The Conflict of Kargil

Mrs. Farzana Shahid

MCB – 103 Social & Cultural Anthropology

Note: Glossary & References in end.

The Conflict of Kargil, in depth analysis & review

Conflict of Kargil:

The 1999 Kargil War took place between May and July, when Pakistani forces and

Kashmiri activists were detected atop the Kargil ridges. It is believed that the planning

for the operation by Pakistan may have occurred about as early as the autumn of 1998.

Pakistani army carried out the intrusion after February 1999 Lahore meeting between

the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Indian Prime Minister Atal

Bahari Vajpayee. This conference was thought to have reduced the anxiety that had

existed since May 1998 Nuclear tests of ‘Pokhran testing ranges’* and ‘Chaghi testing

site’* by India and Pakistan respectively. The main reason behind the ‘Operation Koh-e-

Paima’* that was lead by Pakistani troops was to help the Kashmir issue gain a global

recognition, for which international consideration had been deteriorating for some time.

The intrusion plan was the invention of Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez

Musharraf and Lieutenant General Mohammed Aziz, the Chief of General Staff. They

obtained and executed the plan, without any formal notice to Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the

Pakistani Prime Minister.

Pakistan's military aim for carrying out the intrusions were based on the exploitation of

the large gaps that exist in the defenses in the sectors both on the Indian and Pakistani

part of the Line of Control (LOC). The land topography is tremendously rocky with very

few paths and tracks leading from the chief roads and highways towards the LOC.

Especially, throughout winters the area gets a very grave snowfall making maneuvering

almost impractical. The one and the only mountain pass that links up the Kargil to rest

of the Kashmir Valley; ‘Zoji La’* usually gets open to traffic by the end of May or

beginning of June. Thus, moving of reinforcements by ground from Srinagar would not

have been possible till then.

Shireen Mazari, a Pakistan defense analyst observes:

“To begin with the lack of strategic policy coordination between the military and political

leadership was so apparent that no serious attempt was made to cover it up. The

political leadership did not make any serious efforts to think-through the unfolding

military situation on a strategic plan, and until late in the day June 3, 1999 this

leadership did not feel the need and made no attempt to try and discuss the issue in the

federal cabinet. Hence the utter confusion and lack of coordination in the diplomatic and

political stakes rose".

Area of Conflict:

The town of Kargil is located merely 205 kilometers from the strategically city of

Srinagar, Kargil also faces the conflicted regions in upper Himalayas and Karakoram

like Siachen etc. Like other areas of the Himalayas, Kargil also has a chilled climate.

Summers are cool with frosty nights, while winters are extensive and cold with

temperatures often plummeting to −48 °Centigrade.

An Indian national highway NH1A (National Highway 1a-1d) is a key road connecting

the military garrisons of Srinagar to Leh and this highway passes, zigzagging through

the peaks of Kargil.

A detailed map, showing National Highway 1A, red arrows mark the intruding Pakistani Infantry

and Mujahadeen

The planning of Kargil conflict by Pakistanis was done way before time and was re-

strategized time and time again. Pakistan Army’s Generals and top staff officers had

strong faith that if a pre-emptive attack on the unoccupied army posts located across

the key peaks in Kargil sector was launched, Pakistan will gain clear supremacy in

terms of overlook and fog-of-war.

With strategically fundamental positions and well dug in defensive posts atop these

mountains a defender on the higher position would benefit from advantages similar to a

stronghold. Any attack to remove a defender from high ground in mountain warfare

demands a far superior ratio of attackers to defenders, and the complexity would be

aggravated by the high elevations of mountains and the freezing temperatures.

Moreover, Kargil is only 173 kilometers from the Pakistani-controlled garrison of Skardu,

which is capable of housing 2 regular infantry formations and providing full throttled

logistics, aerial-borne and artillery support to Pakistani combatants fighting in the enemy

region across the LOC.

Pakistan Army & Operation Koh-e-Paima:

Pakistan Army before launching the operation codenamed ‘Koh-e-Paima’ took

measures to maintain an element of shock and maximize the art of concealed

operations. No new regiments or men power was moved to the Pakistani posts and the

units and troops of the FCNA(Force Command Northern Areas)* were not changed for

the operations. Any major troop postings that involved even two or three regiments

would have drained the interest of the Indian Army. The Pakistan Army artillery

components, which were introduced into the FCNA during the heavy artillery fire

exchanges from July to September 1998, were not de-commissioned and were still

functional anyways.Though the swaps of these artillery barrages continued afterwards,

although at a minor level, Indians were not considering it strange. There was no

maneuvering of reserve formations or units into FCNA until after the implementation of

the plan and operations that started with the Indian Army's comeback. No new chain of

command for the operation was to be shaped. The logistic patterns of communication

were to be along the tracks and the Nullahs* far away from the vision and positions of

the Indian Army.

After finalizing the plan the execution was started through the end of April. The main

regiments were quickly busted into a number of smaller sub groups, sections and

platoons of 30 to 40 soldiers and mujahedeen equipped with automatic weapons,

RPGs*, food, field hospitals and ammunitions. Each group would carry out multiple

intrusions along the ridgelines and occupy dominating heights like Tololing heights,

Tiger Hill, Jubar, Point 5140 etc.

Map pointing out important peaks of Kargil, Drass and Batalik Sectors.

The land of Kargil and the nearby regions of LOC are unwelcoming in the best of times.

One of the individuality of the region is that it has mighty heights of up to 18,000 feet

and cruel breeze of wind and temperatures plunging to as low as -60 degrees Celsius in

the winter. Pakistani forces after claiming these positions would gain a total overlook on

National Highway 1A and the Indian supply lines helping the troops fight in Northern

Regions like Siachen would be under Pakistani control and surveillance, meaning Indian

trucks sitting ducks for Pakistani Howitzers and Mortars.

Pakistani troops from the Elite Special Services Group Yaldram*, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 12th

Northern Light Infantry, Punjab Regiment and Azad Kashmir Force backed by elements

of Engineers, Signals, Air Defense and Artillery from FCNA and 10 Division* along with

Kashmiri Mujahedeen and Afghani tribal guerrillas successfully gained total control of

the targeted heights with utmost silence.

Indian Discovery of Incursion:

An Indian Army Patrol led by Captain Saurabh Kalia from 4th Jat Infantry after being

advised by a local shepherd scouted and detected intruders atop Kargil crests on 13th

May 1999. The patterns and halo of infiltration was clearly recognized as a full-fledged

participation of trained Mujahedeen and Pakistan Army regulars throughout the area of

operations from east of the Batalik sector and in north as far as Dras. Pakistani troops

were also backed by rapid and strong artillery firing from across the border both in

common areas and cantonments of Kargil and Dras.

The aggressors on the heights were a mixture of professional soldiers and mujahedeen.

It was originally predicted that there were about 500 to 1,000 fighters occupying the

heights but later it is estimated that the real potency of the Pakistani army infiltrated into

LOC may have been about 2-3,000. The main line of Pakistani operation was a 160

kilometer mountain collection and to inter-link the troops it had to establish logistical

network through which the soldiers fighting on the other side would be well supplied

from the Pakistani bases and garrisons in AJK (Azad Jammu & Kashmir).

Indian Response:

The Indian Army got awareness about the attacks between May 3 -12. From May 15 -

25, 1999, Indian military operations were planned, troops moved to their attack

locations, artillery and other gears were moved in and the essential tools were

purchased. Indian Army's ground offensive named Operation Vijay and Indian Air

Forces air Operations codenamed Safed Sagar were launched on May 26, 1999. Indian

troops very rapidly relocated towards Pakistani overtaken positions with air cover

provided by aircraft and helicopters.

Operation Vijay

The first Indian victory came in Tololing in the Drass sub-sector on June 13, 1999 which

was recaptured after several weeks of bitter fighting between 18th Grenadiers, 7th Bihar

and 13th Jat Regiment. The attacks were headed by continued fire from over 100 Indian

Artillery guns, mortars and rocket launchers shelling Pakistani posts in gigs. Tons of

lead in form of shells, bombs and rocket warheads broke havoc on Pakistani posts. The

155 mm newly inducted Dutch Bofors medium guns and the old yet big 105 mm Indian

field guns in a supreme ‘fire for effect mission’ annihilated all visible Pakistani hangars,

posts and bunkers and forced the troops of 4th NLI to abandon several positions. The

curves of fire extending behind this ‘Bofors’ guns high explosive shells and the rockets

provided a splendid view and filled a psychological fear into the minds of ‘politically

betrayed’ Pakistani soldiers.

This victory in Tololing opened a free run for overwhelming Indian Formations to launch

an all out pincer* maneuver and take the war on to the Pakistani troops.

While losing at most fronts, Pakistan army managed to contain the Indian attacks on

Tiger Hill, it is here legends of ‘Kernel Sher Khan’* and ‘Lalik Jan’* were written. Though

both sides make claims about their performance. Tiger Hill in reality saw doom of many

Indian soldiers.

While Tiger Hill was still a battlefield, some achievements of Indian military in land

Operations are as under:

a) Point 4875, west of Tiger Hill re-captured on July 7, 1999.

b) Point 5203 was re-captured on June 21, 1999.

c) Khalubar was re-captured on July 6, 1999.

Indian Army destroyed the Pakistani logistics that were already getting highly effected

by the growing tensions inside Pakistani political system, especially the brawl between

Prime Minister Nawaz Shari and Chief of Army Staff(COAS) Perver Musharraf that

would later turn into a blood-less military coup and sacking of Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s led

Muslim League government.

It is estimated that more than 1,200 rounds of high explosive were rained down on Tiger

Hill and caused large-scale death and devastation. Indian Artillery gunners claimed the

vital Pakistani artillery observation posts (Ops) weakening the Pakistani support. Even

the oldest 122 mm Grad multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRLs) were called in for the

direct firing role. Metric tons of artillery shells and rocket warheads were fired on the

summit of Tiger Hill in front of TV cameras and the Indian nation would be spell-

bounded in the might of the their Corps of Artillery and Indian war machine at its full .

While the attention was fascinated on the combating in the Dras sector, stable Indian

development was being made in the Batalik sector where Pakistani soldiers before

abandoning their posts would literally raise full Indian units, companies and regiments

that would attack their posts from full to zero inflicting heavy casualties on Indian

attackers. In the Batalik sector, the ground was greatly tougher and the Pakistan was far

more powerfully established. The battle to regain the control back itself took almost a

month. Indian Army declared Batalik clear of enemy on July 13th 1999.

Operation Safed Sagar

Operation Safed Sagar was the alias allocated to the Indian Air Force's attacks to help

the Ground troops indulged in Operation Vijay that was meant to wash out the Regular

and Irregular troops of the Pakistani Army from the Positions in the Kargil sector along

the LOC. It was the first large level use of air supremacy in the Jammu and Kashmir

area since the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

The Western Air Command conducted the three-week-long exercise ‘Trishul’* three

weeks before Kargil that helped them come up big during Safed Sagar by better ability

and preparation to attack the very little/tiny targets existing, often not visible to the bare

eye on the hill posts.

The General Officer Commanding of the India’s Srinagar-based 15 Corps, Lieutenant

General Krishan Pal was informed that the Air Force operations demanded by the Army

on May 15 had now acknowledged Cabinet approval and would begin on May 25. They

would cover the elimination of Pakistan’s executive bases and the tactical support to all

infantry objectives, as essential.

Pakistani Soldier from an Air Defense Unit with an ANZA-II SAM Missile

The Pakistani ‘shoulder-fired missile’ threat was omnipresent. Pakistan had recently

moved its elements from Air Defense regiments armed with SAMs(Surface to Air

Missiles) and there were no uncertainties about this. An Indian Air Force(IAF) Canberra*

reconnaissance aircraft was damaged by a Pakistani Stinger fired possibly from across

the LOC.

On 27 May 1999, Gunner Sepoy Shafaqat Ali commanded by Captain Faheem Tipu,

Pakistan Army Air Defense shot down an IAF MiG-27ML using an ANZA-II SAM. The

IAF fighter (Serial No. 1135), was flown by Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa of No. 9

Squadron, IAF pilot who ejected and was taken prisoner and later released on 4 June

1999. The IAF fighter was shot down after intruding into Pakistan airspace at 11:15 a.m.

(PST) near Marol-Hamzi Ghund*, Pakistan.

Very same day Naik Talib Hussain Basharat again commanded by Captain Faheem

Tipu of the Pakistan Army Air Defense shot down an IAF MiG-21 again using an ANZA-

II SAM. The IAF fighter (Serial No. C1539) was flown by Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja of

No. 17 Squadron, IAF, who was killed. The Wreckage fell 10-12 kilometers inside

Pakistan. Body of IAF pilot was handed over to India on 29 May 1999.

On 28 May 1999, Lance Havaldar Muhammad Kamal of the Pakistan Army Air Defence

shot down an IAF Mi-17 Helicopter using a Stinger SAM(Surface to Air Missile).

The Indian airfields adjacent to Kargil were Srinagar and Avantipur. Adampur near

Jalandhar was near enough to support air operations too. Therefore, the IAF functioned

from these 3 bases with its command still in New Delhi. The planes used for ground

attack were;

a) MiG-2ls

b) MiG- 23s

c) MiG-27s

d) Jaguars

e) Mirage- 2000

All these airplanes were optimized for low level bombings and were modified to carry a

load of 4 tons each, showing the interest of IAF to help its struggling troops on land.

IAF MiG-21s were used extensively in the Kargil war.

Pakistan Air Force(PAF) fighters though were picked up on the airborne radars of the

Indian fighters and ground reconnaissance systems but it is reported that PAF planes

never crossed into the Indian side of the LOC throughout the Kargil conflict.

Nevertheless, as a safety measure, the IAF strike aircrafts were mostly escorted by the

fighter jets.

Withdrawal of Pakistani Soldiers:

In a skilful use of naval power in the form of 'Operation Talwar', Indian Navy’s 'Eastern

Fleet' joined the 'Western Naval Fleet' and blocked the Arabian sea routes of Pakistan.

Distant from a restriction, the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief later revealed that

Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel (POL) to maintain itself if a matured war broke

out.

On July 11th Batalik sector is reclaimed by Indian Army and Pakistani infiltrators make

an all out push-out after the operation is called off.

The Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee 3 days later on 14th declare operation Vijay a

success. Mr. Vajpayee’s Government sets condition for dialogues with Pakistan. The

Indian army launched its final assault in the final week of July; as quickly as the Drass

subsector had been cleaned from Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The

day has since been marked as ‘Kargil Vijay Diwas’ (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the

end of the war, India had regained the control of all land south and east of the Line of

Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement, Pakistan Army

still claims the highest post on Tiger Hill, a small garrison, a botanical garden and a

double lane road still depicts the might of Pakistani NLI soldiers that fought with bravery

and courage.

An Indian howitzer zeroing on Tiger Hill in the background during Kargil War

Pakistan army fatalities have been difficult to decide. Pakistan has confirmed that 453

soldiers were martyred. The US Department of State had made an early, partial

estimate of close to 700 fatalities. One Indian Pilot was officially captured during the

war, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were captured during the fighting,

and were send home on 13 August 1999. The Indian casualties are around 527 killed

and more than 1500 wounded. 3 aircrafts and 1 helicopter was also amongst the Indian

losses.

The Indian government placed a momentary news ban on all stories coming from

Pakistan, Pakistan Television and Dawn news were banned. The Pakistani media

criticized this obvious limitation of freedom of the press in India, while India media

asserted that it was in the importance of national safety. The Indian government ran

commercials in foreign journals and papers including The Times and The Washington

Post pointing Pakistan's role behind extremists in Kashmir in an effort to gather political

support for its situation through this one of a kind propaganda.

A retired Pakistani Army General, Lieutenant General Ali Kuli Khan Khattak, defines the

Kargil war as "a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy",

Faced with the likelihood of global separation, the already flimsy Pakistani economy

was damaged more. The confidence of Pakistani forces after the pulling out turned

down as many regiments of the Northern Light Infantry endured heavy losses. The

government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif, a puppetry of United States of America’s government

under Mr. Bill Clinton declined to recognize the dead bodies of many of its officers and

troops - an issue that aggravated fury and complains in the Northern Areas.

Countering it all, Pakistan COAS Pervez Musharraf said,

"It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own forces," and claimed that Indian

casualties were more than that of Pakistan.

Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that; "Sharif's moves were confusing"

Gallantry awards of Kargil:

1. Indian soldiers

Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra

Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra

Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous

Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra

Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous

2. Pakistani soldiers

Captain Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous

Havaldaar Lalak Jan, Northern Light Infantry, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous

Indian army Memorial of Kargil war operation Vijay

___________________________

Glossary:

Pokhran Testing Range

Pokhran (also spelled Pokaran) is a city and a municipality located in Jaisalmer district

in the Indian state of Rajasthan. It is a remote location in the Thar Desert region and

served as the test site for India's first underground nuclear weapon detonation.

Chaghi Testing Site

Chagai is the capital of Chagai District in the Balochistan province of Pakistan - five

underground nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan at 15:15hrs (3:15p.m. PST) in 28 May

1998.

Operation Koh-e-Paima

Original codename of Pakistani land operations – the word ‘Koh-e-Paima’ was made

public on Pakistan Army’s website after 2007.

Zoji La

Zoji La is a high mountain pass in India, located on the Indian National Highway 1

between Srinagar and Leh in the western section of the Himalayan mountain range.

FCNA(Force Command Northern Areas)

The Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) is essentially a division sized formation

specialized in mountain warfare. There are certain international obligations due to which

the FCNA is not called a division but in reality it is a division.

Nullahs

A Nullah or Nulla (Hindi, also Nallah in Punjabi) is an arm of the sea, stream, or

watercourse, a steep narrow valley. Like the wadi of the Arabs, the nullah is

characteristic of mountainous or hilly country where there is little rainfall.

RPG

Rocket Propelled Grenade.

SSG Yaldram

Yaldram is one of the 3 Special Service Group (SSG) units in Pakistan, also known as

Black Storks, because of their distinctive headgear, the unit is also known as Maroon

Beret, are a special operations military unit of the Pakistan Army.

10 Division

Pakistan Army division garrisoned in Rawalpindi and Murree Cantonments.

Kernel Sher Khan & Lalik Jan Shaheed

Captain Kernal Sher Khan and Havaldar Lalik Jan Shaheed were both awarded Nishan-

e-Haider for fighting with utmost courage and zeal on the outskirts of Tiger Hill.

Canberra

The English Electric Canberra is a first-generation jet-powered light bomber

manufactured in large numbers through the 1950s. The Canberra could fly at a higher

altitude than any other bomber through the 1950s

Trishul

Indian Air Force scheming and exercising throughout the Kashmir valley only before 3

months of Kargil War.

Simla Agreement

The Simla Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan at 12:40am on July 2,

1972. It followed after the war between the two nations in the previous year that had led

to the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh.

___________________________

Books:

a) M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-

7099-734-8.

b) Amarinder Singh (2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999.

Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN: B0006E8KKW.

c) Jasjit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia

Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7.

d) J. N. Dixit (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-

30472-5.

e) Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army

From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh.

Pennsylvania, USA.. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.

f) Ranjan Kumar Singh. Sarhad Zero Mile. Parijat Prakashan.. ISBN 81-903561-0-

0.

References:

a) Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Yaqub (PA 20150) – 47th Field Artillery Regiment

b) Major Muhammad Zeeshan (PA 34093) – 6th Punjab Regiment

c) Colonel Naeem Zaka (PA 18459) – 6th Northern Light Infantry

Websites:

a) www.google.com.pk

b) www.wikipedia.org

c) www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk

d) www.vayosina.blogspot.com

______________