BRION, J.: On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for Other Purposes ” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8 th of August 2011, to the second Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local elections. The law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed. Factual Antecedents The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states: Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
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BRION, J.:
On June 30, 2011, Republic Act (RA) No. 10153, entitled “An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the
Elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and Local Elections and for
Other Purposes” was enacted. The law reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide with the country’s regular national and local
elections. The law as well granted the President the power to “appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.”
Even before its formal passage, the bills that became RA No. 10153 already spawned petitions against their
validity; House Bill No. 4146 and Senate Bill No. 2756 were challenged in petitions filed with this Court. These
petitions multiplied after RA No. 10153 was passed.
Factual Antecedents
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 15 states:
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these autonomous
regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of
the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
On August 1, 1989 or two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through
Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao.” A plebiscite was held onNovember 6, 1990 as required by Section 18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734,
thus fully establishing the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734 scheduled the first regular elections for the
regional officials of the ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its ratification.
RA No. 9054 (entitled “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended”) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided further
refinement in the basic ARMM structure first defined in the original organic act, and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM – RA No. 9140 [1] - on June 22, 2001. This law reset the
first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite
to ratify RA No. 9054 to not later thanAugust 15, 2001.
RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the same date.
RA No. 9333[2] was subsequently passed by Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the
2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date every 3 years thereafter. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054,
RA No. 9333 was not ratified in a plebiscite.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to
May 2013, to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill (HB) No. 4146, seeking the
postponement of the ARMM elections scheduled on August 8, 2011. On March 22, 2011, the House of
Representatives passed HB No. 4146, with one hundred ninety one (191) Members voting in its favor.
After the Senate received HB No. 4146, it adopted its own version, Senate Bill No. 2756 (SB No. 2756),
on June 6, 2011. Thirteen (13) Senators voted favorably for its passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of
Representative concurred with the Senate amendments, and on June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153
On September 13, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of RA
No. 10153 and ordering the incumbent elective officials of ARMM to continue to perform their functions should
these cases not be decided by the end of their term on September 30, 2011.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No.
9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1
and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The petitions assailing RA No. 10153 further maintain that it is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with
the three-reading requirement of Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Also cited as grounds are the alleged
violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM, as well as the failure to adhere to the “elective and
representative” character of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM. Lastly, the petitioners
challenged the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the elective ARMM
officials until the officials elected under the May 2013 regular elections shall have assumed office. Corrolarily, they
also argue that the power of appointment also gave the President the power of control over the ARMM, in complete
violation of Section 16, Article X of the Constitution.
The Issues
From the parties’ submissions, the following issues were recognized and argued by the parties in the oral
arguments of August 9 and 16, 2011:
I. Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections
II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to
Section 7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No.
9054 violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
corollary doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous
regions under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV. Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM
V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:
A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI. Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.
We shall discuss these issues in the order they are presented above.
OUR RULING
We resolve to DISMISS the petitions and thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.
I. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
The respondent Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the Constitution mandates synchronization,
and in support of this position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noonof June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years.
xxx
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
We agree with this position.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the
Constitution,[10] which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making adjustments
to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.[11]
The objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others
through the shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years.[12] This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission deliberations.[13]
These Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May, 1992 and for all the following elections.
This Court was not left behind in recognizing the synchronization of the national and local elections as a
constitutional mandate. In Osmeña v. Commission on Elections,[14] we explained:
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of
office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992.
It is likewise evident from the wording of the above-mentioned Sections that the term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phraseholding simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will synchronize future elections to once every three years (Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 605).
That the election for Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials (under Sec. 2, Art. XVIII) will have to be synchronized with the election for President and Vice President (under Sec. 5, Art. XVIII) is likewise evident from the x x x records of the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission. [Emphasis supplied.]
Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be
synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they
have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.[15] As this Court explained in People v. Derilo,[16] “[a]s the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer’s document, its language should be understood in the sense that it may have in common. Its
words should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.”
Understood in its ordinary sense, the word “local” refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a
particular limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision.[17] Regional elections in the ARMM for
the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this
classification, since they pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local
governments, as evident from Article X of the Constitution entitled “Local Government.” Autonomous regions are
established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this Article – the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
Thus, we find the contention – that the synchronization mandated by the Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM –unmeritorious. We shall refer to synchronization in the course of our discussions
below, as this concept permeates the consideration of the various issues posed in this case and must be recalled time
and again for its complete resolution.
II. The President’s Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
The petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 also challenge the validity of RA No. 10153 for its alleged failure to
comply with Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution [18] which provides that before bills passed by either the
House or the Senate can become laws, they must pass through three readings on separate days. The exception is
when the President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment.
The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[19] explained the effect of the President’s certification of
necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
xxx
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day [May 14, 1968] after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections.[20] Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement.
On the follow-up contention that no necessity existed for the immediate enactment of these bills since there
was no public calamity or emergency that had to be met, again we hark back to our ruling in Tolentino:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law Art. VII, Section 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, Section 23(2) is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be of hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review. [Emphasis supplied.]
The House of Representatives and the Senate – in the exercise of their legislative discretion – gave full
recognition to the President’s certification and promptly enacted RA No. 10153. Under the circumstances, nothing
short of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the two houses of Congress can justify our intrusion under our
power of judicial review.[21]
The petitioners, however, failed to provide us with any cause or justification for this course of
action. Hence, while the judicial department and this Court are not bound by the acceptance of the President's
certification by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, prudent exercise of our powers and respect due
our co-equal branches of government in matters committed to them by the Constitution, caution a stay of the judicial
hand.[22]
In any case, despite the President’s certification, the two-fold purpose that underlies the requirement for
three readings on separate days of every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other parties
interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them. Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of
Congress is: (1) to inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure
is in progress through the enactment process.[23]
We find, based on the records of the deliberations on the law, that both advocates and the opponents of the
proposed measure had sufficient opportunities to present their views. In this light, no reason exists to nullify RA No.
10153 on the cited ground.
III. A. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
The effectivity of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged because they did not comply
with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 in amending this law. These provisions require:
Section 1. Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.
Section 3. Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90) days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
We find no merit in this contention.
In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of
these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM elections and does not fix the
date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws – RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 – cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the
law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.
This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under delusions of omniscience.
xxx
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to
persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.[34](Emphasis ours.)
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly constricts the
future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.
III. C. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section
18, Article X of the Constitution
The requirements of RA No. 9054 not only required an unwarranted supermajority, but enlarged as well the
plebiscite requirement, as embodied in its Section 3, Article XVII of that Act. As we did on the supermajority
requirement, we find the enlargement of the plebiscite requirement required under Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution to be excessive to point of absurdity and, hence, a violation of the Constitution.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of
autonomous regions and for determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas will be included in the
autonomous regions. While the settled rule is that amendments to the Organic Act have to comply with the plebiscite
requirement in order to become effective,[35] questions on the extent of the matters requiring ratification may
unavoidably arise because of the seemingly general terms of the Constitution and the obvious absurdity that would
result if a plebiscite were to be required for every statutory amendment.
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that “The creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by the majority of the votes case by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.” With these wordings as standard, we interpret the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or
revisions of, the Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions – i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act – require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the
regional government; (b) the region’s judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family, and property
To return to the underlying basic concepts, these concepts shall serve as the guideposts and markers in our
discussion of the options available to Congress to address the problems brought about by the synchronization of the
ARMM elections, properly understood as interim measures that Congress had to provide. The proper understanding
of the options as interim measures assume prime materiality as it is under these terms that the passage of RA No.
10153 should be measured, i.e., given the constitutional objective of synchronization that cannot legally be
faulted, did Congress gravely abuse its discretion or violate the Constitution when it addressed through RA No.
10153 the concomitant problems that the adjustment of elections necessarily brought with it?
B. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional
We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in
the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three yearsand no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. As this Court put in Osmeña v.
COMELEC:[52]
It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that
they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
In American Jurisprudence it has been stated as follows:
“It has been broadly stated that the legislature cannot, by an act
postponing the election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution, extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the Constitution.” [Emphasis ours.]
Independently of the Osmeña ruling, the primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land dictates
that where the Constitution has itself made a determination or given its mandate, then the matters so determined or
mandated should be respected until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or repeal through the applicable
constitutional process. A necessary corollary is that none of the three branches of government can deviate from the
constitutional mandate except only as the Constitution itself may allow. [53] If at all, Congress may only pass
legislation filing in details to fully operationalize the constitutional command or to implement it by legislation if it is
C. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
Another option proposed by the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 is for this Court to compel COMELEC to
immediately conduct special elections pursuant to Section 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 881.The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident from, and exemplified
by, the following provisions of the Constitution: Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours]
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours]
These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be held on any other date for the positions of
President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by another Act of
Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the
authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.[63]
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional
and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative
wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without
thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is not without the
power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave
abuse of discretion.[64] But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to annul a contravening act of
Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in
the exercise of its legislative powers. Thus, contrary to what the petition in G.R. No. 197282 urges, we cannot
compel COMELEC to call for special elections.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that the constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the
power of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited to enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election.[65] Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to call for the holding of
special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP
881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date. However, this power is limited to, and can
only be exercised within, the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. We quote:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [Emphasis ours]
A close reading of Section 5 of BP 881 reveals that it is meant to address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but have to be postponed because of (a) violence, (b) terrorism, (c) loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, (d) force majeure, and (e) other analogous causes of such a nature
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision . Under
the principle of ejusdem generis, the term “analogous causes” will be restricted to
those unforeseen or unexpected events that prevent the holding of the scheduled elections. These “analogous
causes” are further defined by the phrase “of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election
Neither we nor Congress can opt to shorten the tenure of those officials to be elected in the ARMM
elections instead of acting on their term (where the “term” means the time during which the officer may claim to
hold office as of right and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another, while the
“tenure” represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office).[72] As with the fixing of the
elective term, neither Congress nor the Court has any legal basis to shorten the tenure of elective ARMM officials.
They would commit an unconstitutional act and gravely abuse their discretion if they do so.
E. The President’s Power to Appoint OICs
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant to
Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself, however, should be
examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications
to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized.[73] The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.[74]
If RA No. 10153 cancelled the regular August 2011 elections, it was for a very specific and limited purpose
– the synchronization of elections. It was a temporary means to a lasting end – the synchronization of elections.
Thus, RA No. 10153 and the support that the Court gives this legislation are likewise clear and specific, and cannot
be transferred or applied to any other cause for the cancellation of elections. Any other localized cancellation of
elections and call for special elections can occur only in accordance with the power already delegated by Congress
to the COMELEC, as above discussed.
Given that the incumbent ARMM elective officials cannot continue to act in a holdover capacity upon the
expiration of their terms, and this Court cannot compel the COMELEC to conduct special elections, the Court now
has to deal with the dilemma of a vacuum in governance in the ARMM.
To emphasize the dire situation a vacuum brings, it should not be forgotten that a period of 21 months – or
close to 2 years – intervenes from the time that the incumbent ARMM elective officials’ terms expired and the time
the new ARMM elective officials begin their terms in 2013. As the lessons of our Mindanao history – past and
current – teach us, many developments, some of them critical and adverse, can transpire in the country’s Muslim
areas in this span of time in the way they transpired in the past.[78] Thus, it would be reckless to assume that the
presence of an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully functioning Regional Legislative
Assembly can be done away with even temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
Significantly, the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake the functions of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark back to our earlier
pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:[79]
It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As between the President who has supervision over local governments as provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides otherwise.
A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it
deprives the constituents of their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if
one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is missing.[80](Emphasis ours.)
As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the
delivery of basic services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional government, and in
responding to critical developments that may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable
measure to take.
B. Autonomy in the ARMM
It is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat
or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume
that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandates – synchronization and regional
autonomy – such that it is necessary to choose one over the other.
We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional construction – ut
magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, [81] and one mandate should not be
given importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the other is clear. [82] We refer to the Court’s
declaration in Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al.,[83]thus:
A provision of the constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather,
the constitution must be interpreted as a whole, and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of them full force and effect.[Emphasis supplied.]
Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally entrenched as regional autonomy. They are interests that this
Court should reconcile and give effect to, in the way that Congress did in RA No. 10153 which provides the
measure to transit to synchronized regional elections with the least disturbance on the interests that must be
respected. Particularly, regional autonomy will be respected instead of being sidelined, as the law does not in any
way alter, change or modify its governing features, except in a very temporary manner and only as necessitated by
the attendant circumstances.
Elsewhere, it has also been argued that the ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and
local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and insulate its own electoral processes from the
rough and tumble of nationwide and local elections. This argument leaves us far from convinced of its merits.
As heretofore mentioned and discussed, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy, the
framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus
continues to operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to the national policies set by the
national government, save only for those specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination. As reflected during the constitutional deliberations of the provisions on autonomous regions:
Mr. Bennagen. xxx We do not see here a complete separation from the central
government, but rather an efficient working relationship between the autonomous region and the central government. We see this as an effective partnership, not a separation.
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete autonomy is not really thought of as complete
independence. Mr. Ople. We define it as a measure of self-government within the larger political
framework of the nation.[84] [Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the
Constitution, and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same Article that autonomy shall be “within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines.”
Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to remove Section 17 of Article X, believing
it to be unnecessary in light of the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers decided to reinstate the provision in order to “make it clear,
once and for all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous government. Those not enumerated are
actually to be exercised by the national government[.]”[85]Of note is the Court’s pronouncement in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Hon. Aguirre[86] which we quote:
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Emphasis ours.]
In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked to defeat national policies and
concerns. Since the synchronization of elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be used to exempt the region from having to act in
accordance with a national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
Conclusion
Congress acted within its powers and pursuant to a constitutional mandate – the synchronization of national
and local elections – when it enacted RA No. 10153. This Court cannot question the manner by which Congress
undertook this task; the Judiciary does not and cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation.[87] As judges, we can only interpret and apply the law and, despite our doubts about its wisdom, cannot
repeal or amend it.[88]
Nor can the Court presume to dictate the means by which Congress should address what is essentially a
legislative problem. It is not within the Court’s power to enlarge or abridge laws; otherwise, the Court will be guilty
of usurping the exclusive prerogative of Congress.[89] The petitioners, in asking this Court to compel COMELEC to
hold special elections despite its lack of authority to do so, are essentially asking us to venture into the realm of
judicial legislation, which is abhorrent to one of the most basic principles of a republican and democratic
government – the separation of powers.
The petitioners allege, too, that we should act because Congress acted with grave abuse of discretion in
enacting RA No. 10153. Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law or to act at all in contemplation of the law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.[90]
We find that Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, acted strictly within its constitutional mandate. Given an
array of choices, it acted within due constitutional bounds and with marked reasonableness in light of the necessary
adjustments that synchronization demands. Congress, therefore, cannot be accused of any evasion of a positive duty
or of a refusal to perform its duty. We thus find no reason to accord merit to the petitioners’ claims of grave abuse
of discretion.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we can only reiterate the established rule that
every statute is presumed valid.[91] Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality of its acts, and
the party challenging the validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this presumption. [92] Any reasonable
doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. [93] As this Court declared
in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:[94]
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[95] [Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153,
we must support and confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity of RA
No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September 13, 2011. No costs