Institutional and Organizational Design and Contractual Relations
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Institutional, Organizational Design and Contractual
Relations.
Rosário Macário
January 2016
CERIS | CESUR
Instituto Superior Técnico
Universidade de Lisboa
• Understand the main decision making processes in BRT
systems and the structure underlying quality of decision
• Develop a formal structure for retrospective analysis of the
various interplaying policy components, and relations
between institutional and organizational design and
performance
• Develop a systems dynamic model to search for well-designed
and promising BRT policy packages
Objectives
Policy Design and
Packaging
Policy ImpactAssessment
System Performance Monitoring andFeedback
QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING
Institutional
setting and
organizational
design
Contracts and
Partnerships (Risk)
Integrated System
Planning for
accessibilty and
mobility (STO)
Funding and
Financing
FRAMEWORK FOR BRT IMPLEMENTATION
Bidirectional SystemCommunication
Public
Private
Hybrid
Hierarchies
Market
Networks
Hybrid
Formal
Informal
Profit
Non-profit
Complete
Incomplete
Organizations
Contracts
INSTITUTIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS
(GOVERNANCE)
INSTITUTIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
Formal
Informal
Enforcement
Federalism*
(De)centralization*
Ownership***
Levels of Regulation***
Levels of Competition
(monopoly, oligopoly,
perfect competition)***
Vertical/Horizontal
Integration***
Concentration**
Entry & Exit barriers**
Product
Differentiation***
STRUCTURE CONDUCT
Policy (Competition/Antitrust,
Fiscal, Labour, Trade, Regional,
Environmental, Social, Transport,
Health etc)*
Regulation*
Privatization, nationalization or
municipalization***
Coordination*
Collaboration***
Competition***
Taxation*
Subsidies*
Pricing**
Collusion**
Merger**
PERFORMANCE
Growth***
Social welfare*(*)
Public value*
Regulatory effectiveness*
Economic Performance***
Social Performance***
Environmental Performance***
Organizational Performance***
Quality***
Profitability**
Public Participation*
Relevance***
Equity/Justice***
INDIVIDUALS
Officials
Planners
Decision-makers
Citizens
Voters
Suppliers
Customers
Other
stakeholders
Mandatory Participation
Voluntary Participation
Collaboration
Opposition
Veto
*public realm **private realm ***public and private realms
Spanou
M.,
2015 (
PhD
)
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT PERFORMANCE
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
(GOVERNANCE)
PERFORMANCE
Formal Rules
H N M
H: Hierarchies, N: Networks, M: Markets, C: Contracts & other Commitment documents
Informal Rules
C
ORGANIZATIONALPERFORMANCE
S
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PERFORMANCE
T
OS: Strategic, T: Tactical, O: Operational
[Strategic Performance]
[Planning Performance]
[Financial & Operating Performance]
Spandou, M. 2015 (PhD)
MIS
SIN
G
MIS
SIN
G
Missing in BRT implementation
MIS
SIN
G
MIS
SIN
G
DB of Contracts
EuropeAustria: Innsbruck
Belgium: Brussels
Czech Republic: Prague
Denmark: Copenhagen
Finland: Helsinki
France: Dijon, Lyon
Georgia: Tbilisi
Germany: Elmshorn, Frankfurt,
Gifhorn, Munich suburbs, Wittenberg
Hungary: Budapest
Ireland: Dublin
Italy: Rome, Sondrio/Lombardy,
Trieste
The Netherlands: Amesterdam,
Haarlem, Hague, Rotterdam
Norway: Grenland, Vestfold and
Telemark
Poland: Krakow, Warsaw
Portugal: Lisbon, Porto
Spain: Barcelona, Oviedo,
Parla/Madrid, Santiago de
Compostella
Sweden: Halmstad, Stockholm,
Sundsvall
United Kingdom: Leeds, London,
Manchester
Northern AmericaCanada: Ontario region
USA
South AmericaArgentina: Buenos Aires
Brazil: Porto Alegre, São Paulo,
Chile: Santiago
OceaniaAustralia: Adelaide, Sydney
New Zealand: Wellington
Infrastructure experience
The most traditional forms are in Q4,
with direct financing by the State and
separation of the various stages
In Q1 the State still assures (most
of) financing needs directly, but
“buys” from the private sector the
construction and operation of the
infrastructure (possibly with
maintenance in the package)
In Q2 the Private Sector assures
(most of) financing needs, keeping
within its responsibility good
performance of several stages of the
lifecycle
Model to test strategic and tactical policy goals
Martinez L.
Dynamic decision entity encompassed inan Agent Based ModelWith three components
Research team:
Rosário Macário (Prof)
Vasco Reis (post-doc)
Luis Martinez (post-doc)
Maria Spandou – PhD finished
Camila Garcia – PhD finished
Marisa Pedro – on-going PhD
Matheus Oliveira – on-going PhD
Joana Costa – on-going PhD
Luís N. Filipe – Starting PhD
Bruno Aguiar – Starting PhD
Bernardo Garcia – Starting PhD
Thank you !
Rosário Macário
rosariomacario@tecnico.ulisboa.pt
Support:
BRT – ALC
National Science Foundation
MIT Portrugal Program
Thales Industry Group
European Commission
SI-BRT
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