Institutional and Organizational Design and Contractual Relations

Institutional, Organizational Design and Contractual

Relations.

Rosário Macário

January 2016

CERIS | CESUR

Instituto Superior Técnico

Universidade de Lisboa

• Understand the main decision making processes in BRT

systems and the structure underlying quality of decision

• Develop a formal structure for retrospective analysis of the

various interplaying policy components, and relations

between institutional and organizational design and

performance

• Develop a systems dynamic model to search for well-designed

and promising BRT policy packages

Objectives

Policy Design and

Packaging

Policy ImpactAssessment

System Performance Monitoring andFeedback

QUALITY OF DECISION MAKING

Institutional

setting and

organizational

design

Contracts and

Partnerships (Risk)

Integrated System

Planning for

accessibilty and

mobility (STO)

Funding and

Financing

FRAMEWORK FOR BRT IMPLEMENTATION

Bidirectional SystemCommunication

Institutional context for BRT implementation

Spandou M., 2015 (PhD)

MISSING

Public

Private

Hybrid

Hierarchies

Market

Networks

Hybrid

Formal

Informal

Profit

Non-profit

Complete

Incomplete

Organizations

Contracts

INSTITUTIONAL

ARRANGEMENTS

(GOVERNANCE)

INSTITUTIONAL

ENVIRONMENT

Formal

Informal

Enforcement

Federalism*

(De)centralization*

Ownership***

Levels of Regulation***

Levels of Competition

(monopoly, oligopoly,

perfect competition)***

Vertical/Horizontal

Integration***

Concentration**

Entry & Exit barriers**

Product

Differentiation***

STRUCTURE CONDUCT

Policy (Competition/Antitrust,

Fiscal, Labour, Trade, Regional,

Environmental, Social, Transport,

Health etc)*

Regulation*

Privatization, nationalization or

municipalization***

Coordination*

Collaboration***

Competition***

Taxation*

Subsidies*

Pricing**

Collusion**

Merger**

PERFORMANCE

Growth***

Social welfare*(*)

Public value*

Regulatory effectiveness*

Economic Performance***

Social Performance***

Environmental Performance***

Organizational Performance***

Quality***

Profitability**

Public Participation*

Relevance***

Equity/Justice***

INDIVIDUALS

Officials

Planners

Decision-makers

Citizens

Voters

Suppliers

Customers

Other

stakeholders

Mandatory Participation

Voluntary Participation

Collaboration

Opposition

Veto

*public realm **private realm ***public and private realms

Spanou

M.,

2015 (

PhD

)

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT PERFORMANCE

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

(GOVERNANCE)

PERFORMANCE

Formal Rules

H N M

H: Hierarchies, N: Networks, M: Markets, C: Contracts & other Commitment documents

Informal Rules

C

ORGANIZATIONALPERFORMANCE

S

INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PERFORMANCE

T

OS: Strategic, T: Tactical, O: Operational

[Strategic Performance]

[Planning Performance]

[Financial & Operating Performance]

Spandou, M. 2015 (PhD)

MIS

SIN

G

MIS

SIN

G

Missing in BRT implementation

MIS

SIN

G

MIS

SIN

G

Need Integrated System Planning (STO)

Garc

ia C

. (2

015,

Ph

D)

Po

lic

yP

ac

ka

gin

g

DB of Contracts

EuropeAustria: Innsbruck

Belgium: Brussels

Czech Republic: Prague

Denmark: Copenhagen

Finland: Helsinki

France: Dijon, Lyon

Georgia: Tbilisi

Germany: Elmshorn, Frankfurt,

Gifhorn, Munich suburbs, Wittenberg

Hungary: Budapest

Ireland: Dublin

Italy: Rome, Sondrio/Lombardy,

Trieste

The Netherlands: Amesterdam,

Haarlem, Hague, Rotterdam

Norway: Grenland, Vestfold and

Telemark

Poland: Krakow, Warsaw

Portugal: Lisbon, Porto

Spain: Barcelona, Oviedo,

Parla/Madrid, Santiago de

Compostella

Sweden: Halmstad, Stockholm,

Sundsvall

United Kingdom: Leeds, London,

Manchester

Northern AmericaCanada: Ontario region

USA

South AmericaArgentina: Buenos Aires

Brazil: Porto Alegre, São Paulo,

Chile: Santiago

OceaniaAustralia: Adelaide, Sydney

New Zealand: Wellington

Subsidization vs sources

Spandou

M.,

2015 (

PhD

)

Infrastructure experience

The most traditional forms are in Q4,

with direct financing by the State and

separation of the various stages

In Q1 the State still assures (most

of) financing needs directly, but

“buys” from the private sector the

construction and operation of the

infrastructure (possibly with

maintenance in the package)

In Q2 the Private Sector assures

(most of) financing needs, keeping

within its responsibility good

performance of several stages of the

lifecycle

Ma

trix

of

resp

on

sab

ilit

ies

in

pro

vis

ion

of

infr

ast

ruct

ure

Model to test strategic and tactical policy goals

Martinez L.

Dynamic decision entity encompassed inan Agent Based ModelWith three components

Research team:

Rosário Macário (Prof)

Vasco Reis (post-doc)

Luis Martinez (post-doc)

Maria Spandou – PhD finished

Camila Garcia – PhD finished

Marisa Pedro – on-going PhD

Matheus Oliveira – on-going PhD

Joana Costa – on-going PhD

Luís N. Filipe – Starting PhD

Bruno Aguiar – Starting PhD

Bernardo Garcia – Starting PhD

Thank you !

Rosário Macário

[email protected]

Support:

BRT – ALC

National Science Foundation

MIT Portrugal Program

Thales Industry Group

European Commission

SI-BRT