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PETER PAUL DIMATULAC AND VERONICA DIMATULAC, PETITIONERS VS.
HON. SENSINANDO VILLON
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in
Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after
preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants of
arrest against the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao
were arrested and it was only Yambao who submitted his
counter-affidavit.
Judge David then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground
that the crime of murder has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. Though it was not clear whether Pampanga
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu
proprio, or upon motion of the private respondents, she conducted a
reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in
conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed
homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of
Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the
release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for
homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court. Judge
Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the
warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue
hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the
second. He also set the arraignment of the accused. The petitioners
filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting the date
for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for prejudging
the matter.
They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment
with the trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also
stated that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to
participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was
replaced by Judge Villon.The Petitioners filed with the RTC a
Manifestation submitting documentary evidence to support their
contention that the offense committed was murder. Judge Villon
ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a
plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to
set aside arraignment. Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the
appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery
was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already
been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy. The
Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was
held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide. Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside
arraignment. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
this petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the
information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to set
aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of
discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that
the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that
the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who
conducted the investigation, the resolution should be based on the
review of the record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should
have sustained the recommendation since all the accused, except
Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible
for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ.
The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the
filing of an appeal once an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring
the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since the
accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since
they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the
resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents
submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting
aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of
control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has
been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is
null and void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the
accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ANTONIO ENRIQUE, JR.
FACTS:
An Information was file against Antonio Enrique stating that not
being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver five (5) sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, as prohibited drug, to one Patrolman
DaniloNatividad, a member of the Integrated National Police (INP)
and assigned with the 2nd Narcotics Regional Unit, Narcotics
Command, who was then posing as a buyer of the said prohibited drug
for the consideration of TEN (P10.00) PESOS
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to
the crime charged. The trial court then found Enrique, Jr. guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant vigorously insists in his
innocence. He asserts that the arresting officers did not
confiscate sticks of marijuana or any marked money from him and
that evidences obtained from him should have not been admitted by
the trial court since there was no confiscation receipt shown and
were erroneous because the same were taken during custodial
investigation, therefore, violative of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty despite his arguments
regarding the inadmissibility of evidences against him
HELD:
Yes.
Appellant completely misses the whole point of his prosecution
and ultimate conviction under RA 6425. He was caughtin flagrante
delictoselling marijuana cigarettes to a poseur-buyer in exchange
for money. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction. The serial number of the marked money need not even be
stated in the information. The non-presentation of the marked money
at the trial is not indispensable to the conviction of the
accused-appellant. What is important is the fact that the
poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the
said cigarettes were presented in court as evidence. Having been
caught in the act of selling a prohibited drug, appellant's arrest
was lawful. Hence, whatever is found in the accused-appellant's
possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence
against him.
We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the
accused-appellant. The evidence on record has fully established his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED subject to the modification as
above-indicated.
TAN JR. V. GALLARDO(RULE 110)
FACTS:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari with
Prohibition; petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's
Orders in 2 Criminal Cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the
respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10)
days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary
restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further
proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of
the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his
Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court,
thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating
that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his
resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion
of bias and prejudice and, therefore, the case should he remanded
to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision.
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment
in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge
BUT objected to the remand of said cases.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the
"Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private
prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no
standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court
and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his
entertained by this Tribunal.
The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to
appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to
adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor
General.
ISSUE:Do the private prosecutors have the right to intervene
independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand
inconsistent with that of the latter in the present
proceedings?
HELD:NO, To begin with, it will be noted that the participation
of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by the
SC in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with
the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and
pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means
to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand
independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
Solicitor General.
The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to
represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for
the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense.
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to
intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests
are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines
represented by the fiscal.
STA. ROSA MINING V. ZABALA (RULE 110)
FACTS:Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of
materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its
mining property against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil
Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of CamarinesNorte,
then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, a resolution
recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which
resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.
On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of
First Instance of CamarinesNorte an Information dated October 17,
1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private
respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents
requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and
October 14, 1974.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the
Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to
immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice
but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by
the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground
that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents
and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.
Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of
First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became
officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of
CamarinesNorte.
On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to
Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent
fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this
petition for mandamus.
ISSUE:Should the Criminal Case be terminated on a motion filed
by the prosecutor upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation, after an information has
been filed to the court?
HELD:No, the rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint
or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even
while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was
filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion
of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal
may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition
for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the
complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
JOHN LONEY V. PEOPLE (RULE 110)
FACTS:Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro
B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively,
of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged
in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit
in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage
tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24
March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged
petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC)
with violation of the ff.: Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984) Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942); and Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations among others that
the informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice
charged more than one offense for a single act.
The MTC granted a partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.
The RTC, set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it
quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and
ordered those charges reinstated by reason that there can be no
absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts
penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each
other.
The CA, affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:Should the charges filed against petitioners, except one,
be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should
stand?
HELD:No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case. Duplicity of
charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more
than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a
single Information charges more than one offense.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a ground
to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner
with four offenses, with each Information charging only one
offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges
as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the
petition deserves outright denial.
Petitioners further contend that they should be charged with one
offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property
because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from and are
based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and
Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge
for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges
since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection,
negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them.
The contention has no merit. As early as the start of the last
century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused
for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its
elements are present. However, for the limited purpose of
controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with
one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative
analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC
showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were
charged, there is one essential element not required of the
others.
PEOPLE V. TUMLOS(RULE 110)
FACTS:On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to
MaximianoSobrevega and five belonging to his son-in-law,
AmbrosioPecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of
Libong-cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken
by the herein defendant without the knowledge or consent of their
respective owners.
The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938, an
information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of
the eight cows belonging to MaximianoSobrevega, which resulted in
his being sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an indeterminate penalty
with the accessories prescribed by law and costs.
In the information filed in the present case the same defendant
is charged with the theft of five cows belonging to
AmbrosioPecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the
commission of the theft to the eight cows of MaximianoSobrevega
charged to the previous information.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error
allegedly committed by the lower court in the aforesaid judgment
its failure to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" or double
jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.
ISSUE:Was there double jeopardy in the case at bar?
HELD:Yes, the theft of the thirteen cows committed by the
defendant took place at the same time and in the same place;
consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight of said
cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him
criminally liable for two distinct offenses, for the reason that in
such case the act must be divided into two, which act is not
susceptible of division.
The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose
of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found
grazing in the same place. As neither the intention nor the
criminal act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from
the concurrence of its two constituent elements cannot be divided,
it being immaterial that the subject matter of the offense is
singular or plural, because whether said subject matter be one or
several animate or inanimate objects, it is but one.
Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo
Tumlos were integral parts of the thirteen cows which were the
subject matter of theft, and as he had already been tried for and
convicted of the theft of the other five.
JARANTILLA V. CA (RULE 111)
FACTS:The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing
was "side-swiped by a vehicle which was then driven by petitioner
Edgar Jarantilla and that private respondent sustained physical
injuries as a consequence.
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of
Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he
intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a
private prosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case
"on reasonable doubt".
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint
against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in the criminal case.
In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special
and affirmative defense that the private respondent had no cause of
action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if
any, is barred by the prior judgment in the criminal case inasmuch
as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was
also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve
the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal
case.
After trial, the CFI rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor
of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to
pay the former for the hospitalization, medicines, for other actual
expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs.
The respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court and a motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent court.
ISSUE:Can the private respondent, who was the complainant in the
criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the
civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated
or awarded in the judgment of acquittal?
HELD:Yes, although it was held that where the offended party
elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the
criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the
final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent
civil action based upon the same cause.
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated
and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against
petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the
trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very
well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and
the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of
acquittal. Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate
civil action after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29
of the Civil Code.
Thus, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence.
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the
doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement,
favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused
amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability
litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere
provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it
becomes no longer enforceable.
DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUINFACTS:
Seishin International Corporation, represented by its
president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against
respondent. An Information for violation ofB.P. Blg.22. respondent
was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, of Pasig City
by Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15,
2003when he vacated his office,found the cash voucher evidencing
his cash payment of the two (2)road rollers, Sakai brand, which he
purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing Seishin
International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and
it was signed by respondent and Mr. Hirota.
Claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation
against him was false, unfounded and malicious respondent filed a
complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, before the
Office of the City Prosecutor ofQuezon cityagainst petitioner and a
certain Yasunobu Hirota.
In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully knowing that it was
baseless and without factual or legal basis, according to
respondentMr. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally
liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable
under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.
By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon Citydismissed respondent's complaint for
incriminating innocent personIt appearing that the case of estafa
was filed in Pasig City , and the testimony given by respondent
David Campano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this office hasno
jurisdictionon the above-entitled complainant.ISSUE:
Whetherthe City prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction over
the complaint filed by the respondent
HELD:
It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential
element of jurisdiction;and that the jurisdiction of a court over a
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.
The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed
by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of
its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City . The only
reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is
where respondent resides.Respondent's complaint-affidavit was thus
properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack
of jurisdiction
The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its reversal of the
DOJ Resolutions that since petitioner's November 20, 2003
Counter-Affidavitto respondent's complaint for incriminating
innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.In any
event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a
clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person under Article
363 of the Revised Penal Code.
The petition isGranted. The Court of Appeals Decision of
December 9, 2005 isReversedand set aside. The complaint of
respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against
petitionerDavid Campamano,Jr.isDismissed
ERNESTO M. FULLERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the
Bureau of Telecommunications Office in Iriga City. In 1982, he
became the Acting Chief Operator of the same office until 1994. A
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) purportedly accomplished and signed by
petitioner, states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board
Examination. It appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau of
Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi
City). A letter dated and signed by petitioner shows that he
applied for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications
Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor with the Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region 5, Legazpi
City. Upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado, a subordinate of
petitioner in the BTO, Iriga City, with the PRC, it was verified
that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil
engineering and that petitioners name does not appear in the book
of registration for civil engineers.
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS
containing the statement that he passed the board examination for
civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumb
mark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature
appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine
signature.He added that the letters contained in the PDS he
accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters
since his typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the
subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital
typewritten letters. He further argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try him there being no evidence that the alleged
falsification took place in Legazpi City.
After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated
its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC
Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC of Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the
case
HELD:There are three important requisites which must be present
before a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases.First,
the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject
matter.Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory
where the offense was committed. Andthird, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.There is no dispute
that the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and
over the person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction
of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.The
territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint or information as regards the place where
the offense charged was committed.It should also be emphasized that
where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
to its consummation occur in one province or city and some in
another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction to
try the case, it being understood that the court first taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others.In the case at bar,
the information specifically and positively alleges that the
falsification was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, the
testimonies and documentary evidence for the prosecution have
sufficiently established that petitioner accomplished and
thereafter submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The
foregoing circumstances clearly placed thelocus criminisin Legazpi
City and not in Iriga City.
ANTONIO MAGO and DANILO MACASINAG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROLANDO
ASIS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITYNATURE:This is an appeal
bycertiorari. Petitioners pray for reversal of the Decision of the
Court of Appealsaffirming the Orders of the RTC, denying their
Motion to Intervene and Petition for Relief from Judgment in Civil
Case Rolando Asis v. National Housing Authority.FACTS:Private
respondent Rolando Asis filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
Petition against public respondent NHA to prevent it from acting
upon the recommendation for cancellation of the award in his favor
and the lot be subdivided into two, one to him and the other to
Antonio Mago and Danilo Macasinag as co-owners.This case relates to
an erroneous award by the NHA of a parcel of land belonging to
Francisco Mago, petitioner Antonio Magos predecessor-in-interest,
to Asis. Francisco Mago complained to the NHA which acknowledged
its mistake. As a result, the parties agreed on a Kasunduan ng
Paghahati ng Lote, whereby the lot will be divided into two and
split between petitioner Antonio Mago (to whom Francisco Mago sold
his interest over the land) and respondent Asis. However, the NHA
later, ironically executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage over the
land in favor of Asis. Antonio Mago again complained to the NHA and
sued Asis in civil case for recovery of possession and damages. NHA
eventually came up with the abovementioned Resolution.
The RTC dismissed Asiss petition in view of the NHAs admission
and recognition of Asiss title to the land. 69 days after they
learned of the above order, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order. RTC denied
the motion and the petition. CA sustained the trial court and held
that while the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases, the
rules on reglementary periods must be strictly construed against
the filer or pleader to prevent needless delays.
Applicable Law
Under Sec. 2, Rule 12, of the Rules of Court, a person may,
before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its
discretion, to intervene in an action if he has legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.8As
for the Petilion for Relief from Judgment/Order, the same was filed
sixty-nine (69) days after movants learned of the order, or beyond
the reglementary period of sixty (60) days from notice of judgment,
under Sec. 3, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioners shall be allowed to
intervene.
2. Whether petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment should
be heard.
HELD: 1. YES. Under Sec 2, Rule 2, a person may, before or
during trial, be permitted to intervene if:a. He has a legal
interest in the matter under litigation; orb. He has a legal
interest in the success of either parties or an interest against
both; orc. When he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in custody of the
court or an officer thereof.
In this case, petitioners motion for intervention was,
admittedly, filed after the disputed order has become final.
However, it must be noted that petitioners were unaware of the
proceedings in the case between Asis and NHA. They were never
impleaded therein. Worse, they were led into believing that all was
well, by virtue of the Kasunduan. Asis acted in bad faith when he
accepted the award erroneously made to him by NHA knowing full well
that there was a previous perfected agreement between him and
petitioners. NHA itself even admitted its mistake in one of its
comments in the case between it and Asis.The permissive tenor of
the provision on intervention shows that the intention of Rules was
to give the court full discretion in permitting or disallowing the
same. However, this discretion must be exercised judiciously and
only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the
case. In this case, the lower courts only considered the
technicalities, which worked injustice on the part of the
plaintiffs. Therefore, petitioners Motion to Intervene should be
granted.
2. YES. The time of filing said petition must satisfy both
periods as indicated in the Ruleswithin 60 days after knowledge of
order and not more than 6 months after entry. A few days in excess
of the 60-day requirement is not fatal as long as it is filed
within 6 months from issuance of the order. In this case, the
petition was 9 days late of the 60-day deadline but still within
the 6 month period.PRINCIPLE:Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides "these rules shall be liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding," but jurisprudence qualifies it by enunciating the
principle that rules on reglementary periods must be strictly
construed against the filer or pleader to prevent needless
delays.But it is apparent that the courtsa quoonly considered the
technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for
relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene
arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to
petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject
property-cannot be disputed. We need not belabor the point that
petitioners are indeed indispensable parties with such an interest
in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication
cannot be made in their absence without affecting, any injuring,
and such interest.
THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs.THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
NATURE:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion
of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the controversy.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court
of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of
certain real estate. After the filing of the complaint, the
plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building
its line, stations and terminals and put the same in operation.
Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so
taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had
been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the
court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently
ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned
were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the
Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has
the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a
railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in
another province.
HELD:
The court holds that the terms of section 377 providing that
actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province
where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is
located, do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance
over the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of
parties as to the place of trial. They are of the opinion that what
as they have said in the discussion of the effect of section 377
relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over lands
is applicable generally to the sections of law just quoted. The
provisions regarding the place and method of trial are procedural.
They touched not the authority of the court over thelandbut,
rather, the powers which it may exercise over theparties. They
relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court over the
subject matter but to theplace wherethat jurisdiction is to be
exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured, whatever
the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is thething; the place
of exercise its incident.
The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to
criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the
people of the state are a party. The interests of the public
require that, to secure the best results and effects in the
punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the
criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed
his crime. As a result it has been the uniform legislation, both in
statutes and in constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action
must be laid in the place where the crime was committed. While the
laws here do not specifically and in terms require it, we believe
it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal
prosecutions must be brought and conducted, except in cases
especially provided by law, in the province where the crime is
committed.For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and
the cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed
with the action according to law.
PEOPLE v MONTENEGRO
NATUREPetition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order
FACTS- The City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal
Virginia G. Valdez, filed an Information for "Robbery" before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano
Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now
private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon
City and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery
committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded
guilty and had been convicted in a crimial case before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was
convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and pieces of
jewelry belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P75,591.40.
- Upon arraignment, all of the accused (now private respondents)
entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against
them.
- However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting
fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information seeking to amend
the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from
"Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging
conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items,
articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to have been stolen in the
original Information and substituting them with a different set of
items valued at P71,336.80.
- Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended
Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed
amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court
denied said motion; hence, this petition.
ISSUEWON the amended information should be admitted
HELD- Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of
the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before
the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the
trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights
of the accused.
- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by
the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any
evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original information, and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
- The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the
instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of
changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article
209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302
of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private
respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty
imposable for the offense charged in the original information to
which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during
their arraignment.- Moreover, the change in the items, articles and
pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely different articles
from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the
imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to
meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the
preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It
will be observed that private respondents were accused as
accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had
already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the
original information. To charge them now as
accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that
committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to
be allowed by the Court.
- The allegation of conspiracy among all the private
respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the
original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling
the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a
different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage the
proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will
make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual
transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their
co-conspirators.
Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent
court AFFIRMED. TRO lifted.
ELCANO V HILL
FACTS:Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son
of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but
Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake.
Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal
in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a
parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under
Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does
not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by
law.While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor
child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall
enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of
age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable
to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the
decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
PEOPLE VS NAZARENO
Facts:Accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala were
found by the trial court guilty of murder. However, on appeal,
Ramil Regala contends that the failure of the prosecution to
investigate Rey Taling, his alleged companion and Mang Doming, Mang
Romy, and Nick Pealosa, as those who supplied the guns, raises
doubt as to accused-appellants guilt.
Issue: WON Regalas contention is meritorious
HELD:The manner by which the prosecution of a case is handled is
within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion
of other guilty parties is irrelevant to the case against an
accused.
PEOPLE V RAMOS
Facts:Accused was charged with rape in its simple form, that is,
having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation,
with the additional allegation that the victim was only 14 years of
age at the time of the incident. However, the information failed to
allege that the victim was his daughter. The relationship between
the accused and the victim, was not laid down in the information.
Despite this, the trial court convicted the accused with qualified
rape with death as punishment.
Issue: Whether the trial court could hold the accused guilty of
qualified rape.Held: No. As this qualifying circumstance was not
pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant,
he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not
properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape.The
Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.This right finds amplification and
implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of
Court.Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an
information. The facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime of which the accused stands charged and for
which he must be tried.This recital of the essentials of a crime
delineate the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. It
is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed
must be alleged in the complaint or information.The main purpose of
requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.An accused person cannot be
convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged
in the complaint or information on which he is tried.It matters not
how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in
the complaint or information on which he is tried or is necessarily
included therein.He has a right to be informed of the nature of the
offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial.To
convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the
complaintor information on which he is tried would be an
unauthorized denial of that right.
SANTIAGO VS GARCHITORENANature:This is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First division) and to declare Presiding Justice
Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting
in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court
promulgated onMarch 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32
Amended Informations against petitioner.Facts:Santiago was charged
by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified"
aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program.
Santiago later on filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass
her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this
was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution
which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The
petition was dismissed.Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena. The Sandiganbayan (First Division),
of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the
criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. Subsequently
she filed for a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion stated
that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the
application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect
benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens.
According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names
and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and
prepare for trial. Consequently, although at the hearing where the
prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one
amended information, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32
Amended Information.
Issue: Whether or not there should only be one information to be
filed against petitioner.Held: Yes, because it was a continued
crime. Sc found that there is only one crime, hence there should
only be one information. According to CuelloCalon, for
delitocontinuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts
performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in
one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of
the same criminal purpose. According to Guevarra, in appearance, a
delitocontinuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the
Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine
Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of
a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution
(Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).Applying the concept of
delitocontinuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the
following cases:(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different
owners committed by the accused at the same time and at the same
period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).(2) The
theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the
same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55
SCRA 563 [1974] ).(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place
and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926]
).(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a
lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a
client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of
said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The
collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that
of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of
collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v.
Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).On the other hand, we declined to
apply the concept to the following cases:(1) Two estafa cases, one
of which was committed during the period from January 19 to
December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People
v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on
two different occasions.(2) Several malversations committed in May,
June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses
committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and
falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only
one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66
Phil. 354 [1938] ).(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December
1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the
installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the
pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v.
Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the
conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the
employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68
SCRA 308 [1975]).The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim
the allegation of the original information, except that instead of
the word "aliens" in the original information each amended
information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were
committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was
done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was
embodied in the same document.
PEOPLE VS. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL
FACTS:A criminal complaint (Case No. 3335) was first filed
against respondent Margarito Fama alleged to have willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal
violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a
stone, hitting him in the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical
injuries which would have required and will require medical
attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days. Arraigned on July 7,
1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Meanwhile, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint (Case No.
5241) with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo chargingagainst same
respondent arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal
Case No. 3335. Same accusations were made except for an allegation
of hitting Viajar on the lower right eye which would heal from five
(5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent
scar and deforming on the right face.
Respondent Fama filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged
and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in
double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This
motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both
parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double
jeopardy. In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241,
sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did
not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing and
was thereafter dismissed.
ISSUE:Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in
the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element
which should take this case outas one not of double jeopardy
HELD:The Court said No finding was made in the first examination
that the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of
the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical
certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the
right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent or could
have been discernible at the time the first examination was made.
The course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the
period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court
considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the
filing of the original information.In other words, in the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private
respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error
correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed
Criminal Case No. 5241.
PEOPLE VS MARIANO
FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an
Informationagainst herein Private respondent Hermogenes Mariano
accusing him of estafa for allegedly to have wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefits the items he received valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35,
belonging to the USAID/NEC. Mariano has the duty of making delivery
of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but, in spite of
repeated demands he failed to comply with his obligation.
Respondent was appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent
Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of
the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground,
among others, that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction of
the offense charged or of the person of the defendant. In his
motion, he claimed that the items which were the subject matter of
the Information were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was
indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of
malversation of public property, and for which he had been found
guilty. Inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been
decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost
jurisdiction over the case against him. The respondent Judge
Geraldez granted the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense ofestafaof goods valued at
not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a
civilian.
HELD:
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial
proceedings.The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words
"juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law" which means fundamentally
the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to
entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. "Criminal
Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a
particular offense and impose the punishment for it.
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall
have original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (f) In all criminal cases
in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than
six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos, (emphasis
supplied)
The offense ofestafacharged against respondent Mariano is
penalized witharresto mayorin its maximum period toprision
correccionalin its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.By
reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses
and in the case, the accused in one is different from the accused
in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that the court does
not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the
rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the
case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other.The
Military Commission as stated earlier is without power or authority
to hear and determine the particular offense charged against
respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction
between it and respondent court to speak of.
PEOPLE VS OLARTEFACTS:Defendant Olarte was charged with libel.
It is alleged in the information that it was committed on or about
the 24th day of February, 1954 against Ms. Meris. A complaint was
filed on Feb 22, 1956 where dependant Olarte waived her right to
Preliminary Investigation. The information was filed on July 3,
1956. Defendant moved to quash the information on the ground of
that the offense charge prescribed which was dismissed by the CFI
on the ground that the filing of the complaint interrupt the
running of prescription. Defendant, citing the case of People vs.
Coquia, argued that it is the date of the filing of the information
that should be taken in determining prescription and not the filing
of the complaint.
ISSUE:Whether or not filing of the complaint interrupt the
running of prescription.HELD:
This Court has reexamined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding
that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is
filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation
merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial
step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. All that the
victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.Considering the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the
cases ofPeople vs. Del RosarioL-15140, December 29, 1960; andPeople
vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.Having been finally
decided in the previous appeal that the criminal action here was
not barred, the issue of prescription is utterly foreclosed, and
all that remains is to try and decide the case on the merits. It is
expected that it will be done with the utmost dispatch, this case
having been already pending for many years.
ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, Petitioner Isabelita Reodica
was driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol.
As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the
damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Thus, on 20 October 1987,
complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with
the Fiscal's Office. Later, on 13 January 1988, an information was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging petitioner
with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury." Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
RULING OF RTC:The RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a
decisionconvicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical
injuries," and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
months ofarresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol
y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen P13,542, representing the cost of
the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00)
without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals
RULING OF COURT OF APPEALS:Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court.Petitioner subsequently filed a motion
for reconsideration, where:Now that an acquittal seems impossible,
may we revisit the penalty and move that it be reviewed and set
aside since it is respectfully submitted to be error to complex
damage to property and slight physical injuries, as both are light
offenses, over which the respondent court had no jurisdiction and
even assuming such jurisdiction, it cannot impose a penalty in
excess of what is authorized by law.CA denied. Hence, this
petitions before the Supreme Court for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely
abused its discretion when it complexed the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight physical
injuries imposing a single excessive penalty
2. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely erred
when it affirmed the trial court's decision notwithstanding the
defense of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
3. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be
questioned for the first time on appeal.
HELD:1. In the instant case, following the ruling in
theTurlacase, the offense oflesiones levesthrough reckless
imprudence should have been charged in a separate
information.Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph
3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions
of law carrying the penalty of arresto menoror a fine not exceeding
P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article
25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the
graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a
penalty lower thanarresto menor, it follows that the offense of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a
light felony.On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting
in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
witharresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. Sincearresto
mayoris a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code, thequasioffense in question is a less grave felony not
a light felony as claimed by petitioner.Hence, the trial court
erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the
less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and thelight felonyof reckless
imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
2. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in
Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment.The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was
then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount
of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. Since offenses
punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months
were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs,
it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty
lower thanarresto menorunder the graduated scale in Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should
also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by
said courts.As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the
jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty
therefor wasarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods the
duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.Therefore,
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of
Makati.Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.Pursuant to
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in
two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave
felony whose penalty isarresto mayorin its minimum and medium
periods, prescribes in five years.Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents, andshall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable
to him.
It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a
matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary
Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the
latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the
Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof shall apply. Thus, the
prescriptive period for thequasioffenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office
three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending
the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold
petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the
information in this case.
3. FollowingLontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that
thequasioffense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries should have been charged in a separate information because
it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous
character of the information,i.e., charging two separate offenses
in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to
raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or
more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and
the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may
convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved
and impose on him the penalty for each of them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS OMBUDSMANFACTS:An information was
filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was
issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a
motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to
post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000.
Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation
of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on
recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to
accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion submitted for
our resolution, petitioner argues among others that the
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order
considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner. He initially postulates that respondent court
never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she
has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered,
aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she
never personally appeared before said court.ISSUE:Whether or not
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner
HELD:It has been held that where after the filing of the
complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is
issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily
submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.The
voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his
pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or
other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction
there over, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing
bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain
the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot
be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid
posting of bail bond.We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed
to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted
"UrgentEx-parteMotion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in
behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly
sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the required
trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the
bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly
accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having
placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot
now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations,
she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she
had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it
to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she
filed therein.
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR VS. HON. JOB B. MADAYAGFACTS:Petitioner
was originally charged in an informationfor the crime of frustrated
murder allegedly committed while armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds, which ordinarily would have caused her death. But it did
not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her
will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance
rendered which prevented her death.After the prosecution had rested
its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file
a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be
filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently, private
prosecutor filed an omnibus motionfor leave of court to file
amended information to change the same from frustrated murder to
consummated murder. At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner
refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a
preliminary investigation thereon. When petitioner's counsel
manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because
of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counselde
oficioto represent herein petitioner.
ISSUES:1. Whether or not an amended information involving a
substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the
prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and
validly be admitted
2. Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be
appointed to represent an accused who is represented by counsel of
choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a
perceived denial of due process and after a plea for appellate
remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court
HELD:1. To answer:
Q: Was there an amendment of the information or substitution
when the information was changed from frustrated murder to
consummatedmurder?
A: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses
charged in both the original and the amended information. What is
involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses
charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same
offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case,
we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice
and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for
murder is proper.
Q: What kind of amendment? Is it formal or substantial?
A: Formal. Anobjective appraisal of the amended information for
murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the
nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed.
Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of
the death ofthe victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court
in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused
committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues
to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever
defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information
for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information
for murder.
Q: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new
charge?
A: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change
the crime or when there is substitution, there is a need of
preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal
amendment,preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended
information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to
petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges
essentially the same offense as that charged under the original
information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime
originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an
inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an
inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary
investigation is notnecessary.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments,
viz:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the
penalty that the court might impose in the event ofconviction;(2)
an amendment whichdoes not charge another offense different or
distinct from that charged in the original one;(3) additional
allegationswhich do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case
so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense he has orwill assume; and (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his
right toinvoke prescription.
2. The Court said We find nothing irregular in the appointment
by the trial court of a counselde oficiofor herein petitioner whose
counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because
of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated
herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the
trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the
disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the
substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged
in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left
to the sound discretion of the trial court.