Alvarez v CFI (G.R. No. 45358. January 29, 1937)64 Phil. 33
FACTS:
The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the
Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David,
an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection
with his activities as a money-lender, charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the
affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers
to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and
belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his
own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person. Judge issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the
petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of
the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery
thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law. On
June 4, 1936, around 7 PM, the agents raided the subject place and
seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs,
cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc
Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to
the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the
agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that
all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued
was illegal.
On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further
investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez
elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as
well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to
retain custody be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
WON search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has
been based upon the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose
oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but
that he had knowledge thereof through mere information secured from
a person whom he considered reliable.RULING:
That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following
reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the
facts necessary to determine the existence or non-existence of
probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued for the sole
purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the
petitioner, for violation of the Anti- Usury Law
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and
Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only
probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath
of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause.The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant
is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search
warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and
other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this
jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who
issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take
the deposition of any other witness.ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitionervHON. JOSE HERRERA,
respondentFacts:Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued
by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and
to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers,
receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized
thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.On October 27, 1965, respondent
Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso
Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel
Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed
criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax
evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with
principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila.Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other
agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the
premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search
warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence
of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of
directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and
carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and
receipts.Issue:Whether or not the search warrant is void.Ruling:In
the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate
and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax
evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit
command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the
search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and
the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all
documents, papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder.
Without costs.STONEHILL v DIOKNO
FACTS
Several judges issued on different dates a total of 42 search
warrants against the petitioners and/or the corporations of which
they were officers, to take books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, receipts as means used or intended to commit offense in
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Code, Internal
Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
Police proceeded the search and seizure both in the petitioners
residences and offices of the corporations. Petitioners then were
subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to
question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.
On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with
respect to some documents and papers.
HELD
Petitioners have no cause of action to question legality of
search warrant ordering the search of the corporation because
corporations have separate and distinct personality from the
petitioners, and this is regardless of the shares of stock each of
them has in said corporations.
Legality of the seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired and objection thereto is purely personal
and cannot be availed by third parties.
Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and
the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no
probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things
to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing
the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers.
Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible
in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be
returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity
and return of those taken from the corporations for which they
acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from
that of the corporation.
DISSENT:
Aggrieved Person Doctrine
A person has legal standing where he is in a position to be
directly aggrieved/benefitted from the adjudication of a case.
Petitioners owned the matters seized and they control the premises
searched.
PEOPLE VS MAGO GR No. L-27360
FACTS:
On November 4, 1966, Martin Alagao, head of the
counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, together
with his group intercepted two trucks at the Agripina Circle,
Ermita, Manila, and the two trucks were seized on instructions of
the Chief of Police. The interception was based to the information
that misdeclared and undervalued personal effects would be released
from the customs zone of Port of Manila.Alagao and a duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs conducted surveillance of the two
trucks allegedly carrying the goods.
Subsequently, the owner of the cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin
Lanopa (owner of the truck Mago has hired to carry the goods) filed
with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
preliminary injunction on the ground that the trucks were seized
without a search warrant. Forthwith, the order had been issued by
Judge Hilarion to prevent the bales from opening. However, when the
restraining order was received, some bales were already opened.
Furthermore, upon hearing, the lower court with respondent
Hilarion issued an order releasing the goods to Remedios Mago upon
filing her bond. The decision of Judge Hilarion prompted the
petitioners to file a petition for prohibition and certiorari
citing that the court and Judge Hilarion has no jurisdiction over
the case.
ISSUE:
WON the inception and seizure of goods without warrant is in
contravention with Magos constitutional rights.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, stating
that there is no violation of constitutional rights despite the
absence of search warrant.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the
case at bar. The code allows entering, passing through, or
searching any land, enclosure, warehouse, store, or building, not
being a dwelling house and also to inspect, search, and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any truck, package, or envelope of any
person on board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast, or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases with
exception to the dwelling house.
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over
imported goods for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws,
from the moment the goods are actually in its possession and
control, even if no warrant of seizure and detention had previously
been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure
and forfeiture proceedings, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Case Title: DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
Topic:Search and Seizure
Facts:
On October 31, 1987 Saturday, Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of
the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western
Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo
Dayrit, an application for the issuance of a search warrant,
docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD
NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of
the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente,
Defendant."
Prudente was the president of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, of which premises he hides the firearms and
ammunitions without license to possess, likewise to be used in
committing an offense. Major Dimagmaliw presented Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD)as witness, which
Judge Dayrit asked some questions in connection to the issuance of
search warrant.
In the search warrant, several firearms and ammunitions were
mentioned to in possession of the petitioner, however during the
search, only 3 live fragmentation hand grenades were
confiscated.
Petitioner's Contention:
The petitioner attack the validity of the search warrant issued
against him by the respondents, in three propositions:
1. That the judge executed the search warrant with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, since
probable cause was not established based on personal knowledge of
the applicant and his witness.
2. That the area to be searched is general in its terms, since
it was not specified what room in the second floor of the
university be subject of the searched.
3. That the applicant forgot to comply with Supreme Court
Circulars pertaining to search warrant issued after regular office
hours, which a reason must be provided for the urgency of issuing
the search warrant.
4. That the search warrant did not provide the specific crime
committed by the petitioner in relation to his violation to P.D
1866.
Respondents Contention:
That it is based on reliable information and confirmed through a
surveillance in the aforementioned university.
Issue:WON the search warrant issued against Prudente is
valid.
Court Decisions:
Lower Court: Ruled against the petitioner
Appellate Court: Ruled against the petitioner
Supreme Court:
a. Majority Decision :
No, the search warrant is declared invalid. Nevertheless, the SC
ruled that based on the second third and fourth assailed errors of
the lower courts by the petitioner, it did not render the search
warrant invalid.
The designation of the places to be searched sufficiently
complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant
must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there
were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the
PUP.
Also, the SC held that it would suffice to state that the
circular merely provides for a guideline, departure from which
would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid
search warrant.
Moreover, the SC opined that it has long been a practice in the
investigative and prosecution arm of the government, to designate
the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The
Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession
of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and
another for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing
of three different informations for each of the above offenses
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the
courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or information must
charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses.
With regard to the first assailed error, the respondent Judge
did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the
Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
Furthermore, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio
Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did
not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers."
On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called
for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI,"
the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish
probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of
a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the
existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search
warrant. SC also notes post facto that the search in question
yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or
ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the
supporting deposition, and the search warrant the supporting hand
grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the
searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an
alleged member of the searching party.
b. Dissenting Opinion:Doctrines/Definition of Terms:
Probable Cause Personal knowledge
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn
in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant
be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the
facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be
reliable.
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, et al vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO, et al.
FACTS:Prior to August 6, 1984, AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No. MC-25-113 of Military
Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at
large.On August 6 @ 11:30AM, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection
of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. According to
the petitioners, at 12:00 NN, the elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Therespondents alleged
that the search was conducted "late on the same day"; that is late
on august 6th.
On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G.
Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent
Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after
almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as
a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has
been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following
circumstances were stated: the Search Warrant was issued in
proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila
Aguilar-Roque, Accused, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion"
(the SEARCH WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88; It does
not appear from the records that an application in writing was
submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Pao; according to the
record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus,
were examined under oath by Judge Pao but only the deposition of
S/A Lapus has been submitted to the Court. The latter deposed that
to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be
searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the
National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and
local sources intended to be used for rebellion.
In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th the
petitioners alleged that: TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of
the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest; the searching party seized 428
documents and written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all; according
to the Return, submitted in the search warrant on August 10th, the
search was made in the presence of Dra. MarcianaGalang, owner of
the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made
that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and
documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay
Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
The three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO,
were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (the CITY
FISCAL, for short) upon complaint filed by the CSG against
petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."
ISSUE:
WON THE SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT WAS VALID?
WON THE SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT IS INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST?
RULING:
NO, the search is invalid.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the
personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of
the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic
Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these
groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public, and
support money from foreign or local sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant
authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and
not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which
includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to
what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the
law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in
fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It
is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the
things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search
warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general.
The applicant's witnesses are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify
the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and
act in pursuant thereof.
2. NO, the search is not a valid search incidental to lawful
arrest.
Section 12.Search without warrant of person arrested.A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to
the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an
arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be
search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts
and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application
of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to
what constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the
individual's right to privacy and the public's interest in the
prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.
Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988 (173 SCRA 211)
September 29, 1989
TOPIC: SEARCH and SEIZURE: The Checkpoint Case
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of
the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of
conducting security operations within its area of responsibility
and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region.As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila,and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates For
Peoples Rights (ULAP) sought thedeclaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the
alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De Villa and the
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to
formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the
protection of the people.
Petitioners contention:
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said
checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being
harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the
checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order.
Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn
,Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to
speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
Checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make
searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in
violation of the Constitution.
ISSUEDo the military and police checkpoints violate the right of
the people against unreasonable search and seizures?
HELDNO,military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right
of the people against unreasonable search and seizures.
The Court DISMISSED the petition.
Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints per se illegal.No proof has been
presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their
routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations
of petitioners'' rights against unlawful search and seizure of
other rights. The constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those
whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered
as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may not also
be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in
the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individuals right against a warrantless search w/c is, however,
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible
of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental
power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the
checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in
reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and a peaceful community.
Dissenting Opinion
The declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands
of national security ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights was
intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if
asserted on the ground of national security. What is worse is that
the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be
reasonable even without proof of probable cause and much less the
required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at
'establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace
and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social,
economic and political development of the National Capital Region."
For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at
random and at any time simply because he excites the suspicion,
caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the
checkpoints, on pain of arrest or worse, even being shot to death,
if he resists.
While the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
my brethren advance, is a right personal to the aggrieved party,
the petitioners, precisely, have come to Court because they had
been, or had felt, aggrieved. .In that event, the burden is the
State's, to demonstrate the reasonableness of the search. The
petitioners, Ricardo Valmonte in particular, need not, therefore,
have illustrated the "details of the incident" .
PEOPLE VS MAQUEDAAppeal from the decision of RTC Benguet
convicting Maqueda of robbery with homicide and serious physical
injuries
J. Davide, Jr.
FACTS:
Britisher Horace William Barker and Filipino wife, Teresita
Mendoza, reside in Tuba, Benguet. On 27 April 1991, Horace was
brutally slain and Teresita badly battered with lead pipes on the
occasion of a robbery in their house.
Rene Salvamante, the victims former houseboy, was pinpointed.
Richard Malig was initially included in the information robbery
with homicide and serious physical injuries filed in the RTC of
Benguet.
Only Malig was arrested. Before his arraignment, the prosecution
filed a motion to amend the information to implead as co-accused
Hector Maqueda alias Putol. On the hearing of the motion the next
day, the Prosecutor asked that Malig be dropped from the
information because the evidence against him wasnt sufficient. The
motion was granted.
Warrants for the arrest of Salvamante and Maqueda were issued.
Maqueda was arrested and he filed an application for bail about a
month later. He categorically stated that he is willing and
volunteering to be a State witness, as he is the least guilty among
the accused. Salvamante continued to elude arrest.
Maqueda was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries.
Prosecutions version:
At 6 AM on 27 August 1991, Norie Dacara, a househelp who shared
a room with Julieta Villanueva (her cousin and fellow househelp),
got up and went to the toilet. There, she was surprised to see Rene
Salvamante (whom she knew because she and Julieta replaced
Salvamante and his sister).
Salvamante suddenly strangled her and she saw a
fair-complexioned, tall man she identified as Maqueda at his side.
She fled towards the garage but Salvamante pulled her back into the
house.
Julieta got up and saw a man brandishing a lead pipe outside her
door. She pointed to Maqueda as the man she saw. She immediately
closed the door and she held on to it as the man was trying to
force his way in.
The shouts awakened Teresita. In the dining room, she saw
Salvamante and a man she identified as Maqueda. They rushed to her
and beat her with lead pipes until she lost consciousness.
Salvamenta made Julieta and Norie open the door of the garage and
then they hid in their room.
Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio were in a waiting shed beside the
Asin road a kilometer away from the Barkers home and two men asked
them if the road they were following would lead to Naguilian, La
Union. Mike replied that it did not. They identified the shorter
man as Salvamante and Maqueda as the taller man with an amputated
left hand and a right hand with a missing thumb and index
finger.
September 1, 1991: A police team from the Tuba Police Station
came to the hospital bed of Mrs. Barker and asked her to identify
the persons who assaulted her. She pointed out one who turned out
to be Richard Malig. When informed of the investigation, Dr.
Hernandez told them it was improper for them to conduct an
investigation since Mrs. Barker had not yet fully recovered
consciousness and her eyesight had not yet improved.
After efforts to locate Maqueda had failed, on March 1992, they
received information that Maqueda had been arrested in Guinyangan.
The Guinyangan police turned him over to Maj. Anagaran who brought
him to the Benguet Provincial Jail.
Before Maj. Anagaran arrived, Maqueda was taken to the
headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company and SP03 Amando
Molleno got his statement. He informed Maqueda of his rights and
Maqueda signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay narrating his participation in
the crime.
While under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail in
which he stated that he is willing and volunteering to be a State
witness in the case. Prosecutor Zarate had a talk with Maqueda and
asked him if he was in the company of Salvamante on the day in
question in entering the Barkers home. When he got an affirmative
answer, Zarate told him he would oppose the motion to bail since
Maqueda is the only one on trial.
Ray Dean Salvosa arrived at the Office of the Prosecutor Zarate
and obtained permission to talk to Maqueda. Maqueda narrated to
Salvosa that Salvamante brought him to Baguio to find a job as a
peanut vendor but instead brought him to the Barkers house and told
him of his plan. He initially objected but later on agreed to
it.
Maqueda put up the defense of denial and alibi. He says:
He claims to have been at the polvoron factory of Minda
Castrense. That day, he claims to have been teaching new employees
how to make polvoron seasoning. On December 20, 1991, he went home
to Gapas, Guinyangan for vacation and ran into Salvamenta, his
childhood playmate. They just waved to each other. He again saw
Salvamante after Christmas day and Salvamante invited him to go to
Calauag. Since he wanted to visit his brother, he agreed. There,
Salvamante asked him to accompany him in selling a cassette
recorder from Baguio. After that, he never saw Salvamante
again.
He was arrested by CAFGU members on March 2. He was told that if
he points to Salvamante, he would be freed and would become a state
witness, He told them he could attest to Salvamantes sale of the
recorder.
Prosecution responded by presenting Fredesminda Castrence, the
owner of the factory Maqueda worked in, who testified that she
started her business in 30 August 1991, making it impossible for
her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991.
The trial court disregarded the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and
the maids on Maquedas identification, they decreed a conviction
based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti plus
circumstantial evidence.
HELD:
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of RTC Benguet to convict
Maqueda is affirmed.
RATIONALE:
It was wrong for the trial court to hold that the the rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination are limited to custodial
investigation and do not apply to a person against whom a criminal
complaint or information has already been filed.
The trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial
confession --the Sinumpaang Salaysay--and an extrajudicial
admision--the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean
Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay shows that it is an
extrajudicial admission.
The distinction is made clear in Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 26: Admission of a party -- The act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him.
Sec 33. Confession -- The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilty of the offense charged , or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.
In a confession, there is acknowledgement of guilt. The term
admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of
fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgement of his guilty or of the criminal intent to commit
the offense with which he is charged.
A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a party
in a criminal case, of his guilty of the crime charged while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilty. An admission is something less
than a confession, and is but an acknowledgement of some fact or
circumstance which, in itself is sufficient to authorize a
conviction.
TC: At the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was made, Maqueda was
already facing charges in court and no longer had the right to
remain silent and to counsel but he had a right to refuse to be a
witness. And still, he confessed. Thus, the admissibility of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay should be tested not under the Constitution
(Section 12, Article III) but on the voluntariness of its
execution. Voluntariness is presumed so Maqueda has the burden of
proving otherwise.
SC: DISAGREE. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to
counsel and to be informed are not confined to that period prior to
filing of a criminal complaint or information but available at that
stage when a person is under investigation for the commission of an
offense. Thus, procedural safeguards still need to be used.
The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to
use the term custodial by inserting it between the words under and
investigation proves that our Constitution did not adopt in toto
the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. The second paragraph of
Section 20 broadened the application of Miranda by making it
applicable to the investigation for the commission of an offense of
a person and in custody.
If we follow the TCs theory, police enforcement authorities
would have a heyday extracting confessions or admissions from
accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are
arraigned because at such stage, the accused are supposedly not
entitled to the rights to remain silent and to counsel.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court and
the accused is thereby arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest,
he must be delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the issuing
judge, and since the court has already accepted jurisdiction over
his person, it would be improper for any public officer or law
enforcement agency to investigate him in connection with the
commission of the offense for which he is charged. If,
nevertheless, he is subjected to such investigation, then Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the jurisprudence
thereon must be faithfully complied with.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken after his arrest was in
violation of his Article III rights. He was not even told of any of
his constitutional rights under the said section and the statement
was taken in the absence of counsel.
The extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and
Ray Dean Salvosa, however, stand on a different footing and are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. He
made them voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not
in the course of an investigation but in connection with his plea
to be used as a state witness. As to Salvosa, he is a private
person. The Bill of Rights concerns limitations on the
government.
Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions, his guilty
was established by circumstantial evidence.People vs Santiago
Evaristo and Noli Carillo
Warrantless Search and Seizure
FACTS:
Sgt. Romeroso, Sgt. Daniel MaligayaEdgardo Villarta of the
Philippine Constabulary together with 2 members of the Integrated
National Police, were on routine patrol in Mendez, Cavite. At or
about 5:50 in the afternoon, successive bursts of gunfire were
heard in the vicinity. Proceeding to the the approximate source of
the same, they came upon one BarequielRosillo who was firing a gun
into the air.
Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of appellant
Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the
immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon the
slightly inebriated appellants, Evaristo and Carillo. Inquiring as
to the whereabouts of Rosillo, the police patrol members were told
that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Sgt.
Vallarta immediately observed a noticeable bulge around the waist
of Carillo who, upon being frisked, admitted the same to be a .38
revolver. After ascertaining that Carillo was neither a member of
the military nor had a valid license to possess the said firearm,
the gun was confiscated and Carillo invited for questioning.
As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso
sought Evaristo's permission to scour through the house, which was
granted. In the sala, he found, not Rosillo, but a number of
firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and
manufacture of firearms, all of which, thereafter, became the basis
for the present indictment against Evaristo.
For their part, the appellants dispute the above narration of
the events in question, alleging that they were forcibly taken into
custody by the police officers and even subjected to physical and
mental indignities. They denied ownership or knowledge of any of
the firearms presented in evidence, contending that these were
purposely planted in their possession by the prosecution witnesses
and other police authorities.
Trial Court Convict Evaristo and Carillo
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure was legal?
RULE: the court sited sec 2 of the bill of rights as well as 2nd
paragraph of sec. 3
It is to be noted that what the constitutional provisions
prohibit areunreasonablesearches and seizures. For a search to be
reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search
warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer. Yet, the
rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search
warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for jurisprudence
has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant
requirement. Amongthese exceptions isthe seizure of evidence in
plain view, adopted by this jurisdiction from the pronouncements of
the United States SupremeCourt in Harris vs.U.S.andCoolidge vs.New
Hampshire.Thus, it is recognized that objects inadvertently falling
in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence.
The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted
permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
officer's purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought
refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for firearms
was not Romerosa's purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering
his discovery of the subject firearms as inadvertent and even
accidental.
CARILLO
With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo,
the Court sustains the validly of the firearm's seizure and
admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized
warrantless arrests. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure
For purposes of the present case, the second circumstance by
which a warrantless arrest may be undertaken is applicable. For, as
disclosed by the records, the peace officers, while on patrol,
heard bursts of gunfire and this proceeded to investigate the
matter. This incident may well be within the "offense" envisioned
by par. 5 (b) of Rule 113, Rules of Court. As the Court held
inPeople of the Philippines v.Sucro,7"an offense is committed in
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning
of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or HEARS THE
DISTURBANCES CREATED THEREBY AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE
THEREOF
The next inquiry is addressed to the existence of personal
knowledge on the part of the peace officer of facts pointing to the
person to be arrested as the perpetrator of the offense. Again,
reference to the records resolves said query. Giving chase to
Rosillo, the peace officers came upon the two (2) appellants who
were then asked concerning Rosillo's whereabouts. At that point,
Sgt. Vallarta discerned the bulge on the waist of Carillo. This
visual observation along with the earlier report of gunfire, as
well as the peace officer's professional instincts, are more than
sufficient to pass the test of the Rules. Consequently, under the
facts, the firearm taken from Carillo can be said to have been
seized incidental to a lawful and valid arrest.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALVARO SAYCON
y BUQUIRAN, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 110995
September 5, 1994
SUBJECT: The State vs. Suspected Shabu Courier
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE: The Philippine Coastguard and Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) were alerted to the arrival of a suspected shabu
courier in a ship docking that morning. The suspected courier was
invited for questioning and asked to reveal the contents of his
bag. Prohibited drugs were found and he was arrested.
FACTS:
Alvaro Saycon (D) was charged with violating Section 15, Article
III of R.A. No. 6425 as amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act when he
was found transporting four (4) grams of metamphetamine
hydrochloride ("shabu") and sentenced him to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
On or about July 8, 1992, at 6:00am, a Coastguard personnel
received information from a NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a
suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board
the MV Doa Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete
City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer
ordered a combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard
personnel to intercept the suspect.
The vessel docked at 6:00am that same morning at Dumaguete City.
Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through
the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was
identified by a police officer of the NARCOM. Saycon was then
invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and he
willingly went with them. At the headquarters, Saycon was asked to
open his bag and he willingly obliged. In it were personal
belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was
a cigarette pack (Marlboro) containing the suspected "shabu". When
asked whether the cigarette pack containing the suspected "shabu"
was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then, Saycon , his bag and
the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for
booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not
have a warrant of arrest.
Contention of respondent:
Saycon contends that the search of his bag was illegal because
it had been made without a search warrant and that, therefore, the
"shabu" discovered during the illegal search was inadmissible in
evidence against him.
ISSUE:
Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest
valid?
RULING:
Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained
prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute.
"There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court
noted in People vs. Barros. The exception which appears most
pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that relating to the
search of moving vehicles. In People vs. Barros, the Court
said:
Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles
without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a
judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant may be sought. (People vs. Bagista, supra; People vs. Lo Ho
Wing, supra) In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989), the
Court stated:
"Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case."
When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such a warrantless search would be
constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the
search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject
matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
Close examination of the record of the case at bar shows that
there did exist reasonable or probable cause to believe that
appellant Alvaro Saycon would be carrying or transporting
prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City on the MV Doa
Virginia on 8 July 1992.
This probable cause in fact consisted of two (2) parts.
Firstly, Senior Police Officer Winifredo Noble had testified in
court that the NARCOM Agents had, approximately three (3) weeks
before 8 July 1992, conducted a test-buy which confirmed that
appellant Saycon was indeed engaged in transporting and selling
"shabu.". The police authorities did not, on that occasion, arrest
Alvaro Saycon, but what should be noted is that the identity of
Saycon as a drug courier or drug distributor was established in the
minds of the police authorities.
Secondly, the arresting officers testified that they had
received confidential information that very early morning of 8 July
1992, Alvaro Saycon would probably be on board the MV Doa Virginia
which was scheduled to arrive in Dumaguete City at 6:00 a.m. on 8
July 1992, probably carrying "shabu" with him.
The Court considers that a valid warrantless search had been
conducted. It follows that the warrantless arrest of Saycon which
ensued forthwith, was also valid and lawful.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 10325, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATIONS, however, that appellant shall suffer imprisonment
for an indeterminate period ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correctional as
maximum, and that the fine of P20,000.00 shall be DELETED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Rule of Law:
General rule: The search and seizure must be carried out through
or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above
constitutional provisions.
Exception: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of
moving vehicles without need of a warrant.
Title:People of the Philippines v Normando del Rosario (G.R. No.
109633 July 20, 1994)
Topic:Unreasonable Search & Seizure
Facts:
Del Rosario was charged and convicted for IllegalPossession of
Firearm and Ammunitions and Illegal Sale of Regulated Drugs (Branch
17 RTC, Cavite City) for having in his possession during a raid in
his residence a homemade(paltik)caliber .22 revolver with three (3)
live ammunition and for knowingly selling to a poseur buyer an
aluminum foil containingMethamphetamine Hydrochloride also known as
"Shabu", aregulated drug, prior to the said raid.
RAID DETAILS:
Search Warrant - applied for by SPO3 RaymundoUntiveros
issued by Judge Arturo de Guia on Sept. 4, 1991 AM
specific place to be searched: appellant's house located at 828
R. Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City
items to be seized: "undetermined quantity of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalias"
Sequence of Events:
9pm: - raiding team organized (raiding team not organized
immediately after issuance of search warrant)
final briefing
Station Commander gave to PO1 Luna a marked money consisting of
a P100 bill bearing serial no. PQ 329406 and entered in the police
logbook;
PO1 Luna (as poseur-buyer) bought shabu from the
appellant-accused using the marked money (but Luna didnt testify
during the trial; Supreme Court information about the alleged sale
is, therefore, considered HEARSAY) Luna returned to the station and
informed the raiding team he already bought shabu from the
appellant-accused;
Raiding team executed the search warrant and found the
appellant-accused lying down in his living room;
Raiding team fetched two persons to serve as witnesses after the
raiding team have already bargained themselves into the house of
the appellant-accused
Found Items during the Search:
black canister containing shabu,
an aluminumfoil,
a paltik .22 caliber atop the TV set,
three usedammunitions in a cup and three wallets ,
onecontaining the marked money
Barangay Capt. Maigue, Normadel Rosario and appellant
Issue:W/N the search was conducted legally and in accordance to
police protocol;
W/N the searched items are admissible as evidence.
Ruling: Conviction reversed. Appellant-accused acquitted.
The failure of the prosecution to present the alleged buyer of
themarijuana was a fatal flaw in the case against the accused.
The record is devoid of any reason why the police officers did
notmake any attempt to arrest accused-appellant at the time he
allegedly sold theshabu to Veneracion Luna who was accompanied by
another police officer.That was the opportune moment to arrest
accused-appellant. The versionfoisted by the prosecution upon this
Court is contrary to human experience inthe ordinary course of
human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy-bustoperation is for
the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the verymoment
he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer. That is
thevery reason why such a police operation is called a "buy-bust"
operation.Thepolice poseur-buyer "buys" dangerous drugs from the
pusher and "busts"(arrests) him the moment the pusher hands over
the drug to the police officer.
In consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the
subsequent and much-delayed search is highly irregular.
At any rate, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of possession
of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seized at his
house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu with the
information alleging that the "accused, without legal authority did
. . . sell to a poseur buyer an aluminum foil containing
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride . . ." Sale is totally different from
possession. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines sale as a
contract whereby "one of the contracting parties obligates himself
to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determine thing, and
the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
equivalent", while "possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right" as defined by Article 523 of the Civil Code.
Accused-appellant cannot be convicted of a crime which is not
charged in the information for to do so would deny him the due
process of law
The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized
only the search and seizure of ". . . the described quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its
paraphernalia" (Exh. O, p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding
party was authorized to seize only shabu and paraphernalia for the
use thereof and no other. A search warrant is not a sweeping
authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a finishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or
articles relating to a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2,
Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 126)
specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the firearm which was
not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the
search warrant.Neither may it be maintained that the gun was seized
in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accusedappellant's arrest was far from regular and legal. Said
firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not admissible
in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967]).
Title:ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ,petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALSTopic:Arrest and Seizures Re: Proper Jurisdiction
Facts:
On March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM
Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The
search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged
violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro
St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge
of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day,
at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject
search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to,
where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor
Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to
CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive
materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and
taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found
within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon
City but most of them were later released, with the exception of
the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for
violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before
Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over
by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.On July 10, 1990,
petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired
Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion
to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and
Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.On September 21, 1990, the
respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order,
consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal
of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant
was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs
and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be served not only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial
Region);. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order
under challenge has been denied by the assailed Order of October 5,
1990.
Issue:
Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for
a search warrant in connection with an offense allegedly committed
outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to
conduct a search on a place likewise outside its territorial
jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Reason:
The basic flaw of the petitioners reasoning is in erroneously
equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant
with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a
trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special
criminalprocess, the power to issue which is inherent in all
courts, as equivalent to acriminal action, jurisdiction over which
is reposed inspecific courtsof indicated competence. It ignores the
fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of
a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action. For, indeed, a warrant, such as a
warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes
process.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present
vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 194812or the
recent Judiciary Reorganization Act,have never required the
jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek
to be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary
provisions.
Writs and processes-----(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a
regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial
court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or
municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification
by the judge of the regional trial court.
The rule enumerates the writs and processes which, even if
issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its
judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all
other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the
same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier
demonstrated, a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a
criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary,
expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial
limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the
above-quoted provision of the interim Rulesexpresslyauthorizes its
enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the
processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or
exception made regarding the processes contemplated inparagraph
(b).
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the
following policy guidelines:1. The court wherein the criminal case
is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a
search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme
and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the
justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to
quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court,
without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher
court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing
court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known
shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the
court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the
same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence
are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent
forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by
the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress
shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate
higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the
motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein
the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and
documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same
criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints
and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original
jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which
court will try the case shall have been resolved, such court shall
be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.