AUTOMATION SCENARIO May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.

AUTOMATION SCENARIO

May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections

BackgroundThe Commission on Elections started its efforts at

modernizing or automating the electoral process way back in 1992 with Operation MODEX (Modernization and Excellence), immediately after the first Synchronized National and Local Elections (NLE). 1. The first try of an automated election system using the

Optical Mark Reader (OMR) technology in the 1996 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections

2. The partial implementation in the ARMM provinces of the same automated system in the 1998 National and Local Elections

3. The halted nationwide implementation of a centralized automated counting system in 2004

4. The fully automated election system in the 2008 ARMM Elections

COMELEC continues to fulfil its mandate of conducting election – be it manual or automated.     

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

BackgroundFor the coming 2010 elections, the COMELEC is set to

conduct the country’s first nationwide fully automated elections – from counting of votes to transmission and canvassing of election results.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

Kinds of Technologies Considered The following shows the kinds of technologies considered

by the Philippine inspection team during the 15-day inspection trip to the US in October 1993:

1. Mechanical Leverage Machine - a voting machine, wherein a voter would face or enter a cabinet-type booth to cast his vote. All the names are already presented to the voter in the booth, and the voter would just have to push a button corresponding to the name of a candidate of his choice, and pull a mechanical lever afterwards. His vote automatically gets counted.

2. Punch Card System - a voting device, wherein a voter is given a ballot, with hole slots corresponding to the candidates' names, and a puncher (similar to that used by our provincial bus conductors in ticketing their passengers). To cast his vote, the voter has to punch a hole corresponding to the name of the candidate of his choice. A separate reader machine does the counting afterwards.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

Kinds of Technologies Considered3. Optical Mark Reader (OMR) - a ballot counting

machine: wherein a voter is given a ballot, with pre-printed candidates' names, with corresponding ovals to shade or broken arrows to connect. The votes in the shaded ballots would be scanned using an OMR.

4. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machine - a voting machine wherein a voter is presented with a screen showing all the names of the candidates, much like the locator screens in the Glorietta Shopping Malls. To cast his vote, the voter has to touch the name of the candidate of his choice on the screen, and his vote automatically gets counted.

Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

Electronic Voting Machines Used in other Countries

Australia (eVACS) Type: Bar code reader

authenticates ballots, which are completed with a keypad.

Usage: Eight of 80 polling places voted with the Electronic Voting and Counting System, or eVACS, in the Australia Capital Territory.

Addressing distrust: The government specified that the program's code be open source.

Addressing multiple votes: Voters sign in and receive a bar-coded ballot that gives them one vote.

Still at issue: On intellectual-property grounds, the company that created eVACS, Software Improvements, wants to restrict the source code.

Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

India (EVM) Type: Battery-powered

electronic device has buttons next to choices.

Usage: The Electronic Voting Machines, or EVMs, were used countrywide in May for the parliamentary elections by about 390 million people.

Addressing distrust: The simple-to-use machines are built to address illiteracy and be tamperproof. Vote data is stored in nonremovable memory.

Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.

Still at issue: Questions remain about the security of the devices and the tabulator that collects votes from the devices.

Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

Venezuela (Smartmatic) Type: The integrated voting

device has a small touch screen and a receipt printer.

Usage: Almost the entire country voted on the device for an Aug. 15 referendum on the ouster of President Chavez.

Addressing distrust: Paper receipts were kept by polling stations for random audits.

Addressing multiple votes: A voter's fingerprint is transmitted to a national database, ensuring that each person votes only once.

Still at issue: The voting process still lacks adequate checks on system integrity.

Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

United States (Diebold, among others)

Type: System has a touch screen and, in some cases, a receipt printer.

Usage: An estimated 31 percent of voters in the United States will use the system in the November presidential election.

Addressing distrust: Easy-to-use terminals include accessibility features for the handicapped.

Addressing multiple votes: A chip card given to the voter contains a key to allow only one vote.

Still at issue: Many questions remain about device security and the secrecy surrounding machine development and certification. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-

5387540.html

Philippines (Smartmatic)

Type: Bar code reader, scans ballots, with built-in printer

Addressing distrust: Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review

Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.

Project Specifications• Component 1: PAPER-BASED AUTOMATED ELECTION

SYSTEM (AES)

Component 1-A : Election Management System (EMS) Component 1-B : Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS)Component 1-C : Counting/Consolidation System (CCS)

• Component 2: PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION USING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS

• Component 3: OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT

STATISTICS

• Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters• 44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing

• 58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death• 1,246,272 registration records deactivated

• Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009

• 80 Provinces • 1,631 cities and municipalities• 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate)• 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate)• 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate)• 82,200 PCOS Machines• 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered

precincts

Board of Election Inspectors

• One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct• Three regular members

– Chairman– Delivers ballot to voter

– Poll Clerk– Third Member

• Support Staff– Depends on number of precincts clustered– To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing

– List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters

Board of Election Inspectors

No. of Precincts Clustered

No. of Support Staff

Total no. of personnel

(BEI + Support Staff)

1 none 32 none 33 1 44 2 55 3 6

Establishing Identity of Voter

LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS Photograph

Establishing Identity of Voter

Establishing Identity of Voter

If identity cannot be established through photograph Compare signatures

Use Book of Voters Contains applications for registration

• Includes specimen signature of voter Other methods to challenge identity

Official Ballots

Pre-printed names of candidates

300 candidates can be accommodated 150 names per

side of ballot

Official Ballots

Ovals opposite names of candidate

Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate

PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan

• One unit per clustered precinct

• Voter personally feeds ballot into machine

• Ballot can be fed at any orientation

• Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously

TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURESAt least three days before election day

Public shall accomplish test ballots Ballots shall be manually counted and election

returns accomplished Same set of ballots that was manually counted

shall be fed into the counting machine Manual count shall be compared with the print-

out of the election returns If public is satisfied that the manual count is the

same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses

TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURESAt least three days before election day

Machines shall be sealed without any connection to transmission links

Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installed

The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is on election day in the presence of watchers

Voting

Voting period 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to votePoll Clerk lists down names voters

queuingPoll Clerk calls voter to cast ballotVoter who fails to appear after being

called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote

Precinct set up At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one

time

Voting

Before voting starts Show that ballot box

is empty Transparent plastic

Turn on and initialize PCOS

Print “Zero Report” To show that there

is no entry/vote in machine’s memory

Counting

• At close of polls– Perform close function

• To prevent additional ballots from being inserted

– After close function, PCOS automatically• Starts counting

process• Prints election returns

after completion of automated count– Eight (8) copies

Counting

Insert transmission cable After printing first eight (8) copies of ER

To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely

Perform electronic transmission functionPrint additional twenty-two (22) copies of

ER Automatically performed by PCOS after

completion of transmission

Canvassing/Consolidation

• Electronically transmitted results– Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and

proclamation of winning candidates for• City/municipal officials• Provincial officials• Members, House of Representatives• Senators and Party-list

– Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results• Constitution authorized the Congress to

promulgate rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice-President

Municipal/City Board of Canvassers

Provincial Board of

Canvassers

National Board of

Canvassers

Congress COMELEC

Precinct

Election Returns

Mun./City COC

SOVP

Prov. COC

SOVM/C

Physical transport

Physical transport

Physical transport

Manual System of Canvassing

Municipal/City Board of Canvassers

Provincial Board of

Canvassers

National Board of

Canvassers

Congress COMELEC

Precinct

Physical transport

Physical transport

Physical transport

Electronic Transmission

Comelec Central Back-

up ServerAdvance Results/

Monitoring

Server for Dominant Majority/

Minority Parties, Citizens Arm,

KBPAdvance Results

Secured Public

Website

Election Returns

Mun./City COC

SOVP

Prov. COC

SOVM/C

SECURITY

Security measures under a manual election system still applicable

Strengthen security through automationPasswordPINDigital signaturesEncryption

SECURITY

128-bit encryption 2

2 = 4 2 = 8 2 = 16 2 = 32 2 = 64 2 = 128 2 = 256

128

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

• 2 = 512• 2 = 1024• 2 = 2048• 2 = 4096• 2 = 8192• 2 = 16,384• 2 = 32,768

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

• 2 = 65,536

• 2 = 131,072

• 2 = 262,144

• 2 = 524,288

• 2 = 1,048,576

• 2 = 2,097,152

• 2 = 4,194,304

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

SECURITY

128-bit encryption

• 2 = 8,388,608

• 2 = 16,777,216

• 2 = 33,554,432

• 2 = 67,108,864

• 2 = 134,217,728

• 2 = 268,435,456

• 2 = 536,870,912

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

• 2 = 1,073,741,824

• 2 = 2,147,483,648

• 2 = 4,294,967,296

• 2 = 8,569,934,592

• 2 = 17,179,869,184

• 2 = 34,359,738,368

• 2 = 68,719,476,736

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

SECURITY

128-bit encryption

• 2 = 137,438,953,472• 2 = 274,877,906,944• 2 = 549,755,813,888• 2 = over One Trillion

combinations

37

38

39

40

SECURITY

128-bit encryptionSame security system used by banks

Random EncryptionTemperature of machineVoltageUnique machine identityUser identity

No single/master decryption code

SECURITY

• Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result

• Transmission takes at most 2 minutes• Copies for distribution

– 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level

– 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal level

– 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial level

SECURITY

Audit LogActivitiesTimeDate

SECURITY

Paper BallotBallot digital imageData storage deviceTransmitted resultsHard copies of election results

FIELD TEST/S

8 areas2 for NCR 2 each (1 urban/1 rural)

Luzon Visayas Mindanao

To test system and transmission in the same environment/conditions as on election day

CONTINUITY PLAN

Types of Systems BreakdownFails to scanAble to scan but fails to print ERAble to print ER but fails to transmit

Able to transmit but fails to consolidate

CONTINUITY PLAN

Fails to scan Use spare PCOS Use PCOS of another precinct

Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct

Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct

Scan ballots If all PCOS fails

Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to scan but fails to print ER– Use spare PCOS– Use PCOS of another precinct

• Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct

• Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct• Use removable storage device of defective

PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER– If all PCOS fails

• Manual counting

CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to print ER but fails to transmit– Go to nearest precinct or polling center

which has a functioning transmission facility

– Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let the functioning facility transmit precinct results

– If all transmission facilities bog down• Physically transport removable storage

device to canvassing site – In the presence of watchers and security

escorts

CONTINUITY PLAN

• Able to transmit but fails to consolidate Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS)

of another municipality/province Use the removable storage device and let

functioning CCS consolidate the results Provide back-up canvassing through the

Central Server Print results and send the same to

affected board of canvassers Print results and constitute special board

of canvassers to take the place of the affected board

Basic Elements of Elections

• People– Vote-buying– Coercion– Intimidation– Terrorism

• Systems & Procedures– Misreading of ballots– Unreadable handwriting– Error

• Honest• Deliberate

– Fraud– Manufactured election

returns– Tampering of election

results

Successful Implementation

Vigilance of citizenryCooperationCoordination

Support

THANK YOU!