-
SMARTMATIC PCOS 2013A Primer on the
Automated
Election
System
in the Philippines
By the Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch)
Second Release: February 18, 2013
(What the Filipino people should know about the Smartmatic PCOS that
was proven to be decient with admitted program errors remaining
uncorrected. The use of automation technology without the license from
the real software owner, Dominion voting Systems, looms in the coming
May 2013 elections with the DVS terminating its licensing agreement with
Smartmatic, last May 23, 2012. An ongoing legal battle between Smartmatic
and DVS led in September 2012 in the chancery Court of Delaware, USA
reveals the core issue at the heart of the PCOS problem: that the election
technology used in May 2010 was not fully functional, had programming
errors, with the technology owner accusing Smartmatic of not
complying with international standards, a validation of studies by Filipino
IT experts and social scientists as early as 2009. The ongoing battle of citizens'
watchdogs and the Filipino IT community for the integrity of the vote and
accountability in automated elections remains integral with the ght for the
Freedom of Information --the right to know- by the public.)
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blank page
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A Primer on the
Automated
Election
System
in the Philippines
By the Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch)
First Release: January 26, 2013
I. The automated election
system (AES)
1) What is the Automated Election System (AES) for
Philippine elections?
The AES for Philippine elections is mandated by Republic Act (RA)
9369. RA 9369 amends RA 8436, entitled "An Act authorizing the
Commission on Elections to use an automated election system in the
May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national
and local electoral exercises, to encourage transparency, credibility,
fairness, and accuracy of elections, amending Batas Pambansa Blg.
881, as amended, RA No. 7166 and other related election laws,
providing funds thereof and for other purposes; to use an
automated election system or systems in the same election in
different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording
electronic election system as it may deem appropriate and practical
for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral
exercises a system using appropriate technology which has been
demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and
transmission of election results, and other electoral process.
1
-
SEC. 1 of RA 9369: It is the State policy to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, credible and informed elections, plebiscites,
referenda, recall and other similar electoral exercises by improving
on the election process and adopting systems, which shall involve
the use of an automated election system that will ensure the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation and
transmission documents in order that the process shall be
transparent and credible and the results fast, accurate and reective
of the genuine will of the people.
2) Under the poll modernization law (RA 9369), why does the
country need to automate its elections?
Automating the election, lawmakers said, will eliminate clerical,
human intervention-related errors. Other reasons: The conventional
manual process is too long and tedious. It takes almost two months
before national positions are proclaimed; to remove conditions for
dagdag-bawas or wholesale cheating in manual elections.
3) What are the requirements of a credible, secured, and
reliable automated election system (AES)?
The Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch), through a
committee of IT, business, and management experts came up in 2009
with its System Trustworthiness, Accountability, and Readiness
(STAR) Card to comprehensively assess and rate the implementation
of AES primarily by Comelec and Smartmatic-TIM. The STAR Card
listed 20 items of concerns rated as Pass=3; Qualied Pass=2.5;
Warning=2; Danger=1; Fail=0.
a. System set-up (Will the AES be ready for full
implementation?)
Timely delivery of machines
Quality of machines
Technology certication
Availability of transmission facilities
Deployment of machines
Physical security of machines
Precinct-specic ballots
Resource inventory at voting centers
Adequate general instructions
2
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b. Internal security (Will the AES have the necessary
safeguards to prevent fraud?)
Source code & its review
Veriability of voting and results
Secured transmission of results
Initialization of machines
Random Manual Audit of vote counts
c. Personnel training and voters' education (Will the teachers
and the voters know exactly what to do on election day?)
Training of election personnel
Stakeholders education & training
Precinct assignment voters
d. Contingency planning
Continuity plan
Electoral protest mechanism
Alternative election system
4) According to the law, who are responsible for making the
AES successful?
Government: Comelec Project Management Ofce together with
system-integrator Smartmatic counterparts; Comelec Advisory
Council; Technical Evaluation Committee; DOST-certied IT-capable
BEIs; Board of Canvassers; Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
(JCOC) on AES; Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine National
Police; and other state agencies.
Others : International Certication body; election watchers; media
such as the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP); Partish
Pastoral Council for Responsible Reporting (PPCRV), and the
National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL); Political Parties
and Candidates.
5) What is the role of the other sectors in the conduct of AES?
Other sectors/stakeholders mandated by the Constitution and other
laws: the civil society community, NGOs, citizens' watchdogs, media,
institutions, and the general public.
3
-
Their role: 1) right to participate in the electoral exercise as well as in
policy- and decision-making; 2) they represent the sovereign will of
the people and government emanates from them; 3) RA 9369 gives
CSO and other interested parties the right to review the election
source code, monitor the conduct of elections including the RMA,
conduct dialogs with Comelec and related agencies, participate in
Congress hearings including proposing amendments to existing
laws, and le election protests; 4) to protect the right to suffrage,
right to public information and transparency, non-interference by
foreign entities, as well as to fair, honest, and credible elections they
have the right to hold all government agencies and ofcials
accountable for misdeeds with the actions to include going to court
and calling for impeachment.
6) When was the AES rst implemented?
The rst AES was implemented in ARMM elections in 1996 and then
in August 1998. There was an attempt to fully automate the national
and local elections in 2004 but the Supreme Court stopped the
implementation. The 2007 midterm elections was not automated due
to lack of time. The May 10, 2010 presidential elections was the rst
to be automated.
What were the activities as well as critical problems and issues - on
election day (May 10, 2010) and after? Were these problems and
issues addressed by Comelec and other concerned agencies?
II. How was the automated election system
conducted in 2010?
4
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Ph
ase
Issu
eC
om
ele
cA
cti
vit
y /
Su
b-a
cti
vit
y
Ap
prais
al
of
Co
mele
c A
cti
on
Ele
cti
on
Day
Ele
cti
on
mate
ria
ls
inv
en
tory
;
Bo
oti
ng
of
PC
OS
&
sig
nin
g i
n;
Zero
resu
lts p
rin
tin
g;
Decla
rati
on
th
at
po
ll
is o
pen
fo
r v
oti
ng
;
Tech
nic
al
pro
ble
ms o
f
bo
oti
ng
an
d s
ign
ing
in b
y B
EI
in s
ev
eral
clu
ste
red
precin
cts
;
Do
cu
men
ted
scan
ned
vo
tes a
lread
y
dis
pla
yed
on
th
e
PC
OS
befo
re s
tart
of
vo
tin
g a
s i
n B
ilir
an
.
2010: T
he s
yste
m w
as a
reso
un
din
g s
uccess!
2011: T
he s
yste
m w
as a
q
uali
ed
su
ccess!
No
tech
nic
al
rep
ort
was d
on
e w
ith
acco
mp
an
yin
g
do
cu
men
ts r
ele
ased
to
the p
ub
lic.
Do
cu
men
ts e
xp
lain
ing
the n
ati
on
wid
e
pro
ble
ms s
ho
uld
be
dis
clo
sed
to
th
e
pu
bli
c.
Co
mele
c a
nd
Sm
artm
ati
c c
on
ten
d
that
the p
ro
ble
ms
were e
xp
ecte
d o
f a
new
sy
ste
m s
ince
no
tech
no
log
y i
s
perfe
ct
an
yw
ay
.
Massiv
e
dis
en
fran
ch
isem
en
t
du
e t
o 1
-bla
nk
ball
ot
Vo
tin
g p
erio
dT
he o
ld 5
precin
cts
-
per c
luste
red
precin
ct-
co
n
gu
rati
on
has n
o
Th
e k
ilo
metr
ic q
ueu
es
on
ele
cti
on
day
were
the b
est
arg
um
en
t
5
-
per v
ote
r r
ule
; v
ote
r
au
then
ticati
on
to
ok
too
lo
ng
; P
CO
S
brea
kd
ow
ns
(do
cu
men
ted
cases)
Vo
tin
g p
erio
dscie
nti
c b
asis
. It
was
mo
re o
f a c
ost-
based
decis
ion
(at
wh
at
po
int
it w
ill
be l
ess
co
stl
y t
han
DR
E).
No
serio
us q
ueu
ing
stu
dy
an
d s
imu
lati
on
were
do
ne t
o g
et
a p
ictu
re
of
ho
w t
he v
ote
r l
ines
wil
l b
eh
av
e o
n
ele
cti
on
day
an
d
arriv
e a
t th
e o
pti
mu
m
nu
mb
er
of
PC
OS
un
its.
that
the s
izin
g
meth
od
(to
dete
rm
ine
nu
mb
er o
f P
CO
S
un
its n
eed
ed
) w
as
utt
erly
wro
ng
. It
resu
lted
in
v
olu
nta
ry
v
ote
r
dis
en
fran
ch
isem
en
t
du
e t
o t
he l
on
g
wait
ing
tim
e. T
he
inef
cie
nt
vo
ter
iden
tity
veri
cati
on
ste
p a
gg
rav
ate
d t
he
sit
uati
on
fu
rth
er.
Vo
ter a
uth
en
ticati
on
& i
den
tity
veri
cati
on
Th
e V
ote
r R
eg
istr
ati
on
Sy
ste
m, a 9
-year-o
ld
pro
ject
wh
ich
has c
ost
at
aro
un
d P
hP
4b
n, is
sti
ll i
nef
cie
nt
an
d
inco
mp
lete
Co
mele
c i
s s
o
passio
nate
ly b
iased
tow
ard
th
e a
uto
mati
on
of
the v
oti
ng
/
can
vassin
g p
ro
cesses
giv
ing
less p
rio
rit
y t
o
the v
ote
r r
eg
istr
ati
on
sy
ste
m, a p
ro
ject
wh
ich
sta
rte
d a
s f
ar
Eq
ual
prio
rit
y m
ust
be
giv
en
to
th
ese t
wo
co
re a
nd
mis
sio
n-
crit
ical
fun
cti
on
s o
f
the C
om
mis
sio
n t
o
rem
ov
e t
he v
ery
vis
ible
messy
dy
sfu
ncti
on
we s
aw
in
May
2010 b
etw
een
6
-
back
as A
pril
2003
an
d w
hic
h t
o d
ate
is
sti
ll a
wo
rk
in
pro
gress
them
. I
f w
e s
imp
lify
the f
un
dam
en
tal
req
uis
ites o
f a
tru
stw
orth
y e
lecti
on
we w
ill
arriv
e a
t o
nly
three c
om
man
dm
en
ts
(sim
ple
r a
nd
less
nu
mb
er t
han
th
ose f
or
gett
ing
to
heav
en
):
1)
fair
ness (
on
e v
ote
per q
uali
ed
vo
ter),
2)
priv
acy
or s
ecret
ball
ots
(v
ote
s k
no
wn
on
ly t
o t
he v
ote
r),
an
d
3)
accu
racy
(v
ote
s a
re
reco
rd
ed
as i
nte
nd
ed
an
d c
ou
nte
d a
s
reco
rd
ed
).
Du
e t
o t
his
messy
Vo
ters R
eg
istr
ati
on
Sy
ste
m c
om
man
dm
en
t
#1 w
as m
ost
lik
ely
vio
late
d
7
-
Ball
ot
issu
an
ce
PC
OS
-driv
en
fak
e
ball
ots
dete
cti
on
featu
re n
ot
av
ail
ab
le;
au
tom
ati
c f
ak
e b
all
ot
dete
cti
on
man
dato
ry
featu
re d
id n
ot
wo
rk
;
wo
rk
-aro
un
d s
olu
tio
n
usin
g h
an
d-h
eld
UV
scan
ners w
as
ineff
ecti
ve.
Sm
artm
ati
c w
as
all
ow
ed
to
use u
sed
prin
ters f
or p
rin
tin
g
the b
all
ots
. T
his
cau
sed
fail
ure i
n
pla
cin
g a
n e
ffecti
ve
so
luti
on
on
th
e b
all
ots
that
wil
l b
e d
ete
cte
d
by
th
e P
CO
S
au
tom
ati
call
y u
po
n
feed
ing
of
the b
all
ots
.
Th
e a
uto
mati
c f
ak
e
ball
ot
dete
cti
on
featu
re i
s a
MU
ST
sin
ce a
ny
hu
man
-
driv
en
dete
cti
on
op
tio
n w
ill
no
t b
e
str
ictl
y c
arrie
d o
ut
by
the B
EIs
as w
hat
hap
pen
ed
. M
ost
lik
ely
fair
ness w
as v
iola
ted
.
Actu
al
vo
tin
g
(sh
ad
ing
)
Vo
ter p
riv
acy
was
co
mp
ro
mis
ed
du
e t
o
the l
en
gth
of
the
ball
ot;
oth
er v
ote
rs c
an
easil
y s
ee o
ne's
vo
tes.
Th
e p
ossib
ilit
y o
f a
priv
acy
co
mp
ro
mis
e
cau
sed
by
th
e l
on
g
ball
ot
did
no
t ev
en
co
me t
o t
he m
ind
s o
f
the C
om
ele
c
imp
lem
en
ters.
Vo
ter p
riv
acy
or v
ote
secrecy
is a
basic
rig
ht
of
the v
ote
r a
nd
was
co
mp
ro
mis
ed
by
Co
mele
c.
Ball
ot
su
bm
issio
n
to P
CO
S
Vo
te v
eri
cati
on
by
vo
ter p
rio
r t
o
su
bm
issio
n t
o P
CO
S,
a m
an
dato
ry
Co
mele
c i
s s
o w
orrie
d
ab
ou
t th
e p
ossib
le l
on
g
qu
eu
e t
hat
mig
ht
form
if t
he v
ote
r i
s g
iven
a
Vo
ters d
id n
ot
hav
e a
ch
an
ce t
o r
ev
iew
th
e
vo
tes r
eco
rd
ed
by
th
e
PC
OS
wh
ich
is a
8
-
req
uir
em
en
t w
as
deacti
vate
d; g
iven
th
e
do
ub
tfu
l accu
racy
of
the P
CO
S, th
is i
s a
very
serio
us i
ssu
e. T
he
vo
ter d
idn
't k
no
w i
f
his
vo
tes w
ere
co
rrectl
y r
eco
rd
ed
.
ch
an
ce t
o v
erif
y
wh
eth
er h
is v
ote
s w
ere
reco
rd
ed
co
rrectl
y t
hat
is w
hy
it
all
ow
ed
Sm
artm
ati
c t
o
deacti
vate
th
is v
ery
imp
orta
nt
mach
ine
featu
re.
vio
lati
on
of
the A
ES
law
. W
orse, it
s
ab
sen
ce r
em
ov
ed
th
e
ch
eck
th
at
wil
l v
erif
y
the a
ccu
racy
of
the
PC
OS
. A
vio
lati
on
of
accu
racy
a
min
imu
m
sy
ste
m r
eq
uir
em
en
t.
Qu
eu
e m
an
ag
em
en
tN
o r
eal
an
d
scie
nti
call
y-b
ased
tim
e a
nd
mo
tio
n s
tud
y
of
the e
nti
re v
ote
r
iden
ti
cati
on
an
d
vo
tin
g p
ro
cess w
as
do
ne. T
he 5
old
precin
cts
clu
ste
rin
g
decis
ion
was m
ad
e v
ia
the s
eat-
of-
the-p
an
ts
meth
od
(o
r w
hat
wil
l
be c
heap
en
ou
gh
to
hu
rd
le t
he D
BM
bu
dg
et
scru
tin
y i
f
PC
OS
is u
sed
).
9
-
Ex
ecu
tio
n o
f clo
se o
f
vo
tin
g p
ro
ced
ures;
Sh
ift
to p
ost-
vo
tin
g
mo
de;
Prin
tin
g o
f 8 E
R c
op
ies
Prin
tou
ts o
f th
e E
Rs
(on
ly 3
.5-i
nch
es w
ide
an
d v
ery
, v
ery
lo
ng
)
are t
oo
sm
all
wh
en
these a
re r
eq
uir
ed
to
be p
oste
d o
n t
he
precin
ct'
s w
all
an
d
rem
ain
th
ere f
or 4
8
ho
urs a
fter p
oll
s c
losed
for t
he p
ub
lic t
o s
ee
an
d r
eco
rd
.
Co
mele
c a
llo
wed
th
is
desp
ite t
he c
lear i
nte
nt
that
the E
Rs w
ill
be
po
ste
d a
t th
e p
recin
ct
wall
fo
r 4
8 h
ou
rs a
fter
clo
sin
g o
f p
oll
s. T
his
wil
l req
uir
e t
he P
CO
S
to h
av
e a
n e
xte
rn
al
wid
er p
rin
ter w
hic
h
Sm
artm
arti
c/
Do
min
ion
's p
ro
po
sed
so
luti
on
do
es n
ot
hav
e.
Du
e t
o t
his
un
met
req
uir
em
en
t C
om
ele
c
sh
ou
ld h
av
e
dis
qu
ali
ed
Sm
artm
ati
c b
ut
it d
id
no
t. In
ste
ad
, o
ur
ele
cti
on
sy
ste
m w
as
mad
e t
o
t to
th
e
so
luti
on
of
Sm
artm
ati
c, n
ot
the
oth
er w
ay
aro
un
d.
Th
is l
essen
ed
th
e
tran
sp
aren
cy
of
the
ele
cti
on
co
nd
uct.
T
his
vio
late
d f
air
ness a
nd
accu
racy
.
Dig
ital
sig
nin
gT
he a
bsen
ce o
f a r
eal
an
d i
nd
ustr
y-a
ccep
ted
dig
ital
sig
natu
re f
or
Co
mele
c a
llo
wed
a
mach
ine s
ign
atu
re -
an
utt
erly
un
accep
tab
le
Its a
bsen
ce
co
mp
ro
mis
es t
he e
nti
re
ele
cti
on
's i
nte
grit
y.
10
-
the E
Rs a
nd
CO
Cs
was a
very
, v
ery
larg
e
secu
rit
y h
ole
;
an
yth
ing
can
be d
on
e
on
th
e r
esu
lts b
y
an
yb
od
y w
ho
gain
s
access t
o t
hese r
esu
lts.
decis
ion
fo
r n
ow
here
in t
he w
orld
an
d t
he
IT i
nd
ustr
y c
an
a
mach
ine s
ign
atu
re
qu
ali
fy a
s a
real
dig
ital
sig
natu
re.
Tran
sm
issio
n o
f resu
lts
Tran
sm
issio
n o
f th
e
ER
s d
id n
ot
foll
ow
th
e
man
dato
ry
hie
rarch
ical
seq
uen
ce
an
d d
irecti
on
th
us
op
en
ing
th
em
to
po
ssib
le f
rau
d.
Co
mele
c a
llo
wed
un
restr
icte
d
tran
sm
issio
n s
eq
uen
ce
an
d d
irecti
on
th
us
vio
lati
ng
wit
h
imp
un
ity
th
is
man
dato
ry
pro
toco
l.
Tran
sm
issio
n w
as d
on
e
to w
hic
hev
er h
ad
an
op
en
lin
k a
t th
e t
ime o
f
tran
sm
issio
n.
Th
e c
orrect
hie
rarch
ical
tran
sm
issio
n p
ro
toco
l
of
rst
to t
he c
ity
/m
un
serv
er w
as n
ot
foll
ow
ed
wit
h
Co
mele
c's
ap
pro
val;
we d
id n
ot
kn
ow
if
the
PC
OS
were
tran
sm
itti
ng
rst
to a
ro
gu
e s
erv
er
so
mew
here w
here
resu
lts c
an
be d
octo
red
or t
he c
en
tral
serv
er
itself
als
o s
erv
ed
as t
he
ro
gu
e s
erv
er. I
t is
1,6
34 t
imes m
ore
11
-
dif
cu
lt t
o c
oerce
/co
op
t p
eo
ple
man
nin
g o
ne s
erv
er
sit
e t
han
1,6
34 s
ets
of
peo
ple
in
1,6
34 s
ites
(th
e n
um
ber o
f cit
ies
an
d m
un
icip
ali
ties).
Tran
sp
aren
cy
was
cle
arly
vio
late
d h
ere.
Tran
sm
issio
n t
o t
he
cit
y/
mu
nic
ipal
co
nso
lid
ati
on
serv
er
FIR
ST
Th
e c
orrect
hie
rarch
ical
tran
sm
issio
n p
ro
toco
l
of
rst
to t
he c
ity
/m
un
serv
er w
as n
ot
foll
ow
ed
wit
h
Co
mele
c's
ap
pro
val;
we d
id n
ot
kn
ow
if
the
PC
OS
were
tran
sm
itti
ng
rst
to a
ro
gu
e s
erv
er
so
mew
here w
here
resu
lts c
an
be d
octo
red
or t
he c
en
tral
serv
er
itself
als
o s
erv
ed
as t
he
12
-
ro
gu
e s
erv
er. It
is 1
,634
tim
es m
ore d
if
cu
lt t
o
co
erce p
eo
ple
man
nin
g
on
e s
erv
er s
ite t
han
1,6
34 s
ets
of
peo
ple
in
1,6
34 s
ites.
To
th
e c
en
tral/
KB
P
serv
ers s
ub
seq
uen
tly
;
Prin
tin
g o
f 22
ad
dit
ion
al
ER
co
pie
s;
Back
-up
& s
hu
tdo
wn
of
PC
OS
Th
ere a
re v
ali
d
gro
un
ds t
hat
the C
F
card
is n
ot
a W
rit
e-
On
ce-R
ead
-Man
y
(WO
RM
) sto
rag
e
med
ium
th
us o
pen
ing
the p
ossib
ilit
y o
f
tam
perin
g e
ith
er t
he
resu
lts o
r t
he b
all
ot
co
n
gu
rati
on
an
d
oth
er s
erio
us f
rau
d.
Co
mele
c a
llo
wed
th
is
desp
ite b
ein
g a
man
dato
ry
req
uir
em
en
t
wh
ich
in
ten
ded
fo
r a
CD
-R o
r D
VD
-R
reco
rd
ing
med
ium
. T
he
Sm
artm
ati
c/
Do
min
ion
pro
po
sed
so
luti
on
did
no
t h
av
e e
ith
er a
n
inte
rn
al
or e
xte
rn
al
CD
/D
VD
driv
e.
We c
learly
saw
th
e C
F
card
mess t
hat
hap
pen
ed
5 d
ay
s
befo
re e
lecti
on
day
an
d
on
ele
cti
on
day
its
elf
.
Had
Co
mele
c a
dh
ere
to t
he t
ech
nic
al
sp
eci
cati
on
s t
hese
co
uld
hav
e b
een
prev
en
ted
.
Tran
sp
aren
cy
ag
ain
was a
vic
tim
here.
13
-
Ele
cti
on
mate
ria
ls
inv
en
tory
;
Precin
ct
rep
ort
writ
ing
;
Th
e C
hain
-of-
Cu
sto
dy
of
sen
sit
ive
co
mp
on
en
ts (
ball
ots
,
ball
ot
bo
xes, C
F c
ard
s,
PC
OS
un
its, etc
,) o
f th
e
sy
ste
m w
as n
ot
secu
re
en
ou
gh
to
assu
re t
hat
it
is n
ot
bro
ken
an
yw
here
in t
he c
hain
. W
orse,
reco
un
ts s
tarte
d o
nly
10
mo
nth
s a
fter e
lecti
on
day
, so
mu
ch
tim
e t
o
frau
du
len
tly
tam
per t
he
ball
ots
to
matc
h t
he
ER
s.
Th
e C
hain
-of-
Cu
sto
dy
of
sen
sit
ive
co
mp
on
en
ts (
ball
ots
,
ball
ot
bo
xes, C
F c
ard
s,
PC
OS
un
its, etc
,) o
f th
e
sy
ste
m w
as n
ot
secu
re
en
ou
gh
to
assu
re t
hat
it
is n
ot
bro
ken
an
yw
here
in t
he c
hain
. W
orse,
reco
un
ts s
tarte
d o
nly
10
mo
nth
s a
fter e
lecti
on
day
, so
mu
ch
tim
e t
o
frau
du
len
tly
tam
per t
he
ball
ots
to
matc
h t
he
ER
s.
Co
mele
c s
eem
ed
to
be
no
t serio
us i
n
preserv
ing
an
un
bro
ken
ch
ain
-of-
cu
sto
dy
of
sen
sit
ive
co
mp
on
en
ts o
f th
e
sy
ste
m w
hen
th
is
asp
ect
de
nes w
heth
er
an
ele
cti
on
is
tru
stw
orth
y o
r n
ot
esp
ecia
lly
in
th
e c
on
tex
t
of
pro
test
cases.
Re-p
ack
ing
of
PC
OS
an
d a
ccesso
rie
s;
Prep
arati
on
fo
r R
MA
if
the p
recin
ct
is s
ub
ject
to R
MA
;
14
-
Init
iali
zati
on
of
cit
y/
mu
nic
ipal
serv
ers
Co
nso
lid
ati
on
at
the
cit
y/
mu
n s
erv
ers;
Dig
ital
sig
nin
gT
he a
bsen
ce o
f a r
eal
an
d i
nd
ustr
y-a
ccep
ted
dig
ital
sig
natu
re f
or
the E
Rs a
nd
CO
Cs w
as
a v
ery
, v
ery
larg
e
secu
rit
y h
ole
; an
yth
ing
can
be d
on
e o
n t
he
resu
lts b
y a
ny
bo
dy
wh
o g
ain
s a
ccess t
o
these r
esu
lts.
Co
mele
c a
llo
wed
a
mach
ine s
ign
atu
re -
an
utt
erly
un
accep
tab
le
decis
ion
fo
r n
ow
here
in t
he w
orld
an
d t
he I
T
ind
ustr
y c
an
a
mach
ine s
ign
atu
re
qu
ali
fy a
s a
tru
e d
igit
al
sig
natu
re.
Its a
bsen
ce
co
mp
ro
mis
es t
he
en
tire e
lecti
on
's
inte
grit
y.
Tran
sm
issio
n t
o
cen
tral/
KB
P s
erv
ers
Init
iali
zati
on
of
cen
tral
serv
er
Co
nso
lid
ati
on
at
cen
tral
serv
er
15
-
Can
vassin
g a
t
Co
mele
c C
en
ter &
Join
t C
on
gressio
nal
Can
vassin
g C
en
ter
Th
e s
ho
ck
ing
ly w
ro
ng
tall
y o
f th
e n
ati
on
wid
e
tota
l v
ote
s (
150+
mil
lio
n i
n t
he C
om
ele
c
Can
vassin
g s
erv
er a
nd
250+
mil
lio
n i
n t
he
Join
t C
on
gressio
nal
Can
vassin
g s
erv
er w
ere
ign
ored
by
th
ese t
wo
bo
die
s; th
is i
s a
n
ob
vio
us t
ech
nic
al
erro
r.
Th
e s
ho
ck
ing
ly w
ro
ng
tall
y o
f th
e n
ati
on
wid
e
tota
l v
ote
s (
150+
mil
lio
n
in t
he C
om
ele
c
Can
vassin
g s
erv
er a
nd
250+
mil
lio
n i
n t
he
Join
t C
on
gressio
nal
Can
vassin
g s
erv
er w
ere
ign
ored
by
th
ese t
wo
bo
die
s; th
is i
s a
n
ob
vio
us t
ech
nic
al
erro
r.
Co
mele
c e
ch
oed
Sm
artm
ati
c's
ex
cu
se
that
the w
ro
ng
tall
y
was a
resu
lt o
f
ap
pli
cati
on
erro
r
Th
is i
s a
BU
G o
f te
rrib
le
po
ssib
le c
on
seq
uen
ce
wh
ich
co
uld
hav
e b
een
dete
cte
d h
ad
a p
ro
per
ind
ep
en
den
t so
urce
co
de r
ev
iew
was
all
ow
ed
. T
he l
arg
e
nu
mb
er a
s p
er i
nd
ustr
y
practi
ce)
is s
up
po
sed
to
be t
he s
o-c
all
ed
sy
ste
m
ch
ok
e p
oin
t (t
he p
oin
t
for t
he m
ax
imu
m
nu
mb
er o
f b
all
ots
th
at
can
be c
ou
nte
d s
et
as a
param
ete
r o
f th
e
sy
ste
m).
W
hy
were
these t
wo
param
ete
rs
set
at
3 a
nd
5 t
imes t
he
nu
mb
er o
f reg
iste
red
vo
ters? G
iven
a t
urn
ou
t
of
40 m
illi
on
, w
here
did
th
e 1
10+
mil
lio
n
an
d 2
10 m
illi
on
plu
s
ex
tra b
all
ots
co
me f
ro
m
16
-
sin
ce t
hese n
um
bers
were r
each
ed
by
th
e
two
can
vassin
g c
en
ters?
Po
st
Ele
cti
on
Ran
do
m M
an
ual
Au
dit
(R
MA
)
Th
e R
MA
was
co
mp
lete
ly w
ro
ng
du
e
to t
he w
ro
ng
sam
pli
ng
meth
od
plu
s t
he
sam
ple
s a
re n
ot
rep
resen
tati
ve o
f th
e
ele
cti
on
co
nte
sts
th
at
were a
ud
ited
; g
iven
su
ch
, n
o d
efe
nsib
le
sta
tisti
cal
co
nclu
sio
n
can
be g
lean
ed
fro
m
the e
xp
en
siv
e e
ffo
rt
thu
s d
efe
ati
ng
th
e
fun
dam
en
tal
pu
rp
ose
of
the l
aw
pro
vis
ion
fo
r
tran
sp
aren
cy
.
Th
e R
MA
was
co
mp
lete
ly w
ro
ng
du
e
to t
he w
ro
ng
sam
pli
ng
meth
od
plu
s t
he
sam
ple
s a
re n
ot
rep
resen
tati
ve o
f th
e
ele
cti
on
co
nte
sts
th
at
were a
ud
ited
; g
iven
su
ch
, n
o d
efe
nsib
le
sta
tisti
cal
co
nclu
sio
n
can
be g
lean
ed
fro
m
the e
xp
en
siv
e e
ffo
rt
thu
s d
efe
ati
ng
th
e
fun
dam
en
tal
pu
rp
ose
of
the l
aw
pro
vis
ion
fo
r
tran
sp
aren
cy
.
Co
mele
c i
s N
OT
pro
hib
ited
fro
m
imp
ro
vin
g o
n t
he l
aw
pro
vis
ion
fo
r R
MA
. Y
es,
it t
rie
d t
o i
mp
ro
ve t
he
pro
vis
ion
by
gearin
g f
or
5 s
am
ple
s p
er d
istr
ict
inste
ad
of
on
e p
er l
aw
req
uir
em
en
t. B
ut
the
sam
pli
ng
used
was
co
mp
lete
ly w
ro
ng
,
hen
ce, th
e s
am
ple
s
were n
ot
rep
resen
tati
ve
of
the d
om
ain
s a
ud
ited
.
Erg
o n
o u
sefu
l o
r v
ali
d
co
nclu
sio
n c
an
be m
ad
e
fro
m t
he R
MA
resu
lts.
It e
nd
ed
up
as ju
st
an
ex
pen
siv
e a
nd
waste
ful
mad
e-f
or-m
ed
ia t
heatr
e
of
zero
au
dit
valu
e.
17
-
Pro
cla
mati
on
Pro
cla
mati
on
s w
ere n
ot
eff
ecte
d a
s c
arefu
lly
as
they
sh
ou
ld b
e
resu
ltin
g i
n p
ro
tests
nu
mb
erin
g b
igg
er t
han
in p
ast
man
ual
ele
cti
on
s.
Pro
tests
Pro
tests
were i
n e
ffect
futi
le f
or t
he r
eco
un
ts
were d
on
e 1
0 m
on
ths
aft
er e
lecti
on
day
, m
ore
than
tim
e e
no
ug
h t
o
lose t
he a
ud
it v
alu
e o
f
the r
esu
lts.
Bo
tto
mli
ne, th
e 2
010
AE
S d
urin
g i
ts u
se o
n
ele
cti
on
day
an
d a
fter
becam
e a
bla
ck
bo
x
infe
ste
d w
ith
so
man
y
wo
rm
s w
hic
h a
te i
ts
inte
grit
y, secu
rit
y a
nd
tran
sp
aren
cy
.
18
-
1) Why is monitoring and assessment important in the
implementation of the AES?
Especially because it is a new election process with its full-blast
implementation in the May 10, 2010 synchronized national and local
elections, the AES should be subjected to rigorous monitoring and
assessment.
Monitoring and assessment are important in order to ascertain how
the AES was implemented - from preparations for the May 2010
elections, how it performed on election day, as well as post-election.
Assessment is also vital in establishing whether implementation is
compliant with the election modernization law (legal); follows the IT
standard requirements such as security, trustworthiness, accuracy,
auditability, and reliability (technical); and ensures secret voting and
public counting, transparency and accountability (management).
An important aspect of the assessment is to validate the AES' goal of
electoral reform particularly in minimizing if not entirely eliminating
fraud as well as enhancing electoral democracy.
2) Who are mandated by law to conduct the assessment/probe
of the AES?
The government bodies that are mandated by law to conduct the
assessment are: Comelec, Comelec Advisory Council (CAC), and the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) on the AES.
Congress (both the House and Senate) through its concerned
committees is also mandated to probe into the conduct of the AES in
aid of legislation.
In its report on The Conduct of the Automated 2010 National and
Local Elections released only on March 7, 2011, Comelec dubbed the
May 2010 AES as credible and successful. However, it downgraded
its claim of resounding success to qualied success later. The
report of CAC (June 2010) described the AES as not a perfectly
executed exercise but, despite the mistakes committed by Comelec
and Smartmatic-TIM it ultimately did work. However, since the
AES has too many problems that need to be solved, it recommended
III. Monitoring and assessment of the AES from
May 10, 2010 present
19
-
to Comelec not to exercise the option to purchase the Smartmatic-
TIM election system for the May 2013 elections.
The House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (CSER) in
its June 2010 report called its assessment of the AES a mixed
success: Automation showed no substantial advantage. On the
local level, our assessment is of profound unease. On the other
hand, the JCOC on AES is mandated by law to review the automated
polls within one year and recommend whether to use the same
technology or a new one. But it convened nally after 2 years only
on Nov. 21, 2012. No assessment was ever made until Congress
adjourned for the May 2013 polls.
3) What other agencies and groups were involved in the
monitoring and assessment and what were their ndings?
Citizens' watchdogs, organizations, and institutions that were
actively involved in the monitoring and assessment included: the
Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch), a broad multi-
sectoral group composed of 45 organizations; the Center for People
Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG); National Movement for
Free Elections (NAMFREL); Philippine Computer Society (PCS); and
DLSU-College of Computer Studies. Others were the Philippine
Computer Society, Consortium of Christian Organizations for Rural-
Urban Development (Concord through Healing Democracy);
People's International Observers Mission, observers from the Global
Filipino Nation, Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), Carter
Mission, Global Filipino Nation, former Comelec Chair Christian
Monsod, and others.
4) What major ndings and conclusions (or specic
highlights) were made by these groups in the monitoring
and assessment of the May 2010 AES?
AES Watch: The major concerns raised by AES Watch through its
STAR Card were strongly validated by the actual experience in
implementing the AES. The glitches, errors, and deciencies
observed throughout the country during the May 2010 elections
clearly highlighted the aws in the setup and internal security of the
automated system, as well as the inadequacies in personnel training,
voter's education, and contingency planning. Problems and issues
encountered at the various stages of the election process, from voting
and counting to canvassing and proclamation, have been
recorded/documented in the reports of print and broadcast media,
20
-
the hearings of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of
the House of Representatives, the ndings of the Forensic Team
constituted by the Joint Congressional Canvassing Committee to
examine certain PCOS machines, and the testimonies of various
election stakeholders. (Post-Election Report of AES Watch: Recap and
Validated of the STAR Card Assessment of the Preparations for the May
2010 Automated Elections, October 2010)
CenPEG: There was a high incidence of technical hitches, blunders,
voting procedural errors, and other operational failures throughout
the country during the May 10, 2010 automated elections. As The
CenPEG Report reveals, these can be attributed to the lack of
safeguards, security measures, as well as timely and effective
continuity/contingency measures (software, hardware, technologies,
and other system components) that proved damaging to the
accuracy, security, and reliability of election returns. Lacking these
vital mechanisms, the automated election system (AES) that was
harnessed for the May 10 polls was vulnerable not only to various
glitches and management failures but also electronic cheating
including possible pre-loading of election results. The Comelec is
called upon to disclose all election documents public information
to test and validate its claim of election success and debunk
allegations of electronic fraud all for the sake of public interest and
voters' rights. (The CenPEG Report, December 2010)
NAMFREL: The preoccupation with new technology and speedy
counting to impress the public came at the expense of greater
transparency and accountability of the system In spite of the
automation of the voting process, traditional forms of electoral fraud
such as vote buying; ballot capturing; use of minors in the campaign
as well as in vote buying; threats, intimidation, and violence; and
non-observance of secrecy and privacy during voting, remained
rampant. (Terminal Report, July 10, 2010)
Joint Forensic Team (Final Report to Congress' Joint Canvassing
Committee, June 10, 2010): The published hash code (in the
Comelec website) is not the same as the extracted hash code; no
digital signatures in the PCOS machines, contrary to the claims of
Smartmatic; the PCOS machine contains a console port; (the
Team upon testing) was able to connect an ordinary laptop
computer to the console port of a PCOS machine. (The Joint
Forensic Team, led by Atty. Al Vitangcol III, examined 60 PCOS
machines found in the house of a Smartmatic technician in Antipolo,
Rizal after the May 10, 2010 elections.)
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Christian Monsod, former Comelec Chairman: Our automation was
mass-produced in one step, was not really pilot-tested satisfactorily,
and was provided by a supplier who had no extensive experience in
the technology and seemed to be also learning while it was being
implemented. (The 2010 Automated Elections An Assessment, Nov.9,
2010)
Philippine Computer Society (PCS) report on the Biliran fraud case:
There were highly questionable instances where the probability of
fraud may have been perpetrated using the PCOS machines (based
on) the audit trail of the PCOS machines and the computer audit trail
of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC). There were
inconsistent protective counters displayed by the PCOS machines.
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL): Secrecy of the ballot was
virtually impossibleThe operation of PCOs machines encountered
numerous technical glitches, ranging from minor ones that lasted for
a few minutes, to others that led to suspension of polling for hours.
Delay and failure of the transmission of the elections results was
widely reported.
Carter Center (U.S.): Review of the AES's source code was limited to
an on-screen presentation conducted under the auspices of
COMELEC. Concerned that such a review was inadequate to
identify potential problems, many watchdog groups chose to forgo
participation and were unable to review the code at all.(There was)
signicant curtailment of the right to vote by secret ballot in the 2010
elections(Comelec should) conduct pre-election testing in a real-
world and set at an earlier date in order to ensure adequate time to
correct any issues identied.
Healing Democracy: The May 10, 2010 election was no different from
previous fraudulent, anomalous, and violence-ridden polls in the
country. Like in previous elections, Comelec should explain for the
technical glitches, transmission failures, as well as incidents of fraud
and violence taking place across the country. These election
irregularities were vivid in Lanao del Sur. (Testing Democracy: The
2010 Automated Elections in Lanao del Sur, Dec. 2010)
People's International Observers Mission (PIOM): In focusing on the
machines, the Comelec lost the people. The elections were not
peaceful or violence-free. Neither were the elections fair nor honest.
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Global Filipino Nation (GFN, election observers' team): Events put
to question the authenticity, integrity, condentiality, veracity and
accuracy of the vote counts in the ERs. The dark cloud rose from
disabling critical, legally specied security features, particularly
relating to the digital signatures. Thus, no one (both perceived
winners and losers) can be sure whether the vote results are true and
correct, and reect the real will of the Filipino people. Accordingly,
the Election Observers Team of GFN challenges the legitimacy of the
election results.
A. How were these major ndings and conclusions addressed
by the responsible agencies?
Pressed for transparency, Comelec under its new head held dialogs
with election stakeholders led by AES Watch. Contrary to claims that
it welcomed strong policy recommendations to correct the
Smartmatic-TIM AES program bugs and other vulnerabilities in the
nal analysis Comelec refused to adopt the legally-mandated
minimum system requirements such as source code review and
digital signature and still exercised its option to purchase the
PCOS machines for use in 2013. Under its new membership, the
Comelec Advisory Council (CAC) welcomed demands for reforming
the automation system and recommended the non-purchase of the
PCOS machines. Its recommendations were, unfortunately, thumbed
down by Comelec.
The Supreme Court (SC) in a Sept. 21, 2010 landmark decision
directed the Comelec to release the source code for review by
CenPEG and other election stakeholders. The review of the AES 2010
source code was never held due to restrictions imposed by the
Comelec that made an independent, scientic, and rigorous review
by IT experts impossible.
IV. Accountability
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As expected, the technology provider insisted that its system was
sound and boasted to the whole world about its election success in
the Philippines. Facing persistent demands from citizens' election
watch groups, Congress' election-related committees held hearings
on electoral reform. As a whole however the lower House endorsed
the use of the Smartmatic-TIM system for the 2013 elections. Only
dogged follow-ups by AES Watch made the JCOC to convene nally
in November 2012. But the assessment of the 2010 poll automation
was never clearly part of its agenda.
B. How were these major ndings and conclusions addressed
by other election stakeholders?
Under its old leadership, the accredited citizens' watchdog, PPCRV,
as expected stood for the re-use of the Smartmatic-TIM system in the
2013 elections and never indicated receptiveness to proposals by
various citizens groups' including its own ground-level volunteers in
the provinces to either reconsider the 2010 PCOS machines or make
the technology provider accountable for the errors committed.
On the other hand, since Day 1 after the 2010 elections, AES Watch
and its afliate groups along with other watchdogs lobbied for
several amendments for enhancing RA 9369, held dialogs with
Comelec, CAC, Congress, DOST, TEC, and other agencies, and the
convening of JCOC. In cooperation with UP, it organized the rst
Filipino IT for Election (FIT4E) national conference in June 2011
where key IT groups, practitioners, academics, researchers, U.S.-
based IT scholars, and multi-sectoral groups resolved to make
election technology inclusive by tapping the expertise of Filipino IT
a resolution that was backed, at least in principle, by Comelec
commissioners.
Likewise, AES Watch and afliate organizations, for three years,
pressed for Congress through its election committees to review the
May 2010 election automation and probe into the accountability of
the election manager and technology providers. Similarly, several
bills were proposed to ensure compliance with the election law. In
April 2012 individual conveners and members of AES Watch
petitioned the SC for a temporary restraining order against
Comelec's option to purchase the Smartmatic machines.
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A. What are the critical problems and issues regarding the
preparations for the May 13, 2013 elections?
1) Legal Lack of compliance with provisions of law, like (1)
the use of digital signatures to sign the election returns and
certicates of canvass and (2) review of the AES source code
by interested political parties and groups.
2) Technical Use of CF cards is insecure. A write-once-read-
mean storage medium was specied in the Request for
Proposal for the automation of the 2010 elections. CF cards
will be used again in 2013, in violation of COMELEC's
dened requirement. CF cards can be transplanted with new
data.
3) Management Considering that the same number of PCOS
machines will be deployed for the May 2013 elections,
clustering of precincts will be maintained. COMELEC has to
prepare for more voters per voting precinct, perhaps assign
more BEI members for voter verication.
B. Are the critical issues and problems being addressed by
Comelec?
The critical issues are not being addressed properly or are largely
ignored. Just like in 2010, CF cards will be used again for 2013. The
controversial machine-generated digital signature will be used
again.
The July 24-25, 2012 mock elections held by Smartmatic at the
lower House revealed a 97% accuracy rating which is lower than the
required 99.995% rating. The low accuracy translates to 600 errors
out of 20,000 ballot marks (the law mandates only 1 out of 20,000).
The deciencies and inaccuracies of the Smartmatic PCOS system
were exposed again but were belittled by Comelec - during the Feb.
2, 2013 mock elections which resulted in machine breakdowns,
paper jams, transmission delays, and counting discrepancies.
The system that will automate the May 2013 mid-term elections has
no certication by the international SysTest Labs, Inc. in the absence
V. Preparations for the May 2013
mid-term elections
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of approval by the technology owner, Dominion. Comelec said they
will use the voting system designed for the aborted 2011 ARMM
election which is regional unlike the 2013 mid-term elections with
thousands of elective positions at stake. Comelec Chairman Sixto
Brillantes also announced recently there will be no source code
review the second time when this vital legal requirement will not
be complied with.
C. Based on these problems and issues, what is expected to
happen in the coming May 2013 elections?
Trustworthiness, reliability, accuracy, and security among others are
issues that need to be addressed. While the trusted build activity has
been performed (on Jan 10, 2013), the input to the trusted build
process, which is the source code of the AES, has not been reviewed
by any interested political party or group. If the source code cannot
be trusted, how can the output (the executable code which will be
loaded in the PCOS and CCS machines) be trusted?
Further, the trusted build process covered only three sets of
software. The PCOS software was not subjected to the trusted build
process.
The COMELEC has been awfully silent on this issue which arises
from the complaint led by Smartmatic against Dominion Voting
Systems, the owner of the PCOS technology supplied by Smartmatic-
TIM.
D. If not resolved, what will be the impact of these problems
and issues on the voters and on the integrity of the May
2013 elections?
On May 23, 2012 the real owner of the AES system used in May 2010
terminated its licensing contract with Smartmatic. A subsequent
lawsuit led before the Delaware chancery court revealed and
validated the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of AES 2010 including
the non-compliance with IT standard practices. The license issue is
critical as Dominion Voting Systems can probably sue COMELEC
and/or the Philippine Government for using unlicensed software for
the 2013 Midterm Elections.
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E. Why is the real digital signature, among other minimum
system requirements, not being complied with for 2013?
Comelec's position in 2010 is that while RA9369 requires signing
election reports (from the PCOS and CCS) with digital signatures,
the law does not identify who will sign said reports. In 2010,
Comelec implemented what it referred to as "machine digital
signature". Comelec further argues that electronic signature is
recognized and dened by RA8792 and the denition is in two parts:
a) Where a signer adopts an electronic mark (could be any of the
characters or combination of said on a computer key board, a
photo, an email address, video stream, audio stream, etc)
b) Where a signer adopts a process that enables independent
verication and authentication of an electronic signature.
The second part of the denition is closest to what a digital signature
is.
This was contested by IT groups during the CSER Hearings at the House
following the May 10, 2010 elections for the following reasons:
1. Comelec erred by considering only RA9369 to the exclusion of other
election- related laws. RA9369 is an amendatory law, amending
among others RA8436 and BP881. Nothing in RA9369 expressly
repealed the provisions of BP881 where it mandates the members of
the BEI and BOC to sign the ER and COC/SOV/COCP
respectively.
2. There is no law that recognizes the legality of a "machine digital
signature".
3. Digital signature as a technology implementation of electronic
signature that enables independent verication of the owner of the
digital signature and independent authentication is recognized by
Ra8792.
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1. Lack of transparency by the premier election manager in the
country, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in dealing
with various groups of citizens' election watchdogs, Filipino
IT community, research groups and other stakeholders when
it comes to ensuring safeguards for security, accuracy and
reliability of the chosen technology in the automated election
system (AES) used for elections.
1.1 The right to know and access public information on the
AES has become an exclusive domain of only a few
favored or approved individuals and/or groups;
1.2 The Filipino IT community on the whole continues to be
excluded and treated as second class to foreign provided
technology and know-how.
2. Inconsistent and varied interpretations of provisions of the
Poll Automation Law (RA 9369), among which are the
following:
2.1 Source Code Review
2.2 Use of digital signature
2.3 Voter verication
2.4 Use of storage devices
2.5 Other technical provisions like accuracy
2.6 Pre-tested technology
2.7 Certication and role of TEC (Technical Evaluation
Committee)
2.8 Role of the CAC (Comelec Advisory Council)
3. Major implementers including the Comelec and its major
citizens' arm accredited for major technical tasks like
conducting random manual audit (RMA) of the system lack
knowledge, competence, and appreciation of the technical
complexities.
VI. What have been main problems in the
implementation of the Election Modernization
Law or the Automated Election Law (RA 9369)
since 2008?
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4. Safeguards (and therefore, non-compliance and violations of
the laws, TOR, agreements and contract) to ensure security,
accuracy and reliability of the system are conveniently set
aside or disregarded and made as excuses to give way to
lower cost, lack of time, and better alternative to
manual (dened as fraudulent) elections.
5. Sovereignty in running the elections is compromised when
the implementers rely too heavily on a foreign technology
provider which does not own the operating license of the
technology. (Note: the case between Smartmatic (technology
provider in the Philippines vs Dominion Voting System
(PCOS technology owner) remains unsettled in Delaware,
USA since it was led in September 2012.
Because of these, VOTE buying is no longer a major problem in
automated elections. With the lack of major safeguards in the
hardware and software components of the system, the problems in
PILAHAN (long queues), BILANGAN (inaccurate counting), at
BENTAHAN (not just vote buying but program system buying) are
emerging as modern-day problems in election. If left unchecked,
automated election forms of cheating like CF card buying, PCOS
machine buying and transmission jamming plus the clustered precinct
long queue-delaying tactics will prevail alongside traditional forms of
cheating, wholesale fraud and violence.
With only two months to go (since publication of this Primer) before
Election Day, the Comelec decided not to conduct anymore Mock
Elections against the advice and request of the JCOC and AES Watch
last February 6, 2013 for condence building after the humiliating
VII. Is there anything yet to be done to salvage
the wrong or correct the mistakes and ensure
against fraud generated by a problematic
automated election system if Comelec persists
in using the provided technology?
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humiliating February 2 Mock Elections. With major PCOS errors
still uncorrected and no source code review done by political parties
and interested parties as prescribed by law, the people are left to
pursue all course of actions necessary to a) assert the rule of law,
b) ensure that the elections push through, c) the voters' right are not
violated, d) teachers' duties and rights as BEIs are protected, and
e) the integrity of the vote through automation is maintained.
Based on Chairman Brillantes' public statements, automated elections
with Smartmatic as technology provider, will proceed as scheduled.
As the premier election manager, the Comelec must allow
stakeholders, especially political parties and election watchdogs
equal access to the following MINIMUM information during election
day:
1) Printed precinct audit logs
2) Printed MBOC (municipal board of canvassing) audit logs
3) Continuing public website (as provided for in the law) where
the canvassed votes in the national server should be posted
4) Random Manual Audit immediately after elections conducted
by a competent group
5) Electronic Transmission Results
This should be contained in new Comelec Resolutions and General
Instructions since only the copy of the Election Returns (ERs) are
provided in RA 9369 and the outdated Omnibus Election Code as
documents to be made accessible to dominant and minority political
parties. All the above mentioned data are important for political
parties and watchdogs to know in order to gain condence and trust
that the system used is really secured, accurate, and reliable or
compliant with minimum requirements of the law, as claimed by the
provider and Comelec.
Pollwatchers and voters alike should prepare for the worst. What
happened during the February 2, 2013 mock elections involving only
a few PCOS machines and staged-managed with ill prepared voters
and actors' names in the ballots that did not simulate the real
conditions on Election Day, has provided only a glimpse of the actual
scenario come May 13, 2013. Aside from the usual kits, Watchers
should equip themselves NOT only with skills on how to shade and
how to cast the ballot into the PCOS, but more with detailed
knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the PCOS machines and the
environment of the clustered precincts. For cheaters, ignorance is
bliss. For enlightened voters and watchers, ignorance is a crime.
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The right to suffrage is the people's sovereign right to elect ofcials
upon whom they confer the authority to serve the public responsibly,
transparently, with accountability, and on a full-time basis. For this
reason, it is imperative that the electoral process is credible,
trustworthy, reliable, and accurate in serving as the instrument of the
people's will.
However, given the learning lessons of the rst automated elections,
the lack of transparency and accountability in the system, its
implementers, and oversight bodies as well as the persistence of
traditional fraud which automation itself has not effectively
addressed ensuring the electoral process fair, democratic, and
reliable rests on the vigilance of the people.
Automating the election is ne but it should comply with the law
and the high standards of IT and election management. While we
continue to push for a reliable technology, we should be alert on the
fact that modern technology's capability to eliminate fraud, whether
traditional or electronic, remains to be validated.
As AES Watch has always consistently advocated, voter education
and poll watching should focus not only on the external features and
operations of the AES but more critically on its internal systems.
Vigilant watching should as well monitor the Comelec, the foreign
technology provider, and other principal agencies and implementers
of poll automation as well as the election cheats. There is no
substitute for vigilance and in safeguarding our freedom.
VIII. What can we as citizens, voters, and election
watch groups do for the May 2013 automated
elections and for our country?
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MGA DAPAT BANTAYAN
SA ARAW NG ELEKSYON
MGA DAPAT BANTAYAN
BAGO MAG-ELEKSYON
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blank page
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Launched on Jan. 18, 2010, the Automated Election System Watch (AES Watch) is now
composed of more than 40 organizations, among them, the University of the Philippines
Alumni Association (UPAA), National Secretariat for Social Action-CBCP, Center for
People Empowerment in Governance (CenPEG), Philippine Computer Society (PCS)
Foundation, TransparentElections.org, Computer Professionals Union, Caucus of DLSU-
CCS, NAMFREL,Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP),
National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), Philippine Computer Society
Foundation; Transparency International-Philippines, National Council of Churches in the
Philippines (NCCP), Faculty of Ateneo de Manila Dept. of Information Communications
System, UP Dept. of Computer Science and ITTC, Philippine Computer Emergency
Response, Movement for Good Governance, Concerned Citizens Movement, Dilaab-Hearts
Foundation, Solidarity Philippines, Association of Schools of Public Administration in the
Philippines (ASPAP), Sisters Association in Mindanao (SAMIN), Computing Society of the
Philippines (CSP), Pagbabago (Movement for Social Change), Alyansa Agrikultura,
Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Biliran Kawsa, Workers' Election (WE) Watch, Health Alliance
for Democracy, and others. Its President Emeritus is former Vice President Teosto
Guingona, Jr. while its rst spokesperson was Alfred Pascual, now UP President.
For information, please contact: Acting Secretariat Ofce, 304 CSWCD Bldg., Magsaysay
Avenue, UP Diliman 1101 Quezon City; TelFax +9299526; email address:
AUTOMATED ELECTION
SYSTEM WATCH (AES Watch)
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