Accountability in the context of EMU & EBU Judicial Review ...

Accountability in the context of EMU & EBUJudicial Review of the ECB by the CJEU

by Rosa María Lastra

ProfessorofInternationalFinancialandMonetaryLawCCLS,QueenMaryUniversityofLondon

EBIBrexitSeminarBrussels,10January2018

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Outline• ChallengesfortheECBwiththeadventofbankingunion

– Overlappingnatureofitsfunctions,seamlessprocess– Governanceissues,independence&accountability.– Issuesofjurisdictionaldomainandcomplexity– LackofEUadministrative(procedural)leadstolackofuniformity– Applicationofnationallawanduseofnationalpowers

• Accountability• ThecaseforJudicialreview

– Understandingdiscretion– Specializedjudges– ConstitutionalcourtsandECJ– Toomuchrelianceonadministrativereview?SSMCasesandSRBcases

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ChallengesfacedbyECBwithadventofbankingunion(SSM)

– Overlappingnatureofitsfunctions:monetarypolicy,ELA/LOLR,micro-prudentialsupervision,macroprudentialpolicyandearlyintervention(preludetoresolution).

• Needforcoordinationamongstcompetentauthoritiesandconsistency.

– Balancingactbetweenprimaryobjectiveofpricestability (defined&quantified)and rediscoveredobjectiveoffinancialstability.

• WhilePSisunambiguouslymentionedinArt127.1TFEU,thetenuousreferencetofinancialstabilityinArt127.5TFEUindicatesthehesitanttoneofthetreatydraftersingivingthisgoalequalfootingtoPS

• ThesimplicityofonegoaloneinstrumentoneauthorityestablishedbytheMaastrichtTreatyinMPversusmultiplegoalsmultipleinstrumentandmultipleauthoritiesinthepursuitoffinancialstability(exampleofFSOC).

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Supervisionandresolution

– Supervisionisresourceandpersonnelintensive,litigious,pronetoreputationaldamage;a‘thanklesstask’inwhichfailuresaremagnifiedandsuccessarehidden.Itrequiresjudgment,discretion.

– Supervisionandcrisismanagementarepartofaseamlessprocess– ThediscretionaryroleoftheECBinearlyintervention(actionstaken

beforethethresholdconditionsforresolutionaremet,andbeforetheinstitutionisinsolventorlikelytobecomeinsolvent)andinpullingthetrigger(andifnationalELAdoesnotgetECBGCfiat… alea jacta est)providesanadditionalchallenge.

• Art4.1(i)oftheSSMRegulationempowersthetheECB:“Tocarryoutsupervisorytasksinrelationtorecoveryplans,andearlyinterventionwhereacreditinstitutionorgroupinrelationtowhichtheECBistheconsolidatingsupervisor,doesnotmeetorislikelytobreachtheapplicableprudentialrequirements (…)excludinganyresolutionpowers.”

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Bankingunionandmissingpillars

Banking Union (based upon the Single Rulebook)

Deposit guarantee

European Deposit

Insurance Scheme Proposal

published Nov 2015

Resolution*Regulation of 15 July 2014

SingleResolution Mechanism

Regulation & IGA

Commission, SRB/SRF &

national resolution authorities

Banking supervision

SSM

ECB / National

competent authorities

European Stability

Mechanism(ESM)

Direct recapitalisation

Fiscal backstop Fiscal union?

Establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)Regulation of 15 October 2013Start – 4 Nov 2014

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LOLR (the missing pillar)

This process replicates the experience of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in the USA one century ago.

Governanceissues,independenceandaccountability

• TheseparationbetweenthemonetaryandthesupervisoryfunctionswithintheECBischallenging,astheprimarylawdidnotenvisageaseparatedecision-makingstructureforsupervision.– The‘non-objection’proceduregivestheGoverningCounciltheupper

handasitcanreject(objectto)adecisionpreparedbytheSupervisoryBoard,(Art.26(8)SSMRegulation).

• ThewideningoftheECB’smandateposesachallengetotheindependenceoftheinstitutionitself,asitismorelikelytobesubjecttoexternalpressureespeciallywhenitcomestosupervisionandthepre-resolutionphase.

• Thebalancebetweenindependenceandaccountabilityisdifferentinmonetarypolicy,supervisionandresolution.Ittiltstowardsindependencemonetarypolicyandtowardsaccountability(andliability)insupervisionandevenmoresoinresolution(fiscalbackstop).

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ExpandedCBmandateandlegitimacy

n Expandedmandate- CBshavegonebeyondtheiroriginalmandateandwidenedtheirscopeofaction.ECB,Fed,BofE.InterpretingwhetheraCBabidesbyitsmandatebecomesmoredifficultasthemandategetsfuzzier,broaderandmorecomplicated.• Bernanke2009:“TheFedhasdone,andwillcontinuetodo,everythingpossiblewithinthe

limitsofitsauthoritytoassistinrestoringournationtofinancialstability”whilePresidentDraghiproclaimedin2012his‘whateverittakes’…withinthelimitsofourmandate…

• Givenits‘instrumental’nature,questioningthegoalleadsalsoleadstoquestioningspecificcentralbankpolicies,takentoachievesuchgoal/s,e.g.,‘bail-outs’,QE.IftheconsensuswhichsurroundsthegoalcrumbleswithittheimportanceofCBIindependence

n Legitimacy pre-existsandisarequisiteofaccountability.Thereis‘formal’legitimacy(inademocracythecreationofanindependentcentralbankmustbethefruitofademocraticact:statute,constitutionaldecisionortreatyprovision)andthereisalso‘societal’legitimacy,determinedbythepublicacceptanceoforloyaltytothesystem...Whensocietallegitimacyweakensorisnolongerpresentachangeinthelawisboundtohappen.

DrRosaMariaLastra 7

Rethinking accountable independence

• Thedesignofaccountableindependenceisabalancingact:Toomuchindependenceleadstoanundesirablestatewithinthestate.Toomuchaccountabilitythreatenstheeffectivenessofindependence.

• Forms of accountability – Lawyers tend to emphasize the institutional dimension, the placing

theCBwithintheexistingsystemofchecksandbalances,inrelationtothethreebranchesofthestate– legislative,executive,judiciary.

• Input or process – particularly relevant in MP (ex ante) – explanatory• AnaccountableCBshouldbejudgedforthereasonablenessofitsactions,byParliament,theExecutive,thecompetentCourtsofJustice andthepublic.

• Checks and balances depending on the institutional balance– Economists – focus on performance accountability and

transparency. Output or outcomes – in supervision (ex post,liability) – amendatory. And de facto dimension

8Prof Rosa M Lastra

AframeworkforFedaccountability(ThomasBaxter,Sullivan&Cromwell)

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TypeofCentralBankFunction

NatureofAccountability

Legislative Judicial Executive

MonetaryPolicy Yes No No

BankingSupervision Yes Yes No

PaymentsSystems Yes Yes Depends

FinancialStability Yes Yes Yes

Influence Control

Judicialreviewofcentralbanksactionsanddecisions

• Upuntiltheglobalfinancialcrisis,courtsdealtsparselywithcentralbankingactionsanddecisions.IntheUSA,there’snomechanismprovidedbystatuteorjudicialdecisiontoreviewFedMPactionsincourt.

• However,thesituationhaschangedinthelastdecadeonthissideoftheAtlantic.IntheUK,theNorthernRockcaseledtoalivelydebateaboutdiscretion,financialstabilityandmoralhazardwithregardtotheLOLRoftheBankofEngland.SRMGlobalMasterFundLPvTheCommissionersofHMTreasury[2009]EWCACiv 788

• IntheEU,withPringle&Gauweiler,theroleofCJEUintheformationofeconomicandMPhasbecomethesubjectoflegalandpoliticaldebate.BeforePringletheonlytwomaterialECJdecisionsrelatedtoEMUwerethe2003OLAFcaseonthestatusandindependenceoftheECBandthe2004judgmentontheStabilityandGrowthPact.

• TheCJEU‘hasdevelopedafairlyconsistentstandardofjudicialreviewofcrisis-relatedmeasures(…).Itcomprisesaclosescrutinyofthepurposesofamandateorcompetence,acheckwhethertheinstrumentsdeployedservethemandate,andananalysiswhethertheeffectsareproportionatetotheobjectives’(Goldmann)

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ThecaseforJudicialreview• JusticiabilityofMPanddistributionaljustice- sinceCBmandatehasbeen

stretched(eg.QE)andhasarguablybecomelessaccountableandtransparent,thisalterstheexistinginstitutionalbalance.– UKandUS– nojudicialreviewofMPbutinUKjudicialreviewofLOLR– EUdifferentapproach– Distributionaljustice– UnderstandingthedomainofMP.

• ThoughParliamentaryaccountability(exanteandexpost)remainsfundamental,whenparliamentisdominatedbytheexecutivebranchofgovernmentorwhenparliamentaryaccountabilityislimitedweshouldconsiderothermechanismstoholdthecentralbanktoaccount.EU….

• InGauweiler (OMT)- TheCJEUexercisedjudicialrestraintbydeferringtothediscretionofcentralbankers– expertise.

• WhenitcomestosupervisionandresolutionintheEU,inthewordsofSabinoCassese(ECBLegalConference2017)therehasbeenashiftofcompetence‘bystealth’totheadministrative.Adequatesafeguards… voice….

Prof.RosaMariaLastra 11

JudicialreviewoftheECB

• Theriskof‘supplantingtheBank’justifiesthe‘degreeofcaution’thatshouldcharacterizetheintensityofjudicialreview.“Judgesshouldnotoverstepthelimitsoftheircompetencesinordertoenforcethelimitsofotheractors’competences.”However,thedeferencetotheECB’s‘broaddiscretion’onthebasisofthelatter’sexperienceandtechnicalexpertisestrengthensthecaseforexpertiseandadequatepreparationofthejudgesthatwillassessthosecomplexissues.Thishappensinotherareasofeconomicregulation.JudicialactivismhasbecomethenorminthefieldofEUcompetitionpolicy.

• USSupremeCourtJusticeStephenBreyer hasarguedthatitisnotpossibletounderstandandevaluatewhatagenciesdowithouthavingsomesenseoftheregulatorypolicyaswell.TheneedforspecificexpertisewhenitcomestotheadjudicationofcomplexfinancialandmonetarymattersisarelevantissuenotonlyfortheCJEUbutalso,forexample,fortheUKSupremeCourt.Ifjudicialrestraintinmonetarymattersisadvocatedonthebasisof[limited]technicalexpertiseandqualificationsofthejudgesadjudicatingsuchmatters,thecounter-argumenttonot‘beingequipped’istoactuallyequipjudges.

• Giventhespecificityandcomplexityofmonetarypolicyandothercentralbankingfunctions(andtheaddeddifficultyintheEUcontextofdeterminingwhetherameasureisofmonetarypolicy– anexclusivecompetenceoftheUnion– oreconomicpolicy)andconsideringthatonlytheCJEUcanjudgetheECB(Article35ESCBStatute),theneedforcompetenceandexpertiseintheexerciseofjudicialreviewcouldbeservedbytheestablishmentofaspecialisedchamberwithintheCJEUtodealwiththeseissues.HavingdedicatedspecialisedjudgeswithexpertiseinfinancialandmonetarymatterswhenadjudicatingcasesrelatedtotheECBwouldenhancethelegalframeworkofECBaccountabilityinlightofthesignificantlyexpandedmandateoftheECB.

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Understandingdiscretion• Centralbankdiscretionisthefreedomtoactwithinalegalframework.Judicial

reviewdoesnotextendtothe‘contentofthedecision’(theaimoftheCourtisnottosupplantorreplacethedecisiontaken),butitdoesextendtotheparametersandlegalframeworkthatsurroundsuchdecisioninordertodeterminewhetherornotthecentralbankmandatehasbeenexceeded.– The‘rulesversusdiscretion’debatehasalong-standingtraditionin

administrativelaw.Thereareproceduralelementsthatdeterminethelegalityofanadministrativeact,e.g.thecompetenceoftheentitythatissuestheact,theproceduretoprepare&approvesuchact,theexistenceofapublicinterest.Themoredifficultissueisthestandardofreviewjudgesshouldapplywhentheyconcludethattheadministrativeacttheyarereviewingisnotlegalorlegitimateandmustbechangedorsubstituted.

– Comprehensivejudicialreview– theCourtbesidesassessingthelegalityoftheprocedurealsoappraisesthefacts

– Limitedreview– whichappliestocaseswheretheactshavebeenchallengesimplyeitheracomplexeconomicassessment,atechnicalassessmentortheexerciseofdiscretion.Controlofreasonablenesstoavoid‘arbitraryandcapricious’useofpower.(LagunadePaz2014).

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DiscretioninMPandinELA• DiscretioninthecontextofMPmeansthatthecentralbankcanchoosewhichever

monetarypolicyinstrumentitdeemsappropriateinthepursuitofthegoal;italsomeansthatthecentralbankcandefinewhatagenericgoalsuchaspricestabilityactuallymeans.Thecontentofsuchdiscretionarydecisionisnotreviewable.

– InGauweiler theCJEUfocusedontheobjectivesofmonetarypolicyratherthantheeffectsofthemeasuresunderreview.Tridimas &Xanthoulis:“Theemphasisontheobjectivesratherthantheeffectsofameasure asthedeterminingfactorfordecidingwhetheritfallswithinMPoreconomicpolicy,coupledwithalowstandardofreview,grantstheauthorofthemeasureenourmousdiscretion”(p.38)

• DiscretioninthecontextofELA,meansthatNCBsactingasLOLRinbilaterallendingoperations(marketliquidityassistanceviaopenmarketoperationsistheECBresponsibility)canchoosetoprovideassistanceornot(attheirownriskandliability),buttmust actinaccordancewiththeTreatyprovisions(Article123etc),theECBEmergencyliquidityassistance(ELA)proceduresandEUstateaidrule

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Specializedjudges

• Whilejudicialrestraintmaybejustifiableinthepresenceofotherstrongmechanismsofaccountability,itmaybelessjustifiablewhenjudicialcontrolemergesasthemainmechanismofscrutinisingthedomainofexpandedcentralbankpowers.Expertiseandcompetence.SpecialisedchamberCJEU?

• IntheEUcontext,aspecializedcourtcouldbecreatedtodealwithmattersrelatedtotheECBaccordingtoArticle257TFEUandArticle62coftheStatuteoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion.

• MonetarypolicyisanexclusiveEUcompetenceinaccordancewithArticle3(1)(c)TFEUwhileeconomicpolicyiscoordinatedattheEUlevel(positiveintegrationinaccordancewithArticle119TFEUandnegativeintegrationintermsoftheprohibitionsapplicabletoMemberStatesoftheeurozone)butthecompetenceremainsatthenationallevel.

• Specialistcourtsorinternalpilotprograminwhichcertainjudgeswouldself-specialize,bytakingonallofonecertaintypeoftechnicalcase.

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ConstitutionalCourtsandtheCJEU(citingChiaraZilioli)

O The GCC is competent for German Constitutional Law, while The CJEU is competent for EU law. The EUTreaty requires national courts to refer the issues of EU law to the CJEU.

O GAUWEILER case - Action before the German Constitutional Court in Case Gauweiler andothers and subsequently the first preliminary reference to the EU Court, C-62/14. On 16June 2015 the CJEU concluded that the OMT does not exceed the powers of the ECB in relation tomonetary policy and does not contravene the prohibition of monetary financing of Member States

O Preliminary ruling confirms the main reasoning of the AG in particular as regards thequalification of a measure as falling within the scope of monetary policy if:O The measure pursues a monetary policy objective (singleness of the monetary policy in the

euro area; safeguarding an appropriate monetary transmission mechanism);O The measure uses a monetary policy instrument.

O It cannot be treated as equivalent to an economic policy measure merely because it is likely tohave indirect effects on the realisation of certain economic policy objectives.

O WEISS case - The GCC has referred to the ECJ a request against the QE of the Eurosystem (defendant isthe Parliament, accused of not having acted to impede the ECB from adopting these measures. ECBand BBk have been asked several questions as technical experts by the GGC.O Same arguments as in the OMT – (i) ultra vires? (ii) monetary financing? (iii) (hypothetical): if full

loss sharing, monetary financing and infringement of constitutional identity?O The GCC has referred only questions relating to the Public Sector Purchase Programme not to

other asset purchasing programmes – ABS, covered bonds etc16

ECBandECJ• LitigationontheapplicationofEUlawbytheECB(asanEUinstitution)requiresa

uniforminterpretationbyoneCourt,whichistheCJEU.• SupremacyofEULaw.• ItwouldleadtohavocifECBactionscouldbechallengedin19nationalcourtsorin

othercourts.InlinewithArticle263TFEUandwiththelong-standingcaselawtheCJEUshouldremainexclusivelycompetenttoassessthelegalityofactsofEUinstitutions.

• TheCJEUstatedinFoto-Frost:“DivergencesbetweencourtsintheMemberStatesastothevalidityofCommunityactswouldbeliabletoplaceinjeopardytheveryunityoftheCommunitylegalorderanddetractfromthefundamentalrequirementoflegalcertainty”].

• ThoughtheECBhasbeentakentonationalcourtsinanumberofoccasions,theECBhasalwayssuccessfullyallegedlackofjurisdiction.

• RelevantTreatyprovisions:Article263(legalityreview),Article288,Article267Article268andArticle340.

•

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IsjudicialreviewthesameforMPasBS?

• Article35ESCBStatuteandthecorrespondingTFEUprovision,namelyArt.271(d)(fulfilmentofobligationsbyNCBs)- giveexclusivejurisdictiontotheCJEUon ECBmonetarymatters,inlinewiththeexclusivecompetencetheECBhasinthesphereofmonetarypolicyoftheeurozone inaccordancewithArt.3(1)(c)TFEU.

• Intheareaof prudentialsupervision,theinterplaybetweenNCBs/NCAsandtheECBintheSSMmaymakeforadivisionofcompetenceswhich,inanactualcase,maybehardtodecipher.See https://ebi-europa.eu/publications/eu-cases-or-jurisprudence/.

• InmattersrelatedtoSSMoperationstheissueis whomtoaddressforreview whenanact,ostensiblytakenbya national authority,wasadopted uponinstructionbytheECB,and whichlawstoapply:istheECJtointerpretandapplynationallawthattheECBhasappliedbyvirtueofArticle4.3SSMRegulation?And:whatwhentheECBisconfrontedwithnationallawthatisinconsistentwithEUlaw(amanifestlyincorrecttranspositionofadirective)orthatisabsent(non-implementationofthedirective)

• http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceedings201712.en.pdf?b452bb9c54dca55f8f5673b21631a4fe Lehmanonvaryingstandards

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AdministrativereviewandJudicialreview(RenéSmits)

• ThosewhowouldliketoseeanECBdecisionintheareaofprudentialsupervisionreviewedhave2trackstofollow:– RequestadministrativereviewfromABoR andthereafterchallengethe

resultingseconddecisionbytheECBincourt– GotoCourtDirectly,bearinginmindthatonlytheCJUEcanjudgethe

ECB.• Thoughadministrativereviewmaybefast,cheapandindependent,itdoes

notamounttojudicialscrutiny.ABoR proceedingsarepartofaseconddecisionmakingprocedureatECNandtheopinionofABoR willbeknowntotheapplicantandtotheECBbutnottotheoutsideWorld

Prof.RosaMariaLastra 19

SSMCases• https://ebi-europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Cases-against-the-ECB-and-

preliminary-proceedings-concerning-prudential-supervision_public-sources-1-September-2017_def_.pdf

• L-BankcaseT-122/15- Landeskreditbank Baden-WürttembergvECB (whichrepresentsaverydifferentapproachfromthatofFSOCintheUSAwiththedesignationofMetLifeasSIFI)

– TheECBwascorrectinclassifyingtheGermanStateownedbankasa‘significantentity.TheCourtpointsoutthatthesupervisionofinstitutionsclassifiedas‘lesssignificant’bythenationalauthoritiesundertheSSMisnottheexerciseofautonomouscompetence,butratheradecentralisedimplementationofanexclusivecompetenceoftheECB.

– IfCJEUconfirmsthisjudgement,itwouldbecertainlyclassifiedasalandmarkdecisionfortheEuropeanizationofthebankingsupervisorylaw.Landeskreditbank Baden-WürttembergCaseC-450/17Phttp://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=193985&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=803401

• Trasta case/s SixpleasagainstwithdrawaloflicensefromaLatvianbankalleging,interalia,thattheECBviolatedArticle24SSMRegulationinconnectionwithABoR’s reviewofanearlierdecision,reliedoninaccuratedocumentssubmittedbytheLatviansupervisoryauthorityandviolatedtheprinciplesofproportionality,equaltreatment,legitimateexpectationsandlegalcertainty,aswellasproceduralrulesrelatingtothewithdrawalofanauthorisation(Article83SSMFrameworkRegulation),andviolateditsindependence(recital19ofthepreambleandArticle19SSMRegulation)

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AdministrativereviewandJudicialreviewofSRBcases

• DecisionsoftheSRBmaybechallengedbeforethe AppealPaneloftheSRB– ThecompetenceoftheAppealPanelisdeterminedbyArticle85(3)oftheSRM

Regulation.OnlythedecisionsoftheSRBreferredtoinArticle10(10),Article11,Article12(1),Articles38to41,Article65(3),Article71andArticle90(3)oftheSRMRegulationcanbethesubjectofanappealbeforetheAppealPanel.IfthecontesteddecisionisnotincludedinthelistofthedecisionsreferredtoinArticle85(3)oftheSRMRegulation,theappealwillnotbeadmissible.

– Anynaturalorlegalperson,includingresolutionauthorities,mayappealinaccordancewithArticle85(3)SRMRegulation.Seehttps://srb.europa.eu/en/node/41

• Orbefore theCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnion– AlldecisionsoftheSRBthatarenotappealablebeforetheAppealPanel,pursuantto

Article86(1)SRMRegulation.Thisincludes,forinstance,decisionsconcerningresolutionactioninrespectofacreditinstitution.Furthermore,decisionstakenbytheAppealPanelmaybealsochallengedbeforetheCourtofJustice.

– MemberStatesandtheUnioninstitutions,aswellasanynaturalorlegalperson,whentheSRBdecisionisaddressedtothatperson,orisofdirectandindividualconcerntothatperson,inaccordancewithArticle86(2)SRMRegulation andArticle263TFEUmayappeal

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SRMcases

• BancoPopularhttps://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banco-popular

• BancaPopolare diVicenzaS.p.A.andVenetoBancaS.p.A.https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/banco-popular

• Adequateguarantees?Voice?

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ELA• ThoughELAoperationsconductedbyNCBsareimputabletotheNCBin

question,totheextentthattheECBGoverningCouncil/ExecutiveBoardgiveinstructions(aspartofthenon-objectionprocedure)theyarealsoimputabletotheECB.AndonlytheCJEUcaninterpretECBrulesrelatedtoitsexclusivefieldofcompetence.

• ThefactthatanumberofECBGoverningCouncilrulesapplytoELA- suchasthe2017ELAAgreement- suggeststhatonlytheCJEUcaninterpretthoserules,whicharedirectlyrelatedtothe objectivesandtasksoftheEurosystem andthenatureoftheECB,includingthescopeofitsindependence.

• Thenon-objectionanalysisthattheGoverningCouncilconductsforeveryELArequesttakesalltheseissuesintoaccount(andotherssuchascompliancewithArticle123TFEU).ThisisbecauseELAasanationaltaskaccordingtoArticle14.4oftheESCBStatuteisverycloselyrelatedtotheECBmonetarypolicyoperations(Article14.3and18oftheESCBStatute).

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