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Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001
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Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

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Page 1: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis

Shawn A. ButlerComputer Science Department

Carnegie Mellon University9 November 2001

Page 2: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

MS

Hey Boss, we need more security. I think we

should get the new Acme 2000 Hacker Abolisher

We always seem to need more security!

Don’t we have enough?

Page 3: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

MS

Trust me, we will be more secure!

What are my alternatives?

What is it going to cost?

What is the added value?

Page 4: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Value?

Alternatives?

S

Page 5: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Problem

• Security managers lack structured cost-benefit methods to evaluate and compare alternative security solutions.

Page 6: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Security Architecture Development Process

Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment

Outcomes

Threats

PrioritizedRisks Select

CountermeasuresSelect

Countermeasures

System Design

Policies Requirements

AvailableCountermeasures

Security Components Develop

Security Architecture

Develop Security

Architecture

Security Architecture

Page 7: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Security Architecture Development Process

Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment

Outcomes

Threats

PrioritizedRisks Select

CountermeasuresSelect

Countermeasures

System Design

Policies Requirements

AvailableCountermeasures

Security Components Develop

Security Architecture

Develop Security

Architecture

Security Architecture

Page 8: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

The Multi Attribute Risk Assessment

1. Determine threats and outcomes2. Assess outcome attribute values3. Assess weights4. Compute threat indices5. Sensitivity Analysis

Risk Assessment

Risk Assessment

Outcomes

Threats

PrioritizedRisks

Page 9: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Threats

ScanningProcedural ViolationBrowsingDistributed Denial of

ServicePassword NabbingPersonal AbuseSignal Interception : :29 Threats

Determine Threats and Outcomes

Outcome Attributes

Lost ProductivityLost RevenueRegulatory PenaltiesReputationLives LostLawsuits : :

Oi = (Lost Prod, Lost Rev, Reg Penalties, Reputation)

Page 10: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Assess Outcome Attribute Values

Outcomes

Attacks

Lost Producti-vity (hrs)

Lost Revenu

e($$)

Regulatory

Penalties(scale 0-6)

Reputation(scale 0-6)

Scanning10,220/yr(3-4/hr)

Low .3 0 0 1Expected .5 2 0 1

High 1 1,000 0 4

Procedural Violation4,380/yr(1-2/hr)

Low 0 0 0 0Expected 2 2 0 1

High 4012,00

03 4

Page 11: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Prioritize and Assess Weights(Swing Weight Method)

BestWorst

Lost ProdLost RevReg PenalReputation

240 hrs$12,000 3 4

0 hrs$000

Rank

100204080

Weight (wi)

.42

.08

.17

.33

Order

1

2

43

Page 12: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Compute Threat IndicesHours + $$ + Reputation + Regulatory Penalties = ?

1

0

P: Lost Productivity R: Reputation G: Regulatory

PenaltiesL: Lost Revenue

1

0

1

0

1

012,000 240 340 000

So determine Value Functions Vj(xj)

L(x1) $$ + P(x2)Hours + R(x3)Reputation + G(x4)Regulatory Penalties = TI

Nonsense !

Page 13: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Computing the Threat Index

pexpected (j=attributesWj Vj(xj expected))

Expected threat

TIa = Freqa [

plow (j=attributesWj Vj(xj low)) +

pexpected (j=attributesWj Vj(xj expected)) +

phigh (j=attributesWj Vj(xj high))

]

Threat index

Page 14: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Scanning in More Detail Outcomes

Attacks

Lost Producti-vity (hrs)

Lost Revenue($$)

Regulatory Penalties(scale 0-6)

Reputation(scale 0-6)

Scanning10,220/yr

Low .3 0 0 1Expected .5 2 0 1

High 1 1,000 0 4.01 = plow (j=attributesWj Vj(xj

low)).07 = pexpected (j=attributesWj Vj(xj expected))

.00 = phigh (j=attributesWj Vj(xj

high)) 10,220 (.01 +.07 +.00) 886.57

Page 15: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Risk Assessment Results

ThreatFrequency Low Expected High Total

Scanning 10,220 .0084 .0750 .0034 886.57

Procedural Violation 4380 .0000 .0773 .0065 367.03

Browsing 2920 .0000 .0742 .0035 226.71

Dist Denial of Service 156 .0085 .1530 .0060 26.12

Password Nabbing 365 .0001 .0008 .0009 .62

Personal Abuse 110 .0000 .0003 .0009 .13

TOTAL 1,507.18

Page 16: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

But what about the numbers?

Page 17: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Risk Assessment Sensitivity Analysis

• Attack Frequencies• Outcome Attribute Values• Attribute Weights

Page 18: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Probability Distributions

Normal(10220, 1)Trunc(0,30660.0000)

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

0.45

10217

10218

10219

10220

10221

10222

10223

< >5.0% 5.0%90.0%1.0218E+04 1.0222E+04

Trigen(1.0000, 1.0000, 4.0000,5, 95)

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.5

5.0%90.0%

1.0000 4.0000

Scanning Frequency Dist Scanning Reputation Dist

Page 19: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Regression Sensitivity for Threat IndexSum/R60

Std b Coefficients

Compromising Emanations / .../F58 .022 Trojan Horse / Low/F44 .024 DDoS / Low/I39 .026 Alteration / Low/F37 .029 Scanning / Ranking/C34 .029 Signal Interception / Low/L40 .03 Signal Interception / Low/F40 .055 Procedural Violation / Ran.../C35 .057 Procedural Violation / Low.../I35 .057

Lost Productivity/K30-.073 Procedural Violation / Low.../L35 .167 Browsing / Low/F36 .199 Signal Interception / Low/I40 .268 Procedural Violation / Low.../F35 .309 Scanning / Low/F34 .56 Reputation/K31 .568

-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Page 20: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Change in TI Rankings

-0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Scann

ing

Signa

l Inte

rcep

tion

Proce

dura

l Vio

latio

n

Browsin

gViru

s

Altera

tion

DDoS

Compr

omise

Trojan

Hor

se

Crypto

grap

hic

Compr

omise

Theft

Mes

sage

Stre

am M

od

Fraud

Passw

rod

Nabbin

g

Perso

nal A

buse

Trap

Door

IP S

poof

ing

Vanda

lism

Denia

l of S

ervic

e

Passw

ord

Guess

ing

Logi

c Bom

b

Conta

mina

tion

Web

Pag

e Spo

ofing

Compr

omisi

ng E

man

atio

ns

Electr

onic

Graffi

ti

Data E

ntry

Erro

r

Threats

Ra

nk

+1SD, -1SD +95% Perc, -5% Perc Mean?

Page 21: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Cryptographic Compromise Distribution

Pro

b D

ensi

ty

Rank

0.0000.0200.0400.0600.0800.1000.1200.1400.160

Mean=11.004

0 10 20 300 10 20 30

5% 90% 5% 6 25

Mean=11.004

Page 22: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Regression Sensitivity

Std b Coefficients

Trap Door / Auditing/AU47 .045 Personal Abuse / Low/F52 .046 Passwrod Nabbing / Line En.../AB46 .046

Procedural Violation / e-S.../AO35 .046 Logic Bomb / Auditing/AU55-.048

Message Stream Mod / Crypt.../AE48 .048 Scanning / URL Block/AA34-.053

Procedural Violation / Bio.../AR35 .054 Trojan Horse / Low/F44 .057 Logic Bomb / FREQ/year/B24 .061

Denial of Service / Anti-S.../Y49-.063 Alteration / Low/F37 .075 Compromise / Low/L45 .078 Lost Productivity/K30 .19

Reputation/wj-.213 Reputation Outcome-.639

-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1

Page 23: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Sensitivity Analysis

• How sensitive are the answers to estimation errors?

• Does it matter if the estimates are not accurate?

• How accurate do they have to be before the decision changes?

• When is it important to gather additional information?

Page 24: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Selecting Countermeasures

Risk Assessment

Outcomes

Threats

PrioritizedRisks Select

CountermeasuresSelect

Countermeasures

System Design

Policies Requirements

AvailableCountermeasures

Security Components Develop

Security Architecture

Security Architecture

Page 25: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Security Attribute Evaluation Method (SAEM)

What is SAEM?A structured cost-benefit analysis technique for

evaluating and selecting alternative security designs

Why SAEM?Security managers make explicit their assumptionsDecision rationale is capturedSensitivity analysis shows how assumptions affect design decisionsDesign decisions are re-evaluated consistently when assumptions changeStakeholders see whether their investment is consistent with risk expectations

Page 26: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

SAEM Process

• Evaluation Method1. Assess security technology benefits2. Evaluate security technology benefits3. Assess coverage4. Analyze Costs

Select Countermeasures

Select Countermeasures

System Design

Policies Requirements

AvailableCountermeasures

Security ComponentsPrioritized

Risks

Page 27: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Assess Security Technology Benefits

Scanning 50% 75% 66% 66% 33% 33%50%

Procedural Violation

50% 40%25%

Browsing 30%

Dist Denial of Service

75%

Password Nabbing

50%

Personal Abuse

40%

Effectiveness Percentages

Threat Secu

rity

Tech

PF

Fire

wall

Prx

y F

irew

all

Net

IDS

Audit

ing

Host

ID

S

Vuln

Ass

ess

Hard

ened O

S

Auth

Polic

y S

erv

Vir

tual Pri

v N

et

Net

Monit

ors

Page 28: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Evaluate Security Technology Benefits

Scanning (886)

443 223 301 301 594 594 443

Procedural Violation (367)

183 220 274

Browsing (226)

158

Dist Denial of Service (26.12)

6.6

Password Nabbing (.62)

.31

Personal Abuse (.13)

.08

Threat Secu

rity

Tech

PF

Fire

wall

Prx

y F

irew

all

Net

IDS

Audit

ing

Host

ID

S

Vuln

Ass

ess

Hard

ened O

S

Auth

Polic

y S

erv

Vir

tual Pri

v N

et

Net

Monit

ors

Page 29: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Prioritized Technologies

Technology

Value Threat Index

Overall Rank

PKI/Cert .24 28

Auditing 241 11

Auth Policy Server

161 15

Host-IDS 589 2

Net-IDS 293 10

Smart Cards 103 16

One Time Psswrd

340 7

Single Sign-on 0 35

Page 30: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Assess Coverage

Page 31: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Host Intrusion Detection Coverage

Page 32: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Auditing Coverage

Page 33: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Analyze Costs

0

589

$0

Host IDS

Single Sign-on

Smart Cards

Net IDS Auditing

PKI Cert$20,000

Auth Policy Server

Th

reat

Ind

ex

Purchase Cost

Page 34: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

SAEM Sensitivity Analysis

The vulnerability Assessment tool is 66% effective. What

does that really mean?

Page 35: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Security Technology Effects on the Risk Assessment

Normal(0.66, 0.1) Trunc(0,1)

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

-0.2

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

5.0% 5.0%90.0%0.4955 0.8242

Benefit Estimates:- Reduce Frequency- Change Outcomes

Vulnerability Assess ScannerBenefit Distribution

Page 36: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Top 25 Countermeasure Rankings

Reduced Frequency

-0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Countermeasures

Ran

k

+1SD, -1SD +95% Perc, -5% Perc Mean

Page 37: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

PKI / Cert Auditing Auth Policy

Servers

H-I DS N-I DS One Time

password

Smart Cards

Technology

Rank

Countermeasure Rank Overlaps

Page 38: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Outcome ChangesProcedural Violations Reputation

Trigen(0.0000, 1.0000, 4.0000,5, 95)

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

5.0%90.0%

1.6718E-07 4.0000

Trigen(0, 2.5, 4.0000, 5, 95)

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

0.30

0.35

0.40

-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6

5.0% 5.0%90.0%

2.5060E-07 4.0000

Before After

Page 39: Security Attribute Evaluation Method: A Cost Benefit Analysis Shawn A. Butler Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University 9 November 2001.

Preliminary Results

• Risk Assessment threat indices reflect security manager’s concerns– based on interviews and feedback

• Security managers are able to estimate technology benefits – based on experience, organizational skill

levels, and threat expectations

• Sensitivity Analysis is key to method– based on uncertainty of assumptions