Vatter Bicameralism

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Bicameralism and Policy Performance: The

Effects of Cameral Structure in

Comparative Perspective

A D R I A N V A T T E R

This article addresses the relationship between cameral structure and policy perform-ance in the member states of the OECD for the time period from 1971 to 1996. The

empirical analysis shows that bicameral structures act as a significant brake on govern-ment intervention and on the expansion of the welfare state. Furthermore, bicameralismis a powerful veto player to block reforms in economic and financial policy. With theexception of the over-representation of small and sparsely populated areas, none of theadvantages that classical political theory ascribes to second chambers has actually beenconfirmed. Bicameral structures pose no barrier to executive dominance, nor do theypromote stability within political systems or improve the quality of democracy or econ-omic performance. On the contrary, with regard to social representation, they have astrong negative effect: in comparison to systems with a single chamber, bicameralismsignificantly reduces women’s electoral success.

Parliament is the centrepiece of modern constitutional states and its design

still belongs to the elementary decisions of constitutional reformers.1 One

of the foremost institutional considerations is the question of whether a

national parliament should have one or two chambers. The controversy over

the spirit and purpose of a second parliamentary chamber is not new at all;

it is one of the classic debates in the history of political theory. Scholars

like Charles-Louis de Montesquieu, Alexis de Tocqueville, and the fathers

of the American Constitution, especially Thomas Jefferson, were fervent sup-porters of a bicameral legislature, while representation theorists such as John

Stuart Mill and Abbe Sieyes expressed considerable scepticism with regard to

their usefulness.2 One only has to take a look at the new democracies in

Eastern Europe to see that even today no uniform solution has been

adopted. Hungary, Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and Belorussia have a unicameral

legislature, whereas Poland, Romania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and

Russia have opted for dual cameral structures.3 The different assessments of

the advantages and disadvantages of one or two chambers in the new



democracies in Eastern Europe have made one thing clear above all: even

today, there is hardly any systematic evidence regarding the effectiveness of

bicameralism, which is why the statements of the supporters and opponents

are correspondingly controversial.4

During the democratisation processes in the twentieth century, the use of a

second chamber was repeatedly fundamentally questioned. New Zealand

(1950), Denmark (1956), Sweden (1971), Iceland (1991), and Scotland

(1999) finally abolished their bicameral legislative structure, and in the

course of the globalisation process the necessity of second chambers has

once again come into doubt. Some critics concluded that the era of integral

bicameralism at the national level was over in Europe.5 Not only do these

scholars blame the two-chamber system for slowing down the decision-

making process, with the consequence that politics is unable to react to thequickly changing economic and social conditions; at the core, they actually

criticise the breaking of the will of the people represented by the first

chamber.

THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES

Two-chamber parliaments have usually been established as a result of insti-

tutional compromise between older and newer claims of legitimacy. It was

either the previously ruling social classes or previously sovereign states andprovinces that were integrated into the new political order by means of bicam-

eral structures in that they were given their own legislative chamber as a com-

pensation for their loss of power. Prominent examples for the class

representation are the second chambers in unitary countries, such as the UK

and Ireland, while the USA and Switzerland have second chambers that typi-

cally represent the territorial units of the federal states.

Given the diverse national path in the development of bicameral legisla-

tures, it is not surprising to find substantial institutional variation. There are

variations in size, legislative term of office, political representation andmode of selection (see Appendix). Because chambers vary especially in size

and in electoral rules, members of each chamber will share characteristics

not shared with their counterparts in the other chamber. What is typical in

this area is that second chambers are almost always smaller than their equiv-

alent first chamber and the terms of office of their members tend to be longer

than in the lower house. However, representatives in the second chamber of

most bicameral systems are not bound to an imperative mandate. Therefore,

over the years, party organisation started to eclipse the originally legitimate

idea of a representation of social classes or regional interests. Today, represen-

tatives in second chambers generally organise themselves in terms of political

B I C A M E R A L I S M A N D P O L I C Y P E R F O R M A N C E 195



The class and territory-based bicameral systems hardly differ from each

other in terms of the party composition of their second chambers. However,

it is apparent from Table 1 that there are systematic differences in party

representation between first and second chambers in bicameral political

systems.

The reason for the different cameral party composition is that in federal

states, small and often rural areas with homogeneous settlement and economic

structures are over-represented in the second chamber. As the voters in rural

and sparsely populated regions have a preference for bourgeois centre

parties of liberal or conservative outlook, so the left is traditionally strong

in urban and densely populated areas, the former predominate systematically

in the seat distribution of the second chamber. Additionally, this effect is

reinforced by the fact that, usually, second chambers are elected accordingto plurality or majority systems and that the number of seats is rather small

(see Appendix). In unitary states, such as the UK and Ireland, it is the

T A B L E 1

A V E R A G E D I F F E R E N C E S I N P A R T Y R E P R E S E N T A T I O N B E T W E E N T H E F I R S T A N D

S E C O N D C H A M B E R I N T H E 1 4 B I C A M E R A L O E C D C O U N T R I E S I N P E R C E N T A G E

PO I N T S ( 1 9 7 1 – 9 6 )

Switzerland Netherlands Belgium Austria

Spain

(1977 – 96) Italy France

ExtremeLeft

22.0 þ0.3 20.5 24.0 21.3 22.7

Green 22.6 þ0.7 20.4 22.1 20.7Left 213.2 24.3 21.7 þ0.7 20.1 þ4.0 210.8Liberal þ10.4 þ0.6 þ0.6 27.0 22.7 þ12.1Conservative þ14.2 þ4.1 þ1.3 þ7.0 þ1.6 þ4.0 þ3.2Extreme

Right23.9 20.3 20.2 20.2 22.4 20.6

Germany Ireland UK USA Canada Australia Japan

ExtremeLeft

20.9 þ0.7

Green 22.8 20.4Left þ4.7 20.7 218.0 29.4 24.0 20.4Liberal 28.6 21.6 þ7.4 25.5 þ17.7 þ6.3 þ0.9Conservative þ7.6 þ3.0 þ14.1 þ5.0 212.3 þ4.3 24.7Extreme

Right

Note: The data for Ireland refer to the time periods 1977– 81, 1983– 87 and 1991 – 96.Sources: A.S. Banks (ed.), Political Handbook of the World: Governments and Intergovernmental

Organizations (Binghamton, NY: CSA Publications, several volumes); BinghamptonUniversity: Election Results Archive (http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/index.html);European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook several volumes;

196 T H E J O U RN A L O F L E G I S L A T I V E S T U D I E S



representatives of the once dominant social classes that lead to a dominance of

bourgeois and conservative positions in the second chamber.

In summary, it can be established that, apart from a few exceptions, liberal

and especially conservative parties are over-represented in the second in com-

parison to the first chamber. Meanwhile, social democratic parties and the

Greens as well as extreme left- and right-wing parties have below average rep-

resentation. In line with the basic idea of the party difference hypothesis,7 it

follows that political systems with a strong second chamber are expected to

deliver notably more liberal (less state) and conservative (status quo) policy

results. The term liberal stands here in the classical European sense for

reduction of state intervention, free enterprise economics and the free devel-

opment of the individual, whereas conservatism means to support the status

quo, to uphold the value of tradition and to oppose major changes in lawsand institutions. In other words: the existence of a second chamber is likely

to lead to a weaker welfare state and fewer policy reforms. Furthermore, it

is to be expected that second chambers, given the representative function of

their federal units, present an effective protection of the existing division of

power, thereby creating a federal counterbalance to democratic majority rule.8

Main Hypotheses

Based on the presented findings regarding the party composition of the second

chambers, the main hypotheses about the expected effects of bicameral insti-tutions can be summarised as follows:

Strong bicameralism (see subsequent measurement in research design)

. reduces state intervention in favour of market forces (liberal effect)

. weakens reform forces in favour of status quo interests (conservative

effect). restrains the central state in favour of the federal units (decentralising

effect).

The postulated effects can be derived not only from empirical findings

regarding the party composition in the second chambers, but also from the-

ories of institutional veto points. The neo-institutional approach is based on

the assumption that political institutions greatly influence not only negotiation

and decision-making processes (politics) and the related strategies of the pol-

itical actors; by structuring political interactions, they also lead to different

policy outcomes. In this context, veto player theory9 argues that with a

growing number of institutions, the consent of which is necessary to make a

policy decision, the cabinet’s scope of action will decrease. As a consequence,

it will become more difficult for the cabinet to assume its responsibilities and




significantly reduce the central state’s scope of administrative and financial

action. This slows the expansion of the welfare state. According to this

theory, strong second chambers act as competitive veto players that limit

the prospect for change of the status quo, especially if they strongly differ

from the first chamber in terms of their party composition.10 The outcomes

of strong second chambers that are postulated here are similar to those

suggested by neo-liberal concepts.

Further Hypotheses

On the basis of the relevant literature and of constitutional theory, the classic

functions and goals of second chambers can be summarised as follows:

. Checks and balances. Even Montesquieu and later James Madison in The

Federalist Papers (in particular 51 and 63) pointed out the positive function

of a second chamber as a guarantee for the restraint and separation of

powers between institutions. Dual cameral structures are specifically seen

as institutional counterbalances to executive power concentration, given

that the cabinet requires the consent of multiple majorities to implement

its policies.11

. Political stability. In addition to the status quo function, second chambers

are claimed to have a positive effect in that they increase regime stabilityand ensure political continuity.12 Especially in unitary systems, where

second chambers lack a territory-based representative function, dual

cameral structures are mainly justified by their stabilisation function. The

political composition of the second chamber tends to be more constant

because it generally has longer legislative terms of office than the first

chamber and, in many cases, members are replaced in a staggered

manner. This promotes greater political stability.. Protection of minorities. The intention to preclude a ‘tyranny of the

majority’13

and to integrate regional minority interests as well as to createa balance between larger and smaller member states was already vital to

the writers of the American Constitution.14 Furthermore, it has been

claimed that bicameral structures have a general positive effect on the pro-

tection of cultural and social minorities.15

. Better legislation thanks to second opinion. One of the most important

advantages of the two chamber system as seen by James Madison is the gen-

erally higher quality of the parliamentary outputs thanks to double delibera-

tion of the legislation (‘inter-organ control’). The second chamber plays the

role of a ‘chambre de reflexion’ or ‘Rat der Weisen’, considering long-term

consequences and assuring a high standard and flawless work that should




RESEARCH DESIGN

The above hypotheses are tested empirically in statistical cross-sectional ana-

lyses of the member states of the OECD (except Luxembourg, Turkey and

Iceland) for the time period from 1971 to 1996. The selection of 21 devel-oped industrial states in the western hemisphere meets the requirements of

the ‘most similar cases design’.16 The advantage of the chosen research

design is that the OECD countries have similar consolidated political

systems and economic patterns of development, whereas in states other

than the highly developed western industrial states, the political and social

conditions for bicameral systems as well as the expected effects may be

too disparate.

The Degree of Bicameralism

The following section introduces the variable of interest and discusses the

operationalisation of the postulated hypotheses. The key (independent) vari-

able is the degree of bicameralism in the OECD countries. It was operatio-

nalised according to Arend Lijphart’s bicameralism index for the period

from 1971 to 1996.17 He distinguishes between unicameralism and

between weak, medium-strength and strong bicameralism to construct an

index of the cameral structures that ranges from 1.0 to 4.0. Lijphart’s criteria

to classify the cameral structures and assign them to one of the four princi-pal categories are on the one hand their respective formal constitutional

powers (symmetry) and on the other hand the design of the procedure by

which members of the second chamber are elected (congruence). Lijphart

defines ‘congruence’ as similarity of political composition. Regardless of

the variations in selection methods, if the two houses have similar political

representation, they are deemed congruent. Disparities in power range from

full symmetry, where agreement of the two houses is necessary to enact a

law, to total asymmetry, where one house is granted decision-making

power. Using these two categories, Lijphart constructs three types of bica-meralism. He assumes that ‘strong’ bicameral legislatures are characterised

by significant differences in composition and by relatively symmetric power.

‘Weak’ bicameralism is characterised either by asymmetric power or by

congruent chambers. And ‘insignificant’ bicameralism is characterised by

both asymmetric power and congruence. A comparison of Lijphart’s bica-

meralism index with indices of other authors makes clear that there is

scant controversy amongst experts when it comes to the classification of

the individual countries. The indexes by Colomer, Huber et al., and

Schmidt18 are strongly correlated. Table 2 gives an overview of

the cameral structures in the 21 OECD countries for the period from 1971




The Dependent Variables (Performance Indicators)The postulated effects of second chambers needs to be operationalised with

measurable, widely used indicators. Unless otherwise indicated, the data

sources are OECD statistics.19 The main hypotheses have been operationa-

lised as follows.

The first postulated effect of bicameralism is a reduction of state interven-

tion in favour of market forces. It will be measured using the following four

indicators: the growth of government expenditure (ratio of public spending

to Gross National Product); the growth of social welfare expenditure (ratio

of social spending to GNP); the change in the tax burden (ratio of tax loadto GNP); and the growth of the share of public sector employees in the econ-

omically active population. With these four indicators of an increase in state

intervention during the period under consideration, the extent to which liberal

theory of less state and more market applies will be empirically tested.

The second effect is the status quo bias or innovative weakness and inertia

of a political system. There are no common indicators in international com-

parative public policy research to measure this effect. However, there are a

number of studies that analysed and measured reform capacity and innovative

strength of political systems in selected policy areas, constructing relevant

indicators. The hypothesis test is based on four studies: the research done

T A B L E 2

T H E C A M E R A L S T R U C T U R E O F T H E L E G I S L A T U R E S I N 2 1 O E C D C O U N T R I E S

(197 1 – 96)

Incongruent Congruent

Symmetric Strong Bicameralism (4) Medium Bicameralism (3)

Australia, Germany,Switzerland, USA

Belgium, Italy, Japan The Netherlands

Asymmetric Medium Bicameralism (3) Weak Bicameralism (2)Canada, France, Spain UK (2.5) Austria, Ireland

Unicameralism (1)Denmark, Finland, Greece, New Zealand,

Norway (1.5), Portugal, Sweden

Notes: The values in parentheses represent the value on Lijphart’s bicameralism scale. ‘Congru-

ence’ means similarity of political composition and ‘symmetry’ means equal constitutionalpowers of the two chambers. Norway (1.5) has a single chamber system, which is dividedinto two sub-chambers (false mixed system). Even though bicameralism in the UK isincongruent, Lijphart classifies it as medium to weak due to its lack of democraticlegitimacy.

Source: Own compilation based on A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and

Performance in 36 Countries (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999),p.314.




during the 1980s and 1990s; the study by Wagschal21 who constructed an indi-

cator for the degree of reform in tax policy; Wilensky’s22 analysis of inno-

vation in family policy and Estes’23 index of social progress that measures

reforms in areas such as health and education policy.

Third, the degree of division of power between central government and

federal units will be operationalised in line with Castles24 by two indicators:

fiscal centralisation and fiscal difficulty. Fiscal centralisation is equivalent to

central state revenue as a percentage share of total fiscal revenue. Fiscal diffi-

culty, according to Scharpf,25 measures the percentage rate by which the

budget of the central government would have to be increased in order to

achieve a one per cent boost of total demand. The two variables should

reflect the degree to which the federal units succeed in defending the resources

and powers of the lower state levels. Therefore, these indicators show thesuccess of territorial representation and whether there exists a federal counter-

balance to democratic majority rule.

The following indicators have been used to measure the other

hypotheses:

. The hypothesis about the separation of powers – in particular the restraint of

executive power – was operationalised by two indicators: first, Lijphart’s26

index of ‘executive dominance’ and second by Keman’s27 ‘balance’ indi-

cator that measures the power relationship between parliament andcabinet in political systems.

. The hypothesis concerning political stability has been measured by a

number of indicators in the literature.28 For the following analysis, three

indicators have been selected: the frequency of cabinet changes, the level

of political unrest, and strike activity, measured by the number of annually

lost working days per 1000 employees.. The hypothesis regarding minority protection can be exclusively applied to

special regional or territorial minority interests and in particular to the

balance between large and small constituent federal units. This balancewill be measured by the degree of over-representation of small units in

the second chamber. An appropriate measure of inequality is the Gini

Index29 that reflects the proportion between the share of seats in the

second chamber and the represented share of the population.30 On the

other hand, the protection of minorities can be understood in a broader

sense, referring to the integration of cultural and social minorities in

general. Unfortunately, defined that way, minority protection is extraordi-

narily difficult to measure, as there are different forms of ethnic and reli-

gious minorities in each country. In an analogy to Lijphart31 and

Taagepera,32 who use the integration of women in politics as a proxy vari-




strength of women’s representation in the national parliaments as an indi-

cator for non-territorial minority protection.. The last postulated effect assumes that thanks to the second opinion in

bicameral systems the resultant legislation will guarantee greater popular

satisfaction and more economic prosperity. In the tradition of public

policy research, this will be measured using common democratic and econ-

omic performance indicators.33 Democratic performance is operationalised

first by the level of subjective popular satisfaction with the functioning of

the democratic system and of the parliament, as measured in Euro Barom-

eter surveys.34 Second, political performance is measured by Dahl’s35

known index of democracy, which assesses the quality of democracy in a

political system on a six-point scale, using indicators such as freedom of

the press and of assembly, competitiveness of the party system, strengthof parties and interest groups and effectiveness of parliament. Finally, the

measurement of economic performance is based on three key variables:

economic growth, changes in the unemployment and inflation rate.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Whether the bicameralism variable significantly helps to explain more than 20

performance indicators will be tested in regression analyses. The previous

section dealt exclusively with the effects of bicameralism on policy perform-

ance. It is obvious, however, that there are other factors that influence policyand economic performance and which need to be included in a statistical

analysis. In the following, the most important control hypotheses will be pre-

sented briefly.

Comparative public policy research, which is concerned with the determi-

nants and effects of government policy, provides several approaches to explain

differences in policy and economic outcomes. It is worthwhile to consider

them systematically in order to gauge the explanatory power of the bicamer-

alism variable. Broadly speaking, four lines of theory have dominated the

cross-national study of public policy in economically advanced democracies:the institutionalist approach, the partisan theory, the theory of power resources

of organised interests and the hypothesis of socio-economic determination.36

These approaches will be used as control hypotheses.

According to the neo-institutionalist approach, policy differences are

largely attributable to differences in political institutions as well as to differ-

ences in the strategies pursued by interdependent collective actors.37 Political

institutions are decisive for the success or failure of economic and social pol-

icies. One of the most important aspects of institutional arrangements is the

formal and informal modes of conflict resolution. The distinction between

consensus and Westminster democracies plays an especially prominent role




compromise techniques, which often lead to the adoption of packages of

measures in which each party receives some kind of compensation and

where minority interests are considered over-proportionally. Theoretically,

it is therefore to be expected that this process of mutual concessions favours

extensive state intervention with a fully developed tax and welfare state. Over-

sized government coalitions and highly fragmented party systems with numer-

ous cleavages, which are typical features of consensus democracies, promote

expansive social policies. The degree of consensus democracy for the period

from 1971 to 1996 will be measured according to Lijphart’s39 first (executive-

parties) dimension.

According to the partisan theory, the party composition of the cabinet is a

major determinant of variation in policy outcomes in constitutional democra-

cies.

40

The theory states that parties, in exchange for political support, serve asagents for the preferences and ideologies of their voters. It is mainly with

respect to economic and social policy that this hypothesis has been developed

and empirically tested. According to the influential ‘parties do matter’ view,

the strength of the major party of the right makes a significant difference in

social policy by limiting welfare expenditures. Conversely, it is maintained

that the stronger the participation of left-wing parties in the cabinet, the

higher welfare spending will be. The strength of left-wing parties in govern-

ment was selected as a control variable, based on the assumption that social

democratic welfare capitalism has a significant influence on the expansionof the tax and welfare state.41

According to the socio-economic hypothesis – a functionalist approach –

political and institutional factors are subordinate to socio-economic variables.

Public policy is mainly understood as a reaction to structurally generated pro-

blems of social and economic development. The hypothesis that socio-econ-

omic development goes along with increasing social differentiation,

mounting economic wealth as well as social and political modernisation lies

at the heart of this approach. The level of economic affluence, measured by

the GNP of a country, is the most commonly used control variable.In summary, three control variables that reflect the different approaches to

public policy research will be included in the following regression models: the

degree of consensus democracy, the strength of left-wing parties in the gov-

ernment, and the level of economic affluence of a country.

RESULTS

The empirical results are reported in Tables 3–7 and will be commented upon

briefly. The cross-sectional analysis (OLS method) follows the frequently used

two-step approach.42 First, we will calculate bivariate regressions using a large




T A B L E 3

B I V A R I A T E R E G R E S S I O N A N A L Y S E S O F T H E E F F E C T O F B I C A M E R A L I S M O N

S E L E C T E D P E R F O R M A N C E I N D I C A T O R S I N 2 1 O E C D C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 7 1 – 9 6 )

Indicators

Standardised

RegressionCoefficients

Absolutet-value

Absolute

t-valueCoefficients

Number of

Countries(N)

State intervention

– Governmentexpenditure

20.09 20.73ÃÃ 4.53 20

– Welfare expenditure 20.01 20.52Ã 2.40 20– Tax burden 20.12 20.54ÃÃ 2.76 20– Public sector

employment20.17 20.74ÃÃ 4.56 19

Policy reform

– Labour market reform 20.18 20.50Ã

2.18 16– Family policy reform 20.13 20.45Ã 1.98 18– Tax policy reform 20.08 20.44Ã 1.97 20– Social policy reform 20.03 20.50Ã 2.26 19

Decentralisation

– Fiscal centralisation 20.03 20.51Ã 2.57 21– Fiscal difficulty 20.34 0.63ÃÃ 3.53 21

Checks and balances

– Executive dominance 20.02 20.02 0.12 21– Executive-legislative

balance

0.21 0.17 0.67 18

Regime stability– Cabinet changes 20.22 20.55ÃÃ 2.60 19– Political unrest 0.08 0.16 0.65 19– Strike activity 20.01 20.07 0.27 19

Minority protection

– Over-representation of small territorial units

0.14 0.87ÃÃ 6.86 18

– Female representationin parliament

20.07 20.66ÃÃ 3.60 19

Democratic performance– Satisfaction with

democracy0.01 0.50 0.64 19

– Satisfaction withparliament

20.02 20.18 0.71 17

– Dahl’s index of democracy

0.18 0.31 1.31 18

Economic performance

– Economic growth 20.18 20.14 0.63 21– Unemployment rate 20.05 20.15 0.65 21– Inflation rate 22.62 20.56ÃÃ 2.98 21

Note: ÃÃ ¼ p , 0.01, Ã ¼ p , 0.05.




T A B L E 4

M U L T I P L E R E G R E S S I O N S O F T H E E F F E C T S O F B I C A M E R A L I S M O N S E L E C T E D

P E R F O R M A N C E I N D I C A T O R S I N 2 1 O E C D C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 7 1 – 9 6 )

D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s : I n d i c a t o r s o f S t a t e I n t e r v e n t i o n

Independent

Variables

GovernmentExpenditure(Regression

Coefficients)

WelfareExpenditure(Regression

Coefficients)

Tax Burden(Regression

Coefficients)

Public SectorEmployment(Regression

Coefficients)

Constant 33.05 11.36 14.71 6.96– Bicameralism 24.42ÃÃ

(20.56)23.55ÃÃ

(20.67)22.13Ã

(20.47)21.81Ã

(20.42)– Consensus

Democracy3.50Ã

(0.40)2.78ÃÃ

(0.48)0.68

(0.13)0.97

(0.21)– Left-wing

government

0.05

(0.12)

0.05

(0.20)

20.00

(20.03)

0.09ÃÃ

(0.49)– Economic

affluence20.00(0.06)

0.01Ã

(0.47)20.00

(20.13)20.00

(20.04)

adj. R2¼ 0.62 adj. R2

¼ 0.65 adj. R2¼ 0.31 adj. R2

¼ 0.72

Note: OLS method; ÃÃ ¼ p , 0.01, Ã ¼ p , 0.05 (two-tailed test); the estimated regression coef-ficients are listed in the first line, the standardised regression coefficients just below in par-entheses. Examinations of tolerance levels indicate no serious multicollinearity.

T A B L E 5



D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s : I n d i c a t o r s o f P o l i c y R e f o r m

Independent

Variables

Labour

Market Policy(Regression

Coefficients)

Family Policy

Reform(Regression

Coefficients)

Tax Policy

Reform(Regression

Coefficients)

Social Policy

Reform(Regression

Coefficients)

Constant 5.35 5.75 14.34 187.42– Bicameralism 21.71Ã

(20.62)0.02

(0.03)22.96Ã

(20.55)21.47

(20.08)– Consensus

Democracy21.55Ã

(20.53)0.40

(0.12)21.19

(20.21)2.14

(0.11)– Left-wing

government0.01

(0.13)0.08Ã

(0.58)20.00

(20.02)0.44Ã

(0.49)– Economic

affluence0.00

(0.34)20.01

(20.19)0.00

(0.27)20.00

(20.25)

adj. R2¼ 0.31 adj. R2

¼ 0.30 adj. R2¼ 0.26 adj. R2

¼ 0.31

Note: OLS method; ÃÃ ¼ p , 0.01, Ã ¼ p , 0.05 (two-tailed test); the estimated regression coef-ficients are listed in the first line the standardised regression coefficients just below in par




those performance variables where in the first step it was found that the

bicameralism variable had significant explanatory power. Table 3 shows the

results of the bivariate regression analyses of the effect of the degree of bica-

meralism in the 21 OECD countries on different dependent variables.

The most important results of the bivariate analyses can be summarised

as follows. The signs and significance of the regression coefficients show

that the main hypotheses (state intervention, policy reform, decentralisation)

about the effects of cameral structures are basically correct. The more import-

ant the second chamber, the smaller will be the fiscal share of the central state

compared to the share of the constituent units, the slimmer the welfare and tax

T A B L E 6


P E R F O R M A N C E I N D I C A T O R S I N 2 1 O E C D C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 7 1 – 9 9 6 )

D e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s : I n d i c a t o r s o f D e c e n t r a l i s a t i o n

IndependentVariables

Fiscal Centralisation(Regression Coefficients)

Fiscal Difficulty(Regression Coefficients)

Constant 99.33 1.65– Bicameralism 27.85Ã (20.55) 0.99Ã (0.54)– Consensus Democracy 24.87 (20.31) 0.32 (0.16)– Left-wing government 20.16 (20.23) 20.06 (20.07)– Economic affluence 20.01 (20.16) 0.00 (0.14)

adj. R2¼ 0.31 adj. R2

¼ 0.30

Note: OLS method;

ÃÃ¼

p,

0.01,

Ã¼

p,

0.05 (two-tailed test); the estimated regression coef-ficients are listed in the first line, the standardised regression coefficients just below in par-entheses. Examinations of tolerance levels indicate no serious multicollinearity.

T A B L E 7



Independent

Variables

Cabinet Changes

(Regression Coefficients)

Female Representation

(Regression Coefficients)

Constant 6.81 14.39– Bicameralism 20.98 (20.40) 24.94ÃÃ (20.51)– Consensus democracy 20.52 (20.20) 3.29Ã (0.33)– Left-wing government 0.03 (0.29) 0.08Ã (0.41)– Economic affluence 20.00 (20.03) 0.01Ã (0.27)

adj. R2¼ 0.37 adj. R2

¼ 0.69

Note: OLS method; ÃÃ ¼ p , 0.01, Ã ¼ p , 0.05 (two-tailed test); the estimated regression coef-ficients are listed in the first line the standardised regression coefficients just below in par




state, the lower state intervention in general and the stronger the persistence in

the status quo in certain policy areas, such as labour market and social policy.

In contrast to the main hypotheses, the majority of the other hypotheses

about the effect of bicameralism have not been corroborated in the bivariate

analysis. The assumption that dual structures restrain executive power has

to be rejected on the basis of the above results (checks and balances variables).

The thesis of greater political stability within bicameral systems has only been

confirmed in part (regime stability variables): on the one hand, there are sig-

nificantly more cabinet changes in unicameral than in bicameral systems, but

the systems do not differ with respect to the extent of political unrest or strike

activity.

The hypothesis of a higher quality of democracy in bicameral systems has

not been confirmed (democratic performance variables). Finally, the thesisthat the second opinion results in better legislation, which will significantly

enhance subjective popular satisfaction with the functioning of democratic

institutions, also lacks empirical foundation.

The bivariate results regarding economic performance of cameral struc-

tures vary (economic performance variables). While there are no differences

in economic growth and unemployment rates, they clearly differ with

respect to inflation rates. According to the bivariate estimations, bicameral

systems are significantly more successful in combating inflation than unicam-

eral systems. However, subsequent multivariate analyses made clear that thiswas a spurious correlation: the differences in combating inflation are rather

due to differences in the degree of central bank independence. National

banks are usually more independent in bicameral than in unicameral

systems, where politics generally exerts a stronger influence, which has a

negative impact on the stability of the monetary value of a currency.43

Mixed results have been obtained regarding the hypothesis that second

chambers fulfil the function of protecting minorities (minority protection vari-

ables). As far as the representation of small territorial units is concerned, the

regression coefficient is highly significant and positive, which demonstratesthat small areas are generally over-represented in bicameral systems. Thus,

one of the fundamental demands of the fathers of the American Constitution

is still met today, namely to strengthen the position of small federal units at the

expense of large and populous ones. At the same time, it becomes clear that

compared to unicameral systems, women are significantly under-represented

in bicameral structures. A comparison of the gender representation between

first and second chambers in European democracies further clarifies this

point. While in the mid-1990s nearly 15 per cent of the representatives in

first chambers were female, the share of women in second chambers was

only about half that, namely 8.7 per cent.44 This under-representation of




representation of bourgeois and conservative parties that are traditionally

dominated by men (see Table 1). Tables 4 to 7 report the influence of the bica-

meralism variable in multiple regression analyses.

The empirical results in Table 4 corroborate the initial hypothesis: the four

indicators of the level of state intervention are all strongly associated with

bicameralism. The bicameralism variable has significant explanatory power

in all of the four regression models. Above all, the second chamber remark-

ably slows down the expansion of government intervention in general and

of the welfare state in particular.45 The thesis that, due to its liberal and con-

servative constellation and its powerful veto position, a strong second

chamber leads to diminished state intervention has thus been confirmed.

The empirical results in Table 5 are mixed. While a strong bicameral struc-

ture effectively limits reforms in areas such as labour market or tax policy,cameral structure is less relevant to innovation in family and social policy.

In these typical areas of welfare policy, the strength of left-wing parties in

the cabinet has a much stronger influence on reforms.

The mixed results mirror the fact that liberal and conservative members of

the second chambers largely agree on employment and tax policy, but not on

welfare and social policy reforms. There is a broad basic consensus that gov-

ernment influence in the areas of economic and financial policy ought to be

limited, whereas in social policy, differences between basic liberal and conser-

vative values emerge more clearly.46

It seems plausible that due to thesedifferent positions of the centre and right-wing parties within the second

chamber, the veto power of bicameral structures will be diluted in these

policy areas.

Table 6 confirms the hypothesis that the degree of decentralisation of a

country is influenced by its cameral structure. Even if other important

control variables are considered in the regression models, the strength of the

second chamber still turns out to be an effective instrument against the increas-

ing centralisation of the state.

The thesis of a stabilising effect of dual cameral structures is, however, notsupported by the empirical findings.47 The case of Australia illustrates that

strong bicameralism can even unfold the opposite effect in parliamentary

systems. Australia’s constitutional compromise between the US model of a

directly elected senate and the Westminster model of a majoritarian party

system led to a prolonged constitutional and government crisis in the mid-

1970s. The presence of different political majorities in the two chambers com-

pletely blocked public policy-making.48 The Australian government had no

choice but to call for new elections, although it had the necessary majority

in the first chamber and was, therefore, sufficiently legitimised following

the logic of the Westminster model. Consequently, in pure parliamentary




responsibility to two legislative chambers with potentially different majorities

can cause higher political instability. Examples of governments resigning

prematurely due to a lack of support in the second chamber are not only

found in the Australian constitutional crisis of 1975, but also in the UK and

in France during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and recently in

Canada.

Furthermore, Table 7 shows that bicameralism significantly increases the

under-representation of women in politics. The existence of a second chamber

proves to be a significant obstacle to gender equality in politics. The explana-

tory power of the bicameralism variable with respect to the weak presence of

women in national parliaments is stronger than that of the level of economic

development, the degree of consensus democracy and the strength of left-wing

parties in cabinet.

49

Finally, the results also revealed that the parliamentary over-represen-

tation of inhabitants from small and sparsely populated regions constitutes

one of the strongest effects of bicameral systems.

CONCLUSIONS

How do bicameral systems work? The empirical analysis shows that bicam-

eral structures act as a significant brake on government intervention and on

the expansion of the welfare state (see summary of findings in Table 8). Inthis sense, bicameralism is an effective institution to strengthen liberal

market forces. Furthermore, it is a powerful veto instrument to block

policy reforms, even though this statement needs some differentiation: if

the members of the second chamber differ in their views, as is particularly

the case with respect to reforms in social policy, they are poor protectors

of the status quo. However, if the members of the dominant parties agree

on their political goals, they are powerful veto players. Given the domi-

nance of centre and right-wing parties in the second chamber, this

especially applies to economic and financial policy. Finally, dual cameralstructures also have a decentralising effect. Not only in theory, but also

in practice, second chambers represent an obstacle to efforts of state

centralisation.

With the exception of the over-representation of small and sparsely popu-

lated areas, none of the advantages ascribed to second chambers in classical

political theory have actually been confirmed. Bicameral structures pose no

barrier to executive dominance, nor do they promote stability within political

systems or improve the quality of democracy or economic performance. On

the contrary, with regard to social representation, they have a strong negative

effect: in comparison to systems with a single chamber and bicameralism sig-




T A B L E 8

O V E R V I E W O F T H E E F F E C T S O F B I C A M E R A L I S M : H Y P O T H E S E S , I N D I C A T O R S ,

A N D R E S U L T S

Hypotheses and Indicators

State intervention Status quo bias Decentralisation Power Restraint

Governmentexpenditure/GNP

Labour marketreform

Fiscalcentralisationdominance

Executive

Welfare expenditure Family policy/GNP

Fiscal difficultyreform

Executive-legislativerelationship

Tax revenue/GNP Tax reformShare of civil service

employeesSocial reform

Empirical Resultsþ (þ) þ 0

Barrier against stateintervention andpaticularly welfarestate expansion

Barrier againstreforms ineconomicpolicy, less insocial policy

Strong barrieragainstcentralisation

No restraint of governmentpower

Hypotheses and Indicators

Political stability

Minorityprotection

Quality of Democracy

EconomicPerformance

Cabinet changes Representation of small territorialunits

Citizensatisfactionwithparliament/democracy

Economic growth

Political unrest Femalerepresentationin parliament

Democracy index(Dahl)

Unemploymentrate

Strike activity Inflation rate

Empirical Results

0 þ/2 0 0No higher stability of

the political systemRepresentation of

small territorialunits increased,of womenreduced

Assessment of democraticquality neithersubjectively norobjectivelyhigher

No highereconomicperformance

Note: þ: Hypothesis confirmed (þ): Hypothesis mostly confirmed.0: Hypothesis not confirmed 2: Results contrary to hypothesis.




NOTES

1. W.J. Patzelt, ‘Vergleichende Parlamentarismusforschung als Schlussel zum Systemvergleich.Vorschlage zu einer Theorie und Forschungsdebatte’, Zeitschrift fu r Parlamentsfragen, 1(1995), pp.355–85, regards comparative parliamentary research as key to the comparative

analysis of political systems.2. S.S. Schuttemeyer and R. Sturm, ‘Wozu Zweite Kammern? Zur Reprasentation und Funktio-

nalitat Zweiter Kammern in westlichen Demokratien’, Zeitschrift fu r Parlamentsfragen, 3(1992), pp.517–36, at p.518.

3. N. Baldwin and D. Shell (eds.), Second Chambers (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2001);and W. Merkel, Systemtransformation (Opladen: LeskeþBudrich, 1999).

4. Baldwin and Shell, Second Chambers; G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.1.

5. R.E. Germann, Staatsreform. Der U ¨ bergang zur Konkurrenzdemokratie (Bern, Stuttgart andWien: Haupt, 1994), p.75.

6. Schuttemeyer and Sturm, ‘Wozu Zweite Kammern? Zur Reprasentation und FunktionalitatZweiter Kammern in westlichen Demokratien’, p.528.

7. F.G. Castles, ‘Decentralization and the Post-War Political Economy’, European Journal of Pol-itical Research, 36 (1999), pp.27– 53; D.A. Hibbs, ‘Political Parties and MacroeconomicPolicy’, American Political Science Review, 71(1977), pp.1467–87; A.M. Hicks and D.H.Swank, ‘Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies 1960–82’, American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), pp.658–74; M.G. Schmidt, ‘The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy’, in H. Keman(ed.), Comparative Democratic Politics (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.166 – 84.

8. M. Heger, Deutscher Bundesrat und Schweizer Sta nderat: Gedanken zu ihrer Entstehung,ihrem aktuellen Erscheinungsbild und ihrer Rechtfertigung. Beitra ge zum Parlamentsrecht (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1990).

9. G. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press, 2002).10. Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism, p.75.11. Heger, Deutscher Bundesrat und Schweizer Sta nderat: Gedanken zu ihrer Entstehung, ihrem

aktuellen Erscheinungsbild und ihrer Rechtfertigung. Beitra ge zum Parlamentsrecht , p.127;and L. Trivelli, Le bicame ralisme: Institutions compare es: Etude historique, statistique et cri-tique des rapports entre le Conseil National et le Conseil des Etat (Lausanne: Payot, 1975), p.29.

12. In A. Hamilton, J. Jay and J. Madison, The Federalist (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1961), No.10, 62 and 63, James Madison showed himself convinced of the stabilitypromoting effect of bicameral structures. See also Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism.

13. This is where the game theory argument by W.H. Riker, ‘The Justification of Bicameralism’, International Political Science Review , 13/1 (1992), pp.101– 16, ties in. He claims bicameral-ism to be an effective institution to preclude cyclical majorities and, thus, a protection against

tyrannical majority decisions.14. Tsebelis and Money, Bicameralism, p.27.15. Montesquieu in particular justifies the two-chamber system with the protection of certain

social groups: ‘permettre une meilleure representation des differents corps de la nation’(cited by Trivelli, Le bicame ralisme: Institutions compare es: Etude historique, statistiqueet critique des rapports entre le Conseil National et le Conseil des Etat , p.31).

16. A. Przeworski and H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley,1970), p.34.

17. A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries

(New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1999), p.314.18. J.P. Colomer, Political Institutions in Germany (London: Routledge, 1996); E. Huber,

C. Ragin and J. D. Stephens, ‘Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Struc-

ture, and the Welfare State’, American Journal of Sociology, 99/3 (1993), pp.711– 49; andM.G. Schmidt, Demokratietheorien (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1996).

19 J E L D M K d K N t P liti l D t H db k OECD C t i (O f d




20. G. Tsebelis, ‘Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An EmpiricalAnalysis’, American Political Science Review, 93/3 (1999), pp.591–605, at p.605.

21. U. Wagschal, ‘Schranken staatlicher Steuerungspolitik: Warum Steuerreformen scheiternkonnen’, in A. Busch und T. Plumper (eds.), Nationaler Staat und internationale Wirtschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp.223–47, at p.237.

22. H.L. Wilensky, ‘Common Problems, Divergent Policies: An 18-Nation Study of FamilyPolicy’, Public Affairs Report , 31 (1990), pp.1–3; and H.L. Wilensky, Rich Democracies:

Political Economy, Public Policy, and Performance (Berkeley, CA: University of CaliforniaPress, 2002).

23. R.J. Estes, The Social Progress of Nations (New York: Praeger, 1994).24. Castles, ‘Decentralization and the Post-War Political Economy’, p.34.25. F.W. Scharpf, Optionen des Fo deralismus in Deutschland und Europa (Frankfurt a. M.:

Campus, 1994).26. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries,

p.324.27. H. Keman, ‘Federalism and Policy Performance: A Conceptual and Empirical Enquiry’, in

U. Wachendorfer-Schmidt (ed.), Federalism and Political Performance (London andNew York: Routledge, 2000), pp.196–227, at p.205.

28. See M. Freitag, Politik und Wa hrung. Ein internationaler Vergleich (Bern, Stuttgart andWien: Haupt, 1999).

29. The Gini Index reflects the degree of over-representation of small territorial units in thesecond chamber (that is, the proportion between the share of seats in the second chamberand the represented population share). It ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating completeinequality and 0 complete equality.

30. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries,p.208.


32. R. Taagepera, ‘Beating the Law of Minority Attrition’, in W. Rule and J. Zimmerman (eds.),Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities(Westport: Greenwood, 1994), pp.236 – 45, at p.244.

33. Based on a cursory comparison of the UK and the USA, Riker, ‘The Justification of Bicamer-alism’, pp.114 ff, appears to be strongly convinced that the existence of a powerful secondchamber will result in a higher quality of democracy and in stronger economic growth.

34. See H.-D. Klingemann and D. Fuchs, Citizens and the State: Beliefs in Government (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1995), p.304.

35. R.A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New York: Garland Publishing, 1991).36. Schmidt, Demokratietheorien; and Schmidt, ‘The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional

Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy’.37. P.A. Hall, Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; P.A. Hall and R.C. Taylor, ‘Political Science andthe Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, 44/5 (1996), pp.936– 57; E.M. Immergut, Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-sity Press, 1992); and K.R. Weaver and B.A. Rockman, Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1993).

38. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries.


40. Castles, ‘Decentralization and the Post-War Political Economy’; Hibbs, ‘Political Parties andMacroeconomic Policy’; Hicks and Swank, ‘Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending inIndustrialized Democracies 1960–82’; and Schmidt, ‘The Impact of Political Parties, Consti-tutional Structures and Veto Players on Public Policy’.

41. A further line of theory that has been mentioned is the hypothesis of power resources of organ-ised interests. A common indicator here is the strength of the trade unions in a country.H thi i di t i t l l t d ith th t th f l ft i ti i




42. This two-step approach corresponds with the one used in international comparative researchon the performance of political institutions. See in detail for example M. Coppedge, ‘DistrictMagnitude, Economic Performance, and Party-System Fragmentation in Five Latin AmericanCountries’, Comparative Political Studies, 30 (1997), pp.156– 85, at p.160; and Lijphart, Pat-terns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 36 Countries.

43. The degree of bicameralism and the index of central bank independence, defined by Freitag,Politik und Wa hrung. Ein internationaler Vergleich, p.108, on the basis of expert opinions forthe period from 1970 to 1990 (with 1 ¼ maximum independence; 3 ¼ minimum indepen-dence), are correlated by -0.53 (N ¼ 18). In a multiple regression analysis to explain differ-ences in inflation between the countries, the index of central bank independence is highlysignificant, whereas the bicameralism indicator loses its significance.

44. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in Parliaments 1945–1995: A World Statistical Survey(Geneva: IPU, 1995), p.48.

45. The bicameralism variable remains highly significant for the explanation of differences inwelfare expenditure even if further common control variables, such as the age structure of a country (measured by the proportion of people aged over 65 in the entire population), areincluded in the model.

46. K. van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State(London: Routledge, 1995). See also Herbert Kitschelt’s, The Transformation of EuropeanSocial Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), new conception of what ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ policies mean in advanced industrialsocieties. According to Kitschelt, liberal and left political visions are oriented towards redres-sing the institutional balance among principles of social order in favour of the realisation of those values that have been ignored in the existing social order, whereas conservative-author-itarian and right visions, in contrast, defend dominant values and organisational correlates of the existing society.

47. Numerous studies indicate that government stability depends much more on institutionalfactors, such as the electoral and party systems (fragmentation and polarisation) and the

type of government coalition. See P. Warwick, Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).48. Schuttemeyer and Sturm, ‘Wozu Zweite Kammern? Zur Reprasentation und Funktionalitat

Zweiter Kammern in westlichen Demokratien’, p.527.49. The effect of bicameralism remains significant even if further variables are controlled for, like

for example the degree of disproportionality of the electoral system and the female share of the economically active population – the two factors that, according to R.E. Matland,‘Women’s Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23/1 (1998), pp.109– 25, are the most important determinantsof women’s representation in national parliaments.

A P P E N D I X

O V E R V I E W O F T H E S T R U C T U R E S O F T H E S E C O N D C H A M B E R S

I N T H E 1 4 B I C A M E R A L O E C D C O U N T R I E S

Country SizeTerm

(years) Congruence Mode of Selection (Method of Election)

Australia 76 6 No Half of the members are elected every 3years; except for 4 senatorsrepresenting the federal territories whoserve only 3-year-terms; each of the 6

states elects 12 senators by proportionalrepresentation.




A P P E N D I X

C O N T I N U E D

Country Size

Term


Austria 64 5-6 Yes The state parliaments send a number of delegates to the upper house based onstate’s population; federal councillorsserve terms corresponding to the termof the state legislature.

Belgium 71 4 No 40 members are popularly elected; 31members are indirectly chosen withinthe Dutch and French-speakingcommunities or are co-opted from theroyal family.

Canada 104 Life No Appointed by governor-general on the

recommendation of the prime minister;senators are expected to retire at 75;equal representation is accorded eachof the country’s main regions.

France 321 9 No One-third indirectly elected every 3 years;senators are chosen by popularlyelected electoral colleges in eachdepartment, the number of seats basedon department population; election bymajority in departments with 4 senatorsor less, by proportional representationin departments with 5 or more senators.

Germany 69 Varies No Appointed by the 16 Lander (state)governments; terms are not fixed, butdepend on the office-holding of thestate governments.

Ireland 60 5 Yes 49 elected indirectly by functional oroccupational groups, 11 appointed bythe prime minister.

Italy 326 5 Yes 315 directly elected; 9 appointed by thePresident of the Republic, 2 ex-officiomembers (former Presidents); majorityvote for 75% of the seats, proportional

representation for 25%.Japan 252 6 Yes Half directly elected every 3 years, 152from the prefectures and 200 from thecountry at large.

Netherlands 75 4 Yes Chosen by members of provincialcouncils.

Spain 257 4 No 208 elected directly from 52 multi-member constituencies in theprovinces, Ceuta, and Melilla; 49indirectly elected by the legislativeassembly of the 7 autonomouscommunities.

(Table continued )




A P P E N D I X

C O N T I N U E D

Country Size

Term


Switzerland 46 4 No Two members directly elected from eachof 20 cantons; 1 member elected fromeach of 6 half cantons.

UnitedKingdom

697 Life No 92 hereditary peers; 579 life peers; 26clergy.

UnitedStates

100 6 No Two senators elected in each of the 50states by direct popular vote; one-thirdelected every two years.

Sources: S.C. Patterson and A. Mughan, ‘Fundamentals of Institutional Design: The Functions andPowers of Parliamentary Second Chambers’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 7/1

(2001), pp.39–60; G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997).




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