Summary Report CT MORSE representation at the United Nations ...

Summary Report

CT MORSE representation at the United Nations General Assembly 22 September to 1 October 2015

Policy implications for the EU

[IFS/2014/349-612]

Report prepared by Anton du Plessis1 ISS Managing Director [email protected]                                                                                        1 With input from CT Morse partners Mark Singleton (ICCT) and Alistair Millar (GCCS)

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Table  of  contents  

1 Introduction to CT MORSE and background to UNGA assignment 2 1.1 Overview of CT MORSE 2

1.2 CVE, counter-terrorism and the broader development context 2

1.3 Background to UNGA representation and reporting assignment 3

2 General observations from the UNGA and relevant side events relating to CT and CVE 4 2.1 Summary of observations and recommendations to EU and CT MORSE 4 3 Overview of selected meetings/events attended by EU CT MORSE 9 3.1 Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Network events 9

3.2 GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25

September 12

3.3 GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September 13

3.4 GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September 15

3.5 Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 28 September 17

3.6 International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) and Hedayah meeting: Building more

effective responses to the FTF threat – addressing prevention, prosecution and reintegration

challenges 18

3.7 GCERF side event on exploring the relationship between violent extremism and the private

sector, 29 September 20

3.8 US leaders summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism, 29 September 22

3.9 Strong cities network official launch, 29 September 25

3.10 EU/International Crisis Group meeting on Balancing Security and Development: Preventing

Violent Extremism and the SDGs, 29 September 26

3.11 High-level event on integrating a gender dimension in preventing and countering violent

extremism policy and practice, 30 September 29

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Introduction to CT MORSE and background to UNGA assignment 1.1 Overview of CT MORSE In January 2015, the European Union (EU) established a project on Counter-terrorism Monitoring, Report and Support Mechanism (CT MORSE) in recognition of the growing importance placed on the EU’s engagement on countering terrorism. The specific objective of CT MORSE is to strengthen the global delivery, coordination and coherence among the various counter-terrorism (CT) projects financed by the EU, as well as to reinforce the EU engagement within the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) framework. In achieving its objective, CT MORSE has five key result areas: 1.   Monitoring 2.   Coherence and coordination: both within the programme itself and with respect to any other

relevant initiative. 3.   Recommendations to the EU: Opinions and recommendations are provided to the EU on

needed and advisable adjustments to on-going projects and appropriate actions 4.   Expert analysis and awareness raising: Expert analytical advice is provided to the EU on reports

delivered under the different components of the CT Programme 5.   Visibility, liaison and information sharing: The visibility of the EU and of the CT Programme is

increased within the EU, Member States, beneficiary countries, partner countries and organisations

1.2 CVE, counter-terrorism and the broader development context

Terrorism  and  violent  extremism  pose  a  multifaceted  threat  that  impacts  on  security,  development,  the  values  of  democratic  societies  and  to  the  rights  and  freedoms  of  citizens.  Fighting  terrorism  is  among  the  priorities  identified  in  the  European  Security  Strategy  and  the  EU  Council  Conclusions  on  Security  and  Development.    

The EU is taking an array of actions as part of a comprehensive approach to address the threat of

terrorism and violent extremism, and to keep its citizens safe. The Commission has mobilised

hundreds of millions of Euros in humanitarian and other economic assistance to respond to the

threat and has developed a number of leading initiatives to improve coordination and impact. Key

among these is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) brings key experts together and works

to ensure that research and analysis on this continually adapting threat is up-to-date. The Council

of the European Union has outlined a series of steps to ensure the security of citizens by taking

action against terrorism, in full compliance with human rights and the rule of law. And as the EU’s

diplomatic service, the European External Action Service is engaging with third countries an

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international organisations, not least the UN, to offer support and strengthen collective efforts to

prevent and counter violent extremism and stem the tide of foreign terrorist fighters, including

supporting adoption and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2178.

The long-term EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) CT programmes aim to fully contribute to the implementation of the EU development and security strategies, while complementing related measures supported under EU geographic instruments, short term Instrument for Stability crisis response actions, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CDSP) activities, and EU Member States’ assistance. Moreover, international CT cooperation in particular in the framework of the UN and of the GCTF will also be fostered.

1.3 Background to UNGA representation and reporting assignment

The EU commissioned a non-key expert to represent CT MORSE at the 70th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in order to follow developments at key events and deliver a policy-orientated report that examines the conclusions of the UNGA and related events for EU policy, programmes and response, for the benefit of EU stakeholders and delegations. This task was carried out by Anton du Plessis from ISS in close collaboration with the other members of the CT MORSE consortium, International Center on Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) and the Global Center on Cooperative Security (GCCS) represented by Mark Singleton and Alistair Millar respectively. Summaries and key conclusions from these meetings and side events are provided below. Agendas and concept notes for the various meetings are annexed to the report.

Despite the main focus of the UNGA being on the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 20302, the topics of counter-terrorism (CT) and countering violent extremism (CVE) were high priorities for the UN and its member states. This recognises the extent to which the rise of terrorism and violent extremism can serve as spoilers to broader development objectives. There were a number of events both within the main deliberations of the UNGA, and in affiliated side-events, with an impact on international policy regarding CT and CVE; that will strengthen the evidence-basis on which this policy is based, or will contribute to the identification, dissemination or replication of lessons learned and best practices in efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

Many of these UNGA and GCTF related events and their conclusions have implications for EU policy, programmes and responses. Moreover in the margins of the UNGA, the EU hosted and co-hosted two events. The first focused on the nexus between CVE and development, in relation to the SDGs. The second was a high-level session on ‘Integrating a gender dimension in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policy and practice.

                                                                                       2  UN,  “Transforming  our  world:  the  2030  Agenda  for  Sustainable  Development,”  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld    

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General observations from the UNGA and relevant side events relating to CT and CVE Overview of UNGA: The 70th UNGA was a remarkable gathering of global leaders and representatives from numerous constituencies, including civil society, academia, business and religious leaders. The breadth of representation is testament to the progress made at the global level towards more inclusive policy making and the recognition that addressing today’s challenges requires a whole of community and collaborative response. The adoption of the SDGs and Agenda 2030 represents a consultative and collaborative process that is unprecedented in the history of the UN.

Due to recent developments (fuelled by the growing threat of ISIL), CT and CVE were priority topics during the UNGA and the multiple side events. This profile was further elevated by the US-lead CVE summit held at the UN on 29 September that was hosted by President Obama and attended by hundreds of world leaders and representatives from governments and civil society. These topics are moving up the priority list of the UN, with the upcoming UNSG comprehensive strategy on Preventing Violence Extremism being mentioned several times.

The adoption of the SDGs and the 2030 Action Plan provided a good platform and context to discuss the intersections between global challenges, including terrorism, violent extremism, and conflict from a broader development perspective. Gender, youth, the nexus between development and security, results/concrete impact, and M&E, were key priority areas in discussions on the SDGs. Civil society had a higher than usual profile at this UNGA.

Despite the distractions caused by various parallel high-level meetings, gatherings and events, and the US/Russia bilateral engagement on how to respond to the Syrian crisis, there was a spirit of cohesion and collective action rarely seen at the UN. The Syrian crisis dominated discussions, with a particular focus on Russia’s interventions and its growing counter-terrorism engagement, mostly against ISIL.

2.1 Summary of observations and recommendations to EU and CT MORSE General observations on CVE •   CVE is based on the notion that interventions located broadly in the development domain can

result in security improvement outcomes. Other fields that are based on this view (e.g. violence prevention, aspects of peace building) have found that for interventions to be successful, long-term investment is needed in well-designed social programmes (usually between 5 and 15 years), and that significant and ongoing investment in programme implementation is required. CVE programming is therefore not a quick fix, and donors need to

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have the funds and sustained engagement to invest in multi-year programmes, and their ongoing evaluation.

•   CVE is an emerging field, with a limited body of reliable, methodologically sound and transferable evidence. Building this body of evidence requires donors to collaborate in long-term investments. Two broad fields of inquiry are needed at this stage: (1) understanding the local drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism, and (2) implementing programmes to test theories about CVE, and the evaluation of these programmes. Item (1) needs to prioritise empirical studies that gather primary data from direct sources, rather than desk-based studies. Item (2) requires multi-year programme funding, with strong monitoring and evaluation built in from the beginning. As more of this evaluation data mounts, programme data emerges, investments should be made in meta-analytical studies that examine the results of similar programmes together, and draw lessons on what approaches show good results, or promise positive outcomes. While the application of these will necessarily have to be context specific, evaluation and identification of proven approaches would add value.

•   CVE work should not be focused on reinventing valuable work undertaken already. For example, the violence prevention field has not only developed programme and evaluation tools (e.g. how to design evaluations, how to assess the reliability and validity of evaluations) but also amassed an enormous body of evidence on what interventions work for specific target groups and specific contexts. Donors should actively engage specialists from this field in CVE work, and ensure that their work is not replicated.

General observations on the UN •   The UN is not as coherent and coordinated as it needs to be considering the priority and

importance of the CT and CVE debates. Various UN entities are driving their own agendas, funding approaches and implementation, often pulling in opposite directions at cross-purposes. The primary reason could be the overt power struggle among CT-mandated bureaus and their governing entities. In addition, there is a structural lack of clarity & purpose and coordination. The discussions and interventions in New York at times seemed removed from reality. Personality clashes between senior leadership also complicates matters and hinders collaboration.

•   Many in the UN system are hoping that the SG will develop a clear Action Plan on PVE (the P for prevention replacing C for Countering Violent Extremism), but what matters most will be the follow up on the ground. Engaging and empowering UN Regional Coordinators and country teams will be necessary, and so far, there appears to be little evidence of a willingness to do so.

•   New ideas and practical/concrete suggestions are still in short supply in many discussions at the UN and related meetings during the UNGA. Many meetings rehashed discussions that

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have been circulating for the past 10 years. Member states, CSOs and academic experts should be challenged to bring fresh thinking and practical suggestions to the table. Almost all meetings start with a commitment to ‘move from words to action’, but then the circular discussions continue unabated with the usual faces and rhetoric.

•   UN entities working on CT/CVE (especially CTED and CTITF) should focus on their core mandates and should be placed under pressure by Member States and the Security Council to deliver effectively on these. There is currently too much overlap, too much institutional infighting, and too little coherence and coordination.

General observations on CT and CVE side events during UNGA •   CT and CVE were priority topics. Many countries are developing new strategies to support

global efforts and respond to national and regional priorities. The EU is a leader in this regard with its Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project. The EU is thus well placed to inform global policy development. But considering the breadth of the growing CVE architecture, there is also a growing need to ensure coherence and complementarity between EU, UN and other efforts and initiatives. UN officials do not know enough about EU CVE efforts, so additional outreach and briefing may be required.

•   The CVE leaders’ summit (rebranded into “countering ISIL and violent extremism”) and GCTF ministerial did not attract the kind of profile or achieve the impact many hoped for. There seems to be some confusion on the side of the US administration and others on the question of how to move forward with the objectives set out of the initial White House Summit in February this year. It is unclear what follow-up will be given to the September summit proceedings and action plan. This said the official White House report from the summit (see summary below) provides an overview of global CVE initiatives, albeit without any clear guidance on how to enhance cohesion and collaboration.

•   CVE has a newfound priority status within most parts of the UN and donor agencies, with multiple agencies and individuals trying to claim a slice of the potentially lucrative funding pie. Everyone wants a place at the CVE table, including traditional development and peace building actors who until now have shied away from CT and CVE discussions and projects for well-known reasons. As a result it is a crowded space, with different political and operational agendas driving the debate, often in different directions. Donors and member states (including the EU) should demand greater collaboration and coherence, especially from UN CT/CVE actors. To achieve this, donors will need to improve their own coordination and communication. In light of the above and lessons learned from the post 9-11 ‘War of Terror’ era, CVE (and CT) label should be used with caution, and for the right strategic objectives. Member states, donors and the UN should resist the temptation of slapping it onto development and conflict

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prevention initiatives without careful consideration. We should not allow CVE and CT to ‘capture’ the development and related work of the UN and other actors, especially not if the end objective is (state) security. Human security is an important component of sustainable development, and development priorities should be inclusive, and citizen centric.

•   Many CT/CVE actors in New York lack proper field experience in understanding the drivers of conflict and violent extremism. As collaboration between development/conflict prevention and CT actors improves, we should look to development experts with proper field experience to drive policy responses to CVE based on what works best from a sustainable development perspective.

•   On the positive side, despite all its conceptual shortcomings and intellectual confusion, the embracing of CVE/PVE as a longer-term strategy at the political level marks an important step forward in the prevention arena. This offers promising opportunities for:

i.   Resource mobilisation for research, policy development and programming ii.   Collaboration with the wider diplomatic and development communities, in particular the

Fragility & Conflict, Stabilisation, Peacebuilding, Governance and Rule of Law constituencies, who have, over the past decades, built up an impressive evidence base at the policy, strategy and implementation level, including tools and instruments for analysis, planning, monitoring and evaluation;

iii.   Influencing of the “hard CT” communities.

•   The SDGs as well as the discussions within the DAC offer very interesting ‘hooks’ for broader discussion on how to practically improve the human security dimension of the debate, what not to do, and how to do it (starting from the premise that context is everything).

•   Two downsides of political momentum are harming CVE: first, politicians are often not the most credible messengers; and second, political momentum usually calls for quick fixes to complicated problems, ignoring context and one’s own role & impact.

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Key recommendations to the EU and CT Morse

1.   The EU’s CT and CVE programmes have a fairly solid foundation in terms of EU policy and practice. But there are still some shortcomings in terms of coordination, coherence, impact and evaluation. It should also have higher visibility and impact with the UN and key actors in New York. The EU seems to be punching under its weight on CT and CVE at this point. There are various ways in which this can be done, partly through CT MORSE, and the IcSP more broadly. Section 4 provides some specific recommendations on EU engagement.

2.   Whether it is through CT MORSE or the IcSP itself, the EU needs to engage in a more strategic dialogue at the national and regional level with various stakeholders, based on a profound understanding of the actors and factors, causes, trends, needs and gaps. That is where planning and eventually, impact measurement, starts. As a result of this context analysis, the IcSP resources must be allocated strategically, either as innovative seed money (CVE specific), or as complementary to other (related) interventions (CVE relevant). Rather than trying to be present in all continents, IcSP staff should ask themselves where their contributions stand the best chance of generating the most success. Coordination with EEAS, other DGs, the CT Coordinator’s office and the EU delegations on the ground should improve. Cooperation is best guaranteed if a shared objective/interest can be found, and this is often easier to achieve at the national level. EU staff could benefit from interactive training and technical assistance on CVE: concepts, methodology, correlations and differences vis-a-vis the conflict, stability, governance and peacebuilding sectors.

3.   The EU needs to demonstrate that it is a CVE/CT key player, not just a payer. EU should engage more in GCTF – politically and technically, and demand (directly and through MS) improvement in UN engagement, coherence, coordination and impact.

4.   The EU needs to engage more with civil society actors, not just governments, from the outset and help strengthen national dialogue processes and buy-in.

5.   Through CT Morse and via EEAS and the EU CTC, the EU can highlight the EU’s experience and comparative advantage at the nexus of development and security, with its vast field presence around the world and its capacity to train field personnel in EU Delegations about how current and future programming can be tailored to be more CVE-relevant and in some cases CVE specific, by working at the local levels to build community resilience to violent extremism.

6.   The EU’s work to support youth and women in fragile country contexts can also be highlighted more at the UN, within the GCTF and other international fora where awareness of the importance of CVE is increasing, but to date, examples of concrete projects and best practices are still undeveloped or disseminated.

7.   EU CT Morse can play a key role in driving priorities that move CT/CVE from theory and political commitments to practice. It can draw on concrete success stories from broader EU/CT

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initiatives, and recommendations from strategic networks like RAN and research on key challenges.

3 Overview of selected meetings/events attended by EU CT MORSE During the course of the UNGA, there were several side-events relevant to the work of CT MORSE. These side-events, including those hosted by the EU, focused on various aspects of countering terrorism, effectively responding to the threat posed by violent extremism and development of strategies geared to address conditions conducive to both.

On behalf of CT MORSE, the non-key expert from ISS, together with ICCT and GCCS partners attended the following events:

•   The RESOLVE Network launch and research conference, 22 September; •   Meeting of the RESOLVE Steering Committee, 23 September; •   GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25

September; •   GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September; •   GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September; •   The global youth summit against violent extremism, 28 September; •   GCERF side event on exploring the relationship between violent extremism and the private

sector, 29 September; •   The US-lead Leader’ Summit on Countering Violent Extremists and ISIL, 29 September; •   Strong cities network official launch, 29 September; •   EU/International Crisis Group (ICG) meeting on Balancing Security and Development:

Preventing Violent Extremism and the SDGs, 29 September; •   EU meeting on Integrating a Gender Dimension in Preventing and Countering Violent

Extremism Policy and Practice, 30 September. 3.1 Researching Solutions to Violent Extremism (RESOLVE) Networks events The ISS was requested by US Institute for Peace (USIP) to participate on the Steering Committee of a proposed new RESOLVE network. The ISS was particularly recommended for this role due to its track record of research and analysis in Africa. Prior to the UNGA side events, the ISS had participated in several telephone conferences to discuss the proposed network’s activities and focus. In addition to the steering committee meeting, the ISS participated in a workshop on RESOLVE and met individually with key stakeholders.

The concept for RESOLVE developed from the 2015 White House Summit on CVE, which identified the promotion of local research and information sharing as key objectives. At this stage, this

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network remains a concept that is not fully developed (in terms of scope and activities), but it was formally launched on 22 September.  

Early versions of the concept note state the overarching goal of the network as, ‘to improve policy and practice by increasing our ability to generate knowledge regarding what CVE strategies work in specific contexts and why’. Ideas for what the network could do include: •   Identifying local researchers doing work at the sub-national or community level to bring into

the network. •   Providing capacity building and resources to those researchers. This will be supported by a

group of experienced researchers who will serve as mentors/advisors to the local researchers. •   Gathering, synthesizing, and presenting the work of the local researchers in ways that make the

results accessible and actionable to national and international policymakers and practitioners. The US Department of State is the central donor, and USIP is the implementing agency. The US has provided a 1-year grant to USIP to establish a clear mandate for the network. Importantly, this funding also includes some funds for grants to local researchers. 3.1.1 The RESOLVE Network launch and research conference, Expanding the CVE Knowledge Base, 22 September

•   The event brought together around 60 researchers from around the world, many of which who

are involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of CVE programming; or directly undertaking CVE-related research (e.g. on the drivers of radicalisation)

•   The network was launched officially by Sarah Sewall – Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, US Department of State, and also attended by USAID.

•   The discussions included setting out the key motivations for the network, and exploring the views of participants on how the network should operate. Questions explored during discussions included: what issues should be prioritized for research; who should be included in the network; how to strengthen local research capacity and how the new network relates to other, existing initiatives (e.g. Hedayah), and how to mobilise resources

•   Short presentations were provided by some of the participating researchers, which profiled innovative research from countries including Afghanistan, Indonesia and Singapore, as well as multi-country studies.

•   There seemed to be a limited understanding in the discussions that much of the work contemplated (e.g. M&E strategies for CVE programming) has already been developed in related fields (e.g. violence prevention) and that these lessons and materials would be easily transferable to the CVE domain. These issues were noted by the ISS.

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•   A report on the event will be provided by USIP.

3.1.2 Meeting of the RESOLVE Steering Committee, 23 September •   The committee is chaired by USIP and its current membership includes the ISS, the Hedayah

Centre, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, United Nations University, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore), as well as other individual researchers. Jon Gandomi of the US Department of State also attended the meeting.

•   The membership, Terms of Reference and governance relating to the Committee were discussed briefly, but remain in development.

•   The discussions again involved considering the purpose and key functions of the network, and while further ideas emerged following the conference

•   A key issue discussed was the potential role of the network as a funding mechanism for local researchers. The ISS noted the existence of other funding mechanisms for localized CVE work, especially GCERF, and noted that care should be taken not to replicate these functions, especially due to the infrastructure that would need to be established to serve this function.

Key observations and recommendations: •   In general, the RESOLVE network could have an important role to play – especially in building

an international body of knowledge on CVE. However, its focus needs to be clear, and it should not duplicate the efforts of other CVE-focused entities, including GCERF and Hedayah. However, more work needs to be undertaken to ensure that the network does not duplicate work that have also been produced in other fields, particularly on technical research methodologies, M&E and approaches for the production of synthesised, meta-analytical studies. Extensive and high quality documentation is available and easily transferable from very credible institutions such as the World Health Organisation, the US Centres for Disease Control, etc.

•   The Network needs to develop clear strategies relating to both the production of good research, as well as its targeted dissemination to relevant audiences (including those at the policy-making level, and at the community level).

•   The activities of the network could involve a series of events to share current research findings on specific themes. Communication will be key, as well as transparency of funding opportunities, how to become a partner, etc.

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•   The Network certainly benefit from the upcoming CT Morse review of global CVE initiatives.

3.2 GCERF Roundtable on CVE: Exploring the Development and Security Nexus, 25 September

This was a short morning discussion session that sought to raise debate on the security/development nexus, particularly in the context of CVE programming. Short presentations were made, followed by a brief discussion session. The presenters at the event were Khalid Koser, GCERF; Amb Armitage (Head of CT for Australia – also on GCERF Board); Amb. Haque, Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary; and Eric Solheim, Chair of DAC. The following key issues emerged from the presentations and during the course of the discussions: •   CVE needs to be understood and defined more specifically – to better understand the

outcomes required from development and security actors. Particularly, the CVE field needs to learn from efforts made in other domains on addressing violence – fields such as violence prevention and peacebuilding have already produced valuable strategies and approaches. In this regard, a far more nuanced understanding is needed on the dynamics of local communities and individuals. The contemporary world has created young people that are interconnected globally, and that have great ambitions. Some of the greatest frustrations emerge from the lack of opportunities to achieve ambitions, including opportunities for education, training and employment.

•   Engagement at the political/diplomatic level is critical especially where local grievances become apparent – early resolutions to local conflict should be a central focus.

•   CVE falls directly into the security and development nexus, and understanding how these issues inter-relate should be a key focus, especially if local-level programming is to be effective. That said, there has already been a great deal of debate on this issue, particularly with concerns being raised by development actors about the “securitisation of development”. Generally, there seem to be varying degrees of cooperation and mistrust as development and security actors engage with each other in different local environments.

•   The impact of violent extremism takes place mostly outside of OECD countries. The needs in the most affected countries are for economic growth, stability, and fairness (particularly given the many grievances, real or perceived), that may drive violent extremism

An important strategy is to counter the extremist narratives at the local level. There is an absence of counter-narratives at the community level and this needs to be emphasized. Thus community

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engagement should be at the heart of CVE, with a particular emphasis on addressing issues related to gender equality as this could have a “dampening” effect on reducing violent extremism. •   There should always be efforts towards diplomatic solutions – even where it seems that such

approaches may be impossible (provided example of experiences of Tamil Tigers). There needs to be more openness to these kinds of discussions

•   Emphasis on the need to resist the tendency towards identity politics relating to language, religion, sects and focus on countering these types of narratives.

•   Last and certainly not least is the need to address the sources of funding and focus on the countries that fund terrorism.

3.3 GCTF coordinating committee meeting, 26 September US CT Ambassador Tina Kaidanow and Turkish CT Ambassador Tunc Ugdul chaired the GCTF Coordinating Committee meeting. Both co-chairs provided an overview of today’s FTF threat and announced two new GCTF-initiatives. The three GCTF-inspired Centres Hedayah, IIJ and GCERF updated the meeting on progress and future plans, and ICCT on the transfer of the Admin Unit to ICCT. The US co-chairmanship was handed over to The Netherlands at the end of the meeting. Ambassador Kaidanow underscored the US’s commitment to the GCTF both now and in the future. 3.3.1 New GCTF initiatives

The first initiative is the US and Turkey-led “Cross-Working Group Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalisation to Violence.” US co-chair Kaidanow emphasised the need to create greater synergy between existing working groups. The aim is to take existing work and use that further to bring forward the agenda and bring GCTF’s work into sharper focus. The initiative is meant to cover a broad range of themes, irrespective of religion and geography. Most of the discussion evolved around defining the target group(s), i.e. FTFs only or also others, e.g. home-grown terrorists, radicalised people and/or extremists; the importance attached to de-radicalisation; the need for concrete tools, instruments; and the emphasis on results. The coordinating committee adopted the initiative without any amendments. A second initiative, the “International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity-Building Clearinghouse Mechanism” (ICCM) was also discussed and endorsed. The aim of the ICCM is to catalogue international efforts, including those outside the realm of the GCTF, identify gaps in assistance / interventions on the civilian side, and work closely together with the governments of the 3 pilot countries to assist them to coordinate programming. Should other country or institution want to, they could use this information. Following an initial pilot phase, if proven successful, GCTF could expand to other countries.

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The GCTF also endorsed two documents on “Good Practices on Women and CVE” and the “Addendum to toe Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists.” 3.3.2 Cross-cutting themes and updates of the working groups

Besides updates from each working groups on their work plans and activities, presentations were given by the UN on the Border Security initiative: a joint GCTF–UNCCT–Moroccan government initiative. Switzerland informed members about a conference held in conjunction with UNICRI on “Juvenile Justice in a CT Context”. Main takeaways from the various working groups were: •   CVE: UK co-chair informed that the WG is developing an action plan on implementation of Abu

Dhabi memorandum, stressing the importance of developing an evidence base and M&E framework; dialogue with Private Sector; the importance of youth and women; tackling the radicalisation lifecycle including de-radicalisation. CVE would be a particularly important area of interest for the ICCM.

•   Criminal Justice Sector and the Rule of Law: The US co-chair informed the meeting that the focus of the WG would lie on juvenile justice and implementation of selected Good Practices 1, 2, 8 & 9, in particular Goof Practices 2 & 9 as they relate closely to UNSCR 2178 and Coalition against ISIL. The WG will draw on work carried out by CTED. In the context of the New Initiative, the WG would aim to develop tools to address recruiters. Furthermore, recommendations would be drafted on preventive and rehabilitative measures that can be made in the context of a CJ system response. The WG will work closely with the working group on Detention to develop tools for Rehabilitation and reintegration.

•   Detention and Reintegration: The WG announced two events: (a) a workshop on life skills and cognitive skills, in Nairobi on 7-8 October; and (b) WG meeting in Sydney on 2-3 November on the management of reintegration of prisoners. The WG will also develop a training package to assist prison officials in the identification of risks in management of inmates: identification of radicalisation and response mechanisms.

•   FTF. The co-chairs reiterated the 3 priority themes (Strategic communications; Border Control; CJ and Rehab) and 2 cross-cutting themes: trends and dynamics and outreach and engagement. The aim of the WG will be to developed standards and highlight trends and dynamics as the basis for responses.

•   Horn of Africa: Both co-chairs EU and Turkey declared commitment to continue their co-chair

role The EU representative reported about the 4th plenary that had taken place in Kampala 19/20 March, and on an event in June marking the creation of a research centre in Djibouti.

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Reference was given to Juncker’s announcement of an EU Emergency Trust Fund (€1.8 billion) for West and the Horn of Africa, with a view to address root causes conducive to radicalisation, violent extremism as well as migration and exile. Focus will lie on strengthening law enforcement capacity.

•   Sahel: Next plenary meeting will be held in May 2016. An inter-sessional workshop will be held in January/February, details TBD.

3.4 GCTF Ministerial Meeting, 27 September

Outgoing co-chair, US Secretary of State John Kerry opened the meeting, taking stock of the unprecedented threat levels posed by ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Taliban, Lashkar-al-Taiba, and others. He called on the international community to step up to the plate and address these threats better and more broadly, including by countering violent extremism. He reiterated the obligations under UNSCR 2178 to curb FTF, and introduced the initiative on the lifecycle of radicalisation. Incoming Dutch co-chair Foreign Minister Koenders laid out his plans for the coming two-year period, emphasizing the following five points: •   Results: The centre of gravity should become action, and less time spent on reflection. In doing

so, GCTF needed to include the multilateral work into our national strategies; •   Resources: a strong political commitment is not enough. More resourcing of the required

actions is needed; •   Reinforcement: focusing assessments and question ourselves what works and what does not

work, combining resources and accelerating coordinated responses together with international stabilization and development partners. This requires reinforcement of our toolkit;

•   Relations: GCTF needs to redouble its outreach efforts, beyond its members. More concrete projects and intensification of region and country specific approaches are needed: countries that are in dire need of counter terrorism support, but also regional organisations willing to actively pursue CT programmes;

•   Renewal: lastly, GCTF must invest in innovative, context-specific initiatives. Prevent global, think local, especially at the community-level.

The UN and GCTF members gave prepared statements, mostly gravitating around the topics already discussed during the coordinating committee meeting the preceding day. The Ministerial Meeting adopted the two new initiatives and papers and marked the official handover of the US co-chairmanship to the Netherlands.

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Observations •   The GCTF is entering a new phase in its still young existence. Increasingly, members are

insisting on less meetings and elaboration of new recommendations, calling instead for more action.

•   A consensus on the need to show results – and, consequently, more and better measurement of outcome and impact – is growing, spearheaded by Western members.

•   The discourse during the meetings was largely informed by trends and developments in the Middle East, in particular ISIL and the need to counter its growing presence in the region, and destabilise its global outreach. One of the (undesirable) consequences of such an enemy- or threat-centric approach lies in its tendency to equate radicalisation and various manifestations of violent extremism with terrorism, thereby risking repetition of past (GWOT) mistakes.

•   The GCTF meetings coincided with a series of thematic CVE events and the CVE White House Leaders Summit. How and to what extent the GCTF, UN and others are expected to adopt and integrate the White House CVE Action Plan remains to be seen. There are potentially contradicting messages coming out of the US State department on this matter, with some interlocutors strongly in favour of incorporating these within GCTF, and others less so.

•   Despite its adoption, a great deal of uncertainty remains about the exact notion and scope of the Cross-Working Group Initiative, and how it fits within the incoming co-chairs’ expressed ambition to strengthen the synergy between the various working groups and reach out to the wider Fragility and Stabilisation community.

•   It will be interesting to see how the transition of US leadership to The Netherlands plays out. This transition, which coincides with the build up to US Presidential elections, may offer opportunities for the EU to encourage a more medium- and longer-term Rule of Law based approach (see below).

•   Despite upcoming UN-initiatives such as the PVE Global Action Plan, the GCTF will remain the centre of gravity for CVE and Rule of Law based approaches to counter-terrorism. Nevertheless, there is a material risk that the GCTF and the GCTF-inspired institutions are drawn into a more binary approach to CT; in doing so, the achievements of the past decade may be lost. The EU should weigh in and emphasise the importance of strengthening resilience at the local level as the most sustainable response to radicalisation and violent extremism.

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•   Compared to its policies, collective weight and substantial resources, the EU’s involvement in GCTF is relatively limited. By collaborating closely with the incoming co-chairs, supporting their 5R-agenda and assuming a more visible role in the various working groups, the EU can expand its footprint on policy content and implementation.

•   As co-chair of the Horn of Africa Working Group, the EU is in an advantageous position to further develop and operationalize a comprehensive approach to radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism. The EU-funded STRIVE project can serve as an excellent example at the practical level and merits wider dissemination among members, given that it is based on rigorous comprehensive analysis, existing insights and addressing local as well as global trends and dynamics.

•   The EU’s support to the GCTF-inspired institutions is equally important; these institutions should be given the opportunity to meet the expectations set out at their inception. Recent US-led initiatives (e.g. RESOLVE research network, the CVE centre in Djibouti) appear to have been borne out of dissatisfaction with Hedayah’s performance thus far. Rather than creating similar initiatives elsewhere, we recommend to examine the validity of these “claims” and address these constructively, i.e. within the confines of the centre’s mandate.

3.5 Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, 28 September

Over 60 youth-oriented leaders and organisations representing over 45 countries met for the first Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism, which builds on the White House Summit on CVE convened in February 2015. The Search for Common Ground’s Counter Extremism Project, with support from the US Department of State, hosted the Summit that included a number of high-level speakers during the plenary sessions as well as several breakout sessions. The summit adopted a novel and interesting format that allowed for informal and broad engagement on many priority issues, while still being able to bring key conclusions and recommendations back to the plenary session. The summit brought fresh ideas, energy and passion to a key component of the larger CVE debate. This bodes well for future engagement with these key stakeholders in the global CVE response. Key speakers on the plenary panels included: •   Francis Townsend, US President of the CT Extremism Project •   Shamil Idriss, President and CEO, Search for Common Ground •   Lisa Monaco, US Homeland Security Advisor to President Obama •   Ahmad Alhendawi, UN SG’s Envoy on Youth •   Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb of Rotterdam •   Sarah Sewall, US Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights

The breakout sessions covered a broad range of issues, including: role of social media (led by Facebook); the role of traditional media in CVE; security and human rights dimensions of CVE;

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education, faith and interfaith dialogue; networks and networking for CVE. The conference provided an excellent networking opportunity for youth organisations and individuals working on CVE, as well as a unique platform to showcase good practices and examples of individual action, including voices from former violent extremists. Beyond these objectives, the conference achieved its aim of highlighting the key role played by the youth in CVE. It also demonstrated the need for deeper and more sustainable engagement with key actors, especially at the local level. The challenge now will be to maintain the momentum and develop workable initiatives to identify and engage with relevant youth leaders and organisations working on CVE and related matters. To maintain momentum, the UN, regional organisations, member states and relevant CSO actors need to prioritise the Youth Action Agenda3 recommendations that were adopted at the summit to strategically and sustainability engage with youth actors in various CVE initiatives. The Youth Action Agenda proposes some global preventive measures against violent extremism. These include reaching out to former violent extremists and returned fighters and rebuilding relationships with families and communities, and using social media to counter narratives about violent extremism. The Youth Action Agenda developed articulates the following key issues: •   What young people know about violent extremism •   What they are doing in their communities to prevent it •   A call to action for governments, NGOs, and policymakers to seize this moment and engage

youth as partners against violent conflict and violent extremism.

The EU could mainstream the role of youth actors in its various CVE programmes and initiatives, making specific reference to the guidance provided by the Action Agenda. GCTF inspired organisations should do the same. 3.6 International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) and Hedayah meeting: Building more effective responses to the FTF threat – addressing prevention, prosecution and reintegration challenges

The foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) phenomenon is one of the most pressing challenges facing international counter-terrorism efforts at present. This is especially true for European countries and the US, but also applies to countries in other regions including the Middle East and Africa. Frightening numbers of FTFs (men and women) have been recruited to join terrorist groups (most importantly ISIL) in conflicts in Iraq and Syria, but in other countries as well. These individuals pose significant threats, not least the risk they pose when returning to their home countries after engaging with extremist groups abroad. Estimates of exact numbers vary, but recent indications place the number of FTFs in the region of 25,000 – 35,000. These individuals come from more than

                                                                                       3  Youth  Action  Agenda  To  Prevent  Violent  Extremism  and  Promote  Peace,  28  September  2015,  https://www.sfcg.org/wp-­‐‑content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-­‐‑Youth-­‐‑Action-­‐‑Agenda-­‐‑1.pdf    

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100 countries. This is clearly a significant threat that requires urgent interventions, both at the global and regional policy levels, but also in terms of appropriate and effective law enforcement and criminal justice capacity to respond. To explore the issues further, IIJ and Hedayah convened a meeting of key experts to discuss priority elements of response, from a security and broader development perspective. As can be seen from the attached agenda, speakers included leading experts from the UN, Hedayah, IIJ, and senior government officials with experience and expertise on the matter. Despite the high calibre of speakers, the discussion at the meeting seemed rather stale and unoriginal, with most speakers rehashing well-worn debates without any new or exciting proposals and ideas for concrete action. Mr Auer from the EU gave perhaps the most strategic and useful presentation of the event that focused on what the EU has done in terms of policy and practice to respond to the growing threat, and how the EU is implementing the requirements of UNSC resolution 2178. He highlighted the relevant dimensions of the STRIVE programme and the EU’s Foreign Security and Development Policy which prioritises a holistic whole of community response (including civil society) in support of focused law enforcement and security imperatives. RAN, EU engagement with the GCTF working group (and Hague-Marrakesh memorandum), NATO and OSCE initiatives were also put forward as examples of good practice. Other speakers highlighted the following key points: •   The UNSG’s comprehensive CVE strategy will be released in the coming months and will focus

specifically on the challenge of FTFs. This should guide and support other international, regional and local level initiatives and strategies on FTFs.

•   The overview of the Safe Houses initiative in the Netherlands provided a good example of a multi-stakeholder (non CVE specific) programme that has proven to be extremely useful in the FTF context and could be considered for possible emulation.

•   Several speakers reiterated the importance of more and better research to enable informed responses. We need a deep and granular understanding of the FTF problem in order to develop effective, appropriate and sustainable responses.

•   Returning FTF youths and women should be prioritized as they can channel their energy and perspectives in very constructive ways. These people understand the nature of the challenge, and the allure of the terrorist groups, and they should therefore be key partners in developing responses to the threat.

•   Prison radicalization was raised as a major challenge. Additional attention needs to be paid to this and lessons should be drawn from other experts who have worked on prison violence prevention and recidivism programmes.

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Specific Recommendations for the EU:

•   The EU has a very well developed strategy for dealing with FTFs and this should be shared and promoted with other international, regional and national stakeholders (beyond the traditional areas of engagement like GCTF and Hedayah).

•   The EC Trust Fund on migration should be used to support strategic FTF related initiatives and programmes, although not necessary labelled as CT, CVE and FTF.

•   The EU should invest in strategic programmes that can conduct research, support policy development, and provide capacity building for prison rehabilitation and radicalization programmes in priority regions, including Africa.

•   The EU should invest in additional programmes that focus on women and youth as key actors in responding to the FTF threat, including working with individuals who have returned from conflict zones.

•   The EU should expand the work of RAN on FTFs and improve communication and outreach to other actors to share lessons and good practices. RAN should be positioned as a centre of excellence on this emerging issue.

•   The EU should support current and future GCTF initiatives on FTFs, while encouraging closer collaboration between key EU actors (including Europol and Eurojust) and partners working with GCTF.

•   The EU should support cross-sectoral engagement that brings together key practitioners in different fields relating to CVE, CT and responses to FTFs in particular.

•   The EU should support local level research and programmes (possibly through GCERF) that aim to bring grassroots and local voices and perspective to international responses (policy and practice).

3.7 GCERF side event on exploring the relationship between violent extremism and the private sector, 29 September The event was inspired by the impact violent extremism has on the economy: destabilizing markets where businesses work, disrupting supply chains, inhibiting economic development, and limiting investment capital that might otherwise foster innovation. The event consisted of five short presentations by Swiss Federal Councillor Didier Burkhalter, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Dr Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mr Steve Killelea, Founder & Executive Chairman, Institute for Economics and Peace, Dr Timothy Docking, Leader, Global Post and Emerging Markets Funding (EMF) Group, IBM Public Sector, and US Deputy Under Secretary Sarah Sewell.

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Sewell, calling for a unified approach from all actors including the private sector, emphasized the positives, pointing to the various contributions the private sector could make in support of CVE through e.g. investments in the three pilot countries where GCERF is involved (Bangladesh, Mali and Nigeria) and financing of the GCERF itself. Killelea responded with a description of the negatives, i.e. lack of vital pre-conditions for FDI in fragile states, including lack of legitimacy of state institutions, violence, lawlessness and gross group grievances, the exception being extractive industries where the balance between risk and reward remains favourable. Docking identified three categories of actors within the private sector which, for different reasons, were becoming increasingly engaged with the development community: those involved in Corporate Social Responsibility; the Private Sector activists, especially in the tech industry, who want to counter the use of social media for extremist and terrorist motives; and a more diffuse set of curious, interested actors. Maurer, on the other hand, contested Sewell’s call for a unified approach, pointing to the political nature of terminology used and instead emphasizing the importance of neutrality. As ICRC, he warned against it being hijacked by policies that tend to polarize: by countering violent extremists and terrorists, the ICRC’s space to negotiate with others is being encroached upon. The discussion raised some key questions around both the role of private sector in extractive industries and the lack of interest among foreign investors to invest in fragile situations, despite the availability of FDI incentives such as political risk assurance. Making the business case for (foreign) investment in unpredictable and oftentimes dangerous situations is seldom successful. Observations •   The appropriate role of local, national, and international corporations in supporting local

economic growth and enterprise to counter violent extremism is a relatively new topic and merits further analysis and discussion. Unfortunately, this particular GCERF event did little to advance the discussion: contributions were either too abstract/generic or simply too disparate.

•   The debate would benefit from tangible, evidence-based contributions, distinguishing between local, regional and global actors in the private sector; the diversity between industries; the insights gained from the World Bank’s “Doing Business” country reports; insights into the various trade promotion instruments and incentives; and practical examples of past and present private sector investment in countries at risk.

•   Still, with the exception of tech industries perhaps, the likelihood of the private sector becoming a serious player for CVE in vulnerable economies and societies is most probably low.

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3.8 US leaders summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism, 29 September

Leaders from over 100 countries, 20 multilateral bodies, and 120 civil society and private sector organisations met for the US leaders summit on countering ISIL and violent extremism.4 The summit sought to review progress in countering ISIL, addressing the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), and countering and preventing violent extremism. This event follows on from the February 2015 White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism. In an effort to expand the global CVE movement, several governments, including Albania, Algeria, Australia, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Mauritania, and Norway hosted regional CVE summits and events. These activities allowed regional stakeholders to advance key elements of the CVE Summit Agenda and develop innovative new CVE initiatives. Several organisations led CVE events and activities to ensure the participation of non-governmental actors in the global CVE movement. The following activities and initiatives were announced at the Leaders’ Summit: •   Capacity building in Africa and the Middle East: The Government of Denmark will contribute

$9 million to support a range of CVE activities.

•   South East Asia CVE Initiatives: The Government of Australia will launch a regional civil society network which will bring together a diverse group of experts so the region can better utilise civil society leaders and influencers across the region to target vulnerable communities and the development of a regional compendium of counter narratives. The Government of Japan continues to enhance cooperation in CVE initiatives with South East Asian countries through implementing projects on various aspects of CVE measures such as “Publishing for Counter Radicalization” and ”Comparative Research on Youth and Terrorism in the Southeast Asia”. Rehabilitation, reintegration and after care programs for Violent Extremist Offenders will be another theme to be addressed in this initiative.

•   Sahel CVE Initiatives: The Government of Algeria will host three workshops in the coming months: 1) a workshop on the role of democracy in the fight against terrorism; 2) a workshop on the role of Internet and social media in CVE; and 3) a workshop organized with Canada, within the framework of the GCTF Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group on the role of the criminal justice sector in CVE.

•   Global CVE Research; The EU will conduct an extensive analysis of current and planned CVE research initiatives across the world and prospective opportunities for enhanced mutual engagement by the EU and other partners. The analysis will include key national and regional

                                                                                       4  White  House  Press  Release,  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐‑press-­‐‑office/2015/09/29/leaders-­‐‑summit-­‐‑countering-­‐‑isil-­‐‑and-­‐‑violent-­‐‑extremism    

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institutions, as well as networks and individuals engaged in CVE research and present practical recommendations on how research efforts could be improved at the regional and global level. The findings will be presented at the RESOLVE Summit hosted at Hedayah in December.

•   Recommendations to Counter Prison Radicalization Worldwide: The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) will produce a set of detailed recommendations for governments to mitigate the threat of prison radicalization, building on previous recommendations, such as the GCTF’s Rome and Rabat Memoranda.

•   Training Course on Rehabilitating Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: The IIJ and Hedayah have developed a new case study-based training course to assist countries that are dealing with the return of FTFs from the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere.

•   Enhancing Access to Mainstream Religious Knowledge:

§   The Muwatta Center, a new educational research institute in Abu Dhabi, will focus on

raising the standard of religious education and curriculum design in conjunction with Ministries of Religious Affairs. The Forum for Peace in Muslim Societies in the UAE will develop a global digital platform to help religious scholars better connect with Muslim youth.

§   Collaboration among GCTF, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Islamic Scientific, Education, and Cultural Organization will examine the relationship between education – including religious education – and CVE. A workshop will be held in Rabat in early December to identify priorities in the areas of curriculum development and instructor training as well as innovative new forms of delivering CVE-related education.

•   Just and Sustainable Security Approaches to Violent Extremism: With support from the United

States, USIP convened two expert dialogues on the relationship between security forces and communities and the impact of this relationship on CVE, to culminate in the publication of a special report and a set of concrete recommendations for governments and security actors to be presented at UNGA.

•   Promoting a Development Assistance Community of Practice (CoP): This initiative will facilitate information sharing among members of the development community that are committed to addressing the political, economic or social marginalization and exclusion that may lead to violent extremism and promoting rights-based approaches to mitigate its effects.

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•   Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism (LIVE): The OSCE LIVE initiative will build the capacity of civil society leaders to effectively and safely speak out, mobilize others, and take appropriate action against intolerance and violent extremism in their local communities and policy networks. The OSCE will initially develop three pilot training courses tailored to women, youth, and religious and traditional leaders.

•   UNESCO-Led Efforts on CVE and Education: UNESCO will announce a) a CVE Education Ministers High-Level General Conference Side-Event and Public-Private Partnership Launch (November 2015 in Paris), which will set the stage for building a global network among UNESCO’s 195 Member States’ Education Ministries to discuss both the challenges and how education and community-oriented approaches can prevent radicalization, recruitment, or violence, as well as address the root causes of extremism through community and school engagement; and b) the development of a UNESCO Teachers’ Guide for Countering Violent Extremism to provide tools and resources for educators to address students’ questions and concerns, promote the importance of education and critical thinking, handle demonstrations of intolerance and racism that can lead to violent extremism, and create an enabling environment for dialogue and exchange on the issues.

•   “Whole of OIC” Mobilization on CVE: The OIC will announce: a) An OIC CVE messaging capacity and b) an OIC-led counter-sectarianism initiative (which will include a series of regional workshops/meetings); and c) A series of convenings of religious leaders led by the OIC-affiliated International Islamic Fiqh Academy on CVE and sectarianism.

•   Club de Madrid (CdM) “Madrid+10 Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism”

Conference – Madrid, 27 – 28 October 2015: CdM is an independent organization composed of over 100 former heads of state and government who come together to contribute to strengthening democratic values and leadership across the world. Building on the core themes of the White House CVE Summit’s Action Agenda, the “Madrid+10” program will mobilize policymakers, opinion formers, civil society and grassroots organizations around sustaining CVE commitment, increasing public engagement on CVE, and promoting grassroots CVE initiatives. Madrid+10 will produce a global consensus document outlining a set of principles, recommendations, and measures aimed to inspire political leaders on how to respond to the growing threat of terrorism in a comprehensive manner.

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3.9 Strong cities network official launch, 29 September

The Strong Cities Network (SCN) is a global network of local authorities working on countering radicalisation and violent extremism. The aim is to achieve a focused and rapid exchange of ideas and methods to strengthen the safety, security and cohesion of communities and cities. The SCN will connect cities and local authority practitioners through practical workshops, training seminars and sustained city partnerships. Presently, the network consists of 25 cities. It focused on 6 themes: Connect, Inform, Empower, Build, Innovate and Represent, and will develop tangible and evidence-based tools

There were 10 speeches delivered at the 90-minute launch event opened by US attorney General Loretta E. Lynch. Notable speakers included UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, New York Mayor Bill de Blasio and Aisa Kirabo Kaeyira (UN Habitat). Mayors and Governors from selected cities in the US, Europe and Africa also gave brief remarks.

All speakers stressed the importance of values of inclusion and building resilience at the community level among citizens. In his keynote speech, UNHCHR Zeid Ra’ad rejected the focus on narratives, military interventions and repressive measures, calling them counterproductive. To combat Violent Extremism effectively required principled inclusion, i.e. drawing on the principles of equality and dignity of all. Strong Cities needn’t be wealthy, but should illustrate dignity and bonds. To build trust and resilience, governments and officials must listen and address concerns of their inhabitants.

New York Mayor Bill de Blasio identified inclusion and diversity as the city’s driving force. Diversity was not regarded a negative or something to manage or overcome, but as a prerequisite for success and a vibrant democracy. He praised the SCN for its emphasis on Human Rights and rejection of intolerance as the best way to protect citizens against violent extremism. Law enforcement was important, but insufficient. Nurturing of positive youth leadership, education, economic opportunities, social and health services showed that people feel the difference.

US Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch pointed to the importance of cities as the frontline and the true experts of communities. Cities are the best early warning mechanism. By creating partnerships among cities, more effective responses are created. The SCN mirrors the existing US model of municipal cooperation. Aisa Kirabo Kaeyira (UN Habitat), pointing to the global nature of urbanisation, migration and globalisation and the rifts they bring about, underscored the need for partnerships between cities and empowerment of local government. She referred to the “Safer Cities Network”, involving 80 cities, looking at issues of safety and security in a broader sense, offering space for identity and belonging by building trust between authorities and citizens.

Governor Hassan Ali Joho of Mombasa added a Kenyan perspective, emphasizing the need for cross-community cooperation, supporting positive media, and empowering civil society, especially the roles of women and youth leadership. He challenged the CVE agenda, which may be perceived by local citizens as repressive and intrusive. The tendency in CVE was to focus on symptoms, rather

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than the context out of which violent extremism emerges. Building community resilience should therefore be broader.

Observations •   The SCN launch was a well-organised event: short, high-level, and a good balance between

“global” objectives and “local” experiences.

•   The Network comes across as action-oriented, building on existing examples and experiences, but scaling these up to a global level.

•   With its emphasis on initiatives and practices intended to build resilience at the local level, the SCN fits well within GCTF’s strategy to focus increasingly on implementation of Good Practices at both the national and the community levels.

•   The SCN is a predominantly US-driven initiative; the majority of its steering committee members are mayors and representatives from cities located in western countries, many of which already engage in twinning activities with cities elsewhere.

•   The SCN is an interesting initiative. In principle, its members should be more than capable of providing the financial means needed to both establish and maintain its operations. For the EU, an interest would lie less in funding the SCN and/or its secretariat at ISD, and more in encouraging membership of non-western cities, sharing and documenting experiences, and using these positive examples in the development of national strategies and programmes.

3.10 EU/International Crisis Group meeting on Balancing Security and Development: Preventing Violent Extremism and the SDGs, 29 September

In recent years the term violent extremism – previously seen as the exclusive purview of the security sector – has found its way into the development debate. This has happened for a variety of reasons, but most important perhaps is the impact that violent extremism has on hard-won development gains. Second, many grievances that fuel violent extremism are themselves core development issues. Finally, it has become clear that development interventions affect the drivers of violent extremism in fundamental ways. 2015 is therefore an important year for development and security actors working at the CVE/development nexus. The adoption of the SDGs and the 2030 Action Agenda is clearly at the centre of the current conversation. Is response, the EU partnered with ICG to host the only side event that directly addressed the interplay and linkages between CVE and the SDGs. The timely event was held in the same venue (UN Trustees Council Chamber) on the back of the US Leaders’ Summit and the launch of the Stronger Cities Network. The meeting was well attended by a broad range of stakeholders from

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member states, key UN officials and others from international and regional organisations and civil society leaders. Keynote speakers included: Ambassador Alfonso E Lenhardt, Acting Administrator of UNSAID; Dr Stephan Auer, Director for Human Rights, Global and Multilateral Issues, EEAS, EU; Mr Jean-Marie Geuhenno, President, ICG. Other panellists included well-respected experts on CVE, security and development from several regions. The moderator of the meeting, Ms Carol Bellamy, made the interesting point that of all the member state interventions at the US Leaders’ Summit, only one made specific reference to SDGs in the context of the broader CVE debate. This showed that member states were sensitive to the concerns about the development and SDG agenda being ‘hijacked’ by CVE priorities. Indeed, it was probably a positive sign in that CVE should be seen as an integral element of achieving the SDGs (especially goals 9 and 16), and not the other way around. The meeting covered interesting aspects of the CVE/security/development debate, and focused on concrete and specific recommendations to UN and other partners on how to facilitate continued dialogue on the SDG-CVE nexus. The EU, through STRIVE, is clearly a leader in terms of working at the CVE/development nexus and has many lessons to share with emerging actors in this space. Three specific elements of the EU CT/CVE approach are most relevant here: •   All CVE programming must be evidence-based •   Local context must be taken into account for tailored and appropriate programming •   A multidisciplinary approach must be adopted that involves many actors beyond traditional law

enforcement, criminal justice and military services, including traditional development actors like health, education, good governance and human rights agencies and civil society.

This established approach by the EU ties perfectly into the debate on CVE and the SDGs and can usefully inform approaches as development and security actors attempt to navigate the new terrain that lies before them. Indeed, this is not uncontested terrain. Despite progress in recent years, there are still a number of gaps that exist between national and international agencies expected to implement CVE/development policies. In large part this is an unintended consequence of the ‘War on Terror’ that at times distorted development principles and misappropriated development tools for security ends. This blurred the roles and responsibilities of development and security actors, and created a legacy of mistrust that still lingers today. The EU approach and experience can assist in ameliorating some of these concerns. The following important issues were raised by speakers and during question time from the floor: •   The relevant SDGs (9 and 16) that relate to CVE should be read as complementary to the

existing framework that was developed by the 2006 UN Global CT Strategy. These regimes should be implemented together, and in a complementary manner.

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•   A key advantage of the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda is its universal application and obligations that it places on all nations, including developed ones. This is particularly important for sustainable CVE strategies.

•   Dr Auer provided a useful overview of EU CT and CVE strategies that supported initiatives at the nexus of security and development, including the EU-wide strategy for security sector reform, conflict prevention, peace building and the EU Action plan for the Sahel.

•   Mr Guehenno highlighted recent example of the growing strength and reach of terrorist groups and how terrorists had become major actors in contemporary conflicts.

•   Despite their role in conflicts, history shows that most terrorist groups cannot be defeated militarily and that more complex CVE-centred responses are needed. But he cautioned against one-size-fits all and simplistic approaches that do not respond to the complex and often local drivers of violence.

•   Mr Guehenno also made the important point that war and state collapse had been a boon for terrorists. War leads to violent extremism, not the other way around. Poor understanding of the drivers of violent extremism and inappropiate CT responses have made matters worse, and hence it is vital to develop effective, appropriate and correctly collaborated responses that prioritise broader conflict prevention and state building approaches. The SDGs and 2030 Action Plan provide a good platform for this.

•   Finally Mr Guehenno noted that effective CVE requires building resilient communities that need to be built with local support and buy-in. Indeed, outsiders cannot defeat violent extremism. They need to be defeated by the communities within which they emerge. To do this we need to build the resilience of these communities and this is where the SDG goals are imminently relevant.

•   During the panel discussion and input from the floor, the following key points were highlighted: §   Practitioners and policy makers need to consider the findings of the recent UN high level

panel and SG report on peace building which needs to frame and guide discussions on CVE and peace building.

§   The forthcoming UN Secretary General Action Plan on responding to violent extremism will also provide important guidance from the global/UN perspective and should inform the development of regional and national CVE responses.

§   UNDP has a key role to play in supporting national government implementation of the SDGs, and local CVE strategies where appropriate.

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§   Strong rule of law and criminal justice responses to terrorism remain an important part of broader CVE responses, especially access to justice and respect for human rights. Inappropriate CT responses that undermine the rule of law can be damaging drivers of violent extremism.

§   Lack of employment opportunities, especially for educated young people, remains one of the most important challenges as it leads to non-inclusive growth and drives feelings of relative depravation that are so often at the root of many violent extremism contexts.

§   The family remains a very important social instrument for CVE. Women in particular provide an important counterweight to violence, especially in youth segments.

§   Religious groups also need to be key partners in any sustainable CVE programme.

•   The World Bank highlighted why it’s important to focus on relative depravation and perceived marginalization, especially among the youth. Relative depravation is often more serious than actual depravation when it comes to violence extremism.

•   The World Bank highlighted the following areas to prioritise within development agendas: §   Support for inclusive and accountable institutions. Not just public, but private

and CSO institutions as well. §   Promoting development entrepreneurship for inclusion. Small and medium

businesses need to be at the forefront of this. §   Education is key to ensure longer-term inclusion and growth.

3.11 High-level event on integrating a gender dimension in preventing and countering violent extremism policy and practice, 30 September

This EU event brought together over 100 leading experts, senior officials and civil society practitioners to discus the threat posed by violent extremism and its impact on women. It also aimed to highlight efforts being undertaken to support community-level engagement that integrate gender perspectives in CVE. The event included a number of prominent and high profile speakers (see Agenda as part of Annex for more info), with opening remarks delivered by the EU’s Mara Marinaki, EEAS Principal Advisor on Gender and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. The event underscored that women and girls are increasingly burdened with the price of extreme violence. It highlighted the key issues related to integrating the gender dimension in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) policy and practice. Central to discussions was the instrumentalisation of women and girls in terrorism, and the challenge related to terrorists’ sophisticated strategy of recruiting women. More importantly perhaps, the event highlighted the critical role that women play in CVE. This is not a new phenomenon, indeed this powerful role was recognised many years ago in UNSC Resolution 1325 on the role of women in peace and security. In this regard, it has become clear that women and girls are key in any discussion on security and development.

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The conference also highlighted the important work of the EU in integrating gender perspectives into its broader CVE strategies, including the work of RAN. Specific issues highlighted by speakers include: •   Violent extremist groups are perverting Islam and twisting the ideology to target vulnerable

groups. For example ISIL needs women to ensure survival of the group. As a result it praises motherhood and convinces women that they can change the course of history through the creation of a new society.

•   With this in mind it becomes critical to ensure that women and girls are involved in P/CVE such that they are an integral part of the solution as well. The role of women in CVE is not just about influencing their families. It is much broader and should include women’s role in supporting UN human rights organisations, movements etc., as well as the need to also mobilise against traditionalists.

•   Several entities have recognised this need and are developing strategies that integrate a gender dimension:

•   The GCTF adoption of CVE and gender good practices noted the need for effective counter narrative and alternatives and the need to make sure we can give practical effect to these good practices. Particularly, need to focus at the local level; need to address stereotypes;

•   The OSCE is developing a guidebook on gender in security that will include specific recommendations on CVE dimensions.

•   HRW conducted recent studies on the impact of violent extremism on women. These reports highlight how stigmatisation and discrimination continue after the first attack. There is therefore a need to focus on longer-term support and engagement to deal with the stigma. Also need better communication and information in these regions/places.

•   Hedayah underscored that more evidence and research is needed before we simply respond with an ideological basis. They are currently preparing a publication of women in CVE that will be launched soon.

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Key issues and recommendations

•   Gender perspectives must inform CVE policy making and practice because women are often best-placed to understand the causes and complexities of the violent extremist problems and therefore have important perspectives on what should be done about it. Indeed research shows that involving women in conflict prevention increases chance of success by 50%.

•   As we develop CVE initiatives on gender we should draw lessons from important recent high level reviews of peace building, implementation of the UN 1325.

•   UN Women are key partners in developing effective responses, but also in investigation ongoing violations of rights in conflict zones like Syria, Nigeria and Iraq.

•   Engendered analysis is important as it is not just about rights of women and but also about operational and strategic reasons.

•   Women can play powerful roles in prevention but they need to be given the opportunities to do so, at all levels, including local level in the home. EU CT and CVE initiatives can play a lead role in this regard.

•   We need to expand the debate on gender and CVE into the broader effort of state-building and conflict prevention.

•   There is a need for more research on gender and CVE.