Datu Michael abas kida vs senate
D E C I S I O NBRION,J.:OnJune 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No.
10153, entitled An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with
the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes was
enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections fromthe 8thof August
2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years
thereafter, to coincide with the countrys regular national and
local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to
appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional
Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.Even
before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153
already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No.
4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed
with this Court.These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was
passed.Factual AntecedentsThe State, through Sections 15 to 22,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and theCordilleras.Section 15
states:Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in theCordillerasconsisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines.Section 18
of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an
organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into
effect the granted autonomy.Section 18. The Congress shall enact an
organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees
from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.The creation of
the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region.On August 1, 1989 or two years
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted
through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.A
plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990as required by Section 18(2),
Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi.RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of
the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days
after its ratification.RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen
and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled
An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended) was the next legislative act passed.This law provided
further refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the
original organic act, and reset the regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.Congress
passed the next law affecting ARMM RA No. 9140[1]- onJune 22,
2001.This law reset the first regular elections originally
scheduled under RA No. 9054, toNovember 26, 2001.It likewise set
the plebiscite to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later thanAugust 15,
2001.RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held onAugust 14,
2001. TheprovinceofBasilanandMarawiCityvoted to join ARMM on the
same date.RA No. 9333[2]was subsequently passed by Congress to
reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2ndMonday of August 2005,
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734
and RA No. 9054, RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a
plebiscite.Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held onAugust 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected.But
onJune 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM
elections to May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.RA No. 10153 originated in the House
of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled onAugust 8, 2011.
OnMarch 22, 2011, the House of Representatives passed HB No. 4146,
with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.After
the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate
Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756), onJune 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators
voted favorably for its passage. OnJune 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and onJune 30,
2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.As mentioned, the
early challenge to RA No. 10153 came through a petition filed with
this Court G.R.No. 196271[3]-assailing the constitutionality of
both HB No. 4146 and SB No. 2756, and challenging the validity ofRA
No. 9333 as well for non-compliance with the constitutional
plebiscite requirement. Thereafter, petitioner Basari Mapupuno
inG.R. No. 196305filed another petition[4]also assailing the
validity of RA No. 9333.With the enactment into law of RA No.
10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM
elections.The law gave rise as well to the filing of the following
petitions against its constitutionality:a)Petition forCertiorariand
Prohibition[5]filed by Rep. Edcel Lagman as a member of the House
of Representatives against Paquito Ochoa, Jr. (in his capacity as
the Executive Secretary) and the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No.
197221;b)Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition[6]filed by Atty.
Romulo Macalintal as a taxpayer against the COMELEC, docketed
asG.R. No. 197282;c)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus, Injunction
and Preliminary Injunction[7]filed by Louis Barok Biraogo against
the COMELEC and Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., docketed
asG.R. No. 197392; andd)Petition forCertiorariand Mandamus[8]filed
by Jacinto Paras as a member of the House of Representatives
against Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr. and the COMELEC,
docketed asG.R. No. 197454.Petitioners Alamarim Centi Tillah and
Datu Casan Conding Cana as registered voters from the ARMM, with
the Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan (a political party
with candidates in the ARMM regional elections scheduled for August
8, 2011), also filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Mandamus[9]against the COMELEC, docketed asG.R. No. 197280, to
assail the constitutionality of RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153.Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum
Philippines, Inc. and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement filed their
ownMotion for Leave to Admit their Motion for Intervention and
Comment-in-Intervention datedJuly 18, 2011. OnJuly 26, 2011, the
Court granted the motion. In the same Resolution, the Court ordered
the consolidation of all the petitions relating to the
constitutionality of HB No. 4146, SB No. 2756, RA No. 9333, and RA
No. 10153.Oral arguments were held onAugust 9, 2011andAugust 16,
2011.Thereafter, the parties were instructed to submit their
respective memoranda within twenty (20) days.OnSeptember 13, 2011,
the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
implementation of RA No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective
officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their term onSeptember 30,
2011.The ArgumentsThe petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No.
9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and
thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite
requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9094 in order to become effective.The petitions assailing RA
No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its
failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.Also cited as grounds are the
alleged violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM,
as well as the failure to adhere to the elective and representative
character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
Lastly, the petitioners challenged the grant to the President of
the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective ARMM officials until the officials elected under the May
2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they
also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President
the power of control over the ARMM, in complete violation of
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.The IssuesFrom the
parties submissions, the following issues were recognized and
argued by the parties in the oral arguments of August 9 and 16,
2011:I.Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization
of electionsII.Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 ConstitutionIII.Whether the passage
of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebisciteA.Does
the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an
amendment to Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?B.Does the
requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to
RA No. 9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and the corollary doctrine on irrepealable
laws?C.Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the
creation of autonomous regions under paragraph 2, Section 18,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution?IV.Whether RA No. 10153 violates
the autonomy granted to the ARMMV.Whether the grant of the power to
appoint OICs violates:A.Section 15, Article X of the 1987
ConstitutionB.Section 16, Article X of the 1987
ConstitutionC.Section 18, Article X of the 1987
ConstitutionVI.Whether the proposal to hold special elections is
constitutional and legal.We shall discuss these issues in the order
they are presented above.OUR RULINGWe resolve toDISMISSthe
petitions and therebyUPHOLDthe constitutionality of RA No. 10153in
toto.I.Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandateThe
respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the
Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:Section 1. The
first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.The first local
elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan
Manila area.Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitutionshall serve untilnoonofJune 30, 1992.Of the Senators
elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining
twelve for three years.xxxSection 5. The six-year term of the
incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is,for purposes of synchronization of elections,
hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.The first regular
elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.We agree with this
position.While the Constitution does not expressly state that
Congress has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear
intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,[10]which show the
extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought
to attain synchronization of elections.[11]The objective behind
setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done
among others through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning
senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections whether national or local to once
every three years.[12]This intention finds full support in the
discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.[13]These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read
with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional
mandate to hold synchronized national and local elections, starting
the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following
elections.This Court was not left behind in recognizing the
synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. InOsmea v. Commission on Elections,[14]we
explained:It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987
Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and
the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour,
date and year noon of June 30, 1992.It is likewise evident from the
wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term
ofsynchronizationis used synonymously as the phraseholding
simultaneouslysince this is the precise intent in terminating their
Office Tenure on the sameday or occasion.This common termination
date will synchronize future elections to once every three years
(Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol.
II, p. 605).That the election for Senators, Members of the House of
Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII)
will have to be synchronized with the election for President and
Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from
the x x xrecords of the proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]Although called regional elections,
the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a local election based on the wording and
structure of the Constitution.A basic rule in constitutional
construction is that the words used should be understood in the
sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary
meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case
the significance thus attached to them prevails.[15]As this Court
explained inPeople v. Derilo,[16][a]s the Constitution is not
primarily a lawyers document, its language should be understood in
the sense that it may have in common. Its words should be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed.Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political
subdivision.[17]Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to
the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM.From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions
are considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident
from Article Xof the Constitution entitled Local
Government.Autonomous regions are established and discussed under
Sections 15 to 21 of this Article the article wholly devoted to
Local Government. That an autonomous region is considered a form of
local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:Section 1. The territorial and
political subdivisions of the Republic of thePhilippinesare the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and theCordillerasas
hereinafter provided.Thus, we find the contention that the
synchronization mandated bythe Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM unmeritorious.We shall refer to
synchronization in the course of our discussions below, as this
concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in
this case and must be recalled time and again for its complete
resolution.II.The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No.
10153The petitioners inG.R. No. 197280also challenge the validity
of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to comply with Section
26(2), Article VI of the Constitution[18]which provides that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws,
they must pass through three readings on separate days. The
exception is when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment.The Court, inTolentino v. Secretary of
Finance,[19]explained the effect of the Presidents certification of
necessity in the following manner:The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment,
etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions
before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally
approved.xxxThat upon the certification of a bill by the President,
the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight
of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the
certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with
the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on
second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the
same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the
President as urgent.In the present case, the records show that the
President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local
elections.[20]Following ourTolentinoruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings requirement.On the
follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate
enactment of these bills since there was no public calamity or
emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling
inTolentino:The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension
of the writ ofhabeas corpusor declaration of martial law Art. VII,
Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the
delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI,
Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of
individuals may be of hazard.Butthe factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard
of review.[Emphasis supplied.]The House of Representatives and the
Senate in the exercise of their legislative discretion gave full
recognition to the Presidents certification and promptly enacted RA
No. 10153.Under the circumstances, nothing short of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify
our intrusion under our power of judicial review.[21]The
petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or
justification for this course of action.Hence, while the judicial
department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the
President's certification by both the House of Representatives and
the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due our
co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial hand.[22]In any case,
despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose that
underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of
every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and
other parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond
to them.Specifically,the purpose with respect to Members of
Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they
shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is in
progress through the enactment process.[23]We find, based on the
records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and
the opponents of the proposed measure had sufficient opportunities
to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify
RA No. 10153 on the cited ground.III.A.RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
are not amendments to RA No. 9054The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and
RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this
law. These provisions require:Section 1. Consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended
or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of
two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and
of the Senate voting separately.Section 3. Any amendment to or
revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when
approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days
or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment
or revision.We find no merit in this contention.In the first place,
neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.As an
examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for
the schedule of thefirstARMM elections and does not fix the date of
the regular elections.A need therefore existed for the Congress to
fix the date of thesubsequentARMM regular elections, which it did
by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously,
these subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap
in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the
subsequent regular elections.This view that Congress thought it
best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion finds support in ARMMs recent
history.To recall,RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that
rescheduled the ARMM elections.The First Organic Act RA No. 6734
not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did
not even fix the specific date of the first ARMM
elections,[24]leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647,[25]RA No. 8176,[26]RA No.
8746,[27]RA No. 8753,[28]and RA No. 9012[29]were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections.Since these laws
did not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they
were not amendments to this latter law.Consequently, there was no
need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.The Second
Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001,
provided that the first elections would be held on the second
Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140[30]to reset the date of the ARMM elections.Significantly,
while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the
ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054),the new date
of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among
the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No.
9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333,[31]which further
reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was
not ratified through a plebiscite.From these legislative actions,
we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix
the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct
from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted consistently with this
intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance
with the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.III. B.Supermajority voting
requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the character
of an irrepealable lawEven assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No.
10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting
requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No.
9054[32]has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character
of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution
demands.Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that
a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business.
In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the
quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.Within a quorum,
a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts.In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a
vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House
of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order
to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting
requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires for the
passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of
Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed.The
Courts pronouncement inCity of Davao v. GSIS[33]on this subject
best explains the basis and reason for the
unconstitutionality:Moreover, it would be noxiousanathema to
democratic principlesfor a legislative body to have the ability to
bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both
assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do
the same plenary powers.Perpetual infallibility is not one of the
attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which
attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its
enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.xxxA state
legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial
jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old,
unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal
constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind
itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when
so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the
acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may
be exercised at the same session at which the original act was
passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it
becomes a law.This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to
a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the
intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent
legislation upon existing statutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a
limitation in excess of what the Constitution requires on the
passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it
significantly constricts the future legislators room for action and
flexibility.III. C.Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section
18, Article X of the ConstitutionThe requirements of RA No. 9054
not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as
well the plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3,
Article XVII of that Act.As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement
required under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution to be
excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the
Constitution.Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that
the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous
regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic
areas will be included in the autonomous regions. While the settled
rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the
plebiscite requirement in order to become effective,[35]questions
on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may unavoidably
arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution
and the obvious absurdity that would result if a plebiscite were to
be required foreverystatutory amendment.Section 18, Article X of
the Constitution plainly states that The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by the majority of the
votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.With these wordings as standard, we interpret the
requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation ofautonomous
regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the
Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act
require ratification through a plebiscite.These amendments to the
Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of
the regional government; (b) the regions judicial system,i.e.,
thespecialcourtswithpersonal, family, and property law
jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the legislative
powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government under
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.[36]The date of the ARMM
elections does not fall under any of the matters that the
Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide for in the
Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority votes
and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date
of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the
Organic Act that would require compliance with these
requirements.IV.The synchronization issueAs we discussed above,
synchronization of national and local elections is a constitutional
mandate that Congress must provide for and this synchronization
must include the ARMM elections.On this point, an existing law in
fact already exists RA No. 7166 as the forerunner of the current RA
No. 10153. RA No. 7166 already provides for the synchronization of
local elections with the national and congressional elections.Thus,
what RA No. 10153 provides is an old matter for local governments
(with the exception ofbarangayandSanggunianKabataanelections where
the terms are not constitutionally provided) and is technically a
reiteration of what is already reflected in the law, given that
regional elections are in reality local elections by express
constitutional recognition.[37]To achieve synchronization,
Congressnecessarilyhas to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs
regular elections (which should have been held in August 2011 based
on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local
elections (fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).During the
oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve this problem. These options are: (1)
to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in
a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA
No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office;[38](2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the
terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the
President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153,
also until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office.As will be abundantly clear in the discussion below,
Congress, in choosing to grant the President the power to appoint
OICs, chose the correct option and passed RA No. 10153 as a
completely valid law.V.The Constitutionality of RA No. 10153A.Basic
Underlying PremisesTo fully appreciate the available options,
certain underlying material premises must be fully
understood.Thefirstis the extent of the powers of Congress to
legislate; thesecondis the constitutional mandate for the
synchronization of elections; and thethirdis on the concept of
autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987
Constitution.The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad,
general and comprehensive.[39]The legislative body possesses
plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[40]Any power,
deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.[41]Except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and
extends to all matters of general concern or common
interest.[42]The constitutional limitations on legislative power
are either express or implied. The express limitations are
generally provided in some provisions of the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions
Bill of Rights (Article 3).Other constitutional provisions (such as
the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and
32, and the autonomy provisions of Article X) provide their own
express limitations. The implied limitations are found in the
evident purpose which was in view and the circumstances and
historical events which led to the enactment of the particular
provision as a part of organic law.[43]The constitutional
provisions on autonomy specifically, Sections 15 to 21 of Article X
of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters,
thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to
legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.Of particular
relevance to the issues of the present case are the limitations
posed by the prescribed basic structure of government i.e.,that the
government must have an executive department and a legislative
assembly, both of which must be elective and representative of the
constituent political units; national government, too, must not
encroach on the legislative powers granted under Section 20,
Article X.Conversely and as expressly reflected in Section 17,
Article X,all powers and functions not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National
Government.The totality of Sections 15 to 21 of Article X should
likewise serve as a standard that Congress must observe in dealing
with legislation touching on the affairs of the autonomous
regions.The terms of these sections leave no doubt on what the
Constitution intends the idea of self-rule or self-government, in
particular, the power to legislate on a wide array of social,
economic and administrative matters.But equally clear under these
provisions arethe permeating principles of national sovereignty and
the territorial integrity of the Republic,as expressed in the
above-quoted Section 17 and in Section 15.[44]In other words, the
Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand,
reject the notion ofimperium et imperio[45]in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.In relation with
synchronization, both autonomy and the synchronization of national
and local elections are recognized and established constitutional
mandates, with one being as compelling as the other.If their
compelling force differs at all, the difference is in their
coverage; synchronization operates on and affects the whole
country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests directly
carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect
cannot be discounted.These underlying basic concepts characterize
the powers and limitations of Congress when it acted on RA No.
10153.To succinctly describe the legal situation that faced
Congress then, its decision to synchronize the regional elections
with the national, congressional and all other local elections
(save forbarangayandsangguniang kabataanelections) left it with the
problem ofhow to provide the ARMM with governance in the
intervening periodbetween the expiration of the term of those
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office twenty-one (21)
months away of those who will win in the synchronized elections on
May 13, 2013.The problem, in other words, was forinterim
measuresfor this period, consistent with the terms of the
Constitution and its established supporting jurisprudence, and with
the respect due to the concept of autonomy.Interim measures, to be
sure, is not a strange phenomenon in the Philippine legal
landscape. The Constitutions Transitory Provisions themselves
collectively provide measures for transition from the old
constitution to the new[46]and for the introduction of new
concepts.[47]As previously mentioned, the adjustment of elective
terms and of elections towards the goal of synchronization first
transpired under the Transitory Provisions.The adjustments,
however, failed to look far enough or deeply enough, particularly
into the problems that synchronizing regional autonomous elections
would entail; thus, the present problem is with us today.The
creation of local government units also represents instances when
interim measures are required.In the creation of Quezon del
Sur[48]and Dinagat Islands,[49]the creating statutes authorized the
President to appoint an interim governor, vice-governor and members
of thesangguniang panlalawiganalthough these positions are
essentially elective in character; the appointive officials were to
serve until a new set of provincial officials shall have been
elected and qualified.[50]A similar authority to appoint is
provided in the transition of a local government from a
sub-province to a province.[51]In all these, the need for interim
measures is dictated by necessity; out-of-the-way arrangements and
approaches were adopted or used in order to adjust to the goal or
objective in sight in a manner that does not do violence to the
Constitution and to reasonably accepted norms.Under these
limitations, the choice of measures was a question of wisdom left
to congressional discretion.To return to the underlying basic
concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers
in our discussion of the options available to Congress to address
the problems brought about by the synchronization of the ARMM
elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress
had to provide.The proper understanding of the options as interim
measures assume prime materiality asit is under these terms that
the passage of RA No. 10153 should be measured, i.e.,given the
constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be
faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the
Constitution when it addressed through RA No. 10153 the concomitant
problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with
it?B. Holdover Option is UnconstitutionalWe rule out the first
option holdover for those who were elected in executive and
legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an
option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.This provision
states:Section 8. Theterm of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,shall
be three yearsand no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. [emphases ours]Since elective ARMM officials are
local officials, they are coveredand boundby the three-year term
limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term
through a holdover. As this Court put inOsmea v. COMELEC:[52]It is
not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are
elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by
clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution
fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no
legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period,
even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.In
American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:It has been
broadly stated thatthe legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the
Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as
limited by the Constitution. [Emphasis ours.]Independently of
theOsmearuling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law
of the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself made a
determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined
or mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is
changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable
constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the
three branches of government can deviate from the constitutional
mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow.[53]If at
all, Congress may only pass legislation filing in details to fully
operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by
legislation if it is non-self-executing; this Court, on the other
hand, may only interpret the mandate if an interpretation is
appropriate and called for.[54]In the case of the terms of local
officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.If it
will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another
term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
like theextension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm
because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly,i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the
term of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory.[55]Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively
appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is
effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an
unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment
power of the President.[56]Hence, holdover whichever way it is
viewed is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not
have undertaken.Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples
of cases where the question of holdover was brought before, and
given the imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case
though differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly fromSambarani v. COMELEC,[57]Adap v.
Comelec,[58]andMontesclaros v. Comelec,[59]where the Court ruled
that the elective officials could hold on to their positions in a
hold over capacity.All these past cases refer to
electivebarangayorsangguniang kabataanofficialswhoseterms of office
arenot explicitly provided for intheConstitution;the present case,
on the other hand, refers to local elective officials the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice-Governor, and the members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly whose terms fall within the three-year term
limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. Because of
their constitutionally limited term, Congress cannot legislate an
extension beyond the term for which they were originally
elected.Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it (namely
Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past,[60]we have to
remember thatthe rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is
evident.[61]Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly
clear that it had the intention of suppressing the holdover rule
that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within
the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannotpass uponquestionsofwisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation,[62]except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.C.The
COMELEC has no authorityto order special electionsAnother option
proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to
compel COMELEC to immediately conduct special elections pursuant to
Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.The power to fix
the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as
evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature,
provides:Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but
applicable solely to the President and Vice-President,
states:xxxxSection 4. xxxUnless otherwise provided by law, the
regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on
the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]while Section 3, Article
X, on local government, provides:Section 3.The Congress shall enact
a local government codewhich shall provide for xxx the
qualifications,election, appointment and removal, term, salaries,
powers and functions and duties oflocal officials[.] [Emphases
ours]These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may
be held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice
President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so
provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or
officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of
that power.[63]Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by
postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting another
date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections.By so doing,
Congress itself has madea policy decisionin the exercise of its
legislative wisdom thatit shall not call special electionsas an
adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
other elections.After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive
nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC.This Court,
particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and effectively legislating.To be sure, the
Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null
and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in
grave abuse of discretion.[64]But our power rests on very narrow
ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is
not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative
powers.Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282
urges, we cannot compel COMELEC to call for special
elections.Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the
constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power of
Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited
to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election.[65]Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a
specific statutory grant.True, Congress did grant,viaSections 5 and
6 of BP 881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to
another date. However, this power is limited to, and can only be
exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for
in the law. We quote:Section 5.Postponement of election. -When for
any serious cause such asviolence,terrorism,loss or destruction of
election paraphernaliaor records,force majeure, andother analogous
causesof such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission,motu proprioor upon a verified petition
by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby
all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shallpostpone the election therein to a date which should be
reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to electbut not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or
suspension of the election or failure to elect.Section 6. Failure
of election. - If, on account offorce
majeure,violence,terrorism,fraud, orother analogous causesthe
election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed,orhad been suspendedbefore the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof,such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission
shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party
and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or
continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted
in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the
election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to
elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure
to elect. [Emphasis ours]A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881
reveals that it is meant to address instances whereelections have
already been scheduledto take place but have to bepostponedbecause
of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or destruction of election
paraphernalia or records, (d)force majeure, and (e) other analogous
causesof such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision.Under the principle ofejusdem generis,the term
analogous causes will be restricted to
thoseunforeseenorunexpectedevents that prevent the holding of the
scheduled elections. These analogous causes are further defined by
the phrase of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and
honest election should become impossible.Similarly, Section 6 of BP
881 applies only to those situations where elections have already
been scheduled but do not take place because of (a)force majeure,
(b)violence, (c)terrorism, (d)fraud, or (e)other analogous
causesthe election in any polling place has not been held on the
date fixed,orhad been suspendedbefore the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof,such election results in a failure to
elect.As in Section 5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances
where the elections do not occur or had to be suspended because
ofunexpectedandunforeseencircumstances.In the present case,the
postponement of the ARMM elections isby lawi.e., by congressional
policy and ispursuant to the constitutional mandate of
synchronizationof national and local elections. By no stretch of
the imagination can these reasons be given the same character as
the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881,
which all pertain to extralegal causes that obstruct the holding of
elections.Courts, to be sure, cannot enlarge the scope of a statute
under the guise of interpretation, nor include situations not
provided nor intended by the lawmakers.[66]Clearly, neither Section
5 nor Section 6 of BP 881 can apply to the present case and this
Court has absolutely no legal basis to compel the COMELEC to hold
special elections.D.The Court has no power to shorten the terms of
elective officialsEven assuming that it is legally permissible for
the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials
shall hold office only until the ARMM officials elected in the
synchronized elections shall have assumed office.In the first
place, the Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective
officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the term of
office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in the
case ofbarangayofficials,[67]is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining the
least votes,[68]and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President[69]in order to synchronize elections; Congress was
not granted this same power.The settled rule is that terms fixed by
the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute.[70]More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has
the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the
ARMM forless,or more, than the constitutionally mandated three
years[71]as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution as we ruled inOsmena.Thus, in the
same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortenedby putting
an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands.This is what will happen a term of
less than two years if a call for special elections shall
prevail.In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at
the cost of a violation of an express provision of the
Constitution.Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure
of those officials to be elected in the ARMM elections instead of
acting on their term (where the term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold office as of right and fixes the
interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one
another, while the tenure representsthe term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office).[72]As with the fixing of the
elective term, neither Congress nor theCourt has any legal basis to
shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials. They would commit an
unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do
so.E.The Presidents Power to Appoint OICsThe above considerations
leave only Congress chosen interim measure RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the
pre-synchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
law as the only measure that Congress can make.This choice itself,
however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional
infirmity.At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to
the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized.[73]The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, which states:Section 16. The
President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution.He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]This
provision classifies into four groups the officers that the
President can appoint. These are:First, the heads of the executive
departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of
colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;Second, all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;Third, those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint;andFourth, officers lower in rank
whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.[74]Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates
from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials that
the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution. Thus, the assailed lawfaciallyrests on clear
constitutional basis.If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the
petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of RA
No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the
ARMM executive and legislative officials to be elective and
representative of the constituent political units. This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the
assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs constitutionally
defective.After fully examining the issue, we hold that this
allegedconstitutional problem is more apparent than real and
becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to bemistakenly read as
a law that changes the elective and representative character of
ARMM positions.RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend
what the organic law of the ARMM(RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of
structure of governance.What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is
toappoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to
the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.This power is far
different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the
officials elected in the May 2013 elections.As we have already
established in our discussion of the supermajority and plebiscite
requirements, the legal reality is thatRA No. 10153 did not amend
RA No. 9054.RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only for
synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must
in the meanwhile prevail.And this is how RA No. 10153 should be
read in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms.[75]Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments
that the synchronization requires.Thus, the appropriate question to
ask is whether the interim measure is an unreasonable move for
Congress to adopt, given the legal situation that the
synchronization unavoidably brought with it.In more concrete terms
and based on the above considerations,given the plain
unconstitutionality of providing for a holdover and the
unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or
shortening the term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of
the Presidents power to appoint for a fixed and specific period as
an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for
Congress to make?Admittedly, the grant of the power to the
Presidentunder other situationsorwhere the power of appointment
would extend beyond the adjustment period for synchronizationwould
be to foster a government that is not democratic and republican.
For then, the peoples right to choose the leaders to govern them
may be said to besystemicallywithdrawn to the point of fostering an
undemocratic regime.This is the grant that would frontally breach
the elective and representative governance requirement of Section
18, Article X of the Constitution.But this conclusion would not be
true under the very limited circumstances contemplated in RA No.
10153 where the period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of
governance both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and
RA No. 9054 will notsystemicallybe touched nor affected at all.To
repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will govern
unchanged and continuously, with full effect in accordance with the
Constitution, save only for the interim and temporary measures that
synchronization of elections requires.Viewed from another
perspective, synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders, but this will take place under a situation of
necessity and as an interim measure in the manner that interim
measures have been adopted and used in the creation of local
government units[76]and the adjustments of sub-provinces to the
status of provinces.[77]These measures, too, are used in light of
the wider national demand for the synchronization of elections
(consideredvis--visthe regional interests involved).The adoption of
these measures, in other words, is no different from the exercise
by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where one of
the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure
taken in light of the given circumstances.Furthermore, the
representative character of the chosen leaders need not necessarily
be affected by the appointment of OICs as this requirement is
really a function of the appointment process; only the elective
aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs.In this
regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns
arising from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and
5 of the assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC,
the Manner and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their
Qualifications.Based on these considerations, we hold that RA No.
10153 viewed in its proper context is a law that is not violative
of the Constitution (specifically, its autonomy provisions), and
one that is reasonable as well under the circumstances.VI.Other
Constitutional ConcernsOutside of the above concerns, it has been
argued during the oral arguments that upholding the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153 would set a dangerous precedent
of giving the President the power to cancel elections anywhere in
the country, thus allowing him to replace elective officials with
OICs.This claim apparently misunderstands that an across-the-board
cancellation of elections is a matter for Congress, not for the
President, to address. It is a power that falls within the powers
of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers.Even
Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.If RA No. 10153
cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very
specific and limited purpose the synchronization of elections.It
was a temporary means to a lasting end the synchronization of
elections. Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives
this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot be
transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of
elections. Any other localized cancellation of elections and call
for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power
already delegated by Congress to the COMELEC, as above
discussed.Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot
continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the expiration of their
terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special
elections, the Court now has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum
in governance in the ARMM.To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum
brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months or
close to 2 years intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM
elective officials terms expired and the time the new ARMM elective
officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of
ourMindanaohistory past and current teach us, many developments,
some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the countrys
Muslim areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the
past.[78]Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with
even temporarily.To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the
present circumstances is an absolute necessity.Significantly, the
grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative.We hark back to our
earlier pronouncement inMenzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]It may
be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any
vacancy that may occur.Albeit both laws deal only with the filling
of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of
any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best
interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the
procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the
provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has
no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local
governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are
junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of
the President, until the law provides otherwise.A vacancy creates
an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for
it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.In a republican form of
government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one
of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of
governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered.Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people ofLeyteif the Governor or
the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)As inMenzon,
leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members
of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or
almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the
delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management
of the affairs of the regional government, and in responding to
critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context,
allowing the President in the exercise of his
constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is,
in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.B.Autonomy in the
ARMMIt is further argued that while synchronization may be
constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede
the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in
this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between
two recognized Constitutional mandates synchronization and regional
autonomy such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.We
find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic
principle in constitutional construction ut magis valeat quam
pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole,[81]and one mandate should not be given importance over the
other except where the primacy of one over the other is
clear.[82]We refer to theCourts declaration inAng-Angco v.
Castillo, et al.,[83]thus:A provision of the constitution should
not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the
constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and
apparently,conflicting provisions should be reconciled and
harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and
effect.[Emphasis supplied.]Synchronization is an interest that is
as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are
interests that this Court should reconcile and give effect to, in
the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the
least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected.Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead
of being sidelined, as the law does not in any way alter, change or
modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner
and only as necessitated by the attendant circumstances.Elsewhere,
it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be
synchronized with the national and local elections in order to
maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral
processes from the rough and tumble of nationwide and local
elections.This argument leaves us far from convinced of its
merits.As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous
regions are granted political autonomy, the framers of the
Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as
a regional entity thus continues to operate within the larger
framework of the State and is still subject to the national
policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations
of the provisions on autonomous regions:Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not
see here a complete separation from the central government, but
rather an efficient working relationship between the autonomous
region and the central government. We see this as an effective
partnership, not a separation.Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete
autonomy is not really thought of as complete independence.Mr.
Ople.We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger
political framework of the nation.[84][Emphasis supplied.]This
exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the
above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution, and by the
express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that
autonomy shall bewithin the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the
Republic of thePhilippines.Interestingly, the framers of the
Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X,
believing it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of
powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to
reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for
all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government.Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the
national government[.][85]Of note is the Courts pronouncement
inPimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre[86]which we quote:Under the
Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has
not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments,
including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local
affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and
effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
social development at the smaller political units are expected to
propel social and economic growth and development.But to enable the
country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common
national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still
lies in the President and Congress.[Emphasis ours.]In other words,
the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat
national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of
elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the
ARMM is subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM
cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in
accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the
Constitution.ConclusionCongress acted within its powers and
pursuant to a constitutional mandate the synchronization of
national and local elections when it enacted RA No. 10153.This
Court cannot question the manner by which Congress undertook this
task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.[87]As judges, we can
only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its
wisdom, cannot repeal or amend it.[88]Nor can the Court presume to
dictate the means by which Congress should address what is
essentially a legislative problem. It is not within the Courts
power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be
guilty of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89]The
petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to hold special
elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially
asking us to venture into the realm of judicial legislation, which
is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican
and democratic government the separation of powers.The petitioners
allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave
abuse of discretion in enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of
discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility.[90]We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153,
acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an array of
choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked
reasonableness in light of the necessary adjustments that
synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of
any evasion of a positive duty or of a refusal to perform its
duty.We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners
claims of grave abuse of discretion.On the general claim that RA
No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the
established rule that every statute is presumed valid.[91]Congress,
thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its
acts, and the party challenging the validity of a statute has the
onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[92]Any reasonable doubt
about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.[93]As this Court declared inGarcia v. Executive
Secretary:[94]The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the
political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This
presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which
enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the
other departments. The theory is thatas the joint act of Congress
and the President of thePhilippines, a law has been carefully
studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.[95][Emphasis ours.]Given the failure
of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and confirm its
validity.WHEREFORE, premises considered, weDISMISSthe consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
andUPHOLDthe constitutionality of this law.We likewiseLIFTthe
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution ofSeptember
13, 2011.No costs.SO ORDERED.