Slide 1Combinatorial Auction Slide 2 Conbinatorial auction t 1 =20 t 2 =15 t 3 =6 f(t): the set X F with the highest total value the mechanism decides the set of winners…

Slide 1 A Truthful 2-approximation Mechanism for the Steiner Tree Problem Slide 2 The Steiner Tree problem INPUT: Undirected, weighted graph G=(V,E,c) N  V: set of terminal…

Towards a Characterization of Truthful Combinatorial Auctions Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem, Noam Nisan Hebrew University Combinatorial Auctions k indivisible non-identical items…

Algorithms for Selfish Agents Optimal Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Carmine Ventre Joint work with Paolo Penna 1 Routing in Networks s 1 2 3 10 2 1 1 4…

Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information Tim Roughgarden Price of Anarchy in Games of Incomplete Information Alon Ardenboim The players payoffs are common knowledge.…