A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle for the Mareth Line, 19 th – 29 th March 1943.

A Case Study in Army-A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-OperationAir Force Co-Operation

The Western Desert Air Force and The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle for the Mareth Line, 19the Battle for the Mareth Line, 19thth – –

2929thth March 1943 March 1943

IntroductionIntroduction• Perception of tactical air powerPerception of tactical air power

– Flexible and adaptableFlexible and adaptable

• 1940 – 1942 – a period of difficult gestation1940 – 1942 – a period of difficult gestation

• Often derided as the ‘Royal Absent Force’Often derided as the ‘Royal Absent Force’

• Hard fought lessonsHard fought lessons

• Coningham’s principles:Coningham’s principles:

1.1. Air superiorityAir superiority

2.2. Concentration of forceConcentration of force

3.3. Effective planningEffective planning

4.4. Centralised controlCentralised control

5.5. Flexibility Flexibility

6.6. Command relationshipsCommand relationships

A Hawker Hurricane Mark IID of No 6 Squadron, A Hawker Hurricane Mark IID of No 6 Squadron, Royal Air Force, demonstrates the effect of its Royal Air Force, demonstrates the effect of its

firepower on an abandoned enemy tank in Tunisiafirepower on an abandoned enemy tank in Tunisia

Strategic SituationStrategic Situation• By January 1943 2 key By January 1943 2 key

problems were identified:problems were identified:1.1. The speed with which the OKW The speed with which the OKW

and and Commando SupremoCommando Supremo could could reinforce their positions in reinforce their positions in TunisiaTunisia

2.2. The speed with which 8The speed with which 8thth Army Army and WDAF forces could be and WDAF forces could be reinforcedreinforced

• Affect of the Kasserine Pass Affect of the Kasserine Pass battles – Operation battles – Operation SturmflutSturmflut

• Reorganisation of air power Reorganisation of air power assets in North Africaassets in North Africa

– Formation of NATAF under Formation of NATAF under Coningham Coningham

• Logistical issues for the 8Logistical issues for the 8thth Army and WDAFArmy and WDAF

• Operation Operation CapriCapri• Strength of the Mareth Line Strength of the Mareth Line

positionposition

Initial PlanningInitial Planning• Basic plan laid out by Montgomery:Basic plan laid out by Montgomery:

– Flanking operation by the NZ Corps under FreybergFlanking operation by the NZ Corps under Freyberg• To be supported by X CorpsTo be supported by X Corps

– Frontal attack on the Mareth Line by XXX CorpsFrontal attack on the Mareth Line by XXX Corps• Role of the air forces:Role of the air forces:

– Broad strategic outline for future operation dictated by Broad strategic outline for future operation dictated by Coningham at Canrobert, 12 MarchConingham at Canrobert, 12 March

1.1. No. 242 Group and US XII ASC to attack airfields maintain No. 242 Group and US XII ASC to attack airfields maintain theatre wide air superioritytheatre wide air superiority

2.2. WDAF to operate in support of 8WDAF to operate in support of 8thth Army operations Army operations– In support of the 8In support of the 8thth Army attack against the Mareth Line Army attack against the Mareth Line

operations would consist of:operations would consist of:1.1. Light bombers to conduct attacks on landing grounds – Light bombers to conduct attacks on landing grounds –

Starting 15 MarchStarting 15 March2.2. Fighters to maintain command of the air in the battlespaceFighters to maintain command of the air in the battlespace3.3. Fighters to operate in support of the ground forcesFighters to operate in support of the ground forces4.4. Medium bombers to wear out German positionsMedium bombers to wear out German positions

– 5 fighter wings, 3 light bomber wings, 1 reconnaissance 5 fighter wings, 3 light bomber wings, 1 reconnaissance wing and 2 medium bomber wings in supportwing and 2 medium bomber wings in support

Operation PUGILISTOperation PUGILIST

• Initial attack went in by 50Initial attack went in by 50thth Infantry Division, 20 Infantry Division, 20thth/21/21stst MarchMarch

• BAI and air superiority mission took priorityBAI and air superiority mission took priority• Limited reaction by Axis forcesLimited reaction by Axis forces• During 21During 21stst March BAI missions continued March BAI missions continued• Failure of frontal attacks on the Mareth LineFailure of frontal attacks on the Mareth Line• NZ Corps halted by 21NZ Corps halted by 21stst Panzer Division Panzer Division• Successful use of CAS in support in NZ Corps on 22Successful use of CAS in support in NZ Corps on 22ndnd

MarchMarch– No. 6 Squadron in Hurricane IID ‘tank-busters’No. 6 Squadron in Hurricane IID ‘tank-busters’

• Claimed 36 tanks hitClaimed 36 tanks hit

• Prevention of further operations by bad weatherPrevention of further operations by bad weather• German counter-attacks on 23 March against XXX CorpsGerman counter-attacks on 23 March against XXX Corps• Forced to shift the weight of the attackForced to shift the weight of the attack

Shifting Priorities Shifting Priorities

• Failure of XXX Corps frontal assaultFailure of XXX Corps frontal assault• Decision to concentrate on NZ Corps left hookDecision to concentrate on NZ Corps left hook• Intention to thrust towards the Gabes Gap via El Intention to thrust towards the Gabes Gap via El

HammaHamma• Air effort was to support this new thrustAir effort was to support this new thrust• 2424thth/25/25thth March No. 6 Squadron was again in March No. 6 Squadron was again in

action around El Hammaaction around El Hamma• Continuing attacks on airfieldsContinuing attacks on airfields• 20 tanks hit by Hurricane IID’s20 tanks hit by Hurricane IID’s• Maintenance of air superiority by actions of No. Maintenance of air superiority by actions of No.

242 Group and XII ASC242 Group and XII ASC• Army held up at El HammaArmy held up at El Hamma

Operation Operation SUPERCHARGE IISUPERCHARGE II

• Problem of geographyProblem of geography• A frontal assault would be A frontal assault would be

costlycostly• Broadhurst suggested a Broadhurst suggested a

possible solutionpossible solution– An ‘air blitz’An ‘air blitz’

• Use of air power of roving Use of air power of roving artillery on a fixed patternartillery on a fixed pattern

• This would allow movement This would allow movement by 1by 1stst Armoured Division Armoured Division

• Situation on other frontsSituation on other fronts• Broadhurst’s appreciationBroadhurst’s appreciation• NZ Corps Operation Orders NZ Corps Operation Orders

driven by the air plandriven by the air plan

Air Support – The Air Support – The Breakthrough at El HammaBreakthrough at El Hamma

• Exploitation of allied air superiorityExploitation of allied air superiority• BAI operation to proceed the ‘air blitz’BAI operation to proceed the ‘air blitz’• Outline of the ‘air blitz’Outline of the ‘air blitz’

– 15:30 2615:30 26thth March – 3 waves of light and medium bombers launched March – 3 waves of light and medium bombers launched pattern bombingpattern bombing

– On lines laid by a pre-planned artillery programmeOn lines laid by a pre-planned artillery programme– Relay attacks launched immediately after its completion by fighter-Relay attacks launched immediately after its completion by fighter-

bombersbombers– A strength of 2.5 squadrons was maintained over the battlespaceA strength of 2.5 squadrons was maintained over the battlespace– Relays arrived at quarter hour intervalsRelays arrived at quarter hour intervals– No. 6 Squadron Hurricane ‘tank-busters’ attacked concentrations of No. 6 Squadron Hurricane ‘tank-busters’ attacked concentrations of

tankstanks– Air superiority maintained by a roving patrol of one Spitfire Air superiority maintained by a roving patrol of one Spitfire

squadronsquadron

• Infantry advanced at 16:00 at a rate of 100 feet a minuteInfantry advanced at 16:00 at a rate of 100 feet a minute– Positions marked by flaresPositions marked by flares

• By 29By 29thth March 1 March 1stst Armoured Division had breached the Armoured Division had breached the Gabes GapGabes Gap

Command, Control, Command, Control, Intelligence and Intelligence and Reconnaissance Reconnaissance • Role of 285 WingRole of 285 Wing

– Reconnaissance in Reconnaissance in support of army support of army preparationspreparations

• Based on the Woodall Based on the Woodall systemsystem

• Lessons of No. 2 AASC Lessons of No. 2 AASC in the Western Desertin the Western Desert

• Final perfected use of Final perfected use of the Woodall systemthe Woodall system

• FAC’s deployed with 8FAC’s deployed with 8thth Armoured BrigadeArmoured Brigade

• Use of ‘Flying FAC’s’Use of ‘Flying FAC’s’• Intelligence driven Intelligence driven

interdiction campaigninterdiction campaign

Comments on the Battle at Comments on the Battle at El HammaEl Hamma

‘‘An interesting feature of the El Hamma battle was the An interesting feature of the El Hamma battle was the readiness of the Eighth Army to modify their plans at short readiness of the Eighth Army to modify their plans at short notice in order to fit in with what was considered to be the notice in order to fit in with what was considered to be the most effective method of employing the air forces. The air most effective method of employing the air forces. The air operations themselves had no specifically novel features. operations themselves had no specifically novel features. The conventional rules of war were applied, special The conventional rules of war were applied, special attention being paid to surprise, concentrating the attention being paid to surprise, concentrating the maximum force at the right place, and carefully co-maximum force at the right place, and carefully co-ordinating the air plans with those of the land forces.’ordinating the air plans with those of the land forces.’

AIR 23/6764 ‘Operations of the Western Desert Air Force AIR 23/6764 ‘Operations of the Western Desert Air Force from the capture of Tripoli, 23from the capture of Tripoli, 23rdrd Jan 1943, until the final Jan 1943, until the final

surrender of Axis forces in North Africa, 13surrender of Axis forces in North Africa, 13thth May 1943’ p. May 1943’ p. 2121

Conclusion: A Blueprint for Conclusion: A Blueprint for Success?Success?

• A fusion of lessonsA fusion of lessons• The RAF was proactive rather than reactive to army The RAF was proactive rather than reactive to army

needsneeds• Readiness of army commanders to listen to their air Readiness of army commanders to listen to their air

force counterpartsforce counterparts• Growth in inter-dependence between the army and Growth in inter-dependence between the army and

air forceair force• Development of command relationshipsDevelopment of command relationships

– Notably Montgomery and BroadhurstNotably Montgomery and Broadhurst

• Culmination of 3 years of hard fought lessonsCulmination of 3 years of hard fought lessons• A notable feature of combined arms operations in A notable feature of combined arms operations in

Italy and North-West EuropeItaly and North-West Europe• Introduction of WINKLE and TIMOTHY operationsIntroduction of WINKLE and TIMOTHY operations• Links to CABRANKLinks to CABRANK• Flexible and adaptableFlexible and adaptable