Atlantic Voices - Vol. 2 no. 2
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ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 1
Volume 2 - Issue 2, February 2012
Contents:
The Western Balkans on the Euro-Atlantic “Way”
Branko Lazic examines some of the recent developments in the Western
Balkans with regards to further NATO enlargement. Branko examines
levels of support for NATO membership within domestic populations as
well as some of the wider political questions which hold significant influ-
ence on the issue.
Balkan Euro-Atlantic Aspiration and Regional
Cooperation
Ilija Djugumanov and Jordan Tasev explore the state of the integration
of the Balkans into the wider Euro-Atlantic architecture. Examining the
importance of the region for European security, and also assessing the
importance of the region to Turkey and Russia.
THE BALKANS AND THE FUTURE OF EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION
Atlantic Voices is the monthly publication of
the Atlantic Treaty Association. It aims to
inform the debate on key issues that affect
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its
goals and its future. The work published in
Atlantic Voices is written by young professionals
and researchers.
This issue of Atlantic Voices aims to exam-
ine the Balkans region. Assessing its im-
portance to the Atlantic Community, how far
the Balkans has progressed with integration
into this community, and what some of the
potential obstacles facing this integration are.
The issue utilises expertise from within the
Balkan region itself to explore these issues.
We hope you find the following pages
both informative and thought provoking, As
part of our goal in promoting and informing
the public debate upon these topics, Atlantic
Voices is happy to accept responses to the issue
and articles we have selected.
Admiral James G. Stavridis SACEUR, meets Artur Kuko, Permanent Representative of Albania to NATO and Arben Imami, Minister of Defence of Albania
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 2
Everybody is arguing that the world is changing, but why are
concerned about whether younger generations are prepared to
cope with its consequences?
Essential for any reflections, it is first and upmost essential to
acknowledge that my generation has been strongly influenced by
the 90s enthusiasm and revival for concepts like United Nations,
universal rights, rule of law and the fight for global justice, last
but not least the world community´s responsibility to protect.
This is a result of me and my generation being more or less iso-
lated from an existential threat, and thus raised in society whose
mentality implies that it is the universal values mentioned just
now that make the world a better place to be – as opposed to
more traditional strategic and realpolitikal terms as power, geo-
politics, balance, interests etc, and I´m afraid that we´re more
used to the exception rather than the rule when it comes to glob-
al politics. My generation is raised in an idealistic bubble.
The important question, however, is if this conflicts with
today´s spirit of the transatlantic community?
Well, if the spirit of the transatlantic community is based on
democracy and the rule of law, then it is obvious that we need
not to worry for the future of transatlantic values. Americans
have in fact emphasized democracy and rule of law when it
comes to justifying their foreign policy – and so have Europeans.
The result is common ground – shared values.
The problem, however, arises when conduct is more or less
explicitly disconnected from values or rhetoric, which I believe
is a “shocking” reality that I see many of my friends and fellows
are confronted with more and more, and which is a reality that
probably won´t get any better in the near future. Bottom line is:
the world isn´t what we expected, and I think the consequences
are that we´re distancing ourselves from “the interest-driven
world”, with NATO arguably serving as an arena for interests
rather than a “force for good”.
We, the future of decision- and policy makers, have been
indoctrinated in a “war is bad, peace is good” mentality, and thus
raising the bar for young professionals and students in relating
and engaging in anything to do with interests, NATO being no
exception.
What then can we do? I have to immediate thoughts. First of
all, I think today´s decision-makers have to be more honest on
why we do things. Take Afghanistan as example, submitting
allied troops to the ISAF mission was arguably value-driven
(democracy, governance, getting rid of opium, rule of law, kick-
ing out Taliban), but exiting seems to be based on everything
else than the initial value-based rhetoric. Second, my colleagues
and I in YATA clearly have to intensify our work in furthering
information about our field of study. We have to get better at
confronting our peers with the notion that security and defence
is unfortunately a necessary evil, a necessity that cannot be decou-
pled from the concept of interest.
Ideals are great, but by failing to also address or communicate
interests as an important driver, my generation´s confidence in
transatlantic cooperation (which is both interest and value driv-
en) will never get stronger in the future.
Adapted from a speech by Sean Lobo, YATA Norway, given at the 47th
annual Leangkollen Conference in Norway
Comment: Bursting the Bubble of Idealism
About the Authors
Ilija Djugumanov and Jordan Tasev
Ilija Djugumanov is currently pursuing a Masters De-
gree in International Relations at the University of Göte-
borg, He is also currently president of the Youth Atlantic
Treaty Association of Macedonia.
Jordan Tasev is currently Secretary-General of the
Youth Atlantic Treaty Association of Macedonia, and cur-
rently studying at the Institute for Security, Defence, and
Peace Studies in Skopje.
Branko Lazić
Branko Lazić has studies international relations at the
faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade.
In addition Mr. Lazić has recently graduated from the
“Koca Popovic” Diplomatic Academy, Vienna. In addition,
Branko Lazić has been an active member of the Serbian
Atlantic Council.
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 3
by Branko Lazić
M ore than a decade after the end of period of
permanent hostilities on the Balkans peninsu-
la it is still difficult to speak about prosperous
and democratized region. There are many reasons why it is not
the case but it is obvious that some progress has been made in the
previous decade. Some Western Balkan states are already inte-
grated in the Alliance and one of them is going to become EU
member state next year. The years of violence are behind the
Balkans and it is unlikely to expect new tectonic moves within
the region but there are several very sensitive issues which need
to be resolved if the West wants to see a peaceful and developed
Western Balkans integrated in the NATO and the EU. NATO
membership seems easier to be achieved but that might be
wrongly perceived because some countries still can’t rebuild
relations with the Alliance even though it was expected at the
beginning of 2000’s.
After the adoption of the NATO’s New Strategic Concept in
November 2010 it is clear to everyone that NATO’s doors re-
main open to any European country in a position to undertake
the commitments and obligations of membership. Primarily it
can be directed toward Western Balkan countries which are
already deeply involved in the process of Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Albania and Croatia already reached the goal of the NATO
membership on 1 April 2009 at Strasbourg-Kehl Sum-
mit. In December 2009 NATO foreign ministers decid-
ed to invite Montenegro to join the Membership Action
Plan. At the same time Bosnia and Herzegovina was
informed that it may join the Alliance once it has
achieved necessary progress in its reform efforts. Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is in the state of
‘frozen dialogue’ with the NATO and the EU because of the
country’s name dispute with Greece. The case of Serbia remains
controversial because of Kosovo’s dispute and NATO interven-
tion in 1999, however Serbia still tries to re-establish good rela-
tions within region and with the Western states. Serbia has had a
lot of success in the building of good relations with its neighbors,
especially with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, it is
not an easy task especially after most of the EU and NATO
member states, but also most of neighbor states, recognized
unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence in February
2008.
Discussing the issue of the Western Balkans Euro-Atlantic
integration demands dealing with the fact that NATO member-
ship for most of the European countries was one step before
their EU membership. It is sort of unofficial pre-condition for
the EU membership if we take a look at the EU integration of the
former communist countries. All Western Balkan countries be-
long to that category and they hardly can be compared with non-
communist EU entries. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monte-
negro and Albania definitely belong to the group of countries
which need to carefully balance their Atlanticism with their Eu-
ropeanism.
The European Union and NATO strongly cooperate within
the Western Balkan area. Berlin Plus is just one of the modalities
of their cooperation. The European Union has continued to build
peace and stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina since December 2004
within operation Althea. In FYROM EU has been leading opera-
tion Concordia after NATO finished its Operation Allied Har-
mony. European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) rep-
resents a mission which has a goal to achieve legal and adminis-
trative improvements within Kosovo’s society. At the same time
NATO leads KFOR mission in the still fragile area. It must be
underlined that EU at its
summit in Thessaloniki in
2003 declared that “the
future of the Balkans is
within the EU”. This was
a signal of strong support
to the Western Balkans that they were on their European way.
If we take a look at the concrete developments with individ-
ual countries it can be concluded that there are several groups of
Western Balkan states dealing with NATO integration. Albania
and Croatia already fulfilled their membership goals. Montene-
gro is well on the way towards membership of the Alliance.
Whilst FYROM and Bosnia and Herzegovina are blocked because
of several disputes. Finally, Serbia decided to declare military
neutrality in 2007 and even though it participates in the Partner-
ship for Peace Programme there are no signals that Serbia will
The Western Balkans on the Euro-Atlantic “Way”
...NATO membership for most of the European countries was one step before
their EU membership.
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 4
nal (ICTY) and because of misunderstandings with the most of
EU and NATO member states regarding the status of Kosovo
which Serbia considers as its southern province under UN con-
trol. In the meantime Serbia arrested all war crimes suspects
including Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Serbia answered
on the EC’s legislative questionnaire in a shortest possible peri-
od. The Commission has now decided that Serbia has fulfilled all
technical pre-conditions to become EU candidate. The last de-
velopments regarding Belgrade-Pristina dialogue have delayed
Council’s decision to grant Serbia candidate status. Serbia now
hopes to receive full candidate status in March this year. The
main obstacle towards EU accession of Kosovo is in the different
position of the EU members on the Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of
independence. Five of the EU member states still don’t recog-
nize Kosovo’s independence and there is no space for official
dialogue between Brussels and Pristina. Kosovo remains very
fragile area with serious challenges related to the rule of law,
fight against corruption and organized crime, the strengthening
of administrative capacities and protection of the Serbs and other
minorities.
Looking toward future NATO enlargement the state with
the best chance of gaining full membership is Montenegro. Mon-
tenegro joined PfP in December 2006 together with Serbia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since April 2008 the Montenegrin Govern-
ment has engaged in an Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The
next year in December 2009 Montenegro was invited to join the
Membership Action Plan. NATO’s Secretary General
Mr. Rasmussen in June 2009 commended Montenegro’s
political leaders for their courage and determination. He
encouraged them to continue their efforts saying that it is
of utmost importance to ensure that Montenegrin securi-
ty agencies and defense sector meet NATO require-
ments. He emphasized the need for further fight against corrup-
tion and organized crime in Montenegro. FYROM joined PfP
much before the other former Yugoslav republics. Macedonia
started to cooperate with NATO within the PfP framework since
1995. Because of long-standing name dispute with Greece there
is a serious impediment to Macedonia’s NATO membership
aspirations. Officially Athens demands that Skopje add a geo-
graphic qualifier in the country’s name to differentiate it from
Greece’s province of Macedonia. Several proposals have been
presented for FYROM to adopt the names such as the “Republic
choose membership policy. European Union membership is,
however, a common goal for all Western Balkan countries. Cro-
atia successfully concluded its accession negotiations with the EU
and on 1 July 2013 Croatia will become an EU member country.
FYROM applied to become an official candidate on 22 March
2004 and it was formally named as an EU membership candidate
on 17 December 2005, but there is no progress regarding open-
ing dialogue on the membership accession because of the previ-
ously mentioned country name’s dispute. Macedonia (FYROM)
also has some difficulties in reaching European standards on the
rule of law and the economy. Albania applied for EU member-
ship on 28 April 2009 but has not yet achieved candidate status.
Albania’s candidacy status was not recognized in December 2010
primarily because of long lasting row in the country. Regarding
Bosnia and Herzegovina there are many economic as political
problems which are interrupting Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion. Bosnia concluded its Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment negotiations in December 2007 signing the SAA in 2008.
Their potential move toward EU membership can be described
in the former EC chairman’s words. Mr. Prodi stated that Bosnia
and Herzegovina has a chance of joining EU soon after Croatia,
but it is entirely dependent on the country’s progress. Of
course, that progress can be understood as a dialogue and com-
mon policy among Bosnia’s entity’s leaderships. Some steps
forward were taken in the previous years but there is still a lot of
room for improvement and that might be the main reason why
Bosnia and Herzegovina
didn’t decide to apply for
EU candidate status. Af-
ter obtaining independ-
ence in mid 2006 Monte-
negro very soon submit-
ted its EU membership application. Montenegro officially sub-
mitted its candidacy to the EC on 15 December 2009. After
successful fulfillment of the EC’s questionnaire Montenegro
gained candidate status on 17 December 2010. The largest
country in the region, Serbia has started its SAA negotiations
with EU in November 2005. On 29 April 2008 EU and Serbia
signed Stabilisation and Association Agreement and officially
applied for the EU membership on 19 December 2009. During
its stabilization and accession talks Serbia had many problems,
mainly because of the lack in cooperation with the Hague Tribu-
...the state with the best chance of gaining full [NATO] membership is
Montenegro.
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 5
of Vardar Macedonia” and the “Republic of Northern Macedo-
nia”. Within Macedonia there is strong resistance among the
Slavic majority (65% of population) toward a change of state’s
name, even if this stops further Euro-Atlantic integration. If we
take a look at the polls there is a strong support to NATO’s
membership of Macedonia and it is around 80%, so long as there
is no name dispute issue on the agenda.
Within Montenegro there is still low support among
the Montenegrin population for full NATO member-
ship, though this is slowly rising, and it is now at 36% in
favor of membership with 34% of the population oppos-
ing it. The Montenegrin population (one third of which
declare themselves as Serbs), when asked whether they support
EU membership of Montenegro, answer with 66% of citizens
supporting the country’s EU membership. Obviously the Serbian
population in Montenegro favors the EU more than it favors
NATO. This is partly a reflection of the 1999 NATO interven-
tion against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Bosnia and Herzegovina were granted a conditional MAP in
April 2010. Bosnia has in its possession considerable stockpiles of
excess weaponry, including almost 70,000 rifles and pistols
along with explosive ordnance and ammunition in excess of
around 20,000 tons. Even though military infrastructure and
command were integrated in 2006 there is still lack in control of
military hardware. The two entities haven’t yet found a suffi-
cient compromise regarding this issue and it continues to cause
serious difficulties for Bosnia’s Euro-Atlantic path. If you add to
this the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a dysfunctional
state with weak central government it is clear why Bosnia still
moves only slowly toward the EU and NATO. With Bosnian
Muslims demanding strong central government, Bosnian Croats
demanding more autonomy for Croats within Federation Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Muslim-Croat entity covering 51% of Bosnia and
Herzegovina), and Bosnian Serbs frequently asking for secession
of its entity (Republika
Srpska which covers 49%
of Bosnia and Herze-
govina), the domestic
political situation is con-
flicted. If Bosnian Mus-
lims continue to insist on the state’s centralization it is very diffi-
cult to expect any reforms within this multi-ethnic country. In
the case of Bosnia around 70% of the population, fully or partly,
support the country’s membership of the NATO Alliance.
The Serbian Government pursues a policy of building good
relations with the West, but at the same time declares Kosovo to
be under its sovereignty. This has caused serious disturbances in
Serbia’s relations with a majority of NATO and EU member
states since 2007, when the Serbian Assembly adopted a Resolu-
tion on the military neutrality of Serbia, and especially after Ko-
sovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008. Even
though officially Belgrade declared a neutrality policy there have
been taken some important steps toward NATO admission of
Serbia. The Serbian parliament recognized the 1995 massacre of
more than 7,000 civilians in Srebrenica during the Bosnian war,
recognizing that there were large numbers of non-Serb victims in
The Serbian Government pursues a policy of building good relations with the West, but at the same time declares
Kosovo to be under its sovereignty.
NATO Military Committee, Led by Admiral Giampaolo Di Paola, visits Kosovo on 8 September 2011.
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 6
NATO’s position regarding the future Alliance enlargement
within the Western Balkans area can be described with the
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s words:
“NATO’s vision for the Western Balkans region is clear: Euro-
Atlantic integration is the best guarantee for peace, progress and
prosperity…It is up to political leaders across the West-
ern Balkans to demonstrate the courage and determina-
tion to create better future for their own nations, and for
the entire region.” These words definitely show NATO’s
willingness to strengthen its presence in the region.
However any discussion of this demands open dialogue
regarding several important issues. Alongside this it must be
recognized that further integration will also require the willing-
ness of regional governments to fight against widespread corrup-
tion, and accepting the fact that Russian Federation has strong
influence in the region, with Moscow officially not in favor of
further NATO enlargement. Finally Western Balkan countries
must resolve their internal disputes which are still present. That
means that the any solution must be a compromise where, for
example, Serbia will not be required to lose everything, nor
should Kosovo Albanians be perceived as receiving everything.
This can be achieved by constructive dialogue and with support
of Western allies. The same must be done in case of Macedonia’s
name dispute. With the policy of compromise and sustainable
regional development Western Balkans can be fully integrated in
the community of developed democracies.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They
do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
it’s members, affiliates or staff.
that area. The Serbian government is showing serious efforts in
pursuing a policy of coexistence with Albania proof of which is
the ongoing dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Despite this
there is a still strong anti-NATO sentiment among the Serbian
people. It is mainly related to the NATO bombing campaign
against FR Yugoslavia in 1999 and it is obvious that this challenge
must to be overcome if
Serbia wants to join
NATO. A dialogue has
begun between Serbia
and Western partners on
the subject of Kosovo.
During his visit to Balkans in 2009 US vice president Joseph
Biden expressed the belief that the United States and Serbia
could ‘’agree to disagree’’ on Kosovo. Support for Serbia’s
membership in NATO is currently very low at only 15.6% in
favor of membership with 66.3% of the Serbian population op-
posing.
It should be underlined that the policy of military neutrality
of Serbia hasn’t been clearly defined either by a Resolution or by
any following documents outlining Serbia’s security policies such
as the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategy approved
by the Serbian Parliament in October 2009. Serbia is continuing
to reform its Army, doing so with great success following the
fulfillment of NATO standards. Serbia’s military industry is the
largest in region with around $400 million worth of sold weap-
ons, mostly in Iraq ($ 285 million). There are opinions that
NATO membership would allow Serbia to develop this industry
further. Serbia has also intensified its dialogue with NATO since
2008. Last year there was organized “NATO’s Strategic Military
Conference in Belgrade” which saw a gathering of 200 military
officials from 55 countries. At the same time there is a strong
cooperation between Serbian Army and the National Guard of
Ohio. One clear sign that Western Balkan countries are begin-
ning to play the role of peace facilitator is the fact that all West-
ern Balkan countries participate in international military mis-
sions. With exception of Serbia which participates only in UN
missions other Western Balkan states take part in the ISAF mis-
sion led by NATO in Afghanistan. Croatia has the largest troops
(312) deployed in Afghanistan followed by Albania (286) and
FYROM (163). Bosnia and Herzegovina participates with 55
troops and Montenegro has 37 troops in Afghanistan.
Source and Owner/Caption: ….. (if applicable)
...Western Balkan countries must re-solve their internal disputes which are still present. That means that the any
solution must be a compromise...
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 7
by Ilija Djugumanov and Jordan Tasev
T he Balkan region, famous of its constant turbu-
lence is a part of Europe that has seen massive
changes and transformations in the past dec-
ades. Historically speaking the Balkan Region is known for being
a region with many conflicts. These conflicts were responsible
for enormous loss of life in the past. Unfortunately, these kind of
events, only with smaller intensity, still continue even in the
newer history of the region. The smallest such incident in the
Balkans, has been shown to have the potential to raise external
tensions, and in more recent times, internal conflicts, which
occur even more often.
Such developments have imposed the fact that we should
strengthen our efforts within this region. From this region and
from outside, we should actively encourage sincere cooperation
between the different nations. Otherwise, the word “Balkans” in
people’s minds will always carry negative connotations instead of
indicating a place where peace, freedom, democracy, individual
liberty, and rule of law are the core elements of society.
Despite all of the prejudice and stereotypes, rivalries, mis-
understandings, the Balkans is a region that always finds the
strength to transform itself. Having all of this in mind, the Bal-
kans is still a crucial part of the Euro-Atlantic communi-
ty and that is where it naturally belongs.
After the fall of the Berlin wall and the changes
that started in Eastern Europe, this very same process
inevitably started in the Balkans and resulted with break
up and bloodstained end of Yugoslavia. After that this
region entered a process of massive transformation. Most coun-
tries turned themselves towards closer Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion.
A vital point in the total transformation and transition for
this region was the “Stability Pact”. It was launched in 1999 as
the first comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the inter-
national community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the
countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democra-
cy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity. The Sta-
bility Pact1 provided a framework to stimulate regional co-
operation and expedite integration into European and Euro-
Atlantic structures.
The act of signing the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment2 of which Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro
were already part, marked a step forward for relations at an
international level. It meant opening up the possibility for even-
tual integration in the European and Trans-Atlantic structures of
these countries, with the strengthening of relations between
governments and mutual cooperation (Regional free trade, bor-
der cooperation, suppression of corruption and organized crime,
creation of electricity and gas regional markets, transport devel-
opment, energy and infrastructure, as well as political and parlia-
mentary cooperation).
Nowadays, after a very long transformation, this region is
almost fully integrated into the EU and NATO. Already The
Balkans has six members in NATO.
Five of them are also members of the European Union.
There is a remainder of the countries that are not integrated and
each one of them is its own different case, it is in different state
and has different views. However, the fact remains that all of
them remain committed to the Euro-Atlantic vision and to inte-
gration.
Nevertheless, the full
transformation process
will be only be finished
when the whole region is
fully integrated.
The Balkans as a region, has always had different influ-
ences. Over the last centuries this region has witnessed shifting
alliances and partnerships. More recently, after the breakup of
Yugoslavia this region was guided through transition with the
help of the EU and NATO. Today it has to be said that with the
integration of some and the aspirations of others, this region
remains firmly within the sphere of the Euro-Atlantic region.
Despite this, historically this region belonged to the Otto-
man Empire and taking this fact into account it should be noted
that today Turkey has a natural role and influence on the Bal-
Balkan Euro-Atlantic Aspiration and Regional
Cooperation
...the Balkan Region is known for being a region with many conflicts...The smallest such
incident in the Balkans, has been shown to have the potential to raise external tensions
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 8
kans. It has to be emphasized that the role of Turkey becomes
crucial for the Balkans especially after the fall of the communism.
Turkey, also as a regional power, attaches special importance to
its relations with Balkan countries.
Today’s, basic elements of Turkey’s policy towards the
Balkans can be summarized as follows: developing relations to
the highest level with the
Balkan countries, with
which Turkey has histor-
ic, cultural and social
ties; enhancing the exist-
ing atmosphere of re-
gional peace and stability; keeping open the transportation con-
nection between Turkey and Western and Central Europe3.
Concerning peace and stability in the Balkans, Turkey con-
tributes with military and security staff to the international civil
(UNMIK, EULEX, and EUPOL) and military missions (KFOR,
EUFOR).
Whilst discussing foreign influence it is crucial to highlight
the ever present influence of the Russian Federation within this
region. Alongside this it is important to place this in the context
of the global rise of the Russian Federation. The feeling that
Russia will stamp its influence on the Balkans once again, is inev-
itable.
Looking more at the Russian influence it has to be noticed
that in the past years there have been massive investments in the
energy field. Russian energy interests is a key means enhancing
Russian influence in the region, and the Balkans and South East-
ern Europe are key parts of its energy strategy towards the EU.
Its main projects are:
South Stream gas pipeline
The Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline.
It’s interesting to point out that this is a crucial time for
this issue, the decision of the EU with regards to the
status of Serbia will be very, very important for the re-
gion and the balance of regional influences. How much
Russia will expand their influence in the wake of this
remains to be seen.
Related to the all of the previously said, the personal opin-
ion of the authors on this topic is that the Balkans as a region
should very much remain high on Europe’s global responsibility
list. Taking in consideration the present situation and the chal-
lenge of the numerous problems that it is facing, problems that
question some of the core pillars of the idea of the United Eu-
rope as a global factor, the Balkans has to remain a top priority.
In today's crisis, we often hear the question of the costs of being
or not being part of the EU.
This very same question has to be asked about this region
and in more global context, is it more cost-effective to fully
integrate this region with the fact of the enormous gap in the
development and standards, or is it worth taking the risk to al-
low the region to enter into new turmoil which inevitably will
have effects on the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole.
From this perspective the Euro-Atlantic region has to be
more dynamic and more flexible to answer the challenges and
the changes that are in front of it.
NATO – BALKANS
NATO’s active engagement with the Balkans began in the
early 1990s with its first major peace–support operation. Ever
since then the dynamics and diversity of operations have been
increased. It was during this time that the countries of the Bal-
kans had their first chance to see what NATO is and what NATO
can bring to the region with its own capacities and capabilities.
The other major point for the process of integration was
the Partnership for Peace (PfP)4 program that NATO applied. It
is clear that this program has made a major impact on the devel-
...the Balkans as a region should very
much remain high on Europe’s global responsibility list.
Figure 1: Partnership for Peace Programme start date by country.
(Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_82584.htm)
Country Date
Albania 23.02.94
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14.12.06
Bugaria 14.02.94
Croatia 25.05.00
Montenegro 14.12.06
Romania 26.01.94
Serbia 14.12.06
Slovenia 30.03.94
Macedonia 15.11.95
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 9
Source and Owner/Caption: ….. (if applicable)
opment of this region.
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practi-
cal bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic part-
ner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build up an indi-
vidual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for
cooperation.
The essence of the PfP program is a partnership formed
individually between each Euro-Atlantic partner and NATO,
tailored to individual needs and jointly implemented at the level
and pace chosen by each participating government.
Every country agreed on the program individually and in
different time. This can be seen in figure 1:
Fully aware of the desire of the countries to completely
integrated we have to give notice to the stance of NATO to-
wards this question, and this is very clearly stated in the new
Strategic Concept5:
NATO’s enlargement has contributed substantially to the securi-
ty of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of
cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more
broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing
common values, would be best served by the eventual integration
of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures.
The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all Europe-
an democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are
willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of
membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common
security and stability.
The Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the
aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic
values, regional cooperation and good neighborly relations.
Looking how the countries respond it has to be pointed out
their active engagement to the NATO led operations. Specifical-
ly talking about the ISAF mission in Afghanistan we will present
some statistics for the active contribution in the past and in the
present:
After looking at these facts we must highlight that sending
troops from the Balkans and Europe itself shows that they play
vital role in Afghanistan. This fact is sometimes neglected from
the viewpoint of US stake-holders and the media who often
shape the perceptions of the broader public.
With the recent developments in the Arab world and the
new security challenges the integration of the Balkans has slowed
down. In context of this NATO has to show leadership and deny
the risk of local politicians taking advantage and abusing the pre-
sent situation, when they argue that the Alliance is the reason
why the countries are not integrated, in order to fulfill their own
ambitions. Integration into Euro-Atlantic organizations is crucial
for the stabilization and development of the region.
On one hand, EU and NATO have invested considerable
resources for various forms of support in the region and further
reaffirmed its commitment to expand. On the other hand, non-
integration involves significant negative political and economic
impact on affected countries and future negative impact on Euro-
Is this the image of NATO and the Balkans that the public still perceives?
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 10
Figure 2: NATO ISAF Contributions by Country
(Source: http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php)
ISO Code
COUNTRY Recog-nized as
TCN since
Current Troop
Contrib.
Presence in Afghanistan
OMLT contrib.
POMLT contrib.
PRT ANA Trust Fund
NATO Equip-ment Donation
Programme
POERF
AL Albania 24 July 2003 286
Regional Command Capital
Regional Command West
0 0 N/A 0 0 0
BA B&H 16 March 2009
55 Regional Command North
0 0 N/A 0 0 0
BG Bulgaria 24 July 2003 598 Regional Command Capital
Regional Command West
4 0 N/A €160,000 50 mortars, ~21 million rounds of small arms am-munition, 500
binoculars
€170,000
HR Croatia 24 July 2003 312 Regional Command Capital
Regional Command North
3 2 N/A 0 0 0
GR Greece July 24 2003 154 Kabul International Airport (KAIA)
Compound
1 0 0
MK Macedonia 24 July 2003 163 Regional Com-mand Capital
0 0 N/A 0 0 0
ME Montenegro 24 February 2010
37 Regional Command North
0 0 N/A 0 0 0
RO Romania 24 July 2003 1876 Regional Command Capital
Regional Command South: Zabul
4 0 0 0 0
SI Slovenia 24 July 2003 79 Regional Command Capital
Regional Command West
0 1 N/A €230,000
60 mortars, ~10,000 small arms, and ~2.2
million rounds of ammunition
0
TR Turkey 24 July 2003
1845 Regional Command Capital
5 1 Lead Wardak
Lead Jawzjan
€1,500,000 24 howitzers, ammunition,
clothing, equip-ment and acade-
my supplies
0
Atlantic Voices Volume 2 Issue 2 11
pean security.
Talking about the present situation and the heavy financial
crisis that remains, it has to be said that this issue has already
affected security budgets disproportionately. In NATO, the Eu-
ropean partners contribute 20% of the total NATO budget. In
1991 that participation was one third of the total budget; this
alone speaks for the dras-
tic changes.
The big cuts in the
military budgets and the
emergence of the Smart
Defence concept may yet
be the blessing in disguise that this region emphatically needed.
This concept will be only positive for this region. Not only in the
perspective of efficient military spending, but this will bring to
light increased and emphasized cooperation that inevitably will
transform and will be passed on in lot of other sectors.
At this point we have to conclude that this region still faces
very big challenges. But these challenges are inevitable if the
region is to continue with the very healthy process of integra-
tion, cooperation and progress. As part of the Euro-Atlantic
Council of Macedonia it was always natural for us to work in
regional context and see things in broader spectrum and for us it
is crucial that our goals remain very clear, working towards Euro
-Atlantic integration. The feeling that this region remains dedi-
cated to integration is very strong, and it is recognized locally
that this is an ongoing process.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion
is that this region remains devoted to the Euro-Atlantic region,
where it naturally belongs.
As a recommendation for the further activities in working
towards integration the primary focus should be on the Smart
Defence concept. This concept is the perfect stepping stone for
the Balkans, it has to be put as a number one priority because it
will show that NATO with its own capacities is capable to make
reforms that are positive for every member and every partner
country, and is of benefit to the region. If properly applied and
implemented it will also significantly benefit the region long
after the current crisis is over and the integration process is com-
plete.
Notes
1 The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - EU's initiative adopted by more than 40 partner countries and organisations in Cologne on June 10th 1999. The Pact was reaffirmed at a summit meeting in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999.
2 Stabilization and Association Agreement constitute framework of relations between the European Union and the Western Balkan countries for implementa-tion of the stabilization and association process.
3 Foreign Policy. Relations with the Balkan Region / Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-with-the-balkan-
region.en.mfa>.
4 The Partnership for Peace (PfP). NATO-led program, launched at the 1994 Brussels Summit, to improve security cooperation between NATO and Partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It focuses on building stronger political and military interactions, and increasing NATO interoperability. <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm>.
5 Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19th – 20th November 2010.<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_82705.htm>.
The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the author. They
do not necessarily represent the views of the Atlantic Treaty Association,
it’s members, affiliates or staff.
[Smart Defence] If properly applied and implemented it will also signifi-
cantly benefit the region long after the current crisis is over ...
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