The Conflict of Kargil
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The Conflict of Kargil, in depth analysis & review
Conflict of Kargil:
The 1999 Kargil War took place between May and July, when Pakistani forces and
Kashmiri activists were detected atop the Kargil ridges. It is believed that the planning
for the operation by Pakistan may have occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998.
Pakistani army carried out the intrusion after February 1999 Lahore meeting between
the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal
Bahari Vajpayee. This conference was thought to have reduced the anxiety that had
existed since May 1998 Nuclear tests of ‘Pokhran testing ranges’* and ‘Chaghi testing
site’* by India and Pakistan respectively. The main reason behind the ‘Operation Koh-e-
Paima’* that was lead by Pakistani troops was to help the Kashmir issue gain a global
recognition, for which international consideration had been deteriorating for some time.
The intrusion plan was the invention of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez
Musharraf and Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They
obtained and executed the plan, without any formal notice to Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the
Pakistani Prime Minister.
Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions were based on the exploitation of
the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sectors both on the Indian and Pakistani
part of the Line of Control (LOC). The land topography is tremendously rocky with very
few paths and tracks leading from the chief roads and highways towards the LOC.
Especially, throughout winters the area gets a very grave snowfall making maneuvering
almost impractical. The one and the only mountain pass that links up the Kargil to rest
of the Kashmir Valley; ‘Zoji La’* usually gets open to traffic by the end of May or
beginning of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by ground from Srinagar would not
have been possible till then.
Shireen Mazari, a Pakistan defense analyst observes:
“To begin with the lack of strategic policy coordination between the military and political
leadership was so apparent that no serious attempt was made to cover it up. The
political leadership did not make any serious efforts to think-through the unfolding
military situation on a strategic plan, and until late in the day June 3, 1999 this
leadership did not feel the need and made no attempt to try and discuss the issue in the
federal cabinet. Hence the utter confusion and lack of coordination in the diplomatic and
political stakes rose".
Area of Conflict:
The town of Kargil is located merely 205 kilometers from the strategically city of
Srinagar, Kargil also faces the conflicted regions in upper Himalayas and Karakoram
like Siachen etc. Like other areas of the Himalayas, Kargil also has a chilled climate.
Summers are cool with frosty nights, while winters are extensive and cold with
temperatures often plummeting to −48 °Centigrade.
An Indian national highway NH1A (National Highway 1a-1d) is a key road connecting
the military garrisons of Srinagar to Leh and this highway passes, zigzagging through
the peaks of Kargil.
A detailed map, showing National Highway 1A, red arrows mark the intruding Pakistani Infantry
and Mujahadeen
The planning of Kargil conflict by Pakistanis was done way before time and was re-
strategized time and time again. Pakistan Army’s Generals and top staff officers had
strong faith that if a pre-emptive attack on the unoccupied army posts located across
the key peaks in Kargil sector was launched, Pakistan will gain clear supremacy in
terms of overlook and fog-of-war.
With strategically fundamental positions and well dug in defensive posts atop these
mountains a defender on the higher position would benefit from advantages similar to a
stronghold. Any attack to remove a defender from high ground in mountain warfare
demands a far superior ratio of attackers to defenders, and the complexity would be
aggravated by the high elevations of mountains and the freezing temperatures.
Moreover, Kargil is only 173 kilometers from the Pakistani-controlled garrison of Skardu,
which is capable of housing 2 regular infantry formations and providing full throttled
logistics, aerial-borne and artillery support to Pakistani combatants fighting in the enemy
region across the LOC.
Pakistan Army & Operation Koh-e-Paima:
Pakistan Army before launching the operation codenamed ‘Koh-e-Paima’ took
measures to maintain an element of shock and maximize the art of concealed
operations. No new regiments or men power was moved to the Pakistani posts and the
units and troops of the FCNA(Force Command Northern Areas)* were not changed for
the operations. Any major troop postings that involved even two or three regiments
would have drained the interest of the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army artillery
components, which were introduced into the FCNA during the heavy artillery fire
exchanges from July to September 1998, were not de-commissioned and were still
functional anyways.Though the swaps of these artillery barrages continued afterwards,
although at a minor level, Indians were not considering it strange. There was no
maneuvering of reserve formations or units into FCNA until after the implementation of
the plan and operations that started with the Indian Army's comeback. No new chain of
command for the operation was to be shaped. The logistic patterns of communication
were to be along the tracks and the Nullahs* far away from the vision and positions of
the Indian Army.
After finalizing the plan the execution was started through the end of April. The main
regiments were quickly busted into a number of smaller sub groups, sections and
platoons of 30 to 40 soldiers and mujahedeen equipped with automatic weapons,
RPGs*, food, field hospitals and ammunitions. Each group would carry out multiple
intrusions along the ridgelines and occupy dominating heights like Tololing heights,
Tiger Hill, Jubar, Point 5140 etc.
Map pointing out important peaks of Kargil, Drass and Batalik Sectors.
The land of Kargil and the nearby regions of LOC are unwelcoming in the best of times.
One of the individuality of the region is that it has mighty heights of up to 18,000 feet
and cruel breeze of wind and temperatures plunging to as low as -60 degrees Celsius in
the winter. Pakistani forces after claiming these positions would gain a total overlook on
National Highway 1A and the Indian supply lines helping the troops fight in Northern
Regions like Siachen would be under Pakistani control and surveillance, meaning Indian
trucks sitting ducks for Pakistani Howitzers and Mortars.
Pakistani troops from the Elite Special Services Group Yaldram*, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th
Northern Light Infantry, Punjab Regiment and Azad Kashmir Force backed by elements
of Engineers, Signals, Air Defense and Artillery from FCNA and 10 Division* along with
Kashmiri Mujahedeen and Afghani tribal guerrillas successfully gained total control of
the targeted heights with utmost silence.
Indian Discovery of Incursion:
An Indian Army Patrol led by Captain Saurabh Kalia from 4th Jat Infantry after being
advised by a local shepherd scouted and detected intruders atop Kargil crests on 13th
May 1999. The patterns and halo of infiltration was clearly recognized as a full-fledged
participation of trained Mujahedeen and Pakistan Army regulars throughout the area of
operations from east of the Batalik sector and in north as far as Dras. Pakistani troops
were also backed by rapid and strong artillery firing from across the border both in
common areas and cantonments of Kargil and Dras.
The aggressors on the heights were a mixture of professional soldiers and mujahedeen.
It was originally predicted that there were about 500 to 1,000 fighters occupying the
heights but later it is estimated that the real potency of the Pakistani army infiltrated into
LOC may have been about 2-3,000. The main line of Pakistani operation was a 160
kilometer mountain collection and to inter-link the troops it had to establish logistical
network through which the soldiers fighting on the other side would be well supplied
from the Pakistani bases and garrisons in AJK (Azad Jammu & Kashmir).
Indian Response:
The Indian Army got awareness about the attacks between May 3 -12. From May 15 -
25, 1999, Indian military operations were planned, troops moved to their attack
locations, artillery and other gears were moved in and the essential tools were
purchased. Indian Army's ground offensive named Operation Vijay and Indian Air
Forces air Operations codenamed Safed Sagar were launched on May 26, 1999. Indian
troops very rapidly relocated towards Pakistani overtaken positions with air cover
provided by aircraft and helicopters.
Operation Vijay
The first Indian victory came in Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999 which
was recaptured after several weeks of bitter fighting between 18th Grenadiers, 7th Bihar
and 13th Jat Regiment. The attacks were headed by continued fire from over 100 Indian
Artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers shelling Pakistani posts in gigs. Tons of
lead in form of shells, bombs and rocket warheads broke havoc on Pakistani posts. The
155 mm newly inducted Dutch Bofors medium guns and the old yet big 105 mm Indian
field guns in a supreme ‘fire for effect mission’ annihilated all visible Pakistani hangars,
posts and bunkers and forced the troops of 4th NLI to abandon several positions. The
curves of fire extending behind this ‘Bofors’ guns high explosive shells and the rockets
provided a splendid view and filled a psychological fear into the minds of ‘politically
betrayed’ Pakistani soldiers.
This victory in Tololing opened a free run for overwhelming Indian Formations to launch
an all out pincer* maneuver and take the war on to the Pakistani troops.
While losing at most fronts, Pakistan army managed to contain the Indian attacks on
Tiger Hill, it is here legends of ‘Kernel Sher Khan’* and ‘Lalik Jan’* were written. Though
both sides make claims about their performance. Tiger Hill in reality saw doom of many
Indian soldiers.
While Tiger Hill was still a battlefield, some achievements of Indian military in land
Operations are as under:
a) Point 4875, west of Tiger Hill re-captured on July 7, 1999.
b) Point 5203 was re-captured on June 21, 1999.
c) Khalubar was re-captured on July 6, 1999.
Indian Army destroyed the Pakistani logistics that were already getting highly effected
by the growing tensions inside Pakistani political system, especially the brawl between
Prime Minister Nawaz Shari and Chief of Army Staff(COAS) Perver Musharraf that
would later turn into a blood-less military coup and sacking of Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s led
Muslim League government.
It is estimated that more than 1,200 rounds of high explosive were rained down on Tiger
Hill and caused large-scale death and devastation. Indian Artillery gunners claimed the
vital Pakistani artillery observation posts (Ops) weakening the Pakistani support. Even
the oldest 122 mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were called in for the
direct firing role. Metric tons of artillery shells and rocket warheads were fired on the
summit of Tiger Hill in front of TV cameras and the Indian nation would be spell-
bounded in the might of the their Corps of Artillery and Indian war machine at its full .
While the attention was fascinated on the combating in the Dras sector, stable Indian
development was being made in the Batalik sector where Pakistani soldiers before
abandoning their posts would literally raise full Indian units, companies and regiments
that would attack their posts from full to zero inflicting heavy casualties on Indian
attackers. In the Batalik sector, the ground was greatly tougher and the Pakistan was far
more powerfully established. The battle to regain the control back itself took almost a
month. Indian Army declared Batalik clear of enemy on July 13th 1999.
Operation Safed Sagar
Operation Safed Sagar was the alias allocated to the Indian Air Force's attacks to help
the Ground troops indulged in Operation Vijay that was meant to wash out the Regular
and Irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from the Positions in the Kargil sector along
the LOC. It was the first large level use of air supremacy in the Jammu and Kashmir
area since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.
The Western Air Command conducted the three-week-long exercise ‘Trishul’* three
weeks before Kargil that helped them come up big during Safed Sagar by better ability
and preparation to attack the very little/tiny targets existing, often not visible to the bare
eye on the hill posts.
The General Officer Commanding of the India’s Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lieutenant
General Krishan Pal was informed that the Air Force operations demanded by the Army
on May 15 had now acknowledged Cabinet approval and would begin on May 25. They
would cover the elimination of Pakistan’s executive bases and the tactical support to all
infantry objectives, as essential.
Pakistani Soldier from an Air Defense Unit with an ANZA-II SAM Missile
The Pakistani ‘shoulder-fired missile’ threat was omnipresent. Pakistan had recently
moved its elements from Air Defense regiments armed with SAMs(Surface to Air
Missiles) and there were no uncertainties about this. An Indian Air Force(IAF) Canberra*
reconnaissance aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from across
the LOC.
On 27 May 1999, Gunner Sepoy Shafaqat Ali commanded by Captain Faheem Tipu,
Pakistan Army Air Defense shot down an IAF MiG-27ML using an ANZA-II SAM. The
IAF fighter (Serial No. 1135), was flown by Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa of No. 9
Squadron, IAF pilot who ejected and was taken prisoner and later released on 4 June
1999. The IAF fighter was shot down after intruding into Pakistan airspace at 11:15 a.m.
(PST) near Marol-Hamzi Ghund*, Pakistan.
Very same day Naik Talib Hussain Basharat again commanded by Captain Faheem
Tipu of the Pakistan Army Air Defense shot down an IAF MiG-21 again using an ANZA-
II SAM. The IAF fighter (Serial No. C1539) was flown by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja of
No. 17 Squadron, IAF, who was killed. The Wreckage fell 10-12 kilometers inside
Pakistan. Body of IAF pilot was handed over to India on 29 May 1999.
On 28 May 1999, Lance Havaldar Muhammad Kamal of the Pakistan Army Air Defence
shot down an IAF Mi-17 Helicopter using a Stinger SAM(Surface to Air Missile).
The Indian airfields adjacent to Kargil were Srinagar and Avantipur. Adampur near
Jalandhar was near enough to support air operations too. Therefore, the IAF functioned
from these 3 bases with its command still in New Delhi. The planes used for ground
attack were;
a) MiG-2ls
b) MiG- 23s
c) MiG-27s
d) Jaguars
e) Mirage- 2000
All these airplanes were optimized for low level bombings and were modified to carry a
load of 4 tons each, showing the interest of IAF to help its struggling troops on land.
IAF MiG-21s were used extensively in the Kargil war.
Pakistan Air Force(PAF) fighters though were picked up on the airborne radars of the
Indian fighters and ground reconnaissance systems but it is reported that PAF planes
never crossed into the Indian side of the LOC throughout the Kargil conflict.
Nevertheless, as a safety measure, the IAF strike aircrafts were mostly escorted by the
fighter jets.
Withdrawal of Pakistani Soldiers:
In a skilful use of naval power in the form of 'Operation Talwar', Indian Navy’s 'Eastern
Fleet' joined the 'Western Naval Fleet' and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan.
Distant from a restriction, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later revealed that
Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to maintain itself if a matured war broke
out.
On July 11th Batalik sector is reclaimed by Indian Army and Pakistani infiltrators make
an all out push-out after the operation is called off.
The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee 3 days later on 14th declare operation Vijay a
success. Mr. Vajpayee’s Government sets condition for dialogues with Pakistan. The
Indian army launched its final assault in the final week of July; as quickly as the Drass
subsector had been cleaned from Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The
day has since been marked as ‘Kargil Vijay Diwas’ (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the
end of the war, India had regained the control of all land south and east of the Line of
Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement, Pakistan Army
still claims the highest post on Tiger Hill, a small garrison, a botanical garden and a
double lane road still depicts the might of Pakistani NLI soldiers that fought with bravery
and courage.
An Indian howitzer zeroing on Tiger Hill in the background during Kargil War
Pakistan army fatalities have been difficult to decide. Pakistan has confirmed that 453
soldiers were martyred. The US Department of State had made an early, partial
estimate of close to 700 fatalities. One Indian Pilot was officially captured during the
war, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were captured during the fighting,
and were send home on 13 August 1999. The Indian casualties are around 527 killed
and more than 1500 wounded. 3 aircrafts and 1 helicopter was also amongst the Indian
losses.
The Indian government placed a momentary news ban on all stories coming from
Pakistan, Pakistan Television and Dawn news were banned. The Pakistani media
criticized this obvious limitation of freedom of the press in India, while India media
asserted that it was in the importance of national safety. The Indian government ran
commercials in foreign journals and papers including The Times and The Washington
Post pointing Pakistan's role behind extremists in Kashmir in an effort to gather political
support for its situation through this one of a kind propaganda.
A retired Pakistani Army General, Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, defines the
Kargil war as "a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy",
Faced with the likelihood of global separation, the already flimsy Pakistani economy
was damaged more. The confidence of Pakistani forces after the pulling out turned
down as many regiments of the Northern Light Infantry endured heavy losses. The
government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif, a puppetry of United States of America’s government
under Mr. Bill Clinton declined to recognize the dead bodies of many of its officers and
troops - an issue that aggravated fury and complains in the Northern Areas.
Countering it all, Pakistan COAS Pervez Musharraf said,
"It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own forces," and claimed that Indian
casualties were more than that of Pakistan.
Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that; "Sharif's moves were confusing"
Gallantry awards of Kargil:
1. Indian soldiers
Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra
Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra
Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous
Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous
Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra
Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous
2. Pakistani soldiers
Captain Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous
Havaldaar Lalak Jan, Northern Light Infantry, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous
Indian army Memorial of Kargil war operation Vijay
___________________________
Glossary:
Pokhran Testing Range
Pokhran (also spelled Pokaran) is a city and a municipality located in Jaisalmer district
in the Indian state of Rajasthan. It is a remote location in the Thar Desert region and
served as the test site for India's first underground nuclear weapon detonation.
Chaghi Testing Site
Chagai is the capital of Chagai District in the Balochistan province of Pakistan - five
underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan at 15:15hrs (3:15p.m. PST) in 28 May
1998.
Operation Koh-e-Paima
Original codename of Pakistani land operations – the word ‘Koh-e-Paima’ was made
public on Pakistan Army’s website after 2007.
Zoji La
Zoji La is a high mountain pass in India, located on the Indian National Highway 1
between Srinagar and Leh in the western section of the Himalayan mountain range.
FCNA(Force Command Northern Areas)
The Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) is essentially a division sized formation
specialized in mountain warfare. There are certain international obligations due to which
the FCNA is not called a division but in reality it is a division.
Nullahs
A Nullah or Nulla (Hindi, also Nallah in Punjabi) is an arm of the sea, stream, or
watercourse, a steep narrow valley. Like the wadi of the Arabs, the nullah is
characteristic of mountainous or hilly country where there is little rainfall.
RPG
Rocket Propelled Grenade.
SSG Yaldram
Yaldram is one of the 3 Special Service Group (SSG) units in Pakistan, also known as
Black Storks, because of their distinctive headgear, the unit is also known as Maroon
Beret, are a special operations military unit of the Pakistan Army.
10 Division
Pakistan Army division garrisoned in Rawalpindi and Murree Cantonments.
Kernel Sher Khan & Lalik Jan Shaheed
Captain Kernal Sher Khan and Havaldar Lalik Jan Shaheed were both awarded Nishan-
e-Haider for fighting with utmost courage and zeal on the outskirts of Tiger Hill.
Canberra
The English Electric Canberra is a first-generation jet-powered light bomber
manufactured in large numbers through the 1950s. The Canberra could fly at a higher
altitude than any other bomber through the 1950s
Trishul
Indian Air Force scheming and exercising throughout the Kashmir valley only before 3
months of Kargil War.
Simla Agreement
The Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan at 12:40am on July 2,
1972. It followed after the war between the two nations in the previous year that had led
to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh.
___________________________
Books:
a) M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-
7099-734-8.
b) Amarinder Singh (2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999.
Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN: B0006E8KKW.
c) Jasjit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia
Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7.
d) J. N. Dixit (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-
30472-5.
e) Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army
From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh.
Pennsylvania, USA.. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.
f) Ranjan Kumar Singh. Sarhad Zero Mile. Parijat Prakashan.. ISBN 81-903561-0-
0.
References:
a) Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Yaqub (PA 20150) – 47th Field Artillery Regiment
b) Major Muhammad Zeeshan (PA 34093) – 6th Punjab Regiment
c) Colonel Naeem Zaka (PA 18459) – 6th Northern Light Infantry
Websites:
a) www.google.com.pk
b) www.wikipedia.org
c) www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk
d) www.vayosina.blogspot.com
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