Blood and Iron — Manufacturing, War and its Aftermath ...157921/n07chapter5.pdf · Blood and Iron — Manufacturing, War and its Aftermath, 1914-1919 World War I (1914-1918) had

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Blood and Iron — Manufacturing, War and its Aftermath, 1914-1919

World War I (1914-1918) had a significant impact on the Queensland economy, including the

performance of the manufacturing sector. The war dramatically altered patterns of trade,

internationally and domestically; exports and imports were disrupted, and shortages of skilled

labour, materials, and capital, and reduced demand, all contributed to the unsettled conditions

experienced in the manufacturing sector. The war effectively severed the strong growth trend

in manufacturing activity that preceded the war. The vagaries of the world commodity

markets, and local climatic conditions, severely affected primary processing and metals

production. The outbreak of war shattered business confidence: production stalled, contracts

were not renewed, productive capacity outstripped demand, and inflation increased prices

which further stifled demand. Mass enlistments deprived many industries of much needed

skilled labour and the loss of consumptive demand of the service personnel who left

Queensland was sorely felt by local manufacturers. There was some structural change in the

ratio of male to female employment in the early years as more females entered jobs vacated

by the men. Restricted access to raw materials and manufactured items from overseas led to

acute shortages of materials, especially iron and steel, chemicals, machinery, and machine

tools. Opportunities to establish manufacturing ventures to exploit shortages in imported

goods were reduced by shortages of labour, materials, and capital. The level of successful

import replacement in Queensland was quite low. Despite these difficulties some progress

was made, however, and structural changes and diversification were evident. Although

manufacturing employment decreased and then stagnated, output increased and the sector

solidified its increasingly important position in Queensland’s economy during the war.

Australian Manufacturing and World War I

World War I severely interrupted the patterns of trade within the international economy. Each

nation, and the combatant alliances that evolved, steered production towards a war footing as

their forces of production were mustered for war. World War I presented Australia with as

many economic problems as it did opportunities. Overseas trade in its commodities was

considerably disrupted. Australia’s export trade was not restricted by a lack of demand, but

rather the commandeering of merchant fleets by foreign governments and wartime shipping

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losses, meant that shipping was at a premium, and an outlying market like Australia therefore

was particularly vulnerable to maritime transport shortages. At home, restricted imports

tended to stimulate Australian industries to diversify towards the manufacture of goods which

were usually imported. Some areas of the manufacturing sector prospered from Australia’s

mobilisation, such as in food preparation, clothing, textiles, footwear, leatherware, metals,

engineering, shipbuilding, and chemical production.1 While the war stimulated manufacturing

production in some areas, and obstructed it in others, the gains made were often offset by

shortages in skilled labour, materials, and capital which had the effect of generally retarding

the sector.2

The Queensland War Economy

The economic outlook for Queensland had been a positive one in the months immediately

prior to the war: good seasons and strong overseas and domestic demand fuelled an

expansionary phase. As has been previously noted in Chapter 2, the Denham government had

overseen an expansion in rural settlement, immigration, and railway construction, stimulated

by increased pastoral and agricultural exports. Optimistic appraisals of the prospects of the

secondary industries in Queensland were conspicuous by their absence. Local conditions,

such as the small and decentralised population, and higher than average wages, were

significant deterrents to investment in manufacturing.3 The speed with which the economic

dislocations affected Queensland astonished many Queenslanders. The economic confidence

which abounded in July 1914 had virtually evaporated within days of the outbreak of war.

Business confidence collapsed, orders were cancelled, and unemployment increased rapidly.4

The situation was exacerbated by the doubly cruel blow of a serious drought that began with

the failure of the 1914-15 wet season.5 The drought severely hampered the productive

capacity of the pastoral, agricultural and mining sectors.6 The economic crisis exposed many

1 Helen Hughes, 'Federalism and Industrial Development in Australia', AJPH, 10, 3, (1964), p. 329. 2 A.G.L. Shaw, The Economic Development of Australia (Croydon: Longmans, 1969), pp. 130-5. & N.G. Butlin,

‘Some Perspectives of Australian Economic Development, 1890-1965', in C. Forster, ed., Australian Economic Development in the Twentieth Century (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1970), pp. 281-2.

3 W.R. Wilkie, Brisbane Chamber of Commerce Annual Report [BCCAR], 1913-1914, pp. 20-2. 4 Ross Fitzgerald, "Red Ted": The Life of E.G. Theodore (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1994), p. 58. 5 Dan Daly, Wet as a shag, Dry as a bone: drought in a variable climate (Brisbane: Department of Primary Industries

Queensland, 1994), p. 117. 6 ‘The Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Shops for 1914-1915 [F&SR], QPP, 3 (1915-1916), p. 803;

‘Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Stock [A&SR], 1915-1916', QPP, 2 (1916-17), p. 645. & ‘Annual Report of the Under-Secretary for Mines [Mines], QPP, 3 (1915-1916), p. 1435.

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weaknesses in the structure of Queensland’s economy, particularly its lack of industrial

diversity. The imbalance towards, and reliance on, rural industries meant that Queensland’s

economy was particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in overseas markets, and droughts and

floods, when it could not fall back on a well developed and dynamic secondary industries

sector as the commodity trade weakened. Opportunities which arose for the manufacture of

new lines, to replace imports, were often missed because of the state’s deficit in

manufacturing enterprises, skills base and capital formation.7 The spectre of unemployment

was exacerbated by the rapid rise in inflation and the cost of living, shortages of capital for

investment, and a corresponding growth in Commonwealth and state taxation.8

Despite these difficulties, some diversification took place and the Queensland Chamber of

Manufactures (QCM) was pleased to note an increase in Queensland manufactured goods on

the local store shelves and which also were supplied to the Australian and British armed

forces. Some of these lines included

... glycerine, prismatic compasses and other scientific instruments, scientific glassware, brass buckles, harness and leather mountings, brass mounts for military equipment such as studs, etc., mild forged steel heel plates for boots, knitting needles, strong-room doors, engineers’ turning lathes, dehorning instruments, and numerous veterinary implements.9

The production of these items was more significant, however, than the contribution

Queensland made to the manufacture of munitions.

The economic impact of the war can clearly be seen in Queensland’s trade figures, which

slackened markedly early in the war and then stagnated. Trade, the total value of imports and

exports, fell from £19 million in 1913 to £17.2 million in 1914, with the value of trade only

exceeding that achieved prior to the war in 1915 (£19.4 million), 1917 (£20.8 million), and in

1919 (£18.5 million). The value of Queensland’s exports fluctuated between £8 and £14

million during the war, while imports remained relatively stable between £6 and £7 million,

with a low figure of £4.5 million in 1918. Pastoral and agricultural exports rose and fell

dramatically, mining exports collapsed, while other manufactured and miscellaneous goods

grew steadily. Despite difficult trading conditions, Queensland maintained a positive trade

7 ‘F&SR 1914-1915’, QPP, 3 (1915-1916), p. 803. 8 D.J. Murphy, The Establishment of State Enterprises in Queensland, 1915-1918, M.A. Qual., University of

Queensland, 1965, p. 190. 9 ‘Industrial Events for the Month of April’, QIG, 1, 3, May 1916, pp.160-1. & ‘AGM’, BCCAR, 1915-16, pp. 34-5.

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balance owing to the value of its exports exceeding that of it imports.10 The total value of

production of all sectors stagnated between 1914 and 1916, and then rose before stagnating

again between 1917 and 1919. However, where the rural industries stagnated, or showed only

marginal increases in production, the manufacturing sector was notable for its steady

growth.11

The increased cost of living and high unemployment were the most prominent political

economic issues of the war years, and which gave rise to a rich vein of public dissent that

Labor was to successfully exploit in the 1915 elections. The cost of living rose by 20 per cent

between 1915 and 1918, while real wages declined by 16 percent between 1914-15 and 1918-

19.12 Contemporary research on prices conducted by the Commonwealth Inter-State

Commission (I-SC) during 1917 and 1918 questioned the theory that increased prices

occurred because of higher costs of wages and materials, owing to demand, and from the

sustained high levels of government spending and the subsequent expansion of the currency.

I-SC research found that the inefficient distribution of goods and price manipulation and

exploitation by wholesalers’ associations were the primary causes behind price inflation.

Indeed, the powerful Brisbane Merchant’s Association (BMA) was noted for its manipulative

trading practices and propensity to ignore government price fixing proclamations.13 More

recent research, however, demonstrates that the root cause of wartime inflation was the

contraction of money markets when governments attempted to raise local sources of capital

by offering above market interest rates on government securities. Gold exports were

prohibited, and paper currency was introduced, which in turn prompted sustained rises in

retail prices. While some of this increase can be attributed to the practices of wholesalers and

others it was really a failure by price control authorities to deal effectively with the structural

inflation associated with the fiscal policies of the state and Commonwealth governments that

gave the greatest impetus to price inflation.14 In any event, the economic conditions brought

10 ‘Total Exports & Total Imports 1913-1919', Summary of Queensland Statistics, Statistics of Queensland [QSS],

QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 22-5k. 11 ‘Production of Queensland Industries - Estimated Gross Value 1913-1920', A.B.C. of Queensland Statistics

[ABCQS], 1929, p. 199; Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, ‘Table 158 - Summary of Australian Production Statistics for the years 1909-10 to 1919-20', Production Bulletin No. 14, p. 103. & ‘Summary - Production’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k.

12 A. Lougheed, The Brisbane Stock Exchange, 1884-1984 (Brisbane: Boolorang Publications, 1984), p. 90. & Shaw, Economic Development, p.131.

13 ‘Inter-State Commission of Australia - Prices Investigation No.6 Report - Groceries’, Inter-State Commission, 22 March 1918, pp. 8, 21-22 & 60-61. & ‘Inter-State Commission of Australia - Prices Investigation No.5 Report - Bread’, Inter-State Commission, 9 February 1918, pp. 21-23., A2: 1918/871, Australian Archives [AA] (ACT).

14 Shaw, Economic Development, p.131.

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about by the war significantly altered international and domestic trading conditions for

Queensland and made the lot of the manufacturers a most difficult one.

The Manufacturing Sector in Queensland, 1914-1919: A Statistical Profile

Factories

World War I did little to assist the development of Queensland’s secondary industries. Indeed,

it effectively halted the strong pattern of structural growth that was evident in the years

immediately preceding the war. In most aspects the sector’s performance was less than

positive, nevertheless the secondary industries survived the economic crisis. According to the

Statistics the number of factories in operation remained relatively stagnant during the war

years. In 1914 there were 1796 factories (with four or more employees) recorded, and this

number declined by 100 between 1913 and 1915 to a low of 1742. By 1917 the number had

grown to 1793, but had fallen to 1754 by 1919. The short post-war boom lifted factory

numbers into another expansionary phase with their number approaching 1800 in 1920.15

During the war, the level of compliance and coverage of the Factories and Shops Act had

improved considerably and the statistics provided in the ‘F&SR’ are therefore more useful.

The ‘F&SR’ series indicates a quite different trend from that apparent in the Statistics figures.

After a decline to 2643 factories by 1914 (a similar trend to that demonstrated in the

Statistics), there was significant growth to 1915 (2832), to stabilise in 1916, before falling to a

low of 2486 in 1917. This was followed by a very strong recovery to 3292 by 1920, the

opposite of the trend recorded in the Statistics (see Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2).16

15 ‘Summary - Factories’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k. 16 'F&SR 1913-14', QPP, 3 (1914), pp. 50-9; '1914-15', QPP, 3 (1915-16), pp. 811-20; '1915-16', QPP, 3 (1916-17),

p. 43; '1916-17', QPP, 2 (1917), pp. 1050-70; '1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), pp. 1325-7; '1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), pp. 261-70 & '1919-20', QPP, 2 (1920), pp. 700-10.

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The disparity between the two series occurs because the ‘F&SR’ returns include the great

many small factories, with fewer than four employees, that apparently have not been recorded

in the Statistics. The ‘F&SR’ series suggests that there was considerable growth in the small

establishments during this period, at least until 1918, and this, with the differences in

geographical boundaries and census dates, accounts to some degree, for the larger number of

factories recorded in that series. This discrepancy in itself indicates that the manufacturing

sector was larger than is immediately obvious from the data recorded in the Statistics.

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Table 5.1

QSS Factories Classified by Number of Employees, 1913-1920

[NB: ‘F&SR’ factory series by number of hands discontinued after 1911. However, a QSS series is available

from 1911 and is used from that year onwards. * = Classifications altered after 1911]

YEAR F&SR

YEAR

QSS

1-3

4

5-10

11-20

21-50

51-100

101+

1912-13

2905

1913

1838

206

195

635

360

264

93

85

1913-14

2643

1914

1796

214

167

627

338

276

88

86 1914-15

2832

1915

1775

243

172

597

328

262

92

81

1915-16

2824

1916

1782

315

179

577

310

238

83

80 1916-17

2486

1917

1793

343

178

560

309

241

79

83

1917-18

2639

1918

1778

334

165

548

328

242

76

85 1918-19

3180

1919

1778

327

172

545

327

249

78

88

1919-20

3292

1920

1754

319

179

543

326

256

80

92 Sources: ‘Table - LXVIII’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1913), p. 58k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 58k; LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. 58k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. 58k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. 59k; LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k. & LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1921), p. 40k.

The decline and stagnation in factory numbers was not universally experienced across the

various classifications defined by the average number of employees per factory. In the group

of factories with fewer than four employees there was a steady increase in numbers between

1914 (214) and 1917 (343), followed by a period of stability, with a slight decline after 1918

(334) to 1920 (319). In the 4-10 employee group, however, there was a steady decline from

791 in 1914, to a low of 713 in 1918, followed by a weak recovery in the two years to 1920

(722). The next group, with 11-20 hands, showed a steady reduction in numbers from 338 in

1914 to 310 in 1916 and 1917, with a recovery from 1918 (328) to 1920 (326). The 21-50

group increased strongly to 1914 (276) followed by a downward trend to a low of 238 in

1916, and then recovered to 256 by 1920. The 51-100 group increased from eighty-eight in

1914 to ninety-two in 1915. Factory numbers then contracted to seventy-six by 1918, prior to

another recovery in the years to 1920 (80). In the final group, factories with 101 or more

hands, the trend was opposite to that of the 50-100 group, showing a reduction from eighty-

six in 1914 to a low of eighty by 1916. The group recovered strongly so that from 1917 it had

overtaken the 50-100 group to reach ninety-two by 1920. These figures demonstrate that, in

general terms, the larger firms employing over twenty employees fared better than the smaller

concerns, with the exception of the group with fewer than four hands which expanded up to

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1917.17

Employment

Employment in the manufacturing sector declined markedly from a peak of 43,280 in 1914 to

40,150 by 1916. A soft recovery occurred through to 1918 (40,990) and, after stalling in 1919,

the recovery gained momentum through to 1920 (43,200) (see Fig. 5.3).18 The ‘F&SR’

figures, although lower than the Statistics figures, reflected the different census dates and

coverage of many smaller factories, but nevertheless revealed a similar trend.19 The

employment trends experienced by male and female manufacturing workers were quite

different during this period. Male employment increased from 34,175 in 1913 to 35,717 in

1914 (82.5 per cent of the total workforce), but with the outbreak of war the male workforce

had declined to a low of 32,365 by 1916. A steady recovery was experienced after 1916 and

by 1919 male employment had exceeded the 1914 figure (33,851 or 82.7 per cent of the

manufacturing workforce) and by 1920 had reached a total of 36,011.

17 Table LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1913), p. 58k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k; LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1

(1915-16), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. 58-9k; LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k. & LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1921), p. 40k.

18 ‘Summary ’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k. 19 ‘F&SR 1913-14', QPP, 3 (1914), pp. 50-9; '1914-15', QPP, 3 (1915-16), pp. 811-20; '1915-16', QPP, 3 (1916-17),

p. 43; '1916-17', QPP, 2 (1917), pp. 1050-70; '1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), pp. 1325-7; '1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), pp. 261-70 &

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Female employment decreased slightly to 7565 in 1914, but unlike their male counterparts

female employment gradually increased and reached a peak of 7783 by 1916. However, this

trend was temporary: female employment slumped from 1917 onwards to reach a low of 7040

in 1919. A recovery, however, was evident by 1920 when a figure of 7185 was recorded (see

Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5a and Fig 5.5b).

'1919-20', QPP, 2 (1920), pp. 700-10.

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This disparity is important because the sexual division of labour in manufacturing indicates

that the trades which were dominated by women, trades such as clothing, textiles, and

some food preparation, fared better in the early years of the war, a trend that was later

reversed. Indeed, the percentage of females in the manufacturing workforce increased from

17.5 per cent in 1914 to 19.4 per cent by 1916, and then returned to 17.2 per cent by 1919.20

This trend strongly suggests that there were two key issues affecting female manufacturing

employment. First, clothing and food production were, to some extent, essential items and

were less exposed to drastic cuts in demand during war. Second, the viability of these

industries was enhanced by the lower wages paid to their predominantly female workforce

and to some extant insulated these industries from reductions in demand and from price

inflation.

Statistics on the sexual division of labour in manufacturing are incomplete, but some

examples of the scope of female employment in secondary industries are useful. There was a

significant increase in the intra-sectoral activity of females in the manufacturing industries

during the war. Industries dominated by female employees had increased by 1914 to include,

textiles (85 females out of 129 employees), clothing and shirt making (3773 out of 4861),

dressmaking and millinery (1408 out of 1425), hat and cap making (88 of 127), paper box and

20 Table LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1913), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k; LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. 58-9k; LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k.

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bag making (85 of 124), confectionery (184 of 407), condiments and coffee (33 of 48),

narcotics and tobacco (43 of 75), chemicals and drugs (36 of 72), and in leather goods (25 of

96). By 1919 there were 2888 females employed in clothing and shirt making (of 3702

employees), dressmaking and millinery (1235 of 1243), hat and cap making (233 of 353),

paper box and bag making (75 of 112), confectionery (365 of 641), condiments and coffee (10

of 22), narcotics and tobacco (31 of 64), chemicals and drugs (66 of 107), and in leather

goods (23 of 73). Female employment contributed significantly to several other types of

manufacturing such as in biscuit making and baking, boot and shoe making, in the

manufacture of fibrous goods (ropes and sails), in printing and binding, and bedding and

upholstery. Indeed, females were employed in all but six or seven of the 51 separate fields of

manufacturing recorded in the statistical classifications between 1914 and 1919.21

Production

The value of production, being an estimate of the crude gross value added by the

manufacturing process, but excluding dairy and timber products, increased from £8 million to

£10.5 million between 1914 and 1919. Only the pastoral sector surpassed manufacturing in

value of production, and if dairy and timber manufactures are included, the value of

manufacturing actually exceeded pastoral production after 1918.22 The total value of

manufacturing output (the wholesale value of manufactures) is even more impressive; the

total grew from £25.5 million in 1914 to £32.1 million by 1919, and surged to £39.8 million

in the following year (see Fig. 5.6). Indeed, manufacturing output was consistently at least

three times greater in value than that of the agriculture and mining sectors combined.23 A

consistent advance in the value of manufacturing plant and machinery in Queensland was

evident throughout the war: from £6.9 million in 1914 to £8.9 million by 1919. Moreover, the

value of associated land and buildings also showed consistent growth, from £4.4 to £5.9

million over the same period.24

21 Tables LXIX, ‘SQ’, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k. & LI, ‘SQ’, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k. 22 ‘Production of Queensland Industries - Estimated Gross Value 1913-1920', ABCQS, 1929, p. 199. 23 ‘Table 158 - Summary of Australian Production Statistics for the years 1909-10 to 1919-20', Production Bulletin No.

14, p. 103. & ‘Summary - Production’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k. 24 ‘Summary - Value of Plant & Machinery and Land & Buildings’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k.

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284

World War I had a significant impact on the operations of Queensland’s manufacturers and

hastened several changes in the structure of the sector. The Food and Drink (F&D)

preparation group retained its dominance in factory numbers and employment throughout the

war years, although the process of consolidation was retarded with the average number of

employees per factory easing from 33.7 in 1914 to 28.9 by 1919. This group was followed in

order of their percentage of the state’s factory numbers by the Working in Wood (WW),

Clothing, Footwear, and Textiles (CFT), and Metals and Machinery (M&M) groups, but

while the percentage of employment in the M&M group increased, the CFT group declined.

The Earthern Building Materials (EBM) and Treating Raw Materials (TRM) groups

experienced a strong consolidative trend, whereas the M&M, WW, and Coaches, Wagons, &

Motor Vehicles (CWMV) groups experienced only slight consolidation (see Fig. 5.7).

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285

The F&D, CFT, and Furniture and Bedding (F&B) groups actually experienced de-

consolidation where factory growth outstripped employment. Finally, the Books, Printing and

Paper (BPP) and Heat, Light and Power (HLP) groups experienced growth in factories and

employment, with employment being the stronger, while in the Specialised and Other (S&O)

group factory growth was stronger. Overall growth in factory numbers occurred in the F&B,

F&D, HLP, S&O, and BPP groups, while employment growth was apparent in the TRM,

EBM, BPP, F&B, HLP, and S&O groups between 1914-1919.25

The Industrial Geography of Manufacturing in Queensland 1914-1919

There were some significant changes in demographic patterns in Queensland that influenced

the state’s industrial geography during this period. Queensland’s mean population grew by 5.6

per cent between 1914 and 1919, although the Census indicates an increase of 24 per cent

between 1911 and 1921. The Census data also indicates that Queensland’s urban population

decreased slightly from 45.2 per cent to 43.6 per cent of the total population between 1911

and 1921. This trend towards rural habitation was temporary and in part reflects the brief

ascendancy of rural population growth during this period. With the failure of settlement

schemes the urban population again overtook rural growth from the early 1920s. The people

25 LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. 57-8k. & LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k.

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286

living in urban centres increased from 273,725 (1911) to 329,870 (1921), whereas the rural

population grew more significantly from 332,088 (1911) to 421,189 (1921).26 In technical

terms, while urbanisation stalled, urban growth was apparent along-side rural intensification.

The link between urbanisation and urban growth and the development of manufacturing is

evident owing to the fact that during this period of urban stagnation the number of factories

also tended to stagnate. The demographic patterns that occurred between 1911 and 1921 show

a distinct slowing of growth in population in the Southern Division, which increased by 23.2

per cent, compared to an 80 per cent increase between 1901 and 1911, while in the Central

Division the population increased by 40.9 per cent and in the Northern Division by 23.3 per

cent between 1911 and 1921. The healthy growth in the centre and north of the state was a

dramatic improvement on the stagnation very much in evidence from 1901 to 1911.27 Growth

in the main urban centres varied widely with Ipswich (141.4 per cent), followed by

Bundaberg (81.3 per cent), Toowoomba (70.3 per cent), Townsville (47.9 per cent),

Rockhampton (28.2 per cent), Cairns (20 per cent), Maryborough (12.8 per cent), and Mackay

(9.4 per cent).28

As was noted in Chapter 3, the industrial geography of secondary industries was quite diverse

in Queensland. The Statistics show that in 1914, of the 1796 factories recorded, 532 were

located in Brisbane, followed by Rockhampton (107), Toowoomba (104), Ipswich (68),

Townsville (64), Maryborough (60), Bundaberg (49), Gympie (40), Mackay (39), Charters

Towers (38), Warwick (33), and 662 factories were classified as being located ‘Elsewhere’

around the state. By 1919 these figures generally had declined, and several changes had

occurred in the order. Brisbane accounted for 558 of the state’s 1754 factories, followed by

Toowoomba (98) (3rd to 2nd), Rockhampton (95), Townsville (60) (5th to 4th), Ipswich (59),

Maryborough (57) (6th to 5th), Gympie (47) (8th to 7th), Bundaberg (39), Mackay (37),

Charters Towers (32), Warwick (30), and 651 factories ‘Elsewhere’ ( Fig. 5.8 and Fig. 5.9).29

26 ‘Table III - Queensland Population (Cities, Municipalities, and Shires), 1911', Commonwealth Census [Census], 3,

1911, pp. 2245-46. & 'Queensland - Area, Number and Density of Population... Local Government Area, 1921', Commonwealth Census, 2, 14, 1921, pp. 375-78.

27 See ‘Table 4: Queensland’s Regional Population, 1861-1947', in G. Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland: A Study in Economic Nationalism (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1973), p. 282.

28 No. I, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. [3f]; No. I, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. [3f]; No. I, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. [3f]; No. I, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. [3f]; No. I, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), p. [3f] & No. I, QSS, QPP, 2 (1921), p. [3f].

29 Table LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k & LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k.

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Table 5.2

QSS Factories Classified by District, 1913-1920 Key: Petty Sessions Districts — Metro [Metropolitan], Bundy [Bundaberg], CT [Charters Towers], M’boro [Maryborough], Rocky [Rockhampton], T’wba [Toowoomba], T’vile [Townsville], & W’rick [Warwick].

1913

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

1919

1920 Metro

553

532

536

551

572

573

558

592

Bundy

53

49

54

48

49

47

39

40

CT

37

38

36

35

33

34

32

26

Gympie

49

40

43

46

46

44

47

51

Ipswich

69

68

65

65

64

62

59

59

Mackay

41

39

41

39

36

36

37

39

M'boro

60

60

62

60

59

59

57

61

Rocky

99

107

100

100

95

93

95

94

T'wba

112

104

106

103

98

99

98

95

T'vile

65

64

58

60

63

60

60

57

W'rick

34

33

31

30

30

29

32

30

Other

666

662

643

645

648

642

640

651

TOTAL

1838

1796

1775

1782

1793

1778

1754

1795

Source: ‘Table - LXVIII’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1913), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k; LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. 58-9k; LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1921), p. 40-1k.

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By scaling the relative proportions of factories to the level of employment in the ‘industrial’

workforce as classified by Division in the 1911 and 1921 Censuses, and taking into account

the annual rate of growth or decline, a rough estimate can be made of the distribution of the

factories by Division. Of the 1796 factories recorded in 1914, approximately 910 could have

been located in the Southern Division (900 in 1919), 569 in the Central Division (534 in

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1919), and 317 in the Northern Division (320 in 1919) (see Fig. 5.10 and Fig. 5.11). In

percentage terms this estimate indicates that more than 50 per cent of all factories were

located in the Southern Division, and that the majority were in south-east Queensland.

Brisbane accounted for almost 30 per cent of the state’s factories in 1914 (compared to 26 per

cent in 1900), and 32 per cent in 1919, which indicated a degree of centralisation in the

metropolis. The scale of manufacturing activity located in the Southern Division is apparent

also from the number of manufacturing industrial awards specific to the region (see Map 3).

Accurate estimates of Brisbane’s metropolitan area population are not available prior to 1922.

However, we do know from the 1901 Census that Brisbane accounted for approximately 25

per cent of Queensland’s population in 1901 and 29.8 per cent by 1922. With these figures in

mind, and applying an annualised average rate of growth for the period, it is estimated that

Brisbane would have accounted for approximately 28 per cent of the state’s population of

674,932 in 1914. Brisbane’s population, therefore, would have been close to 182,000 by 1914

(28 per cent) and 206,000 (28.9 per cent) of Queensland’s population (712,928) by 1919.30

This suggests that Brisbane’s share of manufacturing activity was not much more than its

relative share of the state’s population, and thus reflected the truly decentralised nature of the

sector in Queensland.

The Census also supplies data on manufacturing and construction (industrial)31 employment

across the three Divisions in Queensland. It was estimated that 33.5 per cent of the workforce

in the Southern Division was engaged in industrial occupations in 1911. The figure was 20.4

per cent in the Central Division, and 19.5 per cent in the Northern Division. Industrial

employment accounted for 25 per cent of the entire Queensland workforce by 1911. By 1921,

when the next Census figures are available, the percentages were 32.9 (SD), 19.7 (CD), and

26.2 (ND) respectively, indicating that there had been a slight decline in the proportion of the

industrial workforces in the Central and Southern Divisions, and a hefty increase in the

Northern Division was stimulated by population growth. The total industrial workforce had

increased from 25.1 per cent in 1911 to 26.5 per cent by 1921. Unfortunately, hard data on the

number employed by Division is not available in the ‘F&SR’ or Statistics.32 However, using

30 ‘Summary - Mean Population’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), pp. 2-3k & ‘Brisbane - Vital Statistics Metropolitan Area, 1922-1931’, ABCQS, 1932, p. 141.

31 The Census figures include all people working in ‘Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas, Building and Construction’. Therefore these figures are somewhat inflated by the inclusion of the Building and Construction classification, however, this is in part counter-balanced by other manufacturing occupations being recorded in other non-manufacturing groups such as ‘Transport and Communications’ and ‘restaurants and Hotels’.

32 See Tables in C.P. Harris, Regional Economic Development in Queensland 1859 to 1981 with particular emphasis on North Queensland (Canberra: ANU Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, 1984), pp. 70-1. & 92-3.

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these proportions as a guide, a rough estimate can be made of the divisional distribution of

manufacturing employment, based on the Statistics figures. Of the 43,280 manufacturing

workers in 1914, perhaps 21,769 would have been located in the south of the state, 14,023 in

central Queensland, and 7487 in the north. In 1919, the distribution could have been 21,059

(south), 12,268 (centre), and 7564 (north), of a total of 40,891.33 Although these figures are

33 ‘Summary’, QSS, QPP, 1 (1931), p. 20k.

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only estimates, they do indicate that the centralisation of manufacturing employment in

Brisbane and the south of the state was slowed considerably by the war, while in central

Queensland the negative impact on employment was even more severe. However, north

Queensland actually increased its manufacturing workforce, which aptly illustrates the

expansion of economic activity in the north, especially in building and construction, that

accompanied the 25 per cent growth in its population from 1901 to 1921 as the northern

frontier rapidly developed in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Intra-Sectoral Performance in the Manufacturing Sector

Table 5.3

QSS Factories by Group Classification, 1913-1920 Key: Factories with four or more employees. TRM [Treating Raw Materials], EBM [Earthern Building Materials], WW [Working in Wood], M&M [Metals & Machinery], F&D [Food & Drink Preparation], CFT [Clothing, Footwear, & Textiles], BPP [Books, Printing, & Paper], CWMV [Coaches, Wagons, Motor Vehicles], F&B [Furniture & Bedding], HLP [Heat, Light, & Power], and S&O [Specialised & Other]

1913

1914

1915

1916

1917

1918

1919

1920

TRM

62

46

58

43

41

41

45

44

EBM

44

42

40

41

36

39

37

42

WW

315

326

320

301

301

296

297

304

M&M

250

239

230

229

218

224

227

229

F&D

434

433

439

473

486

477

460

467

CFT

273

258

251

247

252

242

235

237

BPP

144

141

144

143

145

146

144

140

CWMV

168

159

153

144

145

144

138

147

F&B

92

82

82

86

87

90

92

100

HLP

24

26

28

29

32

32

32

31

S&O

32

30

30

31

35

34

36

41

TOTAL

1838

1796

1775

1782

1793

1778

1754

1795

Source: ‘Table - LI’, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1921), p. 40-1k; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1922), p. 40-1k; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1923), p. 40-1h; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1924), p. 41-2h; LII, QSS, QPP, 2 (1925), p. 41-2h; Statistics of the State of Queensland (ABS Serial), LII, QSS, 1925-26, pp. 71-3h; LIII, QSS, 1926-27, pp. 68-71h; LIII, QSS, 1927-28, pp. 68-71h; LIII, QSS, 1928-29, pp. 68-71h; LIII, QSS, 1929-30, pp. 67-70h. & LII, QSS, 1930-31, pp. 65-8h.

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1. Treating Raw Materials (TRM):

(This group includes bonemills, tanneries, woolscouring and fellmongering works.)

During the war years there was a slight reduction in the number of factories in the TRM group

from 62 in 1913 to a low of 54 by 1918. The number had risen to 58 by 1919. Woolscour and

fellmongery numbers overtook tanneries after 1914, the former accounting for twenty-one

factories in 1914, had dropped to seventeen by 1917, and had risen to twenty by 1919.

Tanneries dropped from eighteen to settle at seventeen from 1917. The number of bone mills

remained stable at seven throughout the period, and soap and candle works declined

marginally from fourteen to thirteen. Unlike factory numbers, employment in this group

steadily increased during the war years, from 753 in 1914 to 944 by 1919 (see Fig. 5.12 and

Fig. 5.13). Woolscouring and fellmongering consistently employed more hands than the

tanneries, with numbers growing from 395 in 1914 to 461 by 1919. In the tanneries

employment also grew, from 205 to 260 over the same period. In soap and candle works

employment increased from 153 to 172 between 1914 and 1919. The average number of

employees per factory in the TRM group was 12.6 by 1914 and 16.3 by 1919. In

woolscouring and fellmongering the average was 16.9 in 1914 and increased to twenty-three

in 1919, which indicated a high degree of consolidation throughout the war years.

Consolidation was also apparent in the tanneries: the average number of employees was 11.4

by 1914 and 9.7 in 1913 and by 1919 had increased to 15.3, with a similar trend occurring in

the soap and candle works when its average increased from 10.9 to 13.2 over the same period.

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From the statistical data available it is not possible to quote a monetary value for the total

production of this group. Rather, the various enterprises have to be assessed by either their

relative output, usually by quantity, or by the value of production. The value of woolscouring

and fellmongering which was £1.2 million in 1914, had increased slowly to a peak of £2.6

million by 1918 (£2.4 million in 1919). By 1919, the production of lard had declined steadily

to 656,547 lbs from 929,610 lbs in 1914. The output of tallow fell from 16,762 tons in 1914 to

only 6115 tons by 1919. The production of skins grew strongly from 152,880 to 393,180

between 1914 and 1919, while the number of leather hides also increased from 181,700 in

1914 to 206,919 by 1917. It is worth noting that exports from this group were valued at £5.9

million in 1915 and peaked at £7.8 million by 1919.34

34 Unless noted otherwise the sources for the analysis in the ‘Intra-sectoral performance’ section are as follows: Table

LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1914), p. 57-8k; LXVIII, QSS, QPP, 1 (1915-16), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1916-17), p. 57-8k; LXIX, QSS, QPP, 1 (1917), p. 58-9k; LI, QSS, QPP, 3 (1919-20), pp. 40-1k. 'F&SR 1913-14', QPP, 3 (1914), pp. 50-9; '1914-15', QPP, 3 (1915-16), pp. 811-20; '1915-16', QPP, 3 (1916-17), p. 43; '1916-17', QPP, 2 (1917), pp. 1050-70; '1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), pp. 1325-7; '1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), pp. 261-70 & '1919-20', QPP, 2 (1920), pp. 700-10. 'Production, Queensland: Principle Products of Industries or Manufactories', ABCQS, 1915, p. 29; 1916, p. 28; 1921, p. 28. & ‘Tables - Exports Oversea, Queensland (by type)’, ABCQS, 1916, p. 33; 1917, pp. 33-4; 1919, p. 33. & 1921, p. 33.

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2. Earthern Building Materials (EBM):

(This group includes the manufacture of bricks and tiles, concrete pipes, ornamental glass,

lime, plaster, cement, marble masonry, pottery and earthernware.)

There was a reduction in the number of factories in the EBM group from forty-two in 1914 to

thirty-seven in 1919. Brick and tile works dominated the composition of this group in 1914

with nineteen, but had dropped to fourteen by 1919. Marble and monumental masonry works

also decreased in number from twelve in 1914 to ten in 1919, the number of potteries from

four to three, and lime, plaster and cement works increased from four to five. Employment in

this group defied the downward trend in factory numbers, increasing from 677 to 827 between

1914 and 1919, but in 1917 there had been a slump to 423 (see Fig. 5.14 and Fig. 5.15). Brick

and tile works dominated employment in this group, with 502 in 1914, and while this number

declined to just 250 in 1917, numbers had recovered somewhat to 386 by 1919. Employment

in the lime, plaster and cement works increased from 28 in 1914 to 119 by 1919, whereas

numbers employed in marble masonry declined from 124 to 100 over the period. The average

number of employees per factory for the EBM group was 16.1 in 1914, and had increased to

22.3 by 1919. The reduction in the number of factories and increase in the numbers employed

clearly demonstrates the level of consolidation apparent in this group. For the brick and tile

works the average was 21.8 in 1914 and 22.3 by 1919. In marble masonry employment

stabilised at around ten employees per factory for the period. In the lime, plaster, and cement

classification the average increased from 7.3 in 1914 to 23.8 by 1919. This indicates that the

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four factories considerably enlarged their respective workforces during the war.

From the limited data available it can be seen that the quantity of clay bricks manufactured in

Queensland decreased dramatically, after the surge in production from 1910, down from 30

million in 1913, to 22.5 million in 1914, and to a low of 9.3 million bricks by 1917.

Production recovered slowly to reach 12.7 million bricks during 1919. The value of pottery

production continued to decline from £29,593 in 1913, to £25,007 in 1914, and to a low of

£20,949 in 1916. This slump, however, was followed by a rapid expansion in production

which had risen to £35,452 by 1919.

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3. Working in Wood (WW):

(This group includes the manufacture of boxes, cases, timber products, plywood, and

cooperages, joineries, sawmills, wood-turning and carving.)

The number of factories operating in the wood-working industry was second only to the Food

and Drink group despite having decreased from 326 factories in 1914 to 301 in the following

year, and had stagnated to drop to 297 by 1919. The outbreak of war had an immediate impact

on these trades. Sawmills progressively closed down: numbers decreased from 252 in 1914,

from 230 in 1915, and to 226 by 1919. The joineries were less affected with only a slight

decline from fifty-two to forty-eight. The number of cooperages also fell, from twelve to nine,

while box and case making remained stable at eight, but plywood and the remaining other

works actually increased from two to six between 1914 and 1919. Employment in this group

was quite significant and ranked forth in importance, with 5275 workers involved in these

trades in 1914. This figure, which collapsed to 4110 in 1916, indicated something of the direct

impact the war economy had on this sector. Employment, however, did recover, and had

increased to 4828 hands by war’s end (see Fig. 5.16 and Fig. 5.17). Employment in sawmills

fell from 4359 to 3973 between 1914 and 1919; the joineries also declined from 752 to 600,

and cooperages from 100 to 86. The situation was a little different in the box and case making

trade where employment actually increased from 64 to 163, an improvement due to the surge

in butter exports from 1917 and the resultant demand for timber butter boxes. The average

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number of employees per factory for the WW group remained largely static at around 16.2

because of an almost equal increase and decrease in total numbers employed in the group. In

sawmilling, the average number of employees per factory increased marginally from 17.3 to

17.6, while the joineries average declined from 14.5 to 12.5 between 1914 and 1919. In the

cooperages, however, the pre-war trend continued, with the average increasing from 8.3 to 9.5

during the period. The best result was recorded in the box and case making, owing to the

increase in demand where the average grew from 8 to 20.4 employees by 1919.

Again, production figures are incomplete for this group. Nevertheless, timber production

figures show that the output of cedar steadily decreased from 668,997 super feet (s.f.) to just

197,783 s.f. by 1917, but output had recovered to 629,485 s.f. by 1919. It is worth noting that

cedar production stood at 2.2 million s.f. in 1900.35 The output of hardwood followed a

similar pattern, decreasing from 66.6 million s.f. in 1914 to a low of 40.9 million s.f. in 1917,

but lifting a little to 43 million s.f. by 1919. Likewise, the production of softwood decreased

from 101.1 million s.f. to 70.5 million s.f. in 1917; followed, however, by a rapid recovery

and production had bounced back to over 100 million s.f by 1919. Timber exports were

adversely affected by the war with the value falling from £3833 to £479 between 1914 and

1919.

35 ‘Table - CCXLIX’, QSS, QPP, 2 (1901).

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4. Metals and Machinery (M&M):

(This group includes the manufacture of agricultural implements, stoves and ovens, nails,

brass and copper works, engineering works and foundries, galvanised iron and iron works, rail

and tramway workshops, metal extraction and smelting, blacksmithing, tinsmithing, and sheet

metal works, wire working, gas fitting, shipbuilding and repair, and electrical appliances.)

The M&M group was ranked fourth in terms of number of factories in Queensland with

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239 factories in 1914, a reduction from 250 in the previous year, which continued to fall

until reaching a low of 218 in 1917. A recovery, however, was evident by 1919 when

there were 227 factories in the group (see Fig. 5.18 and Fig. 5.19). The war severely

retarded the growth of this group of industries, mainly because of acute shortages in

skilled labour and raw materials. Lack of a fully developed iron and steel industry meant

limited access to iron and steel products, as well as to other metals, for domestic use.

Moreover, the drain of skilled labour to the factories of Britain,36 and to the battlefields in

the Middle East and Europe, adversely affected the capacity of Queensland’s metal

industry to cope with domestic demand.37 For example, in the Government Railways

Workshop at Ipswich, shortages of boiler plate, hardened steel, other metals, and tool

steels, disrupted production and repair of the state’s fleet of locomotives.38 The demand

for the ordnance of war provided little by way of productive opportunities for

Queensland’s engineering works. Despite the enthusiasm of local business and community

leaders, and the efforts of the Queensland Munitions Committee,39 munitions production

in Queensland was limited to some shell making at the Ipswich and Rockhampton

Government Railways workshops.40 Indeed, the authorities in the United Kingdom, while

pleased with

36 The exact number of skilled workers who left Queensland to work in munitions and associated industries in Britain

is unknown, although the total number from the whole of Australia was 2941. The munitions workers received few of the benefits afforded to returned servicemen and after the war they lobbied for government assistance and access to soldier settlement schemes. It is estimated from correspondence between the Returned Munition and War Workers’ League of Queensland [RM&WLQ] and the Queensland Premier that several hundred were recruited in Queensland. Correspondence between D. Caldwell & F. G. Sewell, Secretary of the RM&WLQ, to Acting Premier Fihelly, 14 and 16 July and 12 and 14 August 1919, PRE/A662, 5095, QSA; State Munitions Committee to the Under-Secretary of the Chief-Secretary’s Office, 13 September 1917, PRE/A566, 11344, QSA; Commonwealth Minister for Repatriation to Senator H. S. Foll, 2 September 1919, A2487; 1919/8812, AA (ACT) & Morgan, QPD, 132 (1919-20), p.1064.

37 QPD, 121 (1915-16), pp. 2098-9; BCCAR, 1915-16, p. 35; Tracksons Bros. Ltd. to Premier Ryan, 21 July 1915, PRE/A496, 7779, QSA; ‘F&SR - 1915-16', QPP, 3 (1916-17), pp. 72-87; ‘F&SR - 1916-17', QPP, 2 (1917), pp. 1075-95; ‘F&SR - 1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), pp. 1346-9; ‘F&SR - 1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), pp. 275-89; ‘Shortage of material’, DS, 6 October 1917; Queensland Government Offices to Commonwealth Supply Office, 6 February 1917, PRE/A551, 3658, QSA; ‘Tin Plate’, DS, 30 June 1917 & A. Sargeant & Co. to Premier Ryan, 12 July 1918, PRE/A594, 7910, QSA.

38 Prime Minister Hughes to Premier Ryan, 28 November 1917, PRE/A574, 14856, QSA 39 ‘Manufacture of Munitions’, Courier, 21 August 1915, p. 6. The State Munitions Committee was established by the

Queensland parliament to investigate the possibility of manufacturing munitions. The executive comprised the Premier T.J. Ryan, John Adamson, Minister for Railways, and H.F. Hardacre MLA for Leichardt.

40 ‘Munitions Wanted’, DS, 9 June 1915; ‘Organising Munitions’ & ‘Chamber of Commerce’, DS, 16 June 1915; ‘Munitions Making’, DS, 23 October 1915; ‘Manufacture of Munitions’, Courier, 15 August 1915, p. 6; ‘Making Munitions’, Courier, 5 January 1916, p. 6. & ‘Munition-Making’, DS, 12 January 1916. Theodore to Premier Ryan, 4 August 1915, PRE/A505, 12452, QSA; A.J. Thynne to Premier Ryan , 20 October 1915; PRE/A504, 12252, QSA. Swayne & Adamson, QPD, 121 (1915-16), pp.2098-99. & p. 2197; G.E. Davies, Agent for Toowoomba Foundry Company, to Premier Ryan, 10 February 1916, PRE/A515, 1446, QSA. Over a dozen lathes were in operation at the Fitzroy Park railway workshops in Rockhampton, with another six at the Ipswich workshops (another eight were to follow). The majority these purpose built lathes were manufactured during the war by Queensland firms including Walkers Limited, Sydney Williams and Co., J. & G. Downie, Smith and Faulkner, and Evans, Anderson & Phelan.

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Queensland’s overtures to supply munitions, were of the opinion that supplying the

Imperial Government with the raw materials for waging war was the most important role

that the far-flung state could play in the war effort. Britain required Queensland’s meat,

butter, jam, sugar, copper, and men, rather than its limited capacity to supply munitions.41

The most numerous of the metal working industries were the tinsmithing, galvanising and

sheet metal works which numbered eighty-four in 1914, but which had declined to seventy-

three by 1919. Next in descending order were engineering, iron works, and foundries with a

figure which remained relatively stable at around fifty works throughout the war years. Then

came blacksmithing works (with more than four hands) with forty-seven factories in 1914, but

which slumped to thirty-three by 1917. This number had recovered slightly to stand at forty-

two by 1919. Of the other classifications, recorded shipbuilding and repair facilities were

reduced from thirteen to ten, while smelters increased in number from eleven to thirteen.

Railways and tram workshops increased from eight to fifteen, brass and copper works

numbered between seven and eight, and in stove making there were between six and eight

factories, while agricultural implement works numbered between six and seven for the period.

The M&M group increased its ranking from the third largest manufacturing employer to the

second largest between 1914 and 1919 despite this group of industries being considerably

41 J.N. Parkes, TCCAR, 1915-16, p. 9.

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affected by the outbreak of war in 1914. This is clearly evident from the collapse in

employment numbers from 7236 in 1914 to 5709 by 1917. Indeed, 1917 was the zenith of the

dislocation to the manufacturing sector before employment was to regain some ground to

reach 7160 employees by 1919. The average number of employees per factory which was

30.3 in 1914 had increased marginally to 31.5 by 1919. Employment data specific to each

industry is generally not available, except for shipbuilding and repair and smelting. In

smelting, the average number of employees per factory in smelting increased significantly

from 50.8 to 74.8 between 1914 and 1919, which indicated the great level of consolidation in

this industry. In shipbuilding, the level of consolidation was less spectacular, with an average

rising from 8.8 to 11.7 over the same period. Employment numbers in smelting experienced a

significant decline between 1914 and 1916 from, 559 to 119, and remained below 175 until

1919 when the smelting industry boomed and employment climbed to 973. On the other hand,

shipbuilding numbers grew from 115 to 134 by 1917, but by 1919 the number employed had

declined to 117 by 1919.

The value of production in the M&M group is recorded only as a total figure for the entire

group and no details are provided for the various types of manufacturing operations in the

group. Overall, the value of production declined dramatically from £2.6 million in 1914 to

just £1.7 million by 1917, and to £1.6 million by 1919.

5. Food and Drink (F&D):

(This group includes bacon curing, butter and cheese making, creameries, condensed milk,

meat preserving, arrowroot, bakeries and biscuits, confectionery, flourmills, jam, fruit and

vegetable canning, sugarmills and sugar refineries, aerated waters, breweries, condiments,

coffee, distilleries, ice and refrigeration, malting.)

The F&D group was the most significant and largest of the manufacturing sectors in

Queensland with more factories and employees than any of the manufacturing groups. In this

group there was a reasonable increase from 433 factories in 1914 to 486 by 1917, before a

decline to 460 by 1919. Again, the firms manufacturing aerated waters were the most

numerous in this group with 148 factories in 1914, but this number had dropped to 134 by

1919. Next came butter and cheese factories and creameries, whose number increased from 90

to 133 during the war, which reflected the rise in demand for these manufactures in Britain.

This group was followed by the sugar mills and refineries with forty-nine in 1914, but this

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number had declined to thirty-four by 1919. Biscuit and cake manufacturing overtook jam,

fruit, and vegetable canning; the former increased its number from sixteen to twenty-two,

while the latter also increased from eleven to twenty-two between 1914 and 1916 before

settling at eighteen by 1919. Meat preserving underwent consolidation from fifteen to thirteen

factories over the period. The confectioners decreased somewhat from nine to eight between

1914 and 1919, whereas brewery numbers remained stable at ten (see Fig. 5.20 and Fig. 5.21).

Employment in this group reflected the overall increase in the number of factories in the early

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years of the war, which after an initial decline from 14,609 to 13,585 between 1914 and 1916,

rose to a peak of 15,247 in 1917. Another slump occurred after 1917 when employment fell to

13,320 by 1919. The peak in employment figures in the middle of the war mirrors something

of the level of growth in demand for Queensland’s processed foods in Britain, with highest

export figures occurring in 1915, 1917, and 1918. The average number of employees per

factory had increased to 33.7 by 1914, yet had declined to 28.9 by 1919. During the war the

meat preserving industry vied with the sugar industry for the mantle of largest employer in

this group; the former’s numbers decreased from 5429 to 4346 between 1914 and 1919, while

the latter’s numbers fluctuated between 5270 (1914), and 4901 (1916), and reached a peak of

5916 in 1917. However, employment in sugar manufacturing had decreased to 4488 by 1919.

Further consolidation in the sugar industry can be seen in the increase in the average number

of employees per factory, from 107.5 to 132 between 1914 and 1919.

In meat preserving, the converse was the case, with the average declining from 362 to 334

over the same period. The third largest employer in this group was that of the aerated waters

manufacturers where employment declined from 836 to 670. The employment numbers per

factory average in aerated waters also declined, from 5.6 to 5 between 1914 and 1919. In

butter and cheese factories, employment peaked at 783 in 1917 (from 672 in 1914) and then

decreased to 694 by 1919, with the employment average falling from 7.5 to 5.2. Biscuit-

making and bakeries employment numbers increased from 501 to 613, and confectionery

employment also increased from 407 to 641. The averages for the biscuit-making and

bakeries was 31.3 and 27.9 employees per factory and for the confectionery works 45.2 and

76.6 employees. Brewery employment numbers also increased, from 430 to 548; the number

of breweries, however, remained static and the level of consolidation is evident as the factory

employment average increased from 43 to 54.8. Employment in the canning of jams, fruits,

and vegetables increased steadily from 220 to 358, with the average number of employees per

factory remaining relatively stable at around 20 for the duration of the war.

The productive output of the F&D group was anything but universal, a response to the

unsettled conditions of the war economy. Dairy production stumbled at first, then achieved a

high of 37.2 million lbs of butter and 11.1 million lbs of cheese by 1917. Production in both

these lines had declined to 26.2 million lbs and 8.3 million lbs respectively by 1919. Exports

of butter decreased in value from £697,437 to £136,232 between 1915 and 1916, before rising

rapidly to around £1.3 million during 1917 and 1918, and then declining once again to

£608,587 by 1919. Cheese exports decreased from £61,545 to £3793 between 1915 and 1916,

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before climbing strongly to £225,000 between 1917 and 1918, and then falling back to

£50,370 by 1919. Beef and mutton production both declined; the value of exported meat

products was £5.5 million in 1914-15, (a low of £2.7 million in 1916), peaked at £5.8 million

in 1917, and declined to £3.3 million by 1919. In the more complex food processing

industries, the manufacture of cakes and biscuits consolidated during the war, with production

remaining stable between 20 and 23 million lbs, from a low of 16.6 million lbs in 1914.

Refined sugar production fluctuated a great deal between 140,000 tons and 225,847 tons per

annum. The production of jams, on the other hand, experienced a consistent expansion in

output throughout the war, from 4.3 million lbs in 1914 to 7.5 million lbs by 1919. The value

of production of aerated waters (£234,496 in 1914) increased before falling to £208,644 in

1917 and recovering strongly to £260,695 by 1919. The consumption of beer slumped

between 1914 and 1916, due in part to the slowing down of the economy and the exodus of

males who were posted overseas. Production of beer fell from 6.1 million gallons in 1914 to a

low of 5.5 million gallons in 1916. With the strengthening of the economy, however, and the

return of servicemen from overseas, beer production increased strongly to peak at 8.3 million

gallons in 1919.

6. Clothing, Footwear and Textiles (CFT):

(This group includes woollen and tweed mills, knitting mills, cotton ginning, boot and shoe-

making and repairs, clothing, dress, hat, cap, and shirt-making, millinery, dyeing, and

cleaning, rope, cordage, sail, tent, tarp, bag and sack-making.)

The CFT group was ranked third in numbers of factories. The numbers of factories in this

group decreased steadily, with the exception of 1917 (252), falling from 258 to 235 between

1914 and 1919. There were 213 clothing apparel factories (including dressmaking, millinery,

shirts and underclothing) in Queensland by 1914, comprising 143 general clothing factories,

58 dressmaking and millinery factories, and 12 shirt and underclothing factories. The overall

number steadily decreased during the war years to 186 by 1919, with 131 general clothing, 44

dressmaking and millinery, and 11 shirt and underclothing factories. In percentage terms the

greatest decline occurred in the dressmaking and millinery trades — down 24 percent —

followed by general clothing and shirt and underclothing, both down by 8.4 per cent. The

number of boot and shoe factories, however, remained relatively stable (27-28) between 1914

and 1919 (see Fig. 5.22 and Fig. 5.23). Sail, tent and tarp making also remained stable at

around eight throughout the period. Of other factory types in this classification, dyeing and

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cleaning works increased in number from two to three, woollen mills from one to two, and hat

and cap works remained stable at four for the entire period.

Employment for the CFT group matched the pattern in factory numbers, although it was

relegated in rank relative to numbers employed, from second to third, with employment

declining from 7806 in 1914 to 7297 in 1917, and to a low of 6616 by 1919. The average

number of employees per clothing factory (all types) also declined slightly from 30.5 in 1914

to 28.1 by 1919. The number of employees involved in the general clothing and shirt and

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underwear factories declined from 4861 to 3702 during the war, with the employee average

falling from 31.4 to 26 over the same period. In the dressmaking and millinery sector

employment actually increased to peak at 1621 in 1918 after first declining from 1425 to 1350

between 1914 and 1916, before declining again to 1243 by 1919. The employee average for

these factories indicates that, in this area at least, the consolidative trend continued unabated,

expanding from 24.5 to 34.5 between 1914 and 1919. In the boot and shoe factories

employment increased steadily from 1047 in 1914 to a peak of 1130 in 1918, but with a slight

reduction to 1088 by 1919. The employee average remained relatively stable at around 38.7

for the period. The increase in employment in the footwear sector was stimulated somewhat

by a Commonwealth Defence Department contract for 25,000 pairs of military boots which

was secured by the Brisbane Boot Manufacturers Association in late 1915.42 The textile mills

increased employment from 129 to 225 by 1919, with an employee average of 129 and 112.5

in 1914 and 1919 respectively. Employment in hat and cap making declined during the first

half of the period, from 127 to 89 by 1917, before a rapid expansion to a peak of 353 by 1919.

The average number of employees per factory in this classification jumped from 31.7 to 88.2

between 1914 and 1919.

As noted in Chapter 3, an overall figure for the value of production of this group is not

available. Nevertheless, figures that are available show that the production of boots and shoes

increased from 744,315 pairs in 1914, with production peaking at 756,862 pairs in 1917,

before a small drop in production to 680,592 pairs by 1919. The value of clothing produced

which was estimated to have been £1.1 million in 1914 fluctuated between £1.1 million and

£1.3 million until 1919 when the figure exceeded £1.5 million. The rather patchy performance

of this group can be attributed to a combination of several factors. First, the negative

economic impact of the war significantly decreased consumer demand for clothing and this

was exacerbated by the disproportionate drop in demand for male civilian clothing as men left

for overseas war duties. Second, the amount of war-related work, although important, did not

generally compensate for this reduction in demand as these contracts expired by early 1917.

The recovery in clothing production experienced at the end of the war occurred when demand

increased when the servicemen returned from overseas. Finally, an important aspect of these

conditions was the shift in the gender balance in these trades, especially in tailoring which

had, until the war, been a male-dominated trade.43 Here the success early in the war years was

42 ‘Boot Trade’, DS, 20 November 1915. 43 ‘F&SR 1915-16’, QPP, 3 (1916-17), p. 72.

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achieved through the efforts of the underpaid and often exploited female workforce who were

recruited to replace the male workers who enlisted in the armed services. The success, or

otherwise, of this group also varied widely across the state since the regional experience was

tempered by not having to rely upon the bulk order trade, as was the case in Brisbane.44

7. Books, Paper and Printing (BPP):

(This group includes the manufacture of paper boxes and bags, printing and binding,

newspapers, die-sinking and engraving.)

The number of factories involved in the printing trades remained reasonably stable through

the war years, with a moderate increase from 141 to 144 between 1914 and 1919, reaching a

peak of 146 in 1918 (see Fig. 5.24). The majority of factories were engaged in printing and

binding; there were 136 in 1914, and 139 by 1917, but back to 136 by 1919. Paper box and

bag manufacturers are the only other type specified in this group, with only three factories

operating throughout the war. This sector was a significant employer accounting for 3007

manufacturing employees in 1914. The relative stability of this industry is reflected in the fact

that employment fluctuated by less than 200 over the entire period of the war, hitting a low of

2916 in 1918 and rising to a peak of 3090 in the following year. The average number of

employees per factory varied marginally between 21.3 and 21.6. The printing and binding

classification, including newspapers, accounted for 2857 employees in 1914, with numbers

falling to 2711 in 1918, and recovered to 2868 by 1919. The average number of employees

per printery remained stable at 21 throughout the period, while in the bag and box

classification, where employment fell from 124 to 112 between 1914 and 1919, the average

was 41.3 and 37.3 respectively.

44 ‘F&SR 1915-16’, QPP, 3 (1916-17), pp. 72-3 & 78; ‘F&SR 1916-17', QPP, 2 (1917), pp. 1075; ‘F&SR 1917-18',

QPP, 1 (1918), pp. 1346-9. & ‘F&SR 1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), p. 275..

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Precise statistics on the gender division of labour in the printing trades are not available, but

union records do provide some indication of the role of females in this industry. Labour was

well organised in the printing industry, and of the 1034 members of the Printing Industry

Employees Union (PIEU) in Queensland in 1916-17, 148 were females who were employed

in all areas of the printing trades. By 1918 there were 204 females out of a total union

membership of 1169, increasing to 221 of a total of 1220 members by 1919.45 The proportion

of females to males in this trade could have been greater since the female participation rate in

unions was considerably lower than that of their male counterparts even though efforts to

recruit females into the PIEU had met with some success early in the war.46

The printing industry performed well considering shortages of skilled labour and paper and

the recurring problem of securing replacement machines and parts. Nevertheless, several new

printing works equipped with the latest machinery were established during the war.47 The

greatest problem that confronted this industry was the shortage of paper that became

increasingly acute as the war progressed.48 Business, government and unions agreed on the

45 ‘Second Annual Report of the PIEU Queensland Branch, 1916-17’, The Printing Trades Journal [PTJ], 2, 18

December 1917, p. 8; ‘Third Annual Report...1917-18’, PJT, 3, 15 October 1918, p. 227; ‘Fourth Annual Report...1918-19', PJT, 3, 21 October 1919, p. 253, S354/Box1, NBAC.

46 ‘World of Labour’, Worker, 29 April 1915, p. 8. The effort to organise all females in the printing trade in Brisbane was spearheaded by Miss M.I. Coleman of the female section of the PIEU in New South Wales at the behest of the Queensland Typographical Association.

47 ‘F&SR 1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), p. 275. 48 ‘Protection for Printing Industry’, PTJ, 1, 3 (21 January 1919), pp. 1-2, S354/Box1, NBAC.

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gravity of the problem, and collaborated on various schemes to establish paper manufacturing

in Queensland to offset the wartime supply problems, and at the same time assist the industry

towards self sufficiency and to counter the 300-400 per cent increase in the price of paper that

had occurred by early 1918.49 Schemes included several attempts to manufacture paper

products from pine timber pulp50 and the pulp of the prickly pear, the scourge of the selectors

across Queensland. This latter scheme had the support of government, especially the Lands

Department which was eager to adopt just about any measure to advance the cause of closer

settlement. Tests proved the viability of such pulp for the manufacture of commercial paper

products such as cardboard, which was used, for example, to make butter boxes.51

8. Coaches, Wagons and Motor Vehicles (CWMV):

(This group includes the manufacture and repair of coaches, wagons, motors, motorcycles and

bicycles, motor body building and repairs, saddlery and harnessware, and spokes.)

In the CWMV group 159 factories were listed in 1914, but this number steadily decreased to

145 by 1917 and to 138 by 1919 (see Fig. 5.25). The motor body and vehicle building and

repair section overtook saddlery and harnessware operations, despite both declining in

number; the former decreased from eighty-three to fifty-eight, and the latter from fifty-one to

thirty-five between 1914 and 1919. The cycle, motor and bicycle manufacturers defied the

trend of the previous decade to increase in number from nineteen to thirty-seven over the

same period. Employment in the CWMV group continued its pre-war decline, falling from

1457 to a low of 1169 in 1916, and recovering slowly to 1283 by 1919.

49 ‘The Shortage of Paper and the Remedy’, PTJ, 2, 2 (19 February 1918), S354/Box1, NBAC; Printing Industry

Employees Union to Premier Ryan, 18 January 1918, PRE/A579, 691, QSA & ‘Paper Making In Australia’, Worker, 4 October 1917, p. 11.

50 ‘Paper Pulp - A New Industry’, DS, 23 April 1918, p. 5. 51 Prickly Pear Commission (Travelling) various correspondence with Lands Department, February and October 1915,

LAN/AK105, Batch 440, QSA; T.D. Chataway to Premier Denham, 25 February 1914, PRE/A453, 2145, QSA. Research had been conducted from 1913 on the suitability of prickly pear pulp for the manufacture of paper products.

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The average number of employees per factory for the entire group remained stable at around

9.2 for the period. Employment classifications do not directly correspond to factory

classifications but broadly speaking, in the coach, wagon, motor body, cycle, motors and

bicycle works employment fell from 893 in 1914 to a low of 775 in 1916, then recovered to

873 by 1919. The average in this group improved marginally from 8.7 to 9.2. In the saddlery

and harnessware group employment steadily decreased from 516 to 344 between 1914 and

1919, and the employee average also declined from 10.1 to 9.8. The CWMV group

experienced mixed fortunes during the war: the leather trades experienced hard times as

military orders were offset by shortages of raw materials and price controls. Indeed, one

political supporter of these trades claimed the government’s price controls were mostly to

blame for the high level of unemployment among the Master Saddlers.52 Other observers of

the trade noted that the loss of demand was due to the men serving overseas which meant that

fewer saddles were needed, and also suggested that the increased used of motor vehicles

underpinned the shift in importance between this trade and the motor vehicle firms.53

52 Bebbington, QPD, 121 (1915-16), p.1172. 53 ‘F&SR 1915-16', QPP, 3 (1916-17), p. 78.

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9. Furniture and Bedding (F&B):

(This group includes the manufacture of bedding and upholstery, furniture, cabinets, picture

frames, blinds, wicker and bamboo goods, brooms and brushware.)

In the furniture and bedding industries the positive trend in factory numbers which continued

throughout the war defied the overall trend toward stagnation or decline across the whole

sector. There were eighty-two factories in this group in 1914; this number had grown to

eighty-seven by 1917, and had moved on to ninety-two in 1919. By far the most numerous of

this group were the furniture and cabinet making works, which increased from sixty-two to

seventy-one (see Fig. 5.26). Next were broom and brush makers whose numbers remained

stable at nine throughout the period. Bedding and upholsterers also experienced positive

growth from three to six works. Picture framers numbered seven in 1914, but unlike others in

this group, their number had declined to five by 1919.

Employment in the group expanded marginally from 1171 in 1914 to 1213 by 1919, after a

low of 1155 in 1917. The lion’s share of this employment belonged to the furniture and

cabinet making industry, which remained relatively static at 1142 in 1914, fell to 1115 in

1917, and finally steadied at 1160 by 1919. In bedding and upholstery, the only other group

where employment data is recorded, employment increased from twenty-nine to fifty-three

over the period. The average number of employees per factory in the group was reduced

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marginally from 14.3 to 13.2 between 1914 and 1919. The difference in the employee average

between furniture and cabinet making, and bedding and upholstery making, is significant. The

former was the larger, even though its average declined from 18.4 to 16.3, while the latter

decreased from 9.6 to 8.8 between 1914 and 1919. This illustrates that, generally, the

furniture and cabinet making works were on a larger scale than the bedding and upholstery

section.

The conditions experienced in this group varied across the state, although it can be said that,

in general, conditions throughout most of Queensland were buoyant in the year prior to the

outbreak of war. During the war, however, conditions were unsettled, particularly in Brisbane,

because of alternating lack of demand and material and skilled labour shortages. Matters

improved during 1916-17 with good employment opportunities and high wages available in

Brisbane, while at the same time trade in Toowoomba was described as ‘dead’ by the District

Inspector of Factories and Shops. During 1917-1918 trade expanded and employment was

stable.54 One serious problem perceived by governments and those in the furniture trade, was

the problem associated with the competitive threat to white Australian furniture

manufacturers from ethnic Chinese furniture makers operating in Queensland. An amendment

to the Factories and Shops Act 1908 was passed in 1916 that forced all furniture made by

Chinese labour to be marked as such so that consumers could discriminate between articles of

furniture based upon the racial classification of the labour that produced such items.55 This

clearly racist action had a dramatic effect on the viability of furniture manufacturing

conducted by Chinese-Australians in Queensland, to a point that their livelihoods in these

trades were all but extinguished.56 In other aspects of the trade some progress was made. For

example, the brush and broom making industry bloomed from infancy as a direct result of

wartime shortages of imported items. This was one successful example of import substitution

occurring in Queensland.57

54 ‘F&SR 1913-14', QPP, 2 (1914), p. 43; ‘F&SR 1914-15', QPP, 3 (1915-16), pp. 803-5; ‘F&SR 1915-16', QPP, 3

(1916-17), pp. 72-3 & 79 & ‘F&SR 1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), p. 1349. 55 Theodore, QPD, 124 (1916-17), pp. 1176-1220 & 1437-40 & Fitzgerald, "Red Ted":, p. 83. Theodore, in moving the

amendment, was himself subject to a racial slur from William Barnes, MLA for Warwick. Barnes taunted Theodore over his Rumanian background, to which he angrily replied, “You [Barnes] are a contemptible cur! If you were a younger man, I would punch your head off.” Obviously Theodore could not see the contemptible nature of his own amendment.

56 ‘F&SR 1917-18', QPP, 1 (1918), p. 1349. 57 ‘F&SR 1919-20', QPP, 2 (1919-20), pp. 275-89.

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10. Heat, Light and Power (HLP):

(This group includes electric light and power generation, and gas works.)

In the power and energy generation industries there was an expansion in number of works

from twenty-six to stabilise at thirty-two from 1917 onwards (see Fig. 5.27). The number of

gasworks remained stable at sixteen, while there was growth in the number of electrical

generation plants from eight to fourteen by 1917. This expansion reflects the increasing

importance of electrical energy to domestic and industrial life. Indeed, the extension of

electric power to regional areas proved a boon to some manufacturers by providing them with

an efficient source of energy and by spurring new investment in productive technology and

processes.58 Employment in this group also witnessed a strong increase during the war, from

795 in 1914 to 897 in 1917, and to 1021 by 1919. The majority of employees in the

gasworks, and while numbers fell slightly from 526 in 1914 to a low of 504 by 1917, they had

recovered to 586 by 1919. The average number employed per factory in this group improved

slightly from 30.6 to 31.9. The employee averages in both electrical generation and gasworks

were, however, relatively stable, the latter increased steadily (32.9 to 36.6), while the former

increased only marginally (29.6 to 29.9) between 1914 and 1919.

58 ‘F&SR 1918-19', QPP, 2 (1919-20), p.277. This was the case for many manufacturing enterprises in the Ipswich

district.

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11. Specialised and Other (S&O):

(This group includes the manufacture of domestic and industrial chemicals, fertiliser, surgical

and scientific instruments, jewellery and timepieces, leather and rubber goods, toys,

umbrellas, soap and candles, musical instruments, and other.)

The number of factories in this mixed group fell from thirty to thirty-six, including sixteen to

seventeen manufacturing jewellers and electroplaters, six to seven scientific and surgical

instrument makers, and three chemical firms. Employment in this group defied pre-war trends

and steadily increased from 496 to 589 between 1914 and 1919 (see Fig. 5.28). Of these

employees, the most numerous were jewellers and electroplaters with 140 in 1914 and 146 by

1919, followed by chemicals manufacturers (72 and 107), miscellaneous leather goods (96 to

a peak of 139 in 1916, and 73 by 1919), and scientific and surgical instrument making, which

accounted for between 32 and 51 employees. The average number of employees per factory

for the group remained fairly stable at around 16.5, whereas within the group there was a wide

differential. The employee average ranged from 24 to 37.3 in leather works, 24 to 35.6 in

chemicals, 8.7 to 7.7 in jewellery and electroplating, to 5.3 to 7.3 in scientific and surgical

instrument making.

Manufacturing in the Political Economy

The relative marginalisation of the manufacturing sector in the political economy in

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Queensland, apparent in the decades prior to the war, continued during 1914 to 1919.

Nevertheless, some government interest in the sector was aroused by the economic

dislocations associated with the war. During the early years of the war, pre-existing issues of

protectionism and material support for local manufacturing came to the fore as the economic

impact of the war took hold in the domestic economy. Import restrictions, and goods and

materials shortages, stimulated debate about the need for Australian governments to take steps

to advance the scope and scale of manufacturing in Australia. Industrial self-sufficiency was

a common cry, as was the acknowledgement of unwarranted discrimination by consumers

against locally manufactured goods and their preference for imports. Concerns along these

lines were expressed by both employees and employers.59 However, elements of the

conservative press, mirroring the attitude of the Queensland government, believed aid to

manufacturers was a side issue to the real task of developing the state’s ‘natural’ industries.

The Courier made its position clear in a warning levelled at the reformist and interventionist

Ryan government, railing against state support for manufacturing.

[Locally manufactured goods], at two or three times the cost for which they can be made elsewhere should not be allowed to lead to the dissipation of out national energies, which can find, under a proper system of government, more than enough scope, for decades to come, in the profitable exploitation of the soil, the mine, and the forest. To that end we should frame our tariffs, arrange our railway system, both constructively and administratively, and regulate our industrialism.60

This statement of economic principle clearly illustrates the common feeling that held sway in

the political economy of Queensland in the first half of the twentieth century: the only schism

resulting from Labor’s proclivity for direct state involvement in economic activity. This

cleavage was especially apparent after the election of the Ryan Labor government in 1915 and

its subsequent penchant for state enterprise. Essentially Labor’s state enterprise program was

primarily directed towards mercantile and retail reforms through the provision of state

competition to the private sector. The greatest focus was levelled at increasing the supply of

consumer goods, decreasing consumer prices, and enhancing the viability of small-scale

family farms through produce marketing and processing ventures with various levels of

producer cooperative control or direct state ownership.

59 ‘A Self-supporting Commonwealth’, Worker, 26 August 1915, p. 6; ‘Support Local Industries’, Worker, 26 August

1915, p. 7; ‘Foreign Made Goods’, Worker, 4 November 1915, p. 5; ‘New Industries’, Worker, 11 November 1915, p. 16; ‘Australia's Importing Habit’, Worker, 16 December 1915, p. 7; Bundaberg Chamber of Commerce to Premier Ryan, 24 August 1915, PRE/A499, 9938, QSA; BCCAR, 1915-16, pp. 21 & 33, JOL..

60 ‘The paramount economic need’, (ed) Courier, 23 October 1915, p. 4.

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A detailed examination of the evolution and operations of the state enterprises need not be

entered into here as this issue is comprehensively presented in several historical studies.61 It is

worth noting, however, that in 1919 there were fifteen types of state enterprises operating in

Queensland (not including the Railways Department). They were the State Pastoral Stations,

Farms, Butchers’ Shops, Meatworks, Sawmills, Coal Mines, Batteries, Railway Refreshment

Rooms, Sugar Mills, Arsenic Works, Joinery, Cannery, Hotel, Fish Supply, Produce Agency,

and later the proposed State Iron and Steel Works.62 Geographically the state enterprises were

well dispersed across the state with thirty-seven of the ninety-two state enterprises located in

central and north Queensland. Of the total number, fifteen were state stations, the majority of

which were located in the north of the state. Of the ninety-two state enterprises, only eight can

be said to have been directly involved in manufacturing: the four state sawmills (Brisbane,

Taromeo, Imbil, and Innisfail), the joinery (Woolloongabba)63 and cannery (Bulimba)64,

meatworks (Charleville), and the arsenic works (Jibbinbar near Stanthorpe).65 The butchers’

shops were the most numerous, followed by the refreshment rooms, and state stations.66

Clearly, the emphasis of the state enterprises was to secure stable markets for primary

producers and stability of supply and price for consumers.

61 For analysis of the state enterprises in Queensland see Murphy, The Establishment of State Enterprises in

Queensland, 1915-1918; D.J. Murphy, T.J. Ryan: A Political Biography (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1990); R. Fitzgerald & H. Thornton, Labor in Queensland: From the 1880s to 1988 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1989); & Fitzgerald, "Red Ted".

62 ‘Report of the Commissioner of the State Trade Department on State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th of June 1919', QPP, 4 (1919-20), pp. 979-80.

63 The state joinery, a large and expansive works, was established in 1918 on 9.5 acres at Woolloongabba and was operated by the Department of Agriculture. ‘State Workshops’, DS, 19 April 1918.

64 For details on the State Cannery see: ‘State Politics - State Cannery’, DS, 3 September 1919 and ‘Report of the Commissioner of the State Trade Department on State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th June 1920', QPP, 2 (1920), pp. 580-1; BCCAR, 1917-18, p. 24; A.H. Austin, Commissioner for the Queensland State Trade Office to the Under Secretary of Lands, 12 February 1920, LAN/AK115, Batch 637, QSA; ‘State Cannery’, DS, 21 January 1919; ‘State Cannery’, DS, 12 April 1918; DS, 25 May 1918; DS, 17 August 1918; ‘Canning Factory’, DS, 18 September 1918; ‘State Cannery’, DS, 24 October 1918; ‘Report of the Commissioner of the State Trade Department on State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th June 1920', QPP, 2 (1930), p. 82. & ‘Report of the Auditor-General upon the Accounts of the State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th June 1930', QPP, 2 (1930), pp. 104-5. The Cannery was sold for £31,690. Fitzgerald & Thornton, Labor in Queensland, pp. 86-7.

65 The manufacture of arsenic acid by the government was first proposed in mid-1915 and the works finally opened on 25 August 1919. The exact date of termination of activity at the State Arsenic Mine and Works has not been ascertained, the last mention of it in the Auditor-General’s Reports was for the year 1922-23. It was noted in Parliament, however, that arsenic acid was manufactured at Wallangarra (on the QLD/NSW boarder) as late as 1929, which suggests that the works may have been relocated to Wallangarra from the mine at Jibbinbar. By 1923 almost £70,000 had been expended on the mine and works by the Government, having returned £20,000 on that investment since 1919. ‘State Arsenic’, DS, 30 August 1919; ‘Report of the Auditor-General on the Accounts of the State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th June 1923', QPP, 2 (1923), pp.1162-4. & J. Larcome to Premier McCormack, 3 May 1929, PRE/A963, 2870, QSA. For details of the operations of the State Arsenic Works see P. O'C. Russell & Co. Ltd, Brisbane, to Lands Department, 29 July 1914, LAN/AK 115, Batch 618, QSA; W.G. Graham to Chairman Board of Advice on Prickly-Pear Destruction, 13 July 1915, LAN/AK115, Batch 618, QSA; Under-Secretary of Lands to Walter Austin, Bollon, 8 January 1921, MIN/G174, Batch 151, QSA & QPD, 136 (1920), p.170; & Dr H.I. Jensen to Under-Secretary of Mines, ‘Report on the Manufacture of Arsenic Acid by the Government Arsenic Works, 1918', MIN/1918, Bundle A/8714, QSA.

66 ‘Map of Queensland showing the location of the Various State Enterprises - 1919', in ‘Report of the Commissioner of the State Trade Department on State Enterprises for the Year Ended 30th of June 1919', QPP, 4 (1919-20), p. 1014.

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The Queensland Chamber of Manufacturers (QCM) also became increasingly active in

political economic affairs during the war. The QCM engaged in national conventions of the

Chambers of Manufactures in Perth (1914) and Melbourne (1918), and hosted successful

Australian Manufacturers Week promotions.67 Moreover, the QCM was especially active in

lobbying the Denham and Ryan governments, as an individual chamber and in concert with

other chambers, such as the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce (BCC), and through it affiliation

with the Queensland Employers’ Federation (QEF), over various legislative measures. The

reformist zeal of the Ryan government, particularly in the area of industrial legislation, such

as the Industrial Arbitration Act, Workmens Compensation Act and the Trade Union Act, kept

the officers of the QCM busy drafting proposed amendments to protect their rights as

employers.68 Aside from the large number of industrial relations reforms, the Ryan

government’s proposal to establish an integrated state-owned iron and steel works caught the

attention of the QCM and all the other Queensland employer associations.

A State Iron and Steel Industry for Queensland?

Labor’s greatest and most significant effort to foster manufacturing in Queensland came in the

form of T.J. Ryan’s proposal to establish a state iron and steel industry. World War I brought

to a head the recurring issue of whether or not to establish an iron and steel industry in

Queensland. The first large-scale integrated iron and steel works in Australia was established

by the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd. at Port Waratah in Newcastle in 1915.69 The

successful establishment of the BHP steelworks arose from a prolonged drive by the Labor

party in New South Wales to promote a scheme to establish a state-owned and operated iron

and steelworks, which dated back to the first decade of the twentieth century. The intricacies

67 ‘Manufacturers’ and ‘Manufacturers Week’, DS, 27 May 1914 & ‘The Manufacturers’ Conference’, Courier, 10

August 1918. 68 Queensland Chamber of Manufactures to Premier Denham, 30 November 1914, PRE/A478, 12004, QSA; ‘Chamber

of Manufactures’, DS, 7 August 1915; QEF Minutes of Meetings, 1915, various, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL; BCCAR, 1917-18, p. 24, JOL; QEF Minutes of Meetings, 15 February 1917; 26 June 1917; 19 July 1917 & 29 May 1918, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL.

69 Construction of the BHP Company’s Newcastle steelworks began in January 1913 and the No. 1 Blast Furnace was ‘blown in’ during March 1915. The works was officially opened on 2 June 1913. Sadly, a decision has been made by BHP in 1997 that steel making at the Newcastle works is to cease by the end of 1999. This decision will bring to an end 85 years of steelmaking at Newcastle. J.C. Docherty, Newcastle: The Making of an Industrial City (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1983), p. 34. & Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd, B.H.P. 75 Years: Eighteen Hundred and Eighty-Five, Nineteen Hundred and Sixty (Melbourne: BHP/Herald Gravure Printers, 1960), p. 18.

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of this political process need not be addressed here,70 but suffice to say that the avowedly

reformist McGowen Labor government, which in 1910 was the first Labor administration

elected in New South Wales, did not possess the fiscal means to institute its grand scheme

which had been legitimised in the recommendations of the 1911 Iron and Steel Industry Royal

Commission.71 Guilaume Delprat, the dynamic General Manager of BHP, exploited the

McGowen government’s dilemma, and by convincing his board of directors to provide the

capital to establish an iron and steelworks, Delprat was able to exploit his company’s

considerable iron ore reserves at Iron Knob in South Australia.72

In Queensland, similar convictions about the establishment of an iron and steel works, both

private and state-owned, had arisen from time to time since the turn of the century. An early

scheme involved a private syndicate comprising the London and Globe Company (UK) and

the Australian pastoral company Dalgety and Company, of Melbourne. The scheme, proposed

in early 1900, involved the establishment of an ironworks in Queensland where coal would be

used to manufacture coke for iron making, and also for export to a nickel and copper smelter

in New Caledonia. From New Caledonia iron ore would be shipped back and used in the blast

furnace of the Queensland works, a reciprocal trading arrangement of benefit to both projects.

Unfortunately, due in part to a lack of government support, the scheme was postponed and

eventually abandoned.73 Another scheme for a private iron works in Maryborough had also

been floated and abandoned prior to 1906.74

The issue of establishing a state-owned iron and steel works surfaced just after federation. In

1902, Prime Minister Alfred Deakin had written to Premier Philp inquiring whether his

government would utilise the provisions of the proposed Commonwealth Manufactures

Encouragement Bill to help establish a state-owned iron and steel industry. Philp replied that

his government had no intention whatsoever of entering the iron trade. The issue, as far as the

70 For details on the New South Wales scheme see: David Cameron, Towards the Wage-Earners' Welfare State? - The

Establishment of the New South Wales State Government Dockyard and Engineering Works, Walsh Island, Newcastle, 1910-1918: An Industrial, Political and Labour History, B.A. Hons., University of Newcastle, 1994, pp. 10-2 & 34-6. & David Cameron, '"On an island in the River": The establishment of the Walsh Island Dockyard & Engineering Works, Newcastle, 1910-1919', HRJLIH, 4, (1998), pp. 4-15.

71 ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the Iron & Steel Industry in New South Wales: Together with a copy of Commission & Evidence, 31 October 1911', NSWPP, 78, 4 (1911-12).

72 For an account of Delprat’s triumph in establishing the Newcastle steelworks see A. Trengove, ‘What's Good for Australia.!’: The Story of B.H.P (Stanmore: Cassell Australia, 1975), pp. 86-103.

73 ‘London Letter’, Courier, 10 February 1900, p. 4 & 3 March 1900, p. 10. 74 Mitchell, QPD, 98 (1906), p. 1225.

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Philp government was concerned, ended there.75 In 1903, a Royal Commission was

established to investigate the possible usefulness of the proposed Commonwealth Bill. The

object of the Bill, which was later enacted as the Manufactures Encouragement Act 1908, was

to enable the Commonwealth to offer some form of financial bonus or bounty to encourage

the establishment of a state-owned Australian iron industry. The Iron Bonus Commission

heard evidence in Queensland and found that considerable reserves of iron ore and coal were

available there.76 From this inquiry there were several calls for the establishment of a state

iron and steel works including petitions from the residents of Charters Towers and Bowen,

during 1904 and 1905,77 and from the Rockhampton Chamber of Commerce in 1906.78 In

November 1904, and again in October 1906, Kenneth Grant, MLA for Rockhampton, moved

in the Queensland parliament that the government establish a state-owned iron and steel

works in either the Gladstone or Broadmount (Rockhampton) districts. Grant’s position was

based on much the same commercial assumptions as those of the Globe and Dalgety scheme:

cheaper iron rails and lower long-term public debt. Interestingly, there was general political

agreement that an iron and steel works would be beneficial to the state’s economic progress,

albeit if only to advance the government’s ability to procure iron rails more cheaply and

lessen the burden of the state in rural railway development. While Grant, and a few others,

saw the potential for greater industrialisation and resource development, the conservative-

dominated and anti-socialist parliament was only willing to offer some form of bounty to a

private concern and would not entertain a state-owned scheme.79

The issue simmered in the background of political life in Queensland and was briefly

resurrected by the Labor opposition in 1912 in response to the moves that were afoot in New

South Wales.80 The economic difficulties associated with the war ignited concerns for

industrial self-sufficiency among many Queenslanders, even within the hearts and minds of

the predominantly ruralist Labor party. It became patently obvious to Queensland’s

politicians that the state’s reliance on imported iron and steel from the United Kingdom,

75 Chief Secretary’s Department, memo on correspondence between Prime Minister Deakin, Premier Philp, and others, July 1902, PRE/A239, 6617, QSA.

76 ‘Mines 1903', QPP, 1 (1904), p. 1162. & ‘Iron Bonus Commission’, BC, 2 May 1903, p. 10. 77 Burrows, QPD, 95 (1905), p. 475 & Petitions from the residents of the townships of Bowen and Charters Towers,

PRE/A239, 6617, QSA. The Bowen petition, presented on 10 April 1905, was signed by forty-six people, the Charters Towers petition, presented on 15 December 1904, carries the signatures of 1742 of its 5500 citizens. The occupations of the petitioners indicate that they represented the broadest possible cross section of their respective communities of that time.

78 Rockhampton Chamber of Commerce to Premier Kidston, 27 December 1906, PRE/A239, 6617, QSA. 79 Grant, QPD, 98 (1906), pp. 1216-28 & 1341-5. 80 Fihelly, QPD, 113 (1912), p.2268.

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Germany and the United States was a strategic weakness, and not only in time of war.

Increasing demand for iron products, such as iron rails, iron bridge girders, roofing iron, and

fencing materials, meant that a ready, expanding and viable market for locally manufactured

iron and steel products existed. Moreover, the spectre of post-war development would mean

heavy government and private expenditure and an equally heavy public debt to finance such

development. With these issues in mind the Ryan government in June 1917 appointed a Royal

Commission to ‘Inquire into the Advisableness of Establishing State Iron and Steel Works in

the State Of Queensland’. The Commission, dominated by Labor MLAs and presided over by

William Gillies (and later James Stopford), was also instructed to assess all aspects of the

state’s iron ore and coal reserves, select the most suitable site for a central works, and provide

an estimate of the cost of establishing these works.81

In their progress report of August 1917 the Commissioners noted that much research had to

be undertaken with regard to the accurate assessment of the state’s raw materials suitable for

iron and steel making. Moreover, these technical matters were a precursor to any decision as

to where such a works might be most suitably located. This research task was seconded to the

officers of the Mines and Geological Survey Departments. The Commission, however, was

able to report that ‘all the essentials are in this State for the successful manufacture of pig

iron’ and recommended that ‘a complete plant for the manufacture of pig iron can be

established at a cost not exceeding £5,000’. This plant was to be a pilot works which would

process iron ore from around Queensland in order to assess, in a practical manner, the

suitability and properties of the various ores and coking coals in order to find that most

‘suitable for smelting and converting [to] steel’. Furthermore, the Commission found that

market conditions, and those expected to prevail after the war, would make the manufacture

of pig iron in Queensland a viable proposition.82

Although iron smelting had already been successfully conducted at a works in Maryborough

in mid-1917,83 the Commission directed that exhaustive tests be conducted by the Mines

Department at the Ipswich Government Railway Workshops where a small makeshift blast

81 ‘Report of the Royal Commission on the State Iron and Steel Works, 1918: Includes Minutes of Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendices’ [RCSI&SW], QPP, 2 (1918), pp.1815-99. The Commissioners involved were William Gillies, MLA Eacham, Chair, John Gilday, MLA Ithaca, James Stopford, MLA Mt Morgan, John Payne, MLA Mitchell, James Larcombe, MLA, Keppel, and John T. H. Bird as Secretary. They were succeeded by Stopford as Chair, Gilday, Payne, Charles Collins, MLA Bowen and Henry Ryan, MLA Cook.

82 ‘Progress Report of the State Iron and Steel Works Royal Commission [RCSI&SW, 1917], 11 August 1917', QPP, 2 (1918), pp. 1825-6.

83 ‘The Iron Industry’, Courier, 17 July 1917.

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furnace was erected. These tests, in lieu of establishing a pilot works, proved the suitability of

several types of iron ore sourced in Queensland for smelting into pig iron and the economic

viability of an operation on commercial lines. From these tests, and from the evidence of

many experts, including geologists, engineers and even BHP’s Guilame Delprat, the

Commissioners recommended that the government establish, in the first instance, a pig iron

works utilising a modern blast furnace with a capacity of 100-150 tons of ore per day, and

associated coke ovens at a total cost of between £100,000 and £150,000 (depending upon the

capacity of the blast furnace). It was envisaged that at a later date the works could be

extended, with the addition of open hearth furnaces and rolling mills, to the production of iron

rails and steel.84 Queensland state geologist E.C. Saint-Smith reported that such a plant could

manufacture pig iron at a cost of £4 5s per ton, which meant that the proposition was more

than economically viable and politically justifiable since the purchase price of pig iron at that

time was between £10 and £12 per ton.85 Furthermore, the Commissioners recommended:

That a thoroughly qualified expert, with business and administrative ability, trained in metallurgical science and engineering, and having a practical knowledge of modern iron and steel works, be appointed to the position of General Manager of the works, and, as such, be empowered to choose the most suitable site on which the plant should be erected.86

The General Manager was also to investigate

... (a) The advisableness of establishing State Steel Manufacturing Works in Queensland. (b) The cost of such works and capacity. (c) Existing and potential markets in Queensland for iron and steel. (d) The possibility of a market for export beyond the State.87

The Commissioners therefore concluded:

[We] have only to add that Mr. Delprat, a man with an international reputation and, in his position as General Manager of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company, ... advises the Government to start straight away with the manufacture of iron and steel in Queensland, in order to take advantage of the high prices ruling at the present time. He generously offered to help the venture in every way and agreed to enter into a contract with the Queensland Government for the supply of iron ore from Iron Knob until such time as Queensland could rely on her own resources.88

84 ‘Progress Report of the RCSI&SW, 1917’, QPP, 2 (1918), pp. 1827-8. 85 Ibid., p. 1832. 86 Ibid., p. 1833. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

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The nominally socialist Labor-dominated Commission therefore had the backing and

legitimacy of one of Australia’s greatest industrial capitalists of the time. Delprat, of course,

knew that his company did not have the resources to establish a second works of its own. He

was, nonetheless, more inclined to compete against a presumably more inefficient state works

than some other more aggressive and experienced competitor from Britain or the United

States. In any event, Delprat could secure good profits for his company through the sale of

BHP iron ore to the state iron works.89 Delprat’s support was not matched by some sections of

Queensland’s business community. The QEF, for example, not only objected to the state

ownership of such a works but argued that demand for iron and steel products was already

well provided for, and that establishing an iron works in the prevailing economic

circumstances was ‘inappropriate’. The Ironworks Bill was far too broad in its scope, and if

any action was to be taken it should be by way of bounty to attract private investment.90 This

project, they feared, was but the first great step towards the Armageddon of industrial

socialism.

Ryan, the chief instigator of the scheme, sponsored the State Iron and Steel Works Bill 1917

which was rejected the Legislative Council in 1917, and then reintroduced in 1918. However,

securing passage of the Steelworks Bill was no longer required after the State Enterprises Act

1918 was passed; the government did not now require a specific Act to establish the

steelworks. The project came under the control of the Public Works Commission and the

Mines Department.91 In late 1918 the Public Works Commission appointed John William

Brophy, from a field of twenty-four applicants,92 as the General Manager of the State Iron

and Steel Works. Brophy’s appointment was something of a coup as he was lured from his

post as chief mechanical engineer at the BHP Newcastle steelworks.93 Brophy’s appointment

secured for the Queensland government much crucial commercial information on the

processes and production costs that applied at the Newcastle steelworks. Indeed, surviving

documents show that Brophy did provide sensitive commercial information, which he noted

must be kept confidential, of the type that Delprat had flatly refused to provide to the Royal

89 Ibid. 90 ‘Minutes of Meetings’, QEF, 22 October 1916, Film 0090, V2/C1, 1915-1928, JOL. 91 C.A. Bernays, Queensland Politics During Sixty (1859-1919) Years (Brisbane: Queensland Government Printer,

1919), p. 503. 92 Under-Secretary of Mines to Applicants, 28 November 1918, MIN/G158, 6414-38, QSA The applicants came from

all states of Australia. 93 ‘World of Labour’ , Worker, 5 December 1918, p. 8 & Under-Secretary of Mines to the Crown Solicitor, 2

December 1918, MIN/G158, 6446, QSA. Brophy, a 49 year old Canadian with experience in steel making in Canada, USA, and

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Commission on grounds of commercial secrecy.94 This information was invaluable in

planning the most viable operating conditions and gave the proposed state works a

competitive advantage.95

Brophy, ably assisted by Saint-Smith, set to an exhaustive process of site selection. Saint-

Smith had undertaken a preliminary study of possible sites in mid-1917, and recommended

that Ipswich, being close to excellent coal supplies, would be the most suitable site, if the

project was to be limited to the production of pig iron. However, he noted that if the works

was to be an integrated iron and steel works, which in turn would attract other iron and steel

manufacturing such as shipbuilding, then a site on the coast was crucial. Saint-Smith drew up

a short list including Pinkenba (on the northern bank of the Brisbane River), Gladstone

harbour, Rockhampton, and Urangan on Hervey Bay. Saint-Smith opted for Urangan, citing

the close proximity of coking coal at the Burrum coalfields and iron ore at Mt Biggenden, the

engineering infrastructure at Maryborough, and that the site could be developed into a fine sea

port.96 Brophy thought Saint-Smith’s selection was justifiable, given his brief and the fact

that he had no real experience in the practicalities of the business of iron and steel making.

Together they inspected seventeen possible sites: four in Ipswich, three in the Burrum district

(Wide Bay), two in Gladstone and Townsville, and one each in Cairns, Bowen, Broadmount

(Rockhampton), Aldershot (Maryborough), Urangan, and Bulimba (Brisbane).97 Brophy

rejected Saint-Smith’s Urangan site, not because it was unsuitable, indeed it was, but because

he calculated it would be much cheaper and more efficient to utilise the superior site at

Bulimba.98

Brophy came to the conclusion that the Bulimba site was the most suitable for several

practical, commercial and administrative reasons. The site occupied 1.6 km of river frontage

India, was appointed general manager on a salary of £1500 per annum.

94 Record of evidence given by Guilaume Daniel Delprat, General Manager of the Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd., at Newcastle Wed 23 January 1918, in ‘Report of the RCSI&SW, 1918’, QPP, 2 (1918), p. 1862.

95 Confidential memo from J.W. Brophy to A.J. Jones Minister for Mines, 5 June 1919, Department of the Premier & Cabinet, Papers on the Establishment of Iron & Steel Works in Queensland (1918-1923) [Iron & Steel Works Papers], Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 58-57. Brophy provided the government copies of balance sheets that showed the actual costs of iron production at the BHP works and advised Jones that he had obtained them through a ‘secret source’ and that this information was to be kept confidential.

96 ‘Report on possible sites for erection of State Iron Smelting Works by E.C. Saint-Smith to Chief Government Geologist, 26 October 1917' [Iron Works Site Report, 1917], in ‘Report of the RCSI&SW, 1918’, QPP, 2 (1918), p.1879.

97 ‘Memo for the Honourable A.J. Jones, M.L.C., Minister for Mines, Brisbane, Report on Selection of Works Site - March 1919’, Department of the Premier & Cabinet, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 138-106.

98 ‘Report on Works Site - 1919’, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 131.

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on the southern bank of the Brisbane River (directly opposite the Royal Queensland Golf

Club), from near the present day Gateway Bridge westwards towards the Cairnscross graving

dock, extending back to Lytton Road and taking in part of the suburbs of Queensport and

Colmslie. This position offered excellent wharfage with plenty of space for loading and

discharging, and would have required a minimum of dredging. Supplies of iron ore would be

obtained from a combination of ore available at Biggenden (340 km by rail or sea), north

Queensland, and Yampi Sound in north Western Australia, and possibly from New Caledonia

(the source of the ore for the Globe and Dalgety scheme in 1900). Steaming and coking coal

was readily available from the Ipswich, Darling Downs, Burrum, central Queensland, and

Bowen fields. Fluxes (limestone, dolomite, magnesite) and other necessary mineral additives

and conditioners (nickel, manganese, phosphorus, sulphur, chromium) could be all obtained

in south-east, central and north Queensland. The critical issue of sufficient suitable water

supplies, as works of this nature required huge quantities of water, did not pose a problem at

Bulimba as it did at most of the other sites. Moreover, the Brisbane site offered all the

necessary technical, engineering, and utilities infrastructure, including a large pool of suitable

labour. While observing the political nature of this enterprise, Brophy cleverly stressed the

close proximity of the works to the seat of government, noting that the Minister responsible

would be in close communication with the General Manager and the works.99 In a later report

Brophy provided an estimate of the cost of erecting a blast furnace, coke ovens, boilers,

powerhouse, a wharf at Bulimba, and ore bins at Biggenden, would have been £651,430. To

this would have to be added the cost of the bloom and rail rolling mills, open hearth furnaces,

and locomotives (these items totalled £1,240,000), so that it is estimated that the Bulimba

works would have cost approximately £1.9 million in 1919-20.100

Brophy spent 1919 investigating sites, working up plans and layouts, calculating production

and supply requirements, and transport and production estimates. The scale of his endeavours

is recorded in the varied and complex technical documents that survive. The government had

a change in leadership on 20 October 1919, after Ryan left the state parliament to contest a

federal seat in New South Wales.101 Theodore became Queensland premier and turned some

of his attention to establishing the iron and steel works. On 18 February 1920, Theodore

announced to the parliament that the government had decided to locate the state works at

99 Ibid., Folios 109-106. 100 Ibid., J.W. Brophy to A.J. Jones Minister for Mines, 10 November 1919, Folios 147-146. 101 Tragically Ryan was to die in Barcaldine, possibly of pneumonia, while campaigning during a 1921 by-election in

the Queensland federal seat of Maranoa. Murphy, T. J. Ryan, pp. 513-15.

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Bowen in north Queensland. It was clear that he and his Cabinet saw fit to ignore Brophy’s

expert commercial advice. Headlines in the press envisaged that the small coastal community

was set to ‘boom’ and would become a great industrial city.102 Many more articles would

follow; some were in favour, others were against the scheme, with the latter mainly objecting

to state ownership.103 At least one conservative MLA might have got wind of the disparity

between Brophy’s recommendation and Theodore’s decision as he refused requests from the

opposition to publish Brophy’s report.104 Theodore made his announcement just prior to his

ill-fated trip to England to secure loans for his public works programs, including £2.5 million

to establish the steelworks.105 What Brophy privately thought of the government overturning

his recommendation remains a mystery, but what is certain is that he did not believe that the

Bowen site was among the most suitable for the project.

Brophy had reported on the Bowen site in 1919. The site was located on the shores of Port

Denison Bay approximately 6.5 km south of the Bowen township near Mt Bramston. This site

included the location where the Mines Department intended to erect a coal-loading jetty to

service the Bowen coalfields. The location of the excellent coking coals available on the

Bowen coalfields was also a key consideration for selection of the site.106 The location for the

works was geographically suitable, although, the blast furnace would be located on reclaimed

land. Indeed, an area of up to 1.6 km of the harbour frontage from the high water mark would

have to be reclaimed. A breakwater also would have had to be constructed from the south-

west end of Stone Island. These matters did not really affect the practical operations of the

works but did add considerably to the costs and time frame of establishing the works. The

closest source of iron ore was located almost 1000 km to the west near Cloncurry, while

102 ‘Bowen to Boom’, DS, 19 February 1920 & ‘Iron and Steel’, Daily Mail, 19 February 1920. 103 ‘State Ironworks Scheme’, Courier, 2 November 1920; ‘Iron & Steel’, Daily Mail, 22 November 1920; ‘Those

Steel Works’, Courier, 23 November 1920 & Collins, QPD, 136 (1920), p. 84. 104 Corser, QPD, 136 (1920), p. 133. 105 ‘State Steelworks’ (ed), Daily Mail, 19 February 1920, p. 5. 106 After presenting a seminar paper on Queensland’s economic development to the History Department of the

University of Queensland on 7 May 1998, Emeritus Professor Raymond Wiltshire, mining engineer and historian, expressed the view that the Bowen site was superior to the Bulimba location. Professor Wiltshire argued this was so because a higher quality and quantity of coking coal was available on the Bowen coalfields than existed close to Brisbane. Professor Wiltshire is an acknowledged expert on coal mining in Queensland and his point is a valid one. My contention with regard to the superiority of the Bulimba site, however, is based upon contemporary opinion and documentary evidence. In the period 1917 to the early 1920s, officers of the Mines Department, the government geologists Jackson and Saint-Smith, and the General Manager of the State Iron and Steel Works, J.W. Brophy, all reported that the Ipswich coalfields had proven supplies of coking coals suitable for iron and steel making, and the estimates of production costs of the proposed works were calculated on that belief. For confirmation of this see for example: Saint-Smith, ‘Iron Works Site Report, 1917', in ‘Report of the RCSI&SW, 1918’, QPP, 2 (1918), p.1879; Report by J. W. Brophy, Manager of the State Iron & Steel Works, to A. J. Jones, Minister for Mines, 25 April 1919, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 97-100. & Memos from Brophy to Jones, Minister for Mines, Summary of Production Costs at Several Sites in Queensland, 13 January 1920, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1,

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plentiful quality coal was available at the nearby Bowen coalfields, and all the fluxes and

other mineral additives could be obtained in north Queensland. An adequate water supply

was, however, a bigger problem; an expensive dam would have to constructed on the Don

River and water pumped six kilometres to the works. Finally, the Bowen township did not

provide anything like the support infrastructure that was available in Brisbane.107

The Bowen site was, however, inferior to alternative sites at Urangan (Hervey Bay) and

Bulimba (Brisbane),108 and its selection, against the advice of the appointed expert John W.

Brophy, was a clear demonstration of the rural decentralist bias and political expediency of a

Labor Cabinet dominated by north Queensland MLAs. E.G. Theodore, William McCormack

and Charles Collins made no secret of their collective desire to promote northern

development, particularly if this meant avoiding the greater centralisation of manufacturing

production, urbanisation and industrialisation in Brisbane.109 Moreover, there could have been

a significant link between Theodore’s long-held dream to establish a new Australian state in

north Queensland, and his desire to establish a heavy industrial base in the north.110 Whatever

the reason, the Cabinet’s decision cannot be justified on economic or commercial grounds, as

the Bowen works would have cost about £500,000 more than locating the works in

Brisbane.111 The Labor Cabinet was clearly prepared to pay a premium of at least 25 per cent

for the pleasure, and perceived political gain, of locating the works in north Queensland. This

cost did not include the considerable expenditure on harbour works and improvements that

would have run into many tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of pounds. This is not to say

that a works at Bowen would have been a failure. Indeed, Brophy estimated that, compared to

the production costs of pig iron at the BHP works, a ton of pig iron could be smelted in

Folios, 70-80.

107 ‘Report on Works Site - 1919’, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 124-122. The writer visited the site in December 1996 and local information on the exact location of site supplied by J.R. (Bob) Porter. The site is today called Gordon Beach at the foot of Mt Bramston, to the east and generally parallel with the Bruce highway. J.R. Porter, telephone conversation with author, 28 December 1996.

108 For details on the merits or otherwise of these sites see: Saint-Smith, ‘Iron Works Site Report, 1917', in ‘Report of the RCSI&SW, 1918’, QPP, 2 (1918), pp.1878-9; Report by J.W. Brophy, Manager of the State Iron & Steel Works, to A.J. Jones, Minister for Mines, 25 April 1919, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 97-100; J. W. Brophy, Memo and Report on the selection of a site for the establishment of a State Iron and Steel Works for Queensland for A.J. Jones, Minister for Mines, March 1919, Iron & Steelworks Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, ‘Bulimba Site’, Folios 106-9; ‘Urangan Site’, Folio 111; ‘Bowen Site’, Folios 122-4. & ‘Infrastructure and Transport’, Folios 133-5; & Memos from Brophy to Jones, Minister for Mines, Summary of Production Costs at Several Sites in Queensland, 13 January 1920, Iron & Steel Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios, 70-80.

109 Fitzgerald, "Red Ted", pp. 162-3. & I. Young, Theodore: His Life and Times (Sydney: Alpha Books, 1971), p. 41. 110 Fitzgerald, “Red Ted”, p. 161. 111 J.W. Brophy to Premier Theodore, 23 December 1920, ‘Report on Works Site - 1919’, Iron & Steel Works

Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folios 212-210.

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Queensland at a cost of £1 6s 5d less than the BHP iron.112 Nevertheless, on an objective

commercial basis the Bulimba site was clearly the most economically viable location for an

iron and steel works in Queensland.

By early 1920 all was in readiness: costings were done, tests completed, plans drawn up, the

site selected, tenders sought, and the political will evident; all that was required was finance.

As will be explained in some detail in Chapter 6, Theodore was unsuccessful in his trip to

secure loans in London, owing to a loans embargo that was applied to the Queensland

government in retaliation for the threat of increased pastoral rents under the Lands Act

Amendment Act 1920. Brophy continued in his role as General Manager of the State Iron and

Steel Works, drawing the huge salary of £1500 per annum until at least late 1922, even

though he had no works to manage.113 Despite various attempts to secure finance from other

capital markets and private sources,114 funding for the state steelworks was never secured and

subsequently the scheme was eventually abandoned in July 1923. Brophy took up another

public service position, and the whole affair cost the Queensland treasury £20,000. The only

concrete result of the whole exercise, in terms of industrial infrastructure, was the eventual

construction of a coke ovens battery at Bowen to supply the Mount Isa Mines smelters with

coke.115

This was a rather unfortunate fate for the only substantial attempt by a Queensland

government to encourage through direct action the establishment of a heavy industrial base,

and by association significantly expand manufacturing in Queensland. Ryan never lived to see

his project fail. He died of pneumonia at Barcaldine in August 1921. It would have been a

bitter blow to him for as one of Ryan’s contemporaries claimed the steelworks project ‘was

the State enterprise above all others that Ryan believed in and hoped to see a success’.

Moreover, D.J. Murphy concludes in his 1965 thesis that the steelworks, ‘had it eventuated,

112 ‘Tables - Comparison Cost of Producing One Ton of Pig Iron’, in ‘Report on Works Site - 1919’, Iron & Steel

Works Papers, Batch 291 - Part 1, Folio 53. One ton of BHP pig iron cost £4 11s 8d to produce while Brophy estimated the same using Biggenden iron ore would cost only £3 15s 3d.

113 30 August 1921, QPD, 137 (1921), p. 356. & 19 July 1922, QPD, 139 (1922), p. 341. Brophy’s contract did not expire until 31 December 1924.

114 Correspondence between S.E. Green and Premier Theodore, 19 April 1921 to 18 November 1921, PRE/A699, 6138, QSA. Brokers had attempted to obtain finance through large manufacturing and engineering companies in the United Kingdom, including Armstrong, Whitworth and Company, to finance and construct the steelworks. London financiers were aware of this tactic, a situation that served only to further alienate the Theodore government from the ‘City’.

115 ‘The Steel Works: Proposal Abandoned’, Courier, 14 July 1923, p. 7. & R.L. Whitmore, Coal in Queensland: From Federation to the Twenties 1900 to 1925 (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1991), p. 11.

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would have been the most dominating and greatest achievement of Ryan’s Premiership’.116 If

the state steelworks was a victim of this financial crisis, so too were the embryonic plans of

the Theodore government to assist the development of Queensland’s secondary industries.

However, the level of Labor’s commitment to industrial development must not overstated.

The agrarian development ethos would have remained intact regardless of the success or

otherwise of a steel industry in Queensland. Indeed, during the 1920s the Labor government

held fast to the electoral certainties of supporting the rural vote and the manufacturing sector

was again largely left to fend for itself. Queensland’s economy began to slide into depression

from 1927, so that production was pared back prior to the onset of the Great Depression of the

early 1930s, the impact of which was not felt as severely as it was in the more heavily

industrialised states.117 What is historically significant, however, is that the Labor government

was moving towards state support for and involvement in the secondary industries sector from

late in its first term in office. The die was cast in the loans crisis of the early 1920s: the

opportunity of heavy industrialisation was lost, and the primacy of rural development would

retain its hegemony in the political economy until the late 1950s.

116 Murphy, The Establishment of State Enterprises in Queensland 1915-18, p. 66. 117 B.J. Costar, 'The Great Depression: Was Queensland Different?', LH, 26, (1974), pp. 32-48 & B.J. Costar, Labor,

Politics and Unemployment: Queensland During the Great Depression, Ph.D., University of Queensland, 1981.

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Conclusion

The economic difficulties associated with World War I had a significant impact on the

viability and structural integrity of Queensland’s manufacturing sector. Wartime conditions

curtailed the strong growth trend in manufacturing activity that was evident in the years

before the war. Primary processing and metals smelting, the backbone of Queensland’s

secondary industries, were severely affected by the volatility of world commodity markets

and local climatic conditions. Investment in manufacturing was insufficient and the sector

was burdened by a lack of investor confidence and access to capital. Inflation had the effect of

increasing prices and served to further flatten demand for locally manufactured items. Acute

shortages of raw materials and other items, especially iron and steel, chemicals, machinery,

and machine tools, restricted the potential for the sector to expand and take up opportunities

to replace imports. Supplying servicemen for the war in Europe and the Middle East also

deprived Queensland’s factories of much needed skilled labour. While females were able to

move into some male occupations, such as the clothing, textiles, and footwear trades, the

progress made in these trades was soon reversed when the servicemen returned. Queensland,

unlike the Commonwealth and the other states, devoted little time and effort in assisting the

manufacturing sector, with the exception of some state enterprises and the state steelworks

project. Despite these difficulties, however, the manufacturing sector made some progress,

and boasted reasonably impressive growth in overall employment, productivity, output, and

value of production. The manufacturing sector had indeed proved its value to the Queensland

economy during this very difficult period, and was to continue to do so in the decade that

followed.