This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija

This Project is funded by the European Union

Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium

This project is funded by the European Union

Projekat finansira Evropska Unija


Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum

TOPICS ADDRESSED IN DEVELOPMENT OF EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLANS (EEP) IN GREECE

Antony ThanosPh.D. Chem. [email protected]



• Basic framework on External Emergency Planning Developed in last half of 90s, for 3

major industrial areas of Greece, included :

o Main structure of External Emergency Plan Document

o Emergency Zones definition and extent

• Development of External Emergency Plans During 2004-2005, 100 External

Emergency Plans developed with EU funding, at 24 different prefectures

Development by consortium of private companies in close collaboration with Authorities and Seveso establishments



• Emergency Zones definition and extent Typically, standardized endpoints (usually

up to 3 levels at EU members) defined by Authorities for Emergency Zones, different per accident effects categories:

o thermal radiation

o overpressure

o toxic dispersion Definition of Emergency Zones endpoints

must take into account expected extents : Unrealistic situations with huge

emergency zones must be avoided (unrealistic emergency response)

Most hard case: toxics dispersion



• Emergency Zones definition and extent (cont.) Basic element of EEP as providing the

basis for expected effects and protection actions

ExternalEmergency

Plan

ExternalEmergency

Plan

Emergency ZonesEndpoints

Emergency ZonesEndpoints

Emergency ZonesExtent calculation

(Safety Report)

Emergency ZonesExtent calculation

(Safety Report)



• Emergency Zones definition and extent (cont.) Extent of Emergency Zones to be

calculated in Safety Report Requirement by Authorities for

Presentation of Emergency Zones and Domino effects Zone in maps in Safety Reports



• Emergency Zones example (Greece case)



• Emergency and Domino Zones Maps example in Safety Report



• Sources required for EEP Preparation Safety Reports (establishment and

potentially Safety Reports from neighbouring establishment)

Area informationo maps

o information on special interest/vulnerable places (schools, hospitals, elderly houses, campings, hotels, prisons, sport installations- stadiums etc.)

location (for inclusion in maps), contact personnel, phone

operating time, periodcapacities



• Sources required for EEP Preparation (cont.) Authorities information

o Involved agencies (location, contact points, 24-hour phones)

o Resources available (quantities per type)

Very important topic. Facilities for temporarily shelter of people, in case of evacuation, have to be defined.



• Structure of EEP Document

• Section I - Introduction

• Section II - Establishment Data

• Section III - Accident Mitigation Plan

• Appendixes



• EEP Section I – IntroductionI.1 Distribution Table

I.2 Revisions TableI.3 Classified material statementsI.4 Abbreviations/Definitions



• EEP Section II – Establishment Data (cont.)

ΙΙ.1 Establishment identity (address, contact points/personnel along with 24-hour phones, number of personnel present –daily/ shift personnel-, working hours etc.)

ΙΙ.2 Establishment location and surrounding area (dwellings, industries, transportation routes etc.)

ΙΙ.3 Hazardous substances (substances –identity, quantities - in Upper Tier limits)

ΙΙ.4 Units and storage areasΙΙ.5 Buildings – Aux. areas – other installations ΙΙ.6 Detection and mitigation measures, medical

facilitiesΙΙ.7 Fire-fight water (sources, pumps)ΙΙ.8 Information on Safety Report (revision table)ΙΙ.9 Hazards from Establishment (list of scenarios,

including location, substance involved, effects type)



• EEP Section II – Establishment Data (cont.) High standardized form/template Basic material for completion:

Safety Report Could be asked to be filled by the

Establishment



• EEP Section ΙΙΙ – Accident Mitigation Plan (cont.)III.x Accident category x (x=1, 2,..)III.x.1 Accident DescriptionIII.x.2 Consequences estimationIII.x.3 Early warning for accident to Authorities and Authorities

activation sequenceIII.x.4 Operations Command & Control III.x.5 Public protection actionsIII.x.6 Alert to public / Information to publicIII.x.7 Safety of Emergency RespondersIII.x.8 Public Health and Medical SupportIII.x.9 Technical SupportIII.x.10 Accident LogIII.x.11 Post-accident actionsIII.x.12 Short Action List



• EEP AppendixesA Emergency Agencies (address, phones/FAX

day/24-hour for agencies and phones day/24-hour for agencies heads and adjuncts)

1. Agencies for Emergency Operations (scene/field)Civil Protection Secretariat (central

government)Fire Brigade (region, local level

departments)Police (region, local level departments)Port Police (region, local level departments)Ambulance Services

2. Regional/prefectural/municipal administration departments

3. Medical servicesAdministration at central government, and

regional levelsHospitals/Clinics (state and private).



• EEP Appendixes (cont.)A Emergency Agencies (cont.) 4. Central government ministries and other

support agencies (power, water supply providers, public transportation agencies –buses/trains etc.)

5. Military headquarters in region, military installations in accident area

6. Television stations7. Radio stations



• EEP Appendixes (cont.)B Accident Mitigation Resources per agency at

local/prefecture level Human resources Equipment

o emergency response vehicles (per type especially for fire brigade vehicles)

o scene remote surveillance media (helicopters, airplanes etc.)

o personnel protection mediao accident mitigation mediao transportation media (buses etc.)o support equipment (water supply road

tankers , excavators, trucks) Other support resources (locations for

temporary shelters)



• EEP Appendixes (cont.)C Maps/Drawings Establishment Layout (from Safety Report) Close area Map Wide area Map Accident Scenarios Maps (one per worst case

accident examined)

D Safety Data Sheets for substances under concern



• Safety Reports to be used in EEP Preparation Safety Reports of establishment

related to EEP

o Establishment data

o Accident scenarios Potentially Safety Reports from

neighbouring establishment

o due to Domino effects from establishment to neighbours

o Assessment of potential escalation of initial accident



• Safety Reports to be used in EEP Preparation (cont.) Problems encountered:

Unrealistic differences in results for specific type of accidents (dispersion of SO2 due to fire in fuel installations). Judgement necessary to assess who provides realistic estimation.

Some scenarios were based on outdated IDLH values. New Emergency Zones calculated by primary data of concentration (table/graph) in Safety Reports)



• Important !!! For EEP preparation (and implementation) the accident is considered as happened and can potentially escalate

o Do not mix EEP with requirements to the establishment for additional prevention/mitigation measures.

o Other regulatory procedures deal with this point



• Collection of data on Authorities Big challenge to obtain data from

several Authorities agencies Contradictory information available,

need to check out data Hardest challenge to keep data

updated



• Collection of data for Area (mapping up to where ?) One guidance is provided by Emergency

Zones extent ... but Emergency Zones must have been defined

Emergency Zones are prone to uncertainty of consequence analysis. Additional area must be covered.

Additional area required also for facilitating decisions on:

o traffic control

o access routes

o selection of shelters after evacuation

o etc.



• Collection of data for Area (cont.) Approach adopted for wide area map:

o Mapping up to radius of 150% of higher Emergency Zone (Zone 3)

o Minimum case: 4 km radius around establishment

o Typical scale 1:2.500-1:5.000

Approach adopted for close area map: o Mapping up to radius of 120% of higher

Emergency Zone (Zone 3)

o Minimum case: 2 km radius around establishment

o Typical scale 1:25.000



• Collection of data for Area (cont.) Problems encountered:

No central Authority for mapping data available

Poor area maps available in Safety Reports, as typical maps available to public by State (usually Army Geography Service) were quite outdated

In some maps, areas depicted in black (military installations or critical infrastructure installations such refineries) (the public eye in the sky –Google Earth - was not available at that time)

In some areas close to borders, quite limited maps at all available, due to military restrictions



• Collection of data for Area (cont.) Problems encountered: (cont)

No unified GIS-background information available

No special requirements for indication of vulnerable places in Safety Report maps, neither on mapping extent

No organized collection of vulnerable places data by Authorities, contradictory information available

Gathering of data required also area surveys and data verification



• Collection of data for Area (cont.) Wide/Close area maps build by GIS

application in which all cartographic background information were introduced, along with collaborating database (MS Access) in which information were stored for:

o establishment (location of tanks/units, content, scenarios, emergency zones)

o vulnerable places (location, contact information, capacities, working hours)

o authorities agencies (location, contact information)



• Extract of map developed

Seveso sites

AccidentLocations (tanks etc.)

Vulnerable placesSports facilitiesSchoolsElderly housesPublic serviceOther

AgenciesMinistryPoliceFire BrigadeHealth serviceMunicipality officeArmyOther

Road networkPrimarySecondaryOther


Vulnerable placesSports facilitiesSchoolsElderly housesPublic serviceOther




• Accident Categories Categories selected based on top events

(final accidents) included in Safety Report Generic list of top events expected :

o Pool fire

o Fireball (BLEVE)

o Jet flame (only for pipelines)

o UVCE (vapour cloud explosion)

o Toxic dispersion

No flash fire, as typically ignited before EEP can be activated

No jet flame for vessels/tanks, as considered to lead to fireball



• Accident Categories (cont.) For each category of top event,

different scenarios included for :

o tank farm (both tank and dike fire -if applicable-)

o process units area

o pipelines from/to establishment

o movement facilities (road/rail tankers stations, ports)

usually not for LPG depots, as accidents in road/rail tankers can trigger tank accident (even worse)



• Accident Categories (cont.) For each scenario included, the worst-

case one was examined based on :o consequence (protection zones) extent

and

o proximity to fence (affecting external area affected), especially if vulnerable objects are close and

o worst case atmospheric conditions

For large establishments (petroleum refineries, petrochemicals, chemical complexes), multiple worst-cases examined for different areas of establishments (due to different affected areas)



• Accident Categories (cont.) Multiple worst-case (BLEVE) example,

refinery with LPG/propylene tanks at different areas of refinery



• Accident Categories (cont.) Different worst-case scenarios

examined for different toxics (for example in refineries : SO2 dispersion from tank fire, and H2S dispersion from failures in sulphur recovery units –Claus)

Different worst-case scenarios examined for different storage types of same toxic (for example ammonia), due to inherent difference in dispersion mechanisms :

o refrigerated gas

o semi-refrigerated or pressure liquefied gases toxics



• Accident Description Standardised generic description for

accident in such type of establishment (very useful for general overview of accident characteristics)

o Accident expression (causes, duration, evolution)

o Effects to people/structures (qualitative)

o Domino effects/escalation (qualitative)

o Appropriate mitigation strategy/means/actions



• Consequence estimation Scenario data

o Substance involved

o Equipment involved (dimensions)

o Duration

o Other scenario characteristics such as :BLEVE : fireball radiuspool fire : flame length, angleatmospheric conditions,

o Important assumptions (for example: full tank considered)



• Consequence estimation (cont.) Basis of zones definition, zones extent,

BLEVE exampleZone Ι

Emergency responders

Zone ΙΙPopulation

serious effects

Zone ΙΙΙPopulation

serious effects

Domino effects

1500 TDU 450 TDU 170 TDUFireball radius

3rd degree burns (lethal

effects) to over 50%

of exposed people

3rd degree burns to 1% of exposed

people

1st degree burns to

significant part of

exposed people

Significant damage to buildings, structures

1110 m 1750 m 2470 m 311 m



• Affected area identification Standardized table for each Protection

Zone including:o Area description

o Transportation routes

o Industries

o Vulnerable places

o Affected authorities places

o Contact information, capacity, operating hours included

For Domino Zone, comment of equipment, industries included



• Affected area identification (cont.) Example for LPG depot XYZ

Zone PROTECTION ZONES IDENTIFICATION

II Type Description

Area Aspropyrgos, main section of Evangelistria settlement

Transportation routes

Athens-Korinth National Road from Salvation church till 500 m before Koumoundourou lake RailroadNew pier of ABC refinery

Name Address Tel/FAX Capacity

Operating hours

Industries Refinery ABC (administration building, west tank farm),

16th km National Road Athens-Korinth, 19300, Aspropyrgos

21056789123, FAX: 21057924680

950

400

5-days (07:00-16:00)

Other

….




Zone PROTECTION ZONES IDENTIFICATION

II Type Description

Name Address Tel/FAX Capacity

Operating hours

Vulnerable places

Navy Academy 17th km National Road Athens-Korinth, 19300, Aspropyrgos

2105671234567 FAX: 21057924680

1700 07:00-15:00Other hours very limited people

2nd High school

Pericles and Aristeidis str. 19300, Aspropyrgos

2105679876543 FAX: 2105671253642

174 Morning




ZONE DOMINO ZONE IDENTIFICATION

DOMINO The whole of XYZ establishment

Refinery ABC : tanks P-8810 P-8811, P-8812, P-8813, P-8814, P-8819

Greek Steel Factory



• Accident Map Build by the former GIS application,

along with the collaborating database (MS Access)

Both protection and Domino Zones presented

Pre-defined ready layouts for the worst case scenarios examined in EEP

Every accident scenario included in Safety Report can be presented in GIS application



• Early warning of accident Crucial point, as initiating event for

triggering activation of External Emergency Plan

One-call approach adopted : call to Fire Brigade emergency service number

Exception: only one prefecture where authorities insisted on multiple calls (to Fire Brigade, Police and Ambulance emergency numbers)

Please take into account that the caller has the fire running after him, no time for multiple calls

Standardised template for early warning message to be provided



• Early warning message template1 Establishment name

2 Caller data (name, position)

3 Time of accident initiation

4 Type of event (fire, explosion, leak, combination)

5 Event location (process, tank, warehouse)

6 Event severity (A-simple, B-significant, C-very serious)

7 Involved substances

8 Substances quantity (if known or estimation)



• Early warning message template accident (cont.)9 Effects in establishment

(casualties, secondary events)

10 Effects outside establishment (known or expected)

11 Actions for event control (applied)

12 Establishment needs (e.g. materials, media etc.)

13 Phone number or verification call code



• Authorities activation sequence First step, verification of call with call-

back and/or checking of caller data in EEP

Description of sequence of calls (who calls who) for activation of all involved agencies in order to :

o activate all involved agencies

o start of operation of administrative instruments (prefectural coordination committee)

o multiple level sequences, initially spread through different services, then top to down

o sequence of calls presented in tables



• Authorities activation sequence (cont.) 1st level

Caller Receiving agencies (phones in Appendix A)

Fire Brigade emergency service

office

Local Fire Brigade station

Police emergency service

Medical emergency service (ambulance service)

•Prefecture Civil Protection Head



• Authorities activation sequence (cont.) 2nd level


Prefecture Civil Protection Head

PrefectCentral Government Civil Protection Secretariat

Fire Brigade emergency service office

Additional Fire Brigade station for backup

Police emergency service

Police stations in areaPoad traffic control stations in area

Medical emergency service (ambulance service)

Ambulances in shiftHospitals in area



• Authorities activation sequence (cont.) 3nd level


Prefecture CivilProtection Head

Members of Prefecture Coordination Committee :Prefecture Technical Services headPrefecture Public Health head….Police head in areaFire Brigade head in area….Region Civil Protection head….Army Commander in area….



• Command and Control Typically, hierarchy structure and

mission defined by legislation Major gap encountered: No scene

(operations) commander (commander of all emergency responders in accident area) foreseen in legislation.

Considered as absolutely necessary for coordination of actions in accident area between emergency responder teams (fire brigade, police, medical services etc.)



• Command and Control Proposal for scene commander: Top

officer of Fire Brigade on scene. Why Fire Brigade ??? Most probably

the most knowledgeable from emergency responders on hazards from accident and potential escalation risks

Operations Command and Control centres Central government (Civil Protection

Secretariat premises) Regional (prefectural level where

Prefectural Coordination Committee operates, prefecture premises)



• Command and Control (cont.) Important issue to be considered : Local

Operations Command and Control centre

o Rather close to accident area, but in safe distance

o To be used by :Scene CommanderEmergency Response Team headsRepresentative of establishmentRepresentative of Prefect and Representatives of Municipalities



• Command and Control (cont.) Communication networks for :

o between scene responder groups

o from scene responder group to headquarters,

o from scene area to Command and Control Centres

Different radio communication frequencies for each emergency responder group on scene

Common frequency in to be used only upon agreement



• Public warning and information to the Public Predefined standard messages templates

for :

o simple warning (no protection measures required) scene responder groups

o shelter in place instructions

o preparation of evacuation

o public evacuation order

o schools evacuation order

o medical services evacuation order

o other vulnerable places evacuation order

o end of accident message



• Public warning and information to the Public (cont.) Example for shelter in place messageFrom :

•Date/time of send : __________________________________________________•Contact phone : _______________________________________________________

•The Agency _____________has declared the area close to industry __________in state of emergency.•A ______________ has happened in the industry _____________ . In order to avoid exposure to danger, we ask you to keep indoors and to close doors, windows, air condition equipment and fans ___________________________________________________________________________•This is addressed to all within a zone of radius of _____ m around industry _____________________, i.e. till _________________________________•Please remain indoors till further instructions are provided.

•Emergency responders have already been to the event location. Till now, no evacuation is required. Keep informed in radio station ________________ and in TV station ____________ for further instructions.

•The Agency _______________ keeps monitoring and evaluating the situation. For any news, we will inform you promptly..

• The Author



• Public warning and information to the Public (cont.) Additional instructions that could be

provided for shelter in place :o Close all external and as many as possible internal doors

o Close and lock windows

o In case of fire or explosion, close windows and shutters, stay away from window in order to avoid injuries from glass fragments

o Close all air conditioners (including air nitakes –if applicable), ventilation port (as in bathrooms), fans, cook hood extractors and any heating system

o Seal as mush as possible any gas or holes with for wrapping materials (plastic, aluminum foil), waxed paper, adhesive tape

o Close fireplace dampers



• Public warning and information to the Public (cont.) Additional instructions that could be

provided for shelter in place : (cont.)o Not to use elevator (action of sucking air from building

external)

o Perhaps better relocation to upper or lower floors (depending on case)

o In case of dispersion water soluble substances, use of wet rug for even better protection (scrubbing inhaled air)



• Public warning and information to the Public (cont.) Warning and information media :

o Mass Media (TV, radio-essential when electric power supply is stopped in area) for general public

o Telephone calls to vulnerable places within protection zones (by Prefecture or preferably by Police emergency service especially at early stage of accident). Regular update of information to vulnerable place must be foreseen.

o Loudspeakers on vehicles if possible, and only as initial warning in area close to accident.

o Door to door only for very close area and taking into account emergency responders protection equipment (i.e. no heat resistant uniform for police personnel).



• Emergency Responders Safety Approach to establishment

o At least 2 access routes proposed

o Guidelines for approach included (for example, approach downwind/crosswind for toxics or for not-ignited LPG)

Emergency responders safety equipment

o Based on type of accident (thermal radiation, toxic) and typology of personnel safety equipment of Fire Brigade



• Emergency Responders Safety (cont.) o Zone I : excludes all responders

without protection equipment, as immediate death is expected. Typically affects police and medical service personnel

o Zone II-III : for toxic dispersion, emergency responders should not enter without protective equipment or they should remain for limited time, as zones definition is set for exposure time of 30 min. Traffic control should be set outside Zone III



• Short Action List Table with summary of actions and

responsible agenciesNr

Action Responsible

1 Early warning by establishment to Fire Brigade emergency service

Establishment

2 Authorities Alert 1st levelVerification of establishment alert

Fire Brigade emergency service

3 Identification/verification of situation at site incident at Decision of initial protection actions and information to the public in close area

Scene commander

… …. …

25

Population return and transportation routes reopening

Prefecture

26

Final accident report Prefecture Civil Protection office



• Highly important issues• Keep updated all data (maps,

installation, area, authorities)

o Procedure must be established so that periodic review of EEP is carried out

o Land use Planning and building permits must be connected with EEP, among others for update of EEP

This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija

Documents