Attack the Network – Defeat th e Device – Train the Force ...

Attack the Network – Defeat the Device – Train the Force

JIEDDO Overviewpresented to the

United States Naval AcademyAlumni Association, San Diego Chapter

April 21, 2011

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

This briefing is UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OfiL USE ONLY


2

Era of Persistent Conflict

• Enemy will focus on irregular warfare using asymmetric means to attack and influence advanced nations

• Conventional, unconventional, lethal, non-lethal, state supported, non-state, hybrid organizations, extremism… produce a very complex environment

• Globalization

• Demographics

• Resources

• Proliferation

• Urbanization

• Environment

• Failed States

• Technology Advances

• Closed States Threatened

• Criminal Environments

• Resource Wars

• WMD/E Attacks

• Terrorist Recruitment

• Dissatisfied Populations

• Humanitarian Crises

Persistent

Conflict

The world will be in persistent conflict for generations and the IED will be the weapon of choice for decades

The world will be in persistent conflict for generations and the IED will be the weapon of choice for decades

Global Trends

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


3

IEDs are Weapons with…UNCLASSIFIED

Tactical Effect Operational Effect

Strategic Effect• Influence national will• Create perception of “lost

cause”• Use insecurity to

delegitimize host nation

• Isolate population• Disrupt freedom of

movement• Create perception

of insecurity

• Inflict casualties• Isolate population

from contact with friendly forces

Main Charge

Initiating System

Casing

Explosive Filler

Switch

InitiatorPower Sources

Containers

IED


4

Afghanistan IED TrendsUNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

• IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO

• IED severity has decreased

• IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11

Effective IEDAttacks

IneffectiveIED Attacks

# o

f IE

D E

ven

ts


5

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces- Effective host nation security force- Political reconciliation- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables

Iraq IED Trends

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11

Effective IEDAttacks

Ineffective IEDAttacks#

of

IED

Eve

nts


6

Global IED Threat

Source: Triton Report

UNCLASSIFIED

*actual IED attacks or devices found and cleared

Nov 2008 – Nov 2010

IED Incidents*

All Others

The average number of monthly IED incidents outside Iraq and Afghanistan was 245 for the last 6 months.

State & non-state actors

train, practice, &

employ IEDs worldwide

Monthly Global Terrorist Incidents (minus Iraq & Afghanistan)

0100200300400500600700800900

1000

Nov Dec Ja

n

Feb

Mar Apr

May

Jun

Jul

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov Dec Ja

n

Feb

Mar Apr

May

Jun Ju

l

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

UNCLASSIFIED (COIC/703-995-6930/10 Jan 11)


7

Global IED Threat Highlights

IEDs remain an on-going and persistent threat worldwide.Source: Open Source Press Reports

UNCLASSIFIED/

(J2/ 27Jan11)

Philippines: 21 Oct, RCIED attack on bus

kills 10 civilians, injures 40

Pakistan: 5 Nov, 79 killed in PBIED attack on mosque

outside Peshawar

Guatemala: 13 Sep, 1st reported use of

VBIED; device defused

Somalia: 9 Sep, al-Shabaab attacks Mogadishu

International Airport with SVBIED and PBIEDs; 9 killed

Turkey: 31 Oct, PBIED detonates in Istanbul wounding 32; Kurdistan

Freedom Hawks (TAK) claimed responsibility

UNCLASSIFIED

India: 8 Nov, 2 Military Police killed by Maoist

emplaced IEDArgentina: 16 Sep, IED detonated in front of

American Airlines and Alitalia offices. Chilean

anarchist group claimed responsibility.

Colombia: 4 Nov, Colombian Army

recovers 26 FARC gas cylinder bombs

Mexico: 10 Sep, Drug cartel use

‘luring’ tactic with VBIED

U.S.: 27 Oct, Pakistani-American

arrested for planning attacks against DC Metro

Chechnya: 19 Oct, Militants wearing PBIEDs attack Chechen parliament building in Grozny; Three civilians

killed,17 wounded

Algeria: Sep, AQIM conducts SVBIED against security force

convoy in Zemmouri

Moscow: 24 Jan, PBIED attack Domodedovo Airport; 35 killed,

130 wounded


8

DoD Response

In February 2006, Department of Defense stood up the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to support Combatant Commands by leading efforts to defeat improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations: The organization, integration and synchronization of capabilities that enable offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations across all phases of campaigns in order to defeat IEDs as operational and strategic weapons of influence.


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What Makes JIEDDO Unique?

• Laser-like focus on the IED threat

• Reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense

• Funded through OverseasContingency Operations– 3-year uncolored funding

• Rapid Acquisition – 4-24 month response window– 75% solution in months

• An innovative, transparent organization that finds solutions to the complex challenges of the IED fight

DoDs ability to rapidly

respond to Warfighters

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


10

Lines of Operation (LOOs)

Train the Force: Actions and activities designed to enable Attack the Network and Defeat the Device through:

graduate level Combat Training Center events C-IED training at Home Stations and the Centers

of Excellence focused individual C-IED pre-deployment training Training in-theater to stay ahead of adaptive enemy

Attack the Network: Lethal and non-lethal actions and operations against networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at multiple levels (tactical, operational, and strategic) that:

capitalize on or create key vulnerabilities disrupts activities eliminates the enemy’s ability to function

Defeat the Device: Detection, mitigation, and neutralization of IEDs once it has been emplaced through:

route clearance device neutralization explosive detection disposal of unexploded and captured ordnance vehicle and personnel protection

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


11

JIEDDO’s Current COCOM EngagementsUNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

USJFCOM• C-IED Doctrine• Battle Staff Training

USCENTCOM- Main Effort- Continuous Support- Federated Nodes (HQ

& SOCCENT)

USEUCOM• NATO C-IED COE - Spain• NATO EOD Center – Slovakia• Federated Nodes (DGS-4;

Future: HQ & SOCEUR)

USSOUTHCOM• Colombia C-IED Program

Development• Identify C-IED Planning

requirements• Federated Node (DGS-2)

USSOCOM• Ongoing support• Federated Nodes

(HQ, USASOC, and NSW)

USNORTHCOM• TUE plan & exercise

development• Federated Node (JTF-N)

USPACOM• USFK C-IED Plan Development• Key Resolve 2010• Asia-Pacific Fusion Center• Federated Nodes (USARPAC &

DGS-5; Future: SOCPAC)

Working with all COCOMs to:• Identify planning, training, and exercise events• Nest C-IED within OPLANS using the C-IED Planning Template• Build theater C-IED programs• Cultivate international C-IED capacity building

USAFRICOM• Responding to RFIs• Federated Nodes (HQ;

Future: SOCAF)

Goal is for Rest of the World to remain in Phase 0 C-IED operations


12

Technology Challenges

Predict and Prevent

Detect

Neutralize

Mitigate

Social and Dynamic Network AnalysisTagging, Tracking, & LocatingDetect/Prevent Pre-Emplacement ActivityPersistent Surveillance TechnologiesSensor Enhancement and Data Exploitation

Command Wire DetectionBuried IED & Pressure Initiation DetectionStandoff Explosives Detection & ConfirmationExplosively Formed Projectile DetectionSensitive Radio Frequency Detection

Passive Infrared DefeatBlasting Cap DefeatCounter Radio-controlled Electronic Warfare

Vehicle and Crew ProtectionPre-empt Use of New Technologies & TTPsMedical

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


13

C-IED Ops/Intel Integration

Weapons Intelligence Teams

Pattern Analysis

Home Made Explosive

Tactical Site Exploitation

Company Intel Supt Teams

Biometrics

ElectronicWarfareTargeting

Intel, SurveillanceRecon

Law EnforcementProgram

Counter IEDTargetingProcess

Human Terrain Team

Find Fix

AnalyzeFinish

Exploit

We need To Train Attack the Network

UNCLASSIFIED

Disseminate

Facilitates Training On AttackThe Network Using A Common JIEDDO Training Support Plan

Training

UNCLASSIFIED


14

UNCLASSIFIED

JIEDDO Capabilities to the Warfighter

As of 7 October 2010 UNCLASSIFIED TOTAL: $16.6B

FY 06: $3.6B(Appropriated)

FY 07: $3.3B(Obligated)




Attack the Network

FY 06-10 Appropriated

$5.4 B

Defeat the Device

FY 06-10Appropriated

$9.4B

Train the ForceFY 06-10

Appropriated$2B

Constant Hawk

Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles

Jammers: Duke, Guardian, Hunter, Spirals, Chameleon

PIR DefeatEngineer Reconnaissance Vehicles

Robotics

Rhino & Rhino II

Warrior Alpha

Combined Explosive Exploitation Cells (CEXC) Law Enforcement

Program

Rapid Aerostat Initial Deployment (RAID)

Persistent Threat Detection System

Joint Center of Excellence

Electronic Warfare Training

Surrogate Training Devices

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC)

Counter-IED Targeting Program

Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC)

CREW-Mounted 2.1

Route Clearance Blowers

Ground-Based Operational Surveillance System (G-BOSS)

Victim Operated IED (VOIED) Roller Systems

Rapid Deployable Integrated Surv. System (RDISS)

CREW Training

Home Station Training

Federated Nodes

Identity InstaCheck

Palantir

Data Tracker

Forensic Exploitation Team (FOX)

Weapons Technical Intelligence

External Information Programs

Base Expeditionary Target & Surv. System (BETSS-C)

Ahura

Vehicle Optics Sensor System (VOSS)

JCREW-Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer

MARCBot/XBot

Home Station Training I & II

Insurgents on the Battlefield

C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams (C-MATT)

JCAST

Desert Owl

Copperhead

Night Eagle

IED Rollers

CREW-Dismounted 3.1 & SOCOM EGON

Counter Bomber

BeachComber

Entry Control Point Solutions in a Box

Afghan Surge:

C-IED Live Fire

IED Battle Drill

Virtual Medical Training

Afghan Surge:

Keyhole

Route Clearance Optics Suite (RCOS)

Wolfhound II

JCAST

Exploitation Labs

Devil Pup

CREW-Fixed Site CVRJ

Mobile C-IED Interactive Trainer

Tactical Site Exploitation

Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) Toolkits

ORSA

Knowledge &Information Fusion Exchange


15

Summary

• We must contain the spread of IEDs as a global weapon of choice for violent extremists

• The ENEMY adapts quickly – “we can’t armor our way out of IEDs”

• We need to institutionally integrate what we have learned

• We must continue to strive to make IEDs too costly to produce and too risky to employ by:– Attacking networks that emplace IEDs– Training our forces to protect themselves

• We must seek technologies and train warfighters to protect themselves and defeat the devices

• IEDs are not just a tactical problem

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


Mr. Craig S. McDonaldDeputy OIC, JIEDDO USMC Detachment

(760) [email protected]

www.jieddo.dod.mil

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED


17

Afghanistan IED TrendsUNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

• IED efficacy has decreased despite an increased OPTEMPO

• IED severity has decreased

• IEDs are less lethal against US forces -- US KIA per Effective IED Attack have decreased, but Non-US Coalition Force KIA remains relatively constant


18

• No significant change in number of IED events since July; % of effective attacks trending downward• Coalition Force IED casualties continue to trend down, with only 2 CF IED WIA in December• Host Nation IED casualties trends continue to vary month to month

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Reasons for success: - Effective COIN strategy - Effective C-IED enablers w/trained forces- Effective host nation security force- Political reconciliation- Lethal targeting of irreconcilables

Iraq IED Trends


19

Joint Center of Excellence, Ft. Irwin, CA

• Resource Training for the IED Defeat Fight

• Direction, Guidance, & Coordination

Afghanistan Field Team (Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, Salerno, Jalalabad, Ghazni, Gardez, Orgun-E, Sharona, Tarin Kowt & Abad)

• Embed with deployed units• Advising Units• TTP development and dissemination• CREW training• ISAF transition• TF Phoenix Support

Iraq Field Team (Baghdad, Tikrit & Ramadi)

• Embed with deployed units• Advising Units• TTP development and dissemination• CREW training• Transition Team Support

Joint IED Defeat Organization, Crystal City, VA• Resourcing the IED Defeat Fight• Direction, Guidance, & Coordination• Technology Integration• DS Support from Rapid Equipping Force (REF)

JIEDDO’s Reach

UNCLASSIFIED

Counter-IED Operations Integration Center, VA

UNCLASSIFIED

JIEDDO Knowledge & Information Fusion Exchange (JKnIFE), Newport News, VA

• Global TTP, Best Practice, Lesson Learned repository• Collaboration & Information Sharing Portals• Knowledge Management• Joint Training Support

Joint Training COIC, Newport News, VA


20

Joint IED Defeat Organization Mission

Mission Areas

• Operations & Information Fusion• Training & Operations Support

• Rapid Acquisition• Strategic Planning

JIEDDO Lines of Operation

Attack the Network

Defeat the Device

Train the Force

Deputy Secretaryof Defense

Director, Joint IED Defeat Organization

JIEDDO leads DoD actions to rapidly provide Counter Improvised Explosive Device capabilities in support of the Combatant Commanders and to enable the defeat of the

IED as a weapon of strategic influence

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Attack the Network – Defeat th e Device – Train the Force ...

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