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G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, pla inti ff-appel lee, vs .
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO PUGAL and ERNING
ABANO, defendants -appel lants . R E S O L U T I O N
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion
praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid Prisons or, a l
ternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place of
trial of Criminal Case No.
3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as
sole defendant, i s charge d with i l lega l possess ion of fi
rearms and ammunitions .
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in
jeopardy i f he were to be confined in the Vigan municipa l ja i l
during the tria l
because there are many political enemies of the Crisologo fami
ly in that vicinity; some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in
fact been
murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman Floro
Crisologo, was shot to death whi le hearing mass at the Vigan
cathedra l .
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a sitting
duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who wants to assassinate
him. He could even be lynched or shot to death on the specious
pretext that
he was trying to escape. Asked to comment on the motion, the
Provincial Fisca l of I locos Sur
s ignified his conformity to the transfer of the venue of the
trial to the New Bi l ibid Prisons .
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution express ly empowers
this Court to "order a change of venue or place of tria l to avoid
a miscarriage of justice". Here, what i s involved is not merely
a
miscarriage of justice but the personal safety of movant
Crisologo, the accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo
tria l in a
place where his l i fe would be imperi l led. Present hostile
sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justi fication for transfer of venue (See State vs . Siers , 136
S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).1wph1.t
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The change of
venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but a
lso the transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to
another
court. According to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence
against him is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame,
Quezon Ci ty. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the Ci ty
Court of Quezon
Ci ty and the holding of the tria l at Camp Crame appear to be
the most convenient arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed to transfer
the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the Ci ty Court of Quezo n
Ci ty
where it should be re-docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof.
The case may be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and
security measures should be adopted in bringing defendant Crisologo
to
Camp Crame on the occas ion of the hearing. SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr., JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-56158-64 March 17, 1981
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, peti tioner,
vs . MAYOR PABLO SOLA, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBER FRANCISCO
(ECOT) GARCIA, RICARDO (CADOY) GARCIA, JOSE BETHOVEN (ATSONG)
CABRAL, CAPTAIN FLORENDO BALISCAO, JOHN, PETER,
OSCAR, OMAR, JACK, RICHARD, JAMES, DONALD, WILLIAM,
ROBERT, HOMER, JESSIE, ANDY, PAUL, all surnamed
DOES respondents .
FERNANDO, C.J.: The power of this Tribunal, constitutional ly
mandated, 1 to order a change of venue to avoid any miscarriage of
justice as wel l as the
procedure ordained in the implementation of the right to ba i l
2 are
involved in this petition which, even if not so denominated,
partakes of the nature of a certiorari. It must have been the zeal
of private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiri tu, 3 no
doubt under
the conviction that there was no time to lose, that must have
led them to devote less than that full measure of attention to
certa in
fundamentals. They ignored the principle that the respons ibi l
i ty for the conduct of the prosecution is with the public
officials concerned. Nonetheless, the importance of the questions
raised, the need for a
change of venue and the cancellation of the bail bonds, necessi
tated that further action be taken. Accordingly, in a resolution
dated February 12, 1981, one day after the filing of the peti tion,
the Court
required the comment of the Sol ici tor Genera l as wel l as of
the private respondents, 4 the accused in s ix pending criminal
cases before the Court of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidenta l
.
On March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor Genera
l Estelito P. Mendoza. 5 It opened with this prel iminary s
tatement:
"The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in
Criminal Cases Nos . 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola , et a l .,
pending tria l
before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidenta l .
Rightly, any peti tion before this Honorable Court on behalf of the
People of the Phi l ippines can, under the law, be insti tuted onl
y by the Sol ici tor
General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors
that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and
supervis ion of the Fisca l ' wi l l not, therefore, improve their
lega l
s tanding." 6 Nonetheless, it did not press the legal point but
instead adopted "the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the
setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipa l Court
of Kabankalan,
pres ided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the
accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the peti tion
for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases
to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. 7 The facts were therein narrated thus:
"On September 15, 1980, acting
on the evidence presented by the Phi l ippine Co nstabulary
commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidenta l , the Court of Fi rs
t
Instance of that province issued a search warrant for the search
and seizure of ti le deceased bodies of seven persons bel ieved in
the possession of the accused Pablo Sola in his hacie nda at Sta .
Isabel ,
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. * * * On September 16, 1980 armed
with the above warrant, elements of the of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola . Diggings made in a
canefield yielded two common graves conta ining the b odies of
Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Ol impos , Al fredo Perez, Custodio
Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Ca llet and Bienvenido Emperado.
On
September 23 and October 1, 1980, the PC provincial commander of
Negros Occidental filed seven (7) separate compla ints fo r murder
against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia,
Jose
Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other
persons of unknown names. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No.
4129, 4130, 4131, 4137, 4138, 4139 and 4140 of the Municipal
Court of Kabankalan. After due prel iminary examination of the
complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipa l
court
found probable cause against the accused. It thus i ssued an
order for their a . rest. However, without giving the prosecution
the opportunity to prove that the evidence of gui l t of the
accused is
s trong, the court granted them the right to post ba i l for
their temporary release. The accused Pablo Sola , Francisco Garcia
, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed themselves of this right and
have s ince
been released from detention. In a para l lel development. the
witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of their
fears that i f the tria l i s held at the Court of Fi rs t Instance
branch in
Himamaylan which is but 10 ki lometers from Kabankalan, their
safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are
officia ls with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have
been released on
bai l. In addition, most of the accused remained at large.
Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of
threats made on the
fami lies of the witnesses." 8 The facts a lleged argue s
trongly for the
remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the cancel lation
of the ba i l bonds .
On the very next day, March 15, 1981, this Court issued the
following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the
comment of the
Sol icitor General on the urgent peti tion for change of venue
and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition,
namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the
Municipal Court
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of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting
ba i l
to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos . 4129, 4130, 4131, 4137,
4138, 4139 and 4140, a ll enti tled "People of the Philippines v.
Mayor Pablo Sola. et al."; (2) the petition for a change of venue
or place of tria l of
the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b)
[Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V
of
the Court of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidenta l at Bacol od
Ci ty, pres ided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering
that Dis trict Judge Osterva ldo Emi l ia of the Court of Fi rs t
Instance, Negros
Occidenta l , Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of
absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due
to a mi ld attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V
i s
the nearest court s tation to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the
comment of respondents on the peti tion to cancel ba i l , without
prejudice to the publ ic officia ls concerned takin g the
necessary
measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the
prosecution." 9 Thus, the i ssue of a change of venue has become
moot and academic. The comments respectively submitted by
respondent Florendo Bal iscao on March 5, 1981, respondent
Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on
March 16, 1981, dealt solely with the question of the
cancellation of the ba il bonds. Such comments were considered as
answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decis
ion.
The sole remaining issue of the cancel lation of the ba i l
bonds of respondents, there being a failure to abide by the basic
requirement
that the prosecution be heard in a case where the accused is
charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted, must
be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancel
led and the case
remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Al fonso Baguio for such
hearing. So we rule.
1. It may not be amiss to say a few words on the question of
transferring the place of tria l , in this case, from Himamaylan to
Bacolod Ci ty. The Constitution is quite expl ici t. The Supreme
Court
could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice." 10 The Consti tutional Convention of 1971
wisely
incorporated the rul ing in the landmark decis ion of People v.
Gutierrez, 11 where Justice J. B. L. Reyes as ponente vigorous ly
and categorically affirmed: "In the particular case before Us , to
compel
the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where i ts
witnesses wi l l not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to
make a mockery of the judicia l process , and to betray the very
purpose for which
courts have been establ ished." 12 Why a change of venue is
imperative was made clear in the Comment of the Solicitor Genera l
. Thus : "The exercise by this Honorable Court of i ts above
constitutional power in this case will be appropriate. The
witnesses in the case are fearful for their l ives . They are afra
id they would be ki l led on their way to or from Himamaylan during
any of the days o f
tria l . Because of qqqts fear, they may ei ther refuse to testi
fy or testimony falsely to save their l ives. 13 Respondent
Florendo Baliscao
was not averse to such transfer, but his preference is for a
court anywhere in Metro Manila. 14 Respondent Francisco Garcia
confined his comment to the question of the cancellation of the ba
i l bonds .
Respondent Pablo Sola made clear that he had "no objection to
the transfer. 15 It may be added that there may be cases where the
fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than
terri fying,
but the question must a lways be the effect i t has on the
witnesses who wi ll testify. The primordial aim and intent of the
Consti tution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it
should be resolved in
favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not
be a peti tion of this character filed before this Court. Such a
plea could have been done administratively. In this particular
case, however,
there i s justification for the procedure fol lowed in view of
the fa ct that a long with the change of venue, the cancel lation
of the ba i l bonds was a lso sought.
2. Equally so the cancellation of the bail bonds is more than
justified.
Ba i l was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipa l
Court without hearing the prosecution That is to disregard the
authoritative doctrine enunciated in People v. San Diego. 16 As
pointed out by
Justice Capistrano, speaking for the Court: "The question
presented
before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedura
l due proces s . The answer i s in the affi rmative. We are of
the
cons idered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a
defendant who is in custody for a capita l offense be resolved in a
summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, a l l
the
evidence that it may des i re to introduce before the court
should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case
involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedura l due
process , and the order of the court granting bail should be
considered void on
that ground." 17
These words of Justice Cardozo come to mind: "The law, as we
have seen, i s sedulous in mainta ining for a defendant charged
with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence
of an opportunity to defend. Privi leges so fundamental as to be
inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable
to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and
inviolable,
however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser a lso.
The concept of fa i rness must not be s tra ined ti l l i t i s
narrowed to a
fi lament. We are to keep the balance true." 18 This norm which
i s of the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice
requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity to prove
that
there i s strong evidence of gui l t. It does not suffice, as
asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge
before ba i l
was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did
not cure an infi rmity of a jurisdictional character. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed order of Judge Rafael Gasataya granting
ba i l to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared
to be without force and effect. Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of
the Court
of Fi rs t Instance of Negros Occidental, to whose sa la the
cases had been transferred by vi rtue of the resolution of this
Court of March 5, 1981, i s directed forthwith to hear the peti
tions for ba i l of private
respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the
question of whether or not the evidence of guilt aga inst the
respondents i s s trong. This decis ion i s immediately executory.
No costs .
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez,
Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur. Barredo and
Abad Santos, JJ., are on leave.
G.R. Nos. L-32282-83 November 26, 1970 PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, peti tioner,
vs .
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN, FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN
PIANO PEDRO PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO,
CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO,
LORENZO PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO, FERMIN PUGAL,
CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO, ERNING ABANO and
EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN DOES, respondents .
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant
Solicitor
General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and
Special Attorney Juan A. Sison for petitioners.
Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for respondent Erning Abano. Crisologo
Law Office and Pedro Quadra for respondent Camilo Pilotin.
Juan T. David for respondent Vincent Crisologo.
Augusto Kalaw as private prosecutor. REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Peti tion for wri ts of certiorari and mandamus, with prel
iminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor Genera l and State
Prosecutors , to annul and set aside the order of Judge Mario J.
Gutierrez of the Court
of Fi rs t Instance of I locos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20
July 1970, denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos . 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First Instance,
entitled "People vs.
Pi lotin, et al.," to the Circui t Criminal Court of the Second
Judicia l Dis trict; to direct the respondent Judge to effectuate
such transfer; and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesa id in
the Court of Fi rs t
Instance of I locos Sur, s i tting in Vigan, capita l of the
province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed persons
descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of
I locos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On
the afternoon of
the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipa l i ty
and
province, several residential houses were l ikewise burned by
the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in
the death
of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the
authorities, the provincia l fi sca l , with severa l s tate
prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate
with him, on 10
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June 1970 fi led in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, two
informations (Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and
48-V for arson) charging that the seventeen private respondents
herein, together with 82 other unidenti fied persons ,
"confederating,
conspiring, confabulating and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be
burned
several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be
occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the filed
informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, I locos
Sur (Petition, Annexes
B and B-1). Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo
furnished bai l, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared before
respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and pleaded not gui l
ty. Tria l was
then set for 27, 28 and 29 July 1970. It appears that on the
same day, 15 June, the Secretary of Justice
i ssued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino
Anover, of the Circui t Criminal Court of the Second Judicia l Dis
trict, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a
specia l term in
I locos Sur, from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter,
on 18 June 1970, the Secretary further i ssued Administrative Order
No. 226,
authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest
of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative
Order Nos . 258 and 274" of the Department of Justice. On 22
June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a
transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court,
invoking the Administrative Orders just mentioned and ca lling
attention to the ci rcumstance that they were issued at the
instance of the witnesses
seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San
Fernando, La Union, or Baguio Ci ty, for reasons of security and
personal safety, as shown in their affidavi ts . The accused
vigorous ly opposed such
transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge decl ined
the transfer sought, on the ground that Adminis trative Order No.
258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal
Court where
the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious
disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded;
that i f the objective of the proposed transfer was to
subsequently obta in a change of venue from the Supreme Court under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179 the same should have been done
right at the
very inception of these cases . In view of the lower court's
denial of the motion to transfer the cases
to the Circui t Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to Us
for wri ts of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion
and praying this Court to set as ide the order of denia l of the
transfer and to
compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the
cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial
District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases (47-V
and 48-V) at ei ther San
Fernando, La Union, or Baguio Ci ty.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in
view of the fact that the Administrative Order No. 226 merely
authorized the court below, but did not require or command i t, to
transfer the
cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and l ikewise
denied that the ci rcumstances justi fied any such transfer. At
peti tioners' request this Court enjoined the respondent Judge
Gutierrez from proceeding with the tria l of the ca ses unti l
further orders .
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer
upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should
hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of adminis
trative
regulation of executive affa i rs , trenches upon the time
-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while
not di rectly depriving the courts of their independence, i t would
endanger the
rights and immunities of the accused or civil party. It could be
much too easily tra nsformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome
of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony with
the Administration's preferences. The creation by Republ ic Act No.
5179 of the Circui t Criminal Courts for the purpose of a l
leviating the
burden of the regular Courts of First Instance, and to
accelerate the
disposition of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein,
nowhere indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected
individual
cases to the ci rcuit courts. Neither do Administrative Orders
Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any such intention; particularly s ince
Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of i ts
Part
V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same
year, in
Section 3 of Part I I I thereof, provides that the transfer to
Ci rcui t Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of
Fi rs t Instance should be effected by raffle, chance here
operating to nullify
any executive arbi tration of what particular cases should be
apportioned to ei ther tribuna l . The very terms of Adminis
trative
Order No. 226, i s sued on 18 June 1970 by Secretary of Justice
Makasiar, relied upon by the petitioners, in merely authorizing,
and not di recting, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of Fi
rs t
Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos . 44-V and
47-V (People vs . Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District, reveals that the Secretary himself
was aware of the
impropriety of imperatively di recting transfer of speci fied
cases . Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing Adminis
trative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within
the
l imits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the
Executive Orders heretofore mentioned.
It i s unfortunate, however, that in refusing to cons ider
Department Adminis trative Order No. 226 of the Secretary of
Justice as
mandatory respondent Judge Gutierrez fa i led to act upon the
contention of the prosecuting officers that the cases against
private respondents herein should be transferred to the Circui t
Criminal
Court of the Second Judicial District because a miscarriage of
justice was impending, in view of the refusal of the prosecution
witnesses to testify in the court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
where they fel t thei r
l ives would be endangered. This cla im was buttressed by the
affidavi ts of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses ,
reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in cases 47-V
and
48-V and expressing their willingness to testify i f the cases
are heard outs ide of I locos Sur, where they can be free from tens
ion and terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed can
not be
cons idered fanciful and unfounded when account i s taken of the
ci rcumstances that the informations fi led in the Court of Fi rs t
Instance of I locos Sur show that of the one hundred armed
participants in the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este
and Ora Centro, Municipa l i ty of Bantay, some eighty-two (82) are
s ti l l
unidentified and at large; that one of the accused, private
respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs to an influentia l fami ly in
the province, being concededly the son of the Congressman for the
first dis trict of
I locos Sur and of the lady Governor that the reluctant
witnesses are themselves the complainants in the criminal cases ,
and, therefore, have reasons to fear that attempts will be made to
s ilence them; that
i t i s not shown that the Executive branch is able or wi l l
ing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for
a reasonable time thereafter, that even i f armed security escorts
were to be provided,
the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of
murderous assault against the affiant witnesses, as recent events
have proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that between
1 Jan uary
and 31 May 1970 no less than 78 murders have been reported
committed in said province, of which number only 21 were
solved;
and, finally, that the promotion and confi rmation of respondent
Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of
Fi rs t Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch II I , was
actively
supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of
accused Vincent Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to peti
tioner's supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in I locos Sur manifested by the
complaining witnesses, who had on a previous occas ion freely given
evidence
before the investigators in Manila, renders manifest the
imperious necessity of transferring the place of trial to a site
outs ide of I locos Sur, i f the cases are to be judicially
inquired into conformably to the
interest of truth and justice and the State is to be given a fai
r chance to present i ts s ide of the case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of the tria l
s i te can not be made, because i t i s a long s tanding rule of
criminal
procedure in these Is lands that one who commits a crime is
amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is
committed, for the reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phi l
.
376, andPeople vs. Mercado, 65 Phi l . 665, that the
jurisdiction of a
Court of Fi rs t Instance in the Philippines i s l imited to
certa in wel l -defined terri tory and they can not take
jurisdiction of persons
charged with one offense committed outside of that l imited
territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of the Revised
Rules of Court providing that "in a ll criminal prosecutions the
action shal l be
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ins ti tuted and tried in the court of the municipa l i ty or
province
wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essentia l
ingredient thereof took place."
It i s well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran vs.
Ramos, 96 Phi l . 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule invoked by
accused
respondents herein was "not to compel the defendant to move to
and appear in a different court from that of the province where the
crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience
in
looking for his witnesses and other evidence in another place."
Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the pros
ecution, as in the case at bar, i t i s but logica l that the
court
should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or
inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable place of the
tria l according to the exigencies of truth and impartia l ju
stice.
In the particular case before Us , to compel the prosecution to
proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at l
iberty
to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicia l
process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have
been
established. Since the rigorous application of the general
principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here in
preventing a fa i r and impartial inquiry into the actual facts of
the case, it must be admitted
that the exigencies of justice demand that the genera l rule rel
ied upon by accused respondents should yield to occasional
exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor. Otherwise,
the rigor of
the law would become the highest injustice "summum jus, summa in
juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to transfer the
tria l to a s i te where the prosecution's witnesses can feel free
to reveal what they know would be equiva lent to ra i l roading
them into a
conviction. Because regardless of the place where i ts evidence
is to be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to prove
the gui l t of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The scales of
justice clearly
lean in favor of the prosecution being given full opportunity to
lay i ts case before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the
charges for lack of
evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither chal
lenge nor appeal .
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an
impasse of the kind now before Us , are to confess themselves
impotent to further the cause of justice. The Constitution has
vested the Judicia l
Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such judicia l
power connotes certain incidenta l and inherent attributes
reasonably
necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts
"can by appropriate means do a l l things necessary to preserve and
maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective
institution of government" (Borromeo vs . Mariano, 41 Phi l .
322). One of these incidenta l and inherent powers of courts i s
that of
transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of
equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fa i r and impartial trial, or of preventing a
miscarriage of justice, so demands .
This authority was early recognized in England as inhering in
the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century. The
opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court,208 Mass .
162, 21 Ann.
Cases 1067, has shown how the eminent Lord Chief Justice
Mansfield, in Rex vs. Cowle(Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, sa
id that, in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back
as i t can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question was ful ly
discussed, and all the judges appear to have agreed as to the power
of the court, Cramption, Jr., saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to defendants
and prosecutors , ... that where i t
appears that either party cannot obtain a fair and impartia l
tria l in the proper county, then this
court ... has jurisdiction to take the case out of the proper
county, as it is ca lled, and to bring i t into an indifferent
county ... This jurisdiction to
change the venue ... has been exercised by this
court from a very early period. We have reported cases , where
the doctrine i s la id down in
emphatic language; we have the practice of the Court of Queen's
Bench in England independently of any practice of our own court ...
The genera l
jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other, cannot be the
subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in furtherance of
justice, exercised through writs of certiorari, has, according to
the weight of
authori ty, passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American
Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, at page
436, i t was held that the power to transfer the place of holding
tria ls
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law, long before the
independence of this
country; and from that time forth, not only has the practice
prevailed in the courts of England, but the power is now exercised
by the Courts of
very many i f not a ll of our s tates, ei ther by force of
express statute or the adoption of the common law in the
jurisprudence of the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the Phi l
ippine
courts admits of no doubt, because they were organized on the
American pattern with the enactment of the first judicial organic
law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901, by the Phi l ippine Commiss ion,
then
composed by a majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar
with the insti tutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phi l . 300, 333, this
Court s tated: And i t i s safe to say that in every volume of the
Phi l ippine Reports, numbers of cases might be
ci ted wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles
and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true meaning
and scope of the
legis lation enacted i n and for the Phi l ippine Is lands s
ince they passed under American sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Phi l ippine Commiss ion,
after the establ ishment of Civi l
Government under American sovereignty, was the enactment on June
11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act providing for the organization of
courts in
the Phi lippine Islands." This Act in express terms abolished
the then existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of Fi rs t
Instance, and
substituted in their place the courts provided therein. It sets
out in genera l terms the jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and
powers of the
new courts and their judges. The majori ty of the members of the
body which enacted it were able American lawyers . The spiri t with
which i t i s
informed, and indeed i ts very la nguage and terminology would
be unintelligible without some
knowledge of the judicial systems of England and the United
States . Its mani fest purpose and object was to replace the old
judicial system, with
i ts incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources, with a
new system modeled in a l l i ts essential characteristics upon the
judicial systems
of the United States . It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any
incident of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and
settled doctrines on which the new system rests , must be held
to be abrogated by the law organizing the new system.
Whi le not express ly conferred by Act 136, We find i t di
fficul t to bel ieve that the framers ' intent was to deny, by s i
lence, to the
Phi l ippine Courts , and particularly upon this Supreme Court,
the inherent jurisdiction possessed by the English and American
courts
under their common law heri tage to transfer the place of tria l
of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of justice, by
providing fa i r and impa rtia l inquiry and adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or genera l
authority from liability in a civil action for acts done by them in
the
exercise of their judicia l functions , upheld in the Alzua case
as essentially inherent in the courts established by Act 136, even
i f not expressly provided for, the power to transfer the place of
trials when
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1st Sem 2015- Criminal Procedure Full text Cases
so demanded by the interest of justice i s equal ly essentia l
and
possesses no inferior rank. To it apply, mutatis mutandis, the
words of this Court in the Alzua case just ci ted:
The grounds of public pol icy and the reasoning
upon which the doctrine i s based are not less forceful and
imperative in these Is lands than in
the countries from which the new judicial system was borrowed;
and an examination of the reasons ass igned ... leaves no room for
doubt that a
fa i lure to recognize i t as an incident to the new judicia l
system would materia l ly impair i ts usefulness and tend very s
trongly to defeat the
ends for which it was establ ished. (21 Phi l . 333-334)
Not only has there been s ince then no proof of any speci fic
pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress, against the exercise by
our Courts of the power discussed heretofore: on the contrary,
the
law establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act No.
5179, in i ts Section 4, provides express legislative recognition
of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circui t Criminal Courts may hold sess ions anywhere
within their respective
dis tricts:Provided, however, that cases shal l be heard within
the province where the crime subject of the offense was committed.
And
provided further, that when the interest of justice so demands,
with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a
neighboring
province within the district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been
satisfied by
the fi ling of the criminal case in question with the Court of
Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses
charged were committed, according to the informations; s ince the
hol ding of the
tria l in a particular place i s more a matter of venue, rather
than jurisdiction; s ince the interests of truth and justice can
not be
subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to tria l in
the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because i ts witnesses , for
just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the
respondent
court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to
have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in
the exercise of judicial power possessed by i t under the
Constitution and
the s tatutes, should decree that the tria l of cases 47-V and
48-V should be heard and decided by the Circui t Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or
in Baguio
Ci ty, at the earlier available date. This arrangement would
have the advantage that the same trial judge could later be
authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, i f ci
rcumstances so demanded.
Furthermore, the adjudication of the case by a judge other than
respondent Gutierrez, if resulting in acquitta l , would remove
any
doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way influenced by
the tria l Judge's being beholden to the Crisologo fami ly.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals set by
this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phi l .
523, where We sa id:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that which
gives opportunity for the most complete and perfect exercise of
the
powers of the court within the limitations s et by natura l
justice. It is that one which, in other words, gives the most
perfect opportunity for the
powers of the court to transmute themselves into concrete acts
of justice between the parties before it. The purpose of such a
procedure is not
to restrict the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter but to give it effective facility in
righteous action. It may be said in pass ing that the most sa l
ient
objection which can be urged against procedure
today i s that i t so restricts the exercise of th e court's
power by technica l i ties that part of i ts
authority effective for justice between the parties i s many
times in incons iderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart
justice. Its proper a im is to faci l i tate the
appl ication of justice to the riva l cla ims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to faci l i
tate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not consti tute the thing i
tself which courts are a lways striving to
secure to l itigants. It i s des igned as the means best adapted
to obtain that thing. In other words, i t i s a means to an end. It
i s the means by which
the powers of the court are made effective in just judgments.
When it loses the character of the one and takes on that of the
other the administration
of justice becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave cri ticism. (Mani la Ra i lroad Co. v.
Attorney-General, 20 Phi l. 523, 529
[1911]. Emphasis and paragraphing suppl ied.)
In resume, this Court holds , and so rules :
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal
Courts did not, and does not, authorize the Secretary of Justice to
transfer
thereto speci fied and individual cases ; (2) That this Supreme
Court, in the exercise of the Judicia l Power
vested by the Consti tution upon i t and other s tatutory Courts
, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree that the
trial and dispos i tion of a case pending in a Court of Fi rs t
Instance be
transferred to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so demand, and
there are serious and weighty reasons to believe that a tria l by
the court that
originally had jurisdiction over the case would not result in a
fai r and impartia l tria l and lead to a miscarriage o f
justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and adequate
reasons for the transfer of the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos .
47-V and 48-V of the Court of Fi rs t Instance of I locos Sur to
the Circui t Criminal
Court of the Second Judicia l Dis trict, in the interest of
truth and justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the wri ts of certiorari and mandamus
prayed for are granted; the order of the respondent Court of
Fi rs t Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated 20 July 1970, i s susta
ined in so far as i t holds that the Administrative Order No. 221
of the Department
of Justice i s not mandatory, but only di rectory; nevertheless
, sa id order i s declared in grave abuse of discretion and set as
ide in so far as i t
decl ines to transfer the trial of i ts cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V
to another court within the district; and sa id respondent Court i
s accordingly directed and
ordered to remand the two criminal cases aforesa id to the
Circui t Criminal Court of the
Second Judicia l Dis trict for hearing of the evidence for the
prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La Union, at the
earliest ava i lable
date, and such other proceedings as the Circui t Criminal Court
may determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to fi le ba i l bonds to answer for
their appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit Criminal
Court for
the Second Judicial District, in the same amount, and under the
same terms and conditions as their present ba i l bonds , which wi
l l be replaced by those herein ordered, all within fi fteen (15)
days from
fina l i ty of this decis ion. No specia l pronouncement as to
costs .
(separate opinions were not included here)
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1st Sem 2015- Criminal Procedure Full text Cases
G.R. No. 158763 March 31, 2006
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Peti
tioners ,
vs .
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent. D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of
Court, assai l ing the 18 December 2002 Decis ion 1 of the Court
of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and i ts 12 June 2003 Resolution
denying petitioners Motion for Recons ideration. The dispos i
tive
portion of the assa i led decis ion reads as fol lows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad
to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in i ssuing the assa i led Orders , the
instant peti tion for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition i s
hereby GRANTED
and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and i t i s hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismiss ing
the two (2) Informations for Murder, a l l i s sued by publ ic
respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos .
36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered
UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the
Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001
issued by the then acting Pres iding Judge Wi l fredo Tumal
iuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos . 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases
of Branch 36 of the Regional Tria l Court of Santiago Ci ty,
Isabela ; and
3. Publ ic respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the
apprehens ion of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal
in said Criminal Cases Nos .
36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as fol
lows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok
Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identi fied as the dead
bodies of Vicente Bauzon and El izer Tuliao, son of private
respondent
Virgi lio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection
program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander
Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the
Regional
Tria l Court (RTC) of Santiago Ci ty. The venue was later
transferred to Manila. On 22 Apri l 1999, the RTC
of Mani la convicted a ll of the accused and sentenced them to
two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to
be arra igned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed
to this
Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted
the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Madera l was arrested. On 27
Apri l 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified
petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio,
a certa in Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons
responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and El i zer Tul
iao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal compla int for murder against
peti tioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the
sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding
Judge Wi l fredo Tumal iuan issued warrants of arrest aga inst
peti tioners and SPO2 Madera l .
On 29 June 2001, petitioners fi led an urgent motion to
complete
prel iminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall
and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumal
iuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order
denying
sa id urgent motion on the ground that, s ince the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons , the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed
the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice. On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad
took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint
Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation
of the warrant of arrest issued against peti tioner Miranda. He l
ikewise
applied this Order to peti tioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order
dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and
respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the sa id
Joint
Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the
motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16
October
2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order
dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for
certiorari , mandamus and prohibi tion with this Court, with p
rayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge
Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nul l i fy the
Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21
September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to
grant the prayer for a temporary restra ining order against
Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly
after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder
against
peti tioners . On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of
respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15
November 2001, and issued the temporary restra ining orde r whi
le referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication
on the meri ts .
Respondent Tul iao fi led with this Court a Motion to Ci te Publ
ic Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "del
iberately
and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismiss ing the
informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred sa
id
motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral
to it of respondents petition for certiora ri , prohibi tion and
mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assa i
led decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement
of the
criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago Ci ty, as well as the i
ssuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decis ion, but the
same was
denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003. Hence, this peti
tion.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth
to this Court the fol lowing ass ignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in revers ing and setting as ide the Joint Order of Judge
Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001,
October 16,
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered
36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and
reinstating
the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Pres iding
Judge Wi l fredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused
cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction
of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
erred in di recting the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and 36-
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Page 7 of 13
1st Sem 2015- Criminal Procedure Full text Cases
3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of
the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Phi lippines, and in
ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest
aga inst herein peti tioners .
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit a ll due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
revers ible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases
No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases
of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Phi
lippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants
of arrest aga inst
herein petitioners , the order of dismissa l i s sued therein
having become fina l and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires
nei ther jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody
of law over the body of the accused.
The fi rst assignment of error brought forth by the peti tioner
deals
with the Court of Appeals rul ing that: [A]n accused cannot seek
any judicial relief i f he does not submit his
person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the
person of the accused may be acquired ei ther through compulsory
process , such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary
appearance, such
as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It i s only
when the court has a lready acquired jurisdiction over his person
that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico
vs .
Al fonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6,
1992). Thus , an accused must first be placed in the custody of the
law before the court may va l idly act on his peti tion for judicia
l rel iefs .3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that
peti tioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicia
l
rel ief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived
of their l iberty at the time they fi led their "Urgent Motion to
complete
prel iminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to reca l l an
d/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Peti tioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by
arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners
argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court
can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such
jurisdiction over their person was a l ready acquired by the court
by
their fi l ing of the above Urgent Motion. In arguing that
jurisdiction over the person is required only in the
adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Reti
red Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it i s not necessary for the
court to fi rs t acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused to dismiss the
case or grant other relief. The outright dismissa l of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure
(Sec. 12a). In Al lado vs . Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was
dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cau se
without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs .
Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the
i ssuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by
the
Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs . Executive Secretary
(301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissa l
of
the case for lack of probable cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their
person was a l ready acquired by their fi l ing of the above Urgent
Motion, peti tioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court
acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accompl ished ei ther
by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts
jurisdiction thereover,
appearing for arraignment, entering tria l ) or by fi l ing ba i
l . On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obta in the provis
ional l iberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted
before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authori ties
ei ther by his arrest or voluntary surrender. Our pronouncement
in Santiago shows a distinction between custody
of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law
is required before the court can act upon the application for bail,
but i s not required for the adjudication of other rel iefs sou ght
by the
defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a
waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused.8 Custody of the law is accompl ished ei ther by arrest
or
voluntary surrender,9 whi le jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appe arance. 10
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to
the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by vi rtue of a warrant files a motion before arra ignment
to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the
custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after
his tria l
has commenced. 11
Being in the custody of the law signifies restra int on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own wi l l and l iberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. 12 Custody
of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes , but i s not l imited to, detention.
The s tatement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 ci ted by the
Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in
that case, which is the application for admission to bail of
someone not yet in
the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our
pronouncement in Pico reads :
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his l iberty. A person who has
not submitted himsel f to the jurisdiction of the court has no
right to
invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have
di l igently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that
he
indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before cons
idering the appl ication for ba i l . 13
Whi le we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as i
t concerns bail, we clarify that, as a genera l rule, on e who
seeks an affi rmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of
the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago,
seeking an affi rmative relief in court, whether in civil or
criminal proceedings , consti tutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for ba i l , where there i s the
specia l requirement of the appl icant being in the custody of the
law. In
Fel iciano v. Pas icolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of ba i
l i s to secure ones release and i t would be incongruous to grant
bail to one
who is free. Thus, ba i l i s the securi ty required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that i t discourages
and prevents
resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused
could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and
compl iance with the requirements therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that fi l ing
pleadings
seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer i s precisely
for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to
a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the
defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissa l are
included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on
the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
an d (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute
a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third i s
a
consequence of the fact that i t is the very legality of the
court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that i s the very
i ssue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. To recapitulate
what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases , jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the
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accused when he files any pleading seeking an affi rmative rel
ief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the
court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in
narrow cases involving specia l appe arances , an accused can
invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction
over the person nor custody of the law. However, i f a person
invoking the
special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must fi
rs t submit himsel f to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the
genera l rule applies, i .e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking
affi rmative rel ief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in
the custody of the law. The following cases best i l lustrate this
point, where we granted various rel iefs to accused who were not in
the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons
under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases
involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an
information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to
quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Al lado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we
issued a
temporary restra ining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further
proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us
.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of
Warrants
of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge
therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the
criminal case and
to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests aga inst the
accused. 3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of
the accused in a peti tion for certiorari on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part
of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer
the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the i
ssuance of
the warrants of arrest. We hold that the circumstances forcing
us to require custody of the
law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash
the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of ba i l to
persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many
persons who can
afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held
to answer for the commission of the offense i f ever he is proven
gui l ty. On the other hand, i f we allow the quashal of warrants
of arrest to
persons not in the custody of the law, i t would be very rare
that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain
scot-free. This i s because i t is the same judge who issued the
warrant of arrest who
wi l l decide whether or not he fol lowed the Consti tution in
his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion
to quash i f he rea l ly did find probable cause after personal
ly examining the records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regulari ty of officia
l functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is
quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any
time of the
day and night.22
Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken
against him in the determination of probable cause, s ince fl ight
i s indicative of gui l t.
In fine, as much as i t is incongruous to grant bail to one who
is free, it i s l ikewise incongruous to require one to surrender
his freedom
before asserting i t. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in
the hierarchy of rights than property rights ,23 demanding that due
process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking
and
not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently fi led peti
tion for review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts
engendered by the pol i tica l cl imate consti tutes grave abuse
of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
actions
of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a l i ttle too eager of
dismiss ing the criminal cases against the peti tioners . Fi rs t,
he quashed the standing warrant of arrest i s sued by his
predecessor
because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of
Justice,
and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due
to the political climate in the ci ty. Second, after the Secretary
of Justice affi rmed the prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the
criminal cases
on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with di
fferent accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to i
ssue a
temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the
case. After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of peti
tioners , peti tioner Miranda appealed the assis tant prosecutors
resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the bas is of sa
id appeal . According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates
(that) and
because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings i s but
proper."24 Quashal on this basis i s grave abuse of discretion. It
is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence
and obl ivious to
comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners
just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the ass
is tant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But
even i f the
peti tion for review was filed before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a
petition for the review
of the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the
warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25
we held that the peti tioners therein cannot assail as premature
the filing of the information in court against them on the ground
that they s till have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Simi
larly, the i ssuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same
ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the
warrant of arrest is in order i f true: violation of the Consti
tution.
Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question: In these
double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which i s Sec. 2,
Article II I Bi l l of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of
Criminal Procedure and
to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or i ssue,
after a deep perusal of the arguments ra ised, this Court, through
[its] regular Pres iding Judge, finds meri t in the contention of
herein accused -
movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the fol lowin g provis ion of
the
Consti tution as having been violated by Judge Tumal iuan: Sec.
2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses
,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shal l be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall i ssue except upon
probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case,
including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the
prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that
Judge Anghad gravely
abused his discretion. According to peti tioners :
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for
the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the
order i tself, which
clearly s tated that the determination of probable cause was
based on the certi fication, under oath, of the fi sca l and not on
a separate determination personal ly made by the Judge. No
presumption of
regulari ty could be drawn from the order s ince i t express ly
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fi sca l s certi
fication.28
Peti tioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order conta
ins no such indication that he rel ied solely on the
prosecutors
certi fication. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the
prosecutor, the
Court proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause
by personal ly eva luating the records x x x.[29]
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The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification
was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement
under Lim, Sr. v. Fel ix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the fol lowing:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes ; 2. Affidavi t dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez; 3.
Affidavi t dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C.
Miranda and Reynaldo de la Cruz; 5. Affidavi t dated 19 May 2001 of
Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 Apri l 1999 of the Regional Tria l Court of
Mani la , Branch 41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355; 7. Sworn s
tatement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Madera l ;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001; 9. Affidavi t-compla int of
Vi rgi l io Tul iao; and 10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers
of Elezer Tul iao
and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation
on the part of Judge Tumal iuan of Article II I , Section 2, of the
Consti tution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the
substantive
part of said section, i .e., the existence of probable cause. In
failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons:
(1) it was given after
a lmost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of
Investigation; (2) i t was given by someone who rendered himsel f
untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years ; (3) i t was
given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the
information; and (4) i t was given during the election period
amidst a "pol i tica l ly charged scenario where "Santiago Ci ty
voters were pi tted agai nst
each other a long the lines of the Miranda camp on one s ide and
former Ci ty Mayor Amelita S. Navarro, and a l legedly that of DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other."32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found
no
reason to disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge
Tumaliuan. It i s important to note that an exhaustive debate on
the credibili ty of a witness i s not within the province of the
determination of probable
cause. As we held in Webb33
: A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing
that more l ikely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of gui l t, nei ther on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and defini tely, not
on evidence establ ishing absolute certa inty of gui l t. As wel l
put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more
than
"bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would
justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the
suspect to s tand tria l . It i s not a pronouncement of gui l
t. x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not
a part of tria l x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decis ion of this
Court in another case with di fferent accused consti tutes grave
abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground,
among other things , that there was a peti tion for review of the
assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affi rmed the
prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two
criminal cases against the petitioners on the bas is of the fol
lowing explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs . Wilfredo
Leano,
et a l ., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn s
tatements , he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with
him and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators , the
October 9,
2001 Decis ion of the Supreme Court absolving the five cops
of
murder, certa inly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of fa
lsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting sa
id
officers "who were likewise falsely l inked by said Rodel
Maderal in his Apri l 27, 2001 s tatements, it is now beyond doubt
that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured
statements and therefore
the same is without probable va lue." This Court agrees with
the
defenses views. Indeed, of what use is Maderals s tatements wh
en the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented
and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Madera l i s
supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but with
the Supreme Court decis ion adverted to, the probative va lue of hi
s
s tatements i s practica l ly ni l . x x x x
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused
Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissa l
of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme
Court in People of the Philippines vs . Wilfredo Leao, et a l .,
G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused therein and in effect dis
regarding a l l the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly,
the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda
are ordered dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no
right to twis t our decis ion and interpret i t to the discredit of
SPO2
Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decis ion, even of
this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the
bas is of the
dismissal of criminal case against di fferent accused for the
same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by
the fact that our decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt.
We
never ruled in Leao that the crime did not happen; we just found
that there was reasonable doubt as to th e gui l t of the accused
therein, since the prosecution in that case rel ied on ci
rcumstantia l
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the
criminal cases of the peti tioners in the case at bar as there i s
here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore
had
no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas petitioners
herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It i s preposterous to conclude that because of our finding
of
reasonable doubt in Leao, "i t i s now beyond doubt that Rodel
Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured s tatements and
therefore the same is without probable va lue."35 On the contrary,
i f
we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an acquittal
on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probabi l
i ty of the prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probabi
l i ty of gui l t
certa inly meets the cri teria of probable cause. We cannot let
unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissa l of the
informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the
filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibi ting him
from further proceeding with the case. The bond was fi led the day
after the
informations were dismissed. While the dismissa l of the case
was able to beat the effectivi ty date of the temporary restra
ining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this
Courts resolve to i ssue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild
suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nul l i fi cation of a proceeding necessari ly carries with i t
the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nul l i fied
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals did not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest
issued by Judge Tumal iuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to i
ssue
apparently new warrants of arrest.36 According to the peti
tioners , i t was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done
so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance
of new warrants of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of
the
warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter
of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not
be
a l lowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially
in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals
point to the other di rection. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had
reinstated the 25
June 2001 Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37
which issued the warrants of
arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals l ikewise declared the
proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certa inly, the
declaration of nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry
with i t the reinstatement of the orders set as ide by the nul l i
fied proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of
arrest
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had been nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are
henceforth
deemed unquashed. Even i f, however, the Court of Appeals had
directed the i ssuance of
new warrants of arrest based on a determination of probable
cause, i t would have been legally permissible for them to do so.
The records
of the preliminary investigation had been avai lable to the
Court of Appeals, and are a lso available to this Court, allowing
both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the
case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor.
As we have ruled in Al lado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of
Appeals , the determination of probable cause does not rest on a
subjective
cri teria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the
finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule
the deci s ion of a
judge reversing a finding of probable cause, a lso on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal
case dismissed before arra ignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the
Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement
of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, a l leging that
the order of dismissal i ssued therein had become fina l and
executory.
According to peti tioners : It i s also worthy to point out at
this juncture that the Joint Order of
Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders
which were assailed in the private respondent Tul iaos Peti tion
for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private
respondent
before the Court of Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the fi
rst page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders i
ssued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to
wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;
2.) Order dated September 21, 2001; 3.) Joint Order dated
October 16, 2001; and 4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obvious ly, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge
Anghad, which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523
AND
36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the
va lidity or nul l i ty of the Joint Order of November 14,
2001.38
Peti tioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not
with the Court of
Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided the
case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November
2001
Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October 2001, around
three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon receipt of the
14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time
in
fi l ing with this Court a Motion to Ci te Public Respondent in
Contempt, a l leging that Judge Anghad "del iberately and wi l l
ful ly committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November
2001 the Order
dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder."
On 21 November 2001, we referred sa i d motion to the Court of
Appeals, in view of the previous referra l of respondent Tul
iaos
peti tion for certiorari , prohibi tion and mandamus. Our
referra l to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Ci te Publ
ic
Repondent in Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within
the i ssues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals . In cla
iming that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in i
ssuing the
14 November 2001 Order, respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge
Anghad an act much more serious than grave a buse of
discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14
November 2001 Order on 15 November 2001, antedating i t so as to
avoid the
effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In sa id 12
November
2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the
criminal
cases upon the respondent Tuliaos fi l ing of a bond in the
amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tul iao had fi led the bond on 15
November 2005.
Whi le we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in
contempt,
seeing as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of
court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require the
granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39
the prayer to
ci te public respondent in contempt and for other rel iefs just
and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a
prayer
for the nul l i fi cation of sa id 14 November 2001 Order. In
any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before
arra ignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double
jeopardy
cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and i
t was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed.40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the origina l peti tion
for certiorari as well as in his motion to cite for contempt) to
disqual i fy Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we
hold that
the number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are
enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of Judge
Anghad. We further resolve to fol low the case of People v.
SPO1
Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523
and No. 36-3524 to the Ci ty of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII ,
Section 4,
of the Consti tution. WHEREFORE, the peti tion i s DENIED. The
Decis ion dated 18
December 2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court
of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal
Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled
in
the Regional Trial Court of the Ci ty of Mani la . In this
connection,
1) Let a copy of this decis ion be furnished the Executive
Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Santiago, Isabela , who is di
rected to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days
after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the Ci ty of Santiago,
Isabela , i s l ikewise di rected to report to this Court
compl iance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these
cases ;
3) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Manila shal l pro ceed to
raffle the criminal cases within ten (10) days from the
transfer; 4) The Executive Judge of the Ci ty of Mani la i s l
ikewise
di rected to report to this Court compliance with the order to
raffle within ten (10) days from sa id compl iance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled i s di
rected to act on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Fina lly, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is di rected to i ssue
forthwith warrants of arrest for the apprehens ion of
peti tioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B.
Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 18 December 2002.
The Temporary Restra