;
Har r i et
S . Hughes, Competi t i on Opt i ons f o r t he
Medi um
Range Ai r- to- Surf ace M s s i l e Program
unpubl i shed
MA Thesi s, Amer i can Uni versi t y, 1981,
23,
24 Navy
Sees MRASM
as
Money
Probl em Aer ospace
Dai l y
( 24 August 1982) , 297 Ai r
Force Cuts ALCMTotal
;
Navy
Retai ns
Tomahawk
Pl ans,
Aer ospace
Dai l y ( 3 Febr uar y
1983) , 193
.
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CHAPTER
11
THEEARLYYEARS TO1941
Even before Worl d War I , dur i ng t he f i r s t
decade
of power ed f l i g h t , t he i dea of
an unmanned, aut omat i cal l y cont r ol l ed f l yi ng bomb or aer i al torpedo
ci r cul at ed i n
anumber of
count r i es
. ' The t echnol ogy maki ng such
a
devi ce
possi bl e
consi st ed of gyr oscopes mount ed i n
contempor ary ai r f r ames
. The f i r s t p r ac t i c al
e f f o r t s
on record
began
whenPeter
C
Hew tt , i nvent or of t he mer cur y vapor l amp,
appr oached El mer A Sperry
of
Sperry Gyr oscope
Company
i n
Apr i l
1915 w th
t he
i deaof a f l yi ng
bomb
.
z
Together they
devel oped and
testedanaut omat i c control
systemon both a Cur t i s s f l yi ng boat and a
t w n- engi ne
ai r c r af t . ' Thi s p ar t i c ul ar
system showed enough
promse
by
t he
summer of 1916
t o mer i t a t e s t w t h an
o f f i c i a l observer . I n
August,
Elmer
Sperry
wr ote to
Li eut enant
Col onel
Geor ge
O
Squi er
of
t he
Si gnal
Corps,
but the
Army di d
not
answer
. 4
Consequent l y,
t he
two
i nventor s arranged an o f f i c i a l
t r i a l
w t h t he
Navy
On 12 Sept ember 1916,
Li eut enant T
W
W l ki nson,
J r
. ( USN) , w t h
Sperr y' s son
Lawr ence
as p i l o t , took
of f
aboar d a s p e c i a l l y equi pped seapl ane
.
Under aut omati c c ont r o l , t he ai r c r af t
cl i mbed to a predetermned al t i t u de , hel d a s a t i s f a c t o r y compass course, f l ew
a set
d i s t a nc e, dove, andwoul d have
i mpact ed as pl anned had
Sperry
not
i nt ervened . '
El mer
Sperr y' s
developments
w t h gyroscopes
made unpi l ot ed
mss i l e s possi bl e
.
I n
addi t i on,
hewas
di rectl y
i nvol ved
i n
both
of
Ameri ca' s
Worl d
War I
mss i l e s
(Sperry
Corp
. )
7
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EVOLUTIONOF
THE
CRUSEMSSILE
Wl ki nson wr ote what appears, i n
r e t r o s p e c t ,
as a r e a l i s t i c
apprai sal
of
t he
m s s i l e ' s
a s s e t s
and l i a b i l i t i e s
.
He
noted
t h a t comparedw t h guns t he devi ce
had
t he
advant age
of
l onger
range
.
Further,
W l ki nson acknow edged,
The
mor al
e f f e c t
of such devi ces
may
be great .
They
are p r ac t i c a l l y i ndes t r uc t i b l e ,
unl ess a wel l -
ai med
shot di sabl es [ t h e ]
engi ne or contr ol devi ces,
and
they cannot be
dr i ven
of f .
6
But t he devi ce was expensi ve, r equi r ed
compl i cat ed
l aunchi ng
f a c i l i t i e s , and
i t s use i n l ong range
attacks
agai nst f o r t s
and
c i t i e s i s of doubtf ul ml i ta ry
val ue on
account of [ t h e ]
d i f f i c u l t y
of s t r i k i n g at any desi red poi nt rather than
at random
w t h i n t he
l i m t s
of t he c i t y or f o r t r e s s . '
For ei gn Efforts
I n the same general t i me
f r ame,
Eur opeans al so workedon f l yi ng bombs. The
p r i nc i pa l e f f o r t s abr oad wer e made by
t he B r i t i s h
. '
Shor t l y
a f t e r
Worl d
War
I
began, t he B r i t i s h
War
Of f i ce asked Prof essor
A
M
Low
to work on a r angef i nder
f or
coast
a r t i l l e r y ,
appar ent l y because he demonst r ated i n London i n
1914
t he
p r i n c i p l e s
now
used
i n
tel evi si on
.
But
t he
p r oj ec t
soon changed
to a radi o- contr ol l ed
f ly ing bomb to i n t e r c e pt zeppel i ns
and
attack
gr ound
t a r g e t s . On 21 March
1917,
Low demonst r ated
t he
devi ce
to B r i t a i n ' s top brass
. The f i r s t
vehi cl e
i mmedi at el y crashed . One
observer,
Maj or Gordon
B e l l ,
f i t t i n g l y cal l ed t he
Mad
Maj or because he t e r r i f i e d
passengers
w th l oops i nches of f t he gr ound, f l i g h t s
under
br i dges, and i n
one
case a f l i g h t
through
a hangar , excl ai med I coul d
throw
my
bl oody umbr el l a t ha t f a r
9
The second b i r d got of f t he
gr ound
and f l ew
sati sfactori l y- f or
a
whi l e .
But
i t then dove t oward
t he assembl ed
spectators,
s cat t er i ng
them before cr ashi ng
about
three
yards
f r om
Low and
t he radi o
c ont r o l s
. '
H
P
Fol l and,
desi gner
of t he f amous SE- 5
pursui t pl ane, desi gned anot her
mss i l e
f or
t he p r o j ec t . Bui l t by t he Royal
Ai rcraf t Factory, i t measur ed
20
t o 22 f e e t
i n span, wei ghed
500
pounds,
and
used t he same 35 hp engi ne as i t s
predecessor
.
But
t he Fol l and mss i l e
pr oved
equal l y unsuccessf ul , f a i l i n g t o get ai r bor ne on three
at t empt ed l aunchi ngs
i n J u l y
1917 . L i t t l e wonder
the Br i t i sh ended the proj ect .
The
Navy-Sperry
Fl yi ng
Bom
Meanwhi l e,
Amer i ca' s
decl arat i on
of war on
6 Apr i l 1917
changed
everyt hi ng
i n
t he
Uni t ed
S t a t e s
.
Ei ght
days
l a t e r , t he
Naval Consul t i ng
Board
recommended
t h a t
$50, 000
be a l l o t t e d t o
Sperr y' s
f l yi ng
bomb proj ect
.
Subsequent l y,
Secretary
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EARLYYEARS
The
B r i t i s h
Royal
Ai rcraf t
Est abl i shment
(RAE)
Aeri al
Tar get
under
const r ucti on,
1917
The
devi ce
was unsuccessf ul l y
tested
i n
J u l y
1917
( RAE, Farnborough)
of t he Navy J osephus Dani el s
f or med
a
f i ve- man comm t t ee
t o i nves t i gat e
t he
i dea
;
i t recommended support f or t he
p r o j ec t ,
and
Dani el s appr oved $200, 000 f or t he
f ly ing
bomb
i n l a t e May
.
' 3
Exper i ment s began i n J une at Amtyvi l l e,
Long
I s l a n d
. The Navy
suppl i ed f i v e
Cur t i ss N-9 seapl anes and pur chased s i x s e t s of
Sperry
cont r ol s . Dur i ng over 100
f l i g h t t e s t s , whi ch began i n September , p i l o t s got
the Cur t i ss
N- 9s
of f
t he wat er ,
moni t ored
t he
aut omati c
f unct i on
and,
a f t e r
t he
mechani sm
i ndi cated
i t s
descent
t o
the t a r g e t , f l ew
home
.
14
The next step came i n md- October when t he
Navy
ordered f i v e
s p ec i a l
a i r c r a f t
( f l y ing
bombs )
f r om
Gl enn
Cur t i ss b cause Sperry
wanted
a f a s t er a i r c r af t than
t he
N-9 Remarkedl y, Cur t i ss del i ver ed I t h e devi ce*
s i x
days
ahead
of t he 30 day ,
schedul e
But a f t e r t he success of t he manned N- 9, f a i l u r e domnated t he new
phase w i t t y
t he
unmanned vehi cl e
. Maj or
pr obl ems emer ged, t he
f i r s t of whi ch
was
l i t e r a l l i
ge t t i ng
t he machi ne of f t he
gr ound
. Because takeoffs
upset
t he
azi muth c ont r o l , t he
exper i ment er s
used
catapul t
l aunchi ngs
.
The
f i r s t
at t empt ed
l aunchi ng
on 24
November 1917 ended i n di s as t e r , as
di d
a second on 7
December
.
t
o
The
t h i r d
att empt ed l aunchi ng on 21 December, w t h a d i f f e r e nt catapul t system
f a i l e d
because
of
engi ne pr obl ems . Cr ashes on
14
and
17
J anuar y,
when
f ly ing bombs
got b r i e f l y ai rborne, c a s t doubt on both
t he catapul t
system
and t he devi ce' s
f l y i n g
a b i l i t y .
' see AppendixA
ormssi l e
character i sti cs .
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EVOLUTIONOF
THE
CRUSEMSSI LE
Ther ef or e
t o i mpr ove and
hence t o pr ove t he ai rwor t hi ness of t he f ly ing
bomb, man
agai n
took t he
cont rol s
.
On
6
February,
Lawr ence
Sperry successful l y
f l ew
t he
machi ne,
f i t t e d
w th
s k i s ,
of f t he
i c e
of
Gr eat Sout h
Bay, Long
I sl and
.
The
next day,
t he mssi l e
crashed a t l i f t - o f f ,
l eavi ng
Sperry unhurt
but the machi ne
demol i shed . Further manned t e s t s di scl osed
a t h i r d
pr obl em
a m smat ch of
c o n t r o l system
and mss i l e
.
Cont r ol s adequat e f or
t he
N-9pr oved i nadequat e
f or the
mor e
esponsi ve f ly ing
bomb
. Fi ndi ng t ha t t he machi ne l acked l ongi t udi nal
s t a h i ~ i , , ,
t he t e s t e r s l engt hened t he f usel age
t wo f e e t and
made
other s u i t a b l e
modi f i ;: at i ons
. 1 1
The
Na v y ' s
Worl d
War I
f ly ing
bomb, ' '
associ at ed
w t h Elmer
Sperry
and
Genn
Curt i ss
.
A
devi ce
of t hi s type performed
successful l y
f or
t he f i r s t
t i me on 6
March
1918 ( General
Motors
I n s t i t u t e )
The
f i r s t successf ul f l i g h t occurred on 6 March
1918,
when t he
f ly ing
bomb
f l ew
1, 000 yar ds
as
pl anned
. One
month
l a t e r , however , a s i m l a r att empt f a i l e d . 2 0
Al t hough t he c at a pul t
f uncti oned w e l l ,
Sperry
wanted a newl aunchi ng
devi ce .
Consequent l y,
Sperry hi r ed a consul t i ng engi neer , Car l L . Nor den ( l a t e r
knownf or
hi s
Worl d
War
I t
bombsi ght ) ,
t o
desi gn
a
t h i r d
type
of
c at a pul t
.
2
1
The
Chi ef
of
Naval Or dnance,
Rear
Admr al
Ral ph
Ear l e,
reported t h a t
t he c at a pul t
was wort h al l
t he t i me
and
e f f o r t
spent
on t he f l yi ng
bomb
.
122
I n
r e t r o s p e c t , we
can
onl y
specul at e as t o whet her
Ear l e' s apprai sal was real i smor r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n .
For whi l e
c at ap ul t s wer e t o pr ove
i mpor t ant t o
t he
Navy
i n
subsequent
y e a r s ,
l a t e r
model s
r e l i e d upon a
muchd i f f e r e n t
t echnol ogy
.
Meanwhi l e, Sperry
f ur t he r t e st e d
t he f ly ing
bomb
. The t e s t
bedconsi st ed of a
1 0
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EARLY
YEARS
Lawence Sperry, t he
i nvent or ' s
son,
was
very acti ve i n t he devel opment of
t he
f ly ing bomb.
Sperry
( l e f t ) w th Li eut enant
Bel l i nger
i n
a
Curt i ss
f ly ing boat i n
1913
( Nati onal
Ar chi ves)
Marmon
car f i t t e d w t h an OX-5 ai r c r af t engi ne
and
an overhead f r ame f or t he
f ly ing bomb. The
auto- mssi l e combi nat i on reached speeds of 75
t o
80 mphon
t he Long I sl and Par kway, becomng i n essence a movi ng, open- ai r wnd t unnel .
Sperry consi dered usi ng t he combi nat i on as a
l auncher
but coul d not f i nd a s t r ai ght
road of adequat e l ength . The
exper i ment er s
di d
t r y a
s t r a i ght
sect i on of the
Long
I sl and
Rai l r oad,
but
f l anged
wheel s
coul d
not
keep
t he
Marmon
on
the t racks
. z '
I n any event, whi l e t he Norden catapul t pr oved s at i s f a c t o r y , t he f l yi ng bomb
di d not .
On
13
August ,
a
f ly ing bomb movi ngdown
t he Nor den devi ce l i f t e d
t he
f r o n t
wheel of t he dol l y of f t he t r ack
and
wr ecked t he mssi l e . I n ear l y
Sept ember ,
another crash
occurred because
of an el ec t r i c al power
f a i l u r e
i n the f ly ing
bomb
.
On
t he 23d, t he devi ce f l e wabout 300 f e e t before i t went out of cont rol
and
crashed .
Anot her di d l i t t l e
b e t t e r
three days l at e r , f ly ing onl y
500
f e e t
bef or e
cr ashi ng . z
4
Meant i me, t e s t s cont i nued
w th t he N-9
On
17 Oct ober, t he
exper i ment er s
l aunched
one
w th t he di st ance
devi ce
s et at 14, 000 yar ds . But because
of
a
shortage
of
gr ound
crew
member s,
t he
p i l o t
of
t he
N-9
chase pl ane
had
t o as s i s t i n
t he l aunchi ng
of
t he
f l yi ng
bomb
and
when he got a l o f t , he was unabl e t o
cl ose
on t he l i g h t e r , p i l o t l e s s N-9 . The di st ance mechan smon t he p i l o t l e s s N-9
mal f unct i oned
and
t he
devi ce was l a s t seen
f l y i n g
s t r ai ght
and l ev el
east war d over
t he ocean . Thi s was
t he
l ongest
f l i ght i n t he Navy- Sper r y t e s t s . 1 5
On
29
October,
t he Navy l aunched
a modi f i ed f l yi ng bomb
w t h a
l a r ger
t a i l
and
a i l e r o n .
The
Navy
o f f i c e r i n charge,
r e c a l l i n g
t he
m s s i l e ' s
l as t
per f ormance,
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EVOLUTIONOF
THECRUSEMSSILE
ordered
t ha t
onl y
two
gal l ons of f ue l
be
put i n
t he
f u e l tank
( t o
ensure t he
machi ne' s
recovery) . Thi s pr oved catast r ophi c . As t he c at a pul t accel erat ed t he a i r c r a f t , t he
gas
s h i f t e d
t o
t he
r e a r
of
t he
f ue l
t a n k ,
s t a l l i n g
t he
engi ne
and
destr oyi ng
t he
l a s t
Cur t i ss
f ly ing
bomb.
116
These
f a i l u r e s
di scour aged
nei ther the
Navy nor Sperr y ; both
p a r t i e s
i ns i s t ed t hat
t he exper i ment s shoul d
cont i nue
because
t he
devi ce s t i l l
had
a
pr oms i ng
f u t u r e . I
bel i eve,
Sperry wr ote Admral Ear l e, that t he t i me has
p r a c t i c a l l y
arr i ved when
we
have on hand the gun of
the
future
[ or i gi nal emphasi s]
. z ' Hence,
on 1
November 1918, Admral
Ear l e reported t o t he Chi ef of Naval Operat i ons (CNO
t h a t , bef or e spri ng 1919, t he
f l yi ng
bomb
coul d pr obabl y be devel oped
to carry
a
1, 000- pound bombl oadup t o 75 ml es w t h an
accur acy
of about 1 . 5 mles . Ear l e
wr ote
t h a t
such a devi ce coul d be mass
pr oduced f or $2, 500
. The
f ly ing bomb,
he cont i nued : Shoul d have a strong mor al
e f f e c t , and
shoul d pr ove very val uabl e
i n
bombardi ng c i t i e s
. . . . [ But i t ] w i l l pr ove of l i t t l e val ue agai nst i s o l a t e d f o r t s or
agai nst s hi p s
.
I '
Once t he Navy f ound
a s at i s f a ct o r y ai r f r ame, a
pr oduct i on
deci si on coul d then
occur . 1 9
Al t hough t he war ended,
t he Navy
cont i nued t he programw th
t he
hel p
of
t wo
f ormer Sperry
empl oyees, Carl Norden
and
Hanni bal
Ford, a f t e r
El mer Sperry
bowed out
of
t he p r o j ec t . I n Sept ember 1918, t he
Navy
supervi sor of t he p r o j ec t ,
Commander
B
.
B
.
McCormck,
pushed
f or a new
f l yi ng
bomb
desi gn
and
i mpr oved aut op i l o t . McCormck
asked
Nor den
to
study
t he Sperry c ont r o l s
and
r e p o r t
back,
whi ch
he
di d
on
30
Oct ober
.
A
day l a t e r , McCormck
recommended
t h a t t he
Navy
pur chase
s i x
a i r c r a f t f r om
W t t enman- Lewi s ;
on
2
November,
t he
Bureau
of
Or dnance ordered
f i v e
f l y i ng
bombs f r omt h a t
company
The
Navy
f i t t e d twoof
these a i r c r a f t w th
Sperry
cont rol s
f r omt he Amtyvi l l e p r o j ec t ,
and t he
r emai ni ng three w th cont r ol s r edesi gned by Norden The Navy successf ul l y f l ew
t he
W t t enman- Lewi s
ai r c r af t i n March 1919 .
The
program
cont i nued
as McCormck requested a s h i f t
of
t he t e s t i n g
s i t e f r om
Amtyvi l l e,
New
York,
t o
Dahl gr en,
Vi r gi ni a, a
move
compl et ed
by
May
1919
.
I n
addi t i on
t o
t he N-9 and W t t enman- Lewi s
a i r c r a f t ,
t he Naval A i r c r a f t
Factory
at
Phi l adel phi a
b u i l t
t en
f ly ing
bombs. The l a t t e r wer e very t ai l - heavy,
and
appar ent l y f l ew onl y w t h
s a f e t y
p i l o t s aboar d ; a w se
move
i n vi ew
of t h ei r
unmanned f l i g h t per f ormance . On t he
f i r s t att empt ed
unmanned
f l y i ng
bomb
l aunchi ng on 18
August 1920,
t he machi ne crashed
a f t e r
150
yar ds . TheNavy di d
not att empt t he next l aunch u n t i l
November
.
Thi s f l i g h t
l a s t e d
t wenty
mnutes,
and
t he
machi ne f l ew i n c i r c l e s
. The
t h i r d f ly ing
bomb,
l aunched
on 25
Apr i l 1921,
f l ew l e s s than
t wo
mnutes . Them s s i l e ' s
l ack of progress, coupl ed w th decl i ni ng
f unds,
l ed
t he
Navy
t o
cancel
t he
e f f o r t
i n
1922
.
Meanwhi l e,
t he
Army
had
devel oped
a somewhat more successf ul f l y i ng bomb
3
The
Army-Ketteri ng
Bug
There i s a di r e c t
connect i on between t he Army
and
Navy
f ly ing
bomb
progr ams . Whi l e Sperry f a i l e d t o
i nt er es t t he
Army
i n t he i dea bef or e
t he
war ,
a
1 2
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EARLYYEARS
f l y i n g
demonst r at i on i n l a t e 1917 di d t he
t r i c k
.
On
21
November, Gl enn
Cur t i ss,
El mer
Sperry, Rear Admral
Ral ph
A Ear l e, and Maj or Gener al
Geor ge
O
Squi er ,
now
Chi ef Si gnal
O f f i c e r , watched as
an N-9 f l ewover seven mles under aut omati c
control . The f l i g h t i mpr essed Squi er who, f i v e days l a t e r , wr ote t he Chai r man
of
t he
Ai rcraf t
Boar d
t h a t i mmedi at e and energet i c e f f o r t s
shoul d be made w t h t he
f l yi ng bomb proj ect .
Heconcl uded
:
The t i me
has come,
i n
t he
opi ni on of t he wr i t e r , when t h i s f undament al quest i on
shoul d
be
pressed w t h a l l possi bl e vi gor , w t h a vi ew t o t aki ng t o Europe
somet hi ng
new n war rather than
contenti ng our sel ves
as i n t he pas t w t h
f ol l ow ng
t he i nnovat i ons t h a t have been
offered
from
t i me t o t i me
si nce
t he
begi nni ng
of
t he
war by
t he
enemy
Wars
are
won l argel y by new
i ns t r u me nt a l i t i e s,
and
t h i s
Boar d
shoul d be
a
l eader
and
not
f ol l ower
i n
t he
devel opment
of
a i r c r a f t f or war
.
32
The Boar d appr oved Squi er' s
r ecommendat i ons
and, w t h
t he Secretary of War' s
verbal i ns t r uc t i ons ,
exper i mental workbegan .
I n
December ,
Squi er
appoi nt ed
a f our - man boar d t o i nvesti gate t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s
of
the weapon Whi l e three members reported negat i vel y, Char l es F . Ket t eri ng,
i nvent or
of t he aut omobi l e s e l f - s t a r t e r and l a t e r vi ce
presi dent
of General Mot or s,
f i l e d
a f avorabl e mnori ty report .
Not s u r p r i s i n g l y ,
he r ecei ved a cost pl us cont ract
t o
devel op
t he
devi ce
.
3 4
Paral l el
t o
t he
Navy-Sperry programwas an
Army
program
associ at ed
w th Charl es Kett er i ng
Kett er i ng
( r i g h t ) examnes
a
model
of hi s
Worl dWar
I
mss i l e
i n 1946 ( General Motors I n s t i t u t e )
1
3
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EVOLUTION
OFTHECRUSE
MSSILE
t he r e s u l t s of t he f l yi ng
bomb
t e s t s t o
t he Al l i es
. 4
The
Armst i ce, of course,
over t ook everythi ng
.
When
t he
Dayton
proj ect
cl osed
down
on27
November
1918,
20
Bugs wer e
compl et ed
al ong w t h 5
ai r f r ames,
and 11 p a r t i a l l y
b u i l t
Bugs . But
t e s t s cont i nued
a f t e r t he war . '
I n
December
1918, t he
Army
sent
s i x
Bugs t o
Amtyvi l l e
f or
t e s t s
. But
onl y one
of f our
l aunches
of t he
Long
I s l and t e s t s pr oved successf ul .
A
t h r ee- of f i c er
board,
i n
J anuar y
1919,
recommended
further devel opment
of
t he
f ly ing
bomb
by
t he Ai r Servi ce,
pr ompt i ng
t he l a s t phase of t he p r o j ec t , t e s t s i n
t he f a l l of 1919 .
B
J . Ar nol d sel ect ed Car l st r omF i e l d , near Ar cadi a, F l o r i d a , as a
good
pl ace
f or
f u r t h e r t e s t s
i n
hi s
1918 search .
I n md- 1919,
Li eut enant
Col onel
Guy
L
Gearhart,
a
40- year
ol d
f ormer
coast
a r t i l l e r y
o f f i c e r ,
t ook over
t he
proj ect
and
r ecei ved
author i zat i on
on29
August
t o shi p 12 Bugs to Car l st r om 2
Bet ween 26Sept ember
and
28Oct ober 1919,
t he Armyatt empt ed 14 t e s t
f l i g h t s
.
Al t hough f i v e Bugs
crashed
on or
i mmedi at el y
a f t e r
l aunchi ng,
t he
s i x t h
at t empt
( on 13
October )
was
successf ul
; t he f l yi ng
bomb covered
1 3/ a mles . Ot her
successf ul f l i g h t s of 1 3/ a mles and 2 mles occurred before t he f i n a l shot, on 28
Oct ober . On t h i s par t i cul ar
t e s t ,
t he
Bug f l ew16
mles
bef or e
cr ashi ng because
of
engi ne pr obl ems . But t he 16- ml e f l i g h t coul d not conceal t he f a c t t hat 10 of 14
att empt s
had
ended
i n f a i l u r e . Gear har t ' s report avoi ded t h a t poi nt and
recommended
onl y
mat t er s
of a
t echni cal
nature
:
devel opment
of a
c at ap ul t ,
i mpr oved engi nes,
and
exper i ments w th
l a r ger
gyros .
So
ended t he
Ket t er i ng
Bug
p r o j ec t , at a cost to the Ameri can
t axpayer
of
about
$275, 000 f or t he peri od Apr i l
1917
to
March 1920 .
4 3
Besi des an
i nt e r es t i ng
andoften over l ooked epi sode, what di d these Worl d
War
I
f l y i n g bomb p r o j ec t s r eveal ? F i r s t , t he
exper i ment er s
exper i enced
d i f f i c u l t i e s
j u s t
ge t t i ng unmanned a i r c r a f t
i n t o t he ai r . Launch pr obl ems caused a number of
c r a s h e s , compl i cat i ng devel opment of
the
f l yi ng
bombs.
Second, t he
manufact urer s
f ound t h a t
bui l di ng
a
s t a b l e
a i r c r a f t t ha t f l e wwel l w thout p i l o t s was
not
easy . L imted knowl edge of aer odynamcs, l ack of t e s t i ng, and haste i n bui l di ng
t he machi nes guaranteed pr obl ems .
L i t t l e
wonder ,
then, t h a t t he f l yi ng bombs
had
basi c aer odynamc
f a u l t s . The devel opment al method of t he day, t r i a l
and
e r r o r , di d not work wel l w t h
unmanned
a i r c r a f t
. Mannedt e s t s p a r t i a l l y
sol ved
these
aer odynamc pr obl ems ;
modi f i cat i ons
and f l i g h t exper i ence
l ed t o
l a t e r , al t hough
somewhat
l i m t e d , successes
.
Thi r d,
other
t echni cal pr obl ems
hi ndered
t he
progr ams . I n p a r t i c u l a r ,
nei t her gui dance syst ems nor
engi nes
per f ormed as
desi gned
. Fourth,
destr uct i on
of
t he
f l yi ng bombs onmost of
t he
t e s t s r e s t r i c t e d
t he
progr ams . Thi s
f r agi l eness
was
due,
i n
l arge
measure,
t o t he
f a c t
that these
machi nes wer e
desi gned t o be cheap and
f l y
short one-way
mssi ons
. The Army
was
unabl e to recover
many
f or subsequent t e s t i ng,
thereby r api dl y exhaust i ng t he
number of avai l abl e vehi cl es . Further exacerbat i ng t h i s pr obl em
was
t h a t these
wr ecks
yi el ded
l i t t l e
posi t i ve data
onwhy
t he crashes
occurred
. Fi nal l y,
despi t e
al l
t he f a n f a r e ,
expense,
and
e f f o r t , t he
exper i ment ers achi eved
mni mal success . Onl y
1 of t he 12 Spenr y- Navy t e s t s
f unct i oned
pr operl y ; andon t h i s par t i cul ar t e s t , t he
f ly ing
bomb
f l e wamer e 1, 000 yar ds .
The Ket t er i ng Bug
had2
successes
on6
1 6
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att empt s
at
Dayt on,
1
of 4
a t
Amtyvi l l e, and 4 of 14 at
Car l st r om
Takentogether
t h e n ,
there wer e onl y 8 successes on 36 at t empt s
.
I n
b r i e f ,
a
f ew
me- hani cal l y- gi f t ed
v i s i o n a r i e s ,
equi pped
w th
l im ted
knowl edge
and
resources, wer e unabl e to transform t he
f ly ing
bomb i dea i n t o
r e a l i t y
.
Despi t e
t h e i r
best e f f o r t s and a f ewsuccesses, t he theory r emai ned more advanced
than the
t echnol ogy of t he day .
Nevert hel ess, t he i dea
per si sted i n t he
years
t ha t
f ol l owed
.
For ei gn Devel opments
EARLYYEARS
Work
on t he p i l o t l e s s
bomber
cont i nued not onl y i n
t he
Uni t ed
S t a t e s
but i n Gr eat
B r i t a i n . '
As
earl y as
May
1919, t he Royal Naval
Ant i ai rcraf t Gunnery Comm t t ee
requested a
radi o- cont r ol l ed
t a r g e t ai r c r af t . I n response, t he Ai r
Mn i s t r y att empt ed
t o devel op such a vehi cl e i n Engl and and, at t he
same t i me,
buy one
f r omt he Uni t ed
S t a t e s ; but B r i t i s h Secretary of
S t a t e , Wnston
Churchi l l ,
vetoed
t he
l a t t e r
i n i t i a t i v e
.
By 1920,
t he RAF percei ved t h a t
t h r e e
l i n e s of p ot e nt i a l devel opment exi sted a
gyro- gui ded f l yi ng bomb, a t a r g e t m s s i l e ,
and
a radi o- contr ol l ed, ai r- l aunched
m s s i l e
.
I n
s hor t or de r ,
t he
RAF
dr opped
t he
t h i r d
and mer ged
t he
f i r s t
t wo
cat egor i es . The B r i t i s h f l ew a number of radi o- cont r ol l ed
a i r c r a f t ( w t h p i l o t
moni tors) i n t he ear l y and md- 1920s, i ncl udi ng a B r i s t o l f i ght e r ,
a Sperry Avi o,
a
DH . 9A,
and a
Wol f .
After
t he war ,
RAE b u i l t t h i s
r adi o- contr ol l ed
mssi le ,
shown
i n
1920-22 ( RAE, Farnborough)
1
7
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EVOLUTIONOF
THE
CRUSE
MSSILE
But
per haps
equal l y per t i nent to t h i s par t i c ul a r s t o r y i s t he Royal Ai r craf t
Est abl i shment
(RAE) 1921 Target a i r c r a f t . *
Begi nni ng
i n J u l y
1922,
t he B r i t i s h
conduct ed
t e s t s
over
water
f or
both
s a f e t y
and
secur i t y
reasons
.
The
seventh
t e s t ,
on
3 Sept ember
1924,
was a
p a r t i a l
success ; t he devi ce, a f t e r i t s catapul t l aunch, f l e w
f or 12 mnutes before i t s
engi ne
st opped . On the tenth and f i n a l t e s t on 2March
1925,
t he
mss i l e f l ew
39 mnutes
. 45
The
RAF began
work on a t r u e f l yi ng bomb i n Sept ember 1925 .
Compared
w th t he
RAE 1921 Target m s s i l e , t he Lar ynx ( Long RangeGunw th Lynx
Engi ne)
was smal l er , heavi er, and f a s t e r
. *
I n f a c t ,
a200 hp Lynx I Vengi ne gave
t he
devi ce
a t opspeed of about 200mph, maki ng i t
f a s t e r
than
cont empor ary
f i g h t e r s . The fast
Larynx
crashed
i n t o Br i s t o l Channel s h o r t l y a f t e r a catapul t l aunch
f r om
t he HMS
Stronghol d
on20
J u l y
1927
.
The
RAF
bel i eved
t h a t
t he
second
mss i l e
compl et ed
i t s
100
ml e course on 1 Sept ember 1927,
al t hough
i t was l o s t .
On
15 Oct ober
1927,
t he t h i r d Larynx f l e w 112
mles
at
193 mph, i mpact i ng
f i v e
mles of f
t a r g e t
. 4 6 I n
Sept ember and
Oct ober of t he
next
year, HMS
Thanet
l aunched
t wo
mssi l es t h a t
f l ewappr oxi mat el y 50 ml es each,
one
l andi ng w t h i n 1 . 6 mles of i t s t a r g e t whi l e
t he other
i mpacted 4
. 5
mles f r om i t s
t a r g e t .
I n
May 1929,
t he RAF
l and- l aunched
two mssi l es f r omPor t l and
:
t he f i r s t f l ew
beyond
i t s t a r g e t i n t o t he unknown, whi l e
t he
second
per f ormed as
programmed
The RAE
L a r y n x
m s s i l e on c o r d i t e - f i r e d c at a pu l t
of d e s t r o y e r HMSStronghol d, J ul y 1927
The
man
on t he box i s Dr .
Geor ge
G a r d n e r ,
l a t e r
Di r e c t o r of
RAE ( RAE,
Farnborough)
*See Appendi x
A
f or mss i l e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s
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EARLY
YEARS
Anot her vi ew
of
t he
Larynx
.
Note t he 3
on
t he
mss i l e ' s packi ng crates,
w ngs,
and t a i l
.
The
mss i l e ' s
f i r s t
l aunchon
20
J u l y 1927over t he Bri stol Channel
fa i led
.
( RAE,
Farnborough)
Because of safety and secur i t y
consi derat i ons,
t he B r i t i s h s h i f t e d
t he i r t es t s
to
a
200- ml e
course i n the deser t wast es of I raq . The r e sul t s di sappoi nt ed t he
RAF,
however , as t he
t h r e e
Larynxs l aunched i n
August
and
Sept ember 1929 f l e w onl y
27,
60, and 32
mles
r espect i vel y
. I n
Oct ober ,
one crashed
on
t he
l aunchi ng
pl at f orm
whi l e
another was l a s t seen as i t passed t he 22 ml e mark. The
ai r men
bl amed
vapor
l ock
i n t he engi ne, rather than the control system f or t he f a i l u r e s .
They concl uded f r om
these
t e s t s
t h a t
accur acy was equated
w th weat her
i nf ormat i on,
and
t a r g e t s beyond
100
ml e ranges wer e theref ore l i mted
to area
type
t a r g e t s .
47
By 1927, t he B r i t i s h
wer e devel opi ng
three types
of
mssi les
: a
mechani cal l y-
cont rol l ed f ly ing bomb, a radi o- cont rol l ed m s s i l e ,
and
an ai r
def ense mss i l e t o
break
up enemy ai r c r af t
f ormat i ons
. I n Oct ober 1930, t he Chi ef of t he
RAF
Ai r
S t a f f el i mnat ed t he
ai r def ense
m s s i l e ,
shel ved
the radi o- contr ol l ed Lar ynx,
cont i nued t he mechani cal l y- cont r ol l ed
Larynx
at a l owp r i o r i t y ,
and emphasi zed
i ns t e ad
a new
t a r g e t
mss i l e
.
Three
years
l a t e r ,
t he
Chi ef
of
t he
Ai r
S t a f f
establ i shed
new
p r i o r i t i e s
f or t he pr ogram Def ense
agai nst p i l o t l e s s ai r c r af t r ecei ved t op
research p r i o r i t y , shepherd ai r c r af t (manned
mot her
shi ps gui di ng
r adi o- cont r ol l ed
unmanned
m s s i l e s )
ranked
second i n p r i o r i t y ( ahead of a new
Larynx) ,
w th t he
l owest p r i o r i t y assi gned
t o a m s s i l e t h a t woul dhome i n on enemyr adi o s t a t i ons .
I n
1934, t he
ai r
def ense mss i l e
r egai ned
i t s
number one
p r i o r i t y s t a t u s ; but
because
t h i s
ai r
def ense mss i l e
r equi r ed
t wo
mot her
a i r c r a f t f or gui dance, cost
as muchas a
1 9
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EVOLUTIONOF
THECRUSE
MSSILE
s i n g l e
engi ne
f i ght e r , coul d operate onl y i n
dayl i ght , and r equi r ed three t o f our
years t o devel op, t he RAF
dr opped
i t i n 1936 . ' 8
Despi t e these
s t a t e d
p r i o r i t i e s , t he
RAF r e a l l y
di d
not hi ng w t h t he
f ly ing
bomb u n t i l i t s f i n a l cancel l at i on . TheRAF' s
maj or concer ns
wer e hi gh uni t cost
and l ow
accuracy .
The RAF
est i mat ed t h a t a 300 mph,
250- ml e- r ange
mss i l e
woul d cost
500
each i n a 5, 000 uni t run,
whi l e
a 450
mph
m s s i l e
woul d
cost
3, 000 t o f 4, 000 api ece . The B r i t i s h ai r men est i mat ed
accur acy a t
10 mles
on
a
200- ml e f l i ght i n
average
weat her condi t i ons . Dur i ng these
s t u di e s , t he
Ai r S t a f f
l ooked at rockets as a
s ub st i t u t e
f or t he f l y i ng bomb
and consi dered
j et - powered
f ly ing bombs . F i n a l l y , i n Sept ember 1936, t he
Ai r
S t a f f
r evi ewed
both t he
ai r
def ense
and Larynx
m s s i l e s
and
deci ded
t h a t
ne i t he r
mer i t ed
f u r t h e r
devel opment
. 41
The B r i t i s h , however , di d have a successful i nt erwar mss i l e
devel opment
program
t he
t a r g e t
mss i l e
. The RAF began t h i s
program
by
convert i ng
three
F a i r l e y I I I F f l oat bi pl anes t o meet t he 1930
r equi r ement
f or a radi o- cont rol l ed
t a r g e t . Al t hough t he i n i t i a l two,
l aunched
of f t he HMSVal i ant i n J anuar y and
Apr i l
1932, crashed, the
t h i r d , l aunched on 14 Sept ember 1932, f l ew f or
ni ne mnutes . I n
J anuar y 1933, t he converted a i r c r a f t ,
dubbed
t he F a i r l e y
Queen, sur vi ved t wo hours
of Royal
Navy a n t i a i r c r a f t
bombardment . The next mont h, t he
Ai r
Mn i s t r y l e t a
c o n t r a c t
f or
a
cheaper
t a r g e t m s s i l e ,
a
conver si on
of
t he
Ti ger
Moth
t r a i n e r .
Cal l ed
t he Queen
Bee,
i t f i r s t f l ew
under radi o contr ol i n 1934 . I n a l l , t he F a i r l e y
Corporat i on b u i l t 420
such devi ces
bet ween 1934 and 1943 . 5
Fai rl ey I I I F equ pped w th
r adi o- cont rol devi ces
andknown
as
t he Fai r l ey Queen
I t al so
acted
as a
shepherd a i r c r a f t .
( RAE,
Farnborough)
20
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EARLYYEARS
Launch
of
deHavi l l and
Queen
Bee
Th i s
t a r g e t
m s s i l e
was
a
r a di o - c ont r o l l e d
versi on
of
t he
deHavi l l and
Ti ger
Mot h
(RAE
Far nborough)
The
Ar my- Sper r y
Exper i ment s
US
Army i nt erest i n
f l yi ng
bombs cont i nued i n post - war
years . For exampl e,
i n l at e
1919,
one
of f i cer
noted
that
t he f l yi ng
bomb
w l l
be
a
great
asset
t o
t he
ml i t a r y forces
of
t he
country
f i r s t
perf ect i ng
i t
.
5'
Consequentl y,
t he
Army
contracted wth t he
Sperry
Gyroscope
Company i n February 1920 t o
desi gn and
construct f our gyro
uni t s,
and then i n Apr i l 1920 w t h t he Lawrence Sperry Ai r craf t
Company t o
perf ect automati ccontrol by i nstal l i ng equ pment
i n three Standard
E-1
a i r c r a f t
and
f i v e Messenger ai rcraf t . Mechan cal probl em,
especi al l y
w t h
gyr oscopes, hi nder ed several ot her wi se
successf ul
t e s t s fl own
w t h
pi l ot moni t or s
i n
November
and
December
1920 BecauseLawrence Sperry achi eved even
greater
success i n s i m l ar t e s t s betweenMarch
andMay
1921
at M tchel l
Fi el d, he wona
second
cont ract i n J une
t o
upgrade
t he
gudance
equ pment and
t o
construct
si x
Messengers,
three as
aeri al t orpedoes .
Further
f l i g h t s i n
l a t e 1921 achi eved good
accur acy . s z
The contract
i ncl uded
one
unusual feature,
a pr ovi si on pr ovi di ng
$5,000
f or
h i t t ing
a target 1 out of 12 ti mes at 30 ml es ,
and
a $5, 000
bonus
f or 2addi t i onal
h i t s
.
The
same bonus
appl i ed t o
t r i a l s
at
60 and 90 ml es
. 53
Di f f i cul t i es w th
t he
2
1
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EVOLUTIONOF
THE
CRUSEMSSILE
Lawence Sperr y' s Messenger a i r c r a f t
.
Sperry
di ed i n a
crash
of t h i s type ai rcraf t
on
13
December
1923
( Nati onal
Ai r
andSpace
Museum
aut omat i c
cont rol s
encour aged,
i f not f o r c e d , Sperry t o use radi o- cont r ol
gui dance
.
Af t er gai ni ng appr oval
f rom t he Army' s cont racti ng o f f i c e r on 9
May,
Sperry used
radi o- cont rol
equi pment , devel oped a t
t he
Army
Engi neer i ng Di vi si on
by
Li eut enant Redman,
whi ch al l owed an ai r c r af t about 1 1 / 2
mles
away t o
gui de
t he
si mul at ed
f l yi ng bombs .
Sperr y obt ai ned
good r e s u l t s i n
May
and J une 1922-
b e t t e r
than
anythi ng
achi eved
thus
f ar
.
14
I n t he t e s t s at Mtchel l Fie ld
one day
before the expi rati on of t he c o n t r a c t ,
t he
Army j udged Sperr y' s devi ces to have tw ce
hi t
a t a r g e t at 30ml es, t h r e e t i mes
a t
60
ml es, and
once a t 90
mles
. 53
The Chi ef
of Engi neeri ng Di vi si on
i ns i s t ed,
however , t h a t Sperry
had
not ear ned t he bonus si nce the contract di d not speci f y
r a d i o
control . Thi s
par t i cul ar o f f i c i a l noted t h a t a systemrequi r i ng a mot her a i r c r a f t
t o
f l y
a ml e
or
so
f r om
t he f ly ing
bomb a l l
t he
way t o
t he
t a r g e t
offered
l i t t l e
advant age . Regar dl ess
of the meri ts of t he
c a s e ,
t he Army pai d Sperry
a $20, 000
bonus .
5
6
Despi t e
t h i s
negat i ve
r eact i on to
a
r adi o- cont rol
system
t he
Army
pr oceeded
t o
conduct
i t s
own r adi o- cont rol t e s t s . The
Engi neer i ng Di vi si on devel oped a p i l o t -
moni t ored system t h a t gui ded a number
of
Sperr y' s
Messenger
a i r c r a f t between
Oct ober 1923 and
Apr i l
1925 at
McCook and
Langl ey Fi el ds . Agai n, mechani cal
pr obl em hamper ed t he
f l i g h t s
. 5
I n 1927, t he war depar t ment pushed
the radi o- control i dea
. However , t he
two
a i r c r a f t
purchased
i n
1929
f or these
t e s t s ,
a
Cur t i ss
Robi n
( XC- 10)
and
a
St i mson
22
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EARLYYEARS
J u n i o r ,
pr oved unsat i sf actory .
More
i mpor t ant l y, t he
count r y' s economc
depr essi on const r i ct ed
f unds and del ayed t he proj ect .
Bef or e
l eavi ng
Amer i can
Army
devel opment s
t emporar i l y,
one keen
pr oponent
of f ly ing bombs
deserves
ment i on
.
I n J ul y
1923,
Bi l l y Mtchel l
suggested usi ng
f ly ing bombs i n t h e
f amous
bat t l eshi p bombi ng t e s t s . The Chi ef of Engi neer i ng
Di vi si on recommended
agai nst Mtche l l ' s
pr oposal on t he advi ce of
Li eut enant
Redman, who bel i eved
t h a t t he
chances
f or f a i l u r e
wer e hi gh because t he system
wor ked onl y
agai nst l ar g e t a r g e t s and, mor eover ,
because t he Sperry t e s t
r e sul t s
wer e
due
l a r g e l y to good l uck . Ther ef or e, on 18
August
1923, t he Chi ef of t he
Ai r
Servi ce r e j ec t e d
t he use
of a er i a l torpedoes i n t he t e s t s . 5 9
US Navy Ef fo r t s
USNavy
i nt e r e s t i n crui se mssi l es r eemer ged i n t he md- 1930s f r omasomewhat
d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n than mght be
expect ed,
f or t he
mai n i mpet us cameby way of
unmanned
aer i al t a r get
progr ams
.
L i k e t he Army, t he Navy r ecogni zed t he
advant ages
of radi o- cont r ol l ed vehi cl es
.
The
Navy
di scussed r adi o control not
onl y
i n
1916
but al so i n t he
summer
of
1917
i n
connect i on w th
t he
Sper r y devi ce . Radi o
control
work commenced under t he
Bureau
of Or dnance i n J anuar y
1921,
f ol l ow ng an expr essi on of i nt er e s t by t he
Chi ef
of Naval
Oper at i ons
i n a n t i - a i r c r a f t t a r g e t s . Fl i ght t e s t s began i n 1921 w th
f u r t h e r
exper i ments
conduct ed
i n 1923
and
1924 . The f i r s t
successf ul unpi l ot ed
radi o- cont rol l ed f l i g h t
occurred
i n Sept ember 1924 . Al t hough
t h i s naval
wor k
cont i nued, t he
Navymade
l i t t l e
progress a f t e r
1925 because of
i n s u f f i c i e n t
f unds
. A
Navy e f f o r t
t o r eenergi ze
t he program i n 1932 f e l l v ict im to a
budget cut by
Pr esi dent
Roosevel t
t he
f ol l ow ng
year . 6
A
second Navy
e f f o r t begi nni ng
i n
1935
di d b e t t e r
.
I n Apr i l 1935, t he
Commander
of
A i r c r a f t ,
Bat t l e F l ee t ,
requested t h a t t he CNOpr ovi de
a
hi gh speed,
radi o- cont rol l ed a i r c r a f t f or
ant i - a i r c r af t t a r get p r a c t i c e . I n August , t he Pl ans
Di vi si on,
Bur eau
of Aer onaut i cs repeated
t h i s
request
. The
CNO Adm r al W l l i am
H Stanl ey,
who
had
seen
t he
B r i t i s h a i r c r a f t t a r g e t , t he radi o- cont rol l ed Queen
Bee, suppor t ed t he program As t he
Bur eau
of Or dnance had l i t t l e or no
ent husi asm
f or such
an a i r c r a f t , t he CNOdi r ect ed
t he Bureau
of
Engi neer i ng
and
t he Bureau
of
Aeronaut i cs
t o pr oceed w th
t he proj ect
i n
May, 1936 .
The
Navy
began
f l i g h t
t e s t s
i n
February
1937,
and
by
t he
end
of t he
year
had
achi eved good
r e sul t s
. TheNavy f i r s t used t he
devi ce as a
t a r g e t
i n
operat i ons
w th
t he
c a r r i e r
Ranger i n August, 1938 . These
and
subsequent pract i ce sessi ons
r eveal ed shocki ngl y poor
US
Navy
a n t i - a i r c r a f t
gunner y,
consi der i ng t he l ow
per f or mance of
t he
t a r g e t
a i r c r a f t . Meanwhi l e, t he
Navy f ormul at ed more deadl y
pl ans f or t he radi o- cont rol l ed ai r c r af t .
Li eut enant Commander
Del mar Fahmey suggested
combat
uses f or drones 6 2
23
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EVOLUTIONOF
THE
CRUSE
MSSILE
( t ermed assaul t
drones )
as
ear l y
as
August 1936,
a mer e
month
a f t e r
assumng
command Al t hough one aut hor as s er t s t hat i n t he l a t e
1930s naval
av i a t or s
prevented
t h i s concept fromdevel opi ng, t he growt h of t echnol ogy and wor l d events
wer e c e r t a i n l y c at a l ys t s i n accel erati ng t he devel opment of
combat
r o l e s
f or drones .
Two pi eces of el ect roni cs
equi pment
emer ged at t hi s poi nt t o
f o s t e r
t he m s s i l e ' s
progress :
t e l e v i s i o n and
t he r adar a l t i me t e r . By 1937, RCA
demonst r ated
ai rborne
t e l e v i s i o n i n
an ai r
r econnai ssance proj ect
f or
t he Sovi ets
. I n
August 1941,
TV
r ecei ved
i t s
i n i t i a l
t e s t i n g
aboar d
an
Amer i can drone .
I n t u i t i v e l y obvi ous i s
TVs
u t i l i t y i n
ext endi ng
t he vi si on of t he drone' s operator,
thereby i ncreasi ng
operat i onal eff ect i veness
. The
concur r ent use of radar al t i meters
made drone f l i g h t
mor e
p r a c t i c a l ,
s i nc e
they
accurat el y
measur e
a l t i t u d e
above
t he
s u r f a c e ,
an
especi al l y val uabl e capabi l i t y when f l y i n g over
var yi ng t e r r a i n .
( Thi s
i s i n
c o n t r a s t
t o
t he
bar omet r i c a l t i me t e r ,
whi ch measur es a base
pressure . ) I n J anuar y
1941,
t he
Navy successful l y t e s t e d r adar al t i meters i n a
drone . At h i r d f a c t o r ,
wor l d
events,
was
si mpl y
t he gr owi ng t ensi ons
and
c o n f l i c t
i n