Atlantic Voices Special Issue - The Future of NATO

ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

Atlantic Voices, Special Issue 1

- Dr. Magdalena Kirchner

Last September, NATO leaders and

partners from around the world gathered

in Cardiff (UK) to discuss a wide range of

challenges to international security.

Although questions of global stability can

rarely be seen as “business as usual”, the

months leading up to the Summit and the

decisions made in Wales made two points

crystal-clear: First, a rapidly changing and

highly fragile security environment calls

for new thinking on what NATO’s

functions and priorities are and what it

should be capable of. Second, the political

decision to maintain readiness on several

fronts requires more than symbolic

commitments from all allies and partners.

This special issue reflects the Summit

and its outcome from a different

perspective: the transatlantic youth.

Those that will shape the Alliance in the

future provide us with new ideas on how

to implement the decisions made at the

Summit. Furthermore, several authors

explicitly took up issues that were not

discussed in Wales but should remain at –

or even make it to – NATO’s future

agenda.

The Future Of NATO

Young Perspectives On Key Challenges To The Alliance

Special Issue - June 2015

Group picture of the participants in the 2014 `Nato‘s Future‘ seminar in Berlin

(Source YATA)

Contents: Young Perspectives

Twenty-one students and young professionals from 16 NATO member and partner

states share their views on the future of NATO and potential challenges the Alliance

might face. In their essays, they highlight issues such as cyber, the Ukraine-conflict, the

partnership with Russia and hybrid warfare. On November 4th 2014, the authors con-

vened for a day-long seminar on NATO’s Future in Berlin.

NATO’s Future Today Are Those That Will Shape It Tomorrow

Magdalena Kirchner (YATA Germany) discusses the role of the younger generation in

NATO’s assessment of its future challenges - and opportunities. Addressing the genera-

tional gap should not only be a priority when it comes to raising public support for the

alliance among member state constituencies. It furthermore provides NATO with a key

source of innovation and inspiration for future endeavors.


Turkey, determined to stand up for NATO’s members

with borders to conflict and war zones. Some NATO

members, albeit not through a NATO initiative, are

supplying weapons to opposition forces and/or are par-

ticipating in military operations in Iraq and Syria,

bringing together an opposition strong enough to force

ISIL from NATO’s borders. However, experts main-

tain that ISIL cannot be defeated through air strikes and

armed forces, but by stopping the recruitment of new

members from the West and hence letting the self-

declared state dissolve from within. This has an impact

to NATO’s future and the security situation in Europe.

The volume of the US defence expenditure currently

represents 73% of NATO’s total defence spending,

leading the Alliance to heavy dependence on continued

US investments in Europe. Should the US start consid-

ering reducing their engagement in NATO, out of a

consideration that their interests are insufficiently rep-

resented and a desire to shift focus towards Pacific

Asia, Europe would most likely be facing an immediate

security vacuum. Keeping in mind the Chinese territo-

rial challenges against US allies such as Japan and South

Korea, a US shift is inevitable and foreseeable. In that

case the EU, with its Common Security and Defence

Policy (CSDP), needs to play a more prominent role in

the European security architecture. CSDP has held var-

ious peacekeeping missions worldwide, but due to the

lack of troops and institutional framework, it does not

have the same operational qualities as NATO possesses.

EU’s largest countries, France, Germany and the UK,

proved unable to agree in 2011 on the case of Libya.

France also failed to play a constructive role as Hol-

lande’s persistence to sell the Mistral-class warships to

By Øystein Andresen

T he Wales Summit Declaration

stands out as an atypical document

for NATO, given its crass rhetoric

regarding the threats of Russian expansionism, cross-

border terrorism from the Islamic State of Iraq and

the Levant (ISIL) and heavy condemnation of the As-

sad regime in Syria. Collective defence is more im-

portant than ever, but in a time of austerity in Europe

and with countries focusing more on domestic issues

than they do on solidarity with Allies, the challenge is

to turn these threats into actions taken by Allied gov-

ernments.

NATO was created to be a safe haven against

external threats, which in the Cold War were com-

munism and the Soviet Union. Now they are mainly

represented by ISIL, international terrorism and Rus-

sian aggression following the globally condemned and

illegal annexation of Crimea and recent initiatives for

talks on upgrading nuclear arms. Russia also faces a

gigantic increase in defence expenditures, with an

extensive upgrade in the last years. This can be inter-

preted as Russian ambitions to become a militarily

superpower. One may, however, also argue that the

current military equipment is obsolete and has been

so for decades, so an upgrade is purely inevitable in-

dependent of the situation in Crimea.

The uprising of ISIL, labelled as a terrorist

organization by both the United Nations and the Eu-

ropean Union, and its expansion in the region around

Iraq and Syria, leads to new threats to NATO’s bor-

ders. The new NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten-

berg made his first two official visits to Poland and

Wales2014:NATOOnAPivot


Russia despite agreed EU sanctions jeopardized the EU’s

unity. Ultimately, however, France halted the delivery

due to diplomatic pressure from Brussels and Berlin and

as a protest against Russia’s role in Ukraine. If Europe

wants to remain secure from external threats also within

a NATO without the US, these conflicts need to be both

prevented and resolved in a more efficient way than they

have been until today. With two Scandinavian Secretary

Generals consecutively, no one needs to remind Brussels

that a focus on Sweden and Finland remains crucial to

NATO’s future. Will the current undertakings by Russia

in Ukraine lead to a serious NATO membership debate in

these two countries? Russia and Finland share a border

and have a long history of both cooperation and confron-

tation. Putin’s personal envoy has warned Finland that a

Finnish NATO membership might lead to World War 3.

At the same time there is an ongoing debate about NATO

membership in Finland where the military sector advo-

cates an application, in contrast to a reluctant majority in

the population.

Sweden’s new government recently confirmed Swe-

den’s neutrality policy and thus killed speculations about

a Swedish NATO application. Recently, however, Rus-

sian military jets violated Swedish airspace leading to re-

actions from Swedish politicians. If NATO would need to

mobilize in the Baltic States, both the Finnish and Swe-

dish airspace and the Baltic sea will be of great strategic

importance. Thus, an unclarified agreement of the per-

mission to use this area to access the area of mobilization

could turn Sweden and Finland into an unwanted security

vacuum.

The current threats to peace and stability in Eu-

rope from the East and South are serious. The Wales

Summit Declaration in September announces measures to

address these threats. Until the next Summit the Alliance

will go through a difficult time with unclear outcomes

both regarding Russia, ISIL, a US pivot and possible

consequences of Swedish and Finnish NATO member-

ship debates and potential accessions. For now, the

consequences for European security remain uncertain.

Øystein Andresen holds a MA in modern Western

European history from Kassel University and currently

functions as President of YATA Norway. Since he

graduated in 2011, he has worked for the Norwegian

Ministry of Labour, the Norwegian Permanent Mission

to the United Nations in Vienna and the University of

Oslo, which is his current professional position. With-

in his professional career he has specialized in project

management and has been an active member of YATA

and worked with security policy issues since 2012.

Øystein has his specialty within EU affairs, the EU

Common Security and Defence Policy and Nordic for-

eign and security policy in general.

About the author


The results of the Wales Summit regarding cyber

are defined in Articles 72 and 73 of the summit’s decla-

ration. It was emphasized that “[…] cyber-defence is

part of NATO’s core task of collective defence”. To

fulfil this task effectively the Enhanced Cyber Defence

Policy (ECDP) was endorsed at the Summit. According

to the ECDP, every member state is primarily respon-

sible to defend its own networks, with the assistance of

NATO and other member nations. Furthermore, the

declaration emphasized that member states have the

responsibility and are committed to develop the needed

capabilities for the protection of national networks and

also to support other member states if necessary. It is,

however, questionable in how far more advanced

member states are willing to reveal and use their cyber

intelligence and capabilities in support of less advanced

member states. Their behaviour could be somehow

similar to the nuclear extended deterrence dilemma,

where NATO member states in possession of nuclear

arms feared Soviet retaliation during the Cold War pe-

riod, if they would have made use of their weapons on

behalf of other states.

The second cyber defence challenge was only

briefly addressed in Article 73 of the declaration by

acknowledging that the Alliance “will continue to inte-

grate cyber defence in NATO operations and opera-

tional and contingency planning […]”.

Thirdly, the question as to when Article 5

would be invoked was addressed, but not satisfactory

answered. The Alliance agreed that a serious cyber at-

tack would eventually lead to the invocation of Article

5. However, the ambiguity remains about the degree of

intensity and what kind of circumstances would trigger

By Carolin Allenstein

T he nature of war has changed immense-

ly over the last couple of decades. Espe-

cially the technological progress result-

ed in an extensive dependence on cyber systems,

which in turn bear great security vulnerabilities.

NATO placed cyber defence on its political agenda

for the first time at the Prague Summit in 2002.

When in 2007 Estonia experienced several-week long

cyber attacks, mostly directed against both govern-

ment and private-sector web sites, NATO declared

that urgent actions are needed and started to-

thoroughly debate the issue. As a result the Alliance

approved its first policy on Cyber Defence in January

2008.

Nowadays, cyber plays an integral part of all

wars and conflicts around the world. According to

Jarno Limnéll, professor of cybersecurity at Finland's

Aalto University, it was high time for the Alliance to

address three major cyber defence challenges at the

2014 NATO Wales Summit. Firstly, the Alliance

must address the development of their cyber capabili-

ties and secondly, find a way to integrate them effec-

tively with other military and operational concepts for

defence. Eventually, a coherent and clear interpreta-

tion of the famous Article 5 of the North Atlantic

Treaty must be agreed on, including a statement on

how the collective defensive clause shall be handled in

the face of cyber threats. Particularly against the back-

drop of the Ukraine crisis, where Russia is intention-

ally blurring the lines between war and peace with the

aim to not trigger NATO’s collective defence clause,

such an interpretation is indispensable.

CyberSecurity—LackingACoherentApproach


an Article 5 response. The decision will rest with the

North Atlantic Council, which has the authority to decide

on a case-by-case basis. On the one hand, member states

should not be too happy about such a formulation, be-

cause as long as no actual threshold warranting Article 5

exists, they cannot be completely sure about the deploy-

ment of collective defence when they actually need it. On

the other hand, it would be dangerous to disclose what is

accepted and what is not to potential opponents, especial-

ly in times where wars are taking place in so-called “grey

zones”. The adversary would intentionally act just below

the defined threshold, in order to avoid a collective de-

fence response. NATO will face challenges in the future,

when it eventually will have to define what amounts to a

cyber attack. Also in terms of its reactions it will be diffi-

cult to determine who waged the attack and how to react

proportionately. Besides these three crucial areas, active

engagement on cyber issues with relevant partner na-

tions, other international organisations as well as with

industry and NATO’s cyber defence education, training

and exercise activities were underlined.

The Heads of State and Government of the mem-

ber countries touched upon the central issues of cyber

defence previously anticipated by experts in this field. It

must be criticized, though, that cyber defence seemed to

play only a secondary role during the Wales Summit, as

the policy formulations remained rather vague. It is now

up to the member states to implement the policies in such

a manner that NATO can transform into a dependable

player in the cyber domain in the future.

Carolin Allenstein recently graduated with a Master

in International Security and Law from the University

of Southern Denmark. In her thesis she wrote about

sentencing at the ICTY. Previous to that, she complet-

ed a Bachelor in European Studies with a strong focus

on Eastern Europe. Carolin has been on various study

trips to Russia and also spent an exchange semester in

Murcia, Spain, where she studied at the Faculty of

Law. She has interned at the Embassy of the Federal

Republic Germany in Astana, Kazakhstan and at the

German Bundestag for the politician Gernot Erler. At

the moment she is working at the German Atlantic

Association in Berlin.

About the author


this strategy is short selling, i.e. to sell stocks you do

not own but borrow. Employing this strategy against an

economy's main financial institutions has the potential

to effectively shatter the trust in the whole financial

system and to create financial turmoil. For various rea-

sons Bear Stearns would be our first target. A classic

short selling strategy combined with a negative infor-

mation campaign is successful to shake the confidence

into the bank's liquidity. The stock is pushed down

from almost 170 dollar in January 2007 to a mere 2

dollars in March 2008, so that to prevent further tur-

moil eventually the Federal Reserve intervenes and

finds a buyer in JP Morgan.

At the same time the peak of the housing bub-

ble is reached, making it ever more evident that with

stagnating real estate prices many homeowners will not

be able to pay their mortgages. Our next short selling

campaign aims at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and

eventually at Lehman Brothers, a firm heavily engaged

in the mortgage backed securities business. With Leh-

man Brothers eventually filing for bankruptcy, our cri-

sis is there. Money flows cease and the trust in the fi-

nancial system evaporates. To mitigate the situation the

700 billion dollar Troubled Asset Relief Program

(TARP) is set up, allowing the government to buy as-

sets and equity from banks and other financial firms.

Leaving our scenario: A rising US national debt

could be the ideal setting for the final stage of a finan-

cial war: to attack the dollar and try to trash its value.

But even if its status as the world’s reserve currency

should not be shattered, the US still faces tremendous

debt and budget cuts. This could weaken the US’ will

By Dr. Matthias Bange

T he future of modern covert warfare is

asymmetric. So called “unrestricted

warfare” holds sway: sabotage, assassi-

nations, special operations, psychological operations,

attacks on critical infrastructure and cyber warfare.

But one powerful weapon among the means of mod-

ern warfare is often forgotten and – even worse –

almost completely neglected by policy makers, strate-

gy planners and even academia: Financial Warfare.

To understand what financial warfare is and

what it can do, maybe a scenario might help. Let us

go back a few years and assume that the late-2000s

financial crisis was not just a short-time failure in the

long run of capitalism, but was intentionally triggered

by outside forces, in other words, that it was an act of

financial warfare.

In this scenario the target, the financial system

of the United States and the (Western) world, was

fairly weak. The regulatory system was insufficient,

debts were piled up, money was cheap, interest rates

low and the housing bubble was a home grown prob-

lem that would have had to affect the financial system

sooner or later. But would a “regular” crisis have

reached this extent? Let us for a moment assume that

there were “outside factors”. How could they have

done it? How would we do it? Our task in this scenar-

io: We are back in the mid-2000s and want to attack

the Western financial system.

First thing to do would be to test how weak the

financial system is. So called “Bear raids” would be

our financial weapon of choice. The means to conduct

FinancialWarfare–AStrategicThreat?


to engage in conflicts abroad – nefarious forces around

the world would stand to gain.

As stated above, this is only a scenario how the

late-2000s financial crisis could have been employed or

triggered by outside forces. It illustrates the potential

damages of financial warfare and shows that everyone

with proper means would have been able to seriously in-

fluence the events of this crisis by pursuing the strategies

described above.

Stupefying is that even though the possible dam-

ages of financial warfare are tremendous, it almost plays

no role in strategic considerations of countries whatsoev-

er – maybe because of one central problem: How to dis-

tinguish between financial warfare and market activity?

The late-2000s financial crisis example has shown that it

could have been an attack that caused the turmoil, but

that it would also be perfectly explainable with profit-

seeking actions of private market participants. Where to

draw the line? When the outcome is the same, does the

intention matter? Does it call for different responses, if

private companies or foreign actors attack a financial sys-

tem, the ones seeking profit, the others trying to harm a

(potential) enemy?

The matter is yet more complicated, because even

if financial warfare was conducted as part of a foreign

nation's attack strategy, it could easily be covered by the

employment of brokers, foundations, hedge funds and

shell companies, making it impossible to track down the

kingpins of those attacks. All these problems given – a

thorough investigation of financial warfare strategies is

overdue.

Dr. Matthias Bange is an officer in the German

Armed Forces, who received his specialized training in

Psychological Operations. He has just returned from

Mali, where he served five months as Chief Infor-

mation Operations Officer for the European Union

Training Mission Mali (EUTM MALI). His next assign-

ment will be in the analysis branch of the German

Armed Forces' Operational Communication Center,

where he will focus on conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa.

He has studied history in Hamburg, Calgary and Mont-

pellier and has just finished his PhD thesis on credit

money creation at the Helmut Schmidt University in

Hamburg. His next project will deal with financial

warfare. Matthias academic interest is financial history.

About the author


liance's post-cold war transformation is the second par-

amount perception challenge for the Atlantic Alliance.

As NATO's purpose is no longer self-evident, too many

ordinary people do not understand what the Alliance is

good for. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union

NATO's role has extended to partnership and crisis

management. However, all too often NATO is publicly

still associated with hard power exclusively. This no-

tion neglects the Alliance's various dimensions such as

humanitarian assistance in Pakistan and Bosnia, coun-

tering piracy off the Horn of Africa and reconstruction

in Afghanistan. Facing globalized insecurity issues such

as terrorism in the Mediterranean, failed states, the

quest for energy security and the challenges of cyber

space, the Alliance needs to authentically communicate

its relevance in a post Cold War world and promote

the notion of NATO as a reliable and innovative part-

ner. This also might lay a foundation of trust and can

serve as a constructive approach with NATO partner

countries, particularly Russia. Given the recent turmoil

in Ukraine and the timeless critique of NATO's en-

largement policy, it is essential to emphasize that

NATO is no military bloc anymore but rather an alli-

ance of free and democratically legitimized nations op-

erating by consensus.

The third public perception challenge is the

missing transatlantic narrative. A common narrative

determines how people make sense of the world and is

the vital glue that traditionally hold European and

American elites together. However, today's stereotype

driven post-Cold-War »successor generation« in Eu-

By Cedric Bierganns

“ Sometimes they'll give a war and nobody will

come” Carl Sandburg's famous hyperbole has

become a bitter truth for NATO, which

above all is a military as well as political organization

that heavily depends on broad public support in its

democratic member states. As the Wales Summit

2014 has shown, the Atlantic Alliance confronts three

urgent public perception challenges, which, if not

adequately addressed, will compromise NATO's rep-

utation, endanger its cohesiveness and finally make

Article 5 an empty phrase.

The first public perception challenge is the in-

constant support for the Alliance and its specific mis-

sions. As the world slides back into Realpolitik after

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, deterrence once again

can be a powerful instrument in conflict management.

However, hard power that is not credibly under-

pinned by public support is perceived by both adver-

saries and allies alike as an idle threat. As recent poll

ratings indicate, only a minority in Germany approves

Bundeswehr operations beyond the purpose of nation-

al self-defense and humanitarian aid. Others see

NATO as the last international organization that

should lead in a crisis. Given the large number of Alli-

ance casualties in Afghanistan and the general opposi-

tion towards military means in peace-loving and risk-

averse continental Europe, NATO needs to generate

public support by explaining why the military success

of missions beyond NATO's borders matters at home.

The general lack of public awareness of the Al-

TimeToGetBackInTheGame

NATO'sPublicDiplomacyEffortsForATransatlantic

21stCentury


rope and the US shows no understanding for NATO's

new security challenges and hardly knows anything about

the transatlantic values and solidarity that the Atlantic

Alliance historically stands for. At this point, NATO's

public diplomacy should develop a new grand narrative

and explain to the future elites why the shared values of

»democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law«, as

presented in the North Atlantic Treaty preamble, do mat-

ter for them since NATO is the ultima ratio guardian of

liberty and security in the 21st century. As it is only a

matter of time that rising powers challenge the transatlan-

tic narrative, which for so long consensually guaranteed

America's hegemony and Europe's security, it is crucially

important for NATO's outreach efforts to always lead the

public debate, set the agenda and shape the strategic envi-

ronment. Otherwise the Alliance will lose the interpreta-

tional sovereignty it gained after 1945.

In conclusion, Benjamin Franklin's bold prediction

has never lost its relevance for the transatlantic communi-

ty that must remain strong and unwavering: “We must all

hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.”

Cedric Bierganns studied modern history, interna-

tional relations and American studies in Bonn, St. An-

drews and Washington State with a strong focus on

transatlantic relations. His master's thesis deals with

the United States Information Agency's public diplo-

macy activities in West Germany during the imple-

mentation of the NATO Double-Track Decision in the

1980s. Cedric interned for the United Nations Region-

al Information Centre (UNRIC) and the German Com-

mission for UNESCO in Bonn. He also worked as a

student assistant for a publisher. Cedric is not only a

YATA member, but also holds an active membership

of the German Council on Foreign Relations (YOUNG

DGAP NRW).

About the author


complex because they are both traditional and non-

traditional ones in character. These new threats have

the capacity of transcending the borders of one country

and hence become a threat for both regions as well as

global ones. Hence, in the Wales Summit Declaration,

the 28 Allies showed their determination to make a

decisive effort to confront both today´s and tomor-

row´s rising threats. Therefore, two important deci-

sions were necessary in

order to achieve these

goals. NATO, in this re-

spect, has underlined once

again the importance of its

collective security mission,

along with its other key

tasks: cooperative security

and crisis management. In

this regard, the Wales

Summit has given two cru-

cial messages both to its members and to the outside

world.

First, concerning the members and international

cohesion of NATO, the Alliance assured them that the

U.S. and NATO’s extended deterrence is valid-and

precautions like NATO's Rapid Reaction Force etc.

would be taken in this regard. The aim was here also to

assure NATO’s allies that their individual security con-

cerns-like Ukraine’s and others- will be dealt with. By

this way, the principle of the Alliance’s indivisibility of

security was emphasized and it is aimed to be strength-

ened.

By Eda Guney

A ccording to most IR specialists, NATO

is the most efficient and successful in-

ternational military organization. Since

its foundation in 1949, NATO has played a very cru-

cial role not just for peace and security but also for

values such as freedom and democracy. Until very

recently, some people were discussing whether

NATO was still relevant

and necessary in the 21st

century. But just as these

discussions were going

on, new crises on the

Western and Southern

flanks of the alliance clear-

ly showed that NATO is

still needed for peace,

security, and stability.

This Summit was expected to focus on Afghanistan

and NATO’s post military withdrawal from Afghan.

The newly emerged security threats, namely the in-

creasing terrorists threats against Western countries

changed this agenda. The rise of the Islamic State of

Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the crisis in Ukraine

drastically shifted the focus of the Summit which end-

ed up being dedicated to the threats at NATO’s East-

ern and Southern flanks.

We understand that NATO is in need of

strengthening the Alliance’s present capabilities so

that it could act as a credible deterrent against today’s

complex and rising threats. Today’s threats are more

TheAftermathOfWalesSummitOfNATO:WhereTo?

NATO leaders at the 2014 Wales Summit (Source NATO)


Second, conveying a message also to the outside

world, the summit stressed that Article 5 of the North

Atlantic Treaty remains credible and continuous. For

instance, the recent stationing of Patriot Missiles to the

South of Turkey in order to deter any possible assault

from Syria, for instance, made the continuous guarantee

of the credibility of the Alliance’s deterrence mechanism

evident. NATO’s present decision to continue to have

both a conventional and a nuclear arsenal is also the guar-

antee and the proof of the Alliance’s deterrence.

Since the future is full of uncertainties, the Euro-

Atlantic community perceives the value of NATO being

higher than ever. For this reason, NATO seems to work

as the most successful international military organisation

and also constantly up-grades itself. NATO will continue

to do these up-grades depending on the radically chang-

ing geopolitical conditions in its environment. If we look

at the past, during the Cold War and Post-Cold War

years, NATO learned some crucial lessons and these les-

sons will help NATO to mature its overall security for

both its members as well as to the world. In this regard,

the alliance would be both trying to keep securing its

own existence as well as continuing to build democratic,

liberal, and secure areas of peace beyond its borders. To

this end, the continuous work of NATO members to-

gether with partners will be very important and precious

in order to create an area of peace and stability beyond

the borders of NATO. The Wales Summit surely will be

the starting point in this regard.

Eda Guney

is currently

obtaining her Bachelor in sociology at Galatasaray Uni-

versity. She was an exchange student at the Université

Libre de Bruxelles in Brussels form 2013-2014. Eda

has been involved with the Youth Atlantic Treaty As-

sociation of Turkey (YATA-TURK) for the last three

years. Since September 2014 she is working as the

president of YATA-TURK and also keeps providing

reports and analyses for the YATA-TURK’s Facebook

Page. Last year she worked as a communication coor-

dinator for YATA-TURK during the preparations of

the International Student Strategic Studies Seminar,

organized by Yildiz Technical University. Since high

school she is taking part in conferences on internation-

al relations, peace and security as an assistant or partic-

ipant.

About the author


states and NATO’s competences contain mostly territori-

al security and defense, energy security is of utmost im-

portance in terms of foreign policy making. Hence, vul-

nerability in terms of energy security may hamper coher-

ence and foreign policy formulation within NATO as

well, since many members rely on a third country - most-

ly on Russia - for their energy supply. This grants Russia a

bargaining chip vis-à-vis individual states to lobby its in-

terests within NATO.

We should not forget that partners such as Azerbaijan

and Georgia are important countries for many European

members of NATO in terms of supply and transportation

of energy resources, transit of military cargos from Af-

ghanistan, and play a bridge role between Central Asia

and the Southern Caucasus. However, both countries

have territorial conflicts with their respective neighbors

Armenia and Russia. These conflicts make them vulnera-

ble to potential war, threats and attacks from aggressor

countries. Therefore, it is important to protect critical

energy infrastructures and react properly.

The strategies formulated within NATO often

neglect the partner countries by showing that “Article 5”

constitutes its main raison d’être, excluding security guar-

antees for partner countries. Loud statements and deep

concerns do not equal action. People are not impressed

by statements anymore. For partner states in the neigh-

borhood, NATO became a declaratory actor. This means

that NATO will not provide any security guarantees for

its neighbors. It was obvious in the Russian-Georgian

war, the annexation of Crimea, and the recent crisis in

the Southeast of Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis proved that

edges of the security umbrella of NATO literally end at

the NATO-Ukraine border. The same could apply to

By Ilgar Gurbanov

O n 4 and 5 September, the Wales Sum-

mit brought together the heads of

NATO’s member states and partner

countries. The main outcome of the summit was that

NATO is an alliance for Allied States only with political

and geographical limits. The summit de-facto “declared”

Russia a main threat, relates to the security of only the

allies themselves.

Most operations of NATO served as the raison d’être

for the Alliance’s reputation. However, it was not that

easy to pool capabilities and resources to send troops to

crisis points. Not all Allied States agree to contribute to

crisis management and certain states abstain because of

their national interests. Therefore, NATO cannot bring

all the member states together to address crisis manage-

ment with one voice.

A key reason was that there was always a cozy

mentality within the Alliance, notably among its Eastern

and Central European members based on the idea that

the U.S. was the main security guarantor. At the Wales

Summit, the Alliance decided to establish the Rapid Re-

sponse Force that would be deployed immediately in

case of an unexpected eruption of the armed crisis at

NATO’s external borders in order to protect its Allies.

This is also what the EU tried to establish since the early

2000s.

The potential threat stemming from Russia and its

“imperialist dreams” should not be underestimated, but

alternative threats might emanate from radical Islam as

well as territorial conflicts of partner countries, which

might hamper their relationships with the Alliance.

Though energy is a national competence of the member

NATOWalesSummit:FailureOrSuccessStory?


Georgia as well. Despite the fact that Georgia is the biggest

contributor to NATO operations, it could not receive an

invitation to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) yet,

while it has received “packages of cooperation”. However, if

NATO accelerated its ties with partners and accepted Geor-

gia and Ukraine before 2008, maybe the Georgian occupa-

tion and the annexation of Ukrainian territory could have

been prevented.

NATO should not only rely on its “Partnership for

Peace” (PfP) framework. In order not to lose ties with these

partner countries, which are strategically important for the

Alliance, NATO may initiate new cooperation frameworks,

even if it will not contain a membership perspective. Five

PfP-countries – Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

– have territorial conflicts, which emanated from Russia’s

aggressive imperialism and flourished by Kremlin-led poli-

cies. However, even without membership, NATO may pro-

mote its ties with partners by providing more training, ad-

vice and assistance opportunities in order to keep them clos-

er to the Alliance, rather to keep them at a distance with

political statements only. This means, “keep partners on

their tracks to NATO, but not in yet”. Actually, NATO’s

neighborhood strategy constitutes a failure from its core.

While enlargement aimed at pulling out post-Soviet coun-

tries from Russia’s orbit, it failed in doing so and certain

countries found themselves in a trap of territorial conflicts.

From the very beginning, Russia opposed NATO enlarge-

ment in what it considered its “area of influence”. Partner-

ship between NATO and Russia was merely symbolic and

the latest sanctions stalled Russia in its policy towards

Ukraine. The ongoing information war, the crisis in

Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, sanctions against Russia

etc., leave very little possibility for future cooperation in the

near future. While the allies do not aim at confrontation,

there is no willingness to cooperate either.

So far, bilateral relations between NATO and Russia

were suspended three times. First, during NATO’s engage-

ment in Kosovo, second, during the Russian-Georgian War,

and third, after the annexation of Crimea. In the first two

cases, NATO decided to break the ice and continued re-

lations. This shows how fragile NATO’s commitment is

for its partners. It may happen in the Ukrainian case as

well. Relations with Russia will be reconsidered again.

Much also depends on the position of the new Secretary

General of NATO. Assuming that old habits die hard,

Russia, which did not stop with Georgia and Moldova,

won’t stop with Crimea either.

İlgar Gurbanov is a Contributing Columnist on Rus-

sian and Energy Affairs for Strategic Outlook from Azer-

baijan. He is an ENP Fellow from the European Commis-

sion and recently graduated from the College of Europe

on International Relations and Diplomacy Studies with a

Master of Arts in Security and Justice Affairs. İlgar got his

bachelor and first master degree from the faculty of Inter-

national Economic Relations in Azerbaijan State Econom-

ic University. He has worked as a Teaching Assistant in

the Azerbaijan State Economic University and as a Project

Consultant in the United Nations Development Program

in Azerbaijan. From 2008 to 2012, he worked and served

in various international organizations, government bodies

as a trainee and participated in the different programs and

projects organized by European NGOs. İlgar is an author

of numerous articles and columns. His main research area

is Russian Foreign Policy, Energy Security and Policy,

Caspian basin, Arctic basin, South Caucasus region and

NATO/EU policies towards neighbors.

About the author


ganizational information broker, the Allies are still

missing concrete procedures in the case of a severe

cyber attack both above and below the threshold of

Article 5.

The problem is no longer that NATO lacks

agreement on the danger of cyber attacks, but the

greater problem is the missing link, the same scale of

measure, between the civil, political and operational

level among the Allies. Even today, only 14 members

have established special cyber units within the armed

forces. The lack of highly skilled military personnel

with cyber security expertise, including lack of

knowledge of technical terms on the political level, all

comes down to the lack of common procedures and

same measure of scale on all levels among the allies.

When asked what could invoke an Article 5 response,

one ambassador to NATO answered that it would have

to be on the level of an armed force attack. Why is this

approach problematic? Because even though it might

seem like a step towards acknowledging the damage a

cyber attack could do, it seems very unlikely that NAC

could successfully defend an ally with its existing crisis

management procedures. The problem is very simple.

You cannot measure a cyber attack with armed forces

– that would be going back to the basics when leaders

called cyber attacks ‘cyber stuff’. NAC might after

these procedures measure the attack in the proportion

of deaths. But a real devastating cyber attack could do

much more harm than such. By starting with recogniz-

ing that an effective NATO cyber defence needs its

own intensity scale of measure, by for example placing

CallForAClearerCommon

NATOCyberSecurityPolicy

By Maria Mundt Knudsen

T wo months ago, as the NATO Summit

2014 in Wales was approaching, it provided

the Alliance with a much needed oppor-

tunity to review its political principles related to cyber

defence, and hereby rethink strategy outside of its military

comfort zone. And even though, we saw long awaited

policy steps being made by signing the NATO Enhanced

Cyber Defence Policy and initiating the NATO-Industry

Cyber Partnership, the Alliance has shown that cyber de-

fence continues to be a priority, but a priority that lacks a

coherent and common policy among its members. If we

take an even closer look at NATO’s policy developments

and approaches as an international organization, towards a

free and global, yet more secure cyber space, there has

been progress, though at a slow pace and nowhere near a

match to the breakneck speed of development of threats

towards the Allies critical infrastructure. The summit dec-

laration stressed that NATO had become a more fit, faster

and flexible alliance, but that did not apply to the digital

realm. Almost in the bottom of the agenda, we find para-

graph 72 and 73, determining that a cyber attack could

invoke Article 5. Some newspapers declared that was one

of the most important steps made in NATO’s history in

the field, and that the June 2014 Estonian proposal to cre-

ate a NATO Cyber Range in Tallinn, was another step

towards the missed pooling and sharing initiative. The

truth is that far more important steps, such as the estab-

lishment of NCIRC and the information school in Italy,

have already been made. Even though NATO, with ex-

tended information sharing, successfully could be the or-


a cyber command under the SACEUR, NATO could take

the lead as a mediator between private and public stake-

holders that all together will have the necessary capabili-

ties to defend the allies. Furthermore, the recent attacks

on government stakeholders have shown that the future

wars will be the wireless wars, where viruses and mal-

ware can shut down key infrastructure such as nuclear

power plants, airports and other crucial government in-

stitutions, and a deployment of armed forces will be of

little effect here. Cyber attacks are the new way for non-

state actors, such as terrorists and activists, to demand

the attention of their governments. All this calls for coop-

eration across all sectors, including cooperation with the

EU and private stakeholders. But cooperation can only

find a place with the same understanding of the basic

frame in which the defence planning policy is conducted.

25 years ago NATO had to protect its allies against

the “Soviet threat”. This is the age of firewalls, and they

are of such importance, that we need not only to talk

about NATO developing practises and protecting its own

network, because it has done so very effectively, but we

also need to stress the need of standardisation of policies

and capabilities between the Allies. The Wales Summit

2014 called for a NATO that prioritized a common cyber

defence policy, and in order to do so, NATO has to go

back to the basics and develop a scale that measures cyber

attacks in its own realm, and to make sure that all allies

are using the same scale to measure the attacks. This is

not to say that recent developments within NATO’s

cyber defence has not been successful, and the link to

international law clearly stated so, but the very first step

needs to be rethought, and defined with a common scale

of measure on all levels in NATO and among the individ-

ual allies.

Maria Mundt Knudsen is a Program Assistant at

the Atlantic Treaty Association. Maria is currently

pursuing her master's degree in Political Science at the

University of Aarhus, Denmark. Maria obtained her

bachelor's degree in Political Science with a major in

Middle Eastern Studies and a focus on the classification

of terror organizations in the MENA region. Her pri-

mary academic and research focus includes counter-

terrorism, NATO's strategic culture, cyber security,

intelligence, security and state-building in the MENA

region. Maria is the founder and president of

“International Politics – NOW” and a facilitator at the

Security and Defence Agenda's Security Jam 2014.

About the author


ed to lead by example and some positive change has been

achieved already, mainly in the framework of the Euro-

Atlantic Partnership Council. Considerable changes have been

done in operations where inclusion of women has also a sub-

stantial impact. Gender Advisors positions have been intro-

duced in ISAF and KFOR missions. Both the Afghan and Koso-

var societies are perceived as traditionally male-dominated

communities; therefore, broad gender mainstreaming and the

inclusion of women on the tactical and operational level in

international and national forces have been marked as a mile-

stone. On the executive level at NATO HQ, different policies

such as 2007 NATO’s Overarching Policy and 2009 Bi-

Strategic Command Directive 40-1 (pdf) serve as guidelines.

The political commitment formulated in NAC is key, howev-

er, it is up to individual NATO members to keep their govern-

ments accountable. Only 17 NATO Allies and 10 partner

countries have adopted the voluntary National Action Plan to

integrate women into

military in combat or

non-combat units.

Without any doubt the

greatest achievement has

been the open dialogue

itself, which sends a

strong message rejecting

this topic to be inferior

to other security topics.

Yet, more could and should have been done at the Summit in

Newport. Article 90 (out of 113 articles) of the Wales Summit

Declaration leaves the issue at the bottom of the agenda, fol-

lowed by the Open Door Policy, bilateral cooperation, and

environmental security. Article 90 echoes UNSCR1325,

namely ‘women’s full and active participation in the preven-

tion, management, and resolution of conflicts.’ Nothing inno-

By Magda Kocianova

T he issue of women in security and defence

has been increasingly resonant in the last

decade. Getting on board famous faces

such as Emma Watson to tackle gender inequality, and

Angelina Jolie to fight sexual violence in conflicts, have

drawn increased attention to the overall role of women

in security. There have been innumerable debates on the

topic in Brussels and outside (see e.g. the network

called Women in International Security), but has it real-

ly led to a positive change?

In the security field of the Western world,

NATO plays the most important role and belongs to one

of those institutions attaching “a great importance” to

the issue, which made it once again to the NATO Wales

Summit Declaration; nevertheless, it has remained at its

bottom, not at its top, casting some doubt to the seri-

ousness of the mat-

ter. If the latest

NATO Summit in

Wales was about re-

balancing the Alli-

ance in the new geo-

political environ-

ment, it has failed to

tackle thoroughly the

issue of the gender

balance within the

organisation and the question of how to build an institu-

tion of today to deal with the issues of the future.

Since the groundbreaking UN Security Council

Resolution 1325 in October 2000, women’s role during

and after conflicts has caught the spotlight. NATO start-

TheVoiceOfWomenInSecurityAndDefence

Women in peace and security (Source NATO)


vative has been brought to the table. Although the role of

the civil society has been acknowledged, a concrete involve-

ment of these groups, such as for example an establishment

of a permanent advisory panel to NATO in the future,

would be more constructive. At the same time, the fact that

rights of women being the last thing (Article 8) on the

Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, and the topic of

Women, Peace and Security being the last panel at the Fu-

ture Leaders Summit, raises a legitimate question of the

topic remaining still the last thing on the NATO agenda.

Furthermore, out of 28 NATO Heads of State and Govern-

ment attending the NATO Summit at the Celtic Manor Re-

sort in Newport, Wales, 5 were female representatives

(Danish Prime Minister, German Chancellor, Lithuanian

President, Norwegian Prime Minister, and Slovenian Prime

Minister). Along the EU High Representative Catherine

Ashton, there were several female representatives at the

ministerial level. Amid the talks of the latest Summit, some

recent changes and their impact in years to come must be

taken into account. First of all, the former NATO Secretary

General Rasmussen was an eager supporter of the gender

issues within the Alliance, gaining the Hillary Clinton

Award in March 2014. However, the policy of the new Sec-

retary General Stoltenberg remains to be seen in this regard,

noting especially the fact that in his Annual Report 2014 he

tackled the issue of women in security as the very last topic.

Although he inherited most of the achievements mentioned

in the Report, he could have outlined the importance of

Women, Peace and Security better. Second of all, the post

of the first Special Representative for Women, Peace and

Security, Mari Skåre, finished at the end of September 2014

and Marriët Schuurman has taken the post with her policy

yet to be shaped. Third, the first and only female Assistant

Secretary General, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, left her post

in October to run for a president of Croatia (which she

won). All of these bring an internal change in NATO execu-

tive structures and it also brings a temporary uncertainty of

the NATO policies in gender mainstreaming.

The Summit in Wales was certainly not another

missed opportunity but it was an opportunity that was

not used to its fullest potential. It has also marked the

internal change and reshuffling of the key positions. With

including the issue of women in security and defence on

the highest political agenda of the Alliance but usually

leaving it at the bottom, we are left to question whether

it is really an important topic for discussion, one that is

worth a prominent attention. It seems that other topics

steal the attention, not realising that no matter can be

solved sustainably if 50 per cent of the population is left

out or marginalised in the process. NATO must continue

to be exemplary in this aspect. We can hear the voice of

women in security and defence, now it is time for some

more concrete action.

Magda Kocianova holds a MSc in European Studies

from the Institute of European Studies and an LLM in

Public International Law from the University of Kent.

She obtained her BA in International Relations & Diplo-

macy from the Anglo- American University. Magda cur-

rently trains with the DG Trade of the European Com-

missions. She worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of the Czech Republic and the Atlantic Treaty Association

Secretariat in Brussels where she dealt with security poli-

cy. Prior to that she served as a Political Analyst at the

Global Water Institute. Additionally, Magda co-organised

two editions of the Model NATO Youth Summit in Brus-

sels for 250 international participants in 2012 and 2013.

Her professional interest focuses on transatlantic bonds,

regional military cooperation, European security and de-

fense, and women's participation in the security field.

About the author


differently with other armoured vehicles, aircraft or

equipment. Yet, there seems to be little intention to

radically change anything about this practice. In fact,

many multinational defence industry projects are ra-

ther an argument against substantial cooperation than a

success story: The Eurofighter, MEADS or the ar-

moured vehicle Boxer show how - more often than not

- costs explode, participating nations withdraw, and

orders are reduced - while other allied nations simulta-

neously develop a similar system on their own.

The reasons behind this are governments, pro-

tective of their national defence industries. Maybe the

most dramatic display of this protective behaviour

could be witnessed when the merger negotiations be-

tween BAE and EADS were abandoned due to reserva-

tions of the involved governments just a few years ago.

To a rational observer, this seems strange - after all, it

is easily achievable that all participating partners bene-

fit from engaging in far-reaching defence industry co-

operation.

The most obvious benefits deriving from such

cooperation are the subsequent economies of scale:

The price per unit for a tank or an aircraft is substan-

tially lower when higher numbers of units are pro-

duced. This in turn enables governments to buy sys-

tems either in a higher quality or quantity, without

having to take the rather unpopular step of increasing

military spending. It also gives them the freedom to

hold on to otherwise too expensive military capabilities

and therefore not having to rely on partners for that

particular capability. This antagonizes the concept of

By Hendrik Kuckat

A t the Wales Summit, NATO’s mem-

bers agreed that military defence

spending should be increased to at

least 2 % of the respective nation’s GDP. While it

remains to be seen how exactly this project will be

realized by the concerned countries, the fact that the

present security situation requires NATO to over

think defence spending could very well initiate a pro-

ductive impulse to Smart Defence. NATO has a long

standing history of ideas aiming to make the alliance

more effective by having its members work together

more closely. Concepts such as ”pooling and sharing“

are hard to implement with 28 partners, each insisting

upon their own sovereignty. Not even the European

Union can come to an agreement on a unanimous

opinion about most topics, so how could NATO get

there?

The initially mentioned tense current security

situation poses a certain challenge to NATO and

should consequently lead to actions. While the funda-

mental problems keeping Smart Defence from gaining

momentum remain unsolved (no comprehensive con-

sensus, too little trust, reluctance to give up sover-

eignty), now could be the time to lay the foundation -

by engaging in actual, comprehensive cooperation in

the defence industry. This idea is not new, but history

shows that multinational defence projects are rarely

successful, nor are they comprehensive. Roughly a

dozen different battle tanks are being used by the

NATO members, and things aren’t looking much

NATOAfterTheWalesSummit

ANewImpulseForSmartDefense?


”pooling and sharing“, but it possesses the appeal that a

nation does not necessarily have to reduce their military

capabilities while maintaining a given defence budget and

can generally use that budget more effectively. If nothing

else, comprehensive defence industry cooperation is cur-

rently at least not unimaginable, as opposed to compre-

hensive ”pooling and sharing“. (And one thing might very

well lead to the other.) A pleasant side-effect would be

actual interoperability and the ensuing combined train-

ing.

Since such a movement would drive many defence

companies into either bankruptcy or high specialization,

it seems understandable why politicians are typically re-

luctant to choose to go down that road. This is why the

current security situation also offers the chance to break

out of this inefficient circle and value collective security

higher than artificially protecting one’s own national de-

fence industry (whose size commonly does not justify the

received preferential treatment anyway).

Another part of Smart Defence, just like of many

concepts before, is ”burden sharing“. The United States’

contribution to NATO is still many times higher than that

of any other country (and three times as high as the com-

bined contribution of all European NATO members).

The fact that the U.S. bears this much of NATO’s burden

is certainly not the organization’s biggest problem; the

fact that the other nations do not contribute more is far

more profound, especially considering the U.S.’ ”pivot to

Asia“. While European NATO countries seemingly are

not able or willing to contribute more, they certainly are

not interested in taking advantage of comprehensive de-

fence industry cooperation with the U.S. at the price of

damaging their own defence industries - and vice versa.

Despite the aforementioned relative economic irrele-

vance of the defence industry (at least in Europe), gov-

ernments continue protecting theirs even though they

could conveniently bolster up the European role in

NATO by managing their defence budgets more effi-

ciently.

NATO governments insist on their national au-

tarky in terms of their defence industry, even though

NATO’s and especially the European Union’s mem-

bers already have such close partnerships nowadays

that there indeed is no more need for national autar-

chy. On the contrary - comprehensive defence indus-

try cooperation is likely to send out a strong message,

leading to closer cooperation in other fields as well as

visibly strengthening the respective friendships. Either

engaging in extensive defence industry cooperation

(with all its benefits) or protecting one’s national de-

fence industry: You can’t have the cake and eat it - and

now is the opportunity to make the right choice.

Hendrik Kuckat is currently deployed as a platoon

leader in the reconnaissance company of the Jägerba-

taillon 291, an infantry battalion of the German-Franco

Brigade stationed just south of Strasbourg. He joined

the army in 2006 as a conscript, and after a few months

he opted for the officer career. In 2008, he began stud-

ying Economics and Organizational Sciences at the

University of the German Armed Forces in Munich.

During his studies, he completed internships in the

U.S. and in Indonesia (in the field of international trade

and NGOs, respectively). He obtained his Master’s

degree in 2012 and continued his military career with

various officer trainings, most of them specific recon-

naissance and military intelligence courses. In early

2014, he was transferred to his current unit, at first

mostly working in the military intelligence cell of the

battalion (which trained for potential deployments) and

assisting the company commander, until taking over his

assigned platoon in the fall of 2014.

About the author


the European security architecture?

The hypothesis of this short paper is: Past efforts

to establish deep defense cooperation in Europe failed,

because a critical mass of possible member states were

overstepped. It is not possible to build a European ar-

my, because the member states of the EU and NATO

are too heterogeneous. Therefore, if states want a deep

cooperation, they must come together on a lower lev-

el. Two European countries succeeded in beginning to

build a common army: Germany and the Netherlands

(referred to as the

“German-Dutch

model”). The two

countries will likely

extend their liaison,

in order to save mon-

ey and benefit from

other advantages. If

we see this German-

Dutch form of coop-

eration as a possible

model for other

states, we have to

draw up some requirements (the stricter they are, the

more stable such cooperation will be in the long-term):

• The countries must have long-term excellent

political relations and they must have close cul-

tural-historical linkages.

• The countries must share the same basic values

and principles (e.g. rule of law, democracy, plu-

By Tobias Lechner

Y ear after year: The evergreen during

NATO meetings on every level is the

defense budget of European NATO

member states. Originally, a rule, it became a far

away aim. At the end of the Wales summit, the mem-

ber states agreed on “trying” to spend two percent of

the GDP in ten years. Most European countries are

small, but of course they have their own armies.

These armies are incredibly expensive, outdated,

and ineffective. Most parts of the defense budget is

used for personnel

costs. NATO must en-

courage member states

to build stronger coop-

eration. Synergies could

be used and money

could be saved in an

unimaginable extent.

Temporarily, there are

already different forms

of cooperation, e.g.

British-French coopera-

tion; the European Un-

ion developed a “Common Security and Defense Poli-

cy” approach with the headword “pooling and shar-

ing”; and there is the NATO concept of SMART de-

fense. “More with less”, is the slogan used in speeches

by politicians. But in fact, European countries do not

use these possibilities; they are afraid of having to give

up a little bit of sovereignty. What’s the problem with

TowardsaNewEuropeanSecurityArchitecture

Military cooperation (Source NATO)


ralism, social market economy, liberal society,

strong civil society).

• The countries should be as close as possible geo-

graphically.

• If there are more participating countries, the coop-

eration must not exceed the so-called critical mass.

The more countries participate, the more unstable

the project will be.

Under the described circumstances, a common ar-

my of various countries creates a win-win situation.

Where are possibilities for very deep and very stable se-

curity cooperation? Surely, the German-Dutch coopera-

tion could be extended also geographically. Next to the

Netherlands, also Belgium and Luxembourg would fulfill

the requirements, and most likely they would be interest-

ed in joining such cooperation. Similar some Scandinavian

states (especially Denmark and Norway); and eventually,

also the Baltic States could be part: They are compara-

tively small and therefore need some protection. In sum,

we have now around ten states fulfilling the criteria in

Northern Europe. I suppose, the critical mass is reached,

a further enlargement would be counterproductive. But

similar transnational cooperation between countries with

strong ties is possible across Europe. Simultaneously, the

military must be modernized: Instead of spending money

on high salaries, money should be spent for innovative

techniques. With a common military budget there could

be so much more done.

Tobias Lechner is a Master student at Andrássy Uni-

versity, Budapest in the field of international relations.

He holds a Magister’s degree in history and German

studies of University of Innsbruck, Austria. For the

program Korean-EU Leaders for Global Education he

spent 2012 one semester at Chungbuk National Uni-

versity in South Korea. Last year, he participated in a

Common Security and Defence Orientation Course,

organized by the Collège Européen de Sécurité et de

Défense, Brussels. This summer, he worked as intern

in the German embassy in Chisinau, Moldova. He is

especially interested in the future of defense and of

security matters related to religious extremism.

About the author


capability only. Apparently, most new member states in

Central and Eastern Europe insisted that forward deployed

sub-strategic US nuclear weapons in Europe are necessary.

Besides nuclear posture, NATO had also developed peculiar

structures and mechanisms during the Cold War to ex-

change views on sensitive nuclear issues, to develop nuclear

weapons related guidelines and policies and to facilitate alli-

ance cohesion. The DDPR exercise highlighted the value of

nuclear consultation in NATO as a mechanism to compro-

mise on delicate nuclear issues, even if positions and inter-

ests of individual allies diverged sometimes sharply. Given

the severe tensions between NATO and Russia due to the

Ukraine crisis, the renewed sense of potential instability at

the Eastern borders of the alliance and the chance of Iran

going nuclear, collective defense and deterrence in NATO

will be of highest politico-military importance in the future -

especially in the perception of those who would be most

directly affected by aggressive Russian policy or a nuclear

Iran. US extended nuclear deterrence will continue to con-

stitute the very core of collective defense and deterrence vis

-à-vis Russia. As hitherto, it will be supplemented by the

Western nuclear powers’ deterrents which also contribute

to increase uncertainty about NATO’s reactions in the worst

and probably unlikely case of direct hostilities against

NATO.

Even though we lack knowledge about Soviet views

on US extended nuclear deterrence during the Cold War,

the fact remains that NATO’s position was at no time chal-

lenged militarily by the Soviet Union, besides ongoing geo-

political rivalries and Moscow’s continuous efforts to erode

NATO’s cohesion and to split the US off its Western Euro-

pean allies. In this regard, extended nuclear deterrence may

have been important, if not essential, to maintain alliance

security and stability. Nowadays, non-nuclear protégés who

profit from the nuclear umbrella of the US within the frame-

By Andreas Lutsch

T he new strategic concept and the Deterrence

and Defence Posture Review report (DDPR)

demonstrated that NATO achieved consen-

sus after years of controversial debate that “as long as there

are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a

nuclear alliance”. At the same time, NATO made a com-

mitment to “create the conditions” for a world without

nuclear weapons. The backbone of NATO security will

continue to be provided by US extended nuclear deter-

rence. This principle carries fundamental political and stra-

tegic weight. To maintain the security of all Allies, the

Alliance will continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella -

probably for an indefinite period, given the nuclear policies

and strategies not only of Russia, China and North Korea

but also of the Western nuclear powers and especially of

France.

Given the legacies of the Cold War the US umbrel-

la not only includes a correspondent US declaratory policy

with its core to threaten the use of nuclear weapons initial-

ly, to react defensively to an attack against the US or its

NATO allies with conventional, biological or chemical

weapons. The umbrella still involves forward deployed US

nuclear weapons under US custody in several NATO coun-

tries which were already member states before 1989/1990

while some of the host countries still supply delivery vehi-

cles according to the nuclear sharing arrangement. In some

cases and at least in the medium term, related moderniza-

tion decisions will have to be made by certain host coun-

tries, which - especially in the case of cessation of individu-

al nuclear sharing arrangements - may have wide-ranging

implications for NATO’s nuclear structures and the alli-

ance’s credibility. In any case, the DDPR Report demon-

strated that it is not sufficient in the allies’ perception that

the US will maintain an ‘over the horizon’ strategic nuclear

Re2lectionsonNATO’sNuclearFuture


work of NATO may also conclude from the recent

Ukrainian crisis that nuclear weapons matter to provide

for the security of states. They may conclude that nuclear

weapons matter, even if nuclear deterrence is not operat-

ed by a state itself, i.e. even if a state benefits from

(inherently less credible) nuclear deterrence, which is

operated by a nuclear protector state that acts as a trustee

of its allies. Ukraine, in contrast, gave up its control of

former Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory and rati-

fied the NPT on 5 Dec. 1994. In return, the three NPT

depository states (the US, the UK and Russia) signed the

Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on the

same day. The memorandum could be understood as a

guarantee of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and as a pledge

not to use force against Ukraine as an exemplary state in

terms of non-proliferation policy. Russian neo-

imperialism and the annexation of Crimea violated the

given nuclear order of the post-Cold War era. It high-

lighted the potential value of nuclear weapons in national

security strategy, which also led to debates within

Ukraine and expert circles in the West whether it was

prudent or counterproductive for Ukraine to take over

the position as a denuclearized non-nuclear weapons

state. The Crimean crisis also showed that non-

proliferation policy in a nuclear world may be accompa-

nied by military power projection of nuclear ‘haves’

against non-nuclear states that are unprotected in terms

of (extended) nuclear deterrence, even if security assur-

ances (like renunciation of forces waivers etc.) were giv-

en beforehand by atomic powers.

Given the most fundamental challenge to Euro-

Atlantic security since the end of the Cold War, due to

Russian policy vis-à-vis Ukraine, and given the fact that

the overall role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy had

been dramatically reduced since the early 1990s, the nu-

clear dimension of alliance will remain to be of cardinal

importance in the future - especially in the perception of

new member states in the region of the (former) Rus-

sian/Soviet zone of interest who have a strong need for

strategic reassurance. It is likely that the assumed re-

quirements of extended nuclear deterrence credibility

will differ in the future if one assumes that the Russian

perception is probably or very likely to be different

from the perception of NATO allies. Historical experi-

ence suggests that non-nuclear protégé-states in ex-

tended deterrence relationships notably urge the pro-

tector state to take measures steadily to reinforce de-

terrence credibility. As a result, NATO became an

alliance which remained to be interwoven in its nuclear

dimension even after the Cold War. Thus, as long as

US allies in the 21st century will continue to regard the

US nuclear umbrella as indispensable, the global zero

agenda may linger as an unrealizable and potentially

destabilizing vision.

Andreas Lutsch works as an Assistant Professor at

the University of Würzburg, where he teaches German

and transatlantic history of the 19th and 20th Centu-

ries. He wrote a Phd dissertation on West Germany’s

nuclear policy during the 1960s and 1970s. Besides

that he conducted archival research in the US, the UK,

Belgium and Germany with a focus on recently declas-

sified governmental files. He is a member of the Nu-

clear Proliferation International History Project, which

is directed by the Woodrow Wilson International Cen-

ter for Scholars, Washington DC. This project as well

as his own research is devoted to develop a new and

more empirically oriented understanding of the nucle-

ar age, which may also shape our understanding of

problems of the second nuclear age.

About the author


territorial defence or out-of-area operations. In addi-

tion, all three tasks are closely intertwined and conse-

quently supportive of one another.

Since NATO is still a defence alliance at its core,

the other two core tasks are essentially a means to bol-

ster the protection of its member states by both con-

taining crises potentially threatening the Alliance and

by establishing partnerships to contribute to crisis man-

agement. Thus NATO must remain prepared to as-

sume all three of its core tasks. This being said, it yet

remains to be seen how exactly NATO’s principles

ought to be put into practice.

In other words: What will hap-

pen to the Alliance once its last

troops will have been with-

drawn from Afghanistan? Is

there any conceivable chance of

NATO members to agree on

deploying troops to out-of-area

theatres again in the near- or

medium-term future? And

what about NATO’s response

to Russia’s latest aggressions in Crimea and Eastern

parts of Ukraine? The Alliances’ firm condemnation of

Moscow’s demeanour notwithstanding it is yet to be

seen how resolved all 28 member states are with re-

gard to its collective defence pledge. It is safe to say

that Russia’s hybrid warfare not only requires a reas-

surance of NATO’s commitment to defend its Central

and Eastern European allies as expressed in the Readi-

ness Action Plan already. Instead, the threat posed by

By Aylin Matlé

T he NSA-scandal is only one of many

issues overshadowing relations on both

sides of the Atlantic – especially bur-

dening German-American ties in recent times. The

future of NATO is equally uncertain, at least its stra-

tegic orientation in the years and decades ahead. Alt-

hough the Wales Summit and the subsequent declara-

tion have shed light on NATO’s general course of

action, i.e. the reaffirmation of its three core tasks

agreed on in its 2010 Strategic Concept, the question

of details and implementation has yet to be debated

and agreed on. In light of

the current crisis in

Ukraine and the ensuing

reemphasis on NATO’s

collective defence, it is of

particular importance to

find common ground on

how to square the two oth-

er core tasks – crisis man-

agement and cooperative

security – with the Alliance’s Article 5 responsibility.

Despite the dramatic demonstration of its continual

significance for the Alliance, NATO should beware of

solely focusing on collective defence in the years to

come. After all, none of the operations the Allied

member states are currently engaged in were planned

for, which should dissuade NATO from the miscon-

ception that the Alliance’s capabilities will not be

asked for in the future – whether it will pertain to

ViewsOnTheWalesSummitAndItsImpactOnTheFutureOfNATO

NATO‘s relation with Ukraine (Source NATO)


this rather new approach to belligerence necessitates an

adaption of NATO’s military strategic posture and its

approach to territorial defence. Hence the Alliance’s

Very High Readiness Joint Task Force for example will

have to be transformed as to enable the rapidly deploya-

ble infantry brigade to be prepared to fend off different

threat scenarios emanating from Russia. In addition, it is

reasonable if not necessary to contemplate how member

countries like France or Spain would act in a scenario of

Putin furthering his aggressions by attempting to annex

parts of the Baltic States for example, members of NATO

as well. Put differently: Will NATO engage in hybrid

warfare in the Baltics if provoked by Putin’s so-called

little green men? And perhaps more importantly: Is the

Alliance even prepared to turn rhetoric into action?

All these are questions demanding a clear-cut an-

swer as to what NATO should emphasize on strategically

in the future. All these are questions concerning matters

of war and peace – a distinction most citizens living in

NATO member states fortunately did not have to worry

about for decades. To ensure that the comfortable situa-

tion we find ourselves in continues, I consider the devel-

opment of strategic thinking of utter importance, espe-

cially in my generation. After all, it seems long overdue

to seriously deliberate issues such as (nuclear) deterrence

in the 21st century, which will be a main responsibility of

people my age. The Wales summit represents a solid im-

petus for contemplating NATO’s future. However, it is

high time to implement the resolutions agreed on to

shape the direction of the Alliance in a responsible man-

ner. A manner clearly articulating how the allies want to

assume their responsibilities committed to and reiterated

at the summit. A manner, which allows for NATO to

remain prepared in order to protect its member states

from already discernible adversaries and – perhaps more

importantly – from unknown threats yet to emerge and

be identified. After all, NATO has been the only institu-

tion we as Europeans and Americans can fall back on

together when it comes to our security and moreover

our freedom. Despite necessary – sometimes more

technical – discussions about the future orientation of

NATO, we should never forget what the transatlantic

community constitutes at its heart: A community of

shared values avowing for the protection of its citizens’

liberties.

Aylin Matlé recently finished her MA in War Studies

at King’s College London. Prior to completing her

postgraduate studies she graduated from Zeppelin Uni-

versität, Friedrichshafen with a BA in Public Manage-

ment and Governance. Her thesis addressed the impact

of the Libya campaign 2011 on the future of NATO. In

addition to her major Aylin minored in Communica-

tion and Cultural Management. In the course of her

BA studies Aylin interned with the Konrad-Adenauer

foundation (KAS) in their offices in Berlin and London

among others. Before starting her studies in London

she worked with the KAS as a student employee assist-

ing the coordinator for foreign and security policy.

About the author


ered it necessary to deploy German patriot rockets to

Southern Turkey in order to pick off potentially fired

rockets from Syria, there was no official reaction or

action by NATO with regard to advances and land

gains of ISIS which is pushing toward the immediate

border of Syria and Turkey. On the contrary, the

Western Alliance is not involved in the airstrikes on

ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Although one might be tempted

to understand this aloofness as an expression of a politi-

cal move – including neigbouring Arab countries in the

airstrikes and not acting through NATO as a policy to

counter potential claims by ISIS that it would be a war

of Western States against them – it nevertheless raises

the question of NATO’s legitimacy if it is not even re-

acting to a crisis just beyond its geographical borders.

Unfortunately the African continent remains a

hub for conflicts. Within the past two years, new con-

flicts have emerged in no less than three countries: Ma-

li, the Central African Republic and in South Sudan.

The international community has taken a concerted

approach in order to tackle these crises both politically

and military on the basis of cooperation between a vari-

ety of international organizations including the United

Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and the EU.

On 28 July 2014, the Security Council adopted Reso-

lution 2167 on the future of partnerships between the

UN and regional organisations in peacekeeping opera-

tions which does not even contain a single reference to

NATO. Of course, there are good reasons why NATO

is not being more active on the African continent, one

being that it is not within the geographical scope of the

Euro-Atlantic area. Nevertheless this fact has not pre-

By Moritz Moelle

L ooking at the current crises the interna-

tional community is confronted with in

various parts of the world - such as the

Ukraine-Russia issue, the threat posed by the terrorist

group known as ISIS or the various conflicts in Africa

- NATO is remarkably absent. Other national and

international actors are steering the wheel whilst

NATO is taking the backseat.

With regard to Ukraine and the illegal occupa-

tion and annexation of Crimea by Russia, the limita-

tions of NATO’s capabilities became evident. An or-

ganization founded on the principle of collective mili-

tary defence with very limited competences and capa-

bilities in non-military matters, all NATO could do

was to watch the events unfold from the sidelines.

The suspension of cooperation with Russia over the

Ukraine issue led to further isolation of NATO as the

OSCE is now steering the political negotiations with

NATO whereas the EU has adopted economic sanc-

tions against Russia. The adoption of the Readiness

Action Plan as part of the Wales Summit is nothing

but a fig leaf. However, the plan is not sufficient to

reassure the Baltic members of NATO, nor does it

address the fundamental problem of declining defence

budgets due to expenses cuts. Germany is currently

not even able to fulfill its obligations under the North

-Atlantic Treaty.

An even bigger threat to the security of the

North-Atlantic Treaty area and the wider internation-

al community is currently posed by ISIS. Once again,

NATO is remarkably absent. Whereas NATO consid-

NATO’sUncertainFuture–WaitingforGodot?


vented NATO from deploying out of area missions. Fur-

thermore, the European NATO members prefer engag-

ing themselves in Africa militarily and in other forms

through the EU.

These three crises show that NATO is running the

risks of becoming irrelevant in an area which is at the

core of its purpose of existence and legitimacy. The

NATO Wales Summit Declaration is a first step in the

right direction by containing a definitive commitment to

increased cooperation of NATO with other international

actors such as the United Nations and the European Un-

ion. However, more steps are necessary. One important

aspect is NATO-EU cooperation, which has been serious-

ly hampered by division over the Cyprus issue in the past

few years. A reactivation of the Berlin Plus Agreements

would be one first step for NATO to return to the world

stage in crisis management operations. Pooling and Shar-

ing Initiatives also require urgent implementation and

NATO should engage in a serious dialogue with all inter-

national stakeholders, including the United Nations and

in particular recently created international organizations

about the future of partnerships and potential niches for

all organisations and a division of labour in the field of

crisis management operation. So what is NATO waiting

for? May it indeed be Godot?

Moritz

Moelle is a PhD Candidate in International Law at the

Universities of Geneva and Leiden. His thesis analyses

the Cooperation between the United Nations and re-

gional organisations in peacekeeping operations and the

involved questions of international responsibility. As

part of his PhD research, he was a visiting fellow at the

Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University

of Cambridge and a visiting scholar at Columbia Law

School, New York. Moreover, he has worked as an

assistant to Prof. Dr. Georg Nolte, in the International

Law Commission of the UN and as a trainee for the

peacekeeping training program of UNITAR. He was

also a legal intern at ITLOS and an assistant editor of

the Leiden Journal of International Law. Prior to starting

his PhD, he gained a master’s degrees in International

and European Law and in Public International Law

from the Universities of Geneva and Leiden, as well as

the equivalent of the LL.B.

About the author


based on an even balance of two functional pillars. The

first pillar is based on the reiteration and reinforcement

of Article 5 core objectives. The second pillar is repre-

sented by NATO´s continual determination to contrib-

ute to security beyond its own boundaries and to act as

a stability provider around the globe when its core in-

terests are being threatened from the outside. Un-

doubtedly, Russia never really found comfort in nei-

ther of the pillars. The crisis in Ukraine shows the Alli-

ance that it must do both – enhance its internal cohe-

sion but also to do a better job in anticipating emerging

threats from outside. While the events in Ukraine rep-

resent a crucially important challenge to NATO-Russia

relations, it is also apparent that Ukraine is more a

symptom of the clash rather than the main causal fac-

tor. Even if the conflict in Ukraine could be settled and

a lasting peace setting found, it is still rational to as-

sume that the potential for confrontation between Rus-

sia and the West will not disappear all of the sudden.

The Alliance must do its best to avoid the reinforce-

ment of perceptions of a “gray zone” of instable and

manipulable states between its own territory and Rus-

sia. While, due to a lasting lack of crucial consensus of

NATO member states, further enlargement is likely off

the table for the imminent future, the Alliance should

reassure countries like Georgia and Moldova that en-

largement will have its rational pace and will not be

stopped indefinitely even if it would be disliked by

Russia. Over the course of the past twenty years

NATO’s open door policy represented a significant

stabilization tool and thus should not be perceived as a

provocation against anybody - including the Russian

By Tomáš A. Nagy

N early a quarter century after the fall

of communism, NATO once again

finds itself in confrontation with Rus-

sia. Since the end of the bipolar world, Europe has

witnessed the expansion of a zone of peace, prolifera-

tion of democratic principles, enhancement of stabil-

ity and economic prosperity in an extent which had

been rare in its own history. However, with govern-

ments focused more on addressing the symptoms and

the causes of the ongoing economic downturn – the

relevance of defense has been largely downgraded on

the list of national priorities and so decreased the ap-

petite to invest in our own security – and that usually

comes with a geo-political price to pay.

The crisis in Ukraine has created a fundamental-

ly new security reality on the “old continent“. Since

the invasion of Crimea it became largely obvious to

everyone that the transatlantic community is being

challenged by a revisionist power – one that clearly

intends to impose a new geo-political paradigm based

on power, intimidation and supremacy. More than

anything else, the Kremlin is interested in establishing

a recognized exclusive zone of privileged interest –

one in which they want freedom to manoeuvre with-

out outside interference and to uphold the existence

of different pseudo-democratic, illiberal and authori-

tarian regimes.

NATO, on the other side, is facing, after more

than a decade of expeditionary orientation, the begin-

ning of a novel chapter in its history. As formalized at

the Wales Summit, the future of the Alliance will be

TheFutureOfNATO-De2iningTheRightWayFor-

wardfortheAlliance


Federation. Exactly on the opposite side of the argument,

everyone - including Moscow– has to some degree bene-

fited from the stability, security and prosperity of the

"new Europe". The expansion of the Alliance from 16 to

28 members was was made possible because of the com-

bination of two factors. First, NATO had found both

courage and appetite for making itself the greatest securi-

ty-oriented alliance ever - even when it came with politi-

cal cost and created diplomatic hurdles with Russia. Sec-

ondly, the region itself was willing to embark on a chal-

lenging transformation process to make a step through

the "open door" of the Alliance. This must remain to be

the core principle of NATO, even when facing a consid-

erably different Russia than the one it did two decades

ago. NATO’s enlargement will not be directed against

Russia and its existence. The main lesson learned from

the history of Europe is that division creates potential for

instability and insecurity. NATO must not accept new

dividing lines on the European continent and thus must

stand by the principles that made it survive over the

course of previous decades.

NATO soberly recognized the implication of the

conflict in Ukraine, the revisionist nature of Russian for-

eign policy, self-critically recognized the daunting state of

shrinking defensive capabilities and made a solid step to-

ward a new chapter in the history.

The essence of the new chapter in the history of the

Alliance is defined by the change of NATO´s orientation

from being an organization of expeditionary crisis man-

agement to an Alliance that aims to revive the internal

security reassurances of its own members. The result of

this shift in NATO´s raison d´être are Article 5 security

guarantees that acquired a more complex meaning than

ever before.

Tomáš A.

Nagy is an Associate Fellow for Transatlantic Security,

Institutions and Governance at the Central European

Policy Institute - where he contributes to the develop-

ment of a promising research centre that intends to

integrate policy research and advocacy capacities of the

region. Previously, he worked on issues related to Af-

ghanistan and the role of Central European allies in the

stabilization process. Moreover, he is a frequent com-

mentator on security politics in national press and tele-

vision. Besides policy research activities, he contribut-

ed to the organization of the annual Globsec interna-

tional security conferences and to the prestigious trans-

atlantic Marshall Memorial Fellowship. He previously

cooperated with the Bratislava office of the German

Marshall Fund of the US - as administrative assistant

and junior researcher. Mr. Nagy studied International

Relations, European Politics and International Security

at the Metropolitan University Prague, Sciences Po

Paris and the University of St. Andrews.

About the author


face both current and future challenges, NATO must

consolidate and promote its own narrative of purpose,

emphasizing core liberal-democratic values and a

shared history, and encourage individual member states

to communicate to their populations that NATO is an

essential part of their national identity.

The Wales Summit Declaration took suitably firm

positions on Russia and the self-proclaimed Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In addition to the

redeployment of physical assets and the advancement

of cooperation and interoperability, NATO should

have taken steps to confront Russian misinformation

and historical revisionism surrounding the recent

events in Eastern Europe (see – Novorossiya). While

most in the West see Russian propaganda for what it is,

Putin’s information warfare continues to play a large

role in the situation on the ground. ISIL makes similar-

ly impressive use of social media in creating its histori-

cal narrative. In its efforts to establish a so-called cali-

phate, ISIL is engaging in a significant media campaign,

appealing to an often-warped historical narrative. In

the future, NATO will need a much more proactive,

Public Diplomacy Division to compete with modern

information warfare globally, and it cannot have this

without a compelling narrative of purpose. Additional-

ly, ISIL will challenge NATO consensus on out-of-area

engagement. Tensions between Turkey, Kurdish forc-

es, and a United States led coalition containing many

NATO Member and Partner countries, could put a

strain on any future NATO efforts to contribute to the

fight against ISIL. Nevertheless, with conflict along the

Turkish-Syrian border, and a terrorist organization that

By Chris Olsen

T he future of the Alliance will be deter-

mined by not only how NATO con-

fronts immediate challenges, but also

whether it is able to bring a unified sense of identity

and clarity of narrative to bear when dealing with new

challenges. The preamble to the Washington Treaty

establishes that NATO is an alliance of states “…

determined to safeguard the freedom, common herit-

age and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the

principles of democracy, individual liberty and the

rule of law.” Born out of the trauma of World War II,

this narrative of common heritage and civilization was

self-evident to both national leaders and domestic

populations at the time.

Through the Cold War, NATO’s identity shift-

ed from an alliance for collective defense to an alli-

ance diametrically opposed to the Soviet Union and

members of the Warsaw Pact. Since the end of the

Cold War, NATO at times has struggled to maintain

a shared sense of purpose, seen in the public as a

holdover from a bygone era of mutually assured de-

struction. The intent of the NATO Summit in Wales

was originally to focus on both the drawdown of ISAF

forces in Afghanistan, and NATO’s future engage-

ment with the global community. With Russia’s chal-

lenge to European peace and security at the top of the

summit agenda instead, NATO no longer needed to

examine its mission and purpose. It could once again

be an alliance predicated on being in opposition to

Russia. However, NATO’s narrative of purpose

should not be contingent on outside influence. To

NATOMustPromoteIt'sOwnNarrative


has thus far ignored international borders, NATO must

be ready to confront ISIL, should it engage Turkey di-

rectly and trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Moving forward from the Wales Summit, the approv-

al of the Readiness Action Plan and changes to the NATO

Response Force (NRF), including the establishment of

the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), is a

promising step towards deterring further Russian en-

croachments towards NATO member states. Although it

would also serve as an effective deterrent, the stated goal

of all member states reaching the two percent defense

expenditure guideline within ten years is unlikely to oc-

cur without either new incentives or meaningful reper-

cussions for not doing so.

Having all member states contribute their two per-

cent is critical to creating a sense of shared responsibility

and ownership of the alliance. As former Secretary Gen-

eral Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it at the Atlantic Coun-

cil in July of 2014, “NATO is an insurance policy…All

members must pay their premiums.” Moreover, the argu-

ment that defense spending should focus on the quality

and effectiveness of spending, rather than achieving an

arbitrary quantity of spending as a percentage of GDP,

presumes that quality and quantity are mutually exclu-

sive. All states should commit to their two percent, and

make their contribution as effective or “smart” as possi-

ble. This may be fiscally challenging for some member

states in the short term, and will require national leaders

to forgo domestic political infighting and communicate

NATO’s importance.

Internally consolidating and agreeing upon its own

narrative will challenge NATO. However, should NATO

take advantage of the current shared sense of purpose

between member states, reinvigorated by threats to secu-

rity, and engage the public and a new generation of lead-

ers by emphasizing core liberal-democratic values and a

“common heritage,” NATO will be well prepared for

the challenges yet to come.

Chris Olsen is a Project Assistant at the Atlantic

Council’s Young Atlanticist Program, where he con-

tributes to the development of Atlantic Council pro-

gramming for young and emerging leaders. Among

other initiatives, he helped to organize and coordinate

the 2014 NATO Emerging Leaders Working Group

and the 2014 Future Leaders Summit alongside the

NATO Summit in Wales. Prior to joining the Atlantic

Council, Chris worked as an Economic Security Intern

at the EastWest Institute. He received his BA in Inter-

national Relations and History from James Madison

University and minored in Middle Eastern Communi-

ties and Migrations.

About the author


The climate change threat has a full spectrum of

implications to the transatlantic community – direct

and indirect ones, with short and long term conse-

quences. With unseen heat waves, floods and other

climate extremes over the past decades, North Ameri-

ca and Europe have been directly affected by climate

change and required to mobilise a quick emergency

response. These climate changes will only become

more frequent in the upcoming decades.

Looking from an indirect perspective, the trans-

atlantic community will see the already conflict bat-

tered countries in the Middle East, the South and East

Africa and the South East Asia plunging into an increas-

ingly deeper devastation due to water and food insecu-

rity. That, coupled with overpopulation, economic

hurdles and weak governments, has a potential to push

these regions into armed conflicts and sore humanitari-

an crises. These seemingly remote developments can in

fact have very tangible consequences for the transatlan-

tic security. In the current situation of its over-reliance

on imported energy resources, climate change has di-

rect implications for energy security. It happens to be

that most of the US and Europe’s oil and gas are being

imported from volatile regions. Not only can the sup-

ply be disrupted as a result of a natural disaster, but the

energy supply infrastructure in conflict regions may

also come into the hands of militarised and illegitimate

groups.

Another direct impact of climate change initiated

developments in conflict regions is migration. Immi-

grants, refugees and asylum seekers already cause seri-

ous problems mainly in Southern European countries.

By Areva Paronjana

T here is an abundance of security threats

and challenges in our complicated glob-

al security environment. The NATO

Summit in Wales tried to address them all with issues

ranging from the IS and post-2014 Afganistan, to con-

cerns over the Cold War adversary Russia and its ac-

tivities in Ukraine. These are all very serious security

threats with grave consequences and are generally

agreed to have been well handled at the September

summit. There is, however a challenge that did not

receive the attention it deserves – climate change.

Climate change is not only the most overlooked secu-

rity challenge, but potentially the most dangerous and

irreversible one. Human-created climate change has

already led to water and food shortages and climate

catastrophes in certain parts of the world. Continued

climate change will only worsen the situation causing

more severe humanitarian crises, migration and will

eventually fuel ethnic tensions and armed conflicts of

economically desperate populations. Consequences

caused by continuous climate chance are where na-

tional and international security is at stake. It is easier

to find a solution to a challenge that has been general-

ly recognised. It is different with security challenges

that are unprecedented and invisible.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

change in its Fifth Assessment Report clearly states:

Human influence on climate change is clear. Continued

emissions of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and

changes in all components of the climate system. Limiting

climate change will require substantial and sustained reduc-

tions of greenhouse gas emissions.

TheClimateChange&GlobalSecurityNexus


There is no reason to believe that in case of worsening

climate conditions and their impact of livelihood of popu-

lations in the poorer parts of the globe, there will be de-

creased levels of emigration to the wealthier countries.

What makes climate change and its consequences over-

looked is the invisible and unprecedented nature of it.

Either due to short term gains or pure ignorance, there

are still political leaders refusing to accept the realities of

climate change and its disastrous nature. There are some

basic underlying principles that have to be put in place to

successfully overcome the threat of climate change and its

implications for transatlantic security.

First, climate change is a scientifically proven fact.

Thus, all talks and discussions about the existence of cli-

mate change should be disregarded and the international

community should stand strongly together against such

populist and potentially disastrous claims.

Second, following the spirit of the first principle,

there should be more discussions and debates about the

dangers and threats of climate change and to its implica-

tions on national and international security. The public

has to fully acknowledge the risks and be fully aware of

the consequences of human made climate change.

Third, the current leaders are responsible for cre-

ating a comprehensive energy policy, promoting not only

fuel efficiency, but also the cleanliness of it. It should also

create incentives for developing renewable and alterna-

tive future energy resources. The future leaders are re-

sponsible for implementing such an energy policy to its

fullest.

Fourth, when debating climate change, the biggest

and fastest growing developing nations contributing the

most to climate change, like India, China, Brazil, South

America, should always be engaged and on board even if

disagreements exist. Probably the most important in

solving climate change is promoting limited and de-

creased consumption. Consumption is currently the

basis of our capitalist societies built on economic

growth. Economic growth is directly linked to con-

sumption, which is in turn linked to increased produc-

tion and excessive use of energy resources. Unless un-

sustainable consumption is limited, all these other ef-

forts of fighting climate change will not be fully effec-

tive.

Climate change is not a local or regional threat,

there is no short time solution and it cannot be solved

with efforts of only some dedicated members of the

international community. The climate change is not

and cannot be addressed as a regular and typical securi-

ty threat. This is a threat asking for both, a top down

and bottom up approach.

Areva Paronjana has experience in EU’s foreign

affairs and transatlantic security. She holds a MSc in

Development and International Relations from Aaborg

University in Denmark. She wrote her Master thesis

about the causal mechanism of Taliban re-emergence

in Afghanistan. Areva has worked as a research fellow

at the Regional Studies Center, an Armenia-based

think-tank. She then worked for the Security & De-

fence Agenda, a Brussels-based think-tank. Recently

Areva worked for the AeroSpace and Defence Indus-

tries Association of Europe and now deals with strate-

gic communications at the European External Action

Service.

About the author


only military but also political cooperation. The role of

governments is to give a political sense of the Alliance,

a community of states that share some values on which

we cannot compromise: the rule of law, respect for

human rights, democracy, and freedom of expression.

We must first eliminate all possible sources of criti-

cism, all lack of respect for human rights, in order to

not be criticized when we stand in defence of the rights

of civilians in third states, often dictatorships or au-

thoritarian states. In addition, it is important to give

greater voice to the European members of the Alli-

ance, balancing the American voice. In compensation,

as requested by the United States, European countries

have a duty to increase defence spending in a smart

way.

The attacks in New York, London, Madrid and

other European cities have shown how dangerous the

presence of mainly Islamic terrorist cells are in NATO

member countries. The citizens´ focus on their security

adds another risk: the authoritarian drift in our coun-

tries, giving up some freedom in exchange for more

security. NATO countries must avoid that risk. NATO

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, when he was

Prime Minister of Norway, after the terrible attacks of

right-wing extremist Anders Breivik, boldly said that

we cannot respond to extremism and terrorism with

closure and authoritarianism, but with more freedom

and more democracy. The issue of cyber security is an

issue of cooperation between NATO and the European

Union. It is an issue on which the traditional interpre-

tation of Article V takes on a new nature and poses a

question that is not easy to answer: what is a fact or a

set of facts that can under Article 5 indicate that there

By Matteo Pugliese

W ith the fall of the Berlin Wall,

the traditional mission of

NATO has changed and for the

90s we saw a confused stage, with the advent of mul-

tilateralism and the multiplication of potential

threats. For about twenty years the threats have be-

come asymmetrical, involving non-state actors: the

threat of international terrorism, the cyber threat, the

risk of regional destabilization due to failed states. In

this context, NATO takes on a role of institution-

building, in addition to the traditional Article 5.

However, a series of events at the end of the

first decade of 2000 reported the central issue of the

protection of the NATO member countries: econom-

ic and political recovery of the Russian Federation

after the collapse in the nineties, the rise of new eco-

nomic and military powers such as China, the pres-

ence of new actors such as BRICS, potentially hostile

countries such as Iran, Assad's Syria, North Korea for

our allies of Seoul and Tokyo, the political chaos in

the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, and, last but not

least, the establishment of the Islamic State by ISIS.

The Wales Summit was a historic opportunity to

change the priority of the last decade, dedicated to

policies of global cooperation and the fight against

terrorism. The Alliance cannot and should not bear

the shortcomings and the slowness of the United Na-

tions, it cannot be the 'global policeman', but it must

take the responsibility to protect its citizens. The alli-

ance, with the return of France in the integrated mil-

itary command and new countries as Albania and

Croatia, expands and resembles more and more not

ANewPathfortheAlliance


is a real and imminent attack to trigger the defensive re-

action? This is a concept always referred to during the

years of the Cold war to defend the country from the

Soviet threat, although fortunately there was never need

to implement it. There is a second issue: we still have

national networks with non-uniform standards. The third

issue, perhaps even more difficult than the two previous

ones, is to create a doctrine on the use of the network

and computing space because now this does not exist.

There are countries that respect the freedom of the inter-

net, while others limit it strongly in the name of security.

The new policies of President Putin, the annexa-

tion of the Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, as

well as provocations towards the Baltic countries, Scandi-

navia and North America, make policy measures to pre-

vent a military escalation urgently needed. The task is to

protect NATO member countries being at risk, but also

to find a political solution and an agreement with Russia,

which cannot compromise on respect for borders and

international conventions.

M a t t e o

Pugliese is currently majoring in International law at

the University of Genova. He also studied at the Pon-

tifical Catholic University of Chile and at the Universi-

ty of Zagreb, focusing on comparative constitutional

law, political systems and human rights. Furthermore,

Matteo attended courses on human rights and interna-

tional cooperation projects at the Shandong Jiaotong

University of Jinan, China and at Kobuleti, Georgia,

supported by the European Union. Matteo has been an

international observer in the district of Sofia, Bulgaria,

during the general election in 2013. He is active on

NATO topics as president of the Yata Club of Genova,

Italy. Matteo writes for many magazines about geopoli-

tics and interviewed in this context the former foreign

minister Frattini when he was the Italian candidate as

NATO Secretary General. Besides Italian, he speaks

English, Spanish, French and a bit of Serbian-Croatian.

About the author


of Russian interference in other post-Soviet states being

home to Russian-speaking minorities, such as Moldova or

the Baltics. Russia´s aggressive violation of international law

has not only triggered strong calls for an enhanced military

presence at NATO´s Eastern flank; it has also illustrated that

NATO´s original purpose of securing the European security

architecture through collective defence is far from anachro-

nistic.

Second, besides showing the topicality of traditional

security threats, Russian actions in Eastern Ukraine reflect a

new, hybrid form of warfare that goes beyond NATO´s tra-

ditional military doctrine. Such “hybrid warfare” in Eastern

Ukraine is characterized by systematic destabilization efforts

that include ambiguous attacks fought by proxy, economic

pressure and threats regarding ener-

gy supply as well as cyber attacks

and an extensive disinformation

campaign. While the concept of non

-linear warfare is usually applied to

non-state actors such as terrorist

groups, the Russian strategy of

“distraction, deception and destabi-

lisation” (GenSec Rasmussen, June

2014) has shown that it can be used by states as well. Partic-

ularly the absence of a clearly defined status (peace, intra-

state - or interstate war) and an ambiguous opponent makes

a coherent political and military response a challenging task.

Finally, part of Russia’s hybrid strategy was an exten-

sive media campaign. The Russian narrative that has been

spread by every trick in the book was built on allegations of

fascist Ukrainian troops, the Ukrainian government´s lack of

legitimacy, and the praise of the determination of the Rus-

sian speaking population in Crimea to protect itself. This

media component, embracing both traditional and social

By Anne Roth

R ussia´s illegal annexation of Crimea and its

covert intervention in Eastern Ukraine

have evoked memories – and rhetorical

reflexes – of the Cold War era. While the severe crisis in

Ukraine continues to keep Europe in suspense, it has al-

ready been recognized as a turning point in NATO´s post-

Cold War history. Having revealed weaknesses of the Alli-

ance, it should not only be regarded as a challenge but also

as an opportunity for NATO to undertake necessary re-

forms.

In this sense, Russia´s actions have displayed features

that point to NATO´s future, rather than to its past. Many

commentators have given the Alliance poor marks for its

crisis management in Ukraine. In the

light of recent experiences, which

lessons might be derived from them

for NATO´s future? The way in

which the crisis in Ukraine has un-

folded - or rather Russia´s strategy

of exacerbating it- came as a surprise

to NATO and its member states. All

the more, it is necessary to distil

those aspects that help to explain why the crisis promises

to be a challenge to NATO that will carry after-effects,

regardless of its outcome.

Three characteristics of the current crisis stand out:

First, and most fundamentally, Russia revived some

of the classic concerns of European security by illegally

annexing Crimea and violating Ukraine´s territorial integ-

rity. After the Russian government had denied any inter-

vention in the beginning, it later justified its actions refer-

ring to its obligation to protect Crimea´s Russian-speaking

population. Of course, this argumentation has evoked fears

NATO´sFutureCrisisManagement:

LessonsLearnedFromTheUkrainianCrisis

NATO—Russia relations (Source NATO)


media, has been called the “core of post-industrial war-

fare” (Bachmann/ Gunneriossen 2014, “Hybrid Wars”). In any

case, the interplay between covert military operations and a

sophisticated disinformation campaign threatens to undermine

NATO´s credibility if the Alliance does not proactively offer

an effective counter-narrative. Given that Russia has the ad-

vantage of being a single and highly centralized actor while

member states´ positions on an appropriate strategy vis- à-vis

Russia traditionally diverge, the difficulty to formulate a

coherent narrative supported by all should not be underes-

timated.

NATO should draw short-term and long-term les-

sons from this:

In a short-term perspective, NATO must convincingly

reinforce the security guarantee for those member states locat-

ed at its Eastern frontier. The “Readiness Action Plan” (RAP)

agreed upon by the member states at the Wales Summit is the

right approach in this regard; it is designed to “provide a coher-

ent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to re-

spond to the changes in the security environment on NATO´s

border” (Wales Summit Declaration). This is a credible com-

mitment to Article 5, NATO’s core business. The Alliance’s

credibility being at stake in this matter, it will be one of the

most important tasks of NATO’s new Secretary General Jens

Stoltenberg to ensure the necessary resources for swift imple-

mentation of the RAP. Furthermore, beyond its own territory,

NATO should offer vulnerable states in Eastern Europe sup-

port for internal stabilization and to strengthen and reform

their security sector. Drawing a clear line around NATO terri-

tory could, on the one hand, be understood by Russia as a sig-

nal of neglect towards countries such as Moldova or Georgia.

On the other hand, an overhasty enlargement policy would

lead to further escalation in the relationship with Russia. This

means membership should not be on the table for those states

for the time being. “Stability Partnerships” might be a feasible

middle way that could still help to deter further Russian inter-

ventions. A key task for NATO will be to better adapt its mili-

tary doctrine accordingly and to develop mechanisms allowing

for a quick and efficient response to situations such as Russia´s

secret, but effective, annexation of Crimea – but also to ad-

dress all other aspects of Russia’s hybrid strategy.

In the medium to long-term, Russia´s strategy in

Eastern Ukraine points to a fundamental challenge for the

alliance: In order to cope with the non-military aspects of

such hybrid challenges, NATO must broaden its focus. This

requires enhanced cooperation with multilateral partners

such as the EU and OSCE that can provide expertise lying

beyond NATO´s competencies. Furthermore, NATO will

have to formulate a convincing narrative of its goals that

generates public legitimacy beyond immediate crisis situa-

tions. The success of Russia´s disinformation campaign can

partly be explained by NATO´s insufficient access to politi-

cal discourses in Russia and Ukraine. This can only be

changed by putting greater emphasis on regional expertise,

particularly in NATO´s public diplomacy, to allow for not

only a profound monitoring of regional debates but also to

provide NATO with appropriate networks and access points

to make its counter-narrative heard.

Anne Roth studied Political Science and International Re-

lations in Tuebingen, Moscow, Berlin and London, where

she recently graduated from the London School of Econom-

ics and Political Science (LSE). Currently, she is working as

a research assistant at the Center for Transnational Studies,

Foreign and Security Policy at Free University Berlin

(ATASP), while finishing her second Master´s degree at

Free University Berlin, Humboldt University Berlin and

Potsdam University. In spring 2015, she will join the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a Carlo Schmid

fellow. Previously, Ms. Roth has gained professional experi-

ence interning in the German Bundestag, the Research Insti-

tute for Eastern Europe at Bremen University, the Peace

Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and the German Em-

bassy in Moscow.

About the author


ment, as it learned its lessons from the ISAF mission in

Afghanistan. This make sense as most current crisis

management operations are located in very fragile set-

tings that can be compared to Afghanistan; examples

being Libya, Mali, Syria and Iraq in the response against

the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

If we consider, however, how these missions were con-

ducted, we mostly find NATO acting by flying artillery

and supporting local groups with emergency relief (e.g.

Libya), weapons, or both (e.g. in the fight against ISIL).

This seems not to be the comprehensive approach that

the NMS have committed themselves to in the declara-

tion, but rather a very limited one. This is not a call for

“boots on the ground” in those scenarios, but rather an

observation, which I would link to the preferences held

by NMS. It seems to me that NMS are not willing to

engage more in those scenarios, for reasons like an as-

sessment of appropriates, or a response to public opin-

ion at home. Especially in the context of appropriates

there seems to be a big gap between the understanding

of the often cited “Responsibly to Protect” (R2P) and a

more comprehensive view of a responsibility to re-

build, like practiced in Kosovo. I would however argue

that the scope of the missions is in any case not a result

of missing military capability inherent to the NMS or

NATO itself, which does not allow for any other kind

of involvement. A perfect example would be the

NATO crisis management in Mali, where the approach

headed by France was at least in military terms very

comprehensive and decisive.

If we look at the case of Libya we find that mili-

tary action by the NMS also met its goal in stopping the

By Paul Schaudt

T he decisions to enable NATO to better

deal with its core tasks of collective

defense, crisis management, and coop-

erative security in the future made at the NATO Sum-

mit in Wales, are in further need for discussion. In

view of the current events in Ukraine, North Africa

and the Middle East, the military capability of NATO

seems not to be the problem that renders the Alliance

incapable of dealing with those issues effectively. In

fact there seems to be opposing assessments of the

above-mentioned challenges resulting in diverging

political willingness amongst the member states in

how to deal with them. Therefore, the agreement to

reach comparable defense spending efforts of 2% of

the GDP throughout the Alliance in order to stabilize

the capabilities of NATO in times of austerity seems

to be less important. I would argue that the pressing

question in times of austerity is rather how much

NATO Member States (NMS) are willing to engage

comprehensively in crisis management scenarios and

that finding a common ground for these issues is pre-

ceding discussions on enhancing NATO’s military

effectiveness. I will highlight this point in the context

of some of NATO’s past and present crisis manage-

ment missions and put them in context to the Wales

Declaration. All statements in the Wales Declaration

regarding NATO’s crisis management point at a deep-

er cooperation and a need for higher military effec-

tiveness to meet future crises (e.g. point 5, 71, 102 &

103). The sole exception is point 99 of the Wales

Declaration which states that NATO will continue to

follow a comprehensive approach in its crisis manage-

NATOOnItsWayToBecomingTooBigToSucceed


mass killing of civilians by Gadhafi’s military, which is in

accordance with the goals of NATO. Nevertheless, this

mission has not left behind a territory that satisfies NMS

security concerns toward transnational terrorism. Libya

resembles a failed state that most NMS define as a perfect

ground for terrorist groups. The case highlights very well

that NMS where relatively quick to find effective military

measurement to achieve their primary goals yet the com-

plementary economic and diplomatic tools to stabilize the

situation after their involvement have been predominant-

ly missing. NATO’s military effectiveness seems not to be

of much concern for NMS to meet their actual goals in

crisis management.

In sum, I think budgetary concerns regarding

NATO’s capability have had prevalence at the Wales

Summit and I believe that a clear consensus between

NMS regarding their international involvement has to be

reached first. NMS need to evaluate how specifically they

want to react in scenarios of crisis management and how

much they want to invest in order to satisfy their security

goals. My conclusion is therefore that NMS need to find a

common ground on how NATO’s crisis management

shall look in the future, especially after military opera-

tions, and then develop the appropriate tools for burden

sharing and increased effectiveness in accordance. If they

decide that they will increasingly depend on economic

and diplomatic tools, then more effective mechanisms

have to be developed and deployed in these areas. Should

they decide that its military operations will be limited to

airstrikes then it makes sense to further increase the tech-

nological fungibility between allied forces in this field.

Yet ready reaction forces on the ground make no sense if

NMS do not want to deploy ground troops. So every dol-

lar in that field will be wasted, no matter how efficiently

spent. Finally the future of NATO like that of any inter-

national institution needs to be planned, while taking into

account what its members are willing to do with it, and

not what they might wish to with it.

Paul Schaudt obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Politi-

cal Science and Economics in 2012. During his Bache-

lor studies, he worked as a conflict observer at the Hei-

delberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

He also served as board member of the Forum for in-

ternational Security Heidelberg until 2013. Since the

fall of 2012, he is pursuing an M.A. in Political Science

and Economics at the University of Heidelberg. In

2013 he was an exchange student at the San Diego

State University in California. Currently Paul is work-

ing on his thesis on the conflict escalation capability of

foreign aid. The thesis also captures his primary fields

of interest, evolving around security studies, develop-

ment studies, foreign aid, conflict studies, and interna-

tional political economy.

About the author


about the future of EU military engagement and

NATO’s role in it. Agreements between the two or-

ganizations have always pointed to the understanding

that there should not be a duplication of any kind, be it

organizational or in command structures.

However, this was exactly the core of the debate as

observers felt that the EU was copying and expanding

structures that NATO had built over centuries. In the

eyes of many experts the EU still had to learn and

search for its own role instead of attempting to engage

in a competition with NATO.

Numerous agreements between the two organi-

zations cemented the awkward couple situation of both

organizations. However, the recent Ukraine crisis has

brought NATO to the forefront again, as the major

security provider of Europe and North-America. The

EU seemed to follow suit and imposed economic sanc-

tions albeit on a small scale avoiding major trade or

economic wars with the Russian Federation. NATO on

the other hand has conducted a series of joint military

trainings and has scheduled operations to reassure its

allies in Eastern Europe. It seems that although the two

organizations are interested in the same fields of securi-

ty and defence, the EU has stirred away from the mili-

tary part of operations and left the field to NATO. At

Wales this distinction became once more very clear as

the final declaration of the summit rarely mentions the

EU, and – where it does – mostly in a context of part-

nering with other international institutions. Additional-

ly, the cooperation and expansion of European defence

capabilities is mentioned as one key area. However,

this has been a goal for years and is only coming about

in a much slower pace than anticipated. The Ukraine

By Daniel Schnok

T he immediate impact of the Wales

Summit can be felt already as leading

figures in European politics pledge their

continued allegiance and support to the Alliance and

its core functions. The Wales Summit declaration

sums up the new spirit of necessity that is felt in Euro-

pean capitals when it comes to such protracted topics

such as security and defence. Yes, suddenly NATO

seems very necessary, after it was heavily criticized

for its out of area operations mainly in Libya and Af-

ghanistan. It seems that the Alliance is returning to its

core mission and with it to the ideals and values that

come with it – the defence of Western democracy

and its ideals in an insecure world.

However, NATO is not the only international

organization that concentrates on peace, security and

defence. Increasingly, the EU has stepped up a serious

effort to gain expertise, influence and resources relat-

ed to security and defence measures and boasts

around 5 active military missions around the world,

most of them located in Africa. In advance, the EU

has established and staffed some new agencies and

centres that influence European perspectives on secu-

rity as well as the defence industry. In theory, the EU

and NATO are natural partners, with a partially over-

lapping membership and shared values. Some have

also suggested that both organizations could learn

from each other. The EU could get military expertise

while NATO could gain civilian insight especially into

state-building and related measures in which the EU

has a significant advantage of staff and professional

expertise. Before Wales there was a significant debate

NATOAfterWales:WhereIsTheEU?


crisis has changed in many ways the picture that NATO

developed over a decade of war in Afghanistan. A turna-

round has appeared to be probable from the era of out-of-

area operation towards a more confrontational East-West

divide that foreshadows the possibility of conventional

wars in Europe. However, there is more to the picture

than is usually admitted as the fighting in Ukraine is until

today mostly conducted by armed rebel-groups and spe-

cialized forces that are a rather new phenomenon but not

an unfamiliar threat to NATO, drawing lessons from its

engagement in Afghanistan.

All these developments point to a sustained and pivot-

al change in the way Europeans view their security and

how they engage with conventional and non-conventional

threats. NATO and the EU have responded very differ-

ently to these developments, owed to their organizational

set up, their internal sense of mission and of course the

states that are represented in their decision making bod-

ies. However, the awkward cooperation between NATO

and EU has to be reformed and thought over again, de-

spite political impasse, and despite both organizations not

having shown a big interest in sustained cooperation up to

this point. A real strategic partnership between the EU

and NATO after Wales could bring substantial synergy

effects and could complement the strategic and civilian

instruments that would be at the disposal of both the EU

and NATO. The Wales Summit has pointed to interesting

and strategically important changes as well as a solid re-

commitment to European defence and security, but the

other big player in European security has been side-lined

although it possesses important and decisive resources

that could be beneficial. Consequently, the Wales Sum-

mit has produced important decisions and identified key

areas in which NATO has to engage, but to only cooper-

ate in armaments issues, and to write a report about

NATO-EU relations is simply not enough. A substantiat-

ed effort has to be made to end a prolonged phase of

competition between the organizations or the awkward

couple relation will prevail.

Daniel Schnok is a 24 year old Master of Public Poli-

cy student currently living in Berlin. He studies at the

Hertie School of Governance and enjoys the broad of-

fer of security policy relevant conferences, seminars

and roundtable discussions the capital has to offer. He

wrote his Bachelor thesis about EU-NATO coopera-

tion, which he analysed from a perspective of game

theory and in which he sought to prove that under spe-

cific conditions NATO-EU cooperation might be im-

possible to achieve. His research interests include col-

lective security, security structure of East Asia and the

economics of security.

About the author


linear forms of aggression can include mass disinfor-

mation campaigns, cyberattacks, the use of Special

Forces often disguised as local partisans, local proxies,

intimidation, and economic pressure. Examples of

asymmetrical warfare practiced by Russia include Esto-

nia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014.

In Ukraine, insignia-less soldiers seized political

and communication buildings and declared independ-

ence from the Ukrainian state. Despite wearing Russian

military kit and driving vehicles with official license

plates, it was unclear whether they were local activists,

mercenaries, or soldiers acting without orders. The

problem posed to NATO is that such activities often

fall below NATO’s response threshold. According to

Article V, "Parties agreed that an armed attack against

one or more of them in Europe or North America shall

be considered an attack against them all." In light of

ambiguous warfare, NATO must consider what consti-

tutes an Article V attack and whether the adjective

“armed” should be removed from the Washington

Treaty, given the fading importance of kinetic tools

such as tanks, ships, and planes. In the event of an am-

biguous attack, it is imperative that NATO is able to

act swiftly, decisively, and in lockstep.

Countering hybrid threats is about improving

initial understanding and using existing capabilities in

an innovative way to face a threat, rather than about

new equipment or weapons systems. In the recent

Wales Summit Declaration, the threat of hybrid war-

fare was duly addressed, acknowledging the importance

of NATO being able to effectively deter and respond to

By Jenny Yang

A ccording to former Russian General

Valery Gerasimov, military action in

the twenty-first century could begin

with groups of troops operating in 'peacetime' with no

official declaration of war. The effectiveness of non-

military means in achieving strategic goals has sur-

passed that of weapons or conventional warfare. In

this new strain of nonlinear warfare, precedence is

given to psychological operations, information war-

fare, and decentralized civil-military combat units

with the objective of lessening reliance on conven-

tional military force. Russian forces could then be

deployed under the guise of domestic militants. In

light of Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine, NATO is

understandably wary of this new ‘Putin Doctrine’,

which casts Russia as the defender of the rights of

Russian speakers. In reference to Russia’s relationship

with Ukraine and Belarus, Putin has asserted that:

“Essentially, we have a common church, a common

spiritual source, and a common destiny.”

The current threat, described as ‘hybrid’, can

vary from the usage of secret services, diplomacy, the

media, proxies as well as provocation. The term hy-

brid warfare was first used after the 2006 Lebanese

war, referring to a form of warfare that blends sub-

version and low-level political violence, usually falling

below the threshold of conventional war. According

to the NATO capstone concept, "Hybrid threats are

those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simulta-

neously employ conventional and non-conventional

means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives." Non-

NextGenerationWarfare:NATOAndTheChallengesOfCounteringHybridThreats


hybrid warfare risks. Measures proposed by NATO fol-

lowing the Wales Summit include: enhancing strategic

communications, incorporating hybrid threats into exer-

cise scenarios, strengthening cooperation between NATO

and other organizations in the form of information shar-

ing, political consultations, and staff-to-staff coordina-

tion. Moreover, the NATO Strategic Communications

Centre of Excellence was opened this January in Latvia.

In addition, situational awareness must be created by

presenting a credible picture of the opponent and his or

her long-term objectives. The public must be given a

clear and unambiguous understanding of the threat as well

as the time scale of any comprehensive campaign. NATO

needs to strengthen command and control, guarantee

resilience and interoperability of cyber-systems, engage in

counter-propaganda and define the role of special forces.

According to Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House,

“having situational awareness, intelligence, being able to

share it quickly is incredibly important.” With accurate

intelligence and a strong command and control, a country

is able to respond quickly to an ambiguous threat. Com-

batting non-linear threats also requires non-linear

measures such as pressuring western governments to en-

act stronger money laundering laws to root out corrupt

funds from Russia.

In what appears as a uniquely twenty-first century

strategy, Russia has proven itself adept at manipulating

information to suit its strategic interests. However, Rus-

sian information warfare is nothing new. Russian infor-

mation warfare theory is based on ‘spetspropaganda’,

which was first taught as a separate subject in 1942 at the

Military Institute of Foreign Languages, being removed

from the curriculum in 1990s only to be reintroduced in

2000. Russian politicians and journalists have often ar-

gued that information warfare is necessary for the so-

called “Russian/Eurasian civilization” to counteract infor-

mational aggression from “the Atlantic civilization led

by the USA.” However, according to professor Mark

Galeotti, this is not a new Cold War with its steadfast

ideological rivalry, but closer to the nineteenth-

century Great Game of imperial rivalry in Central

Asia: "Like the Great Game, the struggles will be

fought using deniable covert actions political misdirec-

tion, economic leverage, propaganda, espionage hack-

ers, mercenary agents, and useful dupes." In today’s

uncertain security environment, it is more important

than ever that NATO remain swift, adaptable, and in-

novative.

Jenny Yang graduated from Queen's University, with

a BAH in Political Studies. She currently works at In-

terpol's headquarters in Lyon, France in the Strategic

Planning Directorate. She was invited by the Atlantic

Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina to attend the 2014

NATO Summer School in the Balkans and has also

studied at the Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon on

the Ontario Rhone-Alpes Scholarship. Jenny has previ-

ously worked as an advisor at an internship for the Em-

bassy of Canada to the Netherlands, in which she pro-

vided support to the Canadian Permanent Representa-

tion for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemi-

cal Weapons (OPCW).

About the author


dialogue and two-way street education. What does collec-

tive defense really mean and what can be done to establish a

mutual understanding in transnational and cross-

generational terms? If our generation’s reality includes lan-

guage courses in Egypt and China, intern-

ships in South Africa and Russia, and jobs

in Japan or Mexico, is Euro-Atlantic and

territorial security really enough? And if

not, implying a greater commitment to

international crisis management and con-

flict resolution, are we willing to invest

political, military, and financial resources

in what seems to be at a first glance the

security of others? The Atlantic Treaty

Association foresaw this issue in the early

90’s and as a response, founded its youth

division, the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association or YATA in

its respective 36 national associations. Since 1996, YATA

has served as a leading international platform for young pro-

fessionals in security and defense,

working alongside our ATA seniors

and fellow youth organizations to en-

sure that young professionals have a

voice in the policy-making world and

direct access to national and interna-

tional officials.

NATO’s Wales Summit was dominat-

ed by the crisis in Ukraine, the subse-

quent collapse of the alliance’s part-

nership with Russia, and a situation

where closing a key chapter of crisis management

(Afghanistan) was nearly overshadowed by a massive securi-

ty and humanitarian crisis on NATO’s Southeastern flanks,

in Syria and Iraq. And yet, other tasks are looming large –

such as providing energy security, adjusting to security (and

By Magdalena Kirchner

W hen NATO’s international and na-

tional leaders talk about the future of

the alliance, they mostly refer to

uncertainties, processes, whose

outcomes are unforeseeable yet, and

to emerging challenges demanding

political and military adjustments.

Much too little, they emphasize the

role of those, who will determine,

how and to what extent NATO can

respond to those challenges and

who really constitute the future of

the alliance. Twenty-five years after

the Berlin Wall fell, nearly a third of

those one billion people, whose

security is an essential priority for NATO, have little or no

actual memory of the Cold War or political repression in

Europe. Growing up in times of peace or distant wars,

NATO’s youth weren’t

familiar with vocabulary

such as deterrence or col-

lective defense until very

recently, and only from

history and political science

classes. Moreover, eco-

nomic uncertainties and

high rates of youth unem-

ployment limit popular

support for increased de-

fense spending and costly military missions especially

among those, whose security might be at stake if the alli-

ance fails to deliver on its promise to protect and defend its

member states. What could be described as a generation

gap within NATO, can only be overcome by increasing

NATO’sfuturetodayarethose

whoshapeittomorrow

Participants of the `Nato‘s Future Seminar‘ (Source German Atlantic Association)

Areva Paronjana and Brigadier Meyer zum Felde

(Source: German Atlantic Association)


political) challenges of the digital era, and integrating NATO’s

crisis management instruments into broader and comprehen-

sive frameworks of conflict solution and post-conflict manage-

ment. In the seminar, we therefore particularly turned to these

questions, as they share one essential feature – the necessity of

NATO to broaden its scope and understanding of which threats

demand our closest attention and how security can be attained

in an era of such uncertainty.

In order to strengthen the transnational as well as the

cross-generational debate on current security issues, the Ger-

man chapter of the Youth Atlantic Treaty Association (YATA)

organized an international seminar on 04 November 2014 as a

side-event of the conference “NATO after the Wales Summit”,

which took place the following day. Bringing together 41

young professionals, scholars, senior experts, and NATO, as

well as government officials, from 16 member and partner

states, the seminar served as a platform for fruitful and enrich-

ing debates during the day. Ever since, it became a forum for

an exchange of ideas and mutual understanding between for-

mer participants.

During the preparation of the sem-

inar, individual members of YATA Ger-

many had been invited in an open call

for panels to suggest three specific de-

bates that should be held during the

seminar. Those who had been selected

took positions as chairs or discussants

on their panels and played an important

role in the selection of speakers and

conceptualization of the discussion.

Thirteen international and thirteen Ger-

man participants were selected in a competitive application

procedure and immediately started to interact with each other

via social media platforms, selected readings, and essays. The

latter, focusing both on the key topics of the seminar (energy

security, cyber security, and crisis management) and the out-

come of the Wales summit, turned out extremely well-written

and were distributed also among the 450 participants of the

main conference the next day. With this special issue, we aim

at taking these important insights to a wider audience and mak-

ing them heard as what they are – genuinely Atlantic Voices.

In his famous Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle said that “one

swallow does not make a summer”. In the same way, hold-

ing one seminar that allows young citizens of NATO mem-

bers and partner countries to debate their own ideas with

senior experts on an eye to eye level, will not suddenly

overcome the generational gap within the alliance. Especial-

ly in times like these, we have to invest in those that will

shape and secure the implementation of its missions, on the

one hand, and take their arguments and considerations seri-

ously, on the other. The most important task, however, is

to maintain a substantial commitment to youth empower-

ment and to assist young voices in becoming an audible and

visible part of NATO’s future.

Dr. Magdalena Kirchner serves as spokeswoman of

YATA Germany and associated board member of the Ger-

man Atlantic Association (GAA) since May 2014. Besides

YATA, she also coordinates the GAA’s transatlantic projects

and the event series “NATO Talk around the Brandenburger

Tor.” In addition, Magdalena works as an editorial journalist

for the Security Policy Reader, jointly published by the Fed-

eral Ministry of Defense and the German Armed Forces as

well as associate fellow of the Transatlantic

Relations Program of the German Council of

Foreign Relations (DGAP), where she works

on Security Politics in the Middle East and U.S.

policy in the region. Magdalena obtains an

M.A. and a PhD in International Relations from

the University of Heidelberg. Until 2013, she

served inter alia as a lecturer at the Institute for

Political Science at the University of Heidel-

berg and as head of the Working Group

"Conflicts in the Middle East and Maghreb" of

the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research.

In 2010 and 2012, she spent several months as a Visiting

Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and

African Studies in Tel Aviv, the International Strategic Re-

search Organisation (USAK), as well as the Center for Mid-

dle Eastern Strategic Studies (ORSAM), both based in Anka-

ra. She is a member of the extended board of Women in

International Security Germany.

Getting started for the workshops

(Source YATA)

About the author


Sandemans New Europe for a “Walk around the

Brandenburger Tor.” Together with tour guide Sam,

the group discovered the political Berlin by foot and

gained fascinating insights on the city that was just

about to celebrate 25 years of the fall of the wall. A

joint lunch at the canteen of the ZDF (Second German

Television) Berlin Studio gave the participants also the

opportunity to take a

glimpse at one of

Germany’s biggest media

outlets, also home of the

famous Mainzelmännchen.

The afternoon session

“NATO and the Challenge

of Cyber Space” was co-

chaired by Dr. Svenja Post

and Alexis Below,

Research Fellows at the

Brandenburg Institute for

Society and Security.

First, Dr. Olaf Theiler,

Head of the Section Future Analysis at the Bundeswehr

Planning Office, stressed the ambivalent nature of the

internet in terms of security. Furthermore, he and his

co-panelist Prof. Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg,

Chair of Public Law at the European University

Viadrina, agreed that the biggest challenge for NATO

regarding cyber security is the endemic attribution

problem. Liina Areng, Head of International Relations

at the Estonian Information System Authority,

maintained that the capabilities to protect

infrastructure against cyber-attacks is unevenly

distributed among its members. Hence, a

comprehensive approach that also includes NATO-EU

cooperation in the field should be pursued.

The concluding panel “NATO Crisis Management

Revisited?”, chaired by Sebastian Feyock, centered on

the question, which lessons could be drawn from the

ISAF mission in Afghanistan and how they could be

integrated into future planning of such missions. Both

By Magdalena Kirchner

O n the eve of the seminar, an

informal get together in central

Berlin helped the participants to get

to know each other and generate a highly amicable

working atmosphere for the upcoming days.

The first panel “NATO

and the Quest for Energy

Security” started after some

introductory remarks by

Y A T A G e r m a n y ’ s

s p o k e s w o m a n , D r .

Magdalena Kirchner, and a

first round of discussion

among the participants.

The debate was moderated

by YATA members

Alexander Schröder,

German Armed Forces,

and Martin Wölfel, Zeppelin University. First, Dr.

Marco Overhaus, Deputy Head of Research Division

“The Americas” (a.i.) of the German Institute for

International and Security Affairs provided the

participants with key insights on the so called Shale

Revolution in the United States and its economic and

security-related implications. Second, Dr. Julijus

Grubliauskas, Energy Security Advisor at NATO’s

Emerging Security Challenges Division, argued that

energy security might be a national issue at a first

glance but is also on NATO’s agenda given its

importance for the security of its members. Finally,

Sebastian Feyock, Program Officer at the German

Council on Foreign Relations, stressed the

importance of energy diversification as a key factor in

decreasing both vulnerability and independence. After

a lively debate on how the member states could and

should boost coordination and cooperation in the field

of energy security, the participants were invited by

NATO’sFutureSeminar

Panel discussion on NATO and the Challenge of Cyber Space

(Source German Atlantic Association)


Dr. Stefan Oswald, head of division Afghanistan/Pakistan

at the Federal Ministry of Cooperation and Development,

and Nicholas Williams, head of the Afghanistan Team at

NATO’s Operations Division, argued that the current

situation in Afghanistan indicates that ISAF has been a

successful mission. The key lesson, however, was that

realistic goals must be set and commitments need to be

sustainable. Tobias Hecht, Senior Project Coordinator at

Transparency International Germany, pointed out that

especially corruption constitutes a major threat to post-

conflict management and hence deserves further attention

also in the planning process. After a full day of

discussions, a conference dinner not only rounded off the

seminar but also constituted a starting point for future

engagements and exchange, both on a personal and

institutional level.

The seminar was co-sponsored by NATO’s Public

Diplomacy Division, the German Atlantic Association,

the Federal Academy for Security Policy, the Press- and

Information Office of the German Federal Government

and Sandemans New Europe Tours.

Maria Mundt Knudsen, Eda Guney, Rowinda Appelman and

Magda Kocianova (Source Rowinda Appekman)

Impressions of the first panel on energy security

Atlantic Voices Special Issue - The Future of NATO

Documents