Public Transit 101
• Who is Steve Munro?– Transit activist/advocate since 1972– Jane Jacobs Prize Winner 2005– Transit blogger since 2006 (www.stevemunro.ca)
• What is this webinar about?– Policy decisions for planning, building, operating and
funding public transit– What are the options?– Thinking beyond the sound bite– Thinking beyond the coming municipal election
What is Transit’s Purpose?
• Context defines the debate– Do you see transit users as “us” or “them”?– Is your goal to minimize cost or maximize
service?
• Transit has value and benefits for the city– Mobility is a public right and service– Environmental and land use benefits– Avoidance of 2nd and 3rd cars in households– Enables access to jobs, school, recreation
Networks Are Important
• People do not travel on one route, they use a network• TTC is designed around transferring• Artificial boundaries exist between transit agencies
– Service territory– Regional vs Local services– Direct rides vs forced transfers
• Grid vs hub-oriented services
– Fare structures– Conflicting philosophies of purpose and quality of transit– Schemes for change address perceived problems of existing
arrangements, but don’t necessarily built the ideal network
Building a Network
• Past planning limited by funding– Pick one line for this decade– Political rivalry trumps best planning choices– No view of end-state network because even a
staged completion is too remote– Limitations of political and economic cycles on
the planning and funding horizon
Project vs Network Analysis
• Looking at a project in isolation misses the connections and the larger effects– Typically done this way because nobody expects more than one
project to be completed
• Example: Richmond Hill Subway Extension– Effect on demand on Yonge Subway
• Heroic efforts needed to handle new ridership• New, more sophisticated signal system• Many more trains (plus crews, carhouses, maintenance)• Stations cannot handle added load (Bloor-Yonge)
– Need to review alternative, concurrent changes to see which provide the best combined solution
• GO• New downtown subway line
A City of Networks
• TTC Surface System (grid)• TTC Subway System (core-focused, but
supports grid and off-peak travel)• GO Rail System (radial, mainly peak-period)• GO Bus System (feeders and some routes
across the grid)• Transit City (reinforce the grid outside the core)• Metrolinx (mixture of radial and node-to-node)• Much is planned, but little is built
TTC• Surface grid network with all-day service on almost all lines• Rapid transit supports the grid but is core-focussed
GO Transit• Rail system is mainly peak direction, peak period, core
oriented• Poor local connections for other trip types• Under 20% of all riders use bus routes
Metrolinx Regional Plan• Mixture of radial and node-to-node lines• Challenge of serving diffuse travel in the GTA
Toronto Transit City Plan• Support the grid and extend major transit services
throughout the city• Included in Metrolinx Plan
Toronto is Two Cities
• The Transit City– Service is nearby, frequent, fairly reliable– Trips are fairly short– A “transit lifestyle” without a car, or with minimal car
use, is possible
• The Auto City– Longer walks to service, longer waits for buses– Longer trips are more sensitive to delays caused by
service and by connections– Weather is a greater factor
The “Transit City” Within Toronto
• Generally formed of areas close to the subway and downtown – mainly the “old” city
• Rapid transit has pushed into “new” territory, but with a different form (widely spaced stations, dependence on feeders and parking, hostile pedestrian environments)
• Decline in urban route reliability affects transit’s ability to support a transit lifestyle
• Pushing the boundary outward needs more than transit changes
The Auto City Beyond Toronto
• Transit mode share is much lower in the 905 than in Toronto
• Service is heavily oriented to peak travel, especially to feeding GO for commuter trips to downtown
• Design philosophy is “drive to transit”– Metrolinx “Big Move” requires a fundamental change
in the role of suburban transit– Shift to “Mobility Hubs”, transit feeders, cycling and
walking– Even with these changes, a “transit suburb” is unlikely
to form soon
The Three Cities Conundrum• Best transit serves most affluent riders• Planning focus easily pulled to 905 commuters rather
than inside-416 demands
Transit Service Quality• “Good enough” is not good enough• Transit must hold and attract riders rather than being resented as a second
choice– Reliability
• Show up when expected– Frequency
• Waiting should not pose an obstacle• Waits should be predictable• Service is adequate to provide reasonable comfort
– Connectivity• Simple transfers• Network that multiple travel patterns beyond core area commuting
– Cleanliness• Riders feel the system cares about itself
– Customer Service• Information about both regular and unexpected events is available and up-to-date• Staff treat passengers well, and are well-treated by their management• Riders are both customers and the source of political/funding support
Off-Peak Service is Important
• Transit is more than a commuter service– Off peak riding on TTC is greater than peak (about
60% of all rides)– Wider options for times and types of trips– Better utilization of transit infrastructure and staff– Reduces dependence on autos for peak travel– Land use can affect viability of off peak service by
limiting demand
• Fundamental differences in transit’s role in the 416 and the 905 (including GO)
Rivalry for Road Space
• Do roads exist mainly to move cars or to move people?
• What is your priority for users?– Transit / Pedestrians / Cycling– Driving lanes / Parking
• If we take space away from cars, is this “good planning” or “a war on cars”?
• Approach will vary depending on the neighbourhood and the type of street
• Conflict between people passing through and people living in neighbourhoods
Transit Financing
• Three major budget areas– Capital (State of Good Repair)
• Examples: maintain infrastructure, replace vehicles
– Capital (Expansion)• Major new facilities: subways, LRT, commuter rail
route and capacity expansion
– Operations• Day to day service plus routine maintenance
Capital (State of Good Repair)
• Funding from a variety of sources at City, Provincial and Federal Levels– Gas taxes– Time-limited programs– City makes up the shortfall for TTC
• Some is borrowed, some is capital-from-current
– TTC total is about $400-million annually and growing
– Mainly provincial money for GO with some contributions from municipal level
Capital (Expansion)
• Each project gets its own funding• Substantial political and “process” overhead to get
agreement and approval for each project• Funding shares vary by project• Spadina Subway extension (4 partners)• Transit City (Mainly provincial with federal money on
Sheppard East; provincial funding uncertain due to budget problems)
• GO Transit (All provincial)• Metrolinx “Investment Strategy” for sustained funding
– Future operating budget implications of network expansion
Operating
• TTC fares cover about 70% of total budget (roughly $890-million out of $1.4-billion)– A small amount of revenue comes from advertising and rentals
($50-million)– City covers the remainder ($440-million)
• GO fares cover about 78% of total budget (roughly $301m out of $387m)– Subsidy comes from province
• Other cities and countries typically have much higher subsidies, and transit is viewed more as a public service
• Profitable systems are located in dense cities where transit is the only option. Subsidies may flow through other paths such as real estate revenue.
Fares
• Many schemes/philosophies for fare structures– Flat fare (e.g. TTC)– Time based fare (“two hour transfer” or limited use
pass)– Distance based fare (zones or mileage)– Concession fares (class of rider)– Bulk discounts (weekly, monthly flat rates)
• What is the purpose of the fare structure?– What kind of travel should it support/encourage?
Fare Collection
• Collecting fares costs money– Media distribution, cash handling, electronic system operation
and maintenance
• All-door boarding vs pay-enter– Cost of service delays and lost vehicle capacity vs need for
roving fare inspectors
• Evolution of media– Tickets, tokens, cash– Magnetic strips (tickets, swipe cards)– Stored value card– Smart card
• Proprietary vs “Open” systems
• Technology should enable a fare policy, not dictate it
Regional Financing Issues• Fare consolidation and elimination of boundaries requires a revenue
sharing agreement.– Do we attempt to maintain a 70% revenue target as services increase
into less profitable areas?• If fares are reduced for short trips (e.g. just across a border), should
they be increased for long trips?– What are the implications for trips from the outer 416 (the “third” city)?– Average TTC trip is about 10km.
• Substantial increases in commuting traffic by transit are “good”, but growth in GO train traffic requires much better local transit as feeder/distributor systems in the 905.
• Who pays for upgrades within the 416 triggered by growth in transit travel from the 905?
• How should growth in capital and operating costs be funded?
Challenges for Public Transit
• Quality of transit service vs funding• The political will to shift the auto/transit balance
on roads• Customer service• Financial integration and fare structure across
the GTA• Long term funding stability and system planning• Interagency and intergovernmental relations• Confidence in transit’s ability to provide an
alternative to auto travel and absorb a substantial proportion of growing travel demand
Other Topics for Discussion
• Transit as a planning tool– Will politicians actually shape land use?
• Governance– Politicians or “Experts”?– Open or closed access?– Local or provincial control?
• Alternative revenue sources (taxes, tolls)• Labour Relations• Private Sector Involvement
Transit as a Planning Tool• Toronto Official Plan assumes almost all travel growth will be on
transit– Much population growth will be in areas that do not have rapid transit
today– Redevelopment of underused industrial and commercial lands in the
suburbs– Good transit reduces the need for car ownership, road space and
parking– Development form should be pedestrian oriented both for
neighbourhood quality and easy transit access• Political will to shape development around transit is weak
– Existing pattern is car-centric and the development industry wants more of the same
– Problem is bad in the 905, but not unknown in the 416 because transit lags rather than leads
– Waterfront is potentially a “downtown suburb”
A Long Term Planning View
• Planners alone cannot defend the long-term view• Politicians must embrace ongoing support for transit
– Fix tomorrow’s problems, don’t just patch up yesterday’s complaints
– Build a consensus that transit expansion and mobility are essential
– Make plans election-proof by treating transit as an essential part of public services, not an “extra” that can only be afforded in good times
– Ensure transit plans survive economic cycles• Plans go back 50 years or more, but very little has been
built because the political and economic cycles are shorter than the study-approve-fund-design-build cycle for major transit facilities
Transit Governance
• TTC is a separate corporation from the City, but is owned and controlled by it through Council appointments to the Board– 9 Commissioners are all Council members– City influences policy through budget review of
subsidies and planning review for major projects
• In the 905, transit is generally managed by committees of local Councils and is not a separate corporation
• Metrolinx/GO is a Provincial agency with a board appointed by Cabinet
TTC Commissioners
• TTC Board was once all “citizens”, not politicians• Prominent members of the business community• The Board evolved into a home for politicians-in-waiting,
defeated candidates and the well-connected– Politicians without accountability
• Council ended this practice when the TTC strayed into business activities beyond running a transit system
• TTC controls annual budgets of $1.4b (operating), $400m (capital) plus expansion projects (Spadina Subway Extension is $2.6b)
• Large public spending requires transparent public oversight
Metrolinx Board
• “Metrolinx I” (2007) was mainly a political Board with regional Chairs and Mayors, and a minority of non-politicians
• “Metrolinx II” (2009) has no politicians; most members do not have a transit or planning background
• Almost all Metrolinx decisions are taken in private with only pro-forma public discussion of some issues
• No mechanism for public interaction with the Board or challenge to its actions
• Fundamentally different philosophy of accountability and transparency compared with the municipal sector
Who Should Run Transit?
• Politicians or “Experts”?– Actual experience suggests that “experts” will not be the primary
source for board members
• Local or Provincial control?– Local bodies understand local concerns– Who is paying?– Who represents the riders?
• Open or closed access– Municipal agencies are open by law– Provincial agencies are closed– Requirements for a large-scale planning exercise (the Regional
Plan) are completely different than for ongoing operations where customer and citizen involvement are essential
Alternative Revenue Sources• Who should pay?
– General levy vs targeted tolls/taxes– Gas tax, road tolls and congestion fees only hit motorists (and consumers
indirectly through shipping costs)– Should motorists bear the full cost of building and supporting transit?– What happens in a future world of expensive energy and falling auto use?– Why should those whose travel is unlikely to be aided by transit expansion bear
the cost of funding transit construction and operation?• General revenue (all Provincial tax sources) may be constrained by
competing demands• Sales taxes are a common approach in other regions as a transit funding
source– Everybody pays– Good transit is a benefit to businesses as well as people– “World class cities” have good transit networks– Predictable funding that grows with the economy
Alternative Revenue Sources (2)
• Development charges– Funds are generated from new development and from
corridor-specific taxes– Development takes a long time and the initial public
investment may not be repaid from this source– Parts of some corridors are not suitable for new
development (parks, public institutions, stable residential/commercial areas)
– Why should lands along a corridor pay for transit capacity serving people who move through it from other areas?
Labour Relations• TTC labour relations are a classic “us vs them” situation with rigid
management and unions• Both parties have a bad understanding of the effect of poor labour relations
on the quality of their “product” and on public support for their services• Political/media environment is anti-union, values “gotcha” journalism, and
inflames both the riding public and the organization• Need to distinguish between problems inherent with “unions” and those of
the organization generally– TTC has a long history of always blaming someone/something outside of the
organization– Problems don’t exist, only “fault” for causing them– Finger-pointing takes precedence over finding solutions
• Should the TTC be an “essential service”?– Not a life-threatening situation like police, fire, health care– No guarantee of labour peace (work to rule may disrupt service)– Costs are typically higher for essential service workers through arbitration– Is this designation seen as a way to ensure service or to punish the union?
Outsourcing
• Private sector sounds good in theory, but this presumes an experienced, altruistic service provider
• Contract management is not simple– All expectations, criteria must be defined up front– Potential for cost creep through change requests– Unplanned future costs due to poor contract definition and
demands for additional funding– Contract management becomes a new function within the
“public” transit agency– Lack of transparency in political oversight due to “commercial
confidentiality”– Policy discussions may take place in private without public
review or input
Outsourcing (2)
• Competition as a cost limiter– Actual experience is that small companies consolidate into large
ones giving the private operators the upper hand in negotiations– Rapid transit systems are too expensive for small companies to
run, and these are typically taken on by consortia or large companies
• The system cannot be allowed to fail– Contractor may demand additional payments for claimed extras– Contractor may fail to provide all expected services and
presume cost of litigation or penalties will not be pursued by the City
– In the worst case, contractor may walk away (example: London, UK)
• No guarantee of strike-free operation