Slide 1Combinatorial Auction Slide 2 Conbinatorial auction t 1 =20 t 2 =15 t 3 =6 f(t): the set X F with the highest total value the mechanism decides the set of winners…

Slide 1Minimizing Efficiency Loss in Mechanism and Protocol Design Tim Roughgarden (Stanford) includes joint work with: Shuchi Chawla (Wisconsin), Ho-Lin Chen (Stanford),…

Slide 1 A Truthful 2-approximation Mechanism for the Steiner Tree Problem Slide 2 The Steiner Tree problem INPUT: Undirected, weighted graph G=(V,E,c) N  V: set of terminal…

Slide 1 Networks and Games Christos H. Papadimitriou UC Berkeley christos Slide 2 sonoma state, november 6, 20032 Goal of TCS (1950-2000): Develop a mathematical understanding…

Slide 1 Truthfulness and Approximation Kevin Lacker Slide 2 Combinatorial Auctions Goals – Economically efficient – Computationally efficient Problems – Vickrey auction…

Slide 1 Algorithmic Problems in the Internet Christos H. Papadimitriou www.cs.berkeley.edu/~christos Slide 2 Iowa State, April 20032 Goals of TCS (1950-2000): Develop a productive…

Combinatorial Auction A single item auction t1=10 t2=12 t3=7 r1=11 r2=10 Social-choice function: the winner should be the guy having in mind the highest value for the painting…

VCG Computational game theory Fall 2010 by Inna Kalp and Yosef Heskia Mechanisms with money A model for n players: Mechanisms with money – cont. Truthful mechanism: Definition:…

VCG Computational game theory Fall 2010 by Inna Kalp and Yosef Heskia Mechanisms with money A model for n players: Mechanisms with money – cont. Truthful mechanism: Definition:…

A Mechanism Design Approach for the Stabilization of Networked dynamical systems L. Galbusera, N. Gatti, C. Romani Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione – Politecnico…