8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
1/10
On Humes Is-Ought ThesisDavid C. StoveHume Studies Volume IV, Number 2 (November, 1978), 64-72.
Your use of the HUME STUDIES archive indicates your acceptance of HUMESTUDIES Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.humesociety.org/hs/about/terms.html.
HUME STUDIES Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issueof a journal or multiple copies of articles, andyou may use content in the HUME STUDIES archive only for your personal,non-commercial use.Each copy of any part of a HUME STUDIES transmission must contain thesame copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of suchtransmission.
For more information on HUME STUDIES contact [email protected]
http://www.humesociety.org/hs/
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
2/10
6 4 .
ON HUME'S IS -OUGHT THESIS
The famous t h e s i s o f Hume ab ou t
I l i s "
and "ought"
I
(1) F o r any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t e and any e t h i c a l
s t a t e m e n t h , h i s n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m
e ,
t a k e
t o
be,
as I
b e l i e v e
it
h a s g e n e r a l l y b e e n t a k e n
t o
be:
My o b j e c t i n t h e s e b rS ef n o t es i s n e i t h e r t o d efend n o r
t o
a t t a c k
(l),
b u t j u s t
t o
p o i n t o u t c e r t a i n m is ta k es w hich
have been made,
o r
are ap t t o be made, abou t
(1)
or & o u t
what
Hume ' s
t h e s i s
i s .
"only.
statements
o f f a c t c a n f o l l o w. f ro m statements of fact?:
a t h e s i s , B l ack t h i n k s , w hich P o pp e r an d "many o t h e r p h i l -
o s o p h e r s " l b e l i ev e .
be :
A .
Max
Black has taken Hume's ' thesis
t o
b e t h a t
Tha t
i s ,
Black too k Hume's t h e s i s t o
2 )
F or any f a c t u a l e and any non- f ac tua l h ,
I t i s cer ta in , how ever, t h a t P o pp e r d o es n o t
h is n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m e.
b s l i c v e 2 ) , and
I
hope it
i s
u n t r u e t h a t many o t h e r p h i l -
o s o p h e r s b e l i e v e i t . For 2 )
i s
o b v i o us l y f a l s e , and on
th contrary, c v n r y f a c t u a l s t n t c m c n t has a t l c a s t onc non-
f a c t u a l c on se qu en ce ; s i n c e from any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e nt f ,
t h e S t a t e m e n t
' f
o r n o t - f ' , which i s n o t f a c t u a l ,
i s
deduc-
i b l e . But t h i s l ea v es Hume's t h e s i s (1) u n t o u c h e d , s i n c e
t h e r e
i s
n o ex cu se f o r c o n f u s in g it w i th t h e f o o l i s h
t h e s i s 2 ) .
ment e , t h e n g i v e n
e ,
t h e f a l s i t y of h
i s
p o ss i b l e ; o r i n
o t h e r w or ds , h h a s less t h an maximum p r o b a b i l i t y i n re-
l a t i o n
t o
e.
So
p a r t
a t
l e a s t
o f t h e co n t en t o f Hume's
t h e s i s
(1)
is:
( 3 ) F or any f a c t u a l
e
and e t h i c a l h , P ( h / e ) < l .
S e v e r a l t h i n g s d i s p o s e u s
t o
co n fu s e (3 ) w i t h
B.
I f
a
s t a t em en t h
i s
n o t d e d u c i b l e f rom a
s t a t e -
an o t h e r p ro p o s i t i o n w h i ch
i s
r e a l l y q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from it,
and which
it i s
i m p o r t a n t n o t t o cDnfuse wi th it. T h i s i s
t h e p r o po s i t i o n :
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
3/10
65.
4 ) For any
e l
a n y f a c t u a l
e
and any e t h i c a l
To g r a s p t h e d i f f e r e n c e betw een
(3 )
and
4 )
, h e
h , P ( h / e ' . e ) = P ( h / e ' ) .
b e s t way
i s
t o c o n s i d e r t h e i r a n a l o gu e s, where t h e arguments
from
e
t o
h
are
n o t f a c t u a l - t o - e t h i c a l a rg um e nt s, b u t i n -
s t e a d
are
i n d u c t i v e ones : t h a t
i s ,
arguments from observed
t o u no bs er ve d i n s t a n c e s o f e m p i r i c a l p r e d i c a t e s .
The indu c t iv e ana logue o f ( 3 ) i s :
(5)
f o r any e and h such t h a t t h e argument f rom
e
t o h
i s
i n d u c t iv e , P ( h / e ) c l .
Now t h i s
i s
s imply a judgm ent o f n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y , o r o f
non-maximal probabi l i ty . I t s a y s , o f any i n d u c t i v e
argu-
ment, j u s t t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n
t o
t h e p re m is s
e ,
t h e f a l s i t y
o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n h
i s
p o s s i b l e .
( 5 )
,
t h e r e f o r e ,
a s s e r t s
n o more t h a n t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f e v e ry i n d u c t i v e a rgument.
With
( 5 )
,
co n s eq u en t l y , ev e ry o n e
w i l l
ag ree .
F or t h e i n d u c t i v e an al og ue o f
4 1 , it w i l l be
simp-
l e s t , and s u f f i c i e n t ,
t o
c o ns id e r t h e s p e c i a l case where e '
i s
t a u t o l o g i c a l . .
Here,
w r i t i n g
t
f o r
some
t a u t o l og y , t h e
ana logue
i s :
( 6 ) For any e and h such t h a t t h e a rgument f rom
e
t o h
i s
i n d u c t i v e , P ( h / t . e ) = P ( h / t ) .
Now t h i s i s n o t
a
judgment
of
n o n - d e d u c i b i l i t y , b u t
a
pro-
p o s i t i o n o f t h e k i n d which K eynes a p t l y c a l l e d
a
judgment
o f i r r e l e v a n c e .
I t
s a y s , o f any in d u c t i v e ar g u ne n t , t h a t
i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e p re m is s
e
co n j o i n ed w i t h a. t au t o i o g y ,
t h e f a l s i t y o f t h e c o nc lu s i on h
i s
no l e s s p r o b a b l e , o r
more, than it
i s
i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e t au to lo gy a lo ne . Hence,
whereas
( 5 )
i s a t h e s i s of i n d u c t i v e f a l l i b i l i s m r e r e l y ,
( 6 ) i s a t h e s i s o f i nd u ct iv e s c e p t i c i s n j f o r it s a y s , i n t e r
a h a t i n d u c t i v e e v id e nc e n e v e r
r a i s e s
t h e p r o b a b i l i t y
of
a
hypo thes i s above
i t s
v al ue p r i o r
t o
a l l
e x p e r i e n c e ,
or
i n r e l a t i o n t o
a
t au to lo g y. With t h i s t h e s i s , u n l ik e
(5)
few
w i l l
ag re e1 al tho ug h Hume ma in tai ne d
a
s c e p t i c a l t h es i s
ab o u t i n d u c t i o n wh ich , i f I h av e e l s e w he r e i n t e r p r e t e d him
r i g h t l y 1 2 was p r e c i s e l y
(6).
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
4/10
65.
Th e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n
( 5 )
slid ( 6 ) should now be
manifes t , .
Well,
t h e d i f f e r e n c e b et we en ( 3 ) and
4 ) above
is
c x o c t l y t h c
samc;
on1.y
more
so,
s i n c e
4 )
asserts
t h e
i r r e l e v a n c e o f f a c t u a l s t o e t h i c a l s , n o t i r e l a t i o n t o
t a u t o l o g i c a l . e only, b u t t o any 0 .
What are t h e th in g s which di:;posc us t o co n fu s e 3 )
w i t h 4 ; ? One i s t h e c u r r e n c y o f vay.~c?phrases s i l ch as th3
autonomy
of
e t h i c s " . F o r t h e ju dg me nt
of
i r r e l e v a n c e
4 )
h a s a t l e a s t
as
good
a
c l a im as t he judgment of non-deduci-
b i l i t y
( 3 ) ,
t o
b e d e s c r i b e d
as
a s s e r t i n g t h e autononty
of
e t h i c s . A no th er t h i n g which l i n k s ( 3 )
t o
4 ) i n some minds
i s ' t h e c u r r c n c y
of
t h e t h e s i s
o f
deduc t iv i sm:
7 ) F o r
any
e and h , i f P (h /e )
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
5/10
67 .
case 4a ) of a ) , i f , as I have olsewhsxe t r i e d to show , h?
m a i nt a in s t h e d e d u c t i v i s t 7 ) ,
as
well as 3 ) . For t h e s e
roasoi i s i t will bc: wor thwhi le t o show t h a t ( 4 a ) , l i k e i t s
i n d u c t i v e a na lo g ue
6 )
,
can b e v er y . e a s i l y r e f u t e d ; and
hence
t h a t
4 ) t o o i s false.
6
Th e g e n e r a l con j u n c t i o n - p r i n c i p l e o f p r o b a b i l i t y i s :
8 )
( 9 ) I f P ( q / p . r) = ? ( q / r ) ther. P ( p / q . r) = P ( p / r ) .
r ( p . q / r ) = P ( p / r ) x P ( q /p . r )= P ( q / r ) x P ( p / q . r ) .
Prom t h i s it f o l lo w s t h a t :
T L i s
s a y s t h a t i f , i n r e i a t i c n t o
r ,
p
i s
( i n K e yn es 's
s en se ) i r r e l e v a n t to., t h en , i n r e l a t i o n t o
r , q
i s a l s o
i r r e l e v a n t t o p. I n s h o r t , irrelevaiice i n r e l a t i o n t o 1 is
symmet r i ca l .
Now
4 4
asser t s
t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n t o
a t it-
ology, any f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t i s i r r e l e v a n t : t 9 any
ethics '
one. I f t h i s were t r u e , t h e n t he syrr.met?y of
irrelevance
(9) would ensure t h a t c o n v e r s e l y ,
i n
r e l i ? t ion Lo t a u t -
o l o gy , any e t h i c a l s t a t em e n t
i s
i r r e l e v a n t
t ~ /
iip
r dct1Jnl
one.
But
t h a t i s n o t so. W r i t i n g as b c f o r e t f o r
z c i k
t a u t o l o g y , i t is t r u e t h a t
B u t
it is
a l s o
t r u e t h t
10)
P ( S o c r a t e a
i s
a man/t)
e l .
(11) P ( S o c r a t e s i s
a nien/Socratcs
is
good man.
t) l.
Whence t h e e t h i c a l ' ' S oc r a te s is
.a
good
m s n
i s
nor
i r r e l c -
van=, b u t on t h a cc jntrary fav ou rab ly re.'.cvant to
t.he f a c t ; . d
" S o c r a t c s
is
a man", i n r e l a t i o n t o
a t a u t o l o y y . so 4 . 3 )
i s f a l se . Hence a f o r t i o r i 4 ) i s f a l s e .
D.
(1)
and ( 3 ) a re n o n - d c d u c i b i l i t y t h e s e s , and
are
c o n t r o v e r s i a l . I.Iany o t h e r n o n -d e d uc i b il i ty t h e s e s ,
however,
a r e
n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l , a nd e v en obv ious . For
example ,
the
t h e s i s t h a t ' u n d i s t r i b u t e d middle :
13
a
fa:-
lacy :
( 1 2 ) F o r a n y l o g i c a l l y - i n d e p e n d e n t
? re%ca te s
F and G I P ( x is F/A11 F are G.x i s
G ) < 1 .
Another exmiple i s i n d u c t i v e f a l l i b i l i s r c (5) above. A n o 3 1 ~
i s Hume s " t h e r e car. b e no d e m on s tr a ti v e a r g w e n t s f o r a
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
6/10
6 8 .
m a tt er o f f a c t" ; t h a t i s ,
(1 3) F o r any n eces s a ry t r u t h e an d any co n t i n g en t
A n o th e r n o n - d ed u c i b i l i t y t h e s i s which seems o bv i o u s
h, h i s n o t d ed u c i b l e f ro m
e .
t o m e , and which
w i l l , I
t h i n k ,
seem so t o
o t h e r s as
w e l l ,
i s :
( 1 4 )
For any l o g i c a l t r u t h e and any e t h i c a l h ,
h
i s
n o t d e d u c i b l e f r o m
e .
I f ( 1 4 ) were f a l s e t he n e t h i c s , o r p a r t o f it a t l e a s t ,
would be s imply
a
b ra n ch o f l o g i c 1 so t h a t e t h i c a l disputes-
f o r example , abou t h , "Abor tion i s wrong" could
sometimes
be d e c i s i v e l y s e t t l e d s im ply by f i n d i n g o u t t h a t h ,
o r
i t s
n e g a t i o n ,
i s
among t h e theorems of lo g i c . I t seems ob-
v i o u s t h a t t h i s
i s
an i d l e f a n t a sy .
But now, a judgment o f n o n - d e d u c ib i l i ty , i f t r u e ,
i s t r u e n o t i n v i r t u e o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f any s ta t e m e nt t o
t h e a c t u a l u ni v er se ; b u t j u s t i n v i r t u e of t h e r e l a t i o n
be tween the
t w o
s ta te me nt s which t h e judgment of non-
d ed u c i b i l i t y m en ti on s . Hence
a
j u d g n s n t o f n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y ,
i f t r u e , i s
a
l c g i c a l t r u t h .
l o g i c a l t r u t h s . And t h e n , i n view of ( 1 4 1 , it f u r t h e r
f o l l o w s t h e t t h e s e n o n - d e d u c ib i l i ty t h e s e s o f H u m e , f
t r u e , ha ve n o e t h i c a l c on se qu en ce s. I n s h o r t ,
I t f ol lo ws t h a t (1) an d ( 3 ) zihovs, i f t r u e , are
( 1 5) F or any e t h i c a l h , h i s n o t d e d uc i b le
from
(1):
and
( 1 5 ' ) F or any e t h i c a l h , h
i s
n o t d e d u c i b l e f r o m
These conc lus ions a re i m p o r t a n t , b ec au se b e l i e f s
( 3 ) .
i n c o n s i s t e n t w it h them are widespread . A few years ago I
r ead i n an u n d e rg rad u a t e e s s ay words
t o
t h i s e f f e c t ,
( u n f o r t u n a t e l y
I
d id n o t make a copy of t h e
exact
w o rd s ) :
"S ince no
e t h i c a l
s ta te me nt c an be deduced from
a
f a c t u a l
one , it f ol lo ws t h a t
w e
can do what w e l i k e . " Now c l e a r l y ,
t h e secon d "can " h e r e w a s a n e t h i c a l one: we
can do
what
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
7/10
69.
we
l i k e "
was a
v e r s i o n of t h e ' u n i v e r s a l p e rm i ss i on '
:
(16) Anyth ing
i s
m o r a l l y p e r m i s s i b l e .
And ( 1 6 ) i s c l e a r l y an e t h i c a l s t a t e me n t ; i nd ee d, it
i s
o n l y
an extreme
e x p r e s s i o n
of
an e t h i c a l a t t i t u d e which h a s
r e c e n t l y b e en q u i t e common i n t h e
w e s t , G.
l i b e r a l i s m
o r
p e r m i s s i v e n e s s .
I n b e l i e v i n g t h a t (1) e n t a i l s (16)., t h i s s t u d e n t ,
i n
view of
(15 ) , w a s wrong. But h e
er red
i n go od,
o r
a t
any
r a t e
numer ous, company. F o r
it
h a s b ee n q u i t e w i de l y
be l i eved ,
or a t l e a s t va gue l y f e l t , t h a t Hume's non-deduc-
i b i l i t y t h e s i s
(1) does
h a v e ( 1 6 )
as a
consequence .
I t
i s
i n th is way, I be l i eve , t h a t i n t h e west i n t h i s c e nt ur y ,
Hume's ph i l o so phy ha s h e l p e d t o b r i n g a b ou t t h e loss of
moral c onf i de nc e wh i c h
i s
e x p r e s s e d i n ( 16 ) a nd w hi ch i s
o n e a s p e c t
of
t h e phenomenon
of
"modern nervousness" .
S i nc e 1965 , e t h i c a l l i b e r a l i s m ha s be e n
t o a
c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t r e p l ac e d
i n
t h e
w e s t
b y t h e e t h i c a l
f a n a t i c i s m
of
l e f t - r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . Some o f t h e s e r e v o l u t -
i o n a r i e s r e j e c t Hume's (1) b e c a u s e t h e y r e j e c t t h e l i b c r a l
( 1 6 ) .
T h i s s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e y s h a r e w i t h nany l i b e r a l s t h e
e rr on eo us b e l i e f t h a t
(1)
e n t a i l s ( 16 ) .
7
I
h av e m ai nt ai ne d i n e f f e c t t h a t :
(17 ) Fo r any e t h i c a l h , P ( h / ( l ) ) < l ,
(17 ) For any e t h i c a l h , P ( h / ( 3 ) )< 1 .
and
t ha t :
But I w ou ld go much f u r t h e r t h a n t h e s e
mere
n o n - d e d u c i b i l i t y
t h e s e s . I t seems t o
m e
o bv io us t h a t t h e f o l l o w in g i r r e l e -
vance t h e s i s
i s
t r u e :
(18 ) F o r a ny
e l ,
any l o g i c a l t r u t h
e and
any
e t h i c a l h , P ( h / e ' . e ) = P(h/ .e ' ) .
I f
so,
t h e n s i n c e ,
again,
(1)
and
(3)
are
l o g i c a l t r u t h s
i f
t r u e , it follows
t h a t :
P ( h / e ' ) ;
( 19 ) F o r a ny
e l
and any e t h i c a l h , P (h /e ' . (1)
and
t h a t
( 1 9 )
F or a ny
e '
and any
e th i ca l
h , P ( h / e ' . ( 3 ) ) =
P ( h / e ' ) .
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
8/10
70
That
i s , Hume s
n o n -d ed u c i b i l i t y
theses
(1) and 3 ) n o t only
h a v e
no c t h i c a l s t a t cme n t s among
t h e i r
consequences , bu t
a r e e ven i r r e l e v a n t t o e ve ry
e t h i c a l
s t a t em en t .
phi losophy
I
t a ke t o be:
T h i s t h e s i s h as
sometimes
b ee n h e l d i n c o n j un c t io n w i t h (I),
i f ,
n d eed , t h e
two
ha ve n o t b een t h ou g ht t o b e p o s i t i v e l y
connec ted i n
some
way. For t h i s reason
it
w i l l be worth-
whi le t o p o i n t o u t t h a t (1) i s i n co n s i s t e n t w i t h non-
co g n i t i v i s m ( 2 0 ) .
e,
t hen
i f c is n o t
s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y , t h e n
t h e
conjunct icn
of e with not -h
i s
n o t s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . Where e is
f a c t y a l , i t i s no t se l f -c on t r ad ic to ry . Hence
i f h
i s
n o t
deducible from
a
f a c t u a l s t at e me n t
e,
then e-and-not-h i s
n o t s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; w h e n c e . i t
i s
p o s s i b l e f o r e t o be
t r u e and h fa l se . Hence i f (1)
i s
t r u e , t h en , w h e rev e r e
i s
f a c t u a l and
h
i s e t h i c a l ,
it
i s p o s s i b l e f o r e
t o be
t r u e and
h f a l s e .
I f it
is poss ib l e
f o r e t o be t r u e and
h f a l s e , t h en i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r h t o be f a l s e . I f it. i s
p o s s i b l e for h t o be f a l s e ,
it
i s pos.s ible for it t o be
f a l s e or t rue . Hence i f 1) i s t r u e th en it i s p o s s i b l e
f o r a n e t h i c a l s ta te me nt
t o
be
f a l s e
o r t r u e ; t h a t
i s , (20)
is f a l s e .
E. The
t h e s i s
of ' non-cogn i tiv ism ' i n moral
(20) E t h i c a l s t a t e me n t s c an no t b e t r u e or fa l se .
I f
a
s ta tement h is n o t deduc ib l e from a s t a t em en t
'Theses
(1)
and 2 0 ) are i n c o n s i s t e n t , t he n ,
a t
l e a s t
i f
i n (1) t h e words
"h
is n o t d ed u c i b l e from e "
t h e i r
u s u a l s en s e :
t h e
s e n s e , t h a t is, t h a t it i s p o s s i b l e
for
e
t o
be
t r u e
and
h
f a l s e . Y e t
I
am
n o t s u r e t h a t
t h i s
i t a l i c i s e d addendum
i s
really needed here . For i f
it
i s ,
then a
s i m i l a r
addendum would be needed wherever t w o
s ta te -
ments
are
asser ted t o
be
i n co ns i s t e n t . (Evcn "not -p", after
a l l ,
i s n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
p ,
u n l e s s t h e word "not"
h a s
i t s usu al scns e.) And t h i s consequence seems absurd.
main ta in (11, as long as h e a t t a c h e s a s u f f i c i e n t l y ur.usual
S t i l l ,
one who su bs cr ib es t o (20) can c o n s i s t e n t l y
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
9/10
71.
s e n s e
t o
"h
i s
n o t d e d u c i b l e f rom el'. B ut by a d o p t i ng t h i s
c o u r s e a n o n - c o g n i t i v i s t , w h i l e h e a vo i ds i n c o ns i s t e n c y ,
i n c u r s a n o t h e r d i s a d va n t a g e . T h i s
i s
t h a t h e no l o n g er
a f f i r m s , by a f f i r m i n g (1)
,
w h a t most n a t u r a l i s t s have
d e n i e d by d e n y in g it: f o r t h e y h av e t h o u g h t . t h a t some
e t h i c a l
s ta tements
are d e d uc i b le from f a c t u a l on es , i n t h e
u s u a l s e n s e
of
"deducible" .
i b i l i t y
or
o t he r w is e of e t h i c a l s t a te m e n ts f rom f a c t u a l
o ne s , f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s a r e d e du c i b l e f rom e t h i c a l o n es ,
i n t h e u s ua l sense
of
"de duci b le " . (Such exampl es as t h e
d e d u c i b i l i t y
of
" S o c r a t e s i s a
man
from " S o c r a t e s i s a
good
m a n
show t h i s . ) And t h i s f a c t w i l l n o t be e a s y t o
r e c o n c i l e w i t h n o n - c o g n i t i v i s m 2 0 ) .
e s i d e s , w h a t e v e r t h e t r u t h may b e a b o u t t h e d educ-
D. C. S t o v e
D ep ar tm en t o f T r a d i t i o n a l a n d
Modern Ph i losophy ,
U n iv e r s i ty o f S ydney.
1.
2.
3 .
4 .
5.
T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s
are
fro m p.99 o f Hudson ( ed .) The
I s -O u gh t Q u e s t io n , ( Macm i ll an , 1 9 6 1) , where
B l a F s
a r t i c l e , o r i g i n a l l y
i n
The Ph i. l os oph ic a1 Review
,
1964,
i s r e p r i n t e d .
See my P r o b a b i l i t y aild Hu r n e ' s I n d u c t i v e S c e p t i c i s m
( r e f e r r e d
t o
h e r e a f t e r
a s
P r o b a b i l i t y )
,
O .U . P .
,
1 9 7 3 ) ,
c h s .
1
-
4 .
P r o b a b i l i t y , ch . 6 , s e c t i o n ( i v ) .
Moore
s a y s , f o r exam ple , t h a t it i s co m m i t t in g th e
n a t u r a l i s t i c f a l l a c y
t o
h o l d t h a t f rom a f a c t u a l s t a t e -
ment we can i n f e r , or o b t a i n c o n f i rm a t i o n f o r " , an
e t h i c a l s t a t e m e n t . Aga ln , he s a y s t h a t an e t h i c a l ,
s t a t e m e n t " c an n ot b e r ed u ce d t o any a s s e r t i o n & o u t
r e a l i t y , and t h e r e f o r e m ust
remain
u n a f f e c t e d by" a ny
s u c h a s s e r t i o n . ( P r i n c i p i a Z t h i c a , p. 1 1 4 . I t a l i c s
n o t i n t e x t i n
e i t h e r case.)
M r . R. F. A tk i ns o n, ( i n
a
v a l u a b l e
a r t i c l e
i n The P h i l -
o s o p h i c a l Review, 1961, r e p r i n t e d
i n
t h e Hudson volume
r e f e r r e d t o i n f o o t n o t e 1 above); b u t ev en he s u g g e s t s
what i s
f a l s e ,
t h a t 4 ) e n t a i l s ( 3 ) .
8/10/2019 Stove v4n2
10/10
72 .
6 .
7.
P r o b a b i l i t y , c h . 3 ,
T hi s e f f e c t o f (1)
when
Moore
r e v i v e d
s e c t i o n ( i v )
,
and ch .4 ,
i s
a l l t h e more c u r i o u s
t h i s Humean t h e s i s , i t s
s e c t i o n ( v ) . .
because .
f i r s t e f f e c t
was r a t h e r t o i nc re as e moral c o n f id e n c e . T h e t o n o m y
of e t h i c s ,
in fhe
form of 1)
was
c l e a r l y . t ho ug ht
o f ,
by Moore and t h e o t h e r i n t u i t i o n i s t s , as s e t t i n g t h e i r
own e t h i c a l knowledge, for t h e f i r s t
time,
on s o l i d
ground. Only l a t e r d i d (1) come
t o
be though t of as
i m p l y i n g t h a t athlcal 'knowledge'
is
ground les s .