Slide 1Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders Speaker: Shahar Dobzinski Based on joint works with Noam Nisan & Michael Schapira Slide…

Slide 1Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders – An Overview Speaker: Michael Schapira Based on joint works with Shahar Dobzinski & Noam Nisan Slide 2 2…

Slide 1Truthful Spectrum Auction Design for Secondary Networks Yuefei Zhu ∗, Baochun Li ∗ and Zongpeng Li † ∗ Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto…

Efficiency Levels in Sequential Auctions with Dynamic Arrivals Ron Lavi IE&M The Technion Ella Segev IE&M Ben-Gurion Univ. and Sequential Auctions K identical items.…

Truthful Spectrum Auction Design for Secondary Networks Yuefei Zhu∗, Baochun Li∗ and Zongpeng Li† ∗ Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto †…

Design of Multi-Agent Systems Teacher Bart Verheij Student assistants Albert Hankel Elske van der Vaart Web site http://www.ai.rug.nl/~verheij/teaching/dmas/ (Nestor contains…