G.R. No. 162419 July 10, 2007PAUL V. SANTIAGO,petitioner,vs.CF
SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC.,respondent.D E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:At
the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on
one hand, and the manning agent and the foreign principal, on the
other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the
seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and
refused deployment without valid reason but whose POEA-approved
employment contract provides that the employer-employee
relationship shall commence only upon the seafarers actual
departure from the port in the point of hire, is entitled to
relief?This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V.
Santiago (petitioner) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.1Petitioner had been working
as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for
about five (5) years.2On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new
contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of nine
(9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00,
overtime pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4 February
1998, the contract was approved by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on
board the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the port of
Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.A week before the scheduled
date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondents Vice
President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV
Seaspread," which reads:I received a phone call today from the wife
of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to send her husband to
MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their
identity gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if
allowed to depart will jump ship in Canada like his brother
Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in
Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.We do not want this to
happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus in
Japan.Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother
when he was applying he behaved like a Saint but in his heart he
was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will send his
replacement.Kindly advise.3To this message the captain of "MSV
Seaspread" replied:Many thanks for your advice concerning P.
Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to return to
Seaspread.4On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he
would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but he was reassured that
he might be considered for deployment at some future
date.Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages,
and attorney's fees against respondent and its foreign principal,
Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd.5The case was raffled to Labor
Arbiter Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment
contract remained valid but had not commenced since petitioner was
not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and
regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy
petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages
representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed
overtime fee, all amounting to US$7, 209.00.The labor arbiter held
respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29
January 1999 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
hereby Ordered to pay complainant actual damages in the amount of
US$7,209.00 plus 10% attorney's fees, payable in Philippine peso at
the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment.All the
other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.6On
appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondent because under the Standard Terms
and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board Ocean Going Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment
contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from
the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a
POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal,
actual damages, and attorneys fees should be dismissed.7On the
other hand, the NLRC found respondents decision not to deploy
petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management
prerogative.8The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this
wise:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed
Decision dated January 29, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED in so far as
other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION by VACATING the
award of actual damages and attorneys fees as well as excluding
Pacifico Fernandez as party respondent.SO ORDERED.9Petitioner moved
for the reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision but his motion was
denied for lack of merit.10He elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari.In its Decision11dated 16
October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an ambiguity
in the NLRCs Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor
arbiters Decision, because by the very modification introduced by
the Commission (vacating the award of actual damages and attorneys
fees), there is nothing more left in the labor arbiters Decision to
affirm.12According to the appellate court, petitioner is not
entitled to actual damages because damages are not recoverable by a
worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period
prescribed inthe POEA Rules.13It agreed with the NLRCs finding that
petitioners non-deployment was a valid exercise of respondents
management prerogative.14It added that since petitioner had not
departed from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship
between the parties arose and any claim for damages against the
so-called employer could have no leg to stand on.15Petitioners
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 February
2004.16The present petition is anchored on two grounds, to wit:A.
The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law
when it ignored [S]ection 10 of Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers Act of 1995 as well as
Section 29 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels
(which is deemed incorporated under the petitioners POEA approved
Employment Contract) that the claims or disputes of the Overseas
Filipino Worker by virtue of a contract fall within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC.B. The Honorable
Court of Appeals committed a serious error when it disregarded the
required quantum of proof in labor cases, which is substantial
evidence, thus a total departure from established jurisprudence on
the matter.17Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the
Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it failed to deploy him
within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason. In doing
so, it had unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented the consummation
of the POEA- approved contract. Since it prevented his deployment
without valid basis, said deployment being a condition to the
consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed
consummated, and therefore he should be awarded actual damages,
consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime
pay.18Petitioner adds that since the contract is deemed
consummated, he should be considered an employee for all intents
and purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of his claims.19Petitioner
additionally claims that he should be considered a regular
employee, having worked for five (5) years on board the same vessel
owned by the same principal and manned by the same local agent. He
argues that respondents act of not deploying him was a scheme
designed to prevent him from attaining the status of a regular
employee.20Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and
sufficient cause to abandon the employment contract, as it merely
relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed
callers in arriving at the conclusion that he would jump ship like
his brother. He points out that his wife had executed an
affidavit21strongly denying having called respondent, and that the
other alleged callers did not even disclose their identities to
respondent.22Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to adopt
the unfounded conclusion of the NLRC, as the same was not based on
substantial evidence.23On the other hand, respondent argues that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioners monetary
claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his
deployment was withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor
arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain adjudication of
petitioners case much less award damages to him. The controversy
involves a breach of contractual obligations and as such is
cognizable by civil courts.24On another matter, respondent claims
that the second issue posed by petitioner involves a recalibration
of facts which is outside the jurisdiction of this Court.25There is
some merit in the petition.There is no question that the parties
entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998, whereby
petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board
"MSV Seaspread" for the consideration of US$515.00 per month for
nine (9) months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to
deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering
that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport
in the point of hire, the employment contract did not commence, and
no employer-employee relationship was created between the
parties.26However, a distinction must be made between the
perfection of the employment contract and the commencement of the
employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract,
which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof,
occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and
the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein.
The commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier
discussed, would have taken place had petitioner been actually
deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection
of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and
obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that
is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he
would be liable for damages.Moreover, while the POEA Standard
Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the manning
agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being
deployed without a valid reason.Respondents act of preventing
petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV
Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to
petitioners cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and
must therefore answer for the actual damages he suffered.We take
exception to the Court of Appeals conclusion that damages are not
recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency. The
fact that the POEA Rules27are silent as to the payment of damages
to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is
precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for
non-deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of
license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the
worker. They do not forfend a seafarer from instituting an action
for damages against the employer or agency which has failed to
deploy him.The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can
impose on erring agencies. It does not provide for damages and
money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees because it is not
the POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such
matters.Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules that the NLRC
has jurisdiction over petitioners complaint. The jurisdiction of
labor arbiters is not limited to claims arising from
employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042
(Migrant Workers Act), provides that:Sec. 10.Money Claims.
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary
and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]Since the
present petition involves the employment contract entered into by
petitioner for overseas employment, his claims are cognizable by
the labor arbiters of the NLRC.Article 2199 of the Civil Code
provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Respondent is thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the
form of the loss of nine (9) months worth of salary as provided in
the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While
the contract indicated a fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee
that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he
rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was "prevented
without valid reason from rendering regular much less overtime
service,"28the fact remains that there is no certainty that
petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board
the vessel. The amount of US$286.00 stipulated in the contract will
be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime work. This
has been the tenor of our rulings in the case ofStolt-Nielsen
Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission29where we discussed the matter in this light:The
contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would
be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and when overtime
work would be rendered. Simply stated, the rendition of overtime
work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman
could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the
basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract
provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement
to such benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking,
a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or
vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might
be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just
lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and
unreasonable.30The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to
attorneys fees in the concept of damages and expenses of
litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's
act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to
protect his interest.31We note that respondents basis for not
deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like
his brother, a mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls
of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time
and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as
they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of the
employers interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or
under valid agreements.32Respondents failure to deploy petitioner
is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing petitioner to institute the
suit below. The award of attorneys fees is thus warranted.However,
moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondents
failure to deploy petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we
cannot qualify such action as being tainted with bad faith, or done
deliberately to defeat petitioners rights, as to justify the award
of moral damages. At most, respondent was being overzealous in
protecting its interest when it became too hasty in making its
conclusion that petitioner will jump ship like his brother.We
likewise do not see respondents failure to deploy petitioner as an
act designed to prevent the latter from attaining the status of a
regular employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of
Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee,
regardless of his previous contracts of employment with respondent.
InMillares v. National Labor Relations Commission,33the Court ruled
that seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be
considered as regular employees under the Labor Code. Their
employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they
are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract
expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be
employed on a contractual basis.34WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN
PART. The Decision dated 16 October 2003 and the Resolution dated
19 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora
dated 29 January 1999 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that
respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is ordered to pay actual
or compensatory damages in the amount of US$4,635.00representing
salary for nine (9) months as stated in the contract, and attorneys
fees at the reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.SO
ORDERED.
JEBSENS MARITIME INC.,represented by MS. ARLENEASUNCIONand/or
ALLIANCE MARINE SERVICES, LTD.,Petitioners,- versus -ENRIQUE UNDAG,
Respondent..
D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This petition for review assails the
September 16, 2009 Decision[1]and the March 3, 2010 Resolution[2]of
the Court of Appeals(CA),which set aside the October 17, 2005 and
January 24, 2006 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission(NLRC),dismissing the complaint of respondent Enrique
Undag(respondent)for disability benefits.Records bear out that
respondent was hired as Lead Operator on board the vessel FPSO
Jamestown owned by Alliance Marine Services, Ltd. and managed by
its local agent, Jebsens Maritime, Inc.(petitioners).Respondents
contract with petitioners was for a period of four (4) months with
a basic salary of US$806.00 a month. He was deployed on March 24,
2003 and eventually repatriated to the Philippines on July 18, 2003
after his contract with the petitioners had expired.OnSeptember 24,
2003, about two months after repatriation, he went to see a
physician, Dr. Efren Vicaldo(Dr. Vicaldo), for a physical check-up
and was diagnosed to have Hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
Atrial Fibrillation, Diabetes Mellitus II, Impediment Grade X
(20.15%). According to Dr. Vicaldo, respondent had a history of
hypertension and diabetes and was at risk of developing a stroke,
coronary artery disease and congestive heart failure. He likewise
stated that respondents ailment was aggravated by his work as a
seaman and that he was no longer fit for work. For said reason,
respondent requested for financial assistance from petitioners but
the latter denied his request.Constrained, he filed a complaint for
sickness benefits against petitioners before theNLRC,alleging that
he had been suffering from chest pains and difficulty of breathing
since July 2003 when he was on board petitioners vessel. Despite
knowing his bad physical condition upon repatriation, the
petitioners did not give him any financial assistance. Thus,he
prayed that petitioners be ordered to reimburse him for his medical
expenses and pay him sickness allowance amounting to US$3,224.00,
including damages and attorneys fees.Petitioners countered that
respondent was not entitled to disability benefits because his
repatriation was not due to medical reasons but due to the
expiration of his employment contract. Petitioners basically argued
that, under the POEA Standard Employment Contract(POEA-SEC), a
seafarer was entitled to disability benefits only if he had
suffered a work-related illness during the term of his contract.On
June 30, 2005, after due hearing, the Labor Arbiter(LA)rendered a
decision ordering petitioners to pay, jointly and severally,
respondent the Philippine peso equivalent of US$60,000.00
representing total permanent disability compensation benefits for
US$3,224.00 sickness allowance, and 10% attorneys fees.On appeal,
however, the NLRCreversedthe LA decisionand denied respondents
claim for disability benefits. The NLRC reasoned out that
respondent failed to present substantial evidence proving that he
had suffered any illness while on board or after disembarking from
petitioners vessel. Respondents motion for reconsideration was
later denied.Not satisfied with the NLRC decision, respondent
appealed before the CA. OnSeptember 16, 2009, the CA rendered a
decisionsetting asidethe ruling of the NLRC. The appellate court
stated that respondent was able to prove by substantial evidence
that his work as a seafarer caused his hypertensive cardiovascular
disease or, at least, was a relevant factor in contracting his
illness. The CA explained that as Lead Operator, respondent
performed multi-tasking functions which required excessive physical
and mental effort.Moreover, he was also exposed to the perils of
the sea and was made to endure unpredictable and extreme climate
changes in the daily performance of his job. The CA also took
judicial notice of the fact that overseas workers suffer a great
degree of emotional strain while on duty on board vessels because
of their being separated from their families for the duration of
their contract. The CA was of the strong view that the inherent
difficulties in respondents job definitely caused his illness. The
CA added that because of the nature of his work, the illness
suffered by respondent contributed to the aggravation of his injury
which was pre-existing at the time of his employment. Finally, the
CA ruled that respondent is entitled to claim total and permanent
disability benefits because of the undisputed doctors findings that
he is now unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity, which
clearly constitutes a permanent and total disability as defined by
law.Not in conformity with the CA decision, petitioners filed this
petition for review praying for its reversal raising this
loneISSUEWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING FULL
DISABILITY BENEFITS TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
In advocacy of their position, petitioners argue that the CA
committed a reversible error in awarding respondent disability
benefits on the principal ground that there are numerous
substantial and competent evidence on record which clearly
establish the fact that respondent was guilty of fraudulent
misrepresentation, hence, forfeiting his right to any benefits
under the POEA contract. For one, respondent intentionally lied
when he declared that he was not suffering from a previous medical
condition in his pre-employment medical examination(PEME).
Specifically, he failed to disclose the fact that he was suffering
from diabetes and heart problem, which is a clear case of
concealment.Secondly, respondents illnesses were not acquired
during the term of his contract with petitioners. He had no
evidence showing that he acquired the heart problem and
hypertension while he was on board the vessel. The fact that
respondent passed his PEMEdoes not automatically mean that he
suffered his illness on board the vessel or that the same was not
pre-existing.Third, the Labor Code provision onpermanent disability
is not applicable in a claim for disability benefits under the POEA
contract.Respondents PositionRespondent counters that petitioners
never raised the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation before the
labor tribunals despite being given the opportunity to do so.
Hence, they are estopped from raising it for the first time on
appeal. At any rate, he claims that he did not commit any fraud or
misrepresentation because he underwent a stringentPEME,which
included a blood and urine examination, conducted by the
company-designated physician. His illness, therefore, was not
pre-existing.In any case, the pre-existence of an illness is not a
bar for the compensability of a seafarers illness. His
non-compliance with the mandatory 3-day reporting upon signoff is
irrelevant because it only applies to a seafarer who has signed off
from the vessel for medical reasons.Moreover, respondent argues
that a repatriation due to a finished contract does not preclude a
seafarer from recovery of benefits, as the only requirement is that
the disease must be a consequence or a result of the work
performed.He has shown by substantial evidence that his
cardiovascular disease was work-related. The strenuous work
conditions that he experienced while on sea duty coupled with his
usual encounter with the unfriendly forces of nature increased the
risk of contracting his heart ailment.Lastly, he asserts that his
disability is permanent and total because he has been declared to
be unfit for sea duty for which he is entitled to recover attorneys
fees and litigation costs under Article 2208.THE COURTS RULINGNo
substantial evidence that illness was work-relatedEntitlement of
seamen on overseas work to disabilitybenefits is a matter governed,
not only by medical findings, but by law and by contract. The
material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter
VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation with Rule X
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor
Code.By contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order
No. 4, series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment,
and the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) bind the
seaman and his employer to each other.[3]Deemed incorporated in
every Filipino seafarerscontract of employment, denominated as
POEA-SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract,is a set of standard
provisions established and implemented by the POEA, called the
Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which contain the
minimum requirements prescribed by the government for the
employment of Filipino seafarers. Section 20(B), paragraph 6, of
the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions provides:SECTION 20.
COMPENSATION AND BENEFITSx x xB.COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR
INJURY OR ILLNESSThe liabilities of the employer when the seafarer
suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his
contract are as follows:X x x6.In case of permanent total or
partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or
illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the
schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract.
Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease
shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation
applicable at the time the illness or disease was
contracted.Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, two elements must
concur for an injury or illness to be compensable.First, that the
injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the
work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of
the seafarers employment contract.The 2000 POEA Amended Standard
Terms and Conditions defines "work-related injury" as "injury(ies)
resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course
of employment" and "work-related illness" as "any sickness
resulting in disability or death as a result of an occupational
disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied." These are:SECTION
32-A.OCCUPATIONAL DISEASESFor an occupational disease and the
resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the
following conditions must be satisfied:1) The seafarers work must
involve the risks described herein;2)The disease was contracted as
a result of the seafarers exposure to the described risks;3)The
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such
other factors necessary to contract it; and4)There was no notorious
negligence on the part of the seafarer.Sec. 32-A(11) of the 2000
POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions explicitly considers a
cardiovasculardisease as an occupational disease if the same was
contracted underworkingconditions thatinvolveany ofthefollowing
risks a)If the heart disease was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was
clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature
of his work.b)The strain of the work that brings about an acute
attack must be sufficient severity and must be followed within 24
hours by the clinical signs of cardiac insult to constitute causal
relationship.c)If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before
being subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of
cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms
and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal
relationship.Consequently, for cardiovascular disease to constitute
an occupational disease for which the seafarer may claim
compensation, it is incumbent upon said seafarer to show that he
developed the same under any of the three conditions identified
above.[4]In labor cases as in other administrative proceedings,
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required. The
oft-repeated rule is that whoever claims entitlement to the
benefits provided by law should establish his or her right thereto
by substantial evidence.[5]Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not
merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or
work-aggravation imposed by law is real and not merely
apparent.[6]In this case, the Court is of the considered view that
respondent failed to prove that his ailment was work-related and
was acquired during his 4-month sea deployment. Respondent claims
that sometime in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart
disease when he suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and
fatigability.[7]He, however, never substantiated such claim. He
never showed any written note, request or record about any medical
check-up, consultation or treatment.Similarly, he failed to
substantiate his allegation that after his arrival inManilaonJuly
18, 2003, he reported to petitioners office onJuly 31, 2003to seek
medical consultation for the discomfort he was experiencing but
petitioners ignored him.[8]He also alleged that onAugust 4, 2003,
more or less sixteen (16) days after arriving inManila, he
underwent a physical and laboratory examination at the Maritime
Clinic for International Service, Inc. conducted by petitioners
where he was declared to be unfit for sea duty. Again, there is no
record of this except his self-serving claim. What is on record is
that onSeptember 24, 2003, respondent surfaced demanding payment of
disability benefits.Respondent failed to comply with the mandatory
3-day ruleMore importantly, respondent failed to comply with the
mandatory 3-day medical examination deadline provided in Section
20(B), paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels. As earlier stated, it was only onSeptember 24,
2003, or more than two (2) months after his arrival inManila, that
he sought a medical opinion from Dr. Vicaldo who declared him unfit
to work as a seaman due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
atrial fibrillation and diabetes mellitus II.[9]Section 20(B),
paragraph (3) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going
Vessels, reads:Section 20(B), paragraph (3) thereof states:X x x.3.
Upon sign off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer
is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage
until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent
disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician
but in no case shall this period exceed one-hundred twenty (120)
days.For this purpose, the seafarershall submit himself to a
post-employment medical examination by a company-designated
physician within three working days upon his returnexceptwhen he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice
to the agency within the same period is deemed as
compliance.Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory
reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right
to claim the above benefits. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]
While the rule is not absolute, there is no credible explanation
from respondent why he failed to comply with the mandatory rule
considering his claim that in July, 2003, he was suffering from
chest pain, shortness of breath and fatigue. An award of disability
benefit to a seaman in this case, despite non-compliance with
strict mandatory requirements of the law, cannot be sustained.The
rationale behind the rule can easily be divined. Within three days
from repatriation, it would be fairly easier for a physician to
determine if the illness was work-related or not.After that period,
there would be difficulty in ascertaining the real cause of the
illness.To ignore the rule would set a precedent with negative
repercussions because it would open the floodgates to a limitless
number of seafarers claiming disability benefits.It would certainly
be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the
cause of a claimants illness considering the passage of time. In
such a case, the employers would have no protection against
unrelated disability claims.Respondent claims that the 3-day
mandatory rule is not applicable as it is only for those who were
repatriated for medical reasons. This could only mean that he had
no medical reason then.In his pleadings, he claimed that sometime
in July 2003, he showed manifestations of a heart disease as he
suddenly felt chest pains, shortness of breath and
fatigability.[10]He, however, failed to disclose when exactly in
July 2003 that he felt those manifestations whether before or after
his repatriation onJuly 18, 2003. If it was before the said date,
he should have submitted himself to a medical examination three
days after repatriation.The Courts ruling is not novel.In the past,
the Court repeatedly denied the payment of disability benefits to
seamen who failed to comply with the mandatory reporting and
examination requirement. Lately, in the recent case ofAlex C.
Cootauco v. MMS Phil. Maritime Services, Inc.,[11]it was
written:For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a
post-employment medical examination by acompany-designatedphysician
within three working daysupon his return except when he is
physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice
to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance.
Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting
requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim
the above benefits.As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon
sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three working days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment.
Applying the above provision of Section 20(B), paragraph (3),
petitioner is required to undergo post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician within three working
days from arrival, except when he is physically incapacitated to do
so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period would suffice.In Maunlad Transport, Inc. v. Manigo, Jr.,
this Court explicitly declared that it is mandatory for a claimant
to be examined by a company-designated physicianwithin three
daysfrom his repatriation. The unexplained omission of this
requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability
benefits.The NLRC and the Court of Appeals determined that
petitioner did not observe the established procedure as there is no
proof at all that he reported to the office of the respondents. We
see no reason to depart from their findings. While petitioner
remains firm that he reported to the office of the respondents for
mandatory reporting, the records are bereft of any proof to fortify
his claim. The onus probandi falls on petitioner to establish or
substantiate such claim by the requisite quantum of evidence. There
is absolutely no evidence on record to prove petitioners claim that
he reported to respondents office for mandatory reportorial
requirement. Petitioner therefore failed to adduce substantial
evidence as basis for the grant of relief. [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]The Court reiterated the same ruling in the
case ofCoastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. vs. Elmer T.
Esguerra,[12]where it was written:For this purpose, the
seafarershall submit himself to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician withinthree working
daysupon his returnexcept when he is physically incapacitated to do
so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same
period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply
with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.If a doctor
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third
doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer.
The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.Theforegoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it
is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task
of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due
to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's
employment. Concededly, this does not mean that the assessment of
said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the
labor tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer
has the prerogative to request a second opinion and to consult a
physician of his choice regarding his ailment or injury, in which
case the medical report issued by the latter shall be evaluated by
the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For
the seamans claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he
should be examined by a company-designated physician within three
days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory
reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in
forfeiture of the right to claim the compensation and disability
benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. [Emphases and underscoring
supplied]WHEREFORE,the petition isGRANTED.TheSeptember 16,
2009Decision of the Court of Appeals and its March 3, 2010
Resolution are herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE,andtheOctober 17,
2005andJanuary 24, 2006Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission areREINSTATED.SO ORDERED.
FLOURISH MARITIME SHIPPING and LOLITA UY,Petitioners,- versus
-DONATO A. ALMANZOR,Respondent.
DECISIONThis is a Petition for Review on Certiorariunder Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1]of the Court of
Appeals datedFebruary 27, 2007and its Resolution[2]datedMay 18,
2007in CA-G.R. SP No. 95056.The assailed Decision affirmed with
modification the Decision[3]of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) datedApril 28, 2006in NLRC NCR CA NO. 046596-05
which, in turn, affirmed the Decision[4]of Labor Arbiter Lutricia
F. Quitevis-Alconcel, datedOctober 7, 2005in OFW NLRC CASE NO. (M)
05-01-0243-00.The facts of the case are as follows:Respondent
Donato A. Almanzor entered into a two-year employment contract with
Flourish Maritime Shipping as fisherman, with a monthly salary of
NT15,840.00 with free meals every day.It was, likewise, agreed that
respondent would be provided with suitable
accommodations.[5]OnOctober 1, 2004, respondent was deployed
toTaipei,Taiwanas part of the crew of a fishing vessel known as FV
Tsang Cheng 66.Respondent was surprised to learn that there were
only five (5) crew members on board and he had to buy his own food,
contrary to the agreed stipulation of free food and
accommodation.[6]While on board, the master of the vessel gave
respondent orders which he could not understand; thus, he failed to
obey him.Consequently, enraged at not being obeyed, the master
struck him, hitting the right dorsal part of his body. He then
requested medical assistance, but the master refused.[7]Hence, he
sought the help of petitioner Lolita Uy (the manning agency owner),
who then talked to the master of the vessel.While the vessel was
docked at theTaipeiport, respondent was informed that he would be
repatriated.Upon his arrival in thePhilippines, he reported to
petitioners and sought medical assistance after which he was
declared fit to work.Petitioners promised that he would be
redeployed, but it turned out that it was no longer possible
because of hisage, for then he was already 49 years old.Thus,
respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract, earned wages, moral
and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees.Petitioners countered
that respondent voluntarily resigned[8]from his employment and
returned to thePhilippineson the same day.They, likewise, sought
the dismissal of the complaint for failure of respondent to comply
with the grievance machinery and arbitration clause embodied in the
contract of employment.Lastly, they insisted that respondent failed
to discharge the burden to prove that he was illegally
dismissed.[9]OnOctober 7, 2005, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring respondents guilty of illegal
dismissal.Respondents Flourish Maritime Shipping and Wang Yung Chin
are hereby ordered to jointly and solidarily pay complainant Donato
A. Almanzor the amount of NT15,840.00 times six (6) months or a
total of NT Ninety-Five Thousand Forty (NT95,040.00).Respondents
shall pay the total amount in its peso equivalent at the time of
actual payment plus legal interest.All other claims herein sought
and prayed for are hereby denied for lack of legal and factual
bases.SO ORDERED.[10]On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission
affirmedin totothe Labor Arbiters findings.Unsatisfied, petitioners
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals on petition
forcertiorari.[11]The appellate court agreed with the Labor
Arbiters conclusion (as affirmed by the NLRC) that respondent was
illegally dismissed from employment.It, however, modified the NLRC
decision by increasing the monetary award due respondent in
accordance with its interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act
(R.A.) 8042.[12]Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC Board of
Commissioners awarded such amount equivalent to respondents salary
for six (6) months (3 months for every year of the unexpired term)
considering that respondents employment contract covered a two-year
period and he was dismissed from employment after only 26 days of
actual work.The CA, however, disagreed with such
interpretation.According to the CA, since respondent actually
worked for 26 days and was thereafter dismissed from employment,
the unexpired portion of the contract is one (1) year, eleven (11)
months and four (4) days.For the unexpired one (second) whole year,
the court awarded three months salary.As to the 11 months and 4
days of the first year, the appellate court refused to apply the
three-month rule.Instead, in addition to three months (for the
unexpired second year), it awarded full compensation corresponding
to the whole unexpired term of 11 months and 4 days.Thus, the CA
deemed it proper to award a total amount equivalent to the
respondents salary for 14 months and 4 days.[13]Petitioners now
raise the following issues for resolution:1.WHETHER OR NOT THE
THREE LETTERS ARE RESIGNATION LETTERS OR QUITCLAIMS.2.WHETHER OR
NOT THE MODIFICATION OF THE NLRC DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
IS CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]Simply stated, petitioners want this Court
to resolve the issue of whether respondent was illegally dismissed
from employment and if so, to determine the correct award of
compensation due respondent.The Labor Arbiter concluded that
petitioners, who had the burden of proof, failed to adduce any
convincing evidence to establish and substantiate its claim that
respondent voluntarily resigned from employment.[15]Likewise, the
NLRC held that petitioners failed to show that respondent was not
physically fit to perform work due to his old age.Moreover, the
labor tribunal said that petitioners failed to prove that the
employment contract indeed provided a grievance
machinery.[16]Clearly, both labor tribunals correctly concluded, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that respondent was not
redeployed for work, in violation of their employment
contract.Perforce, the termination of respondents services is
without just or valid cause.We reiterate the dictum that this Court
is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater
force in labor cases.Factual questions are for the labor tribunals
to resolve.In this case, the factual issues were resolved by the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.Their findings were affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor tribunal has based its determination.[17]On the amount
of the award due respondent, Section 10 of R.A. 8042
provides:SECTION 10.Money Claims. x x xx x x xIn case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest at twelve percent (12%)per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.x x
x x.The correct interpretation of this provision was settled
inMarsaman Manning Agency Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission[18]where this Court held that the choice of which amount
to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker,i.e.,
whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, or three (3) months salary for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year
or more.[19]The employment contract involved in the instant case
covers a two-year period but the overseas contract worker actually
worked for only 26 days prior to his illegal dismissal.Thus, the
three months salary rule applies.There is a similar factual milieu
between the case at bench andOlarte v. Nayona.[20]The only
difference lies in the length of the subject employment
contract:Olarteinvolved a one-year contract; while the employment
in this case covers a two-year period.However, they both fall under
the three months salary rule since the term of the contract is at
least one year or more.InOlarte,as well as inJSS Indochina
Corporation v. Ferrer,[21]we ordered the employer of an illegally
dismissed overseas contract worker to pay an amount equivalent to
three (3) months salary.We are not in accord with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondent should be paid his salaries for 14
months and 4 days.Records show that his actual employment lasted
only for 26 days.Applying the above provision, and considering that
the employment contract covers a two-year period, we agree with the
Labor Arbiters disposition, as affirmed by the NLRC, that
respondent is entitled to six (6) months salary.This is obviously
what the law provides.WHEREFORE,the petition isPARTIALLY
GRANTED.The Decision of the Court of Appeals, datedFebruary 27,
2007, and its Resolution datedMay 18, 2007in CA-G.R. SP No. 95056,
areAFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATIONthat the monetary award to be paid
the respondent shall be the amount set forth in the decision of the
Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170834 August 29, 2008PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ANTONIO NOGRA,accused-appellant.D
E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before the Court is an appeal from
the Decision1dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 98-7182,
convicting Antonio Nogra (appellant) of large scale illegal
recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),2otherwise known as the
"Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."3The
inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga
and appellant with large scale illegal recruitment reads as
follows:That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November,
1997 in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the General
Manager and Operations Manager of LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS
RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion Grande, Naga City,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist,
hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, for a fee, recruit
and promise employment/job placement to the herein complaining
witnesses RENATO ALDEN, OLIVER SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA
LUALHATI, PILIPINA MENDOZA and KERWIN DONACAO, but failed to
actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to reimburse
their documentation, placement and processing expenses for purposes
of deployment despite their repeated demands for the return of the
same, to their damage and prejudice in the amounts as may be proven
in court.CONTRARY TO LAW.4Only appellant was brought to the
jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then and
still is at large. Arraigned with the assistance of counsel,
appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to the crime charged.
Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.Of the six complainants, the
prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato Alden,
Fe Zaballa, Teofila Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao.
Anaielyn Sarmiento, wife of complainant Oliver Sarmiento, also
testified for the prosecution.The facts, as established by the
prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as follows:Appellant held office at Loran
International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion
Grande, Naga City (p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his
table prominently displayed his name and position as operations
manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12,
1999; p. 21, TSN, November 19, 1998). The license of Loran also
indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February
10, 1999). The POEA files also reflect his position as operations
manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN, November 19,
1998).Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to
apply for a job as hotel worker for Saipan. He was interviewed by
appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and
medical certificate and to pay the placement fee. Alden paid the
amount ofP31,000.00. The additional amount ofP4,000.00 was to be
paid prior to his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17,
1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a period
of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not
able to leave. Alden filed a complaint with the NBI when he was not
able to recover the amount and could no longer talk with appellant
(p. 6, TSN, November 17, 1998).On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati
applied for employment as hotel worker for Saipan with Loran (pp.
1-3, 10, TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit
an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the processing
fee in the amount ofP35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She
paid the amount ofP35,000.00 to Loran's secretary in the presence
of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4 months she
would be able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite
repeated follow-ups, Lualhati was unable to work in Saipan. She
demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount was not
returned to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15,
TSN, November 19, 1998).Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza
went to Loran to apply for employment as hotel worker (p. 4, TSN,
July 12, 1999). She paid the amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fee.
When she was not able to work abroad, she went to Loran and sought
the return ofP35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21,
1999).Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to
apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan (p. 4, TSN, February
10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police
clearance, previous employment certificate and his passport. He
paid the placement fee ofP35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10,
1999). After paying the amount, he was told to wait for two to
three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he demanded
the return of the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7,
TSN, February 10, 1999).During the first week of November 1997,
Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied for
overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they
submitted his medical certificate and certification of previous
employment. They were also made to pay the amount ofP27,000.00 as
processing fee. Oliver Sarmiento was promised that within 1 month,
he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told
that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not
able to leave and what he paid was not refunded, he filed a
complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).Sometime in
May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with
Loran (p. 4, TSN, May 21, 1999). She was required to submit her
medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI
clearance and police clearance. She was also required to pay the
amount ofP35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not be
deployed, she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not
returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).5On the other hand, appellant
presented the following evidence:The defense presented [appellant]
Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier, Maritess
Mesina.From their testimonies it was established that LORAN
INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., (LORAN, for brevity)
was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and Japanese national Kataru
Tanaka (TSN, September 30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994,
[appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main
office at Libertad, Mandaluyong City that it was in need of a
liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-owner and
co-accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager
as the agency was then still in the process of completing the list
of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January 31, 2001,
p. 5).[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994.
In 1995, he was transferred to Naga City when the agency opened a
branch office thereat. Although he was designated as the Operations
Manager, [appellant] Nogra was a mere employee of the agency. He
was receiving a monthly salary ofP5,000.00 and additionalP2,000.00
monthly meal allowance. He was in-charge of the advertisement of
the company. He also drove for the company. He fetched from the
airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them to hotels
and other places. (TSN, May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).Although part-owner
Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually
remained in control of the branch office in Naga City. She
conducted the final interview of the applicants and transacted with
the foreign employers. She also controlled the financial matters
and assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN, September 20,
2000, pp. 8-9). The placement and processing fees collected by the
agency in Naga City were all deposited in the bank account of Lorna
Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant]
Nogra (TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-22).6On March 26, 2003, the
RTC rendered Judgment7finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. Thefalloof the decision
reads:WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment
Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections 6(m) and 7(b) of RA
8042, otherwise known as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon him the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).SO ORDERED.8On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal.9The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to this Court.Conformably to the ruling
inPeople v. Mateo,10the case was referred to the CA for
intermediate review.11On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a
Decision12affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being
an employee is not a valid defense since employees who have
knowledge and active participation in the recruitment activities
may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based
upon this Court's ruling inPeople v. Chowdury13andPeople v.
Corpuz;14that appellant had knowledge of and active participation
in the recruitment activities since all the prosecution witnesses
pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached
regarding their plans of working overseas and he was the one who
told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers
that they had to submit; that the mere fact that appellant was not
issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him from any
liability but rather strongly suggests his guilt; that appellant's
invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his favor since there
is no established rule that non-flight is, in every instance, an
indication of innocence.A Notice of Appeal15having been timely
filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of the case to
this Court for further review.In his Brief, appellant assigns as
errors the following:ITHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A MERE EMPLOYEE OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY
DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS OPERATIONS MANAGER.IITHE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE-CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT CRIMINALY LIABLE
FOR HIS AGENCY'S TRANSACTIONS.16Appellant argues that the agency
was under the management and control of Orciga, and that he was a
mere employee; that he could not be held personally liable for
illegal recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was
validly issued special authority to recruit workers, which was
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA); that his non-flight is indicative of his
innocence.Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not
a mere clerk or secretary of Loran, but its Operations Manager who
directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising
private complainants work abroad, but failed to deploy them and
refused to reimburse the applicants' placement fees when
demanded.The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in
affirming the decision of the RTC.R.A. No. 8042 broadened the
concept of illegal recruitment under theLabor Code17and provided
stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic
sabotage,i.e.,Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal
Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042
defined when recruitment is illegal:SEC. 6.Definition. For purposes
of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or
procuring workers and includes referring, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit
or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder
who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad
to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any person,whether
a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:x x x
x(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined
by the Department of Labor and Employment; and(m) Failure to
reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
where the deployment does not actually take place without the
worker's fault.Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or
in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic
sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually
or as a group.The persons criminally liable for the above offenses
are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or
direction of their business shall be liable.(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)In the present case, evidence for the
prosecution showed that LoranInternational Overseas Recruitment
Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to
establish a branch office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a
licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal
recruitment, should he commit or omit to do any of the acts
enumerated in Section 6.Appellant was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No.
8042. Section 6 (l) refers to the failure to actually deploy
without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse
expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases
in which the deployment does not actually take place without the
workers fault.A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence
reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section
6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure
to deploy bewithout valid reason"as determined by the Department of
Labor and Employment." The law envisions that there be independent
evidence from the DOLE to establish the reason for non-deployment,
such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the
DOLE was presented in the present case to establish the reason for
the accused's failure to actually deploy private complainants.
Thus, appellant cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A.
No. 8042.As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has
proven beyond reasonable doubt that private complainants made
payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts
paid by private complainants when they were not deployed. The
prosecution presented the receipts issued by Loran to private
complainants evidencing payment of placement fees ranging
fromP27,000.00 toP35,000.00.Appellant does not dispute that private
complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the
placement fees they paid were not returned to them despite demand.
However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a
mere employee of Loran.The Court is unswayed by appellant's
contention.The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042
explicitly states that those criminally liable are the "principals,
accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the
officers having control, management or direction of their business
shall be liable."Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of
the complaining witnesses and the documentary evidence for the
prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of
Loran, but its Operations Manager. The license of Loran, the files
of the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office
desk reflected his position as Operations Manager. As such, he
received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed
and informed them of the agencys requirements prior to their
deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical
certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of
placement fee. He was also responsible for the radio advertisements
and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for
employment with the agency. Clearly, as Operations Manager, he was
in the forefront of the recruitment activities.The defense of being
a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large
scale illegal recruitment. InPeople v. Gasacao18andPeople v.
Sagayaga,19the Court reiterated the ruling inPeople v.
Cabais,20People v. Chowdury21andPeople v. Corpuz22that an employee
of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be
held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its
employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in the recruitment process.In the present case, it was
clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private
complainants. He interviewed and informed them of the documentary
requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a
three or four month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to
deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees
paid.The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his
non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight of an
accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to
establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be
due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of
innocence.23Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that
the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant other
than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of
illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire and accuse
another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt
feelings would certainly be against human nature and
experience.24Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for
the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive
and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the
solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence.25It is a
settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including
their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled to
great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when
the CA affirmed such findings.26After all, the trial court is in
the best position to determine the value and weight of the
testimonies of witnesses.27The absence of any showing that the
trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
that, if considered, might affect the result of the case, or that
its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the
trial courts determination according credibility to the prosecution
evidence.Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042,
illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in large scale,viz, committed
against three or more persons individually or as a group. In the
present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts
of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts tantamount to
economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00
nor more thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage.Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly
found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale
illegal recruitment.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDISMISSED. The Decision
dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal
recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic Act No. 8042
isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178204 August 20, 2008[Formerly G.R. No. 156497]THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee,vs.MARCOS GANIGAN,appellant.D E
C I S I O NTINGA,J.:Before us for automatic review is the
Decision1dated 14 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals affirming
the judgment of conviction2for the crime of illegal recruitment
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 21.3In an Information filed before the RTC, accused Ruth,
Monchito, Eddie, Avelin Sulaiman and Marcos (appellant), all
surnamed Ganigan, were charged with illegal recruitment committed
as follows:That sometime between the period from July and August
1998 in Plaridel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing themselves
to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for
employment in New Zealand, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously recruit for a fee the following persons namely: MAURO
EUSEBIO, VALENTINO CRISOSTOMO and LEONORA DOMINGO, all residents of
Sto. Nio, Plaridel, Bulacan for employment in New Zealand, without
first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.CONTRARY TO LAW.4Only
appellant was arrested. The other accused remained at
large.Appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. Trial ensued.The three private complainants, Leonora
Domingo (Leonora), Mauro Reyes (Mauro), and Valentino Crisostomo
(Valentino), testified for the prosecution.They narrated that they
first met appellant in the house of Manolito Reyes in Plaridel,
Bulacan in June 1998. Appellant allegedly made representations to
private complainants, among others, that his brother, Monchito, and
his sister-in-law, Ruth, had the capacity to recruit apple and
grape pickers for employment in New Zealand.5On 5 July 1998, the
group, composed of the three private complainants and 35
others,6went to La Union where they met with Monchito and Ruth.
Ruth proceeded to explain their prospective employment with a
$1,200.00 monthly salary. Ruth also required the group to attend
bible study sessions every Sunday because their prospective
employer is a devout Catholic. Pursuant to their desire to work in
New Zealand, the group attended bible study from 5 July to December
1998.7Each member of the group was asked to payP2,000.00 as
assurance fee.8Leonora paid an additionalP400.00 for her National
Statistics Office-issued birth certificate,9P500.00 for physical
examination andP320.00 for medical fee.10Mauro gave an
additionalP320.00 for medical expenses11whereas Valentino shelled
outP180.00 for pictures,P1,000.00 for bio-data andP350.00 for
medical examination.12The three attested that appellant received
their payment and a document was prepared by one of their
companions as evidence of the receipt.13The exhibits submitted by
the prosecution show that Monchito acknowledged having received a
total ofP101,480.00 from various applicants.14Other documents
showed that appellant and Ruth received payment from the
applicants.15Ruth and appellant allegedly promised them that they
would leave for New Zealand before October 1998. When they were
unable to leave, however, they were told that their prospective
employer would arrive in the Philippines on 22 November 1998. On
the designated date, they were informed that their prospective
employer fell down the stairway of the airplane. An interview was
then scheduled on 29 December 1998 but on that day, they were told
that their prospective employer had been held up. This prompted the
complainants to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to check on the background of the
accused.They learned that appellant, Ruth and Monchito do not have
the authority to recruit workers for employment
abroad.16Certifications to that effect were issued by the
POEA.17Appellant denied having recruited private complainants for
work abroad. He claimed that he himself was also a victim as he had
also paidP3,000.00 for himself andP2,000.00 for his daughter. He
likewise attended the bible study sessions as a requirement for the
overseas employment.18He contended that he was merely implicated in
the case because he was the only one apprehended among the
accused.19The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of
the crime of illegal recruitment. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:Wherefore, all premises considered, this Court finds
and so holds that the prosecution was able to establish by proof
beyond reasonable doubt the criminal culpability of the accused
Marcos Ganigan on the offense charged against him. Accordingly,
this Court finds him guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale resulting in economic sabotage as defined under Section
6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00.Accused Marcos Ganigan
is also directed to pay complainants Leonora Domingo, Mauro Reyes
and Valentino Crisostomo the amounts ofP2,400.00 each plus the sum
ofP500.00 for Leonora Domingo for actual damages andP25,000.00 as
and for moral damages.With regard to accused Ruth Ganigan, Monchito
Ganigan, Eddie Ganigan and Avelin Sulaiman Ganigan, who remain at
large until this time, the case against them is ordered archived.
Let an alias Warrant of arrest be issued for their apprehension.SO
ORDERED.20The trial court found that all elements of illegal
recruitment in large scale had been established through the
testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution.In view of
the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to this Court on
automatic review. However, this Court resolved to transfer the case
to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review in light of our
ruling in People v. Mateo.21On 14 November 2006, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.Upon receipt of the
unfavorable decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 15
October 2007, this Court resolved to accept the case and to require
the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental
briefs. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Manifestation and Motion22stating that it would no longer file any
supplemental briefs and instead adopt its appellee's brief filed on
12 January 2006. Appellant likewise manifested that he would merely
adopt his appellant's brief.23Appellant argues that the prosecution
has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He
maintains that he did not participate in any recruitment activity
and that the alleged payments made by private complainants were for
membership in the Christian Catholic Mission, as shown by the fact
that private complainants have regularly attended bible study
sessions from 5 July to November 1998. He also points out that
nothing on record would show that the necessary training or
orientation seminar pertaining to the supposed employment has ever
been conducted.Assumingarguendothat the Christian Catholic Mission
was only a front to an illegal venture, appellant avers that he was
not part of the conspiracy because he was a victim himself as he in
fact also paid assurance fees for membership in the Christian
Catholic Mission. He laments that aside from introducing private
complainants to Ruth, he has not done any other act tantamount to
recruitment.The OSG defended the decision of the trial court in
giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the
complaining witnesses. It contends that there is no showing that
the victims were impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify
against appellant. It asserts that the collective testimony of the
witnesses has categorically established appellant's participation
in the crime.24The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when
these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license
or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in
the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders
undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and
placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, a third element is added - that the
accused commits the acts against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.25Article 13(b) defines recruitment and
placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers; and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not." In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for employment
purposes.26Since appellant, along with the other accused, made
misrepresentations concerning their purported power and authority
to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process collected
from private complainants various amounts in the guise of placement
fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal
recruitment. In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need
not even expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons
who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that
these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to
enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the
latter to tender payment of fees.27It is clear from the testimonies
of private complainants that appellant undertook to recruit them
for a purported employment in New Zealand and in the process
collected various amounts from them as "assurance fees" and other
fees related thereto.Private complainants testified in a clear,
positive and straightforward manner. Leonora testified that
appellant recruited her to work in New Zealand as a fruit picker
and was promised by Ruth a monthly salary of $1,200.00. She was
required to pay an assurance fee ofP2,000.00. She later learned
that appellant and his cohorts had not been licensed by the POEA to
recruit for overseas employment.28On cross-examination, she
confirmed that she turned over the amount of fees to appellant with
the understanding that such payment was for employment
abroad.29Mauro similarly recounted that he was introduced to
Monchito and Ruth by appellant as an applicant for farm work in New
Zealand. He was told to prepareP2,000.00 as assurance fee, which he
paid to appellant. When he was unable to leave, he checked with the
POEA and found out that appellant had no license to
recruit.30During the cross-examination, Mauro was firm in his
stance that he paid the amount ofP2,000.00 as assurance of
employment in New Zealand. Furthermore, he regularly attended the
bible study as a requirement for said employment.31Valentino's
testimony corroborated that of Leonora and Mauro.32The trial court
found these testimonies credible and convincing.Well-settled is the
doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of
the trial court particularly on the ascertainment of the
credibility of witnesses; this can only be discarded or disturbed
when it appears in the record that the trial court overlooked,
ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or
significance which if considered would have altered the result.33In
the present case, we find no reason to depart from the rule.Verily,
we agree with the OSG that the testimonies of private complainants
have adequately established the elements of the crime, as well as
appellant's indispensable participation therein. Appellant
recruited at least three persons, the private complainants in this
case, giving them the impression that he and his relatives had the
capability of sending them to New Zealand for employment as fruit
pickers. The OSG adds that appellant went to Bulacan to invite the
victims and accompanied them to a fellowship and briefing in La
Union; that appellant misrepresented that joining the religious
group would ensure their overseas employment; and that appellant
without any license or authority to recruit, collected various
amounts from private complainants.Appellant miserably failed to
convince this Court that the payments made by the complainants were
actually for their membership in the religious organization. He did
not present any document to prove this allegation.For their part,
private complainants were adamant that the payments made to
appellant were for purposes of employment to New Zealand. They
further explained that their participation in the bible study
sessions was but a requirement imposed by appellant because their
prospective employer was also a member of the same religious
group.Moreover, appellant has failed to rebut the evidence
presented by the prosecution consisting of a receipt of payment
signed by him.34His flimsy denial that the signature on the receipt
was not his own does not merit consideration in light of the trial
court's contrary finding.As between the positive and categorical
testimonies of private complainants and the unsubstantiated denial
proffered by appellant, this Court is inclined to give more weight
to the former.In sum, appellant is correctly found guilty of large
scale illegal recruitment tantamount to economic sabotage.Under
Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less thanP500,000.00 nor more
thanP1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00867
isAFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169076 January 23, 2007PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Appellee,vs.JOSEPH JAMILOSA,Appellant.D E C I S I O
NCALLEJO, SR.,J.:This is an appeal from the Decision1of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City in Criminal Case No.
Q-97-72769 convicting appellant Joseph Jamilosa of large scale
illegal recruitment under Sections 6 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042, and sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay
aP500,000.00 fine.The Information charging appellant with large
scale illegal recruitment was filed by the Senior State Prosecutor
on August 29, 1997. The inculpatory portion of the Information
reads:That sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, or
thereabout in the City of Quezon, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, representing to
have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and
deploy or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and
promise to deploy, for a fee the herein complainants, namely, Haide
R. Ruallo, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh,
for work or employment in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. in
Nursing Home and Care Center without first obtaining the required
license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).Contrary to law.2On arraignment, the
appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.The case for the prosecution, as synthesized by the Court of
Appeals (CA), is as follows:The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses, namely: private complainants Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine
M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh.Witness Imelda D. Bamba testified that
on January 17, 1996, she met the appellant in Cubao, Quezon City on
board an aircon bus. She was on her way to Shoemart (SM), North
EDSA, Quezon City where she was working as a company nurse. The
appellant was seated beside her and introduced himself as a
recruiter of workers for employment abroad. The appellant told her
that his sister is a head nurse in a nursing home in Los Angeles,
California, USA and he could help her get employed as a nurse at a
monthly salary of Two Thousand US Dollars ($2,000.00) and that she
could leave in two (2) weeks time. He further averred that he has
connections with the US Embassy, being a US Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agent on official mission in the Philippines
for one month. According to the appellant, she has to pay the
amount of US$300.00 intended for the US consul. The appellant gave
his pager number and instructed her to contact him if she is
interested to apply for a nursing job abroad.On January 21, 1996,
the appellant fetched her at her office. They then went to her
house where she gave him the photocopies of her transcript of
records, diploma, Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) license
and other credentials. On January 28 or 29, 1996, she handed to the
appellant the amount of US$300.00 at the McDonalds outlet in North
EDSA, Quezon City, and the latter showed to her a photocopy of her
supposed US visa. The appellant likewise got several pieces of
jewelry which she was then selling and assured her that he would
sell the same at the US embassy. However, the appellant did not
issue a receipt for the said money and jewelry. Thereafter, the
appellant told her to resign from her work at SM because she was
booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for Los Angeles,
California, USA on February 25, 1996.The appellant promised to see
her and some of his other recruits before their scheduled departure
to hand to them their visas and passports; however, the appellant
who was supposed to be with them in the flight failed to show up.
Instead, the appellant called and informed her that he failed to
give the passport and US visa because he had to go to the province
because his wife died. She and her companions were not able to
leave for the United States. They went to the supposed residence of
the appellant to verify, but nobody knew him or his whereabouts.
They tried to contact him at the hotel where he temporarily
resided, but to no avail. They also inquired from the US embassy
and found out that there was no such person connected with the said
office. Thus, she decided to file a complaint with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI).Prosecution witness Geraldine Lagman,
for her part, testified that she is a registered nurse by
profession. In the morning of January 22, 1996, she went to SM
North EDSA, Quezon City to visit her cousin Imelda Bamba. At that
time, Bamba informed her that she was going to meet the appellant
who is an FBI agent and was willing to help nurses find a job
abroad. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. On the same date at
about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, she and Bamba met the appellant
at the SM Fast-Food Center, Basement, North EDSA, Quezon City. The
appellant convinced them of his ability to send them abroad and
told them that he has a sister in the United States. Lagman told
the appellant that she had no working experience in any hospital
but the appellant assured her that it is not necessary to have one.
The appellant asked for US$300.00 as payment to secure an American
visa and an additional amount of Three Thousand Four Hundred Pesos
(P3,400.00) as processing fee for other documents.On January 24,
1996, she and the appellant met again at SM North EDSA, Quezon City
wherein she handed to the latter her passport and transcript of
records. The appellant promised to file the said documents with the
US embassy. After one (1) week, they met again at the same place
and the appellant showed to her a photocopy of her US visa. This
prompted her to give the amount of US$300.00 and two (2) bottles of
Black Label to the appellant. She gave the said money and liquor to
the appellant without any receipt out of trust and after the
appellant promised her that he would issue the necessary receipt
later. The appellant even went to her house, met her mother and
uncle and showed to them a computer printout from Northwest
Airlines showing that she was booked to leave for Los Angeles,
California, USA on February 25, 1996.Four days after their last
meeting, Extelcom, a telephone company, called her because her
number was appearing in the appellants cellphone documents. The
caller asked if she knew him because they were trying to locate
him, as he was a swindler who failed to pay his telephone bills in
the amount ofP100,000.00. She became suspicious and told Bamba
about the matter. One (1) week before her scheduled flight on
February 25, 1996, they called up the appellant but he said he
could not meet them because his mother passed away. The appellant
never showed up, prompting her to file a complaint with the NBI for
illegal recruitment.Lastly, witness Alma Singh who is also a
registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant on
February 13, 1996 at SM North EDSA, Quezon City when Imelda Bamba
introduced the latter to her. The appellant told her that he is an
undercover agent of the FBI and he could fix her US visa as he has
a contact in the US embassy. The appellant told her