Page 1 of 25 , Pre-print Gender, Poverty and Old-Age Livelihoods in Urban South India in an Era of Globalisation. Oxford Development Studies 40 (3), pp. 324-340, 2012 ISSN 1360-0818. Gender, Poverty and Old Age Livelihoods in Urban South India in an Era of Globalisation Penny Vera-Sanso 1 Abstract: This article examines how older women’s work in the informal economy contributes to family, national and global economies. It is argued here that protecting and promoting older women’s livelihoods will not only serve the interests of older women, but will also have much wider social and economic significance. Drawing on fieldwork undertaken over the last two decades in urban South India, the article demonstrates that amongst the poorest families, rather than being dependent on spouse or family, older women are often self-supporting, support husbands and subsidise the incomes of younger relatives. Older women’s work not only helps to reduce family poverty, it is critical to the distribution of agricultural produce in urban areas and supports India’s global competitiveness. The article identifies how state and market responses to liberalisation and globalisation are threatening older women’s livelihoods while failing to provide adequate safety nets for older women or their families. Key words: old age, livelihoods, globalisation, inter-generational relations, poverty, gender, informal economy The orthodox approach to development and poverty alleviation, ie integration into the global market, foreign direct investment and the reduction of state provision, relies on the assumption of a ‘trickle down’ effect that will expand employment and raise living standards for all. It is claimed that this will enable families to invest in their 1 Birkbeck, University of London, [email protected]. The 2007-10 research project on which this article is mainly based was undertaken in conjunction with V. Suresh, Marlia Hussain, Henry Joe and Arul George from the Centre for Law, Policy and Human Rights, Chennai. I am grateful to a number of generous funders including the University of London for their funding of the 1989-1992 research (Central Research Fund and University Postgraduate Studentship) and the ESRC, EPSRC, BBSRC, MRC and AHRC for funding the 2007-10 research through the New Dynamics of Ageing Programme. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Page 1 of 25
,
Pre-print Gender, Poverty and Old-Age Livelihoods in Urban South India in an Era of Globalisation. Oxford Development Studies 40 (3), pp. 324-340, 2012 ISSN 1360-0818.
Gender, Poverty and Old Age Livelihoods in Urban South India in
an Era of Globalisation
Penny Vera-Sanso1
Abstract:
This article examines how older women’s work in the informal economy contributes
to family, national and global economies. It is argued here that protecting and
promoting older women’s livelihoods will not only serve the interests of older
women, but will also have much wider social and economic significance. Drawing on
fieldwork undertaken over the last two decades in urban South India, the article
demonstrates that amongst the poorest families, rather than being dependent on
spouse or family, older women are often self-supporting, support husbands and
subsidise the incomes of younger relatives. Older women’s work not only helps to
reduce family poverty, it is critical to the distribution of agricultural produce in urban
areas and supports India’s global competitiveness. The article identifies how state and
market responses to liberalisation and globalisation are threatening older women’s
livelihoods while failing to provide adequate safety nets for older women or their
families.
Key words: old age, livelihoods, globalisation, inter-generational relations, poverty,
gender, informal economy
The orthodox approach to development and poverty alleviation, ie integration into the
global market, foreign direct investment and the reduction of state provision, relies on
the assumption of a ‘trickle down’ effect that will expand employment and raise
living standards for all. It is claimed that this will enable families to invest in their
1 Birkbeck, University of London, [email protected]. The 2007-10 research project on which
this article is mainly based was undertaken in conjunction with V. Suresh, Marlia Hussain, Henry Joe
and Arul George from the Centre for Law, Policy and Human Rights, Chennai. I am grateful to a
number of generous funders including the University of London for their funding of the 1989-1992
research (Central Research Fund and University Postgraduate Studentship) and the ESRC, EPSRC,
BBSRC, MRC and AHRC for funding the 2007-10 research through the New Dynamics of Ageing
Programme. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for very helpful comments and suggestions.
status, physical ability, and so on. This categorisation defines not only wage levels
but also access to family resources and state provision and, indeed, the capacity of a
person to control the incomes they earn (Vera-Sanso, 2008). What this means in
practice is that in countries without adequate safety nets, the poorest families must
find the means to ensure that everyone contributes to the household economy.5 In
South India, for example, the means used by poorer families to cap dependency and
increase contributions are the formation of nuclear households soon after marriage
and the postponing of support, in favour of more urgent expenses, for those whose
capacity to secure employment or earn a living is on the wane (Vera-Sanso, 2004).6
Global market integration has amplified these pressures on the poorest and socially
weakest as the downward pressure on wages increases, property values boom and
state policies and resources are switched from an emphasis on the direct support of
local social and economic development through public services and the stimulation of
domestic production, including public-sector driven industrialisation, towards
privatisation and the encouragement of foreign direct investment. Simulation and
field studies have demonstrated that trade liberalisation has led to a reduction of
regular work, an increase in casual work and downward pressure on informal sector
wages (Sinha and Adam, 2007; Kaur et al, 2007; Singh and Sapra, 2007). In an
5 See Vera-Sanso (2010) on social pension policy design and implementation outcomes that exclude
the poor. 6 The only people who are likely to be quickly absorbed into another household are those who have a
sudden and irreversible breakdown in their living arrangements, such as young widows or young
deserted women, widowed or deserted men and orphaned or deserted children. The terms on which
they are incorporated into another’s household varies. By no means will all be incorporated as full,
long-term members of the family, as this would provide the family and incomer with much stronger
claims on each other’s resources. Instead, while young women will be given physical protection, men
will have access to a woman’s domestic labour and children a safe environment, most will be expected
to cover their expenses or to take on unpaid work, often to release someone else into the work force.
See also Shah (1996) whose use of census and other data demonstrates that the joint family household
was never the dominant form in India.
Formatted: Highlight
Formatted: Normal, Line spacing: single
Page 5 of 25
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economy such as India’s where an estimated 86% of workers are engaged in informal
activities and the informal sector in 2004-5 (NCEUS, 2008:3) and where 42% of the
population lives on incomes below the international poverty line of $1.25 per day in
2005 PPP (Chen and Ravallion, 2008) it is clear that, far from bringing prosperity,
trade liberalisation has led to the deepening immiseration of the growing number of
informal sector workers (NCEUS 2009). Evidence from the 2001 Census showing a
substantial increase in the female work participation rate demonstrates that a large
number of women entered the workforce as marginal workers to compensate for the
sharp fall in the numbers of main workers, especially male workers since India began
to liberalise under the Structural Adjustment Programme of 1991 (Government of
India, undated).7 Liberalisation has increased the need for older women from the
poorest sections of society to support themselves and their families, drawing many
more women into contributing to the national product and, indirectly, to the global
economy.8
Gender Differentials in Spousal and Family Support
This article draws on two decades of research undertaken in urban Tamil Nadu, the
south-eastern state of India. The research was undertaken in Chennai, formerly
Madras, between 1989 and 1992 and between 2007 and 2010. In the 1989-92 study a
stratified sample of 200 households was selected for qualitative research from a
purposive sample of 450 households surveyed in two slums.9 In the 2007-10 mixed
methods study of 800 households, a survey was undertaken drawing on a systematic
sample of five low-income settlements, including the two from the 1989-92 study.
From the 800 households, 175 participated in in-depth qualitative research. In
addition, a street market in central Chennai was observed between 2007 and 2011.
Chennai is the capital of the state of Tamil Nadu; in 2001 it had over 7 million
residents of whom 7.8% were aged 60 and over (CMDA, 2008). In recent years the
city has developed an international profile for information technology (IT) and Back
Office Processing sectors (BOP) as well as medical tourism, and has a diverse
industrial base catering to national and international markets.
i) Gendered work trajectories and spousal support
The field research, undertaken over the past two decades with people living in
Chennai’s slums, shows an unanticipated degree of continuity in the patterning of
7 See also Durr-y-Nayab (2010) on older women in Pakistan entering the work force to compensate for
male unemployment. Census of India data on work participation rates for 2011 are not yet available. 8 See NSSO 52
nd Round Report (1998:14) which found that older women in India were more self-
supporting than they had been in the prior, 1986-7, NSS survey of older people. 9 For the definition of ‘slum’ in the 2001 Census see Chandramouli (2003) and for the recent
redefinition see Government of India (2010).
Page 6 of 25
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work force participation across the gendered life course. In all the low-income
settings studied, at the start of the marriage husbands are the sole earners. Married
women only take up paid work to cover the gap between family expenses and their
husband’s income.10
By their late twenties a few widowed and deserted women are
beginning to take up paid work.11
Thereafter the number of women entering paid
work rises as their husband’s contribution to the family budget declines. By the time
men reach their late 40s, their contribution to the household budget is increasingly
irregular due to age-discrimination in the labour market, injury and ill-health.12
Qualitative data gathered between 1989 and 1992 revealed that women living in
Chennai’s slums were generally married before the age of twenty, did not start
working until they were in their late twenties or later and only did so to support their
family because of debts, their husband’s inability or unwillingness to fully support the
family or because of widowhood or desertion (Vera-Sanso 1995). The 2007-10 800
household survey in five of Chennai’s slums and the interview data from a subsample
of 175 of these 800 households reveals that women are continuing to enter the work
force to support or substitute for their husband’s role as family provider. While the
reasons propelling women into the work force have remained the inadequacy or lack
of male incomes, the reasons for that inadequacy have changed since the early 1990s.
In Chennai the population structure and labour market is changing and this is evident
in the settlements studied. The survey of 800 households reveals a preponderance of
young men in the age band 20-39, which corresponds to Chennai’s overall population
structure. This youth bulge is a factor contributing to age discrimination against men
in some sections of the labour market that begins when they reach their early forties.
In addition to age discrimination, older men are facing a reorganisation of labour
markets that marginalises middle-aged and older workers; some skilled crafts are
being displaced by digital technologies and some sections of the job market are being
10
See also Kapadia (2010). 11
In surveys deserted women prefer to identify themselves as widows. 12
As is well-documented, there is a high dependence on alcohol consumption in the slums that
impinges on men’s contributions to the household budget. What is not well-documented, but is
repeatedly reported by slum dwellers, is that the pain and injuries of heavy manual work in unsafe
working conditions force men to seek cheap pain relief that will enable them to continue working and,
further, to come off alcohol men must either find ‘less painful work’ or turn to the more expensive,
over-the-counter pain relievers.
Page 7 of 25
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organised using more formal recruitment practices.13
Added to this increasing
marginalisation of middle-aged and older men is a dramatic drop in the number of
men aged 40-44 (highlighted in Table 1); thereafter the number of men in the
population is outstripped by the number of women to the extent that in the sixty and
above age band, there are 1.6 women to every man.14
Table 2 plots the reported work
participation rate for women and men by age. From this we can see that almost all
men are reported as working by the age of 29 and that there is a long and substantial
tail of older men reported working, with the result that while 78% of all males aged
fifteen or more are reported as working, 30% of all men aged over seventy are
reported as continuing to work. Table 3 plots age and reported work participation
against marital status. It demonstrates that approximately one-third of men reported
as working are single and two-thirds are married. It shows that 90% of men aged 20-
24 are single, that by 35-39 most men are married and at age 60-64 90% of men are
married. Tables 2 and 3 reveal results that run counter to the usual expectations
regarding gender, age and dependency. Table 2 reveals that young men aged 20-24
have a lower reported work force participation rate than older men aged 60-64. Table
3 indicates that young men’s work participation is closely linked to their transition
into marriage, which in Chennai’s slums mainly happens between the ages of 25 and
34. Survey data corroborate qualitative data: the pressure on older married men to
generate income is greater than that on younger unmarried men, especially when we
bear in mind that a number of the younger working men surveyed are apprentices
(mechanics, carpenters and painters) whose work is ‘more learning than earning’.
Table 1: Age distribution of females and males in the settlements studied in 2007-
Kapadia, K (2010) Liberalisation and transformations in India’s informal economy: Female breadwinners in working-class households in Chennai, in Harriss-White, B. and J. Heyer (eds) The Comparative Political Economy of Development: Africa and South Asia Abingdon: Routledge. Kaur R, PK Ghosh and R M Sudarshan (2007) Trade liberalization and informality in
the rice processing industry, in B Harriss-White and A Sinha (eds) Trade
Liberalization and India’s Informal Economy, New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Kreager P and Elisabeth Schroeder-Butterfill (2008) Indonesia against the trend?
Ageing and inter-generational wealth flows in two Indonesian communities,